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APPLIED TO RETAIL BANKS IN ENGLAND AND THE NETHERLANDS (1830-2007)
What is the relation between participation in democratisation dynamics and firms’
success? The ability to take a leading role in democratic settlements largely shapes a firm’s
long term success. A key requirement to occupying such a leading role is the creation of a
platform for the execution of rivalling democratisation dynamics by customers, stake -
holders, and political actors. After careful analysis of the strategies followed by commer cial
and mutual banks in the Netherlands and England from the 19th century to 2007, I
conclude that, in general, firms’ success depends on six strategic abilities – conducive to a
settlement between rivalling dynamics of democratisation. A second goal of the manus cript
is to bring the geopolitical and historical back into the theory of the firm. Geopoliti cally,
firms’ ability to take a leading role is enabled and constrained by their affiliation with (a)
particular nation-state(s); in particular the geopolitical perception of a nation-state’s
capacity to express the ideal of popular sovereignty and the right to self-determination.
Historically, the main driver of the emergence of a Western system of democratisation was
the organisation of incipient nation-states around republican principles: the impossi bility
for any actor or interest to dominate others, the possibility of rivalry and dissent, and
timely action against corruption. These republican principles revolutionised geopolitical
competition and are still key to Western nations’ prosperity. Strategic abilities thus have
to be considered within a larger geopolitical and historical context: that of firms operating
in nation-states, and nation-state leaders steering democratisation dynamics according to
principles most likely to provide them with both historical continuity and a geopolitical
advantage. Drawing on an historical analysis of the strategies followed by the Netherlands
(the Dutch Republic) and England since early republican times, the US and the EU since
WWII, I clarify how nation-state leaders should go about in securing an advantageous
geopolitical vantage point; and in maximising the possibilities of self-determination and
success for affiliated firms. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Firms‟ success: ability to contribute to democratic settlements 
 
In the bulk of contemporary business literature, and much of Western popular 
opinion, the relation between firms‘ success and participation in a democratisation process 
is implicitly assumed.  It has become relatively commonsensical that entrepreneurship 
contributes to the democratisation of society. But the many corporate governance and 
industrial democracy debates throughout the 19
th
, 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries also testify 
to a more general point: in the Western hemisphere, firms are periodically evaluated in 
terms of democratic standards.   
The assumption that entrepreneurship plays an important part in democratisation 
dynamics notwithstanding, no theory exists either of the precise role of firms in these 
dynamics, or of the impact of various types of democratic involvement on firms‘ success. 
Such a theory would elucidate how firms‘ positioning in relation to projects of economic 
growth, good citizenship and State development impacts on their long-term success.  
In this PhD-manuscript I argue that the success of a firm is not only affected by 
the types of democratic involvement but in fact depends on the firms‘ capacity to take a 
leading role in democratisation dynamics. In particular, firms are judged on their ability to 
contribute to settlements
1
 between three rivalling dynamics of democratisation: firstly, 
economic versus political versus civic democratisation; secondly, minority versus 
consensual democratisation; and thirdly, territorial versus personality-based 
democratisation. 
After careful analysis of the strategies followed by commercial and mutual banks 
in the Netherlands and England from the 19
th
 century to 2007, I conclude that, in general
2
, 
firms‘ success depends on six strategic abilities – conducive to a settlement between 
rivalling dynamics of democratisation: 
1.  Fulfil core customers‟ social mobility aspirations. 
2.  Cater to customers of different social classes  
3. Make State policy on economic citizenship by “fait accompli”   
4. Translate existing State policy on economic citizenship in services & products 
5. Become a champion of national character 
6. Become a champion of the national economic interest 
The above strategic abilities to contribute to democratic settlements have to be 
considered within an even larger geopolitical and historical context: that of firms operating 
in nation-states, and nation-state leaders steering democratisation dynamics according to 
principles most likely to provide them with both historical continuity and a geopolitical 
advantage.  
 
 
                                                 
1 A settlement is the compromise that institutes a truce between supporters of rivalling  dynamics and 
traditions of democratisation. 
2 Obviously, when generalising findings about banks to the entire population of firms, one needs to be 
mindful of the special national and geopolitical role of the banking sector.  
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Historical grounding of democratic settlements in republican principles    
 
The main driver of the emergence of a Western system of democratisation of 
projects of economic growth, good citizenship and State development was the organisation 
of incipient nation-states around a set of republican principles.  Three republican principles 
– the flag of which was waved by as varied entities as the Dutch Republic, France, 
England and the United States – revolutionised geopolitical competition.  A first principle 
is that no national actor, group or interest should be able to structurally dominate any 
other. In other words, the possibility of democratic rivalry and dissent should be 
institutionalised.  Secondly, democratic rivalry and dissent should be possible across the 
economic, political and civic domains, as economic wealth, a strong state and a vigorous 
civil society are equally important republican virtues. Finally, corruption of republican 
principles is always looming, which calls for a timely transformation of institutions and a 
continuous renewal of settlements.  
In reality, settlements have always been imperfect vehicles of republican 
principles. The actual democratic standards upheld and levels of corruption tolerated in a 
nation-state settlement therefore have to be considered in relative terms, i.e. in comparison 
with the standards upheld and the corruption tolerated by geopolitical competitors.  
Geopolitical comparison leads to rankings of nation-states in terms of their ability to 
express popular sovereignty and exercise the right to self-determination.
3
 
 By proxy, firms‘ perceived ability to express popular sovereignty and exercise 
the right to self-determination is enabled and constrained by their affiliation(s) with 
particular nation-state settlements.  It suffices to contrast the relative ease with which US 
banks and multinationals penetrated West European markets after WWII with the 
laborious quest of English and Dutch multinationals such as Unilever to preserve their 
historical governance systems and autonomy.   
Given the critical link between firm and nation-state success, I advance seven 
propositions about the way nation-state leaders – not in the least those active in firms – go 
about in securing an advantageous geopolitical comparison; and in maximising the 
possibilities of self-determination and success for affiliated firms.  These propositions are 
based on a historical comparison of settlements in the Netherlands (the Dutch Republic) 
and England since the 16
th
 century; and to a lesser extent the United States and the 
European Union (including West Germany) since WWII.   
The propositions are all centred on the finding that the most successful 
institutional arrangements in Dutch and English history – the Dutch and English ―success 
models‖4 – reflect traditions of democratisation5 and historical settlements incorporating 
republican principles:  
 
 
                                                 
3 Such rankings are performed by as varied agencies as governments, stock market investors, NGOs, the UN, 
credit rating agencies, companies, Freedom House, etc… 
4 A success model is that historical settlement that purportedly pushed a nation-state towards its geopolitical 
apogee. 
5
 By traditions of democratisation I mean those historical modes of collaboration and representation which 
according to their supporters are best suited to solving issues of rivalry and mobility between established and 
outsider groups. 
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P1:  Continued nation-state success requires the timely renewal of republican 
settlements and traditions of democratisation 
P2:  The historical relation between a landmark settlement and a nation‟s Golden Age 
provides leaders with a simple success model 
P3:   Home-grown traditions of democratisation have to be reinvented in a way 
 sufficiently adapted to pre-eminent geopolitical traditions 
P4:  Interpretations of pre-eminent geopolitical traditions and settlements have to 
appear sufficiently different from home-grown traditions to avoid confusion 
P5a: Reinvention is more effective when grounded in consciousness of a failed 
 relation  between state and nation 
P5b: Create supra-national settlements and traditions to counter the dominance of 
 emerging  foreign traditions           .   
P6: Successful reinvention requires consciousness of the pivotal role played by 
“happy accidents” in transforming landmark settlements into a success model 
P7: Up-and-coming leaders should go against the grain in periods of high modernity
  and reinvent expressive habits associated with old, bedevilled settlements 
 
Empirical choices  
 
In this PhD-manuscript, I relate the success of various types of retail financial 
firms in England and the Netherlands – building societies, co-operatives, commercial and 
savings banks – to their strategic involvement in democratisation movements in the period 
1815 to 2007. Firms‘ success in this regard is measured in terms of two variables: total 
asset growth and market shares.  
In both the democracy and varieties of capitalism literatures, the Netherlands and 
England are differentiated on the basis of their supposed liberal versus communitarian 
nature. In this PhD-manuscript, I set out to demonstrate that dynamics of democratisation 
in both countries are governed by similar republican principles. The real historical 
difference between England and the Netherlands is in the types of traditions of 
democratisation and historical settlements that have worked best.  
The choice to study two types of firms, namely ―mutual‖ firms such as co-
operatives, building societies or savings banks on the one hand and commercial firms such 
as retail banks on the other hand, fits in with the same perspective. These two types of 
firms historically have been associated with respectively communitarian and liberal 
orthodoxy.   
The choice for the financial sector and banks in particular is grounded in two 
considerations. First, monetary revolutions – most notably the servicing of public debt 
through a standardised currency – have been key drivers of dynamics of democratisation. 
The standardisation of money creates a level-playing field for the different entitlements 
and claims of established and outsider groups. In this regard, banks, as both creators and 
guardians of the circulation of standardised money forms, have always been of particular 
importance to processes of democratisation.  At the same time, money has special 
properties that facilitate settlements between established and outsider groups. Money is a 
prime enabler of the different democratisation dynamics underlying republican 
settlements: minority and consensual democratisation; territorial and personality-based 
dynamics; across the economic, political and civic domains.   
ix 
 
Methodology 
 
A methodology that particularly befits historical units of analysis such as 
historical settlements, success models and traditions of democratisation is analytical 
dualism. For one, the methodology allows for a way round one of the most important 
pitfalls of historical research, namely the tendency to favour either actor-driven (firm-
driven) or structural (geopolitical nation-state) properties in historical explanations. As 
such, analytical dualism also meets a main condition for insightful comparative research; 
one needs to be able to identify key actions and structural turns in terms of varying degrees 
of strategic intentionality and longue durée – with special attention to the role of 
―accidents‖ in changing historical trajectories. Another condition is the ability to compare 
several sequences of structural and strategic changes – episodes – on a case by case basis 
across different contexts. Hence, I apply the methodology of analytical dualism to compare 
democratisation dynamics and the strategies of Dutch and English banks across three 
different episodes: the periods 1815-1930, 1931-1965, 1966-2007.  
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1 INTRODUCTION AND MAIN ARGUMENT 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In this manuscript I argue that the success of a firm depends on its capacity to 
take a leading role in democratisation dynamics. In particular, firms are judged on their 
ability to contribute to settlements between rivalling outlooks on democratisation.  Such 
settlements are conducive to the geopolitical success of the nation-state(s) to which the 
firm is affiliated, and with which it shares a critical relation.
1
   
What do I mean by ―democratisation‖ and ―democracy‖, concepts all too often 
laden with ideological connotations and intentions?  Democratisation refers to the 
inclusion of outsider groups in projects of not only economic wealth, but also civilisation 
and State development.  This inclusion is triggered by geopolitical opportunities and 
threats, outsiders‘ desire to gain influence, and incumbents‘ desire to guarantee a viable 
future for the nation-state they live in.  Democratisation leads to a system of democracy 
once institutions are in place that allow rivalling groups to enact contrary claims: outsider 
minorities declaiming a lack of mobility and contestability, and established groups 
protecting their entitlements.  In essence, democratisation and democracy are two sides of 
the same coin: the former expresses the dynamic aspect of group rivalry, the latter the 
institutional possibility of group rivalry.  Both are relative terms, which only gain meaning 
within a geopolitical framework of competition between nation-states.
2
   
Why is it interesting to posit a relation between participation in democratisation 
dynamics and firms‘ success? In the bulk of contemporary business literature and much of 
Western popular opinion (the United States and Europe), this relation is implicitly 
assumed.  It has, for instance, become relatively commonsensical that entrepreneurship 
contributes to the democratisation of society and that established practices which lead to 
unassailable barriers of entry generally lack legitimacy.
3
  The many corporate governance 
and industrial democracy debates throughout the 19
th
, 20th and early 21
st
 centuries, and the 
recent wave of corporate corruption scandals testify to a more general point: in the 
Western hemisphere, firms are periodically evaluated in terms of ―democratic standards‖.  
This evaluation is not only performed by political actors, but also by civic and economic 
organisations.  Governmental bodies, stock exchange regulators, competing firms, 
consumer, environmental and many other lobby groups regularly scrutinise firms‘ growth, 
be it in terms of standards of accountability, fair play, conflicts of interests, environmental 
sustainability, consumer or human rights, etc… 
The assumption that entrepreneurship plays an important part in democratisation 
dynamics notwithstanding, no theory exists either of the precise role of firms in these 
dynamics, or of the impact of various types of democratic involvement on firms‘ success. 
Such a theory would elucidate how firms‘ positioning in relation to projects of economic 
growth, civilisation and State development impacts on their long-term success.   
A particularly hot topic of debate is whether, in our ―globalising‖ world, liberal-
democratic or social-democratic arrangements would increase the odds of success of any 
firm, no matter what national origins it has. This question is often used in a self-
explanatory, ideological way, i.e. to argue that one variety of democratic capitalism is 
superior to another – for instance the case of the superiority of Anglo-American liberal 
capitalism in recent decades. What is more, the question starts from empirically incorrect 
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assumptions. Historical perspective, i.e. going back between the past and present to make 
connections heretofore undiscovered, will reveal this. I develop the mentioned perspective 
in chapters 4 to 11, in which I compare the historical development of in England and the 
Netherlands
4
, nation-states of an allegedly liberal-democratic and social-democratic nature. 
These chapters will demonstrate that characterising institutional arrangements in England 
as liberal-utilitarian and in the Netherlands as social-communitarian means giving short 
thrift to more relevant historical foundations. The more accurate statement is that the most 
successful institutional arrangements in Dutch and English history – the Dutch and English 
―success models‖ – reflect traditions of democratisation and historical settlements 
incorporating republican principles. 
What do I mean by traditions of democratisation, settlements, success models and 
republican principles? By traditions of democratisation I mean those historical modes of 
collaboration and representation which according to their supporters are best suited to 
solving issues of rivalry and mobility between established and outsider groups. A 
settlement is the compromise that institutes a truce between supporters of rivalling 
traditions of democratisation. A success model, on the other hand, is that historical 
settlement that purportedly pushed a nation-state towards its geopolitical apogee. 
Interestingly, irrespective of contextual differences and (partly invented) historical origins, 
Dutch and English success models reflect the same republican principles; principles that 
revolutionised Western geopolitical competition from the sixteenth century onwards. What 
republican principles am I referring to? A first principle is that no national actor, group or 
interest should be able to structurally dominate any other. In other words, the possibility of 
democratic rivalry and dissent should be institutionalised.  Secondly, democratic rivalry 
and dissent should be possible across the economic, political and civic domains, as 
economic wealth, a strong state and a vigorous civil society are equally important 
republican virtues. Finally, corruption
5
 of republican principles is always looming, which 
calls for a timely transformation of institutions and a continuous renewal of settlements. 
Ample evidence of their greater historical prominence notwithstanding, 
republican settlements and traditions have rarely pulled their weight in contemporary 
writing on democratisation dynamics. One reason for this is that advocates of liberal-
utilitarianism have reinvented and reclassified republican phenomena in essentially their 
own ideological terms (Burrow, 1988: 3). This applies to the republican settlements 
between English promoters of Whig and Tory traditions that emerged in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Likewise, social-communitarianism has often been reified as the 
most continuous thread in Dutch history (e.g. Bax, 1988) – although some argue that 
Dutch political economy has been infused by a remarkable historical blend of social-
communitarian and liberal-utilitarian elements (e.g. Jepperson, 2000; Poutsma and Braam, 
2005). A closer look, however, reveals that the empirically more accurate continuity in 
Dutch history has long been provided by republican settlements between promoters of 
Regent and Orangist traditions (Israel, 1995, 2004).  
Why would Dutch and English leaders go back to republican roots? Such 
settlements and traditions provided the earliest proven track record for their nation – a 
sense of continuity with the national successes of the past (e.g. Bendix, 1967; Shils, 1981). 
Also, these settlements and traditions incorporate a level of complex organisation that 
leaders were eager to build on and extend to previously excluded groups or fields of 
activity in their nations. No wonder that successive leaders were drawn to reinvent these 
settlements and traditions; it provided them with the simplest way to keep consolidating 
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domestic order and gain a competitive geopolitical vantage point.  Obviously, a 
considerable part of these settlements and traditions have had to be reframed in terms of 
changing contexts, constituencies and grievances. As such, the original republican 
settlements and traditions to a significant extent are also the product of imaginative 
invention (Hobsbawm, 1983). Indeed, as we shall see in chapters 4 and 5, settlements and 
traditions are dynamic entities that have to be reframed to be meaningful in a 
contemporary context.   
In sum, it is the capacity to renew democratic rivalries and come to republican 
settlements across economic, civic and political domains that determines nation-states‘ 
contuining success in face of changing geopolitical constellations; not whether a nation-
state appears liberal-utilitarian or social-communitarian on the surface.
6
  Of course, 
corruption of republican principles is the norm in reality. The actual execution of these 
principles should therefore always be considered in terms of geopolitical competition 
between nation-states. That is, in comparison with the competitive standards upheld in 
other nations.  
Still, if republican principles are the ones that really count, why is rethoric of the 
superiority of either liberal or social democracy rife? I have given one reason above. 
Another reason is that such a rethorical strategy provides context-specific settlements and 
traditions with universal, ―end of history‖ qualities. While geopolitically effective in the 
short to medium term, the strategy tends to weaken domestic possibilities of democratic 
rivalry; as has been the case with issues of financial regulation in the ―liberal-democratic‖ 
US and UK since the 1970s, and the issue of immigration in the ―social-democratic‖ 
European Union.    
 
1.2  Outline of the chapter 
 
In the next section (1.3), I expound on the relation between democratisation and 
economic growth from different viewpoints.  First (a), I discuss the ongoing debate in the 
democracy literature. Second (b), I discuss the ideal-type that has dominated geopolitical 
thinking about the relation between democratisation and economic growth during the last 
decades: the liberal democratic ideal type. Arguing that historical perspective can offer a 
more enduring viewpoint, I throw light on the role of incumbents and challengers and the 
institutionalisation of the possibility of rivalry and mobility as a precondition to  a 
geopolitically viable form of Western capitalism (c). Finally, I maintain that one should 
distinguish between active and passive democratisation to understand how rivalries were 
settled and mobility was encouraged since early republican days (d).   
Building on this distinction (1.4), I set out the three types of of democratisation 
dynamics that Western leaders have had to deal with to ensure the success of their nation-
states.  Subsequently (1.5), I argue that a new theory of the firm is needed that allows for 
an ontological relation with the nation-state and geopolitical levels, and incorporates the 
preceding issues. I continue the chapter (1.6) by explaining why I made certain empirical 
and methodological choices in this manuscript.  In particular, I clarify why I chose to make 
a comparative study of the democratisation strategies deployed by a variety of Dutch and 
English retail banks – building societies, co-operative, commercial and savings banks over 
the period 1870-2006. Finally (1.7), I present an overview of the structure of the entire 
manuscript, briefly discussing the content of each chapter.  
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 1.3  What is the relation between democratisation and 
 economic growth? 
 
a. Democracy literature  
According to Linz (1998), democracy distinguishes itself from its premodern 
predecessors by being based on a system of ―government pro tempore‖, i.e. a system of 
institutionalised time constraints on those in power.  The strength of Western democratic 
modernity in this regard is that it allows for ―multiple political forces [to] compete inside 
an institutional framework‖. Outcomes never depend on a single controlling force, but 
rather on a ―a system of decentralised strategic action in which knowledge is inescapably 
provincial‖ (Przeworsky, 1991: 11-12).  An important guarantee of decentralisation is the 
system of universal suffrage, which entitles everyone with an equal political voice, 
regardless of class, party or civic group membership.  
What does the existing academic literature on democracy and democratisation 
have to say about its relation with economic growth? Research on this question generally 
has been conducted at the institutional, nation-state level, and has resulted in three bodies 
of opinion. The first two groups, which I shall conveniently refer to as liberal-democrats 
and social-democrats, or liberal-utilitarians (e.g. Lipset, 1959, 1994; Olson, 1982) and 
social-communitarians (e.g. Hirst, 1994; Putnam, 1993), potentially see a virtuous impact 
of democratisation on economic growth. Liberal-utilitarians and social-communitarians, 
however, differ on what constitutes democratisation, and consequently also on what 
constitutes a sound relation between democratisation and economic growth. On the one 
hand, communitarians stress that democratisation comes about through the empowerment 
of local community traditions, culminating in a comprehensive system of direct 
democracy. One such element of direct democracy in particular, industrial democracy, 
provides a sound basis for economic growth (e.g. Pateman, 1970; Sandel, 1996)
7
. By 
default of industrial democracy, communitarians warn, the logic of the market will have a 
corrupting effect on community traditions, the very basis of sound growth. Liberal-
utilitarians, on the contrary, see democratisation primarily as individual participation in the 
domain of the market, with no community restraints applying. From this viewpoint, sound 
economic growth simply is the most growth one can manage. Not surprisingly, liberal-
utilitarians advocate a popular opinion
8
 dominated by the universal ideal of autonomous 
individuals rather than particular community traditions.   
Liberal-utilitarians and social-communitarians are at odds about what role the 
State, and more generally politics, should play in maintaining a sound relation between 
democratisation and economic growth. For communitarians, every area of life is political 
in that all areas should be aimed at serving the public good. Regarding the State, there are 
two versions of communitarianism. The version which propagates Statism (e.g. Luckacs, 
1988), i.e. the coming together of community traditions into the meta-community of the 
State, has been in secular decline since the 1980s, and certainly since the demise of the 
USSR. According to the dominant social-communitarian version, on the other hand, State 
and industrial democracy are but two manifestations of direct democracy, at a par with 
other community traditions fostered through for instance the family or religion
9
 (e.g. 
Walzer, 1983). While communitarians maintain that the public-private division between 
the State, civil society and economic organisations is false, liberal-utilitarians argue quite 
the opposite. They maintain that politics should remain a neutral and minimal force and 
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that the political promotion of particular community traditions has a profoundly corrupting 
influence on economic growth. Consequently, they support a strict public-private 
separation between on the one hand, the State, and, on the other hand, civil society and 
economic organisation. As one guarantee against ―communitarian corruption‖, liberal-
utilitarians propagate the centrality of a system of private property rights guaranteed by 
formal institutions such as the law and parliamentary control (e.g. North and Weingast, 
1989)
10
.  Furthermore, liberal-utilitarians are in favour of a system of universal suffrage. 
That is because this system, which is based on the ideal of autonomous individuals, has 
proven to be most favourable to approximating the model of efficient economic exchange 
presented in neoclassical economics (North, 1990: 51).  
Liberal and communitarian analyses often take the history of Western 
democratisation and economic growth as a model for developing countries. In doing that, 
they focus on the historical episodes most prone to validating their theoretical 
generalisations. With regards to the most recent episode, for instance, Francis Fukuyama 
(1992) has gone as far as to proclaim the ―end of history‖ and the universal superiority of 
US-style democratic capitalism in the world
11
. Colin Crouch (2004), on the other hand, 
decries the anti-democratic side of US-style capitalism which he claims is threatening to 
throw European social democracies back to feudal times
12
. He claims that the spread of 
liberal capitalism from the 1980s onwards is destroying the ―community traditions‖ that 
typified European polities for much of the twentieth century, by making politics 
subservient to the will of a self-selecting capitalistic elite. 
A third group of academics not necessarily sees a clear historical relation between 
democratisation and economic growth.  So, Ferguson (2001) stresses that the link between 
―political freedom‖ and ―economic wealth‖ championed by liberal-utilitarians often does 
not bear out in practice. Also, against social-communitarianism, he agrees with Barro 
(1996) that, at the most, one can plot an inverted U relation between democratisation and 
economic growth. While democratisation initially is good for growth, it soon thereafter 
turns out to have a negative influence. The explanation Barro gives is that a sound relation 
between democratisation and economic growth requires a measure of stability and 
incrementalism which the early enfranchisement of local communities in the State 
apparatus can actually preclude. Przeworski (2000: 211), finally, notes that, while the 
liberal-utilitarian association of democracy with private property rights nowadays is so 
widespread that the former is often used as a proxy for the latter, most non-communist 
dictatorships have been and continue to be resolutely committed to defending private 
property from encroachment by those without it. Przeworski (1992) warns that, by default 
of a system of market democracy equivalent to the political electoral system of ―one 
citizen, one vote‖, a democratic deficit will appear, with corrupting effects on economic 
growth. Even then, based on empirical studies of Eastern European and South-American 
countries (Przeworski, 1991), he does not find any clear relation between political 
democracy and economic development. While he dispels any tradeoffs between political 
democracy and economic development, he claims that, at best, one can conclude that 
democracies are more likely to survive in wealthy societies. Przeworksi also sees a role for 
the State which is more pivotal than in social-communitarianism – and less holistic than in 
State-communitarianism. More specifically, he argues that reaching more insightful 
conclusions about the effects of democratisation requires a better understanding of the 
relation between State, civic and economic actors (Przeworski, 2003).  
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b. Dominant liberal-democratic ideal type 
For the last few decades, international policy discourse about democratisation has 
reflected a liberal-utilitarian Western ideology. In this view, a sound relation between 
democratisation and economic growth could only be established by enacting the following 
―liberal-democratic‖ ideal-type13: a system of universal suffrage and a secular body of law 
protecting the equality of civic, political and economic liberties of all individuals. Based 
on this ideal-type, nongovernmental organisations such as the Freedom House rank all 
countries in the world in terms of their soundness. From a research viewpoint, this ideal-
type is not very useful, however.  It primarily gives weight to formal institutions with a 
high contemporary visibility, undoubtedly because it reflects a particular version of 
Western modernity, an imagined historical endpoint for the entire world. What is more, the 
ideal-type is grounded in the assumption that when it comes to democratisation and 
economic growth, modernity and premodernity are ―mutually exclusive terms‖.14  This has 
precluded many scholars from taking a more contextualised, and historically variable 
perspective on the relation between democratisation and economic growth processes in 
non-Western countries such as Russia, China, India or even Iraq. Even more disturbing, it 
has precluded a more contextualised, historically variable perspective on the very Western 
countries that provided the archetype for the ideal in the first place. 
Clearly, a perspective on democratisation and economic growth is needed which 
reflects historically changing, contextualised experiences rather than ideal-type endpoints. 
In the following paragraphs, I present an analytic narrative which deals with this issue by 
reconsidering where the Western relation between democratisation and economic growth 
historically comes from and what firm-centred dynamics this involves. 
c. Historical relation between democratisation and capitalism 
The emergence of a ―Western world system‖ of economic, political and civic-
religious organisation from late medieval times onwards led to a growing interdependence 
of groups that previously had lived more or less in isolation. The creation of a level-
playing field between these groups induced new contests of purposiveness across 
previously assumed territorial and community boundaries. Each group tried to influence 
authority patterns in the level-playing field – for instance the division in core and 
peripheral nations or upper and lower civilisations – to its advantage. All this led to a 
remarkable intensification of the mobilisation of people in terms of economic organisation, 
civilisation projects and State development in the Western world (Jepperson, 2000; Mann 
1986; McNeill, 1963; Thomas and Meyer, 1984; Wallerstein, 1974). Before the end of the 
eighteenth century this intensification generally happened under the geopolitical banner of 
a city-state or a commonwealth variety – such as the United Provinces or Great Britain. 
From the nineteenth century onwards, nation-states and to a lesser extent supra-national 
institutions gained primacy as preferred geopolitical boundaries of intensification. 
Throughout all these centuries, however, intensification would not have been possible 
were it not for the invention and propagation of a set of republican principles, the flag of 
which was carried by as varying geopolitical entities as the Dutch Republic, post-
Revolution England, France, the United States and the European Union.   
How does the issue of democratisation tie into this? As argued by Mannheim 
(1935: 44-48), any process of intensification, especially one which involves the 
development of a large-scale capitalistic system, requires a ―fundamental democratisation‖ 
of purposiveness, i.e. an increasing involvement of former outsiders in processes of 
political, civic and economic organisation. Democratisation implies the creation of a new 
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level-playing field: a ―popular opinion‖ open to contestation and participation by both 
established and outsider parties (Weber, 1946: 226; cf. Dahl, 1971).  Obviously, the 
opening up and expansion of popular opinion raises all sorts of problems for incumbent 
elites and gives all kinds of opportunities to leading outsiders, which I shall refer to as 
―challenger elites‖.15  While incumbent elites endeavour to construct a variety of 
capitalism able to compete with foreign varieties, they, on the other hand, also wish to hold 
on to their established authority in the State, civil society and markets as a structuring 
principle for popular opinion. With the purpose of mobilizing outsiders in their own terms, 
incumbent elites reinvent ―traditions of democratisation‖ which cast them in the role of 
historical representatives of popular sovereignty.  Overly rebellious outsiders, on the other 
hand, are portrayed as civically incompetent, economically self-interested and politically 
immature.   
How do challenger elites withstand incumbents‘ defensive attacks? Typically, 
they associate the more recalcitrant elements of the establishment with ―old corruption‖, 
on the basis of their alleged monopoly of State, civil society and market authority. If this 
association gains resonance, and a democratic deficit has been identified, challengers have 
two options.  They can push for new political rules which allow for a more accountable 
and inclusive representation of entrepreneurs, the working people or civic issues; for 
instance in terms of a government whose membership is better representative of business 
dynamics, or in terms of fairer modalities of interest group representation. On the other 
hand, challengers can call for the liberation of economic organisation from the dominance 
of ―old boy clubs‖.  Successful challenger elites generally are those who can combine both 
tracks and reinvent traditions of democratisation which cast them rather than the 
establishment in the role of rightful representatives of popular sovereignty.
16
  
 d.  Settling the rivalry between incumbents and challengers 
Obviously, the strife between incumbent and challenger elites cannot go on 
forever. Over time, established and challenger elites‘ positions converge to an extent that a 
settlement is possible. This generally leads to the setting up of more representative 
institutional mechanisms aimed at promoting a degree of elite mobility, and at curtailing 
the rivalling groups‘ ability to monopolise political, civic or economic authority. As such a 
settlement implies a new stratification of political, civic and economic relations (Etzioni, 
1968), it unavoidably leads to the loss of authority by at least part of the establishment. 
Similarly, a settlement does not automatically imply more sway in decision-making 
authority for outsiders. A necessary but insufficient condition to get into a position of 
―active democratisation‖ for challenger elites, is the ability to create a level-playing field 
with incumbent elites, be it in political, civic and/or economic terms. A sufficient condition 
is the ability to form a majority coalition with the more forthcoming incumbent elites, and 
marginalise the uncompromising incumbent and challengers. Only a minority of 
challengers will be able to fulfil this last condition. Those challengers and incumbent elites 
that are not able to counterbalance the process of downward ―levelling‖ with the 
attainment of significant leadership influence, are prone to forces of ―passive 
democratisation‖. The phenomenon is passive, in that it refers to a process whereby 
participants – challengers or incumbents – are unable to escape the levelling effects of the 
new democratic consensus and become opinion leaders.   
The following example illustrates the workings of active and passive 
democratisation dynamics. How did sixteenth century Holland entrepreneurs become self-
styled ―Regents‖? For one, they did this by encouraging the separation of their economic 
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organisations from the ―arbitrariness‖ of old Habsburg politics.  Toegether  with 
republican Orangists – Dutch reformed representatives of the old nobility, these Regents 
carved out a new leadership position for themselves; not just in the field of markets and 
politics, but also that of civil society.   And Regent and Orangist republicans increasingly 
met as peers in new high society clubs – purveyors of a higher social class.  Politically and 
economically, Regents and Orangist leaders politicised economic organisations such as the 
Dutch India Company on a new, more consensual basis – providing all provinces with a 
proportional number of board positions. Simultaneously, Regents and Orangists settled for 
a very open stock exchange system – both in Amsterdam and the provinces – that provided 
the middle ranks with lots of investment opportunities. All the same, especially the 
settlement between Regents and Orangists ensured a leadership monopoly for themselves 
and their families.  
The success of this settlement was not without limit, however.  Throughout the 
latter part of the seventeenth century, this manifested itself among others in declining 
levels of economic innovation, and problems to cope with the high fiscal, military and 
redistributive demands of a strong and autonomous Dutch Republic.  What was the main 
culprit of this  decline? In order to mitigate the levelling influences of financial and 
economic innovation processes on themselves, successive generations of Dutch Regents 
shifted their weight more exclusively to the field of politics, away from involvement in 
market entrepreneurship. When in the eighteenth century the Regent clubs‘ hold on office 
became so monopolistic as to turn the Republic in a local patrimonial state, it not only 
occasioned a turn away from merchant to rentier capitalism. Ultimately, it also caused the 
demise of the Dutch Republic in a geopolitical world of less local and less patrimonial 
nation-states such as England and France (Adams, 1994; Roorda, 1964). From a 
democratisation viewpoint, one historical lesson to be learnt from this example is that, 
when the fault lines between active and passive democratisation become so rigid as to 
perpetuate the influence of the same minority, other nations [and their firms] will start 
outcompeting the original national champion.  
 
1.4 Types of democratisation as different solutions to leadership 
problems  
 
Handling democratisation dynamics is an important leadership problem. What  
types of democratisation dynamics exist and what kind of leadership problems do they 
pose? 
a. The relation between economic, civic and political democratisation 
First, democratisation can occur in the civic, economic and political fields; it usually is 
a combination of all three. Likewise, traditions of democratisation can be reinvented to 
emphasise the role of the economic, the social (civic), or the political.  For instance, the 
English Whig and Dutch Regent, English Tory and Dutch Orangist traditions are usually 
reinvented to emphasise the role of respectively economic and social issues (Norton and 
Aughey, 1981; Crewe and Searing, 1988; Israel,2004; Kuitenbrouwer, 1985; 1994).  These 
respective traditions are not liberal or communitarian an sich, however; since their main 
driver is the republican principle of freedom of domination – and both incorporate 
elements of negative or positive freedom, thus discounting a purely liberal or 
communitarian heritage.  
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In terms of a republican settlement, the particular leadership problem here is twofold. 
What settlement between proponents of Whig and Tory traditions, Regent and Orangist 
traditions is most likely to stop undue political, civic or economic interference, i.e. 
measures that inhibit the autonomous development of respectively a strong State, a 
vigorous civil society and economic wealth? And what settlement will best ensure the 
complementary development of a strong State, a vigorous civil society and economic 
wealth? 
b. Minority versus consensus democratisation 
Second,  following Barnard (1938), the problem of leadership can be 
conceptualised as containing two sub problems: coordination and cooperation problems 
(cf. Foss, 2001). Coordination problems are based on the following premise: given that 
different individuals or groups realise the need to act upon an issue, what is required to 
make them expect they won‘t waste their time and efforts if they participate in projects of 
change – i.e. make them expect sufficient significant others will participate, and the 
practical means to achieve change will be available (Chwe, 2003; Grandori, 1997; 
Hensmans, 2006; March and Simon, 1958; Weber, 2005).  Questions of coordination thus 
involve the leadership issue of convincing people to sign up to a change project which they 
also see a need for, but heretofore did not have the practical means to engage with 
meaningfully yet. Generally speaking, resolving coordination problems requires a 
vanguard, a minority, to set an inspirational and practical example. In sum, a coordination 
problem is an issue of minority democratisation. 
Contrary to coordination problems, cooperation problems arise from assumptions 
of self-interest and opportunism between groups (Axelrod, 1984; Camerer and Knez, 1996, 
1997; Heath and Staudenmayer, 2000). Questions of cooperation involve the leadership 
issue of convincing people to sign up to a change project which they do not necessarily 
think is in their interest. Resolving cooperation problems therefore is a matter of instituting 
new incentive and distribution mechanisms that diminish tendencies of self-interest and 
create a common interest across groups, encouraging followers with different agendas to 
consent or acquiesce to a change project. In sum, a cooperation problem is an issue of 
consensus democratisation.  
Obviously, coordination and cooperation problems are interrelated issues. Their 
resolution depends on a majority of people signing up to the change project. Only when 
such a majority is found can a democratic settlement be effective; hence the notion of a 
democratic settlement as a minimum requirement for a lasting democratic truce.  
c. Cosmopolitan vs provincial nationalisms, personality vs territoriality principles  
In this manuscript I reconceptualise Polanyi‘s double movement theory to argue that 
democratisation is a double process of nationalisation, involving a reinvention of rivalling  
cosmopolitan and provincial nationalisms, followed by a democratic settlement in a later 
stage.  Polanyi drew attention to the historical workings of a ―double movement‖, meaning 
that when international elites organise to separate the political, civic and economic, less 
advantaged local groups typically organise a countermovement to reunite the three fields in 
a novel way. More particularly, Polanyi (1957: 132) defined his concept of double 
movement as  
―the action of two organising principles in society, each of them setting itself specific 
institutional aims, having the support of definite social forces and using its own distinctive 
methods. The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the world-wide 
establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and 
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using largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of local 
protection17 aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organisation, 
relying on the varying support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of 
the market – primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes – and using 
protective legislation, restive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its 
methods‖18.  
With his theory of the double movement, Polanyi effectively constructed a liberal-
utilitarian and social-communitarian dichotomy.
19
  In this manuscript, I reinterpret 
Polanyi‘s metaphor of the double movement in line with republican principles.  To acquire 
a strategic position and ensure their long-term success, national leaders and firms have to 
mediate between two movements of democratisation: on the one hand, a movement in 
favour of a reinvigoration of traditions of cosmopolitan nationalism, on the other hand, a 
movement in favour of a reinvigoration of territorial, provincial traditions. 
Geopolitical tendencies influence whether cosmopolitan or territorial nationalisms 
gain the relative upper hand; both nationalisms, however, are needed to maintain the 
legitimacy and viability of a geopolitical system of competing nation-states.  If arguments 
and realities of ―national globalisation‖ win the contest, such as during the periods 1840-
1914, and 1970-2007 in the Netherlands, cosmopolitan or city-state traditions are 
increasingly associated in public opinion with the true national character, in that they are 
perceived as fundamental to maintaining the autonomy and sovereignty of the nation. 
Territorial traditions, on the other hand, are then considered more of a secondary, private 
affair. In times of declining globalisation of nation-states – ―national relocalisation‖, the 
opposite is true: city-state traditions are typically associated with established groups and a 
secondary, private sphere; territorial traditions with outsider groups and the public sphere. 
 Beyond these differences, in both periods of relative globalisation and 
relocalisation the same principle goes: democratisation entails a double movement of 
nationalisation, i.e. a reinvention and re-accommodation of cosmopolitan and territorial 
national traditions. In other words, traditions of democratisation can be reinvented to focus 
on competing concepts of the nation
 20
 or nationalism
21, respectively the ―personality‖ and 
―territoriality‖ principles.22 The personality principle entails the abolition of old and the 
invention of new connections between land and people, state and nation. It involves the 
possibility for every citizen coming from any territorial region or ethnic background to 
choose for a new national community. It is often used by proponents of cosmopolitan 
freedoms and mobility of goods, money and people.  This principle is often associated with 
large city-state dynamics, such as in for instance New York, Los Angeles, London, Hong 
Kong, Tokyo, Paris, or Frankfurt. Yet, it is not always. For instance the English and Dutch 
outer provinces led the way with the personality principle during respectively much of the 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. The territoriality principle, 
by contrast, entails a reinvention of old connections between land and people, state and 
nation.
23
  It is at the heart of claims that a certain territory is characterised by permanent 
cultural traits – e.g. a certain set of principles, ethnicities, or  religious roots. And it is often 
used by those advancing the causes of authentic liberties, and the ―real wealth‖ derived 
from territorial unity and autonomy
24
.  Again, this is not to say that the outer provinces are 
always the harbingers of such territorial dynamics; large, soul-searching city-states – such 
as Moscow nowadays – can be as well. 
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1.5  Why another theory of the firm? 
 
This manuscript does not only deal with demoratisation dynamics at the  
geopolitical and nation-state levels. It relates firms‘ economic growth and success to 
participation in these dynamics. To systematise the relation between firms‘ participation 
and firms‘ success, I incorporate the explanations in the above sections in a ―republican 
settlement‖ theory of the firm.  
Why is such a new theory of the firm needed? For one, republican settlement 
theory is more empirically encompassing than existing theories when it comes to studying 
economic, civic and political phenomena. Transaction cost theory, the leading theory 
within the liberal-utilitarian literature, stresses that firms‘ success depends on their ability 
to tackle market failures.  Moral theories of the firm, representing the social-
communitarian literature, emphasise the resolution of civic failures as the basis of long-
term success. Finally, a less popular theory of the firm maintains that firms‘ success also is 
about garnering political power and pursuing one‘s interests25; or, more positively than 
originally intended, the ability to promote those political interests that otherwise may not 
have been defended. In contrast with these theories, republican settlement theory does not 
restrict itself to one disciplinary perspective. It subsumes market, civic and political 
failures under one general category: ―democratic deficits‖. Democratic deficits are 
grievances expressed in popular opinion by outsiders or established actors that an 
economic need is not being met, a political interest is not being represented, or a civic 
value is not being invigorated. In sum, republican settlement theory assumes that firms‘ 
success depends on their ability to resolve democratic deficits of an economic, political 
and civic nature. And involvement in  democratisation initiatives which in popular opinion 
are perceived as more conducive than other alternatives to the promotion of an effective 
State, economic wealth and the vitality of civil society, is crucial to firms‘ success.26   
Second, republican settlement theory is different to existing theories in that it 
assumes a link between firms‘ strategies and the historical construction of nation-state 
settlements. In particular, firms‘ success also depends on their ability to influence 
settlements between rivalling minority and consensus dynamics, as well as personality-
based versus territorial dynamics.  To contribute to such settlements, firms require the 
ability to function as switching points between different democratisation dynamics. 
Occupying such a switching point position confronts firms with a particular 
leadership/follower problem: how to mobilise support or at least acquiescence from a 
majority of both leaders and followers. For one this implies that firms have to target both 
leaders and followers. Much trickier, this implies a delicate exercise of anticipation: 
distinguishing between actors that are most likely to come out as leaders and as followers 
in future democratic settlements.  In other words, judgements have to be made about what 
minority is fit to be influential and lead, and the rest that is not and can only be taken into 
account as followers. Based on these judgement, firms develop ―minority‖ and 
―consensus‖ strategies of democratisation.  The first strategy entails gathering the minority 
willing and competent to change political, economic, and civic modalities of contestability 
and mobility in a way most likely to produce nation-state success in a changing 
geopolitical world. The second strategy entails tempering conflict between all competing 
groups through the redistribution and alignment of incentives.  Finally, to find a 
democratic settlement, the two strategies should complement each other and be perceived 
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as the best way to maintain or create a successful nation-state in a changing geo-political 
world. It is in the nature of democratic settlements that not everyone will agree: thus, 
settlements generally imply marginalising recalcitrant incumbent and challenger groups for 
being ―unrealistic‖ and/or ―anti-national‖.  
The above properties of republican settlement theory enable us to tackle one of 
the main questions posed in this manuscript. What is the impact of different strategies of 
democratisation on firms‘ success? I propose two main answers to this question. First, I 
maintain that, in their bid to get the right balance between competing dynamics of 
democratisation, firms have to deploy six strategies of democratisation. If executed 
properly, these strategies have the effect of changing the institutional relation between 
political interest groups, civic status groups and economic classes in ways advantageous to 
a particular firm‘s growth. Second, I demonstrate empirically that these six strategies are 
equally applicable to, on the one hand, nation-state settings, and, on the other hand, types 
of firms which traditionally are distinguished on the basis of their alleged social-
communitarian versus liberal-utilitarian character 
 
1.6      Historical, actor-centred cross-comparison 
 
a. Advantages and purpose of approach  
In this manuscript I combine historical, comparative and actor-centred methods of 
investigation. What are the advantages of such a combination?  Conducting historical 
research allows for a perspective on organisations that goes beyond topical, law-like 
explanations in that it demonstrates how past decisions and structural turns in varying 
degrees of intentionality impact on present organisational taken-for-grantedness (cf. 
Kieser, 1994). On the other hand, given its emphasis on specialist detail, historical 
research, and business history research in particular, has tended to be notoriously a 
theoretical (Rowlinson and Procter, 1999). One way to bridge this gap is to rely on a 
comparative approach, precisely because it provides a way to strike a balance between 
―grand‖ theoretical generalisation and the flow of consciousness of specialist historical 
detail. More particularly, comparative approaches are complementary to historical methods 
in that they can illuminate the empirical meaning of law-like ―universals‖. But they can 
only do on condition that they focus on the range of ―‘solutions‘ that men have found for a 
given problem‖ across a broader spectrum of localities‖ (Bendix, 1963: 535), that is, on 
condition that they take an actor-centred approach.  In sum, the combination of historical, 
comparative and actor-centred approaches has three advantages.  First, it is highly suitable 
to demonstrating how different trajectories of possibilities are selected across comparable 
situations. Second, it facilitates the identification of the precise agency and institutional 
properties that caused selection between different trajectories (see also Skocpol, 1980; 
Djelic, 1998). Finally, it should lead to more empirically warranted conclusions about what 
properties of a studied phenomenon can be generalised and which ones cannot across 
contexts and over time (cfr. Baum, 1977: 5).  
How is the above relevant to the object of study of this manuscript? The concept 
of democratisation has been and still is being abused profusely by Western media, 
governmental or nongovernmental organisations
27
 to universalise North-American and 
European ideal-types. This universalisation for instance has taken the form of inducing 
Asian, African and Arab governments and popular opinions to embrace economic 
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liberalisation, a secular rule of law and the universal suffrage as the primary enablers of 
democratisation. A combination of historical, comparative and actor-centred perspectives 
can provide an important check on these universalisations. In particular, this study will 
reveal how the reinvention of particular, informal traditions is crucial to resolving 
democratic deficits. In a sense, these traditions are the substance that gives meaning to 
formal Western ideal-types. What is more, one could argue that the very survival of 
Western ideal-types depends on the continuous reinvention of these more invisible, 
informal traditions. In other words, by default of the ongoing reinvention of traditions of 
democratisation and their translation in democratic settlements, ideal type characteristics of 
democracy such as the universal suffrage would be no more than empty shells with little 
prospects of sustainability.  
Obviously, the aim of this manuscript is not only to demonstrate previously 
underemphasised differences; the purpose is equally to highlight underemphasised 
similarities.  Thus, I shall demonstrate that traditions of democratisation, albeit different in 
their specific content, work according to the same republican logic in allegedly social-
communitarian and liberal-utilitarian contexts. 
b. Empirical choices 
In this manuscript, I relate the success of various types of financial firms in 
England and the Netherlands – building societies, co-operative, Commercial and savings 
banks – to their strategic involvement in democratisation movements in the period 1870 to 
2007. Firms‘ success in this regard shall be measured in terms of two variables: total asset 
growth and market shares. Why did I make precisely these empirical choices of nation-
states and firms?  In both the literatures on varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 
8-10; see also Albert, 1991; Streeck and Yamamura, 2001) and democracy (e.g. Lijphart, 
1984), England and the Netherlands are differentiated on the basis of supposedly liberal 
versus communitarian modes of coordination. In this thesis, I set out to demonstrate that 
dynamics of democratisation in both countries are governed by similar republican logics. 
The real historical difference between England and the Netherlands is in the type of 
democratic settlements between challenger and established groups that have worked best.  
In addition to recasting the so-called liberal-utilitarian versus social-
communitarian character of England and the Netherlands in a new light, I shall make a 
historical comparison of types of firms which historically have been associated with social-
communitarian versus liberal-utilitarian orthodoxy. These two types of economic actors 
are respectively ―mutual‖ organisations such as co-operatives28, building societies or 
savings banks, and, on the other hand, ―utilitarian‖ organisations such as commercial 
companies
29
. Traditionally, the history of Western mutual organisations – in particular 
cooperatives – and commercial companies has remained firmly within the remit of 
respectively social-communitarian and liberal-utilitarian theory. Still, the demutualisation 
of co-operative organisations evident in many Western polities at the end of the twentieth 
century, has precipitated the emergence of liberal-utilitarian theories of co-operatives.  
c. The pivotal role of finance and money in democratisation dynamics  
 Given the broad scope of sectors in which cooperatives and commercial 
companies are active, I further narrow down my empirical subset to the banking sector. 
There are two good reasons for focusing on the financial sector and banks in particular. 
First, monetary revolutions – most notably the innovation of servicing public debt in the 
form of a standardized currency (e.g. Dickson, 1967), have been key drivers of dynamics 
of democratisation. Money, in a standardised form, increases the likelihood that 
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established and outsider groups will arrive at democratic settlements.  In this regard, banks, 
as guardians of the circulation of money, have always been of particular importance to 
processes of democratisation.  What special properties of money facilitate democratic 
settlements? Money is a prime enabler of the different democratisation dynamics 
underlying republican settlements: minority and consensual democratisation; cosmopolitan 
and territorial dynamics; across the economic, political and civic domains.   
  Money was increasingly promoted as a standard means of exchange by the 
establishment, allowing it to retain a measure of control over processes of democratisation. 
That is because the use of money ultimately has to be sanctioned by the establishment for 
it to gain currency as a standard and stable means of exchange.
30
  Indeed, the expansion of 
monetary standards has time and time again been used by established parties to enrol 
outsiders in a system which encourages politically harmless market participation and 
authority-abiding citizenship at the cost of further possibilities of contestation (cf. Simmel, 
1896). 
31
 
32
 This is the consensus-inducing side of money. 
 On the other hand, money is also a prime enabler of processes of minority  
democratisation, precisely because it has a levelling effect on establishment-outsider 
differences.  Money introduces a measure of impersonal market exchange and ―matter-of-
factness‖ which anyone in principle can join on an equal civic footing. This has two 
advantageous effects for challenger elites. First, the introduction of money lowers entry 
barriers to participation in civic life – and thus increases opportunities of social mobility. 
While the establishment can claim that ―money is dirty‖ for a while, it cannot deny 
money‘s matter-of-factness in the long-term – unless it is willing to accept its own 
financial demise. Second, the introduction of monetary exchange also allows previous 
outsiders to accumulate enough property to be able to engage in politics on an 
economically independent basis. Indeed, history demonstrates that challenger elites have 
time after time leveraged this capacity of money to create a level-playing field with the 
establishment and achieve a position of active democratisation.  
 Money also plays a pivotal role in the antithesis between cosmopolitan and 
territorial nationalisation dynamics. We can distinguish between two historical outlooks on 
the role of money in consolidating the relation between land, state, civil society and 
economic wealth: money as virtual or real. This distinction can be mapped on the 
opposition between two more contemporary theories of money: monetarism and 
chartalism.  In a system of monetarism, national wealth is not just an external reflection of 
a ―real exchange‖ economy.33 Rather, it is a reflection of the fact that money is an 
independent, quantitative commodity that can lead to the creation of territory-transcending 
customs and legislation – most notably in terms of promissory notes or contemporary 
variations such as Euromarkets.
34
 Chartalists, on the contrary, portray money as the 
product of existing social customs, taxation and legislation, a symbolic means that can be 
controlled to some extent by a central state and/or local governments within a national 
territory (e.g. Muller, 1816; Knapp, 1924).  
 Generally speaking, proponents of English Whig and Dutch Regent traditions 
have been (fledgling) proponents of ―monetarism‖, a financial system partial to a credit-
using economy. Promoters of English Tory and Dutch Orangist traditions, on the other 
hand, rallied more to a ―real‖, or territorial outlook on money. 
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1.7   Outline of the manuscript 
 
The thesis is structured as follows.  In chapter 2, I elaborate on the 
methodological assumptions used throughout the manuscript. In chapter 3, I elaborate on 
the ―republican settlement‖ theory of the firm introduced in this chapter. In particular, I 
maintain that firm  need to deploy six strategies to be successful. I also provide a 
framework that relates firms‘ strategies and success to geopolitical and national 
democratisation dynamics. In chapters 4 and 5, I describe the emergence of Dutch and 
English republican settlements and traditions of democratisation, by analysing historical 
evidence from early republican times to the beginning of the 19
th
 century.  In chapters 6 to 
11, I analyse which Dutch and English varieties of financial institutions were more or less 
successful in the period 1870 to 2007 and why. I organise the empirical analysis in these 
chapters around the framework and six strategies presented in chapter 3.  In chapter 12, I 
draw on all the prior chapters to present a comparative discussion of the relation between 
traditions of democratisation, republican  settlements, geopolitical changes, Dutch and 
English retail banks‘ strategies of democratisation.  I frame this comparative discussion in 
terms of several propositions. Finally, in chapter 13 I discuss some methodological 
limitations and present several issues for further research.   
                                                 
1 The emergence of the nation-state as the key expression of popular sovereignty and the main lever of democratic 
self-determination came with the gradual demise of the Holy Roman Empire. The protracted struggles between 
the pope and the Habsburg emperor allowed for incipient nation-states to push up between the Holy Roman 
Empire and the local feudal or city-state units (cf. Ergang, 1971: 22). These incipient nation-states, however, were 
quite disparate entities, centred in court life and not yet inspired by the more active, self-counscious, and 
territorially unified spirit of  ―popular sovereignty‖ that inspired the official birth of nation-states from the late 
eighteenth century onwards. What is more, it is important to emphasise that, even from the end of the eighteenth 
century onwards, the nation-based state has remained as much claim as reality. In this regard, the nominal 
definition of nation-state as "territorial political unit...whose borders coincide with the territorial distribution of a 
national group" is misleading (Walker, 1978: 96). This definition would lead one to conclude that less than ten 
percent of existing states qualify as "nation states" (cfr. Joppke, 1996). More correct is that nation-states are 
always subject to competing claims: that of established or would-be established groups laying claim on a 
territorially unified entity, and that of outsider groups laying claim on a more cosmopolitan entity.  
2 The birth of the nation-state is often associated with the French Revolution, and its search for a universal model 
of self-determination. The first waves of nationalism in continental Europe coincided with this French  
development in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Indeed, with the exception of England and the United 
States, the French nation-state would become the prototypical example for countries developing their own system 
of self-determination (Bereciartu, 1986: 11). Through a process of vicarious adoption and adaptation to historical 
idiosyncracies, however, the French origins often would become virtually unrecognisable.  For instance,  the 
German nation-state, while rooted in the experience of the French Revolution, would develop into a very different 
model of self-determination (cf. Kohn, 1967). 
3 Unless barriers of entry are erected because entrepreneurial dynamics do not suffice to fulfill mininum criteria of 
economic, civic and political democratisation, i.e. when private entrepreneurship is likely to increase economic, 
civic or political democratic deficits.  
4 The predecessor of the nation-state of the Netherlands was the Dutch Republic.  
5 See page 35 for an explanation of the term ―corruption‖. 
6 A further comparison between for instance the US and Sweden or Denmark would bear this out, the latter 
nation-states being regarded as having a higher standard of living and much lower level of income inequality, a 
freer and more inclusive civic sphere, and a stronger State.  See http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/ for 
comparative measures of standard of living and 
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf for comparative measures of 
political rights and civil liberties.  Even Freedom House, the US government-funded institute, ranks Sweden and 
Denmark higher than the US in terms of comparative measures of political rights and civil liberties 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=275 
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7 With regards to non-Western communities, some communitarians insist on the self-sufficiency of premodern 
community traditions (e.g. Macyntire, 1981, 1988; Sandel, 1982), while others emphasise the necessity of a 
―minimal and universal moral code‖ of human rights to counter growing interdependencies between communities 
(Taylor, 1999; Walzer, 1987: 24). 
8 In this manuscript, I shall refer to a ―popular opinion‖ rather than the more frequently used label ―public 
opinion‖ for two reasons. First, by popular opinion I mean an area of action blurring the boundaries between the 
public and the private. The label ―public‖ is misleading in this regard. Second, popular opinion is the area in 
which ―popular sovereignty‖ is expressed and shaped.   
9 Of course there are cross-influences between liberals and communitarians. So, the communitarian Putnam 
adopts the very liberal ideal of a civil society rid of  ―a-moral familism‖. 
10 This last argument of late has been vastly influential. For instance, following North and Weingast‘s (1989) 
explanation of the rise of British capitalism, De Soto (2000) blames the lack of legal rules guaranteeing private 
property rights for lagging economic growth and democratisation in South-America. 
11 The emergence of the so-called ―Washington consensus‖ in the late 1980s and 1990s gave Fukuyama‘s views 
an air of universalism. The Washington consensus entailed a set of apparently monetarist propositions about the 
policies most likely to promote economic growth. These propositions more or less summarized the view then held 
by most of the senior officials at the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other international 
development organisations. 
12 Similarly, Held (1995), Tilly (1995) and Martin and Schuman (1997) note the destructive effects of the 
―globalisation‖ of liberal capitalism on democratic processes and workers‘ rights. 
13 As a remarkable number of qualifiers and adjectives have been attached to the term democracy (Collier and 
Levitsky, 1997), I limit myself to these few core ideal-types. 
14 For instance, according to Linz (1998), democracy distinguishes itself from its premodern predecessors by 
being based on a system of ―government pro tempore‖, i.e. a system of institutionalised time constraints on those 
in power . Likewise, it is often assumed that the strength of Western democratic modernity is that it allows for 
―multiple political forces [to] compete inside an institutional framework‖. As such, outcomes never depend on a 
single controlling force, but rather on a ―a system of decentralised strategic action in which knowledge is 
inescapably provincial‖ (Przeworsky, 1991: 11-12). Remarkably, despite the assumed modernity of these 
institutions, the same pre-modern ability of making clear distinctions between leaders and followers (Luxemburg, 
1970) is said to be a precondition for the proper working of democratic institutions – leaders being those with the 
capacity to formulate collective interests and to act strategically to further them (Pizzorna, 1978). 
15 Indeed, as Mannheim (1935: 44-48), argues incumbent elites endeavour to enroll outsiders. Despite the 
establishment‘s best attempts to keep the previously excluded masses ―away from politics‖, it typically is aware 
that, in the long run, enrolment in a system of economic intensification also puts ―new vigour into these masses‖. 
And this vigour might well attain a structural autonomy beyond the establishment‘s grasp. Especially given 
challenger elites‘ determination to translate and organise this new vigour in a popular opinion at a remove from 
the establishment‘s traditional authority 
16 Again, this scenario is typical during times of increasing ―globalisation‖. In times of declining globalisation, 
challenger elites attack incumbent elites on the basis of their lack of attention for authenticity and unity, more 
than on grounds of lack of mobility and freedom. 
17 As ―markets spread all over the face of the globe‖ a reaction comes in terms of ―a network of measures and 
policies…integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market‖ (Polanyi, 1957: 76).  
18 In terms of democratisation processes, Polanyi can be said to depict the following movement-countermovement 
dynamic. On the one hand, he posits that through a process of privatisation – the installation of economic laissez-
faire – ―market organisation‖ has been imposed by elite capitalists ―on society for non-economic ends‖ (Polanyi, 
1957: 250). This process of privatisation and its corrollary of the self-regulating market, could only come about 
through the political separation of the economic from the embeddedness of local civic communities . Polanyi 
maintains that against the destruction wrought by economic individualisation, countermovements rise to protect 
substantive values by transforming them into key concerns of popular opinion.  the link between the economic 
and the political. He adds that these countermovements in a first instance do not work through the formal 
workings of the State, but only through the grassroot ―discovery of society‖ (Baum, 1996: 45-46). 
19 On the one hand, he posits that international elites demonstrate purely instrumental purposiveness, and thrive 
by using the State to separate the economic from community restraints.  The grassroot masses, on the other hand, 
are depicted as being motivated mainly by value-rational, public purposiveness; hence their interest in linking the 
economic to community traditions. At the root of Polanyi‘s argument is the communitarian assumption that 
reciprocal and redistributive forms of economic exchange have been much more common in human history than 
self-regulating market systems. In fact, Polanyi argues that the advent of the self-regulating market and its 
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corollary of self-interested, instrumental behaviour is an historical aberration working against deeply ingrained 
traditions of altruism and reciprocity. 
20 According to (Cobban, 1969: 108) a ―nation‖ is a group of people who share a significant number (but by no 
means necessarily all) of the following attributes: history, language, ethnic origin, religion, political belief, fear of 
the same adversaries. In short, a nation may be defined as ―a community that is, or wishes to be, a state‖. 
21 Smith (1995: 150-151) maintains that nationalism does not have a theory of how the national will or the 
national boundaries may be ascertained: ―Nationalism‘s core doctrine provides no more than a basic framework 
for social and political order in the world, and it must be filled out by other idea-systems and by the particular 
circumstances of each community‘s situation at the time...nationalism combines a high degree of flexible 
abstaction with a unique ability to tap fundamental popular needs and aspirations‖.  In prior work, Smith (1983: 
23-24) argued that nationalism fundamentally fuses three historically resonant ideals. First, it invokes claims of 
collective self-determination by a certain people. Second, it expresses the ―Golden Age‖ of a particular people‘s, 
through notions of national character and individuality. Third, it vertically divides the world into unique nations 
each contributing its special genius to the common fund of humanity. 
22 See for instance Knippenberg (1996) for a comparative application of the principles to nation-building in the 
Netherlands and the Soviet Union. 
23 By opening the possibility of both city-state and territorial nationalisms, I go beyond a number of authoritative, 
but historically reified definitions of nationalism or ―economic nationalism‖ which equate nationalism with 
contemporary nation-state, i.e. principally territorial boundaries. For instance, Rappard (1937: 1937: 77-78) 
defines nationalism as ―the doctrine which places the nation at the top of the scale of political values, that is, 
above three values of the individual, of regional units, and of the international community‖. Heilperin (1960: 27), 
on the other hand, with economic nationalism denotes ―a body of economic policies aimed a the loosening of the 
organic links between economic processes taking place within the boundaries of a country and those taking place 
beyond these boundaries‖. 
24 In contemporary terms, real wealth can mean different things. According to some, any definition of real wealth 
is based on the assumption that domestic households own all assets in the economy. This includes the stock of 
private capital, net foreign assets (NFA) and public debt. The interpretation proposed in this thesis is as follows:  
real wealth refers to those ―common heritage sources‖ that constitute a collective birthright to a people; the 
common heritage sources include land, culture and public services.  Generally speaking, what all proponents of 
real wealth have in common is their urge to steer savings and credit into the most productive national 
applications, such as industry and the development of householder ownership, rather than the rootless and 
speculative stock market.  
25 Useful references here are Bonardi et al., 2005; Epstein, 1969; Fligstein, 1990; Hillman et al., 2004; Hillman 
and Hitt, 1999; Salamon and Siegfried, 1977.   
26  Success in this regard is the outcome of the transition from unrestrained ambitions of contestability and 
mobility to democratic settlements and habits of restraint.    
27 The clearest example of a nongovernmental organisation is the US-based Freedom House. 
28 According to Weber (1922: 74) Co-operatives are economic associations, i.e. organisations governed primarily 
by ―autocephalous‖  economic action, where by autocephalous is meant that the chief personnel of the 
organisation is selected according to the autonomous order of the organisation itself, rather than being appointed 
by outsiders. 
29 The nominal difference between both types of organisation is based on legal definitions. Obviously, both co-
operatives and Commercial companies are based on Commercial principles.    
30 More particularly, by allowing outsiders to participate in popular opinion as individuals motivated by utilitarian 
money calculations, the establishment has been able to limit organised contestation of institutionalised elite-
follower boundaries. 
31 In other words, the political sanctioning of money as a universal means of exchange allows for the participation 
of previous outsiders in a system of market exchange based on instrumental-rational, rather than value-rational 
purpose. 
32 According to Simmel (1896: 18) ―money produces both a previously unknown impersonality in all economic 
ownership and an equally enhanced independence and autonomy of the personality‖ (Simmel, 1896: 18).  
33 A link between money and national wealth based on the reality of territorial customs, State taxation and 
legislation. 
34 The above distinction can be mapped on the opposition between two more contemporary theories of money: 
monetarism and chartalism. Contary to monetarism, chartalism portrays money as the product of existing social 
customs, taxation and legislation, a symbolic means that can be controlled to some extent by a central state and/or 
local governments within a national territory (e.g. Muller, 1816; Knapp, 1924). 
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2    METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The focus of this manuscript is on historical units of analysis, namely historical 
settlements, success models and traditions of democratisation.  A methodology that 
particularly befits historical units of analysis is analytical dualism. For one, analytical 
dualism - also coined the morphogenetic approach, fully exploits one of the main 
advantages of historical research. It allows for a perspective on organisations that goes 
beyond topical, law-like contemporary explanations (Geyl and Toynbee, 1968;  Kieser, 
1994). Equally important, the methodology allows for a way round one of the most 
important pitfalls of historical research, namely the tendency to favour either actor-driven 
or structural properties in historical explanations. In the same vein, analytical dualism can 
provide a way to balance explanations in terms of both strategic problem-solving and 
longue durée. To achieve this, however, the morphogenetic approach has to accommodate 
another major problem of historical research: the tendency to privilege either specialist 
detail or theoretical universalisation.   
Generally speaking, historical research has tended to privilege specialist detail 
over theoretical generalisation, including in business research (Rowlinson and Procter, 
1999).  Confronted with this theoretical weakness, political ideologists – liberal and 
communitarian alike – have been quick to fill the void with grand theoretical 
universalisations of their liking – for instance about the phenomenon ―democratisation‖.  
As noted in section 1.6, one way to bridge this gap is to rely on a comparative approach, 
precisely because it provides a way to strike a balance between grand theoretical 
generalisation and the flow of consciousness of specialist historical detail. More 
particularly, comparative approaches are complementary to historical methods in that they 
can illuminate the empirical meaning of law-like universals. Especially if researchers focus 
on the range of solutions that actors have found for a given problem across a broader 
spectrum of localities.  Only then are conclusions warranted about what properties of a 
studied phenomenon can be generalised and which ones cannot.  
But the rewards of comparative history can only be reaped on one condition; a 
condition which brings us back to the methodology of analytical dualism. Key actions and 
structural turns have to be identified in terms of varying degrees of strategic intentionality 
and longue durée – with special attention to the role of ―accidents‖ in changing historical 
trajectories. Furthermore, one has to distinguish between different sequences of structural 
and strategic changes – episodes – that are comparable on a case by case basis across 
different contexts (Haydu, 1998).  
Analytical dualism is able to accommodate all these requirements. In what 
follows, I shall briefly discuss the origins and history of this methodology, before 
considering how it meets each of the challenges pointed out above. At the core of 
analytical dualism is a particular view of (the relation between) actor-driven and structural 
properties of historical dynamics. Logically, this is where my archaeology of the 
methodological assumptions underlying analytical dualism starts. 
 
 
 
19 
 
2.2 Outline of the chapter 
 
 Logically, I start the chapter (2.3) with a discussion of the various dimensions of 
modern agency – instrumental and value rationalisation – and structure – normative and 
material authority. Subsequently (2.4) I provide a short history of the ontological and 
methodological study of the relation between agency and structure. The history ends with 
Archer‘s framework of analytical dualism (2.5). Finally (2.6), I argue in favour of 
supplementary attention to the contrary workings of creative problem-solving and longue 
durée – in particular the role of historical accidents; pointing out the importance of 
deploying the framework of analytical dualism across several historical episodes.  
 
2.3 Dimensions of agency and structure 
 
a. Dimensions of agency: value- and instrumental-rationalisation 
Weber was one of the first to identify modern agency with ―rationalisation‖, in 
particular the interplay between the instrumental and value rationalization of human 
agency. Agency is instrumental-rational when the relative efficiency of different available 
means to an end, and sometimes even the ends themselves are weighted, so as to maximise 
benefits. This type of action is typically associated with rational economic action, but also 
with rational political action. Agency is value-rational, by contrast, when the relative 
effectiveness of alternative means to an end are assessed, but the ends themselves are 
accepted as given, perhaps as a moral imperative. This type of agency usually is associated 
with charismatic leadership and the creation of civic communities – but it can easily spill 
over to the spheres of political and/or economic rationality.  
The concept of rationalisation was not just an ―ideal type‖ for Weber. For him it 
had firm roots in an empirical ―feeling of modernity‖: ―we associate the highest measure of 
an empirical 'feeling of freedom' with those actions which we are conscious of performing 
rationally" (Weber, 1949: 124). He argued that this phenomenological sense of freedom, 
far from being rooted in unpredictability and irrationality, arises precisely in those 
situations that can be consistently predicted and mastered.  Despite its obvious merits, 
Weber‘s concept of rationalisation is one-sided.  
First, his analysis is skewed in that it predominantly identifies ―rationalisation 
with the growth of the instrumental and strategic rationality of action complexes‖ 
(Habermas, 1979: 192). Lurking behind this tendency is a sort of materialistic determinism 
(cf. Gerth and Mills, 1946: 47).   This determinism holds that the instrumental-
rationalisation essential to the development of modern capitalism, while making possible 
the technical implementation of large-scale administrative tasks, is ―substantively‖ 
irrational in that it contravenes some of the most distinctive values of Western civilisation 
(Giddens, 1970: 325). In his own words, instrumental-rationalisation unintentionally leads 
Westerners in an ―iron cage‖ of irrationality. 
Second, Weber‘s  determinism as to the unintentional effects of rationalisation 
might well have been grounded in his denial of the emotional or communal quality of 
rationalisation – the value-rational counterpart of instrumental-rationalisation. Weber 
(1922) acknowledges that value-rationalisation provides for real human values beyond 
individual utility and depersonalized calculation. Yet, as noted by Archer (2000: 80-81): 
―in many ways Weber is not our guide to commitment or the moral career…for his own 
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Kantianism, in which the stern voice of duty has the task of overriding our passions, also 
makes Calvinists of us all in our lifeworlds. What fuels our commitments is left entirely 
obscure because of the firm conventional line which Weber draws between value-rational 
and emotional action. Emotions are viewed as uncontrollable forces, not themselves 
subject to our deliberations, yet capable of subverting our evaluative determinations.‖ 
Instead of relegating the emotional to ―irrational‖ charismatic authority, as Weber does, I 
shall reconnect emotional investment with rationality, by introducing the  concept of 
emotional ―antagonism‖ as a crucial element of value-rationalisation. 
Going beyond Weber‘s methodological individualism, Polanyi (1957b) adds that 
value- rationalisation has a non-quantifiable, ―community-creating‖ effect (cf. Baum, 
1996: 51). This effect is grounded in the struggle between established and outsider groups, 
and the emotional antagonisms that are created in the process between these groups  (Elias, 
1965; Schmitt, 1932; see also Bourdieu, 1985). In contrast to value rationality, 
instrumental rationality does not respect antagonisms and communal boundaries between 
established and outsider groups. Instead, it is grounded in the association between insiders 
and strangers according to depersonalised, calculable criteria (cf. Münch, 1990). For 
instance, the growth of local credit co-operatives in the Netherlands was partly attributable 
to their capacity to organise beyond the local community-level, and organise in Central 
Co-operatives. Through these Central Co-operatives, the local Co-operatives were able to 
pool their financial reserves, and build a financial capital that could be used selectively 
according to impersonal, utility-maximising rationales.  
The important thing to remember is that value-rationalisation and instrumental-
rationalisation are mutually constitutive. On the one  hand, value-rationalities play a 
pivotal role in any process of instrumental-rationalization: they infuse impersonal, 
utilitarian rationalities with a sense of purpose, a ―unified view of the world derived from a 
consciously integrated and meaningful attitude toward life‖ (Weber, 1930: 450). For 
instance, the regional  association of local co-operatives in Central Co-operatives, would 
not have been possible without religious leaders‘ concurrent mobilisation of local farmers 
around a common antagonism; i.e. an aversion for liberal and socialist democratisation 
influences. While instrumental-rationality needs values to motivate actors and infuse them 
with distinct purposiveness, value-rationalization does not occur in a vacuum either, but 
needs to pass the test of instrumental-rationality to be viable in economic life. For instance, 
the bourgeois community of international financiers concentrated in first Antwerp and later 
Amsterdam, provided foreign sovereigns and nobles with the same international lending 
and financing practices which had caused its prior ―excommunication‖ from domestic 
affairs . This move to instrumental-rational lending practices in the international sphere 
was not only concurrent with the material needs of warring international sovereigns, but 
also with the development of an ―economic individualism‖ in fifteenth century Antwerp, 
―a home common to all nations‖, ruled by a liberal bourgeoisie pursuing, ―in the teeth of 
all precedents, a policy of practical individualism which would have been met in any other 
city by rebellion‖ (cf. Tawney, 1926: 67-69).  That financiers in Antwerp and later 
Amsterdam were able to engage in impersonal lending practices with mutually warring 
sovereigns without being attacked themselves, was made possible by the fact that these 
cities were recognised as a-political spheres of private utility exchange in the public 
interest.  
What is the relevance of the above for this particular study? From an agency 
perspective, the intensification of purposiveness in Western Europe went hand in hand 
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with the mutually constitutive processes of value- and instrumental-rationalisation. 
Unfortunately, however, in describing this process, most contemporary organisational 
scholars deny the concept of instrumental-rationalization any footing in the process of 
value-rationalisation. Instrumental-rationalization is often interpreted exclusively in terms 
of means-end rationalities to the detriment of the evaluation of the ends themselves 
(Whimster and Lash, 1987: 19). One of the aims here is to remediate this flaw in 
organisation studies. In order to do this, we first turn to a discussion of the structural 
results of value and instrumental rationalisation efforts, namely normative and material 
authority.  
b.  Dimensions of structure: normative and material authority  
According to Weber (1922: 943) economic organisation faces ― two diametrically 
contrasting types of authority‖: the first type is material as it refers to ―a constellation of 
interests (in particular by virtue of a position of monopoly)‖, the second type is normative 
as it refers to the legitimacy which infuses those holding it with ―the power to command‖ 
and those acknowledging it with ―the duty to obey‖.  Normative authority is the structural 
capacity of actors to realise their beliefs of what is purposive and what is not by virtue of 
collective status-role expectations. Material authority, on the other hand, refers to actors‘ 
structural capacity to enact their interests by virtue of the sheer visibility of their number or 
size.  
As determinants of the stratification of the fields of civil society, politics and 
markets, normative and material authority come into being through two dynamics, value-
rationalisation and instrumental-rationalisation.  The emergence of these forms of 
rationalisation marked a structural transition in Western history: that from a social order 
based on external constraint (traditional authority) to one dependent on the internalisation 
of constraint (rational authority). This crucial transition in Western life entailed the 
internalisation of a belief in self-determination as a main driver of human conduct; 
concurrently a progressive ―disenchantment‖ with external belief systems (Alexander, 
1987: 187) and an increasing reliance on the visibility of material results as proof of the 
capacity of self-determination . From an historical perspective, this implied an increasing 
will to believe that problems considered before as metaphysical could come within reach 
of self-determination if tackled through instrumental-rationalisation. Instead of external 
belief systems, Westerners started internalising a generalised awareness of public norms in 
their life conduct (Etzioni, 1968: 225; Mead, 1934). As we shall see, this involved among 
others the emergence of the structural realities of state law, civil societies, geopolitical and 
market rationalities.  
Weber further subdivides normative authority in three ideal types: legal-rational 
authority, charismatic authority and traditional authority. For Weber, there is a general 
trend in Western society towards the expansion of legal-rational authority. In a nutshell, 
legal-rational authority entails obedience to impersonal, predictable, abstract rules that 
ensures the self-constraint needed for a stable public order. While legal-rational authority 
provides the normative basis of impersonal association, traditional authority has its basis in 
the unreflective reproduction of local, communal practices over time. Charismatic 
authority, finally, is produced through the emotional effects of exceptional leaders who 
reveal a new normative order tot their participants. Weber argues that, though remnants of 
traditional authority are still visible nowadays, in modern times it is mainly through the 
charisma of an extraordinary leader that community feelings can arise (Weber, 1922: 243). 
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Despite its obvious merits, Weber‘s analysis of normative authority is flawed, 
especially when it comes to charismatic authority. For it is in this concept that Weber‘s 
two major theoretical weaknesses converge: on the one hand, his methodological 
individualism, and, on the other hand, his firm belief that value-rationalisation and 
emotional action are unconnected: indeed, for Weber emotional action is ―irrational‖.  
These two assumptions leave him with no other option than to introduce a deus ex machina 
explanation in his account of charismatic authority. On the one hand, he claims that 
charismatic leadership, as the basis of emotional community-creation, is ―specifically 
irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules‖ (1922: 244) and only dependent on the 
personality of one individual. On the other hand, Weber defines the essence of charismatic 
authority as devotion to the ―normative patterns or order revealed or ordained‖ by the 
leader (1925: 215, italics added). Discarding the deus ex machina explanation begs the 
question: how does a leader mobilize a community of participants and build a normative 
order? Instead of reducing charismatic authority to the ―revelation‖ of a normative order to 
a privileged leader, I propose that it is through the ongoing creation of collective value-
expectations – what Mead calls the ―generalized other‖ (1934: 155) – that community-
effecting, normative authority comes about (Joas, 1997). More particularly, as a specific 
end-result of value-rationalisation, charismatic authority comes about by unifying a 
community around specific antagonisms against outsiders‘ lifestyle (cf. Elias, Schmitt, 
Schütz). Obviously, the availability of individuals able to take up normative status-roles 
can facilitate the creation of this authority. The effect of the individual taking up these 
roles, however, is as much structural as charismatic. In assuming this, I correct another 
flaw in Weber‘s theory of authority: his tendency to conceive of tradition and modernity as 
―mutually exclusive terms‖ (Bendix, 1967). Thus, while Weber reduces traditional 
authority to a residual variable in danger of extinction in modernity, I argue that the 
creation of charismatic authority hinges on the availability of charismatic leaders able to 
plausibly ―invent traditions‖ of authority (Hobsbawm, 1983).  
Regarding the concept of legal-rational authority, I assume with Weber that the 
emergence of legal-rationality depended, on the one hand, on the creation of a communal 
framework setting the boundaries of legitimate popular opinion (Weber, 1946: 195) , and, 
on the other hand, on the creation of a State apparatus – an infrastructure of State – holding 
a legitimate monopoly of violence. Weber‘s double assumption reveals how the strength of 
legal-rational authority hinges on its relation to both normative-charismatic and material 
authority. On the one hand, since charismatic leadership is the basis of community-
creation, it provides for the foundations of emotional attachment and normative obligation 
to the law. On the other hand, the authority of law also hinges on its material instantiation 
in a bureaucratic apparatus able to make visible the legitimate monopoly of violence. 
Weber‘s double assumption notwithstanding, most accounts of legal-rational authority do 
not make explicit its grounding in both a normative and material component.
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2.4   Relation between dimensions of agency and structure:                          
 an archaeology 
 
As should have become clear from the above, Weber‘s work has proved 
invaluable in expounding agency and structural properties of organisational endeavours. 
The same cannot be said about his elucidation of the relation between agency and 
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structural properties.  For one, as his argument about the increasing disenchantment with 
Puritan Christianity in favour of material instrumentality indicates, Weber‘s analysis of 
modernisation is rife of material determinism. Also, through the lens of his methodological 
individualism, Weber identifies modern ―rationality‖ predominantly with autonomous 
agency properties. This assumption, together with his inclination of material determinism, 
barred Weber from spelling out that the ―rational‖ also has autonomous structural 
properties, of both material and normative substance. Instead, he associated the structural 
dynamic of modernisation with growing substantive ―irrationality‖, and the agency 
dynamic with a ―blind‖ search for formal rationality (cf. Gronow, 1988: 327-9).   
a) Elias  
With his account of the development of Western civilisation, Norbert Elias (1939) 
was one of the first to tackle these deficiencies in Weber‘s theory . He argued that there is 
more to the modern spirit than reflective rationalization: ―rationalization…represents only 
one side of a more comprehensive change in the whole social personality. It goes hand in 
hand with a corresponding transformation of drive structures‖ (Elias, 1939: 414). In this 
sense, what is finally attributed qualities of ―rationality‖ not only depends on the 
autonomous properties of agencies, but also on the structural changes in the way people 
habitually orient themselves in the world in which they live: ―what is rationalised is, 
primarily, the modes of conduct of certain groups of people‖ (Elias, 1939: 412). This 
entails the embodiment in habitual conduct of self-constraints (Mennell and Goudsblom, 
1998: 19; see also Bourdieu, 1979: 170) . As a largely unpredictable by-product of the 
purposive interaction between agencies, this structural dynamic has often been called 
―internalisation‖ (Mead, 1934; Parsons, 1964; Bourdieu, 1979).   
Because Elias‘ account is positioned as a reaction against Weber‘s 
methodological individualism, it tends to be quite structuralist. In other words, Elias‘ 
contribution to the discussion was only partially successful. As we shall see in the next 
section, Talcott Parsons, another student of Weber, while making other valuable 
contributions demonstrated some deterministic flaws too. In fact, it is only with 
Lockwood‘s, Giddens‘ and Archer‘s reactions to Parsons‘ endeavours, that the relation 
between structure and agency – as two equally important sides of the problem of human 
organisation – has been tackled in less deterministic ways. In what follows, I review the 
contributions of each of these authors with regards to the relation between agency and 
structure, starting with Parsons.  
b) Parsons 
In trying to develop a systematic approach to sociological theory, Parsons (1964, 
1951, 1937; Parsons et al., 1962) developed a ―structural-functional‖ perspective on 
agency. According to Parsons, interaction between individuals is not random but mediated 
by common ―standards of value-orientation‖ – i.e. norms – that provide a stratified order to 
action. He argued that the ―fundamental dynamic theorem of sociology‖ (1952: 42) should 
be to focus on those structural points of the social system that provide normative 
integration to social action. Within this context, the key sociological issue was the study of 
the integration of levels of social analysis. More specifically, echoing Weber‘s interest in, 
on the one hand, societal rationalisation, and, on the other hand, the modern individual‘s 
―conduct of life‖, Parsons focused on ―the problem of theoretical formulation of the 
relations between the social system and the personality of the individual‖ (1964: 1). While 
intially, Parsons articulated a micro-oriented action theory in terms of Weber‘s ―verstehen‖ 
and focused on voluntarism and emergent properties of action (1937), he gradually lapsed 
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into a perspective on actors as passive recipients of normative integration. As a result of 
Parsons‘ personal theoretical development, there lingers in his terminology a duality 
between voluntaristic action and externally constraining structures.
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c) Lockwood 
In response to the dominance of the Parsonian assumption in Anglo-Saxon 
sociological thinking that the motives of human agency could only be supplied by an 
integrated normative order, Lockwood (1956, 1964) was one of the first  scholars to renew 
attention for, on the one hand, the non-normative elements of agency, and, on the other 
hand, the dynamics of structural change through conflictual action. First, Lockwood (1956) 
claims that Parsons neglected the existence of a non-normative factual order in the sphere 
of ―‘power‘, economic and political‖ (141)37 – as first elucidated by Marx and Weber.  
Nevertheless, material interests – i.e. ―interests other than those which actors have in 
conforming with the normative definition of the situation‖ (1956: 136) – are essential to a 
sociological analysis of social stratification, and need to be treated on a par with normative 
structures. In fact, in maintaining that ―sociology has to do with the interplay of norm and 
[material] substratum in relation to the problem of stability and change of social systems‖, 
Lockwood seems to have been aiming at a more sweeping methodological change.
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Second, Lockwood (1964) advances the necessity of a non-reductive analysis of the 
interplay between structure and agency.  Thus, in contrast with Parsons, Lockwood (1964) 
does not assume action to be bound to the confines of systemic integration. Instead, he 
emphasises that ―parts‖ at the system level and ―persons‖ at the social level not only are 
analytically distinct, but also to some degree independent of each other. Combined with his 
prior claim that ―the very existence of a normative order mirrors the continual potentiality 
of conflict‖, most notably with regards to ―material interests‖ (Lockwood, 1956: 137), 
Lockwood opens up considerable space for what has since been seen as a key problem of 
social analysis: ―why does some conflictual action issue in structural change whilst equally 
intense conflictual action remains without issue?‖. 
d) Parsons again 
An aspect of Parsons‘ structural-functionalist statement that was left largely 
unexplored by Lockwood and Archer is his second criterion of stratification. Indeed, 
Parsons recognises that ―the concrete hierarchical ‗position‘ of a system-unit in a social 
system cannot only be a function of its place in the scale of valuation relative to an 
integrated common value-system, because no social system is ever perfectly integrated in 
this sense‖ (1953: 390). He thus points to the existence of a second criterion of 
stratification: material power, which he defines as ―the realistic capacity of a system-unit 
to actualise its ‗interests‘ (attain goals, prevent undesired interference, command respect, 
control possessions, etc.)‖. Parsons elaborates the notion of material power by describing 
the relation between what he called the functional imperatives of the social system and its 
different subsystems, most notably the ―economy‖ and the ―polity‖.  The ―economy‖ is an 
action system geared towards the functional imperative of fulfilling individual need-
dispositions through adaptation to and of the environment. The function of the action 
system called the ―polity‖, on the other hand, is to attain ―societal‖ goals. Coming from an 
―evolutionary theory‖ background, Parsons reduces economic dynamics to the adaptation 
of behavioral need-dispositions. The primary motivation of action in the economic 
subsystem is the individual ―optimization of gratification‖ (cf. Parsons, 1951: 5-6). 
Politics, on the other hand, is mainly geared towards instrumental-rational collective ―goal-
attainment‖, i.e. the enforcement and authoritative interpretation of societal norms in 
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relation to the environment. More generally speaking, it concerns ―collective action in 
whatever situations indicate that relatively specific measures should be undertaken in the 
‗public‘ interest‖ (Parsons, 1969: 46). While Parsons also wants to leave room for 
autonomous political norm-creation, this secondary autonomy argument hardly is 
consonant with his primary argument that an overarching social system normatively 
integrates the subsystems, most notably the economy and the polity. More specifically, 
Parsons argues that the social system keeps the functions of adaption (economy) and goal-
attainment (polity)  in line with higher ―governing‖ patterns of purposiveness through the 
normative regulation provided by status-role expectations
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e) Giddens 
Giddens (1979, 1984), in what has come to be known as ―structuration theory‖, 
set out to transcend the dualism of struture and agency, by building on Lockwood‘s 
distinction between system and social integration. For Giddens, social and system 
integration, agency and structure, are two sides of the same coin. So, on the one hand, 
―structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices‖ (1979: 69), and, 
on the other hand, structure only exists through agency. Agents have ―rules and resources‖ 
between them which facilitate or constrain their action. Giddens‘ analysis has often been 
criticised for its overly agency centred character, as evidenced by Giddens‘ statement that 
―structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that agents have about what they 
do in their day-to-day activity‖ (1984: 26). Since, for Giddens, structure and agency are 
always mutually constitutive, their interplay can be separated only by so-called 
―methodological bracketing‖. Two types of methodological bracketing are possible. In so-
called ―institutional analysis‖, structural properties are treated as chronically reproduced 
features of social systems.  In the ―analysis of strategic conduct‖, on the other hand, the 
focus is placed upon the contextually situated activities of definite groups, where actors 
draw upon structural properties in the constitution of social relations. (Giddens, 1984 
:288). As a proponent of ―social constructionism‖, Giddens has been severely criticised by 
―critical realists‖ such as Archer40, who blame him for neglecting the pre-reflexive and 
autonomous reality of a stratified order.  
 
2.5 Archer‟s analytical dualism 
 
a. Introduction 
Coining herself a ―critical realist‖41, Archer developed a methodological 
programme called ―analytical dualism‖ (1982, 1988, 1995, 1996, 2000)42. With this 
programme, Archer has two main aims.  First, she endeavours to go beyond Giddens‘ 
(1979, 1984) social constructionist concept of ―duality‖. Giddens introduced this concept 
in order to transcend the dichotomy between voluntarism – the transformative capacities of 
actors – and determinism – the persistent, recursive nature of action. Referring to the 
phenomenon of bureaucratisation as introduced by Weber, Archer maintains that Giddens‘ 
concept of duality ―precludes a specification of when there will be ‗more Voluntarism‘ or  
‗more Determinism‘‖ (Archer, 1996: 86).  Giddens' structuration theory has produced a 
conceptualisation of social reality as timeless and endless praxis; ontologically, only praxis 
is real while structures and agents are only useful analytical constructs (Archer, 1995: 79-
89). Contra Giddens, Archer insists that structures and agents from an analytical point of 
view possess their own emergent properties and can be temporally differentiated. The aim 
of Archer‘s approach of analytical dualism thus is not to eradicate the dualism of structure 
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and agency, but to realise that to analyze the interplay between these two sides of the same 
coin, one must introduce a methodological ―historicity‖ that recognises their inter-
dependence over time, but rejects the idea that they are reducible to one another at a certain 
point of time (1995: 66). This, however, is only possible if one takes the view that 
structure and agency are phased over different tracts of time, and that the former begins 
prior to the latter, having autonomy from it and exerting a causal influence on it.  
In terms of this manuscript, one advantage of analytical dualism is that it is aimed 
at differentiating between causalities at the levels of structure (nation-state institutions) and 
agency (firms). Another advantage is that it explicitly incorporates an historical approach 
to the interaction of structural and agency effects. The combination of these two aspects 
makes the morphogenetic methodology a compelling approach for drawing theoretical 
conclusions from historical phenomena. Especially when these historical phenomena are 
the result of a systematic comparative analysis of both agency and structural dynamics, as 
is the case here with the twin focus on firms‘ strategies and changing nation-state 
institutions. 
b. Applying Archer’s analytical dualism 
Not surprisingly I shall apply Archer‘s framework of analytical dualism to throw 
light on the historical phenomena under study in this manuscript. As with all social science 
methodologies, orthodoxy should not be prioritised over relevant application to specific 
empirical and theory-building cases.  Thus, rather than literally following Archer‘s 
prescriptions, I apply the methodology of ―analytical dualism‖ in a way most adapted to 
the particular cases and theory-building purposes at hand. In particular, I construct 
historical narratives and classify historical events and actions in terms of the following 
three analytical phases
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:  
PHASE 1:  CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE  
First, there is a period of structural conditioning, in which emergent structural 
properties causally impinge on actors. These structural properties emerge as growing 
contradictions between changing geo-political realities and the type of democratic 
settlement that is currently in place.
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  Contradictions act as a mechanism for ―warning and 
alarming‖ that a disturbance must be removed (Luhmann, 1984: 369-373).45  By creating a 
structural tension, they open a potential for change which outsiders try to take advantage 
of.
46
 Contradiction in the context of this study,
 
most notably emerges in the form of 
perceptions of a ―democratic deficit‖, be it with regards to political, economic and/or civic 
institutions  
PHASE 2:  FIRST STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS  
Second, there is a period of strategic interaction, in which established and 
challenger elites propose rivalling solutions to democratic deficits.
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48
  Typically, 
challenger elites frame their arguments in terms of ―transformation‖, while established 
elites argue for ―reproduction‖.  To make their case, challenger and established elites 
reframe their arguments in terms of those traditions of democratisation which are most 
contiguous with their positions. 
PHASE 3:  STRATEGIC POSITIONS IN NEW SETTLEMENTS  
Finally, there is a period of institutional elaboration, in which the more lasting, 
structural effects of strategic interaction take shape. In contrast with phase 1, in which 
structural contradictions – between geopolitical and domestic realities – trigger action, in 
phase 3 action triggers the formation of complementarities between structural realities.
49
  If 
clear complementarities emerge in democratic settlements between domestic and 
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geopolitical realities, nation-states‘ and firms‘ strategic positions are likely to improve or 
be consolidated. If no clear complementarities are found, the probability will be high that 
overwhelming contradictions will emerge in a next phase, forcing actors to engage in 
radical and traumatic transformation.
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The totality of these three phases encompasses what Archer calls a cycle of 
morphogenesis
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 or  morphostasis, depending on whether new settlements result in 
respectively structural transformation or reproduction.
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 I shall apply this methodological 
framework in chapter 3, figure 3.2, to throw light on the relation between democratisation 
dynamics and firms‘ ability to occupy a favourable vantage point in nation-settlements.   
 
2.6 Strategic problem-solving versus longue durée 
 
Less clearly integrated in Archer‘s analytical dualism are two key aspects of the 
agency-structure debate: the issues of strategic problem-solving – relatively ―unhistorical‖ 
creativity (cf. Geyl, 1955; Nietzsche, 1983) – and longue durée. 
a) Strategic problem-solving 
As argued before, analytical dualism is highly suitable to identify the precise 
agency and institutional properties that caused selection between different trajectories of 
problem-solving (see also Skocpol, 1980; Djelic, 1998). Especially if an empirical 
phenomenon such as democratisation is considered across clearly delineated comparable 
episodes in different localities. Yet, beyond this methodological framework, how does the 
creativity of problem-solving come about? Archer (2000) herself has brought up the lack 
of elaboration of creative action in her previous work. I shall draw mostly on elements of 
pragmatic philosophy to fill this void. The pragmatism of Peirce (1877, 1878), Dewey 
(1927, 1922, 1917), Mead (1934) and James (1908) has as often been called social 
communitarian as liberal-utilitarian. One reason for this paradox is that pragmatism is not a 
monolithic theory, and the bringing together of decontextualized propositions of different 
pragmatists often leads to contradictory conclusions.  So, while certain propositions of 
Dewey and Mead reveal a tendency towards communitarianism, James‘ propositions of 
―theories as instruments‖ and ―the cash-value of ideas‖ point more to a mentality of 
utilitarianism (cf. James, 1908: 23). Yet, in general, pragmatism differs from 
communitarianism and utilitarianism on crucial points. First, pragmatism is not a theory 
that assumes an ethical or political reality of the good waiting to be discovered, but rather 
is a theory of political and ethical creativity, i.e. the making of reality. So, for James, the 
reality of politics, morality or the economy is acquired through the putting in practice of a 
“will to believe‖. This will to believe is invented rather than revealed in the course of 
human activity. In other words, the reality of an ―organisational habit‖ is created through a 
process that can be called ―what pays in practice by way of belief‖. Quite different from 
utilitarians and communitarianism,  pragmatists – with the exception of Peirce, who tended 
more towards a metaphysical pragmaticism – essentially are process philosophers for 
whom the journey, the flow, is more important than the outcome or the product (cf. 
McDermott: 93). Nevertheless, if pragmatism is used as a short-term perspective, Dewey 
and Mead more and more become communitarians, and James more and more becomes a 
utilitarian. To differentiate pragmatism from the a priori assumptions of communitarianism 
and liberalism it therefore is essential to treat it as a long-term perspective.  
Pragmatists maintain that all purposive action is caught in the tension between 
prestructuring habits and acts of creativity (Joas, 1992: 129). While the ―practical 
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consciousness‖53 of habits dominates most of human endeavours, creative, ―discursive 
consciousness‖54 only arises in situations of ―breakdown‖ of these habits, when new 
problems arise that call for new solutions. In other words, according to pragmatist thinking 
the blockade of traditional, routine activities encourages actors to start a conscious 
reassessment of the situation, a process which has been termed "reconstruction" by John 
Dewey (1977 [1917]) and George Herbert Mead (1934). Reflexive forms of intentionality 
and explicitly stated goals emerge when habits fail.
55
  The anchoring of purpose in 
concrete ―problem-solving‖ situations can be seen as the most fundamental pragmatist 
vantage point. With this problem-solving perspective, pragmatists directly refute 
teleological interpretations of purposiveness, be they in terms of normative or material 
functionality
56
.  
 Adopting a problem-solving perspective allows for a more actor-centred 
perspective on historical episodes than is usually the case in communitarian or utilitarian 
accounts. Indeed, a problem-solving approach can provide a richer answer to the question 
why agencies at a given time focus on either existing or new institutions to resolve issues. 
In this view, one can understand how agencies‘ purposiveness is not (dis)embedded, but 
more or less transformatory, depending on the history of increasing or decreasing returns 
associated with certain institutions.  
 The biggest deficiency of pragmatic theories of problem-solving is their lack of 
institutional underpinnings, which leaves their notion of ―habits‖ rather ungrounded in 
structural variables of context and history. Thus, I reconsider the relation between the ―will 
to believe‖, ―what works in practice‖ and ―habits‖ from a viewpoint of traditions 
accumulated over the longe duree. I argue that expressing affinity with such traditions – 
through modernised habits – is as important in creating actual beliefs as the other way 
round. In other words, to foster a new ―will to believe‖ when the old one is breaking down, 
one needs to keep cultivating traditions – product of the old will to believe – by 
modernising the expressive habits associated with them.   
b) Longue durée 
The ―longue durée‖ is a term introduced by the French Annales School to 
designate a particular approach to the study of history, which gives priority to long-term 
historical structures over short-term events and social consciousness. This social science 
approach to historical research was pioneered by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, furthered 
by Fernand Braudel and most recently integrated in Robert Putnam's study of Italian 
democracy. The great merit of long durée writers is their insistence on the discovery and 
elaboration of centuries old, pre-modern structures as a condition to an adequate 
understanding of modern institutions such as capitalism and democracy. Also, the Annales 
School emphasises the role of historical accidents in their perspective on the emergence of 
enduring deeper structures. Unfortunately, like Marxists the Annales writers tend to 
overemphasise deep structures over social superstructures, leading to a somewhat 
deterministic, objectivistic focus. Furthermore, some writers tend to privilege normative 
structures – structural mentalities (e.g. Febvre, 1911), while others are too enamoured with 
material structures such as geography or the environment (Braudel, 1958).  
Although the recent work of De Landa (2000) falls into the latter category, it 
managed to refresh the longue durée school of thinking by reframing it from a 
morphogenetic viewpoint. According to De Landa, deeper structures should not be 
assumed as such, but studied as the result of specific historical processes, specific 
interactions between actors, institutions and organisations. Although the author still calls 
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social consciousness and actors ―lower scale‖ entities – true to the structuralist Annales 
School, his work opens an avenue to an innovative take on the longue durée. For instance 
if one reinterprets republican settlements from the following viewpoint.  Historical 
settlements accumulate as enduring problem-solving vehicles – success models – by way 
of the repeated interaction between normative ideals, material factors such as geography 
and environment, as well as historical accidents – ―happy‖ accidents in the case of success 
models. Furthermore, key to the morphogenetic approach introduced by De Landa is that 
such success models can be vehicles of transformation as well as stability or inertia. The 
outcome simply depends on actors‘ creative capacities, as well as the timely re-occurrence 
of happy accidents. 
c) The importance of studying successive episodes 
In order to study the causal roles of strategic problem-solving and longue durée in 
a meaningful way it is necessary to study historical phenomena across different historical 
episodes. Longue durée and historical accidents – and their effect on social consciousness 
– by definition can only be analysed as the accumulative result of different episodes. 
Likewise, it is only possible to distinguish the historical role played by either intentional 
problem-solving or unintentional accidents if one considers that either could be reinforcing 
or, on the contrary, thwart the other. This again calls for a study of successive historical 
episodes, at least two but preferably three or more to allow for enough variety of 
causalities and structure-strategy interactions.     
 
 
                                                 
35 In addition, normative accounts of law such as the one dominant in American sociology are conspicuously 
silent on the charismatic properties of agencies engendering legal rationalities. In this manuscript, I explicitly rely 
on the assumption of this double grounding. 
36 Nevertheless, in a final instance, Parsons called himself a ―cultural determinist‖, which for some tilts he 
balance of his theoretical endeavours decidely towards a one-way structure-action process. For instance, in 
Parsons‘ later work he emphasises the key process of internalisation: ―the ways that the norms of a system are 
transferred to the actors within the system‖ (Ritzer, 1992: 357). Thus, some maintain that ―in the world of Talcott 
Parsons, actors are constantly orienting themselves to situations and very rarely, if ever, acting‖ (Whyte, 1961: 
255) 
37 Lockwood elsewhere specificies what he means by the material: ―the factual organisation of production, and 
the powers, interests and conflicts and groupings consequent of it.‖ (1956: 137-138) 
38 ―The presence of a normative order, or common value system, does not mean that conflict has disappeared, or 
been resolved in some way. Instead, the very existence of a normative order mirrors the continual potentiality of 
conflict…Therefore,…it is necessary to conceptualise not only the normative structuring of motives but also the 
structuring of interests in the substratum.‖ (Lockwood, 1956: 137) 
39 Obviously, there are serious problems with Parsons‘ account of the economic and political action. In particular 
the reduction of economic action to behavioral adaptation, and political action to the attainment of goals set in a 
higher field of purposiveness, namely culture, is problematic. From an actor-centered, empirical point of view, 
denying economic and political agencies any real autonomy of purpose is a self-defeating research strategy. In 
addition, Parsons‘ analysis is incomplete in so far as it does not elaborate on the different levels of analysis of 
―the political‖ and ―economic‖ and their mutual relation. Does ―the political‖ only relate to the structure of State? 
How are the political and the economic differentiated and how do they interpenetrate each other? How are value-
rationalisation and instrumental-rationalisation related to the political and the economic? 
40 Its ample merits notwithstanding, Archer‘s interpretation of the morphogenetic methodology can still be 
refined. Perhaps the most common concern expressed by those critical of Archer‘s critical realist approach is that 
it tends to reify social structures by accepting that these structures have an internal logic and reality of their own 
external to human influence. Indeed, the criticism uttered by social constructionists and poststructuralists is that 
Archer‘s approach falls heavily on the structuralist side of the structure/agency debate. This criticism misses the 
point that Archer is introducing an ―analytical‖ separation between structural and agency causalities with the aim 
to facilitate empirical research in historicising terms. What does remain unclear in Archer‘s argument, however, 
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are two elements. First, most of Archer‘s attention has gone to the analysis of normative structure, much less to 
the interplay of normative and material structures through the concepts of contradiction and complementarity. 
Archer (2000: 24) even claims that complementarities and contradictions are internal to normative structures, not 
internal to the interplay of material and normative structures, as Lockwood originally claimed.  (Archer claims 
that culture, i.e. normative structure, is a ―system with internal relationships of contradiction and complementary 
as its emergent properties‖ (2000: 24).  A second weakness in Archer‘s analysis is the lack of elaboration of 
rivalling agency dynamics compared to the attention given to structural contradictions and complementarities. 
This carries a distinct, though unintended methodological danger: the privileging of the structural over the actor-
oriented. For instance, Weber‘s structuralist assumption of, on the one hand, a complementarity of the 
instrumental-rational with modernisation, and, on the other hand, a contradiction of the value-rational with 
modernisation, led him to predict a future in which means dominate values and the substantive is systematically 
irrationalised to the advantage of the formal-technical. (This refers to Weber‘ s argument that, while the formal 
rationality of bureaucracy enables large-scale administrative tasks, it is substantively irrational in that it denies 
some of the most distinctive values of Western civilisation (see also Giddens, 1970: 325)). Weber foresaw no way 
of breaking through this irrationality. He claimed that the future would only bring increasing submergence of 
human autonomy and individuality within an ever-expanding bureaucratisation of modern life: ―the technical and 
economic conditions of machine production…determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this 
mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force‖ (Weber, 1930: 
123).Although this argument has proven to be overly deterministic and negative (e.g. Beetham, 1987), it has had 
an important influence on organisational sociology.  (Obviously, I am not implying that Archer disregards the 
importance of processes of value-rationalisation in modern times. Indeed, in her latest work Archer has started to 
emphasise on the very importance of value-rationalisation and human agency. contradictions are ―functional‖ in 
that they at the same time provide the motivation to build new structural complementarities and reorder the social 
system (Luhmann, 1987a, 1987b) .   Grievances of corruption arise when a group of challenger elites challenges 
the wisdom of established modes of coordinating political, economic and civic issues. To make their case, 
challenger elites reframe their arguments in terms of those traditions of democratisation which they see as 
resonating most in terms of soundness).  To avoid this methodological trap, I introduce two dynamics at the 
agency level as a counterpart to structural ―relations of contradiction and complementarity‖: the dynamics of 
―antagonism‖ and ―association‖. (For an explanation of the relation between antagonism and association and 
respectively value-rationalisation and instrumental rationalisation, see Appendix A, 2a) These dynamics 
effectively relate to the four logics of democratisation introduced in section 2. More specifically, I claim that by 
engaging in political and economic association – the logics of special interest and selective incentive – and  civic 
antagonism – the logics of established and outsiders, economic actors endeavour to transform structural 
contradictions into complementarities.  On the one hand, the preference for the term association is quite evident in 
a study which takes the economic organisational level as one of its key units of analysis. On the other hand, from 
an actor-centered perspective, antagonism points to a different dynamic than ―contradiction‖, as it forces the 
organisation studies scholar to focus on the empirical reality of how agencies draw boundaries between who and 
what constitutes civic community and what not. (Every antagonism ―transforms into a political one if is 
sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to [the categories] friend and enemy‖ (Schmitt, 
1932: 37). Antagonism is a highly emotional, simplifying mechanism that instills an absolute belief in the 
superior worth of the own community as opposed to other communities (cf. Gamson, 1995; Ruef, 2000). 
Obviously, feelings of antagonisms partly originate in the discursive articulation of contradiction. Still, as argued 
by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), to gain maximum emotional resonance contradictions should be grounded in 
binary oppositions that best reflect emerging common denominators in popular opinion. Laclau and Mouffe 
illustrate this with a well-known example. So, they argue that a major reason for the growth of Thatcherism in the 
1980‘s was the conservatives‘ capacity to articulate the increasing unease of the public with collectivist policies: 
in particular, the conservatives successfully contrasted the notions of ―consumer‖ and ―bureaucrat‖, ―market‖ and 
―state‖, ―individual‖ and ―society‖.  
41 The ontology of critical realism was developed by Bhaskar (1975, 1993). 
42 Analytical dualism is an emergentist ontology produced by the realist philosophy of science according to which 
social reality is stratified, so that "the emergent properties of structures and agents are irreducible to one another... 
and given structures and agents are also temporally distinguishable" (Archer, 1995: 66).   
43 Archer in effect distinguishes between four phases (see footnote 34). 
44 One could here refer to the ―Tocqueville effect‖ which Furet interprets as the democratic ressentiment which an 
unbearable consistency between various aspects of reality created in France before and during the Revolution 
(Furet, 1981; Tocqueville, 1856).  
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45 As we shall see in phase 3, contradictions also are ―functional‖ in that they at the same time provide the 
motivation to build new structural complementarities and reorder the social system (Luhmann, 1987a, 1987b).     
46 In the words of Archer (1996a: xxii): ―contradictions mould problem-ridden situations for actors which they 
must confront if and when they realise, or are made to acknowledge, that the proposition(s) they endorse is 
enmeshed in some inconsistency‖. As in any other social system, contradiction lies at the heart of change in 
varieties of democratic capitalism (cf. Przeworski, 1992; Girling, 1997). 
47 My ―phase 2‖ in effect collapse in one phase two phases of Archer‘s approach, the first referring to the 
surfacing of challenger properties of social interaction, the second referring to the immediate effects of social 
interaction. 
48 According to Archer, in this phase, the emergent properties of agencies surface and the immediate outcomes of 
strategic interaction become clear.   
49 In contrast with contradictions, complementarities mould problem-free situations for agents. 
50 Likewise, Giddens maintains that, as a structuration principle, ―contradiction can underlie or stimulate 
retrograde movements of historical change‖ (Giddens, 1979: 141-143). He defines a ―social contradiction‖ as an 
―opposition or disjunction of structural principles of social systems, where those principles operate in terms of 
each other but at the same time contravene one another‖. This argument also applies to Luhmann‘s central notion 
of contradiction, which he – like Giddens – sees as the link between structure and agency. Neither purely 
structural  nor purely intentional, contradictions articulate the ―dynamic of self-referential meaning‖ of social 
systems. On the one hand, contradictions counteract for an instant the system‘s pretension to being totally ordered 
by opening up a potential of ―indeterminate complexity‖. On the other hand, contradictions still ―possess enough 
form to guarantee the connectivity of communicative processing via meaning‖ (Luhmann, 1984: 373). 
51 The terms morphogenesis and morphostasis derive from the work of Buckley (1967) and refers to the social 
processes that alter or change systems‘ states. In Archer‘s terms, morphogenesis and morphostasis are concerned 
with how society changes over time, through the inter-play of structure and agency as a historical process. 
structures may stay the same. While morphogenesis denotes that new structures replace the old, morphostasis 
points to the reproduction of old structures as a result of agencies. 
52 Despite its ample merits, Archer‘s interpretation of the morphogenetic methodology can still be refined. 
Perhaps the most common concern expressed by those critical of Archer‘s critical realist approach is that it tends 
to reify social structures by accepting that these structures have an internal logic and reality of their own external 
to human influence. Indeed, the criticism uttered by social constructionists and poststructuralists is that Archer‘s 
approach falls heavily on the structuralist side of the structure/agency debate. This criticism misses the point that 
Archer is introducing an ―analytical‖ separation between structural and agency causalities with the aim to 
facilitate empirical research in historicising terms. What does remain unclear in Archer‘s argument, however, are 
two elements. First, most of Archer‘s attention has gone to the analysis of normative structure, much less to the 
interplay of normative and material structures through the concepts of contradiction and complementarity. Archer 
(2000: 24) even claims that complementarities and contradictions are internal to normative structures, not internal 
to the interplay of material and normative structures, as Lockwood originally claimed.  (Archer claims that 
culture, i.e. normative structure, is a ―system with internal relationships of contradiction and complementary as its 
emergent properties‖ (2000: 24))  A second weakness in Archer‘s analysis is the lack of elaboration of rivalling 
agency dynamics compared to the attention given to structural contradictions and complementarities. This carries 
a distinct, though unintended methodological danger: the privileging of the structural over the actor-oriented. For 
instance, Weber‘s structuralist assumption of, on the one hand, a complementarity of the instrumental-rational 
with modernisation, and, on the other hand, a contradiction of the value-rational with modernisation, led him to 
predict a future in which means dominate values and the substantive is systematically irrationalised to the 
advantage of the formal-technical. This refers to Weber‘ s argument that, while the formal rationality of 
bureaucracy enables large-scale administrative tasks, it is substantively irrational in that it denies some of the 
most distinctive values of Western civilisation (see also Giddens, 1970: 325). Weber foresaw no way of breaking 
through this irrationality. He claimed that the future would only bring increasing submergence of human 
autonomy and individuality within an ever-expanding bureaucratisation of modern life: ―the technical and 
economic conditions of machine production…determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this 
mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force‖ (Weber, 1930: 
123).Although this argument has proven to be overly deterministic and negative (e.g. Beetham, 1987), it has had 
an important influence on organisational sociology.  (Obviously, I am not implying that Archer disregards the 
importance of processes of value-rationalisation in modern times. Indeed, in her latest work Archer has started to 
emphasise on the very importance of value-rationalisation and human agency. contradictions are ―functional‖ in 
that they at the same time provide the motivation to build new structural complementarities and reorder the social 
system (Luhmann, 1987a, 1987b) .   Grievances of corruption arise when a group of challenger elites challenges 
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the wisdom of established modes of coordinating political, economic and civic issues. To make their case, 
challenger elites reframe their arguments in terms of those traditions of democratisation which they see as 
resonating most in terms of soundness).  To avoid this methodological trap, I introduce two dynamics at the 
agency level as a counterpart to structural ―relations of contradiction and complementarity‖: the dynamics of 
―antagonism‖ and ―association‖. (For an explanation of the relation between antagonism and association and 
respectively value-rationalisation and instrumental rationalisation, see Appendix A, 2a) These dynamics 
effectively relate to the four logics of democratisation introduced in section 2. More specifically, I claim that by 
engaging in political and economic association – the logics of special interest and selective incentive – and  civic 
antagonism – the logics of established and outsiders, economic actors endeavour to transform structural 
contradictions into complementarities.  On the one hand, the preference for the term association is quite evident in 
a study which takes the economic organisational level as one of its key units of analysis. On the other hand, from 
an actor-centered perspective, antagonism points to a different dynamic than ―contradiction‖, as it forces the 
organisation studies scholar to focus on the empirical reality of how agencies draw boundaries between who and 
what constitutes civic community and what not. (Every antagonism ―transforms into a political one if is 
sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to [the categories] friend and enemy‖ (Schmitt, 
1932: 37). Antagonism is a highly emotional, simplifying mechanism that instills an absolute belief in the 
superior worth of the own community as opposed to other communities (cf. Gamson, 1995; Ruef, 2000). 
Obviously, feelings of antagonisms partly originate in the discursive articulation of contradiction. Still, as argued 
by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), to gain maximum emotional resonance contradictions should be grounded in 
binary oppositions that best reflect emerging common denominators in popular opinion. Laclau and Mouffe 
illustrate this with a well-known example. So, they argue that a major reason for the growth of Thatcherism in the 
1980‘s was the conservatives‘ capacity to articulate the increasing unease of the public with collectivist policies: 
in particular, the conservatives successfully contrasted the notions of ―consumer‖ and ―bureaucrat‖, ―market‖ and 
―state‖, ―individual‖ and ―society‖.  
53 Giddens (1984: 375) defines practical consciousness as follows: ―What actors know (believe) about social 
conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action, but cannot express discursively; no bar of 
repression, however, protects practical consciousness as is the case with the unconscious‖. Turner (1991: 531), 
for his part, defines it as follows: ―the stock of knowledge that one implicitly uses to act in situations and to 
interpret the actions of others. It is this knowledgeability that is constantly used, but rarely articulated, to interpret 
events – one‘s own and those of others‖. 
54 Turner (1991: 531) states that discursive consciousness, ―involves the capacity to give reasons for or 
rationalise what one does (and presumably to do the same for others‘ behaviour)‖.  Giddens (1984, p. 374), on the 
other hand, defines discursive consciousness as, ―What actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, 
about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action; awareness which has a discursive 
form‖. 
55 "Our perception must come to terms with new or different aspects of reality; action must be applied to different 
points of the world, or must restructure itself. This reconstruction is a creative achievement on the part of the 
actor. If he succeeds in reorienting the action on the basis of his changed perception and thus continuing with it, 
then something new enters the world :a new mode of action, which can gradually take root and thus itself become 
an unreflected routine." (Joas 1996 :128f). 
56 It has often been claimed that what prevails in Weber is a model of action that prioritizes reflection, i.e. rational 
and intentional action, and downgrades habit, most notably  traditional and to some degree affectual action. So, 
for instance Alexander (1983: 152) claims that for Weber the concept of habit is a ―residual category‖ reducible 
to action motivated by affects and values. Still, a counterargument which holds tat Weber  did refer to pre-
reflective, habitual socialisation is gradually taking the upper hand. So, according to Camic (1986) the role of 
habit has not been sufficiently brought out, where by habit he denominates a ―more or less self-actuating 
disposition or tendency to engage in a previously adopted or acquired form of action‖ (1044). Though an habitual 
disposition is relatively unmotivated  and not subject to reflective argument (cfr. Giddens, 1979), it exhibits a 
―meaningful character‖, either taken for granted by the actor or lodged in the unconscious (Camic, 1986: 1047; 
see also Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 53). Weber used the notion of habit not to refer to lower-level acts, but in 
the broadest sense, as a generalized disposition that suffuses a person‘s action throughout her entire lifetradition. 
In the European tradition of Durkheim (1893, 1905-6), Elias and Bourdieu this encompassing notion of habit is 
mostly denoted as habitus. 
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3. A “REPUBLICAN SETTLEMENT” THEORY OF 
 THE FIRM 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In this manuscript, I develop a ―republican settlement‖ theory of the firm.   
What are the benefits of this theory as compared to existing theories of the firm? 
Summarising shortly, existing theories of the firm do not underline the centrality of the 
rivalry between established versus outsider groups. They do not tackle rivalling minority 
and consensual, territorial and personality principles  across the spectrum of political, 
market and civic democratic deficits. And they do not incorporate a historical perspective 
which ties a firm‘s success model inextricably to the success model – historical settlements 
and traditions – of the nation-state or (nation-states) it is associated with.  
a. Main assumptions about firms’ capabilities 
In presenting this theory, my outlook on firms is influenced by the Penrosian 
equation of success with long-term growth, and the assumption that such growth requires 
the dynamic capability to continuously create ―productive opportunities‖ and devise new 
consumer strategies (Penrose, 1959: 53).  My outlook on firms departs from Penrose‘s 
analysis, in two ways. First, within a republican settlement perspective firms and nation-
states are co-constitutive of each other. Nation-state leaders cannot conclude democratic 
settlements withouth the collaboration of firms. And firms need the stability and 
geopolitical legitimacy of nation-state settlements to grow.  Why are such settlements 
important for firms? Not only does a successful settlement safeguard the right of self-
determination of a nation-state, based on the perceived ―ability of a nation to be an 
independent state‖ in the eyes of other nation-state actors.57 By proxy, the presence of such 
a settlement also conditions the right of self-determination of firms in the eyes of other 
actors – based on the perceived ability of a firm to determine its own governance system in 
the eyes of other actors. These other actors could be allied or rivalling firms, regulatory 
bodies, stock exchange organisations and participants, civil rights organisations (e.g. 
NGOs), labour unions, etc… 
Second, by extension, the long term growth of firms requires more than the 
consumer capabilities emphasised by Penrose; political and civic capabilities are equally 
important. Furthermore, I assume these capabilities centre on the rivalry between outsiders 
declaiming a lack of mobility and contestability, and established groups protecting their 
entitlements.  In what follows, I subsume the different economic, civic and political 
capabilities required to deal with this rivalry under the denominator of ―logics of 
democratisation‖. Finally, I assume that these logics of democratisation constitute effective 
dynamic capabilities in so far as they draw on rivalling traditions of democratisation, 
promoted by competing established and outsider groups.   
  b. Outline of the chapter 
  I start this chapter by providing a number of conceptual definitions. What is 
meant by popular opinion or markets? What are the different logics of democratisation? 
Drawing on a clarification of these concepts, I expound the main differences between 
social-communitarian and liberal-utilitarian theories of the firm in terms of the clarified 
concepts. I shall use the example of cooperative organisations to illustrate the differences. 
After having outlined the limitations of either theory, I present an alternative set of 
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assumptions, which I refer to as ―republican settlement theory‖. Drawing on this theory of 
the firm, I present six propositions about the strategies of democratisation firms need to 
develop to ensure success. The empirical relevance of these six propositions will be 
demonstrated in chapters 6 to 11.  Finally, I build a framework for the study of the relation 
between democratisation, nation-station and firms‘ long-term success. This framework 
draws on the ―morphogenetic‖ methodology; an approach which allows for the analysis of 
structural and agency changes over time.  In this thesis, the analysis concerns nation-state 
changes – England and the Netherlands – and banks‘ strategies of democratisation from 
about 1870 to the year 2000.  
 
3.2   Definitions: fields and logics of democratisation 
 
In chapter 1, I argued that the process of democratisation involves two steps. First, 
it involves the creation of a new level-playingfield, a ―popular opinion‖58 which blurs 
political, civic and economic logics, and which gives both the establishment and outsiders 
a chance to influence authority patterns within and between the fields of politics, civil 
society and markets. Second, as political, civic and economic actors draw closer to a 
settlement the window of opportunity to get in an influential position gradually closes; 
positions of active and passive democratisation become gradually institutionalised.  Let us 
now review the main structural and agency concepts in the above account.  
From a structural viewpoint, I distinguish between four fields of action in the above 
account of democratisation: civil society, politics, markets and popular opinion. By ―civil 
society‖, I mean the field of community life in which groups vie for the internalisation of 
status-role authority
59
 on the basis of distinctive patterns of civic behaviour (e.g., Diamond 
1999; Linz and Stepan 1996)
60
. Ultimately, civil society is structured according to the 
capacity of agencies to realise their beliefs of what is more or less civilised. ―Politics”, on 
the other hand, is the field of associational life in which groups vie for the internalisation 
of governmental authority on the basis of distinctive conceptions of a public interest. 
Ultimately, the field of politics is structured according to the capacity of agencies to gain 
electoral or governmental sanction for their program
61
. By ―market‖, I mean the field of 
associational life in which groups vie for the internalisation of economic authority on the 
basis of patterns of utility exchange
62. The concerns salient in ―popular opinion‖, finally, 
blur the conventional boundaries between politics, markets and civil society (Crick, 1962; 
Lefort, 1988: 35; Zaret, 1996); popular opinion acts as a level-playing field
63
 for 
democratisation dynamics in the other three fields. In essence, it is the area at the 
intersection of the three other fields, in which  traditions of democratisation are reinvented 
and democratic settlements between rivalling groups are reached.  As noted in chapter 1, 
these democratic settlements refer to a double concern:  
- how to stop undue political, civic or economic interference, i.e. measures that 
inhibit the autonomous development of respectively an effective State, a vigorous 
civil society and economic wealth,  
and 
- how to ensure the complementary development of an effective State, a vigorous 
civil society and economic wealth 
What types of agency and logics of democratisation correspond to the above structural 
fields of action – politics, markets, civil society and popular opinion?  I distinguish 
between three types of agency, corresponding to four logics of democratisation. Political 
35 
 
agency refers to the instrumental-rationalisation of popular opinion in terms of special 
interest groups, political parties, governments etc... With regards to democratisation 
dynamics, political agency embodies the ―logic of special interest‖. This logic is based on 
the principle that firms need to provide their stakeholders with political incentives that are 
not available elsewhere in order to attract and retain them. In terms of the democratisation 
strategy of a firm, this implies framing the latter as a vehicle for the advancement of as yet 
unmet citizen grievances and interests.  Economic agency, on the other hand, also refers to 
the instrumental-rationalisation – the ―making calculative‖ and systematic (Callon, 1999) – 
of popular opinion, but this time in terms of exchange utilities. With regards to 
democratisation dynamics, economic agency takes the form of the ―logic of selective 
incentive‖. This logic is based on the principle that firms need to provide their stakeholders 
with market incentives that are not available elsewhere to attract and retain them (cf. 
Olson, 1965).
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 In other words, firms have to be seen as a vehicle for meeting consumers 
as of yet unmet needs and desires. Finally, by civic agency I mean the value-
rationalisation
65
 of popular opinion in terms of norms and morals of civilisation. With 
regards to dynamics of democratisation, civic agency can take the form of two logics: the 
―logic of establishment‖ and the ―logic of outsiders”.66   Both logics are based on the same 
principle: framing democratisation in terms of the values of the preferred side, i.e. the 
establishment or outsiders. Regarding firms‘ strategy this means they have to frame their 
actions in terms of both the values and aspirations of established and outsider groups. The 
effectiveness of both logics often depends on the creation of feelings of enmity towards 
part of the establishment and part of the outsiders – those from either groups who are not 
on your side. This is done by alleging corruption amongst those groups, and by elevating 
friendly groups as the true guardians of democracy. Specifically, the ―logic of 
establishment‖ works by stigmatising outsiders as incompetent or corrupt parvenus, while 
the ‖logic of outsiders‖ involves stigmatising the ―old corruption‖ of the establishment.   
What is corruption? Generally speaking, claims of corruption emerge when 
rivalling established and outsider groups accuse each other of pursuing purposes which 
transgress in some respect the boundaries between political, civic and market concerns. 
Corruption thus can come in three guises: economic, political or civic transgression. For 
some, corruption is the illegitimate reminder of the values of the market place (everything 
can be bought and sold) that in the age of ―global capitalism‖ increasingly permeate 
political and civic spheres. In this view, corruption represents the normative perception of 
capitalist ‗excess‘: the culmination of the systemic process of collusion among economic 
and political elites that results in the re-confusion of public and private spheres (Girling, 
1997: vii). Others see interference by political actors in markets and civil society as the 
main culprit of corruption. In this view, corruption involves substituting rule in favour of 
the private interests of an individual or group for those publicly endorsed practices which 
affect an ordered resolution to conflicting private interests. In this case, corruption acts by 
subverting the distinction between special interests and the public responsibilities of office, 
thereby eroding the very distinction upon which the domain of politics relies for its 
capacity to resolve conflict (Philip, 1997: 458; see also Ross, 1952: 146-150). Finally, 
corruption can also be grounded in the ―moral incapacity of citizens to make reasonably 
disinterested commitments to actions, symbols and institutions which benefit the 
substantive common welfare‖ (Dobel, 1978: 958).  Citizens lacking self-discipline and 
altruism tend to place unwarranted demands upon political and economic organisations, 
while they really should resolve these issues within the confines of civil society.  
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In tables 3.1a and 3.1b, I summarise what structural and agency dynamics relate 
to the four logics of democratisation. As will become later, firms need to deploy strategies 
in terms of these logics to ensure their long-term success. And in figure 3.1 I depict the 
relation between all the constituent elements of democratic settlements, i.e. the relation 
between the different fields, logics and traditions of democratisation. 
 
 
Table 3.1a: Firms‟ political and economic logics of democratisation 
 
                                     
Field    
 
Type of  
Agency  
Politics Market 
 
 
Instrumental-
rationalisation 
 
 
 
Logic of special interest: 
Frame democratisation in 
terms of the advancement of 
target groups‘ specific 
interests 
 
 
 
 
Logic of selective incentive: 
Frame democratisation in 
terms of  meeting target 
groups‘  economic demands 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1b: Firms‟ civic logics of democratisation 
 
              Field 
 
Type of 
Agency 
Civil society 
 
Value-
rationalisation 
 
 
 
Logic of established: 
Frame democratisation in 
terms of  a catering to the 
values and aspirations of 
outsiders 
 
Logic of Outsider: 
Frame democratisation in 
terms of a catering to the 
values and aspirations of the 
establishment 
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  Figure 3.1: The different constituent elements of democratic settlements 
 
 
 
 
3.3  Liberal-utilitarian versus social-communitarian theories                                
  of the firm 
 
 From the viewpoint of the above democratisation logics, what are the main 
differences between liberal-utilitarian and social-communitarian theories of the firm?
67
  I 
distinguish between six main differences (see table 3.2). First, there is the question of the 
locus of democratisation, i.e. the field which harbours grievances of democratic deficit. 
Should firms‘ strategies of democratisation be framed in civic, political or economic 
terms? Second, there is the question of the ontological ―unit of democratisation‖ which is 
assumed in social-communitarian and liberal-utilitarian theories of democratisation. 
Should the target of democratisation efforts be a community or an individual? With 
regards to these two questions, liberal-utilitarians see markets as the basic sphere of 
democratisation; politics and civic society should approximate markets as much as 
possible by supporting the ideal of the autonomous individual.  Social-communitarians, by 
contrast, see civic society as the basic sphere of democratisation, which politics and 
markets should approximate as much as possible by supporting the ideal of community.  
Third, there is the question of the logics of democratisation promoted by the 
different perspectives. Which ones amongst the logics of special interest, selective 
incentive, establishment and outsiders are most valued by the different perspectives?  
Because of their fondness of the virtues of pre-established communities, social-
communitarians privilege the logics of establishment and special interest. Liberal-
utilitarians, by contrast, privilege the logics of outsiders and selective incentive. They are 
inspired by the ideal of autonomous individuals: eternal outsiders to political or established 
MARKET 
Logic of 
selective 
incentive 
 
POLITICS 
Logic of 
special 
interest 
CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
Logics of 
establishment  
& outsider 
POPULAR 
OPINION 
Traditions of 
democratisation 
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groups, who are busy calculating market utilities, not devising special interests or higher 
values.   
 
 
Table 3.2: Liberal-utilitarian versus social-communitarian theories of the firm 
 
 
Social-communitarian 
theory 
 
 
Liberal – utilitarian theory 
 
 
Main source of 
democratisation 
 
Civil society 
 
Market 
 
 
Unit of 
democratisation 
 
Cohesive community Autonomous individuals 
 
Logics of 
democratisation 
 
- Logic of established 
- Logic of special 
interest 
- Logic of outsider 
- Logic of selective 
incentive 
 
Main source of 
corruption 
 
Domination of self-interest 
Domination of special group  
interests 
 
Character of the 
firm 
 
 
- Civic virtue 
- Territoriality 
principle 
- Active 
democratisation 
 
- Economic freedom 
- Personality principle 
- Active democratisation 
Role of the State 
 
 
Servant of civic 
communities
68
 
 
 
Guarantor of stability (property 
rights) and non-interference in 
markets 
 
 
 
Fourth, there is the question what the main source is of corruption – of the relation 
between democratisation and economic growth. Is it the domination of motivations of self-
interest as social-communitarians argue, or, on the contrary, domination of group interests 
over individual utilities as liberal-utilitarians maintain?  
Fifth, there is the question of what type of organisational character firms should 
develop to combat corruption.  Should firms keep political and civic considerations at 
arms‘ length – as liberal-utilitarians argue, or should firms‘ economic and political 
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considerations be embedded in civil society – as social-communitarians argue?  Should 
firms follow the territoriality principle and value long-lived community traditions of 
authenticity and stability, as social-communitarians advocate? Or should firms value 
mobility and contestability dynamics according to the personality principle, i.e. ground 
themselves in a city-state such as London and value universal freedom and mobility, as 
liberal-utilitarians maintain? A third character choice is whether firms should be a vehicle 
of active or passive democratisation for participants. For once liberal-utilitarians and 
social-communitarians agree on an issue: firms should be vehicles of active 
democratisation for all participants. Finally, there is the question of the role of the State in 
supporting firms‘ strategies of democratisation. Should the State be a ―servant‖ of the 
communities in which firms are embedded as social-communitarians argue? Or should, as 
liberal-utilitarians maintain, the State restrain its role to promoting stability – f.i. of 
property rights – and guaranteeing non-interference with the autonomous workings of the 
market?  
To illustrate the differences between liberal-utilitarian and social-communitarian 
theories of the firm, I shall use the example of cooperatives. The aim of this exercise is to 
prepare the ground for an alternative set of assumptions, subsumed under the denominator 
―republican settlement theory‖. Utilitarian theorists of cooperatives generally speaking 
approve of the separation of markets from political and civic concerns. They shrug off 
non-economic explanations of cooperative purpose for being motivated by ―human ideals‖ 
rather than by the material ―reality of the economy‖ (e.g. Emelianoff, 1948; Hansmann, 
1996; Holmström, 1999; Van Diepenbeek,1990). More specifically, according to 
Hansmann (1996: 294-295), the most authoritative theorist of cooperatives at the moment, 
a cross-country comparison of cooperatives demonstrates that civic traditions and morals 
are irrelevant to the success of firms: ―culture and ideology do not seem to play a 
conspicuous role in the organisational forms that appear across different societies, nor do 
they show great force within societies‖. Rather, cooperative growth ultimately can only be 
evaluated in terms of market efficiency: ―in those portions of their economies that societies 
have left to private enterprise, the logic of the market has been surprisingly strong and 
uniform in choosing forms of ownership‖.  What is more, while civic concerns are just 
irrelevant, political interference is plain detrimental to cooperatives‘ success: 
―governmental regulation often plays an important role in permitting investor-owned firms 
to flourish where cooperatives or nonprofits would otherwise be dominant‖.  Ultimately, 
cooperatives can only be successful when they exert ―a corrective effect on the lack of 
equilibrium in market relationships‖ (Nationale cooperatieve Raad, 1957: 96), i.e. when 
there are dominant local actors exerting unchecked market power (cf. LeVay, 1983; 
Schrader, 1989)
69
.  
  Liberal-utilitarians impute cooperative members and leaders with ahistorical, 
impersonal, economizing motives. In spite of Parsons‘ (1940) and Hirschman‘s (1977) 
warnings that even in its most taken-for-granted form, ―self-interest seeking with guile‖ 
(Williamson, 1985: 47) is also a product of normative and historical internalising of status-
maintaining or enhancing behaviour, liberal-utilitarians maintain that organisational 
growth is a matter of human beings following the biological rule of adaptive 
instrumentality. As such, they build a functional realism which assumes that modern 
organisations are transparently purposive and human kind is engaged in a progressive 
evolution towards more efficient forms (Dobbin, 1994b: 138). While the frame for rational 
behaviour thus becomes a set of transcendental economic laws, organisational growth is 
40 
 
modelled as the optimising of private utility-maximising behaviour in accordance with 
these laws, through the institution of formal constraints – contracts, statutes, technologies. 
If organisations and individuals do not internalise these formal rules, the market 
environment will eliminate them (Williamson, 1975).  Typical of this approach is that 
efforts of public ordering are perceived as having only a very limited impact on the 
―private ordering‖ of economic authority relations (cf. Williamson, 1985: 10). 
In contrast with liberal-utilitarians, social-communitarians are deeply aware of the 
importance of historical path-dependencies in their account of human purposiveness. Still, 
they are equally teleological
70
 in their assumptions about, on the one hand, the separation 
of the economic from the civic, and, on the other hand, how cooperative members and 
leaders deal with this separation. So, Marx and Polanyi
71
 describe the separation of local 
traditions of civility and cosmopolitan movements of marketisation in nineteenth century 
England as the deliberate product of respectively ruthless capitalists and the state, who 
through violent oppression imposed a system of self-regulating markets on the working 
classes
72
. Yet, it has by now become clear that the emergence of self-regulating markets – 
as enabled by the separation of territorial control and city-state dynamics –  predated their 
putting forward as a conscious object of policy more than a full century (Perkin, 1968: 11; 
see also Hobsbawm, 1968)
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.   
Communitarians depict cooperatives as the community-oriented counterweight for 
the unbridled instrumental-rationalisation of global capitalism. They see the emergence of 
cooperatives as the logic result of the historical workings of a ―double movement‖74 
(Polanyi, 1957a): in response to capitalists‘ disembedding of markets from local 
community traditions – i.e.the globalisation of markets, civic groups organise to re-embed 
economic concerns in community traditions. The final ambition of the latter groups‘ efforts 
is the emergence of a cooperative or ―Socialist Commonwealth‖ (Owen, 1927; Beatrice 
and Sidney Webb, 1902, 1930).
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  Clearly, social-communitarians picture any meaningful 
separation of the economic from the civic as the prerogative of opportunistic and 
exploitative groups. This has held cooperatives back from realizing their full potential. For 
instance, 1844, the year when the Rochdale Pioneers decided to pay dividend on purchases 
was described as ―the first major breach with Owenism, and one that proved fatal to its 
ultimate ideal‖ (Pollard, 1960: 95).76 The date is used to distinguish between the 
―idealism‖ of the Owenite phase77 and the ―self-interest‖ characteristic of the post-1844 
period (Gurney, 1996: 4).  
Even now, this belief is considered commonsensical amongst social-
communitarians. Following for instance Putnam‘s (1993), ―true cooperators‖ believe that 
the separation of dynamics of marketisation from local community traditions is bound to 
give free play to ―corrupt‖ monopoly-formation. Indeed, as the institutionalisation of local 
group solidarities cannot possibly hold pace with international city-state dynamics, the 
embeddedness necessary to produce sound economic growth would be lacking.  The 
insight that is lost with regard to this last point, is that dynamics of marketisation are also 
driven by traditions of civilisation, be they of a more personalistic, city-state kind. As 
argued by Weber (1922: 635, 636, 640), not only is market exchange the ―archetype of all 
rational social action‖, it also is the ―most impersonal‖ and most ―peaceful form‖ of  
―practical life into which humans can enter with one another‖. Indeed, since the Middle 
Ages, ―the intensive expansion of exchange relations has always gone together with a 
process of relative pacification‖. Because of its ―matter-of-factness‖ and ―impersonal 
universality‖, market exchange historically has functioned to create a level-playing field 
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which in principle anyone can join on the same impersonal footing. What is more, from the 
late eighteenth century on, market exchange became the ultimate instance of managing 
processes of active and passive democratisation in many West European countries and the 
United States.  That is because extending market exchange is one important way to both 
allow for more competition between established and outsider groups and increase the 
likelihood of reaching more satisfactory settlements. Not surprisingly, given the 
dominance of traditions of local embeddedness, the international cooperative movement 
never really flourished, but remained botched under the weight of territorial particularisms. 
Remarkably, similar to liberal-utilitarians, social-communitarians often use evidence 
of cooperative involvement in politics as proof of their decline
78
 (e.g. Hirst, 1994; 
Youngjohns, 1954). Indeed, starting with Owen and continuing all the way to Hirst and 
Putnam, social-communitarians – obviously not State-communitarians – have consistently 
disregarded the reality of politics as a center of democratisation. This disparaging of 
politics is grounded in the belief that civic ―spheres of justice‖ make more of a difference 
to creating a good society than any State apparatus will ever be able to (Walzer, 1983). 
Summarising quickly, social-communitarian accounts
79
 of industrial democracy suffer 
from the normative idea that cooperatives should have been part of a civic movement 
antagonistic of any ―alienating materialism‖ and driven by moral idealism. ―Owenism‖ and 
structural determinism - prophecies of a ―Cooperative commonwealth – have been 
privileged over strategies of democratisation that actually work.
80
  
 
3.4  A “republican settlement” theory of the firm 
 
In this section, I propose a ―republican settlement‖ theory of the firm capable of 
integrating the strengths and avoiding the weaknesses of liberal-utilitarian and social-
communitarian theories. How do assumptions of republican settlement theory differ from 
their utilitarian and communitarian counterparts? In table 3.3, I draw a comparison 
between the the three theories across the six characteristics presented in table 3.2.  First, 
there is the question of the locus of democratisation, i.e. the field which should be targeted 
to alleviate grievances of democratic deficit. Contrary to social-communitarianism and 
liberal-utilitarianism, republican settlement theory portrays markets, politics and civic 
society as different, but equally valuable spheres of democratisation.
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 Furthermore, a 
settlement has to be found in popular opinion as to the autonomy of and relation between 
these different spheres.  Second, there is the question of the unit of democratisation which 
is assumed in each theory of the firm. While communitarians and liberals have a different 
view on what this unit should be, they both share the belief that democratisation should be 
geared towards the fulfillment of man‘s basic nature, i.e. either a world made up of 
autonomous individuals or a world of cohesive communities (Brugger, 1999: 19). 
Historical republicans, on the contrary, do not see democratisation as leading to an 
absolute virtuous endpoint, but as a situational and never-ending process.  That is because 
in republican settlement theory, democratic virtue is the result of ongoing competition 
between established and outsider groups or individuals.  
Third, there is the question of the logics of democratisation emphasised by the 
theories. An interesting paradox arises here, to do with how stale historical ideals of   
established and outsider dynamics have led to a gap between the reality espoused and the 
reality enacted by utilitarians and communitarians. The worldview espoused by social-
communitarian theory is one of pre-modern communites disrupted by new utilitarian 
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groups. As communitarians often believe that the communities they represent have 
unrightfully become outsiders, they often disregard the extent to which, on the one hand, 
the interests they represent actually have become special and not majority interests, and, on 
the other hand, other ―new bourgeois‖ logics have become much more established in 
popular opinion.  
Liberal-utilitarians, for their part, often espouse a logic of outsiders. In the same 
vein as Weber‘s seventeenth century protestant capitalists,  they theorise that the market is 
the new source of equality of opportunity for all individuals. In actuality, however, the 
individuals they represent often have adopted a very established lifestyle and a special 
interest in thwarting the emancipatory power of markets. In contrast with 
communitarianism and utilitarianism, republican settlement theory avowedly holds all four 
logics of democratisation in equal regard. That is because republicans see political, civic 
and economic virtues as equally important, and democratisation as dependent on rivalries 
between established and outsider groups across these three domains of reality.  
Fourth, there is the question ―what is the main source of corruption?‖  
Republicans maintain that both liberal-utilitarians‘ sole emphasis on eradicating group 
interests and social-communitarians overwhelming aversion for self-interest actually 
increases corruption; the result in the first case is individual sectarianism, and in the 
second case group totalitarianism. Instead, republican settlement theory advocates a focus 
on corruption as any type of ―domination‖; it does not discriminate between domination by 
individuals or groups, political, civic or economic actors. Also, in contrast with liberal-
utilitarians and social-communitarians, republicans see corruption as systemic and 
functional. In particular, republicans see grievances of corruption as a main driver of 
competition between the establishment and outsiders. Obviously, corruption has to be 
combated, but there is no final solution to this problem. All established and outsider groups 
and individuals can do is to temporarily settle their differences, and await a new round of 
rivalry. In sum, republican settlement theory sees a lack of opportunities of contestability 
and mobility in the relation between the establishment and outsiders as the main source of 
corruption. 
Fifth, there is the question of what type of organisational character firms should 
develop to combat corruption.  Republican theorists do agree with liberal-utilitarians that 
some degree of separation of markets from the civic and political domains should be 
instituted. Thus, republican settlement theory is not against ―global‖ capitalism – 
capitalism by interconnected city-states. Where republicans do not agree with liberal-
utilitarians, however, is about the premise that separation of the domains is enough. Apart 
from the ―art of separation‖ (Walzer, 1984), they maintain that the ―art of integration‖ of 
economic, civic and political issues should also be cultivated. The particular critique here 
is that liberal-utilitarians do not go beyond the idea of ―absence of restraint‖ in their 
perspectives on liberty and democratisation (Pettit, 1997; Skinner, 1998).  Absence of 
restraint should be accompanied by contestation of power and calls for legitimacy; this 
refers to the concept of ―liberty as non-domination‖ (Pettit, 1993; Skinner, 2002).  To 
ensure such freedom and maintain the meaningfulness of democratisation processes for a 
majority of citizens, a degree of territorialism or ―provincialism‖ is necessary. The 
promotion of territorial traditions not only serves to counterbalance the concentration of 
unaccountable power that accompanies unrestrained ―globalisation‖.  Paradoxically, it also 
serves to create a more legitimate type of international capitalism.  
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Table 3.3: Three theories of the firm 
  
Social-communitarian 
theory 
 
Liberal – utilitarian 
theory 
 
 
Republican settlement 
theory 
 
Main source of 
democratisation 
 
Civil society 
 
Market 
 
 
- Market, Civil society,   
   Politics 
- Settlement in popular  
   Opinion 
 
Unit of 
democratisation 
 
Cohesive community Autonomous individuals 
 
Rivalling established and 
outsider groups82 83 
 
Logics of 
democratisation 
 
Espoused: 
logic of establishment 
 
Actual: 
logics of outsider 
and special interest 
Espoused: 
logic of outsider 
 
Actual:               
logics of establishment 
and  selective incentive 
- Logic of 
selective 
incentive 
- Logic of 
established 
- Logic of 
outsider 
- Logic of special 
interest 
 
Main source of 
corruption 
 
Domination of                      
self-interest 
Domination of         
special group interests 
 
- Domination by 
State, civil 
society84 or 
market actors 
- Lack of               
level- playing 
field for rivalry 
between 
establishment 
and outsiders 
- i.e. lack of 
contestability & 
mobility 
 
Character of 
the firm 
 
 
- Civic virtue 
- Territoriality principle 
-  Active democratisation 
 
- Economic freedom 
- Personality principle 
- Active democratisation 
 
- Political, Civic 
and Economic 
virtues 
- Territoriality & 
Personality 
principles 
- Active / Passive 
 
 
Role of the 
State 
 
 
Servant of civic 
communities85 
 
 
Guarantor of stability 
(property rights) and non-
interference in markets 
 
Encourage public-private 
collaboration with ―non-
domination‖ by any group 
or person 
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Clearly, republicans also take issue with communitarians‘ advocacy of integration 
of the three domains into one field of action, for two reasons. On the one hand, the 
integration of the three domains could leave the door open for policies of totalitarianism 
(cf. Arendt, 1951) or authoritarianism (Frazer, 1999).  On the other hand, the notion of 
loyalty to community traditions denies the corrupting effects of too much cohesion and  
provincialism, and the positive effects of outsiders trying to break down established 
monopolies.   
Contrary to liberal and communitarian assumptions, proponents of republican 
settlement theory argue that active democratisation can only be effected by participants 
that have acquired enough ―competence‖, i.e. those who have internalised enough 
normative and material authority (f.i. Barber, 1992)
86
. Republicans argue that it is an 
unworkable fiction to expect that each of us would acquire a competent opinion about all 
affairs of democratic interest (cf. Lippmann, 1997 [1922]: 19). In doing this, republicans 
take issue with both liberal-utilitarians and social-communitarians.  
A last difference between republican settlement theory and the other two 
perspectives concerns the role of the State. Contrary to liberal-utilitarians and social-
communitarians, republicans see a strong and autonomous political system as a primary 
means – rather than an end – of democratisation (Bellamy 1992: 259).87 In particular, the 
centrepiece of republican thought is a strong constitutionalist state. Constitution here has 
to be interpreted in its broadest sense, as combining both informal and formal 
interpretations of traditions of democratisation. This serves the reality of varieties of 
constitutions well, since for historical reasons some constitutions – such as the US 
constitution – are more formalised than others – e.g. the English and Dutch constitutions 
which exist largely in informal, unwritten terms only.
88
 In fact, the acceptance of the 
equivalence of informal traditions and formal rules distinguishes republican settlement 
theory from other types of republicanism. Most republicans, however, agree that a strong 
constitutionalist state should be grounded in the principle of opposition to arbitrariness and 
a clear notion of the public interest which is not simply the result of group pressure – be it 
from established or outsider groups. Such a state is sustained by a belief that, while politics 
has to operate in a relatively autonomous field, it still should be supported by a majority of 
popular sovereignty to increase the chances of finding an appropriate mode of coordination 
with civic and economic actors.
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3.5      Logics of democratisation: six propositions about their 
 strategic   interplay 
 
In this section, I present six propositions about the democratisation strategies 
firms need to develop for long-term success. These propositions apply to both mutual and 
commercial firms, whether these operate in so-called liberal-utilitarian or social-
communitarian nation-states. The six propositions deal with each possible relational pair of 
the four logics of democratisation: the logics of establishment, outsiders, selective 
incentive and special interests. Besides the four logics of democratisation, the propositions 
draw on the following assumptions of republican settlement theory.  First, the possibility 
of competition between established and outsider actors is a precondition to the viability of 
any strategy of democratisation. Second, following one‘s nation-state‘s historical success 
model is critical to obtaining a sustainable settlement between established actors and 
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outsiders; although this has to be complemented with geopolitical buffers against dominant 
foreign traditions. Third, the most sustainable form of success is based on ―non-
domination‖ of others, as perceived by a majority of stakeholders – customers, 
shareholders, employees, political and civic groups. Fourth, firms‘ success depends on 
their capacity to co-construct new democratic settlements.  Fifth, those settlements which 
prevail are the ones that are more complementary than other alternatives with the 
promotion of all three republican virtues: an effective State, a vigorous civil society and 
economic wealth.  Sixth, finding such superior complementarities depends on the ability to 
realise an acceptable trade-off between dynamics of active and passive democratisation – 
minority and consensus democratisation. In other words, in their capacity of  switching 
points between processes of active and passive democratisation, firms have to decide what 
stakeholders – customers, shareholders, employees, political and civic groups – belong to 
―elected‖ and which ones to ―follower‖ groups. 
The following six propositions specify the different strategies firms need to 
develop to ensure a favourable vantage point in democratic settlements – a main lever for 
long-term success:  
 
Strategy a)  relation between logics of outsider (civil society) and selective       
                     incentive (market)  
Firms‟ success depends on their ability to help core customers fulfil their 
social mobility aspirations 
Strategy b)  relation between logics of establishment (civil society) and selective 
        incentive (market) 
Firms‟ success depends on their ability to cater to customers of different 
social classes  
Practically speaking, the above means that firms have to foster the social 
mobility of aspiring social classes with their economic propositions (strategy a). 
Simultaneously, firms‘ economic propositions need to mitigate resentment and feelings of 
extremity between the different social classes, by providing all with products and services 
adapted to their own needs and abilities (strategy b). 
Strategy a is essentially a coordination strategy, aimed at minority 
democratisation. Strategy b, by contrast, is a cooperation strategy, aimed at consensual 
democratisation. 
Propositions a and b draw on the following assumptions of republican 
settlement theory. First, building a sustainable competitive advantage depends on the 
ability to find new complementarities between issues relating to both economic wealth and 
social status, i.e. issues of social-economic class.  Second, firms‘ success depends on their 
ability to find an appropriate trade-off between core and non-core stakeholders – minority 
and consensus democratisation target groups. The first group should be mobilised on the 
basis of participants‘ competence in embracing and promoting that economic rationale 
which, while not yet part of established market practices, is considered by an avant-garde 
to strike a better balance between the problems of social mobility and economic efficiency.  
Clearly, this avant-garde by definition represents a minority. The second group should be 
mobilised on the basis of the duty to make as many social classes as possible take 
ownership of market practices, so as to facilitate consensus amongst the social classes.  By 
default of such an appropriate trade-off between core and non-core participants on the 
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basis of respectively competence and duty, firms‘ will not be successful in the longer term, 
as their growth will be perceived as corrupting rather than as sound. 
 
Strategy c)   relation between logics of outsider (civil society) and special interests 
        (politics)  
 Firms‟ success depends on their ability to make State policy on economic  
citizenship by “fait accompli”  
Strategy d)   relation between logics of establishment (civil society) and special interests            
                      (politics)   
 Firms‟ success depends on their ability to translate State policy on 
economic citizenship in services and products  
Practically speaking, the above means that firms have to come up with an 
innovative economic proposition: one that relieves the State from the responsibility to test 
ideas that are promising, yet risky policy-wise; allowing the State to sit back and make 
policy on a platform of fait accompli (strategy c). Simultaneously, firms need to help build 
a consensus about existing State policy, by translating it in a set of economic propositions 
adapted to different types of citizens‘ abilities and needs (strategy d). If successful in their 
execution of these two strategies, firms play an immensely important role, both regarding 
the innovativeness and effectiveness of State policy, and in terms of maintaining trust in 
the workings of parliamentary democracy, the universal suffrage, institutional employer-
employee  relations, and other signifiers of democratic capitalism. 
Strategy c is essentially a coordination strategy, aimed at minority 
democratisation.  Strategy d, by contrast, is a cooperation strategy, aimed at consensual 
democratisation. 
Propositions c and d draw on the following two assumptions. First, firms‘ 
success depends on their ability to find complementarities between issues related to civic 
participation, and the development of effective economic policies by the State. In other 
words, a firm‘s success depends on its ability to become a vehicle of economic citizenship, 
i.e. ensure that societal stakeholders see a firm as a rightful provider of economic 
opportunities; and encourage people to participate in and take ownership of economic 
policy goals. Second, firms‘ success depends on their ability to find an appropriate 
organisational trade-off between core and non-core stakeholders – minority and consensus 
democratisation target groups. The first group should be mobilised on the basis of 
participants‘ competence in embracing those new economic policies which are perceived 
by a minority of citizens to be a better guarantee than other alternatives for the promotion 
of civic freedoms/virtues. The second group should be mobilised on the basis of the duty to 
expand a minimum level of economic citizenship to as many people as possible, so as to 
improve consensus between groups of citizens with conflicting preferences.  Again, by 
default of such an appropriate trade-off between core and non-core participants on the 
basis of respectively competence and duty, firms‘ will not be successful in the longer term, 
as their growth will be perceived as corrupting rather than as sound. 
 
Strategy e)    relation between logics of establishment and outsider (civil society)   
 Firms‟ success depends on their ability to become a champion of    
 national character 
       Practically speaking, this proposition means that firms have to become 
national champions of their countries‘ distinctive competences and success model. 
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Strategy e entails a re-combination of personality and territoriality principles, 
taking into account the recombination of minority and consensus principles in strategy f. 
This proposition draws on the following assumptions. First, democratisation is a 
double process of nationalisation, involving a reinvention of rivalling provincial and 
cosmopolitan nationalisms, followed by a settlement between proponents of either thrust in 
a later stage.  To capture a majority of social classes, rivalling proponents try to gain a 
central position in popular opinion, so as to be able to determine what the publicly 
promoted national character should be. Simultaneously, they need to mobilise enough 
cooperation for the change project from social classes who prefer another national 
character, by allowing the latter sufficient space for self-determination (privacy).  In other 
words, settlements about national character come in terms of public-private compromises. 
And firms‘ success depends on their ability to contribute to such compromises. 
 
Strategy f)   relation between logics of special interest (politics) & selective incentive 
        (market)  
Firms‟ success depends on their ability to become a champion of the 
national economic interest. 
        Practically speaking, this proposition means that firms have to delegate the 
promotion of their special interests to (one or more) self-regulating bodies that are viewed 
as serving the national economic interest. Such a self-regulating body evidently should be 
considered a leading vehicle of public-private collaboration.   
Strategy f entails a re-combination of minority (particular firms‘ interests) and 
consensus (national interest) principles, taking into account strategy e. 
 This proposition draws on the following assumptions. Continuing nation-state 
success involves the ability to serve the national economic interest in a way that is least 
conducive to domination by any special interest, whether provincial or city-oriented. For 
firms, success depends on the ability to defend one‘s interests while avoiding the 
perception that one is undermining the larger national economic interest within a certain 
geopolitical constellation. Thus, what firms have to avoid at all cost is that the interest 
groups with which they are associated are considered sectarian, i.e. are perceived by a 
majority of economic citizens as not contributing to the promotion of the national 
economic interest. To be perceived as a non-sectarian vehicle of the national economic 
interest, firms have to rely on bodies with a public-private character such as advisory 
committees and self-regulating industry associations. Following proposition e, these 
public-private bodies need to be able to gain a central position in matters of the national 
economic interest.  Simultaneously, they need to project an image that they are not 
hampering cooperation with the change projects of other interest groups – in particular 
these groups‘ bid for self-determination.  Thus, in order to secure an appearance of non-
sectarian interest group promotion, firms have to defend their interests through 
compromise and a mixture of public and private organisations and causes.
90
    
 
3.6 Framework for firms‟ strategies of democratisation  
 
In this final section, I develop a conceptual framework for studying the relation 
between firms‘ long-term success and their strategies of democratisation – in terms of the 
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six propositions presented above.  The endgame of this developmental effort, is to use the 
framework as a guideline to empirical data collection and analysis in chapters 6 to 11.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Democratisation dynamics and firms‟ strategic positioning in 
settlements 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the discussion in section 2.4, the relation between firms‘ strategies of 
democratisation and their successful positioning in nation-state settlements can be studied 
in terms of three analytical phases (see figure 3.2). In a first, structural phase, 
contradictions between geopolitical and nation-state realities emerge.  If an ―insurgent 
consciousness‖ (McAdam, 1982) about these contradictions takes shape – signalling the 
loss of authority of the establishment, we enter a second actor-oriented phase, in which 
emergent elites attack the old corruption of the establishment, and established elites react 
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with their own grievances of democratic deficit. In this phase, it is up to firms‘ leaders to 
take advantage of these opportunities of democratisation, by devising new strategies of 
democratisation – involving minority and consensus, personality and territoriality, 
economic, political and civil dynamics of democratisation. In a third, structural phase, 
democratic settlements are institutionalised. The type of democratic settlements that win 
out are those that create the best complementarities between geopolitical changes, and 
three nation-state virtues: the development of an effective State, economic wealth and civic 
cohesion. Depending on firms‘ ability to act in accordance with the six propositions 
stipulated in section 3.5 and take an active role in the construction of settlements, their 
competitive position becomes stronger or weaker.   
                                                 
57 National self-determination denotes ―the belief that [a] nation has a right to constitute an independent state and 
determine its own government‖ (Cobban, 1969: 39). About the nominal connection between nationalism, popular 
sovereignty, and democracy, see also Kemiläinen (1993) and Gellner (1997). 
58 In this manuscript, I shall refer to a ―popular opinion‖ rather than the more frequently used label ―public 
opinion‖ for two reasons. First, by popular opinion I mean an area of action blurring the boundaries between the 
public and the private. The label ―public‖ is misleading in this regard. Second, popular opinion is the area in 
which ―popular sovereignty‖ is expressed and shaped.  (This is a repeat of footnote 5 in chapter 1). 
59 ―Status‖ here refers to ―a structural position within the social system‖, and ―role‖ is ―what the actor does in 
such a position, seen in the context of its functional significance for the larger system‖ (Ritzer, 1992: 356). 
60 Civil society organisations are voluntary groupings of citizens. Examples are labour unions, professional 
associations, and an infinite variety of cultural, social, developmental, identity-based, issue-oriented, territorial, 
and other types of groups. To the extent that political and economic organisations are populated by voluntary 
groupings of citizens, these latter organisations also have to take into account norms of civic behaviour. 
61 For an elucidation of the confusion arising with the terms ―politics‖ and ―political‖, see Appendix A (section 
3). 
62 Both politics and markets are structured according to patterns of material authority, i.e. the structural capacity 
of agencies to influence other actors through sheer accumulation of size and visibility. Civil society, on the other 
hand, is a normative field. Thus, in contrast with politics and markets which are constituted by more or less 
visualisable practices – electoral programmes or parliamentary systems, shops or internet auctions – civic society 
is constituted of status communities sharing the more amorphous practice of ―lifestyles‖. 
63 The concept of level-playing field in this case more or less corresponds to Nettl‘s  notion of an ―area of 
normlessness‖ (1968: 588). 
64 While the logics of selective incentive and special interests concern different target groups, respectively 
authorities in State and market participants, they both relate to the same component of purposiveness: the material 
―cash-value‖ of instrumental-rational agency. In the case of the logic of special interest this cash-value comes in 
terms of the use of public means for special interest purposes. In case of the logic of selective incentive, on the 
other hand, cash value is effected through the creation of market utility. By contrast, the logics of establishment 
and outsider concern another dynamic of democratisation:  the creation of groups in terms of higher values or 
civic norms. This requires the formation of general-purpose lifestyles – ―generalised others‖ (cf. Mead. 1934: 
386) – that surpass instrumental forms of allegiance. 
65 By contrast, the logics of establishment and outsider concern another component of purposiveness:  the value-
rational creation of a ―generalised other‖ (cf. Mead. 1934: 386).  
66 This of course is a main theme in Norbert Elias‘ work. Describing the establishment-outsider mechanism, Elias 
(1965: l) notes that ―one of the standard devices of an establishment under strain is that of tightening the restraints 
that its members impose upon themselves, as well as upon the wider group ruled by it.‖ The ―observance‖ of the 
internalisation of ―these restraints‖ can then be used as ―a sign both of one‘s own group charisma and the disgrace 
of outsiders‖. As a result, ―contact with outsiders threatens an ‗insider‘ with the lowering of their own status 
within the established group‖ (Elias, 1965: xxiv). What Elias does not point out, however, is that ―outsiders‖ can 
do something similar. Indeed, while avoiding corrupting ―established‖ influences, they can reinforce their status 
of being different by embodying a degree of self-restraint which in time will also have to be adopted by the 
establishment. 
67 The differences between liberal-utilitarian and social-communitarian theories of Cooperative organisations can 
be traced back to the more general-purpose organisational views defended by respectively Alfred Chandler and 
Philip Selznick. For a comparison of Chandler‘s liberal-utilitarian perspective and Selznick‘s social-
communitarian views, see Appendix A, section 4. 
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68 Again, in contrast to social-communitarians, for state-communitarians the State is not just a servant, but 
embodies entire civic community. 
69 The claim about the raison d´être of cooperatives builds on the more general observation first made by Coase 
(1937) and popularised by Williamson (1975), that firms emerge historically from market failures to economise 
on transaction costs of production – especially monitoring efforts to ensure compliance with contractual 
agreements. In this light, it is remarkable that public commercial companies, because of their reliance on more 
impersonal stocks and governance mechanisms favouring ―exit-mechanisms‖, often are depicted as a natural part 
of an efficient market, not as a countervailing power. So, for instance Williamson (1985: 267) claims that equity 
ownership is subject to greater hazard in the cooperative firm. Undoubtedly, liberal-utilitarians favour exit over 
voice, as transpires in the widely held assumption that exit belongs to the realm of economics and voice to the 
realm of politics (Hirschman, 1970: 15).   
70 According to liberal-utilitarians, human agency is governed by the laws of individual self-interest, opportunism 
and instrumental-economic rationalisation. 
71 Of course, Marx rejected Cooperatives as a communitarian alternative within a capitalist system. According to 
him and his followers, in such a system Cooperatives were a waste of effort, a distraction from the necessary 
political and economic class struggle. Within a capitalist system, Cooperatives stood no chance of helping 
workers. Polanyi had little sympathy for Marx‘ argument that politics is simply a superstructure reflecting power 
relations defined in economic terms. While Marx saw Cooperatives as a viable organisational form in a non-
capitalist political system, Polanyi did encourage Cooperatives as a reformist organisational form within a market 
system. Contra Marx, Polanyi argues that, because Cooperatives transcend narrowly conceived class interests and 
promise to protect society as a whole, they are more likely to succeed in their endeavour to reembed economic 
relations in substantive ethics. Nevertheless, by depicting Co-peratives as the collective efforts of workers and 
ordinary people to defend themselves against the self-regulating market system, Polanyi eventually entrenches in 
the same anti-capitalist – i.e. anti economic instrumentalisation – reductionism as Marx. 
72 So, for Polanyi (1957: 250) ―the market has been the outcome of a conscious and often violent intervention on 
the part of government which imposed the market organisation on society for non-economic ends‖. 
73 According to Richards (1929: 215) ―despite the prevailing economic paternalism of the State, a philosophy of 
laissez-faire gained ground in England after the Civil War‖, mainly through the emergence of a system of free 
trade finance.  
74 At the most general level by ―double movement‖ is meant that when ―cosmopolitan‖ elites organise to separate 
the political and the economic to their material advantage, less advantaged territorial groups typically organise a 
countermovement to reunite both fields in a society-protecting, communitarian way. 
75 This happened against the grain of many cooperators who resisted the subordinate role assigned to their 
movement by collectivists like Webb and had little enthusiasm for the State-supported cooperation advocated by 
Woolf (1919). 
76 Similarly, Webb and Woolf articulated the derogatory notion that workers were attracted to cooperation mainly 
for what they could get out of it, namely the dividend. More idealism was needed in their eyes to make the 
cooperative movement attain its purposes. And this necessarily had to be supplied by outside experts like 
themselves. 
77  ―Owenite phase‖ connotes a form of methodological individualism which postulates that Robert Owen‘s 
influence was decisive for and omnipresent in the whole Cooperative movement.  
78 So, Hirst (1994: 18), while identifying the English Cooperative movement as part of Socialism, argues that ―as 
the twentieth century progressed, the voluntary and cooperative elements in the British Labour Movement 
became weaker and weaker…Socialism, once so strong, so pragmatic and fundamentally humane, died through 
its dependence on the state no less than did the brutal Soviet state collectivist version‖. 
79 The problems with the utilitarian accounts are the same as the ones prominent in other transaction cost 
economy accounts of organisational forms. 
80 As noted by Gurney (1996), there does not seem to be much of a middle way Cooperative literature between 
the utilitarian and communitarian extremes.  One of the few Cooperative theorists notable for having expressed an 
alternative is the French political economist Gide (1904, 1926). Taking the third way of a ―republican‖ stance, 
Gide set forth the idea of a cooperative Republic. Such a republic, Gide advocated, would consist both of an 
effective State and the largest possible number of different associations able to take co-responsibility for the 
affairs of the State. In a nutshell, Gide advanced a theory of public-private collaboration which included both 
elements of utilitarianism and communitarianism. Most notably, Gide claims that it is not immoral to suppose that 
the subject is self-interested, only reasonable. Indeed, in order for the subject to be willing to take part in a 
cooperative venture, he must have some hope of gain. Nevertheless, Gide argued, the cooperative provides its 
members with benefits that are not only material. Each member is able to verify for himself that in order for the  
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cooperative to last over the long term, its members must heed the public interest. In that way, it is probable that 
the initial self-interest of the subject will diminish or at least be limited by the development of motivations that 
are disinterested (Vincent, 2001: 146-147). Still, Gide‘s views generally tend in the social-communitarian 
direction, in two ways. First, he denounces   cooperative producer societies as just forms of ―collective egoism‖ 
lacking any sense of the public interest (Lambert, 1963: 61). On the other hand, his outlook is geared towards 
local rather than cosmopolitan dynamics. 
81 Given the particular focus on the political and civic in most republican theories, however, discussion of 
economic virtues has remained underdeveloped.  
82 According to republican theory, the purpose of this struggle between established and outsider groups is to find a 
mode of coordination which best ensures economic growth, civic virtue and political autonomy. 
83 According to Machiavellian republican theory, overall struggle is healthy and necessary, even it takes violent 
proportions (cf. Shumer, 1979: 30).  The kind of republicanism I profess, sees the (physical) violence aspect as a 
last resort, which even then remains extremely dangerous, as it often reinforces traditions of factional discord 
rather than the recombination of rivalling traditions in a ―common wealth‖ perspective. 
84 For instance an overbearing influence by religious groups. 
85 Again, in contrast to social-communitarians, for state-communitarians the State is not just a servant, but 
embodies entire civic community. 
86 Republican theorists tend to underemphasise the internalisation of material authority as a measure of 
competence, though the ancient Greek ideas of for instance Cicero they draw upon explicitly assume this. 
87 Indeed, much more than either liberal theory, which sees a minimal State and a large private sphere as 
conditions to democratisation, or communitarian theory, which sees the political field – as just one amongst other 
parts of the public sphere, republican theory emphasizes that the development of a strong and autonomous 
political apparatus is a crucial condition to further democratisation.  
88 The main difference between the US and Dutch elites who drafted their respective  constitutions, is that the 
former were much more unified in their concern for absolutism by the "people", i.e. infringement on property 
rights by the "lower" rather than the "higher" ranks (Oosterhagen, 2000 : 364). Indeed, one of the triggers for US 
elites, particularly landowners and propertied citizens, to urge for a new federalist constitution in the years 
preceding 1787, was the increasing influence wielded by the "lower classes" through the different State 
Assemblies and Conventions. Unified in their fear of democratic despotism by an interested and overbearing 
majority, the founding fathers of the US constitution were motivated by the belief that popular participation in 
government had increased to such an extent as to be incompatible with free government  (Dietz and Hamilton, 
1960 : 131). In particular the issuing of paper-money-laws at the State level was seen as a threat to the value of 
traditional property in the US. - against paper-money factions that had come to power in several states, Madison 
said that the Constitution's prohibiting the states from emitting bills of credit ..."the loss which America has 
sustained since the peace...from the pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man 
and man, on the necessary confidence in public councils, on the industry and morals of the people, and on the 
character of republican government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this 
unadvised measure... (Dietz and Hamilton, 1960 : 13). As a result, the US federalist elites made it their task to 
circumscribe clearly how  popular opinion should be guided in ways congruent with the national interest, by, on 
the one hand, stipulating clear boundaries between counterbalancing representative bodies, and, on the other 
hand, ensuring a central place to a council of "wise men", namely the Supreme Court. Similarly, the constant 
respect paid to the tradition of the "founding fathers" in US history can be seen as a means to ensure some 
stability in US popular opinion.  On this account, the English traditions are much closer to the Dutch than to the 
American. Indeed, it can be argued that while the Glorious Revolution led to a clearer "division of powers" 
framework in England than in the Dutch Republic, in a final analysis the English elites were even more 
ambiguous about the need for clear constitutional rules about the role of the State vis a vis civil society. 
89 Republican theorists in effect see the people as entrusting the state with the dispensation of non-arbitrary rule 
(Pettit, 1997: 8). 
90 Firms‘ success also depends on the ability of their special interest group representatives to enjoy some 
autonomy from their members/customers. That is because such autonomy greatly increases the bargaining power 
of representatives to negotiate a measure of self-determination with other agencies (Schmitter, 1974; Schmitter 
and Streeck, 1981, 1991) . 
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4.   REGENT AND ORANGIST TRADITIONS,                                   
AND  A DUTCH SUCCESS MODEL 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, I briefly set out the two main sets of of rivalling traditions that 
emerged and consolidated in the Dutch Republic in the sixteenth, seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries: the « Regent » and « Orangist » traditions of democratisation (4.2). 
For an elaboration of these two types of traditions, I refer to Appendix A, sections 1 and 2. 
In a subsequent section (4.3), I discuss how each one of the five Regent and Orangist 
traditions of democratisation emerged as the result of a combination of strategic problem-
solving and and happy accidents with long-lasting effects. Successive, partial settlements – 
spanning multiple generations of leaders – ultimately, and by happy accident as much as 
original intentions, would lead to a simple Dutch success model. Future generations would 
endeavour to reproduce this success model time and again – up to this very moment, by 
virtue of its association with the Dutch Golden Age. Finally (4.4), I discuss what the 
reasons for the decline of the Dutch success model were during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. This story of decline serves as an introduction to chapter 6. 
 
4.2  Regent and Orangist traditions of democratisation 
  
The traditions of democratisation that follow are partly grounded in the behaviour of the 
original groups of Regents and Orangists. The label Orangist evidently refers to the 
adherents of the Orange family, which served as ―stadtholders‖ in the Dutch Republic. 
Orangists were predominantly from the church and the army. Calvinist ministers saw the 
stadtholders as the custodians of true religion, and army officers regarded the stadtholders, 
who favored the maintenance of the corporate autonomy of civic militias, as a source of 
patronage (Jacob and Mijnhardt, 1992b: 342). Because they strove to strengthen the 
position of the Estates General and the unity of the provinces, the Oranges were the natural 
opponents of the city-state Regents. The denominator ―Regent‖91 refers to those mercantile 
groups who defended the sovereign rights and autonomy of city-states in the Dutch 
Republic.  Regents were usually led by the grand pensionaries of Holland; they mainly 
focused their efforts on protecting the openness of the Holland cities to foreign trade and 
economic spill-overs, among others by expanding the Dutch ―Imperium maris and 
international trade‖ (Gelder, 1918: 41).92  
 The Regent and Orangist traditions to some extent are also the product of 
imagination. For one, successive Regent and Orangist generations have had to learn to 
reframe and reinvent these traditions to suit their own contemporary needs. So, the rhetoric 
of Orangists was different in times when the Prince of Orange held the official position of 
« Stadtholder» than in times when the Regents ruled alone and the Dutch Republic did not 
have a Stadtholder – from 1650 to 1672 and from 1702 to 1747. All in all, the two 
traditions have remained fairly continuous, however. While the Regent tradition promotes 
a more economic nationalism, the Orangist tradition involves the promotion of a civic  
nationalism. Compared with its English Tory equivalent, Orangist nationalism was very 
weak up to the nineteenth century. Yet, this does not mean that the Orangist republican 
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traditions were weak, and that the Dutch did not rally around the Orange stadtholders. 
Successive wars against the Habsburgs, English and French were not sustained by virtue of 
emotional attachment to a Dutch nation or state, but by virtue of a strong sense of 
territorial independence of an altogether more fragmented nature – provincial, city and 
village affiliations. Thus, if during these successive wars, that disparate variety of people 
called the Dutch united around the Oranges, it was to protect their local privileges – 
whether economic, religious or otherwise (‗t Hart, 1993: 221). 
The sixteenth century settlement between rivalling Orangist and Regent groups 
which allowed the Dutch Republic to enjoy its Golden Age in the seventeenth century was 
based on the resolution of two leadership problems. As explained in chapter 1, leadership 
problems consist of interdependent coordination and cooperation problems. The problem 
of coordination in the Republic was resolved by turning the threat of invasion by Great 
Powers into an opportunity to create an interprovincial rallying cry of a  common « foreign 
enemy ». Anti-papist ideology served the same purpose. Both the threat of invasion and 
anti-papism were used to legitimise a tradition of «sound money » in the Republic‘s 
constitution: City monetarism.  This tradition is grounded in Antwerp and Amsterdam city-
states‘ merchant classes‘ historical experiences. Bulwarks of the ―personality principle‖, 
these city-states had provided first generation merchant upstarts – with little political clout 
in the empire – the opportunity to increase their financial wealth and gain a higher status.  
A condition to such a higher status was the ability to circumvent ―arbitrary‖ political and 
fiscal encroachment by the Habsburgs, and guarantee international monetary movements at 
a distance from central State intervention. This tradition for two centuries would ensure 
low and stable interest rates on the Amsterdam stock exchange – in contradistinction of old 
usury principles, and guarantee unlimited possibilities of stockjobbing to anyone who 
wanted – be they foreign or domestic investors. What is more, during the seventeenth 
century no city was home to such a large jockstobbing class than Amsterdam. The 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie was a flagship of such widespread stockjobbing and 
private ownership activity (De Heer, 1929; Gaastra, 2002; Robins, 2006) . Beyond a mere  
solution to coordination problems, this demonstrates the potential consensus-inducing side 
of the monetarism tradition too. Indeed, the invention of an unrestricted prolongation 
market in the eighteenth century, which became very popular during the nineteenth century 
– due to decisive backing from Amsterdam and central authorities (see p. 81) , again would 
illustrate the success of City monetarism as a solution to cooperation problems.  
Another solution to coordination problems was found in the Orangist pacification 
tradition, i.e. the principle that rivalling factions should depoliticise and resolve civic 
differences – religious or otherwise – in elitist decision-making bodies. Furthermore, 
people should not let their differences get the better of national prosperity and concord by 
learning to live together apart. The tradition of pacification obviously has a geopolitical 
side too. The Dutch were notorious – even amongst the fellow « anti-papist » Englishmen 
– for their pragmatism when it came to foreign commerce and settlement (Boxer, 1965).  
What other protestant, anti-papist nation would have had the common sense to mobilise 
Catholic priests, with the mission to inculcate the natives in its colonies with sufficient 
work discipline? In sum, Dutch elites became renowned for their willingness to pacify 
geopolitical antagonisms to facilitate international commerce – most strikingly the Dutch 
Stadtholder William‘s willingness to facilitate his old enemy‘s royal succession and a 
stable international payment system between Amsterdam and London.  The prevalence of 
Dutch city merchants as the leading class in the Republic explains the Dutch habitus to 
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pacify conflicts. Instead of a military style of armed conflict, the art of governing with the 
help of negotiation and compromise was passed on first from the city of Antwerp 
(Tawney, 1926), and later from Amsterdam and Utrecht.
93
  
The problem of cooperation, on the other hand, was resolved by ensuring that 
stock exchange and taxation mechanisms would be proportional to strength, and thus 
relatively redistributive.
94
 For one, participation in the Amsterdam stock exchange was 
more inclusive of the middling ranks than other exchanges in the seventeenth century (Van 
Dillen, 1934).  Also, the Holland Regents agreed to carry a higher share of the taxation 
burden – a burden which was relatively easy to bear in 1600, when Europe‘s centre of 
economic gravity lay in Amsterdam (Ormrod, 2003: 335). Redistribution through a 
tradition of proportionality would come to support  idiosyncratic habits of « tactical 
tolerance » in the Dutch Republic and later the Netherlands (Van Doom 1989: 39), 
involving a willingness to compromise and stay on speaking terms on the part of different 
religious and cultural minorities. A second solution to cooperation problems was found in 
a principle of Orangist democracy: the republican principle that Orangist stadtholders 
would always protect the age-old privileges and rights of particularly the lower middle 
classes from encroachment by those that did not respect the natural balance and integration 
of the social classes.  
Finally, in many ways the living-together-apart principle is the Regent answer to 
Orangist traditions, in particular Orangists‘ preference to pacify differences by virtue of a 
unitary state.  The principle of living-together-apart ensured that as many powers as 
possible were devolved from a central State apparatus to leading local families – 
prompting descriptions of the Republic as a « familial State ».   The continued popularity 
of the complementarity policies of pacification and living-together-apart in Dutch history 
has its origin in a particular « common sense » principle. Because of the heterogenous and 
locally oriented character of the Dutch nation, real peace can never be reached and one 
should strive for a pragmatic armistice between all different groups – continued overt 
antagonism can only damage the common good (Kruijt, 1959; Van Elteren, 1998: 71). 
In sum, the combination of the living together apart and pacification traditions 
encapsulates two contradictory tendencies, whose dialectical synthesis can be summarised 
as ―practical nonconformism‖. In Dutch mythology, the Republic was the new promised 
land for protestant people. At the same time, the confederal nature and small size of the 
Republic pushed the Dutch towards an immense geopolitical pragmatism. Thus, the 
geopolitical success of the Republic was due to an ability to marry confederalism – a 
pronounced provincialism and sense of local difference, to the pragmatic imperative to be 
at the forefront of emerging international standards and agreements – pacify or remain 
neutral in international conflicts. 
 
4.3.    Happy accidents, partial settlements and a simple Dutch 
  success model 
               
 In what follows,  I shall first elaborate on the role of fit-of-absentmindedness in 
the making of each tradition (4.3.1), and then proceed to describe the emergence and 
consolidation of a Dutch success model (4.3.2). 
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4.3.1.   Traditions: the role of unintentionality  
 
                a) Tradition of City monetarism 
                The Holland Regents‘ revolutionary claims of fiscal usurpation notwithstanding, 
it were the Burgundian and Habsburg Regents that had initiated the most advanced fiscal 
and monetary innovations in the Low Countries, unintentionally sowing the seeds of an 
autonomous Dutch Republic. As early as 1515, Habsburg Regents in Brussels persuaded 
the Provincial States to adopt a new type of provincial annuities.  When these Brussels 
Regents in 1553 convinced the States to abandon the custom of forced buying prevalent in 
Holland – encouraged by high interest rate levels, this allowed the capital from aspiring 
classes that flocked to the Low Countries‘ city-states to flow much more freely into the 
refinancing of state debt. The end product of Brussels Regents‘ innovations constituted no 
less than a financial revolution. It marked the first time in European history that the future 
revenues of whole provinces could be mobilised for present needs through the mechanism 
of credit (Tracy, 1985: 221). In sum, the Brussels Regents greatly enhanced the monetary 
sophistication and solidarity of the Regents in the northern provinces;  by fit-of-
absentmindedness providing a crucial stepping stone to the formation of the United 
Provinces. 
b) Traditions of pacification and living-together-apart 
Local agricultural leaders in the northern Low Countries were more unnerved 
by the challenge of pacifying the sea and rivers during the Middle Ages, than the threat of 
imperial invasion. Foreign invaders had little appetite to conquer these inhospitable 
regions, much in the same way the Romans opined of an invasion of Scotland.  This 
provides one explanation why the Dutch developed a living together apart tradition: they 
were allowed more local independence than their counterparts in the surrounding regions. 
Still, as the claiming of fields from sea and rivers was labour-intensive, it compelled 
farmers to remain on speaking terms and work together in a spirit of compromise.   
Faced with an ecological crisis in the late Middle Ages – human-induced, 
although clearly unintentional, the Northern Netherlands completed the transition from 
arable subsistence economy to market dependent, export oriented economy (Brenner, 
2001: 330-331). This transition was accompanied by the gradual transformation of some 
agricultural commoners into a Regent merchant class in the Holland cities – Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and Dordrecht – from the thirteenth century onwards (Israel, 1995). Following 
in the footsteps of the more consolidated and sophisticated merchant classes in the city of 
Antwerp, Holland Regents traded financial assistance for the protection of imperial rulers. 
Thus, the unification of the Low Countries – starting with Flanders and Brabant, and later 
Holland – happened in a rather pacific, mutually agreeable fashion. Yet, the incorporation 
of these provinces in the empire would always remain loose, based on the tit-for-tat trading 
of commercial and administrative privileges and liberties for fiscal revenues; and grounded 
in a living-together-apart principle, i.e. minimum integration and a maximum of autonomy.  
Holland Regents would not have been able to pull off the above and remain on 
speaking terms with the imperial rules, without the ongoing help of Orangist nobles and 
their predecessors in Brussels. By virtue of Orangists‘ skilfull influence on the Burgundian 
dukes and Habsburg gents in Brussels, the latter were more willing to compromise, and 
Holland Regents benefited from several imperial spill-overs.  The noble predecessors of 
the Orange family convinced the Burgundian duke not to interfere in Holland‘s Baltic 
wars, even it these clashed with the interests of the southern provinces of Flanders and 
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Brabant. Also, the Burgundian dukes helped curtail the influence of guilds and civic 
militias in Holland, contributing to an accelerated formation of a Regent oligarchy. A city-
state culture developed in Holland, based on the principle that wealth derived from foreign 
trade was paramount to maintaining the province‘s privileges and liberties. One condition 
of uninterrupted access to foreign trade was peace – even if foreign pacification on 
Holland commercial terms often first involved conquest. Thus, the Holland cities 
developed the principle that its rulers should be merchants – for whom keeping the peace 
was a vested personal interest. Then again, peace was premised first on the pacification 
skills of the Orange Stadtholders, both in political and military terms. It is the Orange 
network, spanning the Habsburg Regents, French and English rulers, that provided the 
Regents with the geopolitical buffer to fend off invasion by greater military powers, and 
come to successive truces and peace agreements.   
c) Tradition of proportionality 
As with the tradition of City monetarism, the tradition of proportionality could 
not have come about without the help of Burgundian and Habsburg Regents – by fit-of-
absentmindedness, as the latter certainly had no autonomous Dutch Republic in mind. So, 
it is Philip the Good who first instituted the States-General to resolve inter-provincial 
economic differences. And the same imperial ruler who first proposed to coordinate the 
provincial currencies and simplify fiscal terms.  And it were Habsburg gents in Brussels 
who first convinced the Provincial States to adopt the principle of collective responsibility 
in fiscal affairs – implying among other a distribution of fiscal burdens according to 
provincial strength.  
d) Tradition of Orangist democracy 
    The same unintentional causal logic applies to the emergence of a tradition of 
Orangist democracy. The emergence of a Regent upper class – and a closed hierarchy of 
public office – in the Holland cities, could not have happened without the Burgundian 
dukes‘ complicity in minimising the constitutional influence of guilds and civic militias. 
This had one important unintentional consequence for the Regents. It increased the need 
for a counterbalancing power that could promote the interests of the middle classes in 
Holland, nobles and landlords in the outer provinces. The Orangists would provide this 
counterbalancing power, by default of Regent constitutional guarantees for the latter 
groups. Calls for a complementary form of Orangist democracy were so persistent and 
widespread that the Holland Regents could not withstand calls for the restoration of 
Orangist stadtholders after the Revolt (cf. Te Brake, 1989). 
 
4.3.2.      Transformation of partial settlements into a simple success model  
The Dutch success model that consolidated during the 17
th
 century Golden Age 
can be summarised as ―Dutch nonconformism‖: ―reinforce local privileges and traditions 
by pioneering a low-cost and pragmatic geopolitical vantage point; a vantage point 
conducive to the spill-over of the benefits of dominant international standards, techniques 
and agreements‖.  This deceptively simple model emerged as the synthesis and 
geopolitical apogée of successive, partial settlements spanning three centuries or more, 
some championed by Regents or Orangists, others mediated by foreign rulers. Crucially, 
the simple model would not have consolidated if it were not for a succession of happy 
accidents. 
a) An ecological disaster and the emergence of a low-cost vantage point 
The ecological crisis of the late Middle Ages was primarily human-induced.  
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The first human-induced disturbances came with the reclamation of raised bogs from 
around AD 800 onwards (TeBrake, 2000). By virtue of vast projects of draining and 
canalisation, the immense raised bogs eventually could be transformed into arable country; 
providing the Holland population with sufficient grain to feed itself, trading little with 
neighboring territories in years of harvest failure. The added advantage of these 
reclamation projects was that they produced vast amounts of peat, which provided Holland 
farmers with cheap fuel and a fledgling merchant class with a first means to acquire a 
modest, low-cost export vantage point.  The latter would soon be transformed in a full-
blown bulk trade model, by virtue of the unintented consequences of the reclamation and 
drainage projects. These projects had the effect of sinking the surface level close to the 
mean water level of the North Sea. Not only did the relative rising of the groundwater level 
put an end to agriculture; the ecological crisis that ensued turned the interior of Holland 
into a a wholly unsustainable enviroment (Van Dam, 2001). 
This did not mean Holland was doomed. On the contrary, this disaster in time 
would prove a blessing in disguise. It would provide the trigger for Holland and Zeeland 
elites to leverage several happy accidents. The latter started transferring capital derived 
from prospering inland activities to sea fishing and long-distance trade, finally exploiting 
their superb geographic position
95
;  this, exactly at a time when the centre of the 
international economy was shifting from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic coasts of north-
western Europe – Antwerp and London. Furthermore, the labour force pushed out of the 
countryside by the rising waters in the fifteenth century provided the cheap immigrant 
labour – and cheap peat – necessary for the expansion of  internationally competitive 
industries and trades. These trades had emerged first as a byproduct to the booming peat 
export trade in areas near raised bogs: cloth manufacturing in Leiden
96
, and the beer 
breweries in Haarlem and Gouda.
97
  Crucially, the cheap, unskilled labour surplus that 
accrued to the new harbour town of Amsterdam allowed it to rise out of the swamps at an 
accelerated tempo in the fifteenth century.  By 1530, Amsterdam had overtaken the Baltic 
transit function from Antwerp, by virtue of the former‘s lower labour costs, and the latter‘s 
upward movement in the foreign trade value chain,   
b) The Lutheran William the Silent is embraced by the Catholic Emperor 
When his Catholic cousin and proud defender of the Empire, René of Châlon, 
Prince of Orange, died childless in 1544, the eleven-year-old Lutheran-born William 
inherited the title Prince of Orange and vast estates in the Low Countries.  The Holy roman 
emperor Charles V, who was at Chalon‘s deathbed, decided to replace William as the 
Brussels Regent until the latter was fit to rule. Being fit to rule implied studying under the 
supervision of Charles V‘s sister, Mary of Habsburg, governor of the Low Countries.  
Besides receiving military and diplomatic training of the highest quality, William received 
a Catholic education. In time this personal tutelage, and early promotion to imperial 
commander and member of the States-General, greatly increased the influence and 
centrality of the Prince of Orange as the main binding factor in the Low Countries.  In 
1559, William was appointed stadtholder of the provinces Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and 
Burgundy by Charles V‘ successor Philip, thereby greatly increasing William‘s  political 
power. It is in this position that William built an impressive network spanning the 
Habsburg Regents, French and English rulers, which he would leverage very pragmatically 
to further his and other Dutch nobles‘ privileges.  
William remained on speaking terms with the Habsburg governors long after the 
Dutch Revolt had started.  Although he privately funded Calvinist militias, the Prince of 
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Orange was entirely pragmatic about the Dutch Revolt. He did not see it as a way to build 
a Republic in service of religious ideals. Up to the very end he supported the Revolt in the 
hope that it would lead to a consolidation of power in the local nobles‘ hand, and a 
pragmatic dilution of the Catholic and Protestant faiths in a Christian tradition. In many 
ways, William‘s protracted fit-of-absentmindedness regarding the emergence of a 
predominantly Calivinist and Regent capitalist Republic was pivotal to its creation in the 
first place. In terms of an historical success model, it inculcated the founders of the Dutch 
Republic with a geopolitical pragmatism in service of the consolidation of local liberties 
and privileges.    
c) Spanish Fury, temporary foreign weakness, roots of the “Dutch miracle” 
The first ―Dutch Miracle‖ did not happen in the late twentieth century, but in 
the late sixteenth century, when Holland made the transition from a bulk trade economy 
based upon grain transport from the Baltic into a rich trade economy based upon rich trade 
goods (Israel, 1995: 307). The miracle did not happen on a pre-planned basis, by virtue of 
home-grown will-power or strategy. It was triggered by several happy accidents that 
facilitated the low-cost transfer of international spill-overs.    
One happy accident was the so-called ―Spanish Fury‖ against Antwerp in 1576. 
The Spanish Crown‘s near bankruptcy in 1575 caused large delays in the payment of 
soldiers; prompting the latter to sack Antwerp to get their due. The brutality and 
arbitrariness of this event caused shockwaves in popular opion, alienating the locals, 
including Catholics, against the Spanish Habsburg empire. It proved a tipping point for the 
Dutch Revolt, not in the least because it promptly led to overwhelming support for the 
Pacification of Ghent and Union of Utrecht settlement.  Crucially, the Spanish Fury 
accelerated the migration of Antwerp bankers and merchants – and their clientele – to 
Amsterdam. Furthermore, the Spanish Fury unintentionally gave the fledgling export 
industries in Holland a serious boost. The Spanish Fury encouraged the decline of the 
Antwerp Cloth Market as English traders sought out new commercial links, most notably 
in Leiden. By 1582, all English trade to Antwerp had ceased. At the end of the sixteenth 
century, Amsterdam had replaced Antwerp as the most influential city-state in Northern 
Europe.   
The Dutch Republic profited from a more general happy accident also. The 
geopolitical opportunity structure was extraordinarily favourable, due to the temporary 
weakness of the larger geopolitical entities surrounding Holland.  The main imperial power 
of the time, Spain, experienced near-bankruptcy several times in the last decades of the 
seventeenth century – first at the hand of English pirates‘ repeated sacking of its ship-
bound fortunes, later due to the Armada‘s failed invasion of England (1588). Meanwhile, 
the Dutch troubles only came third in Philip‘s geopolitical priorities. That is, after the 
conquest of Portugal, and the invasion of  England in retaliation to the latter‘s declaration 
of independence from the Holy Roman Empire. All this gave the Dutch rebels a much 
needed respite to get their internal affairs in order (1580s). If not, Alexander of Parma‘s 
formidable army would have made short work of the Dutch defenses. Now, demoralised 
and occasionally unpaid Spanish soldiers were consistently fighting in numerical 
inferiority against emboldened rebels. Furthermore, the Spanish subjugation of Portugal 
unintentionally opened the way for a Dutch take-over of Portugal‘s imperial trade routes – 
one of the key causes of the Dutch miracle. Finally, the Dutch economy to a great extent 
was dependent on export markets in England and France. Yet, up to the 1660s, the Dutch 
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were given much leeway by their rivals; the latter were too busy arranging internal 
succession and territorial consolidation processes.
98
  
d) Making the Dutch miracle happen: complementarity Regents and Oranges 
  While the Spanish fury and the temporary weakness of larger geopolitical 
entities provided the necessary happy accidents to make a Dutch miracle possible, this was 
not a sufficient condition for the miracle to actually occur. That condition was a greater 
complementarity and accepted division of labour between Regents and Orangists. At its 
simplest, the interplay between the Regent Van Oldenbarnevelt and the up-and-coming 
champion of Orangism, Maurice of Nassau, provided this complementarity through the 
crucial period 1587-1610 – during which the ―Dutch miracle‖, as well as the Republic‘s 
foundations were consolidated.     
Johan van Oldenbarnevelt played an important supportive role in the Dutch 
Revolt. Although he inherited William‘s double predilection for ―freedom of consience‖ 
and ―concord‖, Van Oldenbarnevelt tended more towards the Regent views after his 
appointment as pensionary of Rotterdam and member of the States of Holland in 1576 – 
Van Oldenbarnevelt fully supported the Union of Utrecht (1579), contrary to William who 
clinged to the Pacification of Ghent.  This does not mean he relinquished William‘s 
Orangist views. In many ways, Van Oldenbarnevelt functioned as a bridge between 
Regenst and Orangists, for instance promoting his father‘s acceptance of the countship of 
Holland and Zeeland in 1584. Furthermore, Van Oldenbarnevelt helped convince William 
to relinquish his allegiance to the Spanish Crown. Crucially, he was a fierce opponent of 
the centralisation policies of the Earl of Leicester, who had been appointed governor-
general at the time
99
 in return for English support. In the hope they would be more 
understanding of the Dutch predilection for local privileges and liberties, Van 
Oldenbarnevelt favoured local representatives of the Oranges. Thus, he was instrumental 
in making the Earl leave in 1587 to make way for among other Maurice of Nassau as 
military commander. Maurice, the eldest son from William's second marriage, to Anna of 
Saxony, proved a strong military leader, winning several victories over the Spanish. In 
1589,  Maurice became Prince of Orange and Stadholder of five provinces. Befitting his 
new titles, Maurice gradually became an outspoken representative of a more ideological 
variant of Orangism than the one invented by his father; favouring among other a strong 
national synod and less commercial relativism. This only would cause substantial friction 
with Van Oldenbarnevelt and the Regents from the 1610s onwards, however.
100
 During the 
crucial three preceding decades, Van Oldenbarnevelt and Maurice functioned in a highly 
complementary way, the former acting as Advocate, i.e. administrative and political 
coordinator of the Republic, the latter rather disinterested in Statesmanship, but all the 
more in military prowess and Orangist stability.   
 
4.4.  Decline of the Dutch success model    
      
    a) Causes 
As long as the Habsburg threat had been imminent, the coalition of Regents and 
Orangists held fast. After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, however, the anti-imperial 
struggle against the Holy Roman Emperor which had provided the Dutch Republic with its 
purpose and interprovincial unity, lost much of its relevance. The loss of a common 
foreign enemy made decision-making in the States-General very labourious; the manifold 
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economic, political and religious differences between the provinces surfaced
101
. Decision-
making in the States-General increasingly was referred to closed-door special committees, 
made up of a handful of insiders working on compromise deals. One of the biggest 
divisions which appeared between Regents and Orangists had to do with  involvement in 
the Revolution of the Republic greatest commercial rival, England. Many Regents noted 
that the ascendancy of William III on the English throne concurred with the financial and 
military rise of the English state. So much so that by the time of the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1702-13), Britain had emerged as unquestionably the strongest of the powers 
ranged against the might of France and Bourbon Spain. The Dutch Republic, on the other 
hand, played an increasingly subsidiary role, especially at sea and outside Europe (Israel, 
1997: xii). 
Soon, the idea that one of the great contrasts between the seventeenth and 
eigtheenth century Dutch Republic lay in the character of its leadership gained 
prominence. In the former century the leading ranks knew that they had to fight and work 
to maintain the Republic‘s newly acquired political prestige, not only by investing in the 
military, but also by competing strenuously in trade and industry. By contrast, in the 
eighteenth century, the reputation of the Dutch Republic was established, and the oligarchy 
proved incapable of any sacrifice for the national cause ; they increasingly invested their 
money in one source of wealth: the stock-market. Similarly, it proved impossible to lower 
the high wages in the Holland finishing industry of linen and wool. From 1700, the 
inadequacy of Dutch mercantilist sea policies became visible in terms of wealth: the 
policies of economic protectionism inaugurated by Britain and France in the second half of 
the seventeenth century took effect, also because these latter nations had a more or less 
indepednent industrial production which the Dutch Republic never could have – as its 
specialised in a finishing industry which was becoming superseded in scale by foreign 
manufacturers (Vlekke, 1945: 258-259).   
As a result of the loss of a common foreign enemy – the main basis of 
coordination, an important cooperation problem appeared in the Republic, to do with the 
fiscal quota system. When external pressure on the Republic was high, the quota 
functioned relatively well, but this changed in years of peace. In sum, Holland was the 
only province able – and more or less willing – to solve urgent financial problems. In 
particular after 1648, other provinces free rode as much as possible. Only Holland 
identified itself with the common Dutch interest, the other provinces were aloof of such an 
identification. By 1667 all provinces were far behind in their payments to the central 
treasury. While Holland had already paid 88% of its share, Gelderland had paid only 12%, 
Overijssel 52% and Utrecht 70% (Fritschy, 1996, pp. 9-10). This free riding slowly 
accumulated and became almost the norm. In 1790, when state bankruptcy was 
approaching rapidly and the state lacked adequate means to organise its defences, an 
inventory was drawn of up of the results of all the ‗non-payments‘ that had occurred since 
1783. The total amount of arrears was almost 16 million guilders, but Holland had 
contributed almost its complete share while the other provinces owed huge sums (Meulen, 
1905: 262).  
While the Holland Regents in the States General put a lot of pressure on other 
provinces to reform their tax systems in order to yield more money, or to contribute more 
generally to the common purpose, the problem was that neither the States General nor the 
province of Holland had adequate instruments to force other provinces to pay their share in 
full and in time, since ultimately the Republic was a coalition of independent states
102
 (Van 
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Zanden and Prak, 2004). Only at the very end of the eighteenth century was the fiscal 
quota system in place since 1616 substantially revised. By then, however, Holland's share 
in the quota system had risen to a crippling sixty per cent or more. Holland‘s urban trading 
system, however, had started crumbling as early as the 1720s.
103
  Meanwhile, the Dutch 
state had proved incapable of adopting to the shifting economic and population growth 
momentum in the Republic from the maritime west to the agrarian east, and from 
commerce to agriculture
104. An overhaul of the Dutch Republic‘s taxation system, 
necessary after Holland became overburdened with debt during the wars against Louis 
XIV, foundered on the diverging economic interests of the different provinces  (Aalbers, 
1986). The only solution which the two groups of leaders, the Regents and Orangists, 
could come up with was to form an even more closed oligarchy. After 1747, the year in 
which had France invaded the Republic once again, the authority in this oligarchy shifted 
more and more to prince William IV
105
. By creating an informal network of patronage, the 
prince of Orange succeeded in centralising authority in the Republic to some extent (Prak, 
2000: 352).  This centralisation, however, came at the cost of a democratic deficit. The 
glaring contrast  between, on the one hand, the waxing riches of the oligarchs, and, on the 
other hand, the impoverished middle ranks and the financially powerless state would 
finally help to bring this deficit to surface (De Vries, 1968: 178).  
b) The emergence of Patriotism 
           By the 1780s, a growing contradiction emerged between on the one hand, the 
deteriorating economic wealth of the Republic, and, on the other hand, the fact that the 
Dutch capital market remained the leading provider of government loans to other nation-
states up to the end of the eighteenth century
106
 (cf. Riley, 1980). In the 1780s, the ossified 
oligarchy was challenged by a widespread revolt, the so-called Patriot Movement, which 
for a large part based its grievances of democratic deficit on this contradiction ('t Hart, 
2001: 104-105)
107
. The Patriots, mostly middle ranked people whose economic situation 
was declining, argued that the ―national disintegration‖ that the Dutch Republic was 
experiencing resulted from the unpatriotic rentiering and stockjobbing of the wealthy in the 
Republic
108
. For these wealthy rentiers in the mean time had moved most of their 
investments abroad
109.  Still, the Patriots did not only target the ―old corruption‖ of 
wealthy rentiers. While the Patriots embraced much of Orangist corporatist discourse,  they 
did not distinguish between Regent rentiers and the Prince of Orange. That is because 
Orange‘s pro-English foreign policy was seen as the reason for the disasters of the Fourth 
English War. His patronage was regarded as the source of political corruption at home and 
and his command of the Republic's mercenary army seemed to threaten traditional 
liberties
110
 (Brake, 1989: 90).  The Patriots focused their ―democratic deficit‖ grievances 
on the relationship between both groups: the ―moneyed interests‖ – an iresponsible and 
unpatriotic class of international rentiers and jockstobbers, and the monarchy – a tyrannical 
bunch intent on self-agrandizement through military conquest. In light of the historical 
public debt problems in the Republic, the Patriots argued that only a more patriotic 
financial system could offer an alternative for growing state debts.
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With the aid of French revolutionary armies the Patriots in 1795 brought about 
the 'Batavian Revolution'
113
. The Patriots wanted the new Batavian Republic to be 
governed, like the new French Republic, by a constitutional, representative government. 
An important structural change proposed by the Patriots to nationalise the system of public 
debt provision and taxation by making it accountable to a more representative national 
franchise (cf. Pfeil, 1998). This financial nationalisation, however, was left largely 
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unrealised, both because of the continuing provincial autonomy in matters of fiscality and 
public finance, and because of the spectacular demise of the Amsterdam financial system. 
While the Bank of Amsterdam had continued to flourish until the mid-eighteenth century, 
the Dutch in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in 1784 and the concurrent demise of the East 
India Company, its success declined sharply. Merchants grew increasingly accustomed to 
paying their bills outside the Bank in current money (Van Dillen, 1934: 115-116)
114
.  
A structural change which was unintended, but inadvertently realised during the 
Patriot Revolt, was a shift of the epicentre of popular opinion from Holland to the outer 
provinces. Indeed, while the anti-Orangist element of the Patriot movement was certainly 
strongest in Holland – the ruling regent aristocracy in this province traditionally was 
opposed to the House of Orange – the appeals for grassroots democratisation were 
strongest in the outer provinces, most notably the eastern provinces of Overijssel and 
Gelderland, but also in Utrecht.
115
 Also, Roman Catholics, Baptists and all others who did 
not belong to the Dutch Reformed Church and who were on the whole rather well off, 
supported the Patriot movement because its democratic aims seemed to promise an end to 
their exclusion from first-class national membership (Kossmann, 1971: 164-165)
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. 
Finally, the Patriots launched a new civilisation offensive which would have 
significant structural reverberations in the later Kingdom of the Netherlands, both in 
economic and religious terms. In religious terms, the Patriot movement promoted a 
peculiar mixture of Enlightenment and Christian values
118
.  On the one hand, Patriots 
focused on the ―unsolved antithesis between the ecclesiastical and the secular government‖ 
(Fockema Andreae, 1961: 148) which had lingered in the Dutch Republic
119
. So, Patriots 
such as Jan Nieuwenhuijzen founded organisations such as the Society for Public Welfare 
(1784). With its ―enlightened‖ body of thought, the Society formed a counternetwork 
against the Reformed Church and the governing oligarchy.   And when on August the 5th, 
1796, the National Assembly of the Batavian Republic decreed that ―there cannot and will 
not be tolerated any privileged or dominant Church in the Netherlands‖, the Dutch 
Reformed Church effectively lost its formal authority in matters of marriage, poor relief 
and education. On the other hand, the Patriots often were more religious than the oligarchy 
they were fighting. For instance, the founder of the Society for Public Welfare, 
Nieuwenhuijzen, was a Baptist. What the Patriots reproached the oligarchs, however, was 
that they used the authority of the Reformed Church as a means to govern rather than to 
induce prayer. In response to this abuse of Protestantism as a source of political 
mobilisation, the patriots brought forth a more enlightened ideology in which not the 
church nor theology but the state and a juridical apparatus were the main reference points 
(Stuurman, 1983: 105-108). Still, the Patriots realised that to foster the notion that all 
Dutch citizens should seek to serve the public good, they needed to use Christian rhetoric, 
as this was the most effective means of civic mobilisation in the Republic
120
 (Schama, 
1977: 74-75). 
In economic terms, the Patriots induced a change in mentality with regards to a 
monetary economy and profit-making amongst the lower ranks. Up to the end of the 
nineteenth century, large parts of the country population lived in locally sufficient 
subsistence economies, based on non-monetary exchange.  The Patriots were keen to 
change this by building a nation-wide financial system. To achieve this, they reworked the 
foreign and domestic stigmatisation of Dutch entrepreneurs and financiers as a money-
grubbing and stingy bunch
121;  arguing that, on condition that it served the ―real wealth‖ of 
the country, the urge to make profit actually diminished  prodigal practices. Not afraid to 
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rewrite history, the Patriots even maintained it was  a focus on real wealth rather than 
stockjobbing that had allowed the Republic to enjoy its Golden Age and international 
prestige.
122
  
 The Napoleonic invasion of the country in 1795 many ways would help to give 
substance to Patriotic claims of the Holland middle classes. Although, paradoxically, only 
if reinvented within a reinvigorated Orangist tradition. What would precipitate more 
national unity was the Emperor‘s initiatives to amalgamate the public debt in 1798, create 
a national system of taxation in 1806, centralise the Mint in 1806/7 (t‘ Hart et al., 1997: 4). 
Unfortunately, meanwhile investor confidence was at an all time low, and the public debt 
exploded (Jonker, 1996). Much work still was to be done to create a stable and 
geopolitically viable Dutch entity.   
 
                                                 
91 The denominator of this group in the original historical literature was ―Staatsgezinden‖. 
92 Even the famous Grand Pensionary John de Witt, who did not have a direct interest in trade, was of the same 
opinion (Rowen, 1978: 188).  
93 In fact, Dutch city merchants provide an exemplary case for the question of how to protect civilians from 
violent external attack without being dominated by their own military helpers (Elias, 1996: 11-12). Dutch naval 
captains were in large part from the middle and petit-bourgeois strata. On land, on the other hand, the Republic 
mainly fought with the help of mercenaries, commanded by the members of the one important noble dynasty, the 
Protestant House of Orange. 
94 This principle would be reinvented as a tradition of ―proportionality‖ in the twentieth century, during the period 
of pillarisation. 
95 This geographical position enabled the Hollanders and Zeelanders to consolidate the entrepôt function between 
the Mediterranean and the Baltic. Furthemore, it provided them with a gateway to Germany via the Rhine, and an 
excelling place to land herring for trans-shipment to European Catholics foregoing meat on Fridays. 
96 Leiden is a town that was situated at the heart of the Rijnland raised bogs. 
97 These cities were located at the northwest and southeast corners of the bogs. 
98 Afterwards, the picture changed completely. France and England  introduced more and more protective 
measures in their domestic markets, while engaging all their military power in imperial conquests. When in 1672 
England and France attacked and occupied much of the Republic, the decline of the Dutch Republic as an 
international power had become unstoppable. While the wars against France continued until 1713, prices rose 
sharply in the Republic and the taxation burden needed to finance the public debt and the military became 
unbearable . Dutch Regent capitalists increasingly became rentiers, eager to invest their money in foreign markets 
– first in the English debt and from the late eighteenth century in US railroads. 
99 Dudley was placed in command of the Dutch campaign of 1585, culminating in the Battle of Zutphen. He was 
afforded the title Governor-General of the Dutch Republic under the Treaty of Nonsuch. 
However, the direct support from the English would prove to be of little help to the revolt. Leicester was an 
ineffective administrator, often in conflict with the leading Dutch statesman Johan van Oldenbarneveld. His 
military enterprises came to no success either, culminating in the loss of Battle of Zutphen. He was to return to 
England in disgrace. 
100 Friction started when Van Oldenbarnevelt, against Maurice‘s advice, decided to sign the Twelve Years' Truce 
with Spain, which lasted from 1609 - 1621. 
101 Thus, while the demise of the economic soundness of the Dutch Republic is often situated around 1720, 
decline had already set in much earlier, concurrent with the decline of the Holy Roman Empire – and symbolized 
by the 1648 peace of Westphalia. 
102 Apart from Brabant and Limburg, which were subjected directly to the central authority of the States-General 
and the Stadtholderate - when this last party was in function - the Dutch provinces enjoyed a great degree of 
autonomy. 
103 Israel, 1998: 993. 
104 virtually all inland sandy-soil provincies and in particular Gelderland appear to have profited from the outdated 
quota system...From the mid-eighteenth century, the countryside began to profit from the recovery in agricultural 
prices. In addition, most of the population increase of the later eighteenth century was confined to the countryside  
('t Hart, 2001: 102-103). 
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105 In the emergency, all provinces decided to accept William IV as their new stadholder, granting him even more 
special powers than his predecessor in 1674. As a result, the Orange court was able to control political 
appointments in the towns of all provinces save Holalnd. 
106 During the eighteenth century, the Dutch importance in international public finance increased, to the point at 
which the growing Amsterdam capital market ceased to be related to the functioning of the commercial staple 
market. The expansion of direct trading outside the Netherlands entrepot and the introduction of finishing 
industries at the ports of return - at Bordeaux, Liverppol and Hamburg - contributed to the redundance of the 
Dutch middleman. The role of the capitalist, hitherto inextricably linked with trade through the commission 
business, gradually reverted to more purely banking and broking functions. Attracted by higher rates of interest 
than those prevailing at home, concentrations of capital detached themselves from the entrepot and were invested 
in foreign loans, or lending short with a quick turnaround.. This structural relocation of resources had evident 
political reverberations. While the commercial and financial community did not divide into obviously polarised 
classes, it became more difficult for th emerchants and entrepreneurs to make fortunes that could compare with 
the collossal wealth of the great bankers and financiers...This division, however blurred, was not without its 
polititical implications. there was some feeling within the mercantile community that the crisis to which the world 
of acceptance banking seemed periodically prone in turn generated conditions inauspicious for the prospects of 
trade ...the close association of Dutch financial operations with the expansion of British power and strenght was a 
sore point with the traditionally Anglophobe commercial lobby in Holland...Such objections received dramatic 
emphasis from the events leading to the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-84). The Stadholder's preference for 
"army augmentation" over "fleet restoration" was taken as corroboaration of the accusation that those Orangists 
with strong English connections...were prepared to subvertthe national interest to protect their dividend (Schama, 
1977: 34-36). 
107 Small towns inland sided with rural militias in demanding proper political and economic reforms. The Dutch 
oligarchs, however, managed to restore their power up to 1795. The wealthy small towns and rural communities 
ahd to wait for the centralised state of the nineteenth century to gain their rightful place in the national political 
system 
108 Before the Patriot movement, a radical republican movement had already emerged in Amsterdam in the first 
half of the eighteenth century: the so-called ―Doelistenbeweging‖. The Doelisten in 1747 sought to curb the 
power of the oligarchy and to democratise the institutions of local government so as to address creeping questions 
of economic decline. They hereby focused on two vehicles of popular opinion, one established, one new: on the 
one hand, the guild system, and, on the other hand, the institution of centers for the application of science to the 
problems of industry. But to no avail: the problems of the Dutch Republic accumulated and tensions mounted 
well into the second half of the eighteenth century (Jacob, 1992: 231; Jacob and Mijnhardt, 1992: 3-4)    
109 followed by the Patriots was to picture their own age as decadent compared to the Golden period of 
international prestige of the Dutch Republic. As the culprit of this decadence, they mostly pointed to the moral 
decay of the old elites who could not bear the burden of wealth and with an unlimited prodigality prepared their 
undoing (Dankers et al, 2001: 24-27). 
110 The Prince of Orange, for his part, was blamed for the loss of the Fourth English Naval War (1780-1784) and 
said to be more interested in the army to further his international prestige than in the navy to protect the trade and 
the real interests of the people. 
111 Arguing for more local self-regulation, they also attacked the situation in which landtaxes and excises 
increasingly were spent to furnish the incomes for rich stockholders - the moneyed interests linked with the 
Holland Regent class, which the taxman dared not to touch for fear that they would leave the country taking their 
riches with them 
112 Patriots and Orangists agreed that the main problem of the Dutch Republic was the highly localised character 
of politics and the lack of a national framework. While the Patriots preferred to turn all the State parliaments into 
one dependent instrument of the popular will through a system of government by representation, Orangists, on the 
other hand, proposed the strengthening of the Regent executive, personified by the stadtholder (Jacob and 
Mijnhardt, 1992: 9-13). 
113 The name ―Batavian‖ refers to Classical Antiquity, when the German tribe of the Batavians had succeeded in 
asserting their freedom against the German emperor, in what later on was to become the Netherlands. More 
particularly, the batavian myth postulates the independence of Holland from the time of the Batavian tribe of the 
Roman period and defines the medieval count of Holland as a predecessor the stadtholer and as a creation of the 
representatives of the nobility. In the Patriot period, the term "Batavus: also came to include all noble, fatherland-
loving patriots who were prepared to oppose the Dutch ancien regime. The name of the Batavian Revolution of 
1795 - when many patriots who had gone to exile in France returned to complete the reform of the Dutch state - 
derived from this usage (Jacob and Mijnhardt, 1992: 339). 
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114 With the introduction of Napoleon‘s Continental System and the blockage of free passage by way of the North 
Sea, Amsterdam's economic power was dealt the final blow. Gradually, the entire international shipping traffic 
through Amsterdam was immobilized. Within a time span of a few years, Amsterdam trade completely collapsed. 
The East India Company (VOC) went bankrupt and the trade to Dutch-India fell into the hands of the English.  
The trade to the rest of Europe, Africa, India and the United States suffered greatly from the Napoleonic wars and 
the Continental system. All these factors of isolation and stagnation eventually finished off the Amsterdam staple 
market at the turn of the nineteenth century. The end of the staple market at one stroke meant the bankruptcy of 
the Amsterdam Exchange Bank and the end of the position of Amsterdam as an international financial centre. The 
city now was degraded to a secondary role in marketing foreign loans. And although Dutch capital investment in 
bonds remained impressive, it were the Rotschilds and London-based companies that set the market conditions in 
Amsterdam, thus leaving behind Dutch commercial establishments like Hope & Co. and W.&J. Willink as 
remnants of a glorious past (Jonker, 1999: 51-52).    
115 Generally speaking, in the outer provinces the House of Orange was widely supported by the local regents. 
116 By championing the idea that the pursuit of republican ideas through literature, arts and science was an 
acceptable alternative to direct political participation, the Dutch patriots fostered the notion that all Dutch citizens 
should seek to serve the public good. Despite the ultimate defeat of the republican Patriot movement, this paved 
the way for a democratisation of the Regent politics. Indeed, the discursive struggle between proponents of the 
Patriot movement  and their establishment counterparts of the Orangist movement, made it impossible to return to 
the old order of things after 1787.   
117 The expansion of the anti-Stadholderian constituency by the Patriots was geographical as well as social. In 
contrast to earlier attacks on Orange – and even the ―Doelisten‖ of 1748 – the Patriot campaign was not 
monopolised by the maritime provinces. In fact, the maritime provinces at this time were more than usually 
divided (Schama, 1977: 75). 
118 In doing this, they set out to recruit sections of Dutch society for whom active participation in their own 
government was no more than a memory.  
119 This antithesis was less conspicuous than the more visible antagonism between protestants and catholics 
(―ketters and papen‖) that came to be associated with the Dutch Revolt. 
120 The Christian rhetoric and common-place pamphlet histories which the Patriots distributed were well suited to 
exploit the contrast between the popular version of the founding of national liberties and their contemporary 
atrophy (Schama, 1977: 74-75). 
121 already in 1776, Le Francq van Berkhey, one of the inspirers of the Society of Public Welfare, emphasized the 
virtues of ―economy‖ (thrift) and self-sufficiency as the basis of enlightened reason and intelligent policy in these 
―dark times‖. 
122 The preacher Van Hamelsveld in his 1791 treaty on the ‗Moral State of the Dutch Nation‘ argued similarly that 
―Dutch economy, famous for many centuries, is nowadays falling out of the habit‖ in favour of  ―excess and 
prodigality‖. 
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5.  WHIG AND TORY TRADITIONS,                                
 AND AN  ENGLISH  SUCCESS MODEL 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, I briefly set out the two main sets of rivalling traditions of 
democratisation that emerged and consolidated in sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
century England: the Whig and Tory traditions of democratisation (5.2). For an elaboration 
of these two types of traditions, I refer to Appendix A, sections 3 and 4. In a subsequent 
section (5.3), I discuss how each one of the five Whig and Tory traditions of 
democratisation emerged as the result of a combination of strategic problem-solving and 
happy accidents with long-lasting effects. Successive, partial settlements – spanning 
multiple generations of leaders – ultimately, and by happy accident as much as original 
intentions, would consolidate into a simple English success model.  Future generations 
would endeavour to reproduce this success model time and again – up to this very moment, 
by virtue of its identification as the cradle of Anglican exceptionalism.  Finally (5.4), I 
discuss what the reasons for the decline of the English success model were during the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This story of decline serves as an introduction to 
chapter 7. 
 
5.2  Whig and Tory traditions of democratisation 
 
 The qualifications presented in the preceding chapter about Dutch traditions of 
democratisation also apply to English traditions of democratisation. Despite nominal 
reference to the rivalling groups of ―Whigs‖ and ―Tories‖, the presented traditions are only 
partly grounded in these groups‘ actual behaviour.  The traditions to some extent are also 
the product of the imaginative minds of the original groups‘ successors, needing an 
historical narrative adapted to their own contemporary struggles.  Most confusing is that 
both groups can behave very differently before and after the emergence of a democratic 
settlement. So, Tories‘ rhetoric was most rebellious when the Whigs challenged their 
established power position during and immediately after the English Revolution. By 1720, 
however, Whigs and Tories had come to a settlement which considerably blurred the 
agendas of the two groups. Nevertheless, since the early 17th century, the contrary 
predispositions of Whig and Tory traditions have surfaced time and again in face of 
geopolitical changes. What are these contrary predispositions? While the Whig tradition 
promotes a personality principle of  nationalism – Britain centered in London, the Tory 
tradition involves the promotion of a territorial or provincial English nationalism. The 
Whig tradition is typically championed by challenger elites in times of « national 
globalisation » and associated with established elites in times of « national relocalisation ». 
The opposite is true for the Tory tradition, which generally is associated with established 
elites in times of globalisation, and championed by outsiders in times of relocalisation.  
What settlements between Whig and Tory groups allowed England to enjoy its 
economic revolutions and maritime supremacy from the middle of the eighteenth century 
onwards? One way the English problem of coordination was resolved, was by creating a 
more modern British identity: an identity of industry, empire and financial profit (Evans, 
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1994: 160).  This British identity would formalise and extend the results of the first 
civilisation crusade in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Such an identity would not 
have been possible without the creation of somewhat artificial enmities.  Thus, despite the 
presence of only a minute minority of Catholics, intolerance against anything Catholic – 
Spanish, French, or Popish – was elevated to a priority.123 124  Second, and more 
remarkably, the creation of a convincing Britishness also involved interpreting Englishness 
as an identity which had lost much relevance in the current geopolitical reality.  Indeed, to 
engage in further imperial expansion, the rivalries with the Spanish and French were used 
to forge a British protestant national identity, able to override English, Scottish, or Welsh 
allegiances.
125
  The English Empire, which had consolidated after Cromwell‘s reconquest 
of Ireland and the twin Acts of Union, would fast become a British one.
126
  Or maybe it 
would not.  In spite of all rhetoric of Britishness, English national identity had been and 
would remain central to British identity.  After all, at the root of Britishness were those 
features of ―Englishness‖ which were considered acceptable because they did not overtly 
go against the grain of notions of ―Welshness‖, ―Scottishness‖ or ―Irishness‖. Also, it 
makes more sense to talk about ―Anglican nonconformism‖ than British Protestantism, as 
Anglicanism was at the centre of Englishness, and nonconformism only came into the 
foreground geopolitically, that is to differentiate the country from its continental enemies.    
Parallelling the British-English identity tug of war were two seemingly 
contradictory movements of sound capitalism, or sound money.   The dynamic that 
resonates most in contemporary imagination was the embrace by dissenters and merchants 
in the City of London of a principle of City monetarism; supporting the relative autonomy 
of the Bank of England in issues of debt, liquidity and interest rates, and a City where 
merchants could make money militantly and increase their social status away from 
arbitrary fiscal and political encroachment.  Yet, in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, this embrace 
was only a secondary phenomenon, the result of a ―fit-of-absentmindedness‖ by the 
religious and agricultural elites who favoured a ―real economy‖ focus and were eager to 
represent England-centred sentiment.  
Contrary to contemporary mythology about Britain‘s long tradition of liberal 
capitalism, the ―real economy‖ cause prevailed in England up to the late nineteenth century 
– when high finance motives gained prominence in State policy, among others due to the 
final defeat of the agricultural cause.  As early as the late Middle Ages, i.e. much earlier 
than in Continental Europe, an emphasis on sound money in service of the real economy 
had crystallised in England (Braudel 1984: 356).  English bullionist policy by far was the 
most severe in Western Europe: legally the circulation of foreign coins was not allowed, as 
was the export of specie – especially of English coin (Munro, 1992: 298).127  The reason 
for this severity was the greater domestic contestability in monetary affairs. England was 
unique in having a Parliament – dominated by landlords – that could effectively express 
public hostility to debasements – interpreted as a form of disguised taxation.128  Thus, 
English agricultural and manufacturing concerns remained more central to State policy 
than international commerce considerations up to the late nineteenth century. It is only 
when the former concerns waned that guaranteeing the international centrality of the City 
of London became part of British monetary orthodoxy. And even then, this happened 
largely unintentionally, as the result of an international bandwagon effect beyond 
England‘s territorial control. In a bid to renew the real money or ―real bill‖ character of 
English banking, the State first adopted the gold standard in 1816, and later complemented 
it with Peel‘s 1844 Bank Act. After Napoleon‘s defeat emerging nation-states were 
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increasingly looking at the English clearing system as a model of sound finance. By virtue 
of this happy accident, some of the core features of the English clearing system, such as 
the gold standard were copied abroad, slowly giving rise to an international gold standard.  
The emergence of an international gold standard has been interpreted by liberals as the 
intentional product of English policy and the direct result of an English liberal tradition, 
steeped in universalism. Nothing could be further of the truth. For instance, by default of 
an intentionally internationalist ―liberal tradition‖, English merchants formed standalone 
merchant banks in the colonies, contrary to their continental European counterparts. 
In sum, the English monetary principle of sound finance primarily co-developed 
with a territorial tradition of Anglican voluntarism, and only secondarily – through the 
proverbial ―fit-of- absentmindedness‖ – with a cosmopolitan tradition of City monetarism. 
Based on the myth of a uniquely ancient and English freedom (Colls, 2002: 8), voluntarism 
was not the product of a ―quasi-liberal‖ attitude to international trade and finance. Rather it 
was used by monarchs and parliament as a legitimation for England‘s ―splendid isolation‖ 
of English traditions, i.e. the immovable historical reality of an ―Anglican 
nonconformism‖. 
The tradition of voluntarism has been invented from Saxon settlers‘ origins by the 
pre-Revolution predecessors of the Tories, confusingly called the ―country Whigs‖.  After 
the Revolution, country Whigs and court Tories shifted positions. From then onwards, it 
were the Tories who championed the tradition of voluntarism, for two purposes.  To 
ground early trends of modernisation in a rationale of a real national economy.  And to 
bolster support for a type of national unity maintained by intermediate, civil symbols of 
authority, rather than the State.  In time, post-Revolution Whigs also drew on this tradition, 
although for different purposes: as a way to pit the rationality of the British 
Commonwealth – its monetary principles, but also its massive use of military force – 
against the irrationality of French and  Popish imperialism.  Whoever its champion, the 
spread and instinctive support for the tradition of voluntarism among middling and upper 
ranks in England helped to associate the nation with exceptional democratic credentials of 
social mobility and civic freedoms – religious and otherwise.   
The above discussion introduced some English solutions to coordination 
problems. But how did rivalling English groups deal with the problem of cooperation? 
Cooperation problems were resolved in three ways. First, the government developed a 
fiscal policy that, to an undetermined extent, redistributed wealth; it did this to make sure it 
was not seen as the prisoner of any particular economic interest or class.  Not only did the 
government keep taxes for the gentry and yeomanry relatively high. It also guaranteed 
unprecedented opportunities for assured income to investors in public funds and for instant 
fortunes to other men able to profit from the government's expanding activities (Murrin, 
1980) This was not just another application of the principle of City monetarism. Over the 
course of the centuries, the principle of non-preferential administration would become 
reinvented as a tradition of neutrality – by a government, civil service and economic actors 
eager to reconcile their differences within a unified public interest.
129
 In Dyson‘s words 
(1980: 230): the English State tradition entails a belief in the geopolitical effectiveness of  
―neutral transformatory structures processing ‗inputs‘...into‖outputs‖. The age-old habit of 
delegating difficult regulatory decisions to the civil service and self-regulating economic 
bodies is merely another expression of the tradition of neutrality: to avoid perceptions of 
political, or moral preference and guarantee the continuation of a ―neutral‖ level-playing 
field (fair-play), one relies on decision vehicles with a mixed public-private character. 
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Given the elitist nature of the latter vehicles, the tradition of neutrality is as much a 
solution to coordination as cooperation problems.  
Second, the problem of religious and class strife was resolved by channeling 
aggression to the greater enemy France, and by developing a new consensual tradition of 
―secular Anglicanism‖ (cfr. Marwick, 1996). This tradition holds that all domestic 
religious – and in later centuries class – strife amounted to anti-national factionalism.  The 
only legitimate religious strife was with Catholics, the French in particular (Colley, 1992a: 
56). The paradox of secular Anglicanism is that domestically it was not really protestant in 
character. Yet, successive evangelical movements would do much to strengthen this 
tradition throughout the centuries. Evangelicalism softened the raw edges of potential 
group conflict by its restraining influence on the strategically important classes in England 
( , 1912; Haseler, 1976: 23). By being mobilised as a vehicle of secular 
Anglicanism, religious movements such as Methodism of course signed their own death 
warrant.  
Finally, to keep aspirations of social mobility simultaneously alive and in check, a 
tradition of Anglican democracy came into being. Anglican democracy very much was the 
other side of the Anglican voluntarism coin: it meant that England was a ―Commonwealth 
that embraces all classes, sections, interests in a common life‖ (Bentinck, 1917: 137). In 
this Commonwealth, the Establishment, through Parliament or other political avenues, 
would protect the rightful aspirations of especially the middling, but also the lower sorts 
from encroachment by any outsider – domestic or geopolitical – that did not respect the 
natural balance and integration of the different classes and ranks.
130
  For instance, 
landlords‘ resistance against debasements was successfully depicted in Parliament and 
popular opinion as a way to protect the standards of life of the employed ranks – as well as 
landlords‘ own income. 
  
 
5.3   Happy accidents, partial settlements and an English success 
  model 
 
In this section, I shall first elaborate on the role of fit-of-absentmindedness in the 
making of each tradition (5.3.1), and then proceed to describe the emergence and 
consolidation of an English success model (5.3.2). 
 
5.3.1  Traditions: the role of fit-of-absentmindedness and unintentional 
opportunities 
a) Tradition of voluntarism  
   The Teutonic sea-borne invasions of England in the 400s and 500s were  
distinctive in that they brought about some of the first signs of Western individualisation. 
Saxons in effect were breaking away from old tribal ties and royal allegiances, in favour of 
more voluntary personal followings and migrations to a new motherland. Obviously, new 
communal ties were formed in England; yet given historical antecedents they would 
remain somewhat different from their continental counterparts. This would not change 
noticeably throughout the ensuing centuries, when Christian missionaries from Ireland 
colonised England, and set out to establish closer ties with the European continent.  If 
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anything, the influence of English monastic settlements on continental reality was of a 
reforming, voluntary kind (cf. Collins, 1999).   
In sum, the English tradition of voluntarism has its origins in the migration of 
people breaking old communal ties in favour of a process of individualisation, and 
subsequent re-societalisation on more voluntary principles. As we shall see later, while the 
tradition of voluntarism ultimately was spawned outside of the merchant City, the latter 
would provide a beginning and end point for this double movement – facilitating foreign-
initiated individualisation and abiding by the episodic rule of Anglican re-societalisation. 
b) Tradition of secular Anglicanism 
Another distinctive feature of the Saxon invaders was their religious culture. It did 
not rely as much as its Greek, Roman, Hindu or Celtic counterparts on deities intervening 
in human heroes‘ lives. Saxon religious culture formed in the long struggle against 
Christianity for control of the new states of the north.
131
 Such a ―Godless‖ culture, even 
after being forcefully Christianised was bound to remain more open to influences of 
individualisation and secular re-societalisation than much of continental culture (Borkenau, 
1981: 256).  
Another critical juncture in the making of the tradition of secular Anglicanism  
was the Puritan Cromwell‘s attempt to build a ―Godly Commonwealth‖. While Henry 
VIII, icon of Anglican nonconformism, in fact had opposed the Reformation as a Catholic 
Orthodox, Cromwell unintentionally brought the reformation back with a vengeance. His 
Commonwealth period was marked by the resurgence of Reformation ideas of rationalism, 
anti-clericalism, and the beginnings of secularism (Jones, 1998: 77). 
c) Tradition of City monetarism 
Edward I‘s duality of behaviour towards the City of London in the thirteenth 
century epitomises the central, yet contradictorily secondary role played by the tradition of 
City monetarism. Edward‘s rule marked the last occasion when overseas interests were 
deliberately accorded so reasonable a role in the affairs of London since the period 1986-
2008. During the last twenty years of the thirteenth century, he kept the City under direct 
rule for a dozen years, in part so as to ensure that foreigners could pursue their business to 
his monetary advantage.  Yet, even Edward I succumbed to pressures to demonstrate a 
primary allegiance to the Anglican nonconformism principle. Thus, he introduced the most 
severe English bullionist policy in Western Europe, prohibiting by law the circulation of 
foreign coins and the export of specie – especially of English coin (Munro, 1992: 298).132   
d) Tradition of Anglican democracy 
As noted above, Anglican democracy refers to the principle that England is a 
―Commonwealth that embraces all classes, sections, interests in a common life‖ (Bentinck, 
1917: 137). One avowed aspect of this principle is that the Establishment, through 
Parliament or other political avenues, would protect the rightful aspirations of especially 
the middling, but also the lower sorts from encroachment by any outsider – domestic or 
geopolitical – that did not respect the natural balance and integration of the different 
classes and ranks.  For instance, landlords‘ resistance against debasements was 
successfully depicted in Parliament and popular opinion as a way to protect the standards 
of life of the employed ranks – as well as landlords‘ own income. 
 An entirely unavowed antecedent of the Anglican democracy principle, in 
particular its imperial counterpart ―England and Empire‖, was provided by Cromwell‘s 
Commonwealth. Contrary to the ―liberal tradition‖ associated with the emergence of 
Empire by fit-of-absentmindedness, it was Cromwell‘s aggressive nationalism and 
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protectionism that first gave rise to the idea of an ―England and Empire‖ Commonwealth. 
Rather than a liberal tradition, it was the combination of policies represented by the 
Navigation Acts, a strong navy, and protectionism that resulted in Britain's capturing gains 
from trade as well as achieving fruitful import substitution (Ormrod, 2003). Of course, 
Cromwell did this in the name of the protection of the rightful demands of the English 
people, as represented by Parliament. Thus,  the legislation of the Long Parliament
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during the Civil War ensured that no-one could raise taxes without parliamentary consent.  
Disraeli in 1872 would reinvent both sides of the Commonwealth coin, with his slogans 
―England and Empire‖ and ―Anglican democracy‖.134  
e) Tradition of neutrality 
 The middling role played by City of London merchants in cycles of 
individualisation and re-societialisation inadvertently led to the birth of a tradition of 
neutrality. Contrary to for instance the Dutch Republic, where groups were spared the 
worst pressures of individualisation and re-societalisation, and a tradition of living-
together-apart flourished, English groups were less able to buffer themselves from these 
pressures. This led to Englishmen‘s inculcation with both a more possessive individualism 
and a more qualitative type of territorial nonconformism than in the Dutch Republic. Only 
a non-partial English vehicle, championing a tradition of fiscal and monetary neutrality, 
could mediate these contradictory pressures. Originating in the Norman Conquests, the 
Treasury decisively emerged
135
 as this vehicle in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
It was a City representative, Lionel Cranfield, who provided a tipping point in this regard.  
Cranfield was a successful merchant venturer, who from poacher turned gamekeeper. After 
becoming Lord treasurer under James I in 1614, he in 1621 launched a campaign of 
economic reform in ―every particular‖. Trying to do away with the worst excesses of 
patronage and sectarianism, Cranfield was soon impeached and imprisoned.  Yet, the 
departmental reform of the Treasury he initiated – against inefficiencies in collecting 
revenues, incompetence and waste of public funds
136
 – would have a lasting effect 
(Tawney, 1958: 165).  In effect, it turned the English fiscal system into the most 
centralised of Europe; a system in which provincial estates, special privileges and 
exemptions hardly figured. As this gave Parliament – symbol of Anglican nonconformism 
– great power, the Treasury soon turned it into the incontestable symbol of English 
traditions and liberties within the civil service.  Coinciding with Cranfield‘s economy 
campaign, the City of London claimed its unequivocal place as the bulwark of English 
traditions of democratisation; thus, in 1621, Parliamentary debates did not talk anymore 
about ―this city‖, or the ―City of London‖, but about ―‘the City‘ tout court, in the sense of 
London business‖ (Tawney, 1958 : 75, note 1). 
 
5.3.2 Transformation of partial settlements into a simple English success model 
 The English success model that consolidated from the end of the 17
th
 century 
onwards can be summarised as “Anglican nonconformism‖: ―reinforce English traditions 
and liberties by pioneering a qualitatively sounder national vantage point; a vantage point 
conducive to foreign imitation and transformation by virtue of the international model of 
the City of London‖.  This deceptively simple model emerged as the synthesis and 
geopolitical apogée of successive partial settlements spanning several centuries, some 
facilitated by foreign imported rulers, others championed by Whigs and Tories and their 
precursors. As with its Dutch counterpart, the simple model would not have consolidated if 
it were not for a succession of happy accidents. 
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a) The unintended role of the City in the birth of Anglican nonconformism 
All five English traditions of democratisation were the product of a remarkable  
interaction between foreign invasion and Anglicisation, with the City of London emerging 
as an unlikely middleman between those two dynamics.  Ever since the Roman invasion, 
the City of London had been the entry point for foreign merchants. The Teutonic invasions 
of the 4
th
 and 5
th
 centuries led to a temporary disruption in the City‘s role.  Yet, by 600 AD 
the invading Saxons had been divorced long enough from the Continental motherland to 
have become ―Anglicised‖, i.e. built a territorial relation with the southern parts of the 
Isles. Coinciding with this new national consciousness, Saxons built a new City settlement 
close to the original Londinium, by virtue of its closeness to the harbour. Anglicised Saxon 
kings were increasingly keen on protecting the London settlement, given its potential to 
contribute fiscally in its function as a fishing and trading center. Not surprisingly, 
successive rounds of foreign invaders – Danish and French – found it increasingly hard to 
control the City.  Ultimately, the City would get the connotation of being centric to the 
defense of English traditions. Alfred the Great‘s taking of London to suppress a Danish 
uprise provided one tipping point in this regard. Another tipping point was reached in 1075 
when the invading William of Normandy, finding it hard to conquer the City, granted its 
citizenry with a charter of special privileges. This in effect meant that the City of London 
was one of the institutions where English traditions continued to retain most autonomy 
after William‘s invasion. Ultimately, this would greatly contribute to the City‘s reputation 
as bulwark of English liberties and traditions, and Anglican exceptionalism – or 
nonconformism. Clearly, a large deal of fit-of-absentmindedness was at work here, given 
the reality that English territorial traditions originated outside of London, and that the City 
if anything provided a continuous entry point for foreign merchants.  
b) A Catholic Orthodox initiates “official” Anglican nonconformism 
When Henry VIII, in spite of his past as a Catholic orthodox opposed to the 
Reformation, decided to break with the Roman Catholic Pope (1533), he was motivated 
more by secular power politics than religious ideals. Nevertheless, by transforming the 
English Catholic Church into an autonomous Anglican Church, Henry gave the ideological 
principle of Anglican nonconformism a State-officiated, religious character. Henry‘s 
moment would be used by monarchs and parliament as a legitimation for the ―splendid 
isolation‖ of English traditions. That is, the immovable historical reality of an Anglican 
nonconformism; a form of God-given superiority of the British Isles  versus the Continent 
– as in the myth of the ―rational‖ Englishman against the ―irrational‖ Frenchman.  The 
implicit assumption here was that foreigners may want to adapt to English traditions, but 
the opposite should never happen as it would mean devaluing the superiority of Anglo-
Saxon freedom and democracy. 
 c) The critical, unacknowledged juncture of the Civil War  
The myth of Anglican nonconformism would have been degraded into an 
economically backward, ideological residue, if it were not for a coincident fiscal 
revolution. More than the Glorious Revolution, the Civil War provided a critical 
conjuncture in this regard.  The latter conflict originated as both a tax revolt and a revolt in 
the name of an aggressive territorial nonconformism – implying the crucial antecedent of 
Cromwell‘s reconquest of Catholic Ireland. Ireland‘s conquest provided the prototype of 
later British imperial rule – with its civilising mission, a sense of cultural superiority over 
native people, and the doctrine of terra nullius (Lieven, 2002).
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 In other words, 
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Cromwell‘s time provided a turning point in the use of fiscal and foreign policy as the 
shield of English republican traditions.  
d) Emergence of goldsmiths: Anglican model of sound finance personified  
By the end of the 17
th
 century, the blueprint of an innovative English banking 
system was emerging, championed by goldsmiths. Under pressure of the principle of 
Anglican nonconformism – which often was invoked opportunistically more than anything 
else in Parliament – royal authorities refused to give their blessing to the Continental 
European banking system – merchant bankers in City-states speculating on international 
currency exchange movements. Instead, England developed its own, peculiarly domestic 
banking system. Not as the result of a grand State design, but by virtue of the unintended 
effects of two contradictory types of State interventions, one parliamentary, one royal. 
Parliamentary interventions to guarantee a sound money system and foster internal trade 
and commerce brought about two effects: they led to a legal prohibition of European 
banking practices, and they induced an increasing spirit of ―liberty‖ amongst London 
merchants to develop an informal money market independently of State interference (cf. 
Bisschop, 1968).  What parliamentary pressure effectively did was to pass the buck of 
―royal abuse‖ from themselves to foreign merchants in London. For long stretches of time, 
foreign merchants were in charge of currency exchange practices in London. Yet, 
periodically, the Crown used domestic accusations of foreign greed and papal usury to 
confiscate these foreigners‘ bullion reserves – especially so with the Italian Lombards that 
functioned as collectors of papal tithes in the sixteenth century. While this meant foreign 
merchants eventually were compelled to leave the country, it left the door way open for 
sufficiently ―Anglicised‖ entrepreneurs to step in. The departure of incumbent foreigners 
was not so much of a problem, for two reasons. The influx of new foreigners in London 
continued nonetheless. And the City had come to develop vehicles of Anglicisation of 
foreign entrepreneurs: in particular the Goldsmith Company, but also the City Corporation 
(cf. Evans, 1933).  Seeking ways to supply liquidity and credit without currency exchange, 
Anglicised goldsmiths eventually would devise new techniques of banking. From the 
beginning of the 17th century, a goldsmith was frequently found at the head of the London 
Mint. In sum, with every royal abuse the City of London Corporation‘s pre-existing 
Anglican liberties would be drawn on more; yet, not by foreigners who were periodically 
forced to flee, but by their replacing English or second-generation ―Anglicised‖ 
entrepreneurs.  
 e) Napoleon’s defeat and the unintentional rise of an international gold    
     standard 
As we saw above, principles of sound finance in England primarily co-developed 
with a ―real economy‖ tradition – voluntarism and Anglican nonconformism, and only 
secondarily with a concept of City monetarism grounded in the personality principle. In 
other words, England developed a peculiarly domestic banking system. And English 
agricultural and manufacturing concerns remained more central to State policy than 
international commerce considerations up to the late nineteenth century. It is only when the 
former concerns waned that guaranteeing the international centrality of the City of London 
became part of British monetary orthodoxy. And even then, largely by fit-of-
absentmindedness: as the result of an international bandwagon effect beyond England‘s 
territorial control.  
How exactly did this fit-of-absentmindedness play out? In a bid to renew the real 
money or ―real bill‖ character of English banking, Parliament had adopted the gold 
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standard in 1816, and had complemented it with Peel‘s 1844 Bank Act. After Napoleon‘s 
defeat at Waterloo, the movement of nations looking for states – to form nation-states – 
increasingly sought inspiration in the English, rather than the French republican model. 
Part of the latter model‘s appeal was its banking clearing system, which gradually received 
iconic status in international financial circles as a national model of sound finance. By 
virtue of this largely unintended international reappraisal of English banking after 
Napoleon‘s defeat, some of the core features of the English clearing system, such as the 
gold standard were copied abroad. The effects of this bandwagon movement were such 
that by the mid-19
th
 century, an international gold standard was emerging.  This standard 
has been interpreted by liberals as the intentional product of English policy and the direct 
result of an English liberal tradition, steeped in universal principles of individuality and 
modernity. Nothing could be further of the truth, as can illustrated by a few examples. For 
instance, by default of an intentionally internationalist ―liberal tradition‖, English 
merchants formed standalone merchant banks in the colonies, contrary to their continental 
European counterparts who were less hindered by domestic real economy priorities and 
restrictions. Furthermore, according to promoters of the liberal tradition, English bankers 
would have had the autonomy and intention to push an international gold standard. The 
opposite was true. Parliament during the nineteenth century had introduced a gold standard 
against the wishes of most bankers (cf. Knafo, 2006). That is because Parliament was not 
driven by vested financial interests, but by vested real economy interests, and the principle 
of Anglican nonconformism. Testifying to the institutionalisation of an association 
between fit-of-absentmindedness and Anglican nonconformism, long after the pound 
ceased to be the world currency and London the world‘s eminent financial centre, the 
motivation of retaining a real link between English money and the international British 
sphere would remain central to policy-makers. Although it increasingly was out of reach. 
 
5.4   Temporary decline of the English success model? 
               
               Through the eighteenth century, Tory radicals – representing the Country 
interest
138
 – and a fringe of Whig radicals accused the establishment of selling out on the 
Glorious Revolution principles. Instead of reinvigorating the principles of liberty and 
property in a public spirited way, the establishment allegedly gave way to patronage and 
other forms of ―old corruption‖.139 Taxation in particular was a moot point. Time and again 
it was presented as ruinous to the interests of ordinary Englishmen.
140
 Despite its incessant 
criticism, the ―patriot‖ opposition only occasionally was able to extract concessions from 
the government (Murrin, 1980: 382-383).  By the end of the eighteenth century, however, 
patriots‘ arguments had become much more resonant.  That this coincided with the 
ascendancy of the Tory Pitt at the helm of government does not really matter; by then, the 
Tory and Whig establishment had become indistinguishable in the eyes of the public. Pitt 
was eager to meet Tory demands of a more public spirited government and administration 
in the 1780s
141
 to counter allegations of a lack of patriotism. The subsequent Napoleonic 
wars proved that the English financial system was capable of extracting a hitherto 
inconceivable sum in taxes. Pitt was hard-pressed to prove that his government was 
spending all of it to protect the nation, and not to reward ‗corrupt‘ private interests at 
public expense. These efforts were nullified by the slow pace of administrative reform of 
the 1780s, and the fact that the sheer expense of the military effort had obliged the State to 
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suspend convertibility between 1797 and 1821 in order to enable the Bank of England to 
support it with massive war loans (Fetter, 1965).  
 All this contributed to the dramatic growth of the critique of ―Old Corruption‖. 
By the time of Pitt‘s death in 1806 the image of public-minded stewardship he had been 
keen to project had foundered. An evolution sped up by the occurrence of the French 
Revolution, which had inspired fierce debates about the rights of citizenship – debates 
which would have been virtually unimaginable before the 1790s. Pitt‘s critics, whether 
Tory, Whig or dissenter, attacked the government for defending what they perceived to be 
despotic monarchies abroad while suppressing basic liberties at home (Harling, 1996: 56-
57). Another element were the particularly fierce accusations of Old Corruption towards 
the Bank of England. The outbreak of war with France in February 1793 had found the 
British public and country banks unprepared, leading to one of the worst financial and 
commercial crises that England had experienced up to that time. In view of the long period 
of virtual demonetisation of the historic silver standard, and the loosely enforced but still 
economically significant prohibition on the melting and export of British coin, country 
banks‘ practice of issuing paper notes that could not be fully backed by precious metal 
became their Achilles heel.
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 Many country banks went bankrupt. The Bank of England 
was criticised by various pamphleteers and in both Houses of Parliament for its failure to 
act in support of these little banks. All talk was about the dependence of the entire British 
banking structure on the Bank of England; the need for the Bank to act as a lender of last 
resort, and ease credit in the face of a domestic internal bank run (Fetter, 1965: 12-16). In 
the years thereafter, tension came down somewhat, as new country banks sprang up. By 
the 1810s there were several hundreds of local banks that issued a myriad of local bank 
notes (Presnell, 1956; Hewitt, 2003). Banking became the central channel through which 
money was created, as banknotes came to represent around 60% of the supply of money in 
the early 1810s (Marchal and Picquet-Marchal 1977: 84). This success came with its own 
increased monetary management dilemma:  how to restore convertibility of the system 
without impairing industrial growth based on credit means? 
 Another element of ―Old Corruption‖ that was threatening to destabilize the 
eighteenth century settlement, was the growing contradiction between, on the one hand, 
landlords‘ continuing paternalism towards the ―lower ranks‖143 - the principle that only a 
small elite could embody the principles of Anglican voluntarism, and, on the other hand, 
their abdication to arguments of financial individualism, re-energised by a new wave of 
nonconformist entrepreneurs in the provinces.  Economic hardship and change led many 
workers to appeal to Parliament for protection for either wages or apprenticeship 
qualifications; but Parliament was unwilling to grant such protection, since in practice 
much of it had long since fallen into disuse (Brown, 1982: 71). The fact is that until 1795 
the establishment had been willing to pay some of the price of filial obedience in terms of 
the paternal protection provided by the Speenhamland system. From 1795 then onwards 
they held on to the ends of paternalism without providing the means for it. While denying 
paternal protection, the establishment refused workers the right to negotiate wages for 
themselves. The Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 were the first symptoms of the 
establishment‘s foundering authority. Many others would soon follow. 
                                                 
123 Intolerance of catholics was not only rooted in law, but also in the way Britons chose to remember and 
interpret their own past. According to the Britons, God watched over them with a particular concern (Colley, 
1992a: 20).They had a mission, a distinctive purpose. It was widely believed that while the French religion of 
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catholicism wallowed in irrationality, the British, by contrast, enjoyed a truly rational religion. And since the 
French were oppressed by a bloated army and by absolute monarchy, it was all too manifest by comparison that 
the British were free.  It is only with 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act that most civil disabilities, including the 
prohibition of sitting in the House of Commons, were repealed.  But the Protestant worldview which allowed so 
many Britons to see themselves as a distinct and chosen people persisted long after the passing of the Catholic 
Emancipation Act in 1829. For many Victorians, the massive colonial empire conquered through so much warfare 
represented conclusive proof of Great Britain‘s providential destiny (Colley, 1992a: 368-9). That the aggression 
against Catholics functioned more as a symbolic rallying cry for national unity in the face of foreign enmity than 
as a means to combat a real internal threat is exemplified by the fact that, in terms of their numbers, the Catholics 
by any account represented at most a mere two per cent of the population (Speck, 1988: 170). 
124 Apart from the effects of being a compact island held together by, on the one hand, a relatively advanced 
system of canals and roads, and, on the other hand, a flourishing free trade and a growing urbanisation from the 
eighteenth century on, Great Britain owed a substantial part of its self-definition to Protestantism. Protestantism 
provided the majority of Britons with a framework to interpret the past and make sense of the present, by enabling 
them to identify and confront enemies (Colley, 1992a: 55). It was religion that first converted peasants and 
workers into patriots, long before the onset of modernisation in the shape of railroads, mass education, advanced 
press networks and democracy (369). Especially in foreign policy affairs, and most notably in wars, protestant 
duties were used as mobilisation tools by elites. This logic of antagonism did not only apply to Catholic France. 
Most tellingly, though the Dutch Republic also identified itself as a protestant nation, the British portrayed it not 
so much as a protestant nation than as a depraved nation focused on material gains. So, when the Dutch States-
General rejected Oliver Cromwell‘s suggestion of an Anglo-Dutch offensive alliance against Spain and Portugal 
with a view to dividing the Iberian colonial empires between the two Protestant powers, the English dictator 
sourly remarked that the Dutch preferred gain to godliness (Boxer, 1965). Ironically, because the English 
commercial ranks had taken the successful Dutch Republic as their commercial example, they first focused on 
eliminating the rivalry of the Dutch with their market and ocean transport monopoly in Europe through a series of 
Navigation Acts. After having fought three wars over the issue in the seventeenth century, the English finally had 
succeeded at the turn of the century to acquire the entire colonial market (North and Thomas, 1972: 149-150). 
125 See for instance Colley (1992b) and Riemersma (1967: 29-30). 
126 The English or Anglo-Saxon empire was from every point of view a national empire, an expression of the 
supreme authority exercised by the ruler over the different elements which made up the population of England.. 
The Anglo-Saxon Empire found its fulfilment in the strong kingdom which William the Conqueror and his 
successors were able to establish in England (Folz, 1969: 43-44). 
127 Munro (1992: 298) reports that the first recorded ban – repeating earlier edicts – was Edward I‘s Statute of 
Stepney of 1299. In actual practice licenses for the export of English coin were fairly readily granted and sold. 
The total ban remained on the statute books until 1663, when the re-export of foreign coins and bullion was 
finally permitted. With Peel‘s Law of 1819 full freedom to export specie was finally granted. 
128 For instance, as early as January 1352, by the Statute of Purveyors, Parliament exacted the King‘s promise 
never again to ―impair‖ the current gold and silver coinages in weight or fineness, but to restore them to their 
―ancient state‖….There were very few debasements after that, and all had to be obtained with Parliament‘s 
consent. No other West European nation even approached such conservatism in its mint policies (Munro, 1992: 
191) 
129 Clearly, from the 1740s to the 1830s, and again in the 1980s, these reinventions were very imperfect; in each 
period an oligarchy afraid of democracy and intent on the status quo consolidated and managed to get too 
incontested a grip on the State and civil service machinery. 
130 Disraeli would be the first ―modern‖ representative of the Tories to reinvent this tradition. 
131
 This struggle started with the pagan Saxon revolt against the Frankish converts to Christianity, and would not 
end until the forced conversion of the last Scandinavians after 1100 
132 Munro (1992: 298) reports that the first recorded ban – repeating earlier edicts – was Edward I‘s Statute of 
Stepney of 1299. In actual practice licenses for the export of English coin were fairly readily granted and sold. 
The total ban remained on the statute books until 1663, when the re-export of foreign coins and bullion was 
finally permitted. With Peel‘s Law of 1819 full freedom to export specie was finally granted. 
133 The Long Parliament held from 1640 until the Restoration in 1660. It was summoned by Charles I after his 
defeat in the second Bishops' War.  
134 Disraelian Anglican democracy in effect meant both the reorganisation of the party machine so as to make it 
more open to the urban middle class and the promotion of policies appealing to the working class (Blake, 1997: 
147-148). 
135 From the shadows of the Exchequer which had previously eclipsed it. 
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136  "It was asserted, on the one hand, that departmental inefficiency in collecting the revenue deprived the Crown 
of income which it ought to have received, and, on the other, that laxity, or worse, in controlling disbursements 
resulted in the waste or actual malversation of public funds. Incompetent or dishonest local officers...accept 
gratuities to turn a blind eye on defaulters, and, by mendacious affidavits, 'swear the King out of his revenues'‖ 
(Tawney, 1958: 165). 
137 The principle of terra nullius embodies the idea that land and other resources not effectively utilised by  
indigenous peoples can legitimately be expropriated and developed by a superior invading nation more competent 
to do so. 
138 At the heart of the political outlook of the Country Interest was concern with freedom and ―English liberties‖, 
their condition and prospects. Corruption, in the form of illegitimate influence – bribery or other patronage 
techniques – was seen as a major threat to these liberties, as it weakened the public spirit of the constitution The 
condition and display of public spirit were portrayed by Country writers as being crucial to the defence of liberty 
and to the power and influence of the nation abroad…On this view, the major task facing the Country Interest was 
how to recreate the social and moral basis for a cohesive, prosperous and powerful Britain. The weak condition of 
public spirit threatened..the loss of everything that was dear to Britons – their independence, their freedom, their 
commerce and their religion (Harris, 2002: 69). Not surprisingly, the Conservatives who came in power at the end 
of the 18th century increasingly used Anglican discourse of paternal cohesion and the defence of the National 
Church as a way to counter claims of corruption (Sack, 1993). Against the Tories, a coalition of Whigs, liberals 
and dissenters offered their own version of religious probity, grounded in  evangelical voluntaryism. 
139 From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, the twin perceptions of the pervasiveness of corruption and the 
need for a restoration of virtue united many of those who sought political change in mid-eighteenth century 
Britain. The perceptions were not new. Under Walpole, Tory poets such as Alexander Pope had used their verse 
to comment on what they saw as the degeneration of society and culture….from the early 1740s these perceptions 
became ever more important. People like William King, the Jacobite Principal of St Mary‘s Hall, Oxford 
University, claimed that the pople had grown corrupt and that the source of corruption was luxury. There had 
been a time when Britons had retained their ancient frugality and strictness of manners, together with a fierce zeal 
for liberty. MPs had been chosen with the utmost care and foresight. No candidate had been elected who was 
susceptible to bribery…Yet, now only God could rescue the nation from calamity and ruin. The story of 
opposition politics in this period is the story of the relationship between increasingly desperate hopes for national 
renewal and revival, and a deepening disenchantment with the politics of the Hanoverian regime and a growing 
conviction that parliamentary politics was incapable of delivering reform. As the disillusionment grew, so did a 
tendency to look for heroic figures to effect reform, be he the Young Pretender, or Frederick, Prince of Wales or 
even Pitt the Elder (Harris, 2002: 67-69). 
140 . Simplified populist rhetoric of this sort provided a link between ‗country Tories‘ of the City of London in the 
1730s and 1740s and democratic radicals in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth  centuries (Evans, 1994: 156). 
141 A serious contradiction lingered in Tory Country politics. On the one hand, the landed basis of the Country 
interest claimed that the Whig oligarchy threatened to overturn the legitimate interests and influence on 
government of property, especially landed property, and the values with which this was associated – honour, 
virtue, and public spirit. It represented the subversion of the normal, proper social basis of politics, and its 
replacement by the rule of the ‗lowborn and upstart‘. …On the other hand, from the 1730s onwards, the Country 
Interest absorbed and expressed the grievances and aspirations of non-landed sections of society, especially those 
of traders engaged in commerce, not stockjobbing. There thus was a significant tension in Country ideology 
between supporting trade as an important national interest and a vision of society and social values that were 
essentially pre-commercial. Country writers were often critical of commercialisation, seeing in it the rise of the 
power of money and self-interest in society. The elevation of commerce as a national interest was one way of 
resolving the contradiction (Monod, 1989). Another way of resolving the contradiction was to portray commerce 
as constituting another natural interest in the body public, in contrast with stockjobbing. In effect, a dividing line 
was soon drawn between the ―posse of stock-jobbers, contractors, remitters…and the fair and upright exporter‖.  
There was a strongly populist, republican edge to Country politics, with propagandists frequently pointing to how 
the English Revolution was a mere reassertion of the popular origins of government and liberties (cf. Harris, 
2002: 71). 
142 During the eighteenth century the demands of trade, industrialisation, and shortage of coin during periods of 
war encouraged the growth of local banks and the use of paper m money. 
143 Despite the whole enclosure movement and the repeal of paternalistic laws, it is misleading to see paternalism 
as being deliberately abandoned at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the early nineteenth century. 
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6.   DUTCH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1815-1930) 
 
6.1 Changing geopolitical opportunity structure (phase 1) 
 
               The process of nation-state building that followed the Patriot Revolution and the 
French occupation after 1813 brought to surface several contradictions between 
geopolitical and domestic dynamics of democratisation. These contradictions mostly had 
to do with the reality that, in a world of consolidating nation-states, the old confederal 
settlement of the Dutch Republic had become peculiarly outdated.  The legacy of 
provincial autonomy had caused economic, civic and political life to remain much too 
tentative and small-scale in comparison with life in England, France or the United States. 
Furthermore, the confusion of the Napoleonic regime – as well as William I‘s initially 
muddled national policies – had stirred investors‘ distrust and caused the national debt to 
explode to 200% of real national income (Jonker, 1996: 86). Gone were the days of 
comparatively lower national debt interest rates (Jonker, 1997), and the benefits of 
international investment spill-overs. Now the Golden Age‘s legacy of a low-cost 
geopolitical vantage point was finally crumbling, a renewed mobilisation of people and 
resources in terms of national traditions of economic wealth, civilisation and State 
development was in order. The position of the new entity of the Netherlands as a modern 
platform of self-determination in the Western world system depended on it. In particular, 
the following leadership problems had to be resolved. While the city-state of Amsterdam 
had fallen back to a secondary or even third-rank status in the new geopolitical reality of 
the Pax Britannica, agricultural export coming from the outer provinces had become a 
main draughthorse of economic growth. The Dutch State, however, had not yet come to 
terms with the reality that its newly established territory of the United Netherlands 
harboured two potential nations which were largely unconnected and to some extent even 
antagonistic
144
.  
On the one hand, the Netherlands harboured a cosmopolitan, secular and 
financial nation associated with Regent traditions of democratisation, concentrated in the 
Holland city-states, and with roots in Dutch maritime and colonial trade. On the other 
hand, the Netherlands was home to a provincial, religious, agricultural/industrial nation, 
associated with Orangist traditions of democratisation, and concentrated in the outer 
provinces
145
. The two catholic provinces of Brabant and Limburg
146
, in particular, formed 
a challenge to the Regent nation. During the era of the Dutch Republic, these two 
provinces had been denied independence, in contrast with the original seven united 
provinces. As ―generality territories‖, they had been under firm central control of the 
Holland Regents. What would happen in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a territorial 
framework in which Brabant and Limburg were granted the same formal rights and duties 
as the other Dutch provinces? Popular opinion in Brabant and Limburg was that the 
Holland Regents had never really wanted to incorporate them in the Dutch Republic, 
except for financial debt reasons.
147
 
148
 The predictable reaction in these two provinces was 
an attitude of isolationism, fostered during the preceding centuries as a defense against any 
kind of foreign occupation - including Holland domination.  
a)  Cosmopolitan, secular, financial nation 
When King William I came to power in 1813
149
, he was the first of the Orange 
family to have at his disposal something like a unitary state, a legacy of the French 
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occupation which was soon recast in Patriotic terms. This enabled the King to launch a 
national policy of economic recovery
150
. In particular, William I proposed the foundation 
of the Dutch Bank (1814) with an eye on ―nationalising‖ banking services and credit 
transactions. The vision of William I was to set up a circulation bank that, by granting 
credit, issuing notes and standardizing the currency of exchange in the whole country 
would bring the languishing economy back to life. Thus, William of Orange envisioned the 
Dutch Bank as an extension of the State in matters of debt payments, credit and coin 
operations (Jonker, 1999: 60). The leadership of the Dutch Bank – recruited from long 
established lines of Regent elites – did not share the vision of the King, however, 
especially when it came to expanding credit operations beyond Amsterdam and opening 
branches nation-wide. Nor did the management accede to the request to advance money to 
the government, because it felt this would put in peril the trust of foreign and domestic 
investors in the Amsterdam exchange market.  
  Generally speaking, the King‘s economic policies lacked grassroot support.151 152 
Not surprisingly, the 1840s saw an accumulation of economic, civic and political pressures 
on the monarchical basis of the Dutch polity, above all by Liberals, but also by Catholics
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(Gladdish, 1991: 11-12). Following the English Liberals‘ efforts to abolish the Corn Laws, 
the Dutch Liberals challenged the ―old corruption‖ of controls, subsidies and tariffs 
maintained by the Dutch government, while promoting freer trade
154
. When in 1848 a 
wave of constitutional reforms became apparent in Europe, the Liberals, from being a 
minority section with little power, all of a sudden were promoted to the role of 
constitutional reformers of the Netherlands
155
. Liberal premises finally led to the creation 
of a national State apparatus wedded to the purpose of promoting a secular civilisation 
ideology – and intolerant of any interference of the Reformed Church in public matters.156 
Also, a number of fiscal and monetary reforms were taken up in the Dutch constitution. 
These reforms completed the breakthrough begun 50 years earlier, creating the necessary 
preconditions for a sounder pattern of national economic growth. Within 20 years, a 
national financial system came into being, channelling deposits to the Amsterdam stock 
exchange and extending advances through the agency network of the Dutch Bank. In the 
period 1844 to 1914, budgetary and taxation matters gradually came under control of 
parliamentary institutions
157
. Because the constitutional changes gave a large degree of 
autonomy to the liberal Regents at the helm of the Dutch Bank, the demands of 
―nationalisation‖ of the Orangist faction on the banking sector remained largely without 
avail. As a result, when it came to extending credit and deposit facilities nation-wide, 
Dutch banking century in the nineteenth century remained underdeveloped in comparison 
to banks in the neighbouring countries of Belgium, England, France and Germany.   
b) Provincial, religious, agricultural-industrial nation 
Two elements aggravated the Regent/Orangist, Holland/outer provinces and 
financial/industrial dualisms which had lingered since the eighteenth century, and which 
hampered a new nation-state settlement (Van Tijn, 1971). First, in the nineteenth century 
the ―enlightened‖, wealthy Liberals soon concentrated in the Holland cities, separated from 
the more Orangist outer provinces which experienced a religious revival. Second, while the 
political centre of the Netherlands was in North Holland, the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors in the outer provinces for most of the nineteenth century functioned 
as the ―draughthorse‖ of economic growth158 (De Jonge, 1971: 222). With regards to the 
first issue, it is clear that the Holland Regents were facing an uphill task. Though religious 
freedom was guaranteed in the Kingdom of the Netherlands after the constitutional 
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changes of 1848, the monarchy and its Conservative following remained committed to the 
Dutch Reformed protestant Church (Gladdish, 1991: 10).  The following figure 
demonstrates that this commitment prevailed over liberal secularisation efforts: about 98 
percent of the Dutch population was affiliated to a Christian church in 1880
159
. As such, 
the Liberals
160
 effectively had to live in the shadow of the ―great-protestant party‖ of the 
Conservatives up to late in the second half of the century.
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The opening of international trade that followed Britain‘s repeal of the Corn 
Laws in 1846, induced the Liberals to initiate an answer to the second problem: from the 
late 1840s onwards, they started investing considerable efforts in modern agricultural 
education.
162
  In particular, the liberal government encouraged the setting up of regional 
agricultural societies, with the aim of spreading knowledge and use of new agricultural 
technologies
 163
. Still, in the main, the liberal government held on to a laissez-faire policy. 
This policy became increasingly disputed at the end of the nineteenth century, when after 
the inflow of cheap American corn, agricultural prices had come under pressure again 
(from 1873 onwards). While between 1830 and 1880 there had been a rather strong 
correlation between the growth of agriculture and the development of Dutch GDP
164
, 
during the agricultural depression of 1882-1896 the link was broken. The economy grew 
strongly whereas agriculture struggled to overcome the crisis (Van Zanden and Van Riel, 
2004: 280). And while France, Belgium and Germany proceeded to protectionist action, 
the Dutch government refused to follow suit. 
Still, with the emergence of political parties, labour unions and other popular 
leaders with an active interest in the farmer population – most notably the protestant party 
ARP in 1878, the socialist labour union SDB in 1881 and the emerging catholic 
protectionist movement in the 1880s – the Dutch government developed a somewhat more 
active agricultural policy.
165
 With the pressure of all these parties looming large, the 
government in 1886 established a State Commission of Agriculture. Entrusted with taking 
stock of the causes of the agricultural crisis, the Commission called for improvements in 
production methods. Two recommendations were made: send state-instructors to educate 
farmers about the possibilities of innovation (fertilisers, feedstuffs, milkfactories) and 
encourage the formation of a credit system for farmers. Beyond these recommendations, 
the Commission stuck to its liberal credentials and called for methods of farmer self-help, 
rather than State intervention. In fact, the old and ―new social‖ Liberals who dominated the 
State from the seventies onwards were more focused on what they believed to be the real 
threat to a stable polity: the ―Social Question‖ amongst the working classes. Due to their 
increased market dependency, a large new group of urban workers had emerged, which 
experienced very low wages and rising market prices for food and housing.
166
 
167
 
168
  
Likewise, the so-called small citizenry clearly felt the economic reverberations of this 
crisis, and in reaction urged for more protectionist policies.  
 
6.2  First strategic interactions (phase 2) 
 
6.2.1. Civic organisations and political parties  
i) Conservatives 
The ―Conservatives‖ were an amalgame of locally organised, protestant groups 
who opposed both social liberal and socialist calls for more influence of the people on 
government. While the Conservatives never organised into a national party, their influence 
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in all established areas of Dutch life – political, civic and economic – was considerable. 
They occupied most governmental positions before 1848, and up to the end of the 19
th
 
century exerted considerable influence in government and parliament.
169
  Conservatives 
embraced the Orangist tradition, both in their grudging acceptance of popular sovereignty 
– as imposed by the 1848 Constitution – and in their dislike of free trade. Conservatives 
opposed the enlargement of the franchise, and in particular sought to shield foreign policy 
matters from any ―democratic‖ encroachment. And while Conservatives were in favour of 
a minimal government, they, on the one hand, rejected Liberals‘ appeals to privatise the 
Colonial agricultural system, and, on the other hand, were mostly in favour of increased 
protection of the agricultural industry. Not surprisingly, the Conservatives generally 
speaking championed the cause of colonial banks, while being sympathetic to domestic 
agricultural cooperatives. In particular, they supported and held directorships in the Dutch 
Trade Company – ―Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij‖, the Dutch-Indian Trade Bank – 
―Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank‖, the Colonial Bank, the Amsterdamsche Bank and 
of course the Dutch Bank, which in turn held participations or had substantial sway in the 
above banks.  By the end of the nineteenth century, the Conservative movement had 
ceased to exist. Many of its former proponents meanwhile had joined the ranks of either 
the Union of Free Liberals – the more Conservative-minded liberals – or one of the 
confessional parties. 
ii) Liberals 
The establishment of a unitary state in 1798, the administrative centralisation 
and abolition of local particularism (of for instance guilds) during the French occupation, 
and the recovery of independence from France in 1814 all combined into an excellent 
opportunity for the infusion of a national consciousness in lower strata groups that had not 
been fully included in the polity yet. Especially the economically thriving, but politically 
frustrated heirs of the Patriot Revolution, the emerging liberal‖ bourgeoisie, were eager to 
take the opportunity to present themselves as a societal avant-garde of new civilisation 
values. This first generation of Liberals was soon joined by Baptists
170
 and Catholics who 
were promised religious equality and freedom.  
Following their leader Thorbecke, Liberals wanted to break through the 
political, civic and economic monopolies of the old oligarchy, by formalising and 
modernizing the constitutional setup of the new nation-state of the Netherlands.
171
 Keen on 
establishing a new national identity, the Liberals ―through education and propagation of 
(common) culture among all classes‖ tried to broaden the circle of citizens and establish ―a 
homogeneous Dutch nation‖ (Stuurman, 1983: 116-117)172. More than in England, 
Thorbeckian Liberals relied on the support of the citizenry at large, and not just the 
industrial bourgeoise which was still weak and unorganised. On the other hand, similar to 
their English counterparts, the first generation of Dutch Liberals projected themselves as 
the champions of democracy
173
. In Table 6.1, I give an overview of the major antagonisms 
which arose in the Netherlands up to the beginning of the 1920s, and the main civic group 
or political party associations which ensued. 
Borrowing from English Whig traditions of democratisation, Dutch Liberals 
argued that the ―old corruption‖ of Orangist politics could only be tackled by a 
parliamentary representation which would exclusively serve the general, national interest, 
independent from local particularisms and sectional interests. Despite this new democratic 
fervour, the Liberals themselves lacked national unity: they were primarily organised in 
locally oriented clubs (cf. Koole et al, 1988: 9). In response to the national party 
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organisation of the reformed Protestants in the ARP, the Liberals formed their own, 
loosely organised party in 1885 – the liberal Union (Liberale Unie). The diversity of liberal 
opinions, however, was hard to reconcile with the discipline of party formation. A split 
became apparent between the so-called ―Social Liberals‖ defending the general franchise, 
and the ―Free Liberals‖ afraid of such a move.   
 
 
Table 6.1: Group antagonisms and alignments before WWI 
(source: Daalder, 1981; Kwaasteniet, 1985: 22) 
Start 
period 
Party-formation Issue 
Alignment 
group 1 
Alignment 
group 2 
Nature of 
antagonism 
 
1848 
No, only mass 
mobilisation 
Restoration of 
catholic  
bishopric 
hierarchy 
 
Liberals – 
(Catholics) 
Conservatives – 
(Orthodox 
Protestants) 
liberal >< 
anti-liberal 
1868 
Anti-
revolutionary 
Party (1879) 
 
School 
controversy 
Liberals 
catholic  – Orth. 
Prot./  
Socialist174 
confessional 
>< non-
confessional 
1870s 
Social-
Democratic Union 
(1882) 
liberal Union 
(1885) 
Roman-catholic  
Electoral Union 
(1897) 
 
Labour – 
Capital 
antagonism 
Socialists 
All other 
representative 
groups 
upper >< 
lower ranks 
1888 
Social-democratic 
Workers‘ Party 
(1894) 
Liberal-
Democratic Union 
(1901) 
Christian 
Historical Union 
(1909) 
Roman-Catholic 
Electoral Union 
(1897) 
Extension of 
suffrage175 
Social 
Liberals / 
Socialists/ 
Anti-
Revolutiona
ries 
Conservatives / 
Catholics/  
Orthodox-
Historical 
Protestants 
incorporation 
of the working 
classes in the 
nation-state 
1900s, 
1910s 
Union of Free 
Liberals (1906)176 
Protectionism Catholics   
Free Liberals / 
Anti-
revolutionaries / 
Social Liberals 
Protectionism 
versus free 
trade 
monetarism 
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The Social Liberals, backed financially and electorally by intellectuals and 
middle class citizens, founded their own party in 1901 – the Liberal-Democratic Union 
(Vrijzinnig-Democratische Bond)
177
. This party advocated State protection of Dutch 
workers in the same vein as its ―new liberal‖ equivalent in England. Not surprisingly, the 
Social Liberals backed the endeavours of General savings banks and the State Postal 
Savings Bank; both institutions were meant to morally and materially elevate the lower 
middle and working class ranks. The ―Free Liberals‖, on the other hand, also founded their 
own party – the Union of Free Liberals (―Bond van Vrije Liberalen‖) – in 1906 (Lucardie, 
1993: 42).  This party, which received the financial and electoral backing of wealthy 
bankers, merchants and citizens in especially the Holland provinces, advocated the 
importance of a minimal State focused on the defense of property, law and order. Despite 
its formal allegiance to free trade, the Union of Free Liberals was also keen to support a 
more conservative colonial policy. Indeed, the Free Liberals were not only 
disproportionately represented amongst the directors of new commercial banks and the 
Dutch Bank – who supported a conservative monetary and fiscal policy. They were also 
very much present in the Dutch colonial Banks, where they continued the policies and 
lifestyles promoted by their Conservative predecessors.  
iii) Socialists 
In a typical continental European vein, Dutch socialism developed a secular, 
anti-capitalist doctrine focused on the abolition of private property and the socialisation of 
the means of production. Up to WWII, the Dutch socialist current coalesced in two 
national political platforms: the Social Democratic Union
178
 and the Social Democratic 
Workers‘ Party.179 The first national platform was that of the Social Democratic Union, 
established in 1882
180.  Soon, a schism emerged between advocates of national ―political‖ 
struggle, on the one hand, and international ―economic‖ struggle on the other. The latter 
ultimately predominated, leading to the foundation of the Social Democratic Workers‘ 
Party in 1894
181
. 
This party presented itself as the Dutch representative of the international social 
democratic movement. Contrary to its predecessor, which only saw political solutions for 
workers‘ problems, the advice of the leaders of the Dutch Internationale was to ―found 
self-help banks, Savings banks, and shop unions…to help and support each other‖ 
(Brugmans, 1929: 271). Commercial banks, on the other hand, were seen as the enemy to 
be combated politically. The question which riddled the Social Democratic Workers‘ Party 
was whether a combination of economic and political action – a stance in favour of the 
universal suffrage – could ‗bridle‘ capitalism or only leave it essentially unchanged. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the party opted for the former view
182
. What relations 
did the Socialists maintain with economic organisations? The earlier Socialists generally 
had kept aloof from saving bank initiatives for workers; they were antagonistic to the idea 
that individual savings would be useful to workers, as they did not share the liberal 
purpose to infuse self-restraint in the worker population (Dankers et al., 2001: 396). 
Rather, they preferred workers to steer clear from middle class influence and improve the 
viability of their ―authentic‖ lifestyle by investing in labour union membership, consumer 
cooperative membership or collective insurance plans. Gradually, the advise of the leaders 
of the Dutch Internationale to ―establish self-help banks, Savings banks, and shop 
unions…to help and support each other‖ (Brugmans, 1929: 271) gained influence. Initial 
antagonism turned into conditional, unenthusiastic support for General savings banks and 
the State Postal Savings Bank.  
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iv) Reformed Protestants 
In reaction to the restoration of the bishopric hierarchy in the Netherlands, a 
large group of orthodox Protestants in 1853 started a countermovement
183
, and joined up 
with a group of orthodox Christian parliamentary representatives. They invented a 
―reformed protestant‖ tradition of democratisation which seemed to reflect not only the 
frustration of the heirs of the nineteenth century revival at the new constitution, but also 
the frustration of their Republican predecessors.
184
  This movement in 1873 culminated in 
the foundation of the first national political party in the Netherlands: the Anti-
Revolutionary Party (Janssens, 2001).  As the protestant traditions of other Western 
countries (cf. Badie and Birnbaum, 1983: 88-89), the Dutch reformed protestant tradition 
portrays the political system as organically linked to religion and thus directly dependent 
on the order of civil society itself. As such, the protestant tradition ordains that the 
development of an autonomous State should be as limited as possible. In the Netherlands, a 
special version of this protestant pattern developed. Having reconciled themselves with the 
fact that the Netherlands would never become a ―truly‖ protestant nation, protestant vicars 
such as Kuyper developed the idea of ―sovereignty in the own circle‖ (Zwart, 1996).   
The concept of ―circles‖ formed part of the Reformed protestant strategy to 
prevent national corruption and improve national authenticity by allowing for the 
alignment of family, company, school, science and church life in terms of the different 
Dutch  denominational realities (Kickert, 2003: 129).  The different Dutch circles would 
have to collaborate so as to make sure that no circle, not even the State, would threaten the 
self-determination of the other circles. The ―circles‖ strategy provided two pragmatic 
solutions to the idiosyncratic problem of being reformed protestant in the Netherlands. 
First, the concept of sovereignty in own circles was an expression of the denial that the 
State could either have the monopoly of force or be the main proprietor of nationalism. 
The Reformed Protestants instead argued that politics was governed by the ―Grace of God‖ 
and that the State did not have much bearing on the true protestant nation. Likewise, and 
not surprisingly, the reformed Protestants favoured an economic policy based on the 
separation of state and own circles. Second, the reformed protestant profoundly disliked 
cosmopolitan notions of ―self-interest‖.  On the other hand, they had an aversion for not 
belonging to the ―elected‖ leaders of the modern nation-state.  To overcome this 
contradiction, the reformed Protestants developed a doctrine of ―educated‖ self-interest: 
through a private school system, the own circle should be assured of an educational system 
which would be both modern – i.e. capable of being integrated in the nineteenth century 
nation-state world system –  and ―Godly‖ (Kruithof, 1990: 15). Also, as a reaction against 
the socialist movement that waved over Europe in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, part of the doctrine of educated self-interest entailed the promotion of harmonious 
collaboration between masters and workers
185
.  
In sum, the reformed protestant focus on circles – with the protestant circle 
representing the one authentic Dutch nation – emerged as a reaction against the twin 
threats of liberal universalism and socialist statism or communitarianism in the nineteenth 
century. In collaboration with Catholics, protestant intellectuals not only vehemently 
agitated against the revolutionary tendencies of the socialist movement. They at the same 
time blamed the dominant liberal views of laissez-faire and free trade for the ongoing 
economic crisis, especially in agriculture. Helped by the absence of an industrial working-
class, and through their alliance with Catholic leaders, Protestants succeeded in 
marginalizing liberalism and socialism as ―corrupt‖ and ―totalitarian‖.  By appealing to 
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other, more religious feelings, reformed protestant leaders appealed to a new sense of 
national identity, building on the Regent-liberal view that what the nation-state of the 
Netherlands needed to return to the successes of the Golden Age was not a revolution, but 
political-economic stability. As a result of the circle strategy, separate protestant schools, 
newspapers, a university, a political party, labour-unions, and farmer-associations were 
established. In terms of specific economic organisations, Reformed Protestants supported 
all circle-specific endeavours, be it savings banks or co-operative banks. Furthermore, the 
Godly duty to belong to the ―elected‖ leaders of the modern nation-state induced them to 
look more favourably on especially colonial banks.   
v) Catholics 
Before the constitutional reforms, the catholic bourgeoisie allied with the 
Liberals, with an eye on emancipating the catholic religion from the yoke of the Dutch 
Reformed Church. Dutch catholic leaders had allied with Liberals against official papal 
policy – most notably in their advocacy of a separation of State and Church – for 
pragmatic reasons. Their overall purpose was to break through the dominance of the Dutch 
Reformed Church – the informal State church – in the Netherlands. The pact with Liberals 
held fast up to 1870. Already in the mid-sixties, however, the first signs of a rupture 
between Catholics and Liberals became visible. While Catholics had won the 
constitutional freedom to organise their own church by 1853, the Liberals had remained 
too anti-papist to grant Catholics the freedom to organise their own confessional schools. 
In addition, the liberal predilection for free trade was at odds with the increasingly 
protectionist catholic lobby, originating mainly from the provinces of Brabant and 
Limburg.
186
 
187
. Finally, and most importantly, both pope Leo‘s formulation of a ―ghetto 
strategy‖ and Pius IX‘ Syllabus Errorum (1864) sharply criticised liberalism. Dutch 
Catholics interpreted both writings as a call to withdraw from mainstream liberal nation-
building influences (Zwart, 1996: 32). Thereafer, the catholic clergy started responding in 
a similar fashion as the Protestants to the twin threats of State or communitarian socialism 
and liberal cosmopolitanism
188
.  Indeed, by the 1880s, the Catholics and Protestants had 
done the unthinkable: they had formed an alliance
189
. Even more than Protestants, 
Catholics started emphasizing the need for a ―pillarised‖ style of political, civic and 
economic organisation, with the subsidiarity principle and civic corporatism as the main 
rules of the game
190
 
191
. The first principle entailed that the State would only intervene if 
the respective Protestant, Catholic, Socialist, or liberal pillars could not handle a situation 
themselves; the second principle implied that the elites of each pillar should strive to find 
harmonious solutions beyond pillarised boundaries.
192
 In terms of economic organisations, 
the Catholics as the Protestants supported all pillarised initiatives. Given their timing and 
more defensive, agricultural country-centred attitude, however, Catholics more adamantly 
supported co-operative banks than Savings banks
193
. 
While the protestant initiatives focused on the improvement of both industrial 
workers and farmers within a renewed Dutch nation, Catholics concentrated more on 
farmers and were more ambiguous about their contribution to one Dutch nation. Still, 
contrary to what was often alleged, Catholics did aspire to some form of nation-building 
(cf. Knippenberg, 1999)
194
. While Catholics for a long time were more defensive and 
covert in their approach to nation-building, they could fall back on two very resonant 
traditions of democratisation. On the one hand, Catholics reinvented the ―Orangist‖ 
tradition of Pacification, as first practiced by William of Orange in Ghent in the second 
half of the sixteenth century. According to nineteenth and twentieth century Orangist 
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republicans, this pacification event came to epitomise the desire to unite on an equivalent 
basis and in one peaceful nation rivalling groups of Protestants and Catholics.  On the 
other hand, Catholics also followed Roman-catholic teaching of the one universal and 
centralist nation-state, reminiscent of the era of the Holy Roman Empire: the nation 
guarded by God, Rome and the Pope. While the tradition of pacification would prove a 
fruitful nation-building strategy as soon as WWI – with the 1917 Pacification agreement, 
the latter tradition would have mainly damaging effects for the national standing of 
Catholics before WWII, dominated as Dutch popular opinion was by anti-papist feelings. 
Meanwhile, Catholics championed a protectionist undercurrent in the 
Netherlands. This current originated mainly from the agricultural entrepreneurs and 
organisations in the southern, mostly catholic parts of the country. With that aim, Dutch 
Catholics by the end of the nineteenth century finally decided to complement their civic 
organisations with special-purpose political and economic organisations. The first party-
political program from the Catholics was published in 1883 and in 1897 a union of 
Roman-catholic  electoral associations was established.  
In the next sections, I shall describe the economic organisational elaboration of 
the above nation-state contradictions. To provide some guidance to the next sections, I 
summarised the main economic organisational allegiances of the preceding civic groups 
and political parties in Table 6.2
195
. In the terminology of chapters 1 and 2, the different 
combinations of civic groups, political parties and economic organisations make for 
different – friendly or antagonistic –  movements of democratisation. Together, they 
constitute a double nationalisation process (see chapter 2, section 4b). 
 
6.2.2    Economic organisations 
 
i) Dutch Bank 
The Dutch Bank – ―Nederlandsche Bank‖ –  the equivalent of the Bank of 
England and the Federal Bank, was founded in 1814 by King William. The Bank did not 
carry any responsibility for monetary or financial stability, and essentially was a 
commercial bank which was permitted to issue bank notes by the government.  From 1850 
onwards, economic wealth led to an increase in the demand for credit, which induced the 
Dutch Bank to become more of a finance company
196
. With the rise of private banks the 
Dutch Bank exchanged its role as finance company for business for one as finance 
company for private banks.  All along, the Dutch Bank remained an essentially private, 
commercial bank. Much changed with the arrival of Nicolaas Pierson
197
 at the helm of the 
Dutch Bank – from 1868 to 1877. Pierson durably imprinted the democratisation strategy 
of the Dutch Bank. While recognised as a competent banker, Pierson‘s main innovation at 
the Dutch Bank was to turn the institution into a national representative rather than a 
mouthpiece of Regent rentiers in the City of Amsterdam.
198
 Pierson, however, wanted the 
Bank to be representative to all powers in the country, while maintaing the constitutional 
centrality of Amsterdam and its stock exchange. From a confessional viewpoint, Pierson 
advocated a general christian outlook which was tolerant and respectful towards the 
freedom of religion and the rights of every individual person
199
. While Pierson doubted the 
intentions of the Catholics, he was entirely at ease with those of the Reformed protestant 
Anti-Revolutionaries.
200
 For, according to Pierson, protestant puritanism was essentially 
republican, in contrast with catholicism which tended towards despotism
201
 (Van 
Maarseveen, 1981: 141-144). Pierson, as his successors in the Dutch Bank before WWII, 
87 
 
espoused the view that the real strategy of the Roman-Catholics was to « put the interest of 
their church above the interest of the nation ». Therefore, Catholics could not be «good 
Dutchmen»
202
. Still, faced with the radicalism of both socialism and social liberalism, the 
successive presidents of the Dutch Bank allowed Catholics considerable freedom of 
expression and organisation. 
Pierson drew the Dutch Bank out of its earlier, rather obscure, ―private‖ 
existence, and transformed it into a more public bank, by linking domestic with 
international developments. Thus, in face of the increasing interdependence of money 
markets, and the threat of Socialism
203
, Pierson urged the Dutch Bank to develop a less 
exclusive style of leadership, assume a more active role in the the domestic and European 
financial system, and regularly publish information about international and domestic 
exchange rates, and interest rates. In relation with the 1866 crisis in England, he pointed to 
the necessity of a central bank as a counterbalance to international developments
204
 (Van 
Maarseveen, 1981: 83). Through its initiatives at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, its 
position in the Amsterdam network of interlocking directorates, and to a lesser extent its 
stake in colonial banks, the Dutch Bank soon punched well over its formal weight, 
especially with regards to setting the pattern of commercial banking.  As a legacy of the 
successes of the Golden Age, the nineteenth-century city of Amsterdam still had a strong 
stock market culture and a well-developed network of local agents (notaries, lawyers and 
brokers) who would collect savings from wealthy individuals and channel them to the 
Stock Exchange. Still, after the demise of the Dutch Republic, the Amsterdam stock 
exchange had greatly diminished in dynamism and  international importance. To 
reinvigorate the stock exchange, the Dutch Bank launched the ―prolongation‖, an on call 
money market technique first introduced at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The 
prolongation was a margin loan which, while callable at short notice, was typically rolled 
over or ―prolonged‖, whence its name.205 The prolongation market was overcrowded, open 
and competitive: the principle of unrestricted public access was carefully upheld by the 
city authorities.  It helped industrial and trade companies obtain direct short-term capital in 
a very fragmented way, via margin loans provided by investors without the intermediation 
of a banking system. Because of their widespread use, the prolongation loans were 
considered safe. In addition, the interest rate was attractive – it roughly tracked the London 
discount rate (Jonker, 1996: 96). The prolongation market did not disappear until short 
rates fell dramatically towards the end of the 1920s. 
ii) Commercial banks 
In the 1860s, modern joint-stock banking belatedly entered the Dutch stage with 
the foundation of the Twentsche Bank by the baptist Blijdenstein and the setting up of the 
Rotterdamsche Bank by four protestant Rotterdam cashiers (Brugmans, 1963)
206
.  The 
appearance of the first commercial joint-stock banks from 1860 to 1875 at first sight made 
this a pioneering period in Dutch banking history.
207
  Yet, the denomination ―pioneering‖ 
has to be qualified (Jonker, 1999: 93).  By the mid-1870s the innovative drive of these 
commercial banks was largely spent. What is more, with the benefit of hindsight it became 
clear that these banks were far less revolutionary than first thought. The main innovation 
introduced by these new banks was quantitative rather than qualitative: though the capital 
invested in banking increased, the character of banking and the offered financial services 
did not change substantially. Indeed, new commercial banks covered much the same 
ground as the private banking firms and merchant bankers before. For instance, the 
Twentsche Bank‘s profitability was based more on the strong, uniform demand for 
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Prussian currency and English bills, than on their close contact with domestic industrial 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Table 6.2: Different civic, political and economic alignments 
 
Civic group/ 
political party 
 
Economic organisation 
Conservatives 
 
Colonial Banks 
 
Free Liberals 
 
Colonial Banks, Dutch Bank, Commercial 
banks 
Social Liberals 
 
General savings banks, 
State Postal Savings Bank 
(Mortgage banks) 
Reformed Protestants 
 
Co-operative banks 
(Colonial Banks, General savings banks, State 
Postal Savings Bank) 
Catholics 
 
Co-operative banks 
(General savings banks, State Postal Savings 
Bank) 
Socialists 
 
(General savings banks, 
State Postal Savings Bank) 
 
 
 In fact, it was as if the modernisation process from small, traditional 
organisations to large bureaucratised businesses in the second half of the nineteenth 
century remained unnoticed by the commercial banks. The lack of innovation in the 
banking sector is corroborated by three facts. First, provincial banking never really got off 
the ground and by 1914 had virtually disappeared (Jonker, 1997: 119).
208
  The Dutch 
financial system that spread outwards from Amsterdam from the 1850s onwards did 
succeed in fulfilling a demand for services from the regions, but at the cost of stifling local 
initiatives. The system was operated by Amsterdam-detached agents rather than 
independent banks and bankers in the provinces (Jonker, 1996: 276). Second, in 1890 only 
37 commercial banks had taken up the legal personality of incorporated company with 
public limited liability (NV).
209
  Third, while elsewhere on the continent banks were 
financing the organisation of heavy industry, Dutch banking had been conspicuously 
absent in this regard: Dutch bankers continued to focus on the transfer of domestic savings 
to foreign investments.
210
  Indeed, up to WWI, commercial banks were only interested in 
financing international trade activities. Increasingly, commercial banks showed interest in 
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colonial endeavours in the Dutch Indies, either via a branch network often or through the 
intermediary of colonial banks (Taselaar, 1998: 64). Meanwhile, a wave of banking 
consolidation from 1911 onwards, together with a major shakeout of minor and regional 
banks in the crisis that started in 1920 (in 1920-22 a total 10 of bad debts amounting to 
nearly 10% of the assets of the biggest five banks was written off), left the general banking 
industry dominated by the ―Big Five‖ banks. 
iii) Savings banks 
Already in 1784, the Society for Public Welfare (―Maatschappij tot nut van ‗t 
Algemeen‖) – founded by Baptists – had set itself the purpose to ―elevate the people and 
the nation by spreading enlightened knowledge and virtue‖ (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 247), 
most notably by infusing the lower strata with the virtues of self-help rather than charity. 
In order to achieve its purpose the Society had developed a decentralised structure, with 
local departments governing their own affairs
211
. These departments not only made a 
vigorous contribution to social regeneration by setting up libraries and schools, but, 
through the efforts of liberal leaders, from 1817 onwards were also at the origin of the 
system of general savings banks in the Netherlands
212
. The number of Savings banks grew 
steadily: from 13 in 1818, there were some 191 at the end of the 19
th
 century. While the 
Social Liberals were the most important supporters of general savings banks, they were 
fully aware that these banks were not reaching the masses of the lower working classes. In 
order to spread the habit of saving amongst the poorer, they in 1881 successfully pushed 
for the establishment of a State Postal Savings Bank. The two types of banks were 
regarded as complements rather than competitors. 
    iv) Mortgage banks 
The 1860s also saw the creation of mortgage banks: 17 in the period 1860-1890. 
These banks were focused on the urban market, not on the countryside. In face of 
increasing urbanisation and industrialisation, the Dutch mortgage banking sector 
experienced an unprecedented growth from 1890 onwards. The mortgage banks were 
mainly established in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht, and generally speaking were led 
by Social Liberals
213
.  
v) Co-operative banks 
Contrary to the situation in Germany, the cradle of co-operative banking in 
Europe, agricultural co-operative banks in the Netherlands were established after the 
establishment of producer Co-operatives, most notably dairy and marketing Co-
operatives.
214
  Although the Dutch co-operative farmer movement was comparatively late 
in starting, it was able to organise a very efficient system for the distribution of new inputs 
and the marketing of products in about twenty years – the period 1893 to 1914 (Van 
Zanden, 1985: 51). Through the agency of producer and sales Co-operatives, Dutch 
farmers had been able to leverage economies of scale and push back local merchants who 
had played a dominant role in many local agricultural markets during the years of 
depression. Still, since the need for short-term capital was high, particularly among small 
farmers, the position of these merchants could only be completely eliminated through the 
wholesale reorganisation of the capital market. As advised by a governmental committee 
in 1888, a system of co-operative banks would facilitate this reorganisation. In 1896, the 
first local co-operative banks were established. In 1898 two Central Banks
215
 were created 
to facilitate collaboration between the local banks: the officially neutral, but effectively 
protestant-neutral central bank in Utrecht, and the catholic central bank in Eindhoven.
216
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These two central banks fulfilled several, basic functions.  They managed the surplus 
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savings that could not be put out by local affiliate banks within their work area. In 
addition, they saw to the central balancing of cash surpluses and deficits of local banks. 
Also, they supervised the liquidity position of affiliated banks and provided them with 
credit benchmarks and restrictions.  Finally, the Central co-operative banks invested the 
deposited moneys as securely and profitably as possible, on the one hand, by buying 
treasury bills and bonds from public bodies, and, on the other hand, by lending money to 
big Co-operatives and other agricultural institutions (cf. De Boer, 2002a: 15).
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6.3       Firms‟ strategic positions in new settlements (phase 3) 
 
6.3.1  Emergence of democratic settlement 
In reaction to the national educational aspirations of the Liberals, Reformed 
Protestants and Catholics allied in the so-called ―school-struggle‖ to push for a pillarised 
democracy in the Netherlands. Once again, religion proved to be one of the most resonant 
sources of mobilisation in the Netherlands (see Appendix C).  The latter alliance easily 
won the struggle. Four pillars took shape between 1890 and 1920, based on the Reformed 
Protestant notion of ―circles‖: the protestant (officially the neutral pillar), the catholic, the 
liberal and the socialist. These pillars, which encompassed most educational, religious and 
economic organisational life, were an expression of an emerging ―multi-ideological‖ and 
―multi-regional‖ Dutch nationalism (cf. Knippenberg, 1996).  The pillars were informally 
negotiated with the 1917 Pacification agreement, and institutionalised with the 1920 
Primary Education Act – which set the prototype for the settling of other disputes among 
the confessional and the secular parties.  
One of the reasons the Pacification agreement and Primary Education Act 
provided a highly successful basis for a settlement between rivalling religious and liberal 
groups was historical resonance: especially the former could be easily interpreted as a 
reinvention of the 16
th
 century Pacification of Ghent by the Prince of Orange. According to 
nineteenth and twentieth century Orangist republicans, this event – as its early republican 
equivalent – epitomised the desire to unite in one peaceful nation rivalling groups of 
Protestants and Catholics.
219
  Thus, the 1917 Pacification Agreement and 1920 Education 
Act symbolized the Dutch predilection to depolicitise and resolve differences in elitist 
decision-making bodies, according to the tradition of proportionality. The principle of 
proportionality, as applied to the subsidizing of private and public schools, would become 
one of the main devices for the allocation of government money in not only education, but 
other sectors of society such as health care and housing as well (De Kwaasteniet, 1990: 
38). Both agreements also symbolized a predilection for two other traditions of 
democratisation: the traditions of ―Orangist democracy‖ and ―living together apart‖. The 
former tradition refers to the principle that issues of social mobility and integration should 
be resolved according to the established rules of one‘s own particular group or 
denomination. Furthermore, the tradition of Orangist democracy has long proved an 
important vehicle to national identity building – alongside the tradition of pacification, 
which is more geopolitically oriented. Thus, the school struggle that led to the Primary 
Education Act not only stimulated subnational religious and secular identities, but also 
national feelings and a national identity. At the end of day, the school struggle – based as it 
was on the application of Orangist democracy – would strengthen the nation-state level as 
against the local or regional level.  National organisations would come to dominate the 
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school struggle – certainly after WWII. Thus, it became clear that the Roman Catholic 
Church in the Netherlands first of all was a Dutch church, and only secondarily a part of 
the universal Church; ―the standards of behaviour, which had been formulated by the 
Brabant (and Dutch) clerical elite, were derived from both the rules of the church, and 
from the virtues of the Dutch state, which were propagated by Dutch Protestants and 
Liberals‖ (Meurkens, 1985: 172-173).   
In terms of the tradition of living together apart, Catholics developed the most 
unified pillar, encompassing almost all economic, civic and political organisations in the 
provinces of Brabant and Limburg. Armed with a ―frontier mentality‖ (Van Heek, 1954), 
Catholics rallied around the motto ―in isolation lies our strength‖. Because they saw the 
Netherlands as an essentially Calvinist nation
220
, Protestants, on the other hand, projected 
themselves as being part of the first and leading nation-building pillar. Protestants‘ 
eagerness to be at the centre of federal nation-building efforts had the unintended effect of 
rendering the protestant pillar less homogeneous than the catholic pillar.
221
  Socialists, for 
their part, remained side-lined up to WWII, mainly because of their antagonism towards 
any nation-building endeavours – ethnic or religious.222  Considering themselves the 
natural leading stratum of the Netherlands, the Liberals, finally, opposed the pillarisation 
movement, and resisted the constitution of circle-bound liberal institutions.
223
  This 
explains why, despite their early prominence in Dutch politics, Liberals grouped into 
formal organisations comparatively late, and mostly with defensive purposes against the 
growing political militancy of the religious groups. They failed to neutralise popular 
grievances of a democratic deficit – coined "the crisis of participation" by the other parties. 
Up to WWII, the Liberals failed to present a strong and integrated civic and political front.  
By default of organised associations which represented numbers and mass 
activity, the Liberals had no other recourse than to rely on established positions in 
business, the professions, the universities and the media to remain influential in the 
Netherlands (Daalder, 1989: 11). Eminent Free Liberals and bankers such as Pierson and 
Mees tried to exert influence on the financial policies of the Dutch government and the 
Dutch Bank through two types of connections: their connections with English and North-
American central bankers – both of which championed a tradition of City monetarism 
though linked with different traditions (see chapter 11), and through the agency of the 
« Free Trade Association»
224
 (founded in 1896). Banking on the resonance of ―Golden 
Age‖ precedents of sound finance, and helped by the general upturn of the economy at the 
turn of the century,  the Free Liberals ultimately managed to suppress the resonance of 
mostly Catholic appeals for protectionism by promoting new habits of ―City 
monetarism‖225 (De Vries, 1974: 275). From then onwards, the following rationale became 
an electorally sanctioned, vested foreign policy adage: « as the Dutch public benefits from 
an uninterrupted access of its entrepreneurs to the world market, government policy should 
only be used to promote free access, not to impede it » (De Boo, 1989: 15).  
As announced above, the tradition of City monetarism that had been ingrained 
in Dutch monetary affairs greatly helped the Free Liberals in Amsterdam and Rotterdam to 
escape the limits of pillarisation. It allowed them to expand their (limited) vision of a 
cosmopolitan nation-state:  a nation-state centred in Amsterdam and other Holland city-
states – The Hague and Rotterdam, whose wealth to a large extent depended on expanding 
foreign trade in general, and business relationships with the Dutch Indies in particular.  
The revival of the Amsterdam stock exchange as a centre of international finance after 
WWI contributed disproportionately to the fulfilment of the Free Liberals‘ aspirations. 
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Because international monetary aspirations and a Dutch empire were seen as the central 
success factors of the Dutch Golden Age, they provided an important rallying point in 
popular opinion equivalent to or even stronger than the domestic issue of pillarisation. The 
word of mouth was that, without the Amsterdam stock exchange and the colonies, the 
Netherlands would lose its strength of character: it would be relegated to a position similar 
to Denmark, the benign agrarian dwarf without international ambitions (Nobel and 
Fennema, 2004: 15). Helped by the existence of a prolongation market and a policy of 
international neutrality during WWI, the Amsterdam stock exchange was able to play a 
crucial role as a financial intermediary. This was especially so in the immediate aftermath 
of WWI, when Germany and its former enemies reluctantly renewed commercial ties.
226
 
227
  
Principles of pacification and monetarism constituted the main habits of 
coordination in the Netherlands between 1870 and 1930. In this period, a majority 
coalition of former rivalling groups – Reformed Protestants, Catholics and Free Liberals –  
agreed to use these principles as focal points against a ―common enemy‖ – the 
Socialists
228
, and, to a lesser extent, the Social Liberals. But this majority coalition could 
only have formed thanks to the Pacification agreement, the 1917 answer to lingering 
cooperation problems. The Pacification agreement‘s success was conditional on the 
successful implementation of three co-operative principles: varieties of respectively the 
traditions of living-together-apart, Orangist democracy and proportionality.  Successful 
pacification was not only predicated on the thorough depoliticisation of economic and 
civic issues in elitist decision-making bodies. It equally depended on instituting conditions 
of ―circle confederalism‖, under which the lower ranks could trust the leaders of their own 
circle to protect their interests – ―Orangist democracy‖. Finally, it was based on providing 
all minorities – even the Socialists – with a proportional voice and share of the pie. If only 
by lack of an alternative, all rivalling groups in the Netherlands came to support these co-
operative principles as mechanisms of redistribution. In the end, even the Socialists, who 
through the Dutch Internationale had long expressed uncompromising aspirations, did.  
The effect of the institution of a pillarised democracy was that individual social 
mobility was extremely limited in the Netherlands – probably amongst the most limited of 
all Western European countries (cf. Higgett, 1971). In many ways, to get all social classes 
on board in the new nation-state of the Netherlands, individual mobility was sacrificed in 
favour of more opportunities for the old colonial and financial elites to enrich themselves, 
more opportunities for religious groups to become self-sufficient, and more opportunties 
for previously excluded groups – most notably Catholics – to acquire a more equal status.     
 
6.3.2 Formal evolution of the suffrage 
As announced above, a democratic settlement was established between the 
different rivalling groups in the form of a package deal known as the Pacification 
Agreement of 1917. Based on a fine-tuned system of elite consultation across the different 
pillars, this deal entailed financial equality for christian-democratic schools, and universal 
(manhood) suffrage (see table 6.3) as requested by social democrats (Andeweg, 1989:  45-
47). Since a transition to universal suffrage under the then operative majoritarian system 
would have wiped liberals out in virtually every Dutch district, they were eager to see the 
basis of the suffrage changed to a system of proportional representation. This system 
together with a list system and the treatment of the entire country as a single electoral 
district allowed the liberals to survive (cf. Van den Berg, 1979: 455-9). The proportional 
representation system also worked to the advantage of catholics. Under the new system of 
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nation-wide proportional representation, the excess of catholic votes in southern districts 
and the votes of catholic minorities in northern districts were no longer wasted
229
.  
 
 
Table 6.3:  Evolution of the suffrage in the Netherlands 
1848 Right to vote based on census 
(based on income and status) 
1887 Census lowered to all males over twenty-three with a residence and 
―signs of capability and wealth‖ 
1917 Universal suffrage for men 
1919 Universal suffrage for women 
   
 
6.3.3    Financial institutions‟ strategies of democratisation 
How did Dutch commercial, general savings, state postal savings, cooperative and 
mortgage banks perform in terms of the six strategies of democratisation introduced in 
chapter 3? To illustrate the following discussion of their performance, I visualise the 
growth of different Dutch financial institutions in terms of total amounts of deposits 
received In Figure 6.1,. In Tables 6.4a and 6.4b, I provide more specific growth and 
marketshare figures.
230
 Finally, table 6.5 provides a ranking of the effectiveness with 
which commercial banks, mortgage, savings and co-operative banks have deployed each 
strategy during the period 1900 to 1930. 
 
 
Table 6.4a: Growth and marketshares of varieties of banks in terms of deposits 
Year 
Commercial 
Banks 
General 
Savings 
Banks 
State Postal 
Savings Bank 
Co-operative 
Banks 
Mortgage 
Banks 
1910 263 113 165 29.4 14.4 
1915 432 125 200 84 19.3 
1920 1606 220 300 248.1 28.6 
1925 1520 306 370 383 44 
1930 2100 430 440 525 52 
Growth x 7.98 3.8 2.66 17.86 3.61 
Share % 59.2 12.1 12.4 14.8 1.5 
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Table 6.4b: Growth and marketshare of varieties of banks in terms of total assets 
 
Year Commercial 
Banks 
General Savings 
Banks 
State Postal 
Savings Bank 
Co-operative 
Banks 
1901 547.8 91.9 94 (2.2) 
1910 863.7 129.1 178 30.8 
1914 1150.1 140.6 202.7 59.3 
1918 2949.1 185.4 270.8 228 
1920 4668.2 224.8 307.3 268.8 
1930 4181.1 480.3 491.4 579 
Growth x 7.6 5.2 5.3 18.8
231 
Share % 73 8.4 8.5 10.1 
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Table 6.5: Ranking of Dutch varieties of financial institutions per strategy for the 
period 1900-1930 
(1=highest, 5=lowest) 
 
Commercial 
banks 
General 
Savings 
banks 
State Postal 
Savings bank 
Co-operative 
banks 
Mortgage 
banks 
 
Strategy a 
 
2 3 4 1 5 
Strategy b 
 
1 4 3 2 5 
Strategy c 
 
2 2 4 1 5 
Strategy d 
 
1 4 2 3 5 
Strategy e 
 
1 2 4 2 5 
Strategy f 1 4 3 2 5 
 
 
 
Strategy a   Help core customers fulfil their social class aspirations. 
i)  Commercial joint-stock banks 
 For reasons of lack of dynamism, and the pre-existence of a very popular 
prolongation market, commercial banks were very average performers at this strategy.  
Although heavily involved in all types of stock exchange related activities – which 
explains their vast total assets – Dutch commercial banks were no enthusiastic vehicle of 
social and economic mobility. They seemed interested only in the advancement of 
established and privileged minorities, which hardly helped their democratic credentials.  In 
comparison with their Continental European and English counterparts, Dutch commercial 
banks‘ track record in the pre-WWI market of deposit-taking was particularly 
unimpressive (Jonker, 1997: 101-102). The latter‘s passivity before WWI was caused by at 
least two factors.
232
  First, Dutch commercial banks focused on the old, familiar sectors of 
international commerce and shipping – commercial credit.233 Disregarding the Twentsche 
Bank‘s modest industrial efforts and some failed foreign initiatives, commercial banks 
mainly targeted members of the Regent and rentier ranks in the Holland provinces and in 
the Dutch colonies. To service these customers, commercial banks relied on pre-industrial 
sources and techniques of capital accumulation.  To avoid the wrath of their closed Regent 
clientele, commercial banks avoided being associated with the lower ranks, i.e. farmers, 
the working classes and even the emerging middle classes.
234
  A second reason for the 
relative passivity of commercial banks with regards to the deposit market was the 
existence of the prolongation system.  In effect on the Dutch stock market since the 
seventeenth century, and reinvigorated by the Dutch Bank in 1860, the prolongation 
system had the great advantage of bolstering the financial centre by providing uniform, 
flexible and secure investment options. On the other hand, the prolongation system denied 
commercial banking a sound deposit rate. Indeed, the short-term interest rate on the 
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Amsterdam exchange remained at or above the yield on government bonds until nearly 
1920, effectively precluding profitable deposit taking by banks (Jonker, 1996: 191).
235
  The 
prolongation system was supported by a network of agents that extended into the outer 
provinces. As a result, commercial deposit banking developed late in the Holland 
provinces, while remaining conspicuously weak in the outer provinces
236
 (cf. t‘Hart et al., 
1997: 198).  The temporary closure of the prolongation market during WWI, and the 
soaring demand for industrial capital in the following years finally provided commercial 
banks with the opportunity to develop their deposit business. Nevertheless, even during 
this period, the core clientele of commercial banks fundamentally remained the same as the 
one of its merchant bank predecessors: a ―Regent‖ clientele of Amsterdam financiers and 
colonial customers.
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ii) General savings banks 
     Originally, general savings banks were very original vehicles of social and 
economic mobility, although limited to the lower social classes – which marginalized their 
role against the prolongation market. Led by Social Liberal trustees, the banks also were 
the first to use the concept of saving as a ―civilization‖ vehicle for outsiders. 238  General 
Savings Banks emerged well before the arrival of the State Postal Savings Bank and co-
operative banks. Up to the 1880s, they only had to compete with the old lombard banks
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–  banks that since the seventeenth century had facilitated loans to the working classes.  To 
distinguish themselves from the latter banks, savings bank directors had successfully 
popularised the following motto: ―the lombard keeps making you poorer: the savings bank 
keeps making you richer‖.240  Savings banks offered each one of its customers an 
opportunity to become an ―active and respected member of society‖ by helping them to, on 
the one hand, avoid prodigality, and, on the other hand, raise enough capital to start ―one 
or another trade.
241
   
Because active democratisation was such a priority for savings banks, they soon 
became a haven for the lower middle class instead of the original target group of the 
working classes. Specifically, savings banks became popular in urban regions amongst 
those with a modest, but regular income, such as domestic servants, craftsmen and 
shopkeepers (Dankers et al., 2001: 34-35). In comparison with the State Postal Savings 
Bank, this translated in a smaller number of customer accounts, but a much higher 
―average deposit‖ amount (see Table 6.6).  
 
Table 6.6: Savings, number of accounts and average saldo at selected Dutch banks 
(period 1881-1930
242
) 
Year 
Co-operative banks State Postal Savings Bank General savings banks 
Total 
savings 
X 1000 
Acc. 
X 
1000 
Avera
ge 
Depos
it x 
1000 
Total 
savings 
X 1000 
Acc. 
X 1000 
Average 
Deposit x 
1000 
Total 
savings 
X 1000 
Acc. 
X 
1000 
Average 
Deposit 
x 1000 
1881 - - - 859 23 37.62 39,444 235 168.17 
1895 - - - 44,185 500 88.38 73,114 346 211.24 
1905 8,700 25 351.7 129,930 1,184 109.71 92,194 399 230.89 
1910 30,016 71 422.6 164,278 1,510 108.79 110,879 452 245.44 
1920 200,000 266 893.1 272,954 1,908 143.03 216,801 620 349.79 
1930 484,568 501 968 375,405 2,144 175.09 429,830 1046 411.09 
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iii) State Postal Savings Bank 
     The State Postal Savings Bank stepped in where the general savings banks had 
left unfinished business: the niche of the large minority of unskilled workers with an 
irregular, small income. The choice for this target group with very limited elite potential 
meant that the State Postal Savings Bank deliberately limited its pretensions of active 
democratisation. To fend off more ambitious savers, the Bank decided to offer a relatively 
small interest, between 2.6 and 3 percent – compared to an interest between 3 and 4 per 
cent for general savings banks.  On the other hand, it set a maximum saldo of 800 guilder – 
compared to a maximum of 1000 guilder for general savings banks (Bulder, 1998: 696). 
These low rates explain why, in comparison with commercial, co-operative and savings 
banks, the State Postal Savings Bank experienced modest growth during periods of relative 
wealth, such as the 1920s. Despite its clear choice for the working classes, the Bank hardly 
could become a prime vehicle of active democratisation. Not only was the Bank‘s target 
customer group economically limited. One could hardly expect working class customers to 
become leading members of civil society following their use of the Bank‘s services. 
iv) Co-operative banks 
     Agricultural co-operative banks arguably provided the main innovation in not 
only service methods and customer orientation (Klein, 1973: 144), but also civic rationale 
in pre-WWI Dutch banking.
243
  Co-operative banks provided a core minority of members 
with credit facilities, lesser members with only savings facilities. The core members 
typically were farmers with an international business orientation, organised in successful 
producer and marketing cooperatives.  Being a core member not only depended on 
economic criteria. In line with their allegiance to forces of pillarisation, especially the 
leaders of the catholic central bank were very explicit in their linking of economic and 
civic logics: they laid down in the Bank‘s statutory conditions that anyone wishing to 
become a member and use the co-operatives‘ economic services should recognise the 
principles of religion, family and right of property in a Christian sense.  
In fact, the catholic leaders were borderline isolationist.
244
 They held on to the 
rallying cries ―in isolation lies our strength‖, and ―he who is not a farmer and well known, 
we distrust, and how many times justifiably‖ (De Vries, 1973: 14), with great success.245 
From a republican perspective, Catholic Co-operative leaders drew mostly on old guild 
traditions. In particular, leaders such as Van den Elsen furthered Middle Age « organic » 
traditions of independence: their preference was for small entities run in a personalistic 
way.  
The provinces accommodated by the other, protestant-neutral central bank were 
less ideologically homogeneous; to accomodate the religious and civic differences between 
local banks in Friesland, Groningen and Drente, the other central bank, the Co-operative 
Central Raiffeisen Bank, had to position itself as a more neutral enterprise (Van Campen et 
al., 1940: 58). 
246
 Still, Reformed Protestants and secularized, ―great-Christian‖ Protestants 
constituted most of the members of this central bank.  Less isolationist of character, leaders 
of this central bank reinvented a very resonant republican rallying cry: the song used by 
the Sea-Beggar rebels during the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish duke.
247
  The more 
isolationist, and selective character of the catholic central bank translated into a lesser 
international orientation, a smaller amount of credits granted, and a higher ratio of ―own 
resources to total resources‖ than in the protestant-neutral central bank.248 Overall, this 
translated in a smaller number of customer accounts than at the general Savings Banks or 
the State Postal Office Savings Bank, but also a much higher ―average deposit‖ amount 
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(see Table 6.6).
249
 Remarkably, though co-operative banks offered much cheaper credit 
rates than other banks, their cost/benefit ratio from 1908 onwards was considerably lower 
than the one of commercial banks (a co-operative ratio of 0,5 as against a commercial ratio 
of 1,9) (Sluyterman et al., 1998: 381).
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v) Mortgage banks 
      Mortgage banks were marginal vehicles of social and economic mobility, in 
spite of their theoretical potential. Up to the turn of the twentieth century, these specialist 
banks piggybacked on urbanisation trends in the Holland provinces to exponentially 
increase their number of potential customers – as evidenced in the growing balance total 
and amount of mortgages supplied. Potential customers mostly were those members of the 
emerging middle classes who could not rely on family links in the new urban areas. Three 
factors inhibited further growth of mortgage banks. First, the pillarisation movement 
gained strength, especially in the outer provinces. This thwarted the attempts of the 
mortgage banks‘ invariably Liberal leaders to act as a country-wide democratisation 
vehicle for the group of sizeable property owners. The important property owners in the 
agricultural population could not be reached at all. Mortgage banks‘ working area 
remained confined to a few Holland cities. Second, following new housing legislation in 
1901, which prescribed much more stringent conditions for the building of houses, the 
speculation boom in the urban housing market turned into a bust (Klein and Vleesenbeek, 
1981: 14-15; Van der Woud, 1947). Third, in 1905, large-scale fraud was discovered in 
two mortgage banks. This seriously dented investor confidence. Other banks venturing in 
the mortgage market – both commercial and co-operative – would take advantage of this 
downturn.  The situation got worse during WWI when the costs of construction more than 
tripled.  
 
Strategy b    Cater to customers of different social classes 
i) Commercial banks 
       Compared to their English and German counterparts, Dutch joint-stock banks 
were no outstanding vehicles of social class consensus. While after WWI commercial 
banks opened current accounts for new industrial companies on the basis of the emission 
of shares or obligations,
251
 by the 1930s the Dutch commercial banking system still served 
a remarkably small circle of customers. Most regular payments such as wages, rents, or 
insurance premiums were still effected in cash. To counteract this tendency, commercial 
banks acquired provincial banks to increase their presence nation-wide. Still, bank deposits 
barely exceeded 50% of M1, even showing a tendency to decline, whereas in England this 
figure had already soared above the 60% mark and beyond during the 1920s at the latest 
(Capie and Webber, 1985).  All in all, this was not the fault of Commercial banks; most 
entrepreneurial activity in the Netherlands for a long time came from the same, long 
established industrial, commercial or aristocratic circles (Klein, 1966: 16; Schijf, 1993: 
124).
252
 On the other hand, Dutch commercial banks after WWI were seen as rather 
important vehicles of pacification, living together apart and proportionality between the 
colonial and the domestic monetary system.
253
 In particular,  commercial banks, in 
collaboration with the Dutch Bank, contributed to the consolidation of a network of 
interlocking directorates in the Dutch Indies that went all the way back to the 
Netherlands.
254
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ii) General savings banks 
Despite the fact that savings banks were led by a variety of ―respectable‖ 
community members – pastors, lawyers, small businessmen, or civil servants – capable of 
reaching a very broad range of groups, they were not very successful vehicles of 
consensual democratisation, in casu the tradition of pacification. That is, if we compare 
them not only with the State Postal Savings bank and co-operative banks, but also with 
their international counterparts. The Economist in 1909 described a few reasons for Dutch 
savings banks‘ comparative lack of success: ―Desire to be solid…the satisfaction to be 
working for free for a public purpose…the tendency to keep the costs of savings banks as 
low as possible, to the advantage of the [few] depositors and to the reinforcement of 
solidity; a tad of ‗Regency‘…these are the causes for the slow development of Dutch 
savings banks as compared to [their counterparts in] foreign countries‖ (cited in Buning, 
1957: 9-10). In particular, many savings banks treated their customers in an overly 
patronising way, most notably through their imposition of unrealistic ―limited 
withdrawability‖ conditions.255 These conditions posed an important barrier to entry for 
working people, who mostly enjoyed irregular wages, and for whom immediate 
withdrawability was a sine qua non.
256
  A further problem for the savings bank movement 
was that, while centrally the movement was led by liberal leaders firmly opposed to any 
notion of a pillarised democracy, locally savings banks were not only led by liberals, but 
also by reformed protestant and catholic leaders. This contradiction between central ideal – 
of a social liberal democracy – and local reality – of a pillarised democracy – became a 
serious liability after 1890.  
iii) State Postal Savings Bank 
      The State Postal Savings Bank was a very successful vehicle of consensual 
democratisation. Its advent in 1881 meant that working people would be able to enjoy 
greater anonymity, and less patronising withdrawability conditions on their deposit 
transactions.
257
  In addition, the State Postal Savings bank could draw upon an already 
existent national network of post offices as its outlets. As a result, by 1891, some 13 
percent of the Dutch population already deposited savings at the State Postal Savings 
Bank. The remarkable difference in average deposited amount at the State Postal Savings 
Bank and the general savings banks, respectively 75 and 195 guilder in 1890, also 
indicates that the former organisation was much more effective in reaching the population 
of working class savers. The State Postal Savings Bank would retain this competitive edge 
during most of the first half of the twentieth century.   
iv) Co-operative banks 
    Be it in a more pillarised fashion, Co-operative banks were also champions of 
consensual, passive democratisation in the Netherlands. Most notably, Protestant and 
Catholic co-operative banks had reinvented the traditions of ―Orangist democracy‖ and 
―living together apart‖ (see p. 90-91)..  As early as the 1890s, the two central co-operative 
banks had agreed to the harmonious partitioning of the country in protestant-neutral and 
catholic working areas.  Organised in hierarchical pillars, Co-operative banks mobilised as 
many farmers as possible for the ideal of social class consensus through their combination 
of practices of saving for the lower ranks, and credit for the somewhat better-off.
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Testifying to the Co-operative leadership‘s primary goal of passive democratisation, up to 
the 1920s co-operative banks were closer to being savings banks than credit banks – 
though the latter function was proclaimed to be their raison d‘être.259  Piggybacking on the 
initial efforts of Savings banks, but with more resonant local networks and a consistently 
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higher interest rate (3 % as compared to 2.5 % at the competition), co-operative banks 
succeeded in building an important savings capital, much to the detriment of non-catholic 
Savings banks. In addition, more savings were coming in than credits going out the local 
banks. This was even more the case for catholic co-operative banks than for the protestant-
neutral co-operative banks. In the southern, catholic provinces, borrowing money still had 
a very negative connotation. As a result, less than 50 percent of the savings deposited at 
the southern local banks were lent out.  At local banks affiliated to the protestant-neutral 
central bank this percentage fluctuated between 60 and 80 percent (Weststrate, 1948: 354-
361).
260
 Only co-operative banks were able to match the extensiveness and inclusiveness of 
the State Postal Savings Bank‘s national branch network.  The substantial growth 
experienced by a large part of the dairy and marketing Co-operatives
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, together with the 
depreciation of the guilder accounted for the increase of savings funds flowing in the co-
operative banks. Co-operative banks guaranteed a safe custody, a respectable interest rate 
and a short term withdraw ability. Mainly because of the selling off of mixed farms, 
savings deposited at the co-operative banks during WWI grew much faster than at the State 
Postal Savings Bank or the general-purpose savings banks.
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v) Mortgage banks 
    Mortgage banks‘ ability to function as a vehicle of consensual 
democratisation was limited by several factors. As mentioned above, given the dominance 
of forces of circle confederalism in the outer provinces, the area of operation of mortgage 
banks was effectively confined to the Holland cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and ‗s 
Gravenhage – and to a minor extent Utrecht. This not only meant that mortgage banks 
were conspicuously absent in the market of agricultural mortgages (Glasz, 1935: 4).  It also 
meant that mortgage banks did not play any role in reviving the living together apart 
tradition in line with the main lines of contention in the Netherlands: religious disputes that 
played out in the outer provinces and in the divide between countryside and city life.  
 
Strategy c    Make State policy on economic citizenship by “fait accompli”  
i) Commercial banks 
    Kuitenbrouwer (1985, 1994) introduced the notion of ‗Regent capitalists‘ to  
encompass how a small minority of financiers and their colonial affiliates/customers 
benefited disproportionately from Dutch government policy. Commercial banks were the 
main intermediaries of this elitist form of rentier capitalism.  
Convinced that the distinctive strength of the Dutch state always had been its 
ability to act as a go-between in geopolitical conflicts, the Dutch government at the 
outbreak of WWI decided to revert to a policy of neutrality. This policy boosted the 
international position of the Amsterdam financial market at the detriment of for instance 
the London Stock Exchange.  Commercial banks were quick to capitalise on this.  The 
acceptance business of the large Dutch commercial banks grew extremely rapidly from 
1917 onwards, a development encouraged by the Dutch Bank. The expansion of 
Amsterdam as a centre for international credit services continued in the 1920s. German 
companies in particular set up offices in Amsterdam to take advantage of the low interest 
rates on the Amsterdam money markets (Van Zanden, 1997: 142; cf. De Vries, 1989: 213-
220). The end result of all this was that a privileged minority of international financiers 
and customers – commercial banks‘ main clientele – benefited disproportionately from 
government policy.
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  There was another clear minority aspect to all this. In order to retain 
the confidence of foreign investors, the Dutch government pursued a policy of stable 
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currency rates and deflationary monetary management. As a result, the Dutch guilder was 
overvalued for long periods of time, sometimes to the detriment of provincial industry (cfr. 
Maddison, 1991: 35). 
ii) General savings banks 
   From the 1860s up to the beginning of the twentieth century, the social liberals 
imprinted a lasting legacy on governmental policy: firms that combined a non-profit 
character and the purpose to turn outsiders into good economic citizens, were to receive 
substantial fiscal privileges and organisational freedoms. As a result, in contrast with for 
instance commercial banks, savings banks did not have to pay any corporation tax. In 
addition, in contradistinction with for instance their English counterparts, Dutch savings 
banks were left entirely free in their choice of investments. This allowed savings banks to 
invest their funds in the prolongation market. From WWI onwards, however, savings 
banks showed a conspicuous lack of entrepreneurship, as moral and provincial matters 
dominated economic growth opportunities.  
Generally speaking, savings banks were not able to lobby for or transform 
economic policies in the first decades of the twentieth century in their specific favour – 
and not the advantage of the State Postal Savings Bank and co-operative banks also. There 
were two main reasons for this. First, the central leadership was of a clear social liberal 
signature.  Through the vehicle of savings banks, social liberal leaders had tried to 
mobilise a coalition of reform-minded citizens and the worker movement against the ―old 
abuses‖ of the Dutch oligarchy. Yet, contrary to England where antagonism for the 
aristocracy found a fertile breeding ground and liberal values spread fast beyond bourgeois 
quarters, the liberal culture of good citizenry remained rather small in the Netherlands. 
This would prove to be a crucial weakness in the history of Dutch savings banks. Second, 
this weak position in civil society soon translated into a political weakness: the social 
liberal background of the savings banks‘ central leadership was soon perceived as self-
marginalising within government circles, increasingly populated as these were by 
confessional parties. 
iii) State Postal Savings Bank 
The State Postal Savings Bank provided its working class customers with a 
special political advantage: the State‘s guarantee that the Bank would maintain easy 
access, favourable and stable rates for the working classes. To guarantee this, the 
government representatives made sure that, on the one hand, the Bank would remain a not-
for-profit organisation, and, on the other hand, wealthier savers would find the Bank‘s 
economic proposition below par for their own aspirations. Clearly, the reason why the 
Dutch government provided such a guarantee, is that it saw the State Postal Savings Bank 
as a unique vehicle to turn the working classes into good economic citizens without 
excessive State intervention.  
While its not-for-profit character and clear choice for the outsider group of the 
working classes guaranteed the State Postal Savings Bank plenty of governmental support, 
it nevertheless hardly could become a prime vehicle of active democratisation. Not only 
was the Bank‘s target customer group limited in terms of political leadership. The 
government hardly expected working class customers to become leading members of civil 
society following their use of the Bank‘s services. As proof of this lack of confidence, the 
government imposed certain limitations on the investment options of the State Postal 
Savings Bank. For instance, the State Postal Savings Bank was allowed to lend money to 
mortgage banks, but it was not allowed to issue mortgages from incoming savings. In 
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practice, the law of 1880 limited the Bank‘s investment options to the National Debt and 
some domestic obligations (Dankers et la, 2001: 117-118). 
iv) Co-operative banks 
   Co-operative banks were up-and-coming minority vehicles of economic 
citizenship – and arguably those best able to anticipate policy changes in the decades to 
come. Given the historical importance of agriculture for the wealth and autonomy of the 
Dutch nation-state, the State had given agricultural co-operative banks several fiscal 
benefits in return for a promise that no further intervention would be needed. For instance, 
the different laws that came into effect from 1893 with regards to co-operative banks 
maintained that dividend payments by co-operative banks to members would remain non-
taxable.
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 This allowed both banks to offer comparatively low debet and high credit 
interest rates (between 4.1 in 1921 and 2.5 in 1939) to their members (Bulder, 1998: 
697).
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  Despite these advantages, especially Catholic co-operative banks were very much 
outsiders in the system of special interests organised around the Dutch Bank and the 
Ministry of Finance. More than the protestant-neutral central bank, the catholic central 
bank emphasised its allegiance to the pillarisation movement: it clearly focused on linking 
―outsider‖ catholic and political concerns. Drawing on the rallying cries ―in isolation lies 
our strength‖, and ―he who is not a farmer and well known, we distrust, and how many 
times justifiably‖, Catholic co-operative leaders were able to convince a maximum of 
Catholic participants to become members of their local banks and Union. The protestant-
neutral central bank presented itself as more neutral, which diluted its influence on the 
protestant community to some extent.
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After WWI, the agricultural credit system stood in a similar, but more 
successful relation to agricultural development than the general banking system to 
industrial development. The major difference between Co-operative and Commercial 
banks was that, where the first only prudently and gradually granted more credit to their 
agricultural members, credit services provided by the latter soared uncontrollably after 
WWI. Agricultural banks, for their part, did make important efforts to grant credits to 
agricultural companies, though there still existed a stigma on high credit lines. They 
offered cheap short-term credits to other agricultural co-operatives – be they dairy 
factories, auctions, marketing-, service-, or supply-Co-operatives.  Yet, they pursued a 
very prudent loan policy, creditors having to meet stringent financial requirements. As a 
result, co-operative banks endured the crises of the 1920‘s without any major setbacks, 
allowing them to remain largely independent of the Dutch Bank.  contrast with 
Commercial banks, at the end of the 1920s one of the agricultural banks adopted the 
method of attracting long-term deposits and secured bonds to balance long-term credits, 
and counter credit practice threats to their liquidity position.  
v) Mortgage banks 
    Instead of being able to pioneer future government policy, mortgage banks 
felt they were unduly restricted by it. For one, given the country‘s dependence on the 
international capital market, the Dutch Bank and the Ministry of Finance were opposed to 
the establishment of a separate capital regime for home-ownership (Helderman, 2007).  
This precluded mortgage banks benefiting from unintentional fiscal advantages in a way 
the English building societies could. In addition, albeit mortgage banks were private 
initiatives and officially free from government control – a situation quite different from for 
instance Germany, indirectly some measure of public control was performed on them. For 
instance, statutorily the State Postal Savings Bank not only had to invest part of its savings 
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in mortgage bonds, but also had to supervise the instances from which it bought mortgage 
bonds, in casu the private mortgage banks.  
More importantly, mortgage banks suffered from a key Dutch housing policy 
antecedent in 1901 which – unintentionally – would turn out not be in their favour.  On 
initiative of the Liberal-dominated cabinet, and supported by confessional leaders who 
reinforced the widespread suspicion that direct state provision would be associated with 
socialist totalitarianism (Doling, 1997: 16), the Dutch government in 1901 chose for a 
housing policy based on a maximum of decentralized self-organisation – including local 
municipalities – and the least possible State intervention. At first sight, this boded well for 
mortgage banks who could rely on the weight of Liberal politicians in municipal 
governments. Yet, liberal-dominated municipalities were becoming a rarity outside of the 
major Holland cities. In fact, in view of the emerging strength of the system of 
denominational pillars in the subsequent decades, mortgage banks on the ground were not 
strategically positioned to take up the gauntlet of up and coming local housing 
associations. Organised along pillarised lines, housing cooperatives did not encourage 
home ownership per se, but endeavoured to keep rents as low and housing quality as high 
as possible.  In essence, housing associations were vehicles of the social rental sector, not 
the private home ownership sector to which mortgage banks belonged. While only used as 
―a stopgap‖ strategy before WWII‖ (Van Weesep and Van Kempen, 1993 : 185), the 
comparative effectiveness of housing associations‘ efforts a vis the home ownership sector 
during the first half of the twentieth century, ultimately would convince the government to 
make the social rental sector the avowed, primary focus of its efforts after WWII.  
  
Strategy d    Translate State policy on economic citizenship   
i) Commercial banks 
    Dutch commercial banks were no pioneering vehicles of consensual 
economic citizenship either, except for colonial issues. Ever since the Republic‘s Golden 
Age, the Dutch government has promoted policies to protect its colonial interests. At the 
turn of the twentieth century, the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij argued the country 
was in danger of being relegated to a position similar to Denmark if financial investment in 
the colonial empire were neglected. Other commercial banks followed suit and put their 
money where their mouth was. The Big Four commercial banks took advantage of the 
onset of WWI – in which the country took a neutral position – to invest in colonial 
endeavours.
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  In collaboration with the Dutch Bank, especially the Amsterdamsche Bank, 
but also the Rotterdamsche Bank and the Twentsche Bank invested heavily in the Dutch 
Indies – not eschewing the opportunity to establish a local branch network.268 Arguably, 
the commercial and private banking elites of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were one of the 
driving forces behind the colonial expansion (Taselaar, 1998: 22). And, in many ways, the 
Dutch government saw commercial banks as vehicles of aligning colonial and domestic 
monetary policies.  
Commercial banks were less successful as to domestic investment in 
industrialisation dynamics. In face of growing consternation in popular opinion, the 
Commercial banking sector from the 1910s declared itself prepared to follow the example 
of their German counterparts and take the lead in the industrialisation movement. In order 
to broaden the financial basis for industrial investment, Commercial banks issued new 
shares, took over other banks and established branch networks. Yet, the modest levels of 
industrialisation in the Netherlands, meant that it was the market of foreign capital 
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investment that boomed between 1915 and 1920. Following the inflationary boom of the 
period of 1914-1920, the banking system near collapsed in the period 1922-1924. As a 
result, Commercial banks‘ ability and incentives to act as a consensual vehicle of industrial 
citizenship diminished even more during the financial crisis of the 1920s. Fortunately, the 
Dutch Bank set up large bailout operations; while inciting Commercial banks to show 
more restraint in their loan and credit business (Van Seenus, 1945: 114). From then 
onwards, commercial banks‘ industry relations would become even less ambitious.They 
rapidly withdrew from industrial finance, and returned to the time-honoured tradition of 
―sound banking : banking geared towards international trading business with a regular 
turnover and convenient collateral. Industrialists‘ vociferous complaints about the lack of 
credit facilities notwithstanding, bankers who argued that it was too risky for them to 
engage in long-term credits and monitor firms without receiving a suitable collateral. In 
addition, there was the manifest lack of interest among investors for industrial shares. 
Bankers reacted sceptically to suggestions to recruit engineers for assessing the technical 
and organisational complexities of companies. Nor did the bankers push for a widening of 
the legal definition of collateral, as German bankers did.  The Dutch Bank had a large role 
to play in all this. The fact that the Dutch Bank encouraged a growing number of foreign 
governments and companies to come to the Dutch capital market in the 1920s, meant that 
banks could profitably limit their activities to low-risk stock market flotations and the 
trusted commercial credit.  
ii) General savings banks 
   As organisations that combined a non-profit character with the purpose to 
make good economic citizens of former outsider groups, savings banks were valued by the 
State as a potential instrument of consensual democratisation. But then again, because 
active democratisation was such a priority for savings banks, their willingness to engage in 
more passive, consensual types of democratisation was limited, certainly compared to their 
State Postal Savings Bank counterpart.  
iii) State Postal Savings Bank 
   The State Postal Savings Bank was a champion of consensual economic 
citizenship. One secret of this success was that, in contrast with general savings Banks, the 
State Postal Savings Bank relegated its social liberal beginnings to the background.
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Faced with the reality of changing government coalitions, the State Postal Savings Bank 
consistently held on to a policy of ―cheapness‖ and convenience which all political parties 
wholeheartedly subscribed to. One of the reasons why the State Postal Savings Bank could 
offer advantageous interest rates, and a very low savings threshold is that it could rely on a 
pre-existing national network of Post Office branches. The Dutch government had ordered 
the establishment of this branch network in the preceding decades, with the purpose of 
increasing nation-wide communication. As a result, the State Postal Savings Bank became 
the most successful promoter of savings habits amongst the working classes, certainly in 
terms of the number of savings accounts: this number increased from 23,000 to almost 2.2 
million between 1881 and 1931.  
iv) Co-operative banks 
   Co-operative banks were excellent vehicles of consensual economic 
citizenship, in spite of some isolationist Catholic tendencies. Generally speaking, the 
protestant-neutral co-operative banks functioned more as general-purpose vehicles of 
living-together-apart than their catholic counterparts, who acted more as vehicles of 
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Orangist democracy.  The reinvention of either tradition in  agricultural villages greatly 
facilitated a smooth transition to a system of universal suffrage two decades later.  
As mentioned before, Protestant leadership was relatively neutral and more 
decentralised than Catholic leadership which was very hierarchical, and almost isolationist: 
the latter endeavoured to create unity in their pillar by reminding themselves of the 
historical stigmas they had to endure.  To avoid interference of non-farmers, the Catholic 
central bank did not allow local merchants to become members, and make use of their 
credit facilities. The protestant-neutral Central, on the other hand, was much more focused 
on rapid growth, and therefore substantially relaxed the condition of being a farmer to 
obtain membership. As a result, contrary to the protestant-neutral central bank, the catholic 
central bank was not allowed to use the discount facilities of the Dutch Bank, supposedly 
because it did not stick to the standards of accountability promoted by the Dutch Bank and 
the Regent circles.
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  In fact, the leaderships of the Dutch Bank and the Ministry of 
Finance were of a great-christian signature and strongly anti-papist.  
Thanks to its less isolationist stance, the protestant-neutral central bank from 
1908 until 1925 was allowed to take recourse to the discount facilities of the Dutch Bank 
to keep its liquidity problems at bay - , in contrast with its Catholic counterparts.  During 
this period, the protestant-neutral central bank, more than the catholic Central went 
through a lot of balance fluctuations (deposits of the local banks at the Central minus the 
advances of the Central to the local banks). After 1922, however, the protestant-neutral 
central bank managed to stand on its own feet (Weststrate and Visser, 1948: 49). In 1925, 
the catholic and protestant-neutral Centrals again were treated on a par by the Dutch Bank, 
which increasingly took offence at the so-called unprofessional and unethical practices of 
some local co-operatives that ―tend to consider their business as a family party‖ and 
provide their members with ―too inexpensive credits‖ (Weststrate and Visser, 1948: 198).      
v) Mortgage banks 
    Contrary to its British counterpart, the Dutch government did not see a 
specialised a specialised mortgage banking sector and capital-regime for home ownership 
mortgages and house ownership as the best vehicle of consensual democratisation. Given 
the country‘s dependence on the international capital market, the Dutch Bank and the 
Ministry of Finance were and remained opposed to the establishment of a separate capital 
regime for home-ownership (Helderman, 2007).  Instead, it saw the public enforcement of 
minimum housing quality standards, combined with the maintenance of low rents – in 
proportion to wages – as the way forward. By the end of the 1920s, the consensus amongst 
international observers was that this policy had worked very well, at a cost ―relatively 
lower than in most of the other countries‖ (Bauer, 1935: 282).   
 
Strategy e    Become a champion of national character 
        From the late 1840s onwards, the influence of ―national globalisation‖ 
dynamics mounted in the Netherlands, both as a result of the threat of foreign revolutions, 
and the translation of the Pax Britannica into transnational monetary standards – the gold 
standard – and new agricultural markets. From the 1870s, the emerging nation-states 
Germany and the United States became very influential in these developments. Following 
proposition e (chapter 2, p. 31), in times of national ―globalisation‖, city-state traditions  
become more prominent in the public sphere and the negotiation of democratic 
settlements; for the favourable repositioning of nation-states very much hinges on their 
reinvention.  The Netherlands was no exception to that rule in the period 1840-1930.  In 
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spite of the preponderance of city-state traditions – linking London, New York, Rotterdam, 
Amsterdam and the Dutch colonies‘ capitals, a strong protectionist countermovement was 
emerging as early as the 1870s. While rapidly gaining strength, this movement of 
―consociationalism‖ or ―pillarisation‖ would not become the clear majority movement 
before the 1930s. As such, up to the end of the 1920s, the tradition of City monetarism was 
associated more with the public interest and a national identity than the traditions of 
Orangist democracy or proportionality, albeit not by as large a margin as in England. 
i) Commercial banks 
During the period 1870 to 1930, commercial banks successfully translated their 
aspirations for a financial, City-centered nation, into a democratisation agenda accepted by 
a majority in the outer provinces. Commercial banks achieved this by positioning 
themselves as central to the renewal of the true Dutch character, the one that laid the basis 
of the Dutch Golden Age: utilitarian nonconformism. In particular, commercial banks 
pursued a three-pronged strategy, aimed at both preserving local independence and 
integrating the variety of Dutch financial stakes in one national voice. First, commercial 
banks started acquiring private banks in the outer provinces from the beginning of the 
twentieth century, as a way of integrating these latter institutions‘ stake in an Amsterdam-
centred financial system. Second, during WWI commercial banks decided to greatly 
increase their presence in colonial endeavours. In Dutch popular opinion, the colonial 
empire of the Netherlands was not only considered essential to securing imports of cheap 
goods in the country. It was also portrayed as essential to maintaining the monetary and, 
by proxy, geopolitical weight of the Netherlands. Commercial banks capitalised on this, as 
demonstrated by the following rallying cry of the Rotterdam Bank: ―‗trade follows the 
flag‘ is the axiom that should be proclaimed…[and] ‘trade follows the banks‘ should 
receive civic rights as a second maxim!‖ (Tienhoven, 1917: 31-32).  Finally, and crucially, 
by the turn of the twentieth century most commercial banks had adopted the legal form of 
a public limited company, while remaining intimately linked to the private world of 
merchant bankers and central bankers – Dutch and foreign.  
Soon, this public-private network of interlocking directorates extended to almost 
all public limited companies in other Dutch economic sectors. Indeed, after WWI bank 
representatives, mostly based in Amsterdam, held seats as commissioners on the great 
majority of public limited companies (Schijf, 1993: 39).
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 Remarkably, bankers‘ 
commissioner jobs did not entail so much financial supervision as the bringing in of a 
certain civic lifestyle or competence. One civic barrier of entry to the network of 
interlocking directorates was involvement in the ―Heeren‖ clubs organised around the 
private institutions of the Dutch Bank and the merchant banks.
272
  The top-ranked 
members of these clubs even maintained close relations with British and North-American 
central bankers. On the other hand, religion – which by then had been relegated de jure to 
the private sphere – constituted another important civic requirement. Thus, at the turn of 
the twentieth century, most of the people occupying interlocking directorates in public 
limited companies were members of the Dutch Reformed Church (about 40 percent), 
Baptists (some 10 percent), or Evangelical Lutherans (some 7 percent) or Jews (3 
percent)
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. Only about one fourth of the directors was not affiliated to any religious 
organisation (cf. Schijf, 1993: 39; 79-80). Given the great-christian, financial and 
Amsterdam-centred nature of this network of interlocking directorates, some authors have 
typified it as a new manifestation of ―City monetarism‖ or ―Regent capitalism‖ which 
emerged from the late nineteenth century onwards (Kuitenbrouwer, 1985, 1994). Crucially, 
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the public-private network created by the commercial banking sector – a network of public 
limited companies organised around the private codes of great-christian beliefs and 
―Heeren‖ clubs –  prevailed over emerging forces of pillarisation up to the 1930s.  
ii) General savings banks 
Savings banks did champion a distinctive imagery of Dutch national character: 
the image of a nation whose main successes – the Republic‘s ―Golden Age‖ – had been 
achieved through frugality and steadfastness. While this imagery remained quite strong for 
much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, saving banks soon ceased to be its main 
champions; the main reason for this relative decline was General Savings Banks‘ poor 
performance as to other core national habits: be it ―City monetarism‖, ―circle 
confederalism‖ or ―pacification‖. With regards to the tradition of City monetarism, savings 
banks initially invested a fair amount of their reserves in international prolongations and 
the Amsterdam-centred national debt brokers. This percentage, however, declined fast 
from WWI onwards – the heydays of City monetarism, testifying to the increasing 
introversion of savings banks.
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 Second, the emergence of the pillarisation movement and 
its core principle of circle confederalism hampered savings banks in their bid to become 
the provincial counterpart of City monetarism. Not only were most customers of General 
savings banks to be found in the Holland cities, the spirit of the Savings banks very much 
was one of great-christianism and Holland Regency. Third, following the 1917 
Pacification agreement between catholics, protestants and liberals, the Dutch government 
introduced social security measures and promoted the rise of life insurances and collective 
retirement plans, all according to the principle of circle confederalism. This did not bode 
well either for savings banks.  As testified by the minister of finance Treub in 1917 these 
new forms of «collective saving » would « if not make superfluous, yet make individual 
saving less necessary».
275
   
iii) State Postal Savings Bank 
The governance model of the State Postal Savings Bank was based on a 
precursor of the 1917 principle of national Pacification. Not only was the Bank led by a 
most inclusive coalition of political party representatives; more than other banks, the 
legally imposed aim of the State Postal Savings Bank was to downplay civic differences 
and be as inclusive as possible of people of different provinces and denominations. All in 
all this meant that, while the directors of the State Postal Savings Bank were well 
connected, the law did not allow them to take the lead in initiatives of democratisation 
focused on minorities with elite potential. Even more since Some of the minorities with 
most elite potential before the 1930s were of a cosmopolitan stamp, in contrast with the 
domestic mission of the Bank – tackling the Dutch ―Social Question‖. Rather, the law 
implicitly encouraged the State Postal Savings Bank to take the lead in targeting those 
groups that had been neglected by private initiatives, but whose inclusion in financial 
affairs clearly was in the interest of public order. 
iv) Co-operative banks 
Co-operative banks were very adept at framing agriculture as the oldest and 
most stable element of a sound national character (cfr. Van Balen, 1938: V). Building on 
this legacy, co-operative bank leaders demonstrated considerable skill at inducing a type of 
public-private collaboration in the agricultural sector which could be used as a prototype 
for public-private settlements in other sectors.
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  The ability of co-operative banks to 
contribute to a public-private settlement in the Kingdom of the Netherlands was most 
clearly expressed by the way they managed to combine different systems of education to 
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their advantage. On the one hand, co-operative banks piggybacked on the system of public 
agricultural education set up by the Liberal governments of the 1860s. This system 
provided Dutch farmers and co-operatives with education in the most advanced 
agricultural working methods and significantly boosted their capacity to compete on world 
markets. On the other hand, co-operative banks supported the private educational reforms 
obtained by Reformed Protestants and Catholics at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
As a result, they were able to hire personnel and cater to members who had already been 
socialised into the lifestyle most fitting to either the Protestant or Catholic circle. 
v) Mortgage banks 
   Set up by Social Liberals in Amsterdam in the 1860s, Dutch mortgage banks 
could not build on a long-lived, liquid mortgage market, in the same way as their English 
counterparts, the building societies, could.  On the contrary, given the preponderance of 
the link between provincial land and ―real wealth‖ in images of Dutch national character 
there lay an outright stigma on the practice of mortgaging. For instance, a Dutch 
commission of agriculture in the 1850s claimed that ―when a farmer is compelled to 
mortgage his properties, he usually wishes to keep this as quiet as possible, to be able to 
maintain his credibility.
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 The multiplication of opportunities to mortgage real property 
we cannot call differently than the undermining of the wealth of the country, which for 
each landowner consists of the untaxed property of his goods‖ (Buijs, 1861: 93-94). This 
legacy severely restricted democratisation opportunities for mortgage banks. Things went 
from bad to worse when at the beginning of the twentieth century, governmental housing 
policy became imbued with elements of ―circle confederalism‖ as the leading principle of 
public-private collaboration.  Evidently, mortgage banks suffered from a national housing 
policy based less on ―universal‖ self-help principles than on a maximum of self-
organisation by the different Dutch circles (Van Weesep and Van Kempen, 1993: 185).
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Mortgage banks‘ opportunities became even more restricted when two mortgage 
banks were accused of large scale fraud at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 
comparison with England, the extent to which mortgaging became stigmatized as an anti-
national business was astounding. On the defensive, Dutch mortgage banks agreed to hold 
on to a principle of ―purity‖, meaning that they would restrain from engaging in other 
financial functions than the provision of first mortgages (cf. Glasz, 1935: 23 etc).  This 
meant that Dutch mortgage banks could or would not engage in any deposit and savings 
business on a term shorter than 2 years, and with easy withdrawal facilities. 
 
Strategy f      Become a champion of the national economic interest 
i) Commercial banks 
    Commercial banks contributed significantly to a democratic settlement about 
how to serve both the national economic interest and their own special interests. They 
achieved this by turning two apparently contradictory arguments into a complementary 
one: free trade and protectionism. Commercial banks positioned themselves as allies of 
both free trade associations, such as the Free Liberals and the Association of 
Entrepreneurs
280, and the colonial lobby in the Dutch Indies. Represented by two bankers‘ 
associations – the Rotterdam Bankers‘ Association (1916) and the Amsterdam Bankers‘ 
Association (1919), these banks, on the one hand, promoted a policy of City monetarism, 
much in line with free trade concerns. On the other hand, commmercial banks supported 
the protectionist stance of the colonial government of the Dutch Indies, in the name of the 
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Dutch empire. Simultaneously, commercial banks vigorously attacked calls for more 
domestic protectionism: ―the national interest is served by…international credit‖ 
(Tienhoven, 1917: 31-32).  Up to the end of the 1920s, the alliance of the Dutch Bank, 
commercial banks, Free Liberals and the colonial lobby ensured that the Dutch 
government would resist provincial claims for less City monetarism, and more domestic 
instead of colonial protectionism.
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 How did this alliance hold? While Free Liberals and 
colonial interest groups at first sight would make unlikely allies, they shared one powerful 
connection: the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Clearly, the position of Amsterdam as an 
international financial centre was buttressed by the combination of free trade policies and 
colonial protectionism. While officially the economic contribution of the colonies 
amounted to some 13.7 per cent of the national income, the real effect of the Indonesian 
presence was much bigger: it led to the trebling of the nominal capital value of all 
companies quoted on the Amsterdam stock exchange from 837,000,000 guilder in 1913 to 
2,323,000,000 in 1939. 
ii) General savings banks 
     Savings banks mainly defended a set of domestic special interests, in casu 
those of the lower middle classes. Several issues rendered the contribution of savings 
banks to a democratic settlement about interest group interference problematic. First, 
savings banks did not publicly acknowledge that they were now targeting the lower middle 
classes; they found it hard to dissociate themselves from their historical purpose to 
―enlighten‖ and civilise the working classes. Given the comparatively sorry state of 
interest group representation for the middle classes in the Netherlands, this was a missed 
opportunity.  Second, in face of the growing prevalence of pillarisation, the social liberal 
leadership of the savings banks found it impossible to build a strong and united interest 
group. By default of a central coordinating entity, there for many decades was a lot of 
variety in the policies pursued by local Savings banks. Of varying social-liberal, reformed 
protestant, catholic and even social-democratic signatures, local Savings banks were keen 
to hold on to their independence. Especially the confessional and socialist Savings banks 
for a long time locked the attempts by the social-liberal Society for Public Welfare to 
improve the provision of services through central collaboration. The increasing 
competition of the State Postal Savings bank and the co-operative banks, however, 
gradually stimulated the acceptance of some sort of central organisation, resulting in the 
foundation of the Dutch Savings Association in 1907. Nevertheless, the Savings Union for 
many years remained a relatively weak institution incapable of overcoming the autonomy 
claims of local Savings banks
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. The establishment of a central Savings Bank Bureau in 
1924 gradually would help to bring more unity in the diversity of the movement, but not in 
a decisive way.    
iii) State Postal Savings Banks 
The State Postal Savings Bank constituted the undisputed financial interest 
group of the working classes, certainly in urban areas.  In many ways, the Bank managed 
to serve the public interest – safeguarding the welfare of the working classes – by 
substituting a better financial return for working class agitation or interest group 
polarisation.  On the one hand, the Bank had a highly paternalistic philosophy: it diluted 
working class interests to a ―lowest common denominator‖ motto of cheapness and 
accessibility. On the other hand, the Bank made sure that as many as possible of the 
working classes would remain ―a-political‖, and out of reach of the Socialist party. All in 
all, the State Postal Savings Bank in the eyes of the majority of Dutch economic citizens 
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constituted the model of working class interest representation. The non-working class did 
not trust the working class, and the bulk of the working class was content to have a stable 
vehicle of financial security.  All this meant that the State Postal Savings Bank in many 
ways facilitated the – from the viewpoint of the Dutch State – prudent integration of the 
working classes in a system of universal suffrage. While the State is the best political 
support a firm can have, it is not an interest group. Already in the 1920s, when other banks 
were playing with their interest rates and the State refused to follow, it became clear that 
the State Postal Savings Bank in many ways was too dependent on the State, the latter 
being an instrument of neutrality rather than special interest advancement.     
iv) Co-operative banks 
  Co-operative banks proved remarkably able to adapt to ―national globalisation‖ 
trends, which greatly helped to position themselves as important to the national economic 
interest. This ability had its origin in the nature of Dutch agriculture, which since the 
Golden century had been characterized by the use of large quantities of imported inputs 
and large-scale production for European markets.
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  Building on this tradition, Dutch 
farmers from the 1870s reorganised their activities in co-operative dairy factories and 
regional marketing boards, all with an eye on reinvigorating their import-export 
orientation.
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 Especially in the diluvial, southern provinces with their sandy soils, North-
American competition compelled farmers to transform their business and specialise in 
intensive cattle-farming and dairy products.
285
  This allowed farmers to gradually change 
the relation between international and local market structures to their advantage; as early as 
the end of the nineteenth century Dutch  farmers managed to obtain favourable prices for 
their products in international markets (De Jonge, 1971: 37).
286
  For co-operative banks, 
this in concreto meant that they were catering to an agricultural membership which 
focused as much on international exports as on the development of principles of circle 
confederalism and pacification.
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Undoubtedly, the denominational agricultural interest groups with which the 
Co-operative Banks and their members were associated since 1896 contributed greatly to 
the integration of minorities in the Dutch political system – ensuring amongst others a 
measure of predictability in the new post-WWI environment of universal suffrage.
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The Catholic, Protestant and Liberal agricultural unions were strangely complementary in 
this regard.
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 The Liberal Union was least popular, and did not have a very significant 
following from the turn of the twentieth century onwards. Still, during the nineteenth 
century it had provided a way to institute State-aided agricultural education.  The 
Protestant agricultural union, for its part, had the largest following, but was not as 
politically distinctive than the Catholic Union, especially since the Protestant-neutral co-
operative banks were not formally associated with their Union – in contrast with their 
Catholic counterparts.
291
  The Catholic Union most forcefully represented the minority of 
catholic farmers mobilised by the Catholic co-operative banks.
 292
  It were Catholic 
spiritual leaders such as Van den Elsen and Catholic politicians such as Bahlmann and 
Truyen who first insisted on the need of government protection.  In return, they made two 
promises. They vowed to return a well organised agricultural class, a promise on which 
they certainly delivered.
293
 They also made strides to accommodate the interests of the 
established estates – local shopkeepers, merchants, etc..., for instance by not consorting 
with consumer co-operatives.   
One problem for the Catholic co-operative banks was that the political potential 
of the catholic government representatives and parliamentary fraction had always been 
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disproportional to the actual size of the Catholic  population in the Netherlands (more than 
35 % of the population in 1925).  Maybe this explains why Catholic politicians could not 
obtain the institution of a separate governmental department of agriculture; agricultural 
affairs often were handled by the Department of Economic and Home Affairs, despite the  
1905 establishment of a separate agricultural directorate within the ministry of Agriculture, 
Commerce and Trade (Smits, 1996: 86).  Another problem for Catholic co-operative banks 
was that their Union was slighly isolationist: the Catholic agricultural union promoted a 
somewhat contentious combination of Orangist tradition and contemporary papal ghetto 
tactics.
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 Clearly, the Catholic Farmer Union was perceived as somewhat « sectarian » by 
the Dutch Bank and an important part of the government, especially the ministry of 
finance. Also, the low debet interest and high credit interest rates charged by both the 
catholic  and protestant co-operative banks‘ were a thorn in the eyes of commercial banks; 
they did not differentiate much between co-operative banks in their criticism. Rather than 
manifesting itself in direct attacks, criticism was relayed to the Dutch Bank, which started 
a campaign of stigmatisation vis-à-vis the co-operative banks. These latter banks were not 
only refused access to the Dutch Bank‘s discount facilities most of the time. They were 
also confronted with statements like ―if agricultural credit would run into problems, we 
shall not be able to support them on a large scale‖, knowing that commercial banks had 
received extensive support in periods of crises.  
 Still, all this criticism should not be exaggerated.  As acknowledged by the 
visiting minister Talma in 1911: there have always existed ―good relations between the 
Government, the Ministry of Agriculture, no matter what name it operated under, and the 
Central Bank‖.295 As proof of these good relations, Central Bankers pointed to the 
subsidizing accorded to the co-operative banks and chargeable to the agricultural budget, 
that went on until 1915. These good relations were founded on the steadfastness of, on the 
one hand, the co-operative banks, and, on the other hand, the reinvigoration of Dutch 
agriculture between 1895 and 1913. On instigation of especially Catholic leaders, the 
agricultural co-operative movement after WWI  markedly raised its political aspirations. 
After almost two decades of agricultural wealth, the cost/benefit balance of Dutch 
agriculture decreased – from 1919 onwards. In spite of a looming agricultural financial 
crisis, the Dutch government decided to stick to a free-trade policy. Conscious of the need 
to establish direct entry point in politics, the catholic farmer union – the KNBTB – 
established a lobby office in The Hague. From then onwards, the KNBTB would invest all 
its energy in promoting the values and interests of catholic farmers. In addition, the Union 
took great care of developing an educational system that would elevate the moral condition 
of the farming community to a level at which both self-sufficiency and harmonious social 
relationships would become a reality. In line with papal policy that since the late 
nineteenth century prescribed corporatism as the best remedy for the « socialist evil », the 
KNBTB at the same time worked at the realisation of a corporatist organisation of the 
farmer classes. A first step towards this goal was made when in 1922 the three farmer 
unions, the catholic KNBTB, the protestant CBTB and the liberal KNLC, decided to 
confer with each other on a regular basis so as to develop common lines of action towards 
farmers (Smits, 1996: 116-117).  All these preparatory moves would provide the farmer 
unions with a decisive advantage on other economic pressure groups in the 1930s, when 
the going would become tough for everyone. 
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v) Mortgage banks 
Mortgage banks again were the weakest of all financial organisations when it 
came to being seen as serving the public interest.  This is remarkable, given that there was 
an enormous national demand for housing after WWI.  Instead of spurring the growth of 
mainstream liberal mortgage banks, it was the mortgage bank set up by the catholic co-
operative banks that most profited from this boom, to reach a market share of 25 percent 
by the 1930s. This bank, however, was not affiliated to the official Control Bureau, but 
rather remained closely associated to the Catholic Co-operative Central Bank.  Another 
remarkable aspect of Dutch mortgage banking, is that it suffered from the effectiveness of 
Dutch housing policy, rather than benefited from it. As argued by for instance Bauer 
(1935: 282-283), Dutch housing policy was remarkable effective in comparison with other 
Western countries.
296
  But given that this effectiveness was due to growing organisation 
along pillarised lines, the mortgage banking market not only remained fragmented 
economically
297
, but also politically.    
Still, one aspect of government policy seemed to play in favour of mortgage 
banks‘ perceptions as vehicles of the public interest: statutorily the State Postal Savings 
Bank not only had to invest part of its savings in mortgage bonds, but also had to supervise 
the instances from which it bought mortgage bonds, in casu the private mortgage banks. 
The fact that they were supervised by such a trusted entity meant that mortgage banks were 
perceived as more secure vehicles of public housing policy (Janssens, 1992: 28).  On the 
other hand, it also meant that mortgage banks‘ autonomy to negotiate their private political 
position was very reduced. The mortgage banks tried to fend off this indirect form of 
public control, by establishing an own Control Bureau that would render supervision by 
the State Postal Savings Bank futile. But in face of the recent troubles of the mortgage 
banks, this attempt was not deemed appropriate before 1928 (De Knocke van der Meulen, 
1981:41).
                                                 
144 This national dualism had been compounded in the first decades of the 19th century by the temporary 
incorporation of a ―third nation‖: the Flemish and Walloon provinces in the southern Netherlands. 
145 Up to the 1860s and 1870s, this contradiction between two nations had been mitigated by the fact that 
Amsterdam very much had become a ―sleeping capital of the nation‖ (Brugmans, I.J. Thorbecke: 202). After the 
1870s Amsterdam gradually increased in population, wealth and cosmopolitan entrepreneurialism, so as to 
transform from ―the capital of [polderland]‖ into a national capital with genuinely cosmopolitan aspirations (cf. 
Dillen, 1964).   
146 Before 1795 there had been no political unity in the Dutch province of Limburg. During the era of the United 
Provinces, only a few parts of Limburg belonged to the Dutch Republic; the rest of the province was ruled by 
many other rulers such as the King of Prussia, the Austrian Emperor and the Prince Bishop of Liege (Jappe 
Alberts, 1974; Op den Camp, 1993a and b). 
147 This feeling was especially predominant in Limburg as the following quote in 1848 reveals: ―We are Dutch as 
far as financial debts are concerned…in all other respects, we are considered strangers‖ (1848 De Limburger, 
cited in Op de Camp, 1995: 93 and Knippenberg, 1999: 48). 
148 People in the provinces of Brabant and Limburg were more ambivalent towards the Holland Regents than 
towards the outer province Orangists. Popular opinion in Limburg and Brabant was dominated by the belief that 
the Holland Regent class never really wanted these two provinces to be included in the Republic, as they only 
cared about their own commercial interest. Indeed, the Regent class considered the predominantly catholic 
provinces of Limburg and Brabant a ―foreign‖ region. In fact, it was only due to the insistence of the Princes of 
Orange against the will of the ―Holland regents‖ that Limburg and Brabant were liberated from the Spaniards and 
granted their republican liberties (cf. Thewissen, 1937: 15). If it weren‘t for his assassination, so goes the story, 
William the Silent could have maintained peace between Catholics and Protestants, and avoided a north-south 
divide on a religious basis (cf. Sneller, 1938). As the Orangists never succeeded in occupying a position of 
domination, their threat to strengthen the Dutch Reformed orthodoxy to the detriment of religious freedom of 
conscience was never consolidated. Also, during the periods in which the Dutch Republic did not have a 
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Stadtholderate, Orangists successfully voiced the opinion of the disenfranchised ―commonalty‖, which - more 
than in other provinces - important groups in Brabant and Limburg belonged to. 
149 After the defeat of the French in 1813, the House of Orange made its come-back in the Netherlands. The 
country was converted into a kingdom. 
150 In fact, William of Orange followed a dual-track strategy of national recovery. On the one hand, to help 
finance the industrialisation of the newly joined southern provinces, William set up a National Investment 
Society. On the other hand, in order to help Amsterdam gain back its role as a major import-export entrepot, the 
King financed a new colonial war - the Java War – and set up a new colonial society – the Dutch Trade Society  
(Fritschy, 1988). 
151 The problems he encountered were similar to the ones encountered by his 16h century predecessor in the Low 
Netherlands: there was lack of unity and solidarity between, on the one hand, the northern and southern 
Netherlands, and , on the other hand, the western and eastern provinces in the Northern Netherlands. 
152Contrary to more successful European countries, the process of nation-state building in the Netherlands in the 
first half of the nineteenth century was not eased by increasing fiscal revenue, as economic growth in the North 
languished and proclivity to tax evasion was high in the South.  In 1830, the southern Netherlands finally 
separated in the Kingdom of Belgium. As these latter provinces were the main source of  taxation in the country, 
however, tax revenue even more than before fell short of expenditure. With public debt soaring, King William I 
tried to bypass parliament with ever more ingenious financial constructions (‗t Hart et al., 1997: 197). 
153 Part of the catholic elite was prepared to support the Liberals in exchange for ecclesiastical and educational 
concessions. 
154 Grouped around the leader Thorbecke, the Liberals pressed for constitutional change which would open the 
Dutch governing system to the middle classes. 
155 The acceptance of ministerial responsibility and direct elections for the Second Chamber in 1848, and several 
other reforms drafted by the liberal leader Thorbecke, were the most significant concessions made by the king. Of 
course, it took decades before the legal change led to the recognition in practice of collegial cabinet government, 
and of the necessity for a government to enjoy the confidence of a parliamentary majority. 
156 With the constitutional change of 1848, Dutch Liberals had succeeded in legally abolishing privileges based on 
descent and prohibiting any interference of the Protestant Church in public matters. Still, since the liberal victory 
of 1848 derived more from the influence of foreign revolutions than active changes of heart in the Netherlands 
itself, conservative forces allowed the ―great-protestant‖ heirs of the Regents to remain influential until WWI. 
This is because, while being more particularistic of character (Stuurman, 1983: 115), the conservative purposes of 
the Regents were much more resonant in popular opinion than the abstract conceptions of the Liberals. In fact, 
contrary to England in which liberal values spread fast beyond bourgeois quarters (Breuilly, 1992: 233), the 
liberal culture of good citizenry remained rather small in the Netherlands.  
Thus, despite the liberal democratisation offensive from about 1840 until 1870, it took the recognition – in face of 
the emerging threat of socialism in the Netherlands – of the so-called ―Social Question‖ by a second wave of 
Liberals in the 1870s, for these reforms to become more tangible. As we will see later, paradoxically, this formal 
reinforcement of the laissez-faire towards religious beliefs led to an informal reinvigoration of the power of 
religious mobilisation, as the impending pillarisation along catholic  and Protestant lines would show. 
157 Local tax autonomy was curtailed and public finances became more unified. The new constitution stated 
explicitly that all public expenditures were subject to approval by parliament with the ministers responsible for 
the financial deeds of the government. 
158 The first sector accounted for up to 50 percent of the Dutch labour force, the second for less than 25 percent.   
159 Still, the influence of Christianity was less pervasive than this figure would lead to believe. In fact, only a large 
part of the farmers and the small citizenry were deeply religious. Members of the propertied citizenry were only 
vaguely religious.  A large part of the workers were even quite antagonistic towards religion.  Still, since 1854 
religious views prevailed in the Dutch Poor Law. Poor relief was acknowledged as the exclusive responsibility of 
religious and private charities. Thus, a combination of liberal and confessional influences had decreed the 
primacy of private initiative in affairs of poor relief (Van der Valk, 1991: 102). 
160 Contrary to England and France, before 1848, liberalism in the Netherlands was still in its infancy (Robijns, 
1967: 327). Liberals were considered dangerous by the vested authorities, since they did not yet show the 
tendency to promote vested interests, as meanwhile had become the case in France and Britain.   
161 Indeed, because the liberal victory of 1848 derived more from the influence of foreign revolutions than active 
changes of heart in the Netherlands itself, conservative forces allowed the Regents to remain influential until well 
after that date. This is because, while being more negative and particularistic of character (Stuurman, 1983: 115), 
conservative purposes were much more practicable and concrete than the abstract conceptions of the Liberals. 
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162 In fact, agriculture was the first economic sector in the Netherlands where knowledge and technical 
development were widely diffused, partly through government initiative (and subsidizing), partly through private 
initiative. The development of agricultural statistics, the stimulation of innovation and the provision of adequate 
agricultural education were the main pillars of this democratisation movement. Mechanisation, and its corrollaries 
of fast disposal of labour and enlargement of the agricultural area per farm unit, and intensification of production, 
in the form of improved fertilisation techniques and crop improvement, were the immediate purposes of the 
proposed liberal policy (cf. Maat, 2003: 233, 236-245). The Liberal government of the 1860s – led by Thorbecke 
– was quite well-disposed to these propositions, and adopted a variety of agricultural educational forms in the 
1863 Law on Secondary Education, with a possibility for local initiators to apply for subsidies. In 1876 a Public 
Agricultural School was founded in Wageningen. This public school, however, in the beginning was not very 
successful. In face of the agricultural crisis of the 1880s, government tackled the limited capacity of agricultural 
research and education by subsidising the opening of new experimental stations all over the country. Government 
was in charge of, on the one hand, providing scientific knowledge through its public school and itinerant teachers, 
and, on the other hand,  taking up the role of arbiter in the testing of product quality, for instance of fertilisers, 
milk or sugar beets. The private sector, for its part, through its provincial Agricultural Societies and annual 
congresses was in charge of trying out and disseminating technical innovations by foreign companies, domestic 
artisans or farmers. 
163 These societies were initiated by members of the upper classes and by large landowners, and for some decades 
set the tone. A Dutch Agricultural Congress – Het Nederlandsch Landhuishoudkundig Congres – was established 
in 1846 on the initiative of one of the regional societies. The Congress convened on a yearly basis to discuss the 
diffusion of new ideas and innovations in the agricultural field. Apart from establishing the Congress, the regional 
agricultural societies organised meetings, exhibitions and competitions…all attempts to diffuse knowledge and 
use of new agricultural technologies. The number of members of these organisations increased from about 10,000 
to about 30,000 between 1850 and 1880 (Bieleman, 1996: 17-19). 
164 In this period, quick expansion in the agricultar sector strongly correlated with rapid growth for the total 
economy, and vice versa. 
165 For instance, in response government induced the regional societies to establish a central national organisation 
to better represent and discipline farmers‘ interests. 
166 What financing activities existed for farmers and urban workers? To begin with, there existed limited customs 
of mutual help in the farming communities (less so in the urban worker communities). In addition, farmers and 
urban workers could access the local department of the Society for Public Welfare for small amounts of money. 
Finally, less philantropic credit was offered to farmers by corn-merchants, cattle-dealers, and shopkeepers, who 
exchanged food products and cattle-fodder on credit for eggs, butter and cheese. Because these local merchants 
succeeded in building small credit-monopolies in many Dutch regions, farmers were forced to settle for buying 
goods of a low quality at a high price, and selling goods at comparatively low prices. 
167 Because of the capital affluence of the Netherlands before the agricultural crisis, interest rates in the 
countryside generally had been low, and practices of usury by local merchants – who exploited farmers‘ need for 
short-term credit –  had been scarce. During the agricultural crisis of the 1880s and 1890s, however, ―usury‖ 
became a widespread phenomenon.  
168 Of course, workers (and to a lesser extent farmers) necessitated other services too. Especially institutions 
ensuring collective (health and retirement) security plans were needed. And, in face of the extensive tampering 
with the quality and the prices of food by shopkeepers, some protection was also needed in the area of food 
supply. 
169 Before 1848, members of government were primarily of a Conservative signature. By the end of the 19th 
century, there were no more Conservatives in  Parliament. 
170 Dutch Baptists,especially from the beginning of the nineteenth century, adapted to the new reality of an 
Orangist kingdom by repealing their sixteenth-century proscription of participation in public (government) office 
(or the military). Confronted with the radicalisation of the Dutch Reformed Church (as exemplified by the 
Afscheiding in 1834 and the Doleantie in 1886), the general baptist purpose became to join the liberal, non-
confessional m ovement in the Dutch, protestant Church…This resulted in an emphasis on a practical, 
undogmatic and free-spirited christianity as materialised in local, autonomous municipalities with as little as 
possible central interference (Hoekema and Voolstra, 1999: 24-26). 
171 In order to create a homogeneous nation of rational and civilized citizens, the Liberals proposed several 
constitutional changes, amongst which the following two. First, a separation of church and state had to be 
instituted so as to relegate the religious heterogeneity of the citizenry to the private realm. So, as the father of the 
Dutch constitution, Thorbecke stated in August of 1853: ―It is time, that we in the political field substituted the 
consciousness of a Dutch nation for the notion of a protestant nation‖ (cited in Boersema, 1949: 255). Second, 
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more than in England, it were the Dutch Liberals who emphasized the need of educational reform and 
homogenisation through a public school system. 
172 As argued by Graff (1991: 279), the ―greatest function of the modern school was to teach a ‗new patriotism‘ 
beyond the limits naturally acknowledged by its charges…The school‘s task included not only national and 
patriotic sentiments, but establishing unity in a nation long divided by region, culture, language and persisting 
social divisions of class and wealth‖. The same applies to the Netherlands, where the establishment of a national 
education system was part of the liberals‘ strategy to create an homogeneous Dutch nation within the confines of 
the territorial state of the Netherlands (cf. Amersfoort, 1982; De Vrankrijker, 1969; Knippenberg, 1996). 
173 The first generation of liberals, however, limited their democratisation aspirations to the propertied and 
educated middle ranks. Indeed, to be considered a liberal, one not only had to be well off financially. Extensive 
socialisation in the Amsterdam Regent – ―Heeren‖ – clubs was another implicit condition (Vonhoff, 1966). Not 
surprisingly, once their demands for more democratisation for the (upper) middle ranks had been translated in 
constitutional changes (1848), the Thorbeckian Liberals moderated their tone. They claimed that the lower middle 
and worker ranks had to be educated, but not so much as to put the establishment in peril (Stuurman, 1983: 114). 
174 Afraid of alienating confessional workers, the Socialists indeed finally decided to support the confessional 
parties against the liberal State in their struggle for financial equalisation of public and private education (Korver, 
1987: 45-46). 
175 Where the catholic and protestant parties demanded full state funding of their parochial schools, the social 
democrats, together with progressive Liberals and some Christian democrats, had long been fighting for universal 
suffrage. More conservative Liberals were defensive on both issues. 
176 After the establishment of the fledgling Free Trade Association in 1896, the Anti-Tariffs Committee was 
created by the Free Liberals in 1911. 
177 The social liberal movement had already emerged during the 1860‘s and 1870‘s. In face 
 of the dire living conditions of the working classes, the social Liberals were not at all reluctant about promoting 
active citizenship and self-control amongst workers . To make their moral ideals practicable, the social Liberals 
relied heavily on Co-operation as an economic instrument to tackle social issues from within the working classes, 
without intervention from the State (see Appendix A, section 7). 
178 Sociaal-Democratische Bond, SDB 
179 Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij, SDAP 
180 The political program of the Social Democratic Union largely derived from the Gotha Program that the 
German Socialist Workers‘ Party  (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschland, SAD) had adopted at its foundation 
in 1875. The program consisted of two partially contradictory subprograms:  an analysis and diagnosis of 
capitalist society and a set of programmatic demands that called for state intervention.  
181 This platform was largely derived from the Erfurt Program of the German SPD and also had a built-in tension 
between the theoretical part and the plan of action. The first part predicted the collapse of capitalism and the 
transition to socialism; the second part made demands on the existing state.  This tension between social theory 
and political policy in the Second International led to the revisionism dispute, which in the Netherlands fuelled a 
protracted internal party controversy that involved drafting a new SDAP platform. The authors hoped to restore 
party unity and resolve the tension between theoretical perspective and practical policies. 
182 Finally, the party held that the social democratic movement should act not only  in light of historical 
tendencies, but also from ethical principles. In sum, the party saw itself as the political representative of the 
working class and its activities as promoting the transition from capitalism to socialism, also through universal 
suffrage. But the advent of universal suffrage did not produce a social democratic majority. Nor did the social 
structure increasingly simplify into two antagonistic classes. 
183 This movement was coined the ―April movement‖. 
184 The parallels between developments in the new nation-state of the Netherlands in the nineteenth century and 
developments in the the new Dutch Republic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries indeed are remarkable. 
The first political party in the Dutch Republic was set up by dogmatic protestant preachers in alliance with 
leading merchants during the Dutch Revolt. After the revolt, the merchants increasingly distanced themselves 
from protestant dogmatism, to form a Regent status group which increasingly used the Protestant Church as an 
instrument of pragmatic domination, much to the frustration of the preachers.   
185 Paradoxically, this would greatly facilitate the incorporation of former outsiders in the nation-state of the 
Netherlands. Thus, the Reformed Protestant tradition of democratisation is quite ambiguous in its incorporation of 
both elements of the logic of outsider and the logic of establishment. 
186 For instance, the North Brabant manufacturers went into opposition against the liberal tariff law of 1862. 
187 From 1897 until the end of WWI, a conscious political strategy focused on the population of farmers was out 
of the question. Yet, failures to influence free-trade government policy towards farmers, induced the catholic 
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farmer union, the KNBTB, to think about setting up a Farmer Party in its own right during WWI. At the end of 
the war, the KNBTB finally decided not to set up a political party, but to invest all its energy in making a 
contribution to the catholic state programme. Events in the WWI had a lot to do with this decision. Before the 
war, during which the Netherlands maintained a precarious neutrality, the political parties were still bitterly 
divided. liberal free-traders held a firm grip on government policy. Gradually however, the war helped to rally the 
parties around a common programme, with as major issues the financial position of religious schools and the 
suffrage. 
188 After the divorce of Liberals and Catholics in Parliament, Catholics allied to some extent with the 
Conservatives: they were against excessive government interference in civic and economic life, wanted lower 
taxes – most notably in matters of national defense, expressed the need for more protection of domestic products, 
were against the extension of the suffrage and repudiated government-sponsored social measures.  
189 While before 1900, the association of protestant and catholic elites against socialists and Liberals still 
resembled a temporal ―monstrous alliance‖ of archenemies. Yet, after 1900 the idea that Christian beliefs could 
act as a binding agent gained ground. Association between Protestants and Catholics only happened amongst the 
elites of each pillar. The lower groups of each pillar were very antagonistic vis a vis each other (for instance 
judging by the then popular expression ―two beliefs on one pillow, the devil has to sleep between‖). The 
protestant leader Kuyper talked about an antithesis between believers and non-believers, the Christian gospel and 
the (liberal or social) revolution. Both Catholics and Protestants demanded full subsidizing of denominational 
education (just like public schools) and the possibility to stimulate organisation based on their own convictions. 
Still, while temporally suppressed, the old antagonism between Protestants and Catholics remained latent. The 
predominant feeling amongst Catholics was that the Dutch Protestants did not consider them as forming part of 
the true Dutch nation. As such, the Protestants would make sure that Catholics would always remain politically, 
civically and economically subordinate.  Indeed, in the eyes of Dutch reformed Protestants, the Catholics could 
never be good citizens, because they would always remain loyal to the Pope as the highest authority. 
190 The process of pillarisation implied the organisation of standards of ―propriety‖, ―decency‖ and economic 
welfare per denominational population. 
191 While primarily premised on a logic of outsider, the catholic doctrine of subsidiarity differed from the 
Reformed Protestant doctrine of ―own circles‖, in that it purposively provided for, on the one hand, state-business 
cooperation, and, on the other hand, a distinction between the public and the private sphere. More particularly, the 
catholic  tradition was in favour of the State delegating public authority to private corporations, be they employer-
employee councils, pastoral councils, or unions. Thus, unlike the Reformed Protestant tradition, the catholic  
tradition prescribes not only harmonious co-operation between Capital and Labour, but also with the State. 
Remarkably, even more than the Protestants, the Catholics were against modern notions of the sovereignty of the 
people. As such, while being in favour of some democratisation as a means to gain corporate rights, the catholic  
leaders clearly foresaw an elite/participant boundary of active versus passive democratisation. Indeed, in its 
peculiar, but clearly defined combination of a logic of outsider and a logic of establishment, the catholic  tradition 
arguably is the one drawing most on republican guild traditions (cf. Van Waarden, 1992a). 
192 In contrast with Protestants, who emphasized more the self-reliance of individuals, Catholics pictured their 
population as backward children in need of pastoral guidance. Not surprisingly, where the Protestants were the 
first to create their own schools, the Catholics were the first to create farmer-cooperatives. 
193 The Catholics did establish their own Savings banks, but these joined the more general savings Union only in 
1925 once the pillarisation movement had taken definite shape amongst workers. 
194 Knippenberg (1999: 49) argues that the restoration of the Episcopal hierarchy in 1853 increased the national 
Roman Catholic Church considerably. On the one hand, Brabant and Limburg were not considered missionary 
territory anymore by the Pope, and Dutch Catholics were now free to lead the way in their interpretation and 
implementation of encyclical ltters such as the Quanta Cura.  On the other hand, local churches increasingly were 
connected to the national Catholic Church. The result of all this was the purging from Catholic leadership of most 
liberal elements and the increasing mobilisation of the population of Brabant and Limburg on strict Catholic 
grounds.  
195 For an overview of the popularity of the different religions over time in the Netherlands, I refer to Appendix C. 
196 This tendency was strengthened by the Bank Act of 1863, which stimulated the Dutch Bank to open offices in 
the entire country. 
197 Before becoming president of the Dutch Bank, Ncolaas Gerard Pierson was one of the leading new-, young-
liberal economists in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century. He was very worried about the decline of 
Dutch colonial trade. He urged against the agricultural cultivation system imposed by the Dutch government on 
its colonies. He argued that, in this regard, the Conservatives really were «playing brinkmanship» (Van 
Maarseveen, 1981: 106-115). With regards to the poverty question, Pierson was strongly influenced by the 
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German historical school which posited that for a good functioning of the societal organism an equilibrium 
between classes is a first requisite. Poverty is a disruption to this equilibrium, as a result of which the working 
classes become too dependent of the wealthy. A new equilibrium can be found through fostering the association 
principle in the working classes. 
198 As the president of the Surinam Bank (1865-1868), Pierson had already helped to found an institute of 
―popular improvement‖ –  the ―Paleis voor Volksvlijt‖.  From 1866 to 1870 and from 1872 to 1874, Pierson, a 
self-avowed idealist, was a member of the local school commission (Van Maarseveen, 1981: 141). The driving 
element of societal progress for Pierson was the free and complete development of the capacities of each 
individual, regardless from his societal origin ; education with equal opportunities for everyone was the first 
condition to this. Thus, the duty of government was to provide for good education (142). 
199 Pierson was raised in a well-to-do Amsterdam mercantile family which diligently participated in the Protestant 
revival movement. 
200 The Anti-Revolutionaries were a group of Calvinists which constituted the spearhead of lower middle and 
working class opinion, and which were the first to form an organised anti-Liberal political party. 
201 Letter from Pierson to J.A.Alberdingk Thijm, Amsterdam, 26/10/1868 (UB Nijmegen, Afdeling 
Handschriften).  
202 Letter from Pierson to J.A. Alberdingk Thijm, Amsterdam, 21/10/1868, UB Nijmegen, department of  
―Handschriften‖. Originally, Pierson‘s political ideal was to form a « true » liberal party, differentiated from both 
Conservatives and « pseudo »-Liberals, in alliance with Catholics and anti-revolutionaries. In this party, the three 
groups would work together on the basis of a fair separation of church and state, without encroachment in each 
others‘ principles.  Indeed, not only with regards to colonial policy but also in relation to the school question, 
Pierson argued for an alliance between conservative liberals and anti-revolutionaries, against what he called 
«overzealous, freethinking » social liberals (145). So, he argued: « Let us not forget, we who call ourselves 
Liberals...that we borrowed our best moral principles…from Christianity » (Pierson, Mr Keuchenius, VEG III 
534-536). However, when catholic publicists such as Thijm, who also was member of the school committee, 
under the influence of the papal enclycum « Quanta cura » and « Syllabus errorum » changed political course in 
the period 1866-‘68, and in accordance with the catholic bishops not only resisted the « neutral » state school, but 
advocated a rupture with the Liberals and an alliance with the conservatives Pierson argued: « You do not know 
how much effort it costs to maintain the principle of tolerance towards Catholics in Protestant circles. Pierson 
increasingly was afraid that the Catholics in their struggle for a « private education » would want more than a free 
church in a free state and after the granting of privileges would seize the power to take away non-Catholics‘ rights 
to freedom. The demons of Isabella of Spain, the [brandstapel] and so on were recurrent metaphors used by 
Pierson and other against the catholic « reactionaries». 
203 When at the end of the seventies some radical Liberals joined Socialism of the Chair, which amongst other 
things propagated a greater state influence, Pierson openly turns away from them and with that from radical new-
liberalism (Van Maarseveen, 1981: 225). 
204 As a « progressive liberal », Pierson was a proponent of financial internationalism.  A promoter of the gold 
standard, he claimed that it would not take long before gold would be deposited and received against fixed prices 
in all European banks. Surpluses or deficits of this metal would soon disappear. What is more, «between the 
civilised people of Europe a relation of solidarity will be formed in the area of monetary policy, which, because it 
includes so many, would not be a burden for anyone in particular » (Pierson, Het stelsel van metaalaankopen, 42-
43).   
205 Prolongations were backed by securities, commodities or other exchange-traded collateral. 
206 Oddly, it began when a Dutch baptist Blijdenstein moved the seat of his ―cashier firm‖ from the provincial city 
of Enschede to Amsterdam, and changed its name to ―Twentsche Bank‖. 
207 Up to the mid-nineteenth century and even beyond, the word ―bank‖ even seemed to cause fear in the Dutch 
provinces, the main reason being that banks did not have any contact with a domestic public in the provinces 
since they were exclusively oriented towards the trade of international emissions (Brugmans, 1963: 44-46). 
208 Though provincial banks had profited from the wide availability of uniform and priced bill credit through the 
prolongation system –  the national money market reinvigorated by the Dutch Bank in 1860 – this also meant 
their added value to the market was very low. And securities already found their way to the public through a 
dense network of intermediaries – be they brokers, commissionaries or bankers. 
209 Nevertheless, from 1894-1914 commercial banks gradually took the legal personality of public limited liability 
incorporated company as they became conscious of their changing role in Dutch industrialisation. The techniques 
adopted by commercial banks, however, remained virtually unchanged until 1911, with the merger of two banks 
in the Rotterdam Banking Association (Rotterdamse Bankiersvereniging). The merger was followed by a series of 
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takeovers of smaller commercial banks. As a consequence, the five largest commercial banks were able to 
reinforce their position in the Dutch financial system centered in Amsterdam. 
210 So, it was up to the steamship lines and railway companies to informally undertake this task after 1890.   
211 These were the so-called ―Nutsdepartementen‖. 
212 In 1817, the Society for Public Welfare started encouraging local departments to set up Savings banks. By 
promoting saving, the departments would reinforce the liberal-moral identity of the Netherlands, by reforming the 
behaviour of the lower income-classes into a more productive direction. King William I expressed great interest 
in this initiative. This has to been seen in the context of the construction of a unitary State, and the creation of the 
Dutch Bank in 1814 with the support of the King. As such, it is not surprising that it was William I who first 
instructed the investigation of the possibility of establishing a single Savings bank for the entire country (Ribbe, 
1890: 8). Yet, the time was not ripe for this yet. For one, the idea of a central Savings bank was not in keeping 
with the decentralised, particularist structure of the Society. The local departments not only often were quite 
different in their political and economic approach, but also keen on maintaining their self-governing character. In 
addition, the idea of a national Savings bank compelling workers to deposit part of their salary into the Savings 
bank, so as to make them save more money, did not square with the Society‘s liberal character (Dankers et al., 
2001: 36). The Board of the Society therefore responded to the King not to find the plan of one national Savings 
bank practicable. Notwithstanding this negative answer, William I still supported the setting up of local Savings 
banks in a more particularist, decentralised fashion. 
213 Above all those ―enlightened‖ liberals who also participated in the ―Vereniging van Volksvlijt‖. 
214 From 1893, Co-operatives to buy inputs like fertilizers and feed stuffs, and Co-operatives to process and sell 
agricultural products like dairy factories and sugar beet refineries were playing an increasingly important role in 
the modernisation of agriculture (Van Zanden, 1985: 51).   
215 The purpose of the institution of Central Banks was to delegate the power to pool financial resources and 
coordinate non-local banking expertise to an overarching unit consisting of a Board of Directors, a Supervisory 
Board and staff employees. Deliberaton between the Central councils and the local banks was instituted on a 
regular and obligatory basis in a General Assembly, a common policy-making forum. In this General Assembly, 
the local banks decided on nominations for the Board of Directors and Supervisory Board in the first place. 
Though being affiliates of the Central Bank, the local banks were independent co-operative bodies, with an own 
board and administration, and an own policy responsibility. As shareholders of the Centrals, the local banks were 
statutorily entitled to vote in the General Assembly, which in theory made them  the main decision-makers of the 
Central Bank. In practice, however, the Board of Directors and, to a smaller extent the Supervisory Board, had a 
very important role in coordinating and setting policy-making. The Board of Directors was entrusted with the 
administrative management of the Central Bank. The Board was responsible for appointing the cashier (according 
to the statutes the most important administrative function), decided on the acceptance of members, and 
determined interest rates, provisions, credit rules and limits. The Supervisory Board, on the other hand, 
superintended the general management of the Central Bank and had to grant permission for the proposed interest 
rates, provisions, credit rules and limits. The Supervisory Board consisted mainly of administrators from local 
banks. The Board of Directors, for its part, consisted of legal and financial experts and a few representatives of 
local banks, who after spending some years in the Supervisory Board switched to the Board of Directors. Contact 
between the Centrals and the local banks mainly took place through inspectors that regularly controlled the 
cashbox of local banks. This organisation structure would remain virtually unchanged for many decades. 
216 Why were two different Centrals founded? The establishment of two different Centrals has, with the benefit of 
hindsight, been explained as the result of early forces of value-rationalisation along emerging pillarized lines, as 
expressed in a different choice of legal personality by the Protestants and the Catholics. So, the official argument 
goes that the protestant-christian leaders of the Dutch Farmer Union viewed the law of 1855 on ―moral bodies‖ as 
not solid enough for the foundation of credit banks. catholic  leaders, on the other hand, deemed the establishment 
of credit banks according to the law of 1876 on ―co-operative bodies‖ too time-consuming (Van Campen et al., 
1940: 49). Yet, more instrumental power issues and personal quarrels also seem to have had a hand in these 
different preferences (Hollenberg, 1958). When the North-Brabant provincial union, on the initiative of father 
Van Elsen, proceeded to the institution of a Commission for Raiffeisenkassen, it was the member of the 
Commission Van Rijckevorsel who was assigned the task to draw up regulations. Van den Elsen, twice sent back 
Van Rijckevorsel‘s drafts with a lot of comments, while preparing his own draft version in the mean time. 
Though the Dutch Farmer Union subsequently approved both drafts, the one of Van Rijckevorsel and the one of 
Van den Elsen, Van Rijckevorsel afterwards bore a grudge against Van den Elsen. Since Van Rijckevorsel, 
together with his brother, in the mean time had come to occupy an influential position in the Dutch Farmer Union, 
this would have important consequences. 
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217 In fact, at the outset all member banks of both Centrals were founded on the basis of the same five principles 
(the first two are about the purpose of Co-operation, the last four are about the basic organisational techniques 
ensuring the practicability of the first two principles): 1) the cooperative type of organisation is the expression of 
the concept of mutual (financial) aid, 2) the cooperative type of organisation does not aim at making profit, 3) 
funds must be managed as prudently and as economically as possible, 4) any profits are to be allocated to the 
reserves, 5) the cooperative‘s operational area is restricted to its local community, to be established in agreement 
with the Central Bank, 6) the cooperative‘s members have unlimited liability for any deficits in case of liquidation 
218 Four markedly different properties characterized the purposes of the catholic  and Protestant-neutral central 
bank. First, the catholic  Central specified its purpose to include not only the material edification of farmers, but 
more importantly the moral. Because of the more neutral aspirations of the Protestant-neutral Central, it did not 
mention this last moral element. Second, the catholic  Central‘s statutes explicitly stated that all self-interest 
should be excluded in favour of altruism. The Protestant-neutral central bankput much more emphasis on 
individual independence. Third, to preserve the purpose of altruism, the catholic  Central stuck to the condition of 
several and unlimited liability of members for debts. The Protestant-neutral Central, on the contrary, already in 
1903 downgraded this condition to limited liability. Fourth, fearing the interference of non-farmers in the local 
banks, the catholic  Central Bank did not allow non-farmers like local merchants to become member of the local 
banks, and make use of their credit facilities. Fearing the influence of non-Catholics, the catholic  Central posed 
an additional condition: it was also necessary to be a member of a local farmer union. Though the co-operative 
banks formally have always operated independently of the farmer unions, in 1905 a statutory amendment was 
drawn up which specified that the NCB and the LCB (the Christian Unions from the provinces of North-Brabant 
and the Limburg) would get two representatives in the Supervisory Board of the Central Bank. The Protestant-
neutral Central, on the other hand, was much more focused on rapid growth, and therefore substantially relaxed 
the condition of being a farmer to obtain membership. In addition, the more neutral protestant-neutral central 
bank did not feel anything for compulsory membership in the Farmer Union (Year Report catholic  Central: 
Centrale Boeren Leenbank, 1901, Bijlage XI: 20-21). 
219 What is most telling about the years of pillarisation is the sequence in which structural changes in politics, civil 
society and markets came about. For instance, it is not the introduction of proportional representation in the Dutch 
system of politics which gave birth to a multi-party system, but rather the opposite: proportional representation 
was adopted to give a fair place to new political, civic and economic elite-follower alignments (Daalder, 1975). In 
other words, it was neither through the formal political system nor through civil society that the reality of 
pillarisation was created. Similarly, it was not a market necessity in terms of instrumental rationalities of costs 
and prices that caused the formation of pillarized economic networks. Rather, it was the way elites transformed 
popular opinion beyond existing political, civic and economic rationalities, which caused changes in the relation 
between civil society, politics and markets. In turn, this ultimately impacted on what constituted sound economic 
growth in the nation-state of the Netherlands.   
220 Dutch Catholics, on the other hand, preferred to emphasise the catholic character of Low Countries during 
their own Golden Centuries – the 15th and the 16th centuries (Raedts, 1992; see also Bornewasser, 1989).  
221 The Reformed church (1787) split in 1834 (schism of reform-minded), in 1886 (Doleantie) and 1944 
(Gereformeerden GPV). Catholics did not experience schisms; in 1870 the pope was declared infallible; the 
antagonism of modernism/liberalism formed a further rallying cry. 
222 Paradoxically, because they were isolated by the other elites, the socialists were compelled to expand within 
the confines of their own ―pillar‖, which resulted in a quite elaborate network of institutions.   
223 The existence of a fourth pillar therefore remains contested at best (Lijphart, 1982), virtual at worst. 
224 ―Vereniging Vrije Ruilverkeer‖ 
225 This important pressure group was instrumental in blocking a parliamentary motion for tariff reforms by the 
catholic Dobbel in 1894. Subsequently, the Anti-Tariffs Committee was founded in 1911 by trade elites to block a 
bill for tariff reform introduced in parliament by the Catholic minister Kolkman. In 1913, the question « free trade 
or protectionism » even became a main issue in the elections, which were won by the free trade supporters (De 
Boo, 1989: 31; De Vries, 1974: 275). 
226 The Amsterdam Stock Exchange in particular became a very important market for foreign currencies. 
Especially German banks had contributed to this development. Most notably, the Deutsche Bank established an 
important affiliate bank in Amsterdam after WWI. The Dresdener Bank and Commerz-en Privat-Bank, for their 
part, were well represented on the Amsterdam stock exchange. After the restoration of the golden standard – 
Germany in 1924, England and the Netherlands in 1925, France in 1928, though, the market exchange of foreign 
currencies waned to some extent (Dillen, 1964: 524-525).   
227 Before WWII, the Dutch interest in Indonesia – both economic and political – was sizeable. While officially 
the economic contribution of the colonies amounted to some 13.7 per cent of the national income by the 1930s, 
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the real effect of the Indonesian presence was much bigger. Apart from boosting industrial export, the Dutch 
Indies were of immense importance for the financial establishment in Amsterdam. It led to the trebling of the 
nominal capital value of all companies quoted on the Amsterdam stock exchange from 837,000,000 guilder in 
1913 to 2,323,000,000 in 1939. 
228 When during WWI a political truce was established between the different pillars, socialist leaders seized the 
opportunity to occupy positions in city councils. The result of the first elections under the proportional 
representation system was disappointing for the socialists : the SDAP obtained only 22% of the votes. This meant 
that the SDAP could be excluded from the cabinet formation of 1918. Nevertheless, with the moral examples of 
the Russian revolution in 1917 and the German uprising of workers and soldiers in 1918, the mood amongst 
Dutch workers and soldiers was revolutionary (Van Dongen, 1992). Encouraged by the first hasty signs of liberal 
capitulation, Troelstra, the chairman of the SDAP, in november 1918 therefore declared in the Lower Chamber 
that the revolution would not halt at the frontiers of the Netherlands and that the socialists were ready to take over 
power in the country. But Troelstra was wrong : the incumbent government did not resign. To a large extent, this 
was due to the lack of support that Troelstra enjoyed within the top of his own party. This top in 1918 already was 
co-opted by the existing political system, meaning that it did was not ready to risk its painfully acquired rights. 
This was especially remarkable since the social-democratic doctrine until the 1930‘s entailed a radical reform of 
society. After Troelstra‘s declaration, everyone who was not socialist joined around the queen in a massive anti-
socialist demonstration on november the 18th of 1918. Despite the fact that Troelstra remained the leader of the 
SDAP until 1925, he afterwards never was able to restore his authority in the lower chamber. In fact, during the 
whole interbellum period the socialists were sidelined to an unwished-for ghetto-position. While the social-
democrats still managed to occupy several positions in city councils, they were systematically shunted at the 
national level. As a result of their permanent minority position, the social-democrats were forced to choose the 
path of isolation and organize a separate ―red‖ pillar (Daalder, 1990 : 208).    
229 With the introduction of the general suffrage for men in 1917 and for women in 1919, every citizen in any 
district in the Netherlands could now participate in the election of the Lower House. This constitutional 
amendment entailed the abolition of an electoral system based on districts and customary privileges, in favour of 
a recognition of the fact that the Netherlands was a country of minorities, politically divided by ideological 
convictions. Though the general suffrage had important implications for all political parties like the protestant-
christian Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) and the Social-Democratic Labour Party (SDAP) of the socialists, it 
had even more for the catholics. Before 1917, catholics had not experienced any electoral competition in the 
southern districts, while election of catholic candidates in ideologically mixed districts was virtually excluded 
(Daalder, 1990 : 203). As a consequence, the catholics had not bothered to invest much energy in the formation of 
a national political party before this date. After a lot of internal disputes, this eventually happened in 1926 with 
the foundation of the RKS (Roman-Catholic State Party).   Most fragmented were the liberals, who had not 
realized the necessity of party formation in the nineteenth century, at the peak of their power, and now were 
divided in three groupings and several one-man parties. By establishing the Union of Freedom in 1921, a fusion 
of several of these groupings was attempted. Nevertheless, a dividing line between liberals and liberal democrats 
durably persisted. The period after 1918 witnessed the massive development of societal institutions based on 
these different ideological convictions.  
After 1917, christians and catholics together had a majority in Dutch Parliament for more than half a century. 
Within this confessional coalition, the anti-revolutionaries of the christians explicitly were the dominating faction. 
Though the catholics most often had the majority of the votes, they were doomed to follow rather than lead any 
coalition for several reasons. First, a latent anti-catholicism united the other parties. Second, catholics were 
almost always unanimous about catholic issues, but often disagreed about non-catholic issues, which made their 
political voice more negative than positive when it came to these last issues (Daalder, 1990 : 206). In fact, 
contrary to the self-confident christians, catholics increasingly joined the confessional coalition in a spirit of 
resignation and isolation. Therefore the protestant slogan of the Dutch as ―Gods own people‖ dominated the 
formation of Dutch identity more than any catholic slogan.     
230 In addition, in Appendixes D and E I visualise the growth over time of these organisations in terms of 
respectively total assets and share in the savings market. Finally, for an overview of the evolution of the 
combined Co-operative Centrals‘ share of the Dutch mortgage market, I refer to Appendix R, Table 3. 
231 Growth since 1910, given that in 1901 Co-operative Banks had barely started, in contrast with the comparator 
firms.  
232 Another part of the explanation is historical precedent. Before the arrival of commercial banks in the 1860s, an 
extensive network of cashiers existed in the Netherlands. These, however, had always refused to pay for deposits. 
What is more, Dutch savers‘ distrust of financial institutions was substantial at this time. The sovereign bond 
defaults of the late eighteenth century and the parlous state of government finances in the early nineteenth century 
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(with government debt hovering around a staggering 400% of national income) meant that even the paper money 
circulated by the Dutch Bank (set up in 1814 at the behest of King William I, an energetic supporter of initiatives 
to revive the Dutch economy) was long considered an unsafe substitute for specie. Private banking institutions 
were considered even more dubious; a view confirmed when the first wave of new banking ventures of the 1860s 
was followed by a spate of banking failures in the long recessionary period starting in 1870. 
233 In doing this, the banks piggybacked on the revival of colonial commerce, and the industrialisation process in 
foreign countries. In other words, Dutch economic revival was not the result of commercial banks taking the lead 
in the industrialisation process. Dutch commercial banks merely adapted to the circumstances (Klein, 1973: 142). 
234 There were civic and economic reasons for this. Civically, Dutch bankers and their customers formed part of a 
relatively cosmopolitan, Amsterdam-based establishment, which did not want to be associated with the lower 
ranks. Economically, providing retail services to urban workers was not imaginable, because of the lack of capital 
owned by these workers. The lack of economic interest in farmers, on the other hand, had two main reasons. On 
the one hand, the credit terms needed in agriculture were longer than the ones applicable in trade and industry – 
market sectors which had shorter production cycles than the seasonally bound agricultural activities. On the other 
hand, credit had to be really cheap to be affordable for farmers, since profit margins in agriculture were not the 
same as the ones trade and industry were used to. Consequently, financing farmers would have meant spreading 
credit over many small farming activities, which at the end of the nineteenth century did not offer many 
guarantees of success. This would have resulted in rising administration costs and very low profits for banks. 
While economically the disinterest for farmers and workers was understandable, the disinterest for the lower 
middle classes in historical perspective can only be explained as a missed strategic opportunity. 
235 On the eve of World War I, the amount outstanding on prolongations at any point in time was around 400 
million guilders, more than double the known deposits of all the commercial banks taken together.  As a result, 
when during the 1860s some commercial banks started offering interests on deposits, they met with little demand. 
236 The prolongation market initially did not play much of a direct role in the financing of industry. The bulk of 
the official list seems to have been made up of foreign state loans, American railway stocks, American industrial 
shares and colonial securities. 
237 The focus on international activity and the lack of interest in domestic services was not the result of the 
historical monopoly of a domestic Central Bank, like the Bank of England, incorporated in London in 1694. In 
the Dutch Republic, there did exist something of an equivalent of the Bank of England: the Bank of Amsterdam. 
While this bank from as early as 1610 had performed important deposit, transfer, clearing, exchange and 
purchasing functions, with the defeat against the English in 1784, and the resulting bankruptcy of the East India 
Company, the Bank of Amsterdam rapidly declined. From then onwards,  merchants grew increasingly 
accustomed to paying their bills outside the Bank in current money (Van Dillen, 1934: 115-116).  
238 Not only were savings banks the first financial organisations to introduce the concept of saving in the 
Netherlands – before their emergence, depositing money for a periodical interest at a special-purpose organisation 
was an unknown phenomenon in the Netherlands. What did exist were exchange offices and bankers that took 
charge of deposits, without paying out interests.   
239 "Banken van Lening" 
240 ―Direkteuren der Spaarbank te Leeuwarden, aan hunne minvermogende medeburgers. Aanmoediging tot 
Deelneming‖, 25 August 1818 In De Spaarbank te Leeuwarden gedurende haar 100-jarig bestaan 1818-
22september-1918, Leeuwarden (bijlage I). According to these directors, habits of going to the pawnbroker‘s 
shop had a pernicious effect, because one received back mortgaged goods only with great losses. The Savings 
bank, on the other hand, held in custody one‘s savings safely and advantageously. 
241 The purpose of all Savings banks officially was to, on the one hand, provide ―temporary advantage‖ through 
the prevention of poverty, and, on the other hand, improve the ―moral well-being‖ of lower-income groups. 
242 Table based on Bulder, 1998:  698; Weststrate and Visser, 1948; CBS Statistiek der spaar- en leenbanken voor 
het jaar 1910-1911, ‗sGravenhage 1913. 
243 Co-operative banks explicitly contrasted their purpose with the one of commercial banks. For instance, in 1912 
a member of the Board of Directors of the protestant-neutral central bank argued that ―comparing co-operative 
with commercial banking is impossible on a great many accounts.  Our purpose is not to make profits, but to 
provide farmers with easy and cheap credits.‖  The Directors of the catholic central bank even went beyond this 
purpose, by adding to it the ―moral elevation‖ of farmers.   
244 Catholic priests organised a veritable witch-hunt against any sign of ―modernism‖; any sign of tolerance 
amongst the Catholic population was branded ―dissent‖ and could lead to ―excommunication‖. 
245 To accommodate the ideological differences between local banks in Friesland, Groningen and Drente, the Co-
operative Central Raiffeisen Bank had to position itself as a neutral enterprise (Van Campen et al., 1940: 58), 
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though in practice Reformed Protestants and secularized, ―great-christian‖ Protestants constituted most of the 
members. 
246 The Catholic bank played a pivotal role in the agricultural network of catholic purchasing co-operatives, 
farmer unions, consumer co-operatives and collective insurance and retirement institutions. The protestant-neutral 
bank‘s network was not as densely organised. Links with the protestant farmer union, clergy and schools were 
weaker. Also, the latter central bank did not invest a significant portion of its assets in protestant collective 
insurance and retirement institutions like its catholic counterparts, but rather kept it for payments to its members. 
Finally, the local banks affiliated to the protestant-neutral central bank were less ideologically uniform and more 
prone to safeguard their own independent course vis a vis the central bank. 
247 In particular, they reinvented the following Geus cries  - in the original, old-Dutch language:  
―Helpt nu u self, soo helpt u Godt, 
Uyt der tyrannen bandt en slot, 
Benaude Nederlanden! 
Ghij draecht den bast al om u strot, 
Rept flucks U vrome handen!‖ 
(Van Balen, 1938: 13). 
248 The ratio own resources/total resources amounted to 6.4 for the former and 4.7 for the latter bank in 1930 
Barou, 1932: 211. The local banks affiliated to the catholic Central, while only having 1,128 members for 33 
local banks in 1899, already had 66,470 members for 537 local banks in 1925 (Van Campen et al.: 375). The 
saving deposits at the catholic local banks grew from 199,000 guilder in 1899 to 108,467,000 guilder in 1925 
(Van Campen et al., 1948: 555). The local banks affiliated to the protestant-neutral Central, on the other hand, 
while having 4,605 members in 1903 for 77 local banks (13 in 1899) already had 124, 282 for 710 local banks in 
1925 (Weststrate and Visser, 1948: 351). The saving deposits at the protestant-neutral local banks went from 
90,000 in 1899 to 240,853,000 guilder in 1925. A last figure is illuminating with regards to the percentage of 
farmers mobilized as members of each Central. The first population statistics per denomination in the Netherlands 
were gathered in 1930. The statistics of 1930 show that, while there were 529,708 men involved in agricultural 
enterprises in 1930, about 200,000 of them were Catholics, about 300,000 reformed protestant, and the rest was 
either atheist, jewish, etc... At that moment, the co-operative banks affiliated to the catholic central bank in total 
had 73,954 members (37 percent), while those affiliated at the protestant-neutral central bankcounted 154,432 
members (47 percent). Yet, taking into account that the protestant-neutral central bankalso accepted non-
Protestants as members – in contrast with the catholic  Central – and that about a third of the Catholics lived in 
the provinces covered by the protestant-neutral Central, these figures have to be qualified. 
249 From 46 at the end of 1899, the number of local co-operative banks rose to 875 in 1913, 1000 in 1917 and 
1247 in 1925 (De Vries et al., 1999: 176). 
250 The co-operative banks owed their comparative success to different factors. First, the combined informal 
authority of local notables and clergy meant that an overwhelming amount of catholic and protestant farmers 
became members of co-operative banks. Second, the affinity of co-operative bank administrators with local 
farmers was an invaluable help in monitoring the creditworthiness of members. With regards to the catholic 
central bank, the conditions of unlimited liability and membership in a local Farmer Union, were additional 
guarantees to the prudent conduct of members and administrators. Third, to avoid corruption of the mutual 
interest, administrators of local banks – affiliated either to the catholic or protestant-neutral central bank – did not 
receive any salary. This substantially reduced the co-operative banks‘ administrative costs.   
251 This afterwards resulted in emissions of these stocks to private investors.   
252 See Appendix S, Table S.3 for information on interlocking directorates at the turn of the twentieth century. 
253 Indeed, the increasing investment by commercial banks in colonial endeavours from WWI onwards to some 
extent brought economic stability in the colonies and closer links with the Netherlands. 
254 Not only was the involvement of the Dutch Bank in the Dutch Trading Company striking.  Of all commercial 
banks that were not active in the Dutch Indies with a branch network, the Amsterdamsche Bank was most 
involved. Five of the eight directors of the Amsterdamsche Bank in the interwar period held commissioner offices 
in Indonesian companies . F.S. Van  Nierop, director of the Amsterdamsche Bank from 1872 to 1920 and liberal 
senator, was chairman of the board of several affiliated companies in the Dutch Indies, both in the ―steam tram‖ 
and sugar industries. Other bankers that formed the core elite in the Dutch Indies came from the Rotterdamsche 
Bank(vereeniging), the Twentsche Bank and some private banks such as H. Oyens & Zn and Labouchere, Oyens 
& Co‘s Bank (Taselaar, 1998: 66-67). The directors of the colonial and Dutch banks occupied a central position 
in the network of Indonesian entrepreneurs. Four clusters of banks of Dutch origin could be distinguished in the 
Dutch-Indies organised around the Dutch Trade Company – ―Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij‖, the Dutch-
Indian Trade Bank – ―Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank‖, the Dutch Bank – ―Nederlandsche Bank‖, and the 
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Amsterdamsche Bank. The Dutch-Indian Trade Bank and the Dutch Bank cooperated closely (Taselaar, 1998: 
67). 
255 Urban workers were reticent to make deposits at the Savings banks for two main reasons.  First, the 
paternalism of the local Societies for Public Welfare in terms of limited withdrawability rules and the rejection of 
the growing consumerism in city-life, made that many working people were not willing nor able to make 
deposits. Second, the Society lacked sound judgement about the reasons for poverty. Poverty a fortiori was not a 
sign of moral decay; historical data show that low wages, and the shortage and irregularity of employment caused 
poverty amongst workers during the 1840‘s (Dankers et al., 2001: 84). Yet, the liberals insisted that poverty and 
the lack of saving habits were the cause of the moral decay of the working population (e.g. Kemper, 1851: 165).  
By emphasizing bourgeois values of self-help and self-suffiency at the detriment of practical economic measures, 
the liberal reformers of the Society failed to mobilize many workers, especially in light of the growing 
competition of  more economically realistic players in the savings business, namely the State Postal Savings 
banks from 1881 onwards, and the co-operative banks from the turn of the century. 
256 Already in 1818 did the Board of the Harlem department notice that ―it mostly are those who live in relative 
wealth, rather than working people, that use the savings bank‖ (Pruissen, 1934: 176).  In 1830, about 0,8 percent 
of the Dutch deposited money into Savings banks. More importantly, in view of the high average balance per 
depositor (172 guilder), it is clear that only very few of the indigent deposited money into Savings banks; the first 
saving revolution had failed by default of both the low standard of living in the Netherlands and the lack of 
pragmatism characteristic of Savings banks‘ customer services. 
257 Due to the efforts of the local Societies for Public Welfare, from 1870 to 1880 the percentage of the Dutch 
population that deposited savings grew from 2.5 to 5.5 percentage. With the advent of the State Postal Savings 
Bank, however, this percentage multiplied rapidly. 
258 As shown in Appendix R, the co-operative banks had a much better cost structure than the commercial banks 
in the first sixty years of their existence, despite the fact that the number of Co-operative branch offices grew 
exponentially compared to that of the commercial banks. Only the State Post Savings bank, which could rely on a 
pre-existing network of postal branches, had a comparably advantageous cost structure. Also, the Co-operatives 
charged lower interest rates on credits and mortgages than their commercial counterparts. Of course, the fact that 
fewer credits were granted and then only under conditions of strict social control, meant that the Co-operatives‘ 
debtor risk was considerably mitigated compared to that of the commercial banks. In addition, the embeddedness 
of local banks‘ structure in pre-existing local networks lessened the need to invest in the banks‘ visiblity – either 
through publicity stunts or by investing in aesthetically distinctive branch outlets. Finally, while the co-operative 
banks for a long time were banned from using the Dutch Bank‘s cheap lending facilities, they made intense use of 
the Amsterdam prolongation market set up in 1860 under supervision of the Dutch Bank to compensate for this. 
In terms of total assets, the co-operative banks by 1917 were quickly catching up with the Savings banks. On the 
other hand, the commercial banks‘ international customer base and their involvement in industry after 1910 meant 
that their total assets increased exponentially compared to their not-for-profit counterparts (see Appendix D). 
259 This directly delegitimizes the myth spread by contemporary Co-operators that co-operative banks‘ credit 
services were indispensable in improving the economic condition of farmers.  
260 How did the Dutch co-operative banks perform in comparison with their European counterparts?  In Germany, 
there was, on the one hand, the Agricultural Central Loan Bank, founded by Raiffeissen in 1876, which served as 
a central banking institution for the rural credit societies of the Raiffeisen Federation in Germany. Contrary to the 
Dutch co-operative banks, the inflation period of the 1920s was very difficult for the Bank. When in 1925 it 
became clear that the assets of the institution had been misused by a part of the central administration, the whole 
capital, amounting to 25,000,000 marks was lost. In 1931 the Bank was in a process of liquidation (Barou, 1932: 
215). On the other hand, there was another co-operative bank, the Prussian Central co-operative bank, which had 
been founded in 1895 by the Prussian State to promote co-operative credit for the middle classes in town and 
country, had a total turnover of 775,833,451 marks in 1930 (some 460,146,820 guilder). The Bank by that time 
had become a central institution for the co-operative movement of the whole of Germany.  While in 1919 the total 
assets owned by the Eindhoven (71,916,000 guilder) and Utrecht (55,957,000 guilder) amounted to 127,873,000 
guilder, total assets of the Eindhoven (93,386,000) and Utrecht (103,456,000) central banks in 1930 already 
amounted to 196,842,000 guilder. Taking into account that the Netherlands had a population that was almost ten 
times smaller, and that the Dresdner Bank also targeted non-agricultural people for membership, these figures are 
impressive. In England, for its part, no agricultural co-operative banks were established. 
261 In the Netherlands, the agricultural Co-operatives boosted a social modernisation process which brought 
agriculture even in the most remote areas into contact with the international market, among other things through 
the implementation of the newest techniques and education facilities. So, where by 1899 there were some 924 
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agricultural Co-operatives registered, 416 of them for darying, by 1913 there were no fewer than 1,177 
agricultural purchasing associations, with more than 104,000 members (Wintle, 2000: 177). 
262 Despite the depreciation of the currency and the expansion of the number of members, the funds lent out by 
co-operative banks only increased modestly, from almost 15 million guilder in 1913 to about 21 millions at the 
end of the war. The number of loan records remained stationary, while the average debt ratio per record only 
increased from 693 guilder in 1913 to 880 guilder in 1918 . During WWI it became even clearer that co-operative 
banks were more savings than credit banks. 
263 As elaborated above, there were little civic or economic incentives to raise the interest of commercial banks 
for farmers, the working classes or even the lower middle classes. Politically, no pressure was being exerted on 
commercial banks either in this regard. Instead, the government sponsored the foundation of Savings banks and 
encouraged the establishment of co-operative banks to provide services for the first two target groups.  
264 The different laws were: the Wet of de bedrijfs en andere inkomsten (1893), the Wet op de Inkomstenbelasting 
(1914), and the Wet op de Dividend- en Tantiemebelasting (1917) (cf. Sonnenschein, 1959: 143-147). 
265 In addition, the co-operative banks set a minimum deposit of 1 guilder, a maximum amount which could bear 
interest of 5000 guilder. 
266 The less pivotal role of the protestant-neutral central bank as compared to the catholic central bank in the 
pillarisation movement revealed itself in terms of the comparatively greater civic legitimacy of the Eindhoven 
leaders – in the co-operative agricultural movement of the catholic Dutch provinces (cf. Sluyterman et al., 1998: 
41). 
267 The economic relevance of the Dutch Indies had shifted from trade to financial relations since about 1900. 
While ready access to the Dutch capital market arguably was to the benefit of some economic development in 
Indonesia, this happened at a severe price: a shift in company ownership and a continuous transfer of dividend 
and interest payments to the Netherlands (Van der Eng, 1998). 
268 Not only was the involvement of the Dutch Bank in the colonial Trading Company striking.  Of all commercial 
banks that were not active in the Dutch Indies with a branch network, the Amsterdamsche Bank was most 
involved. Five of the eight directors of the Amsterdamsche Bank in the interwar period held commissioner offices 
in Indonesian companies . F.S. Van  Nierop, director of the Amsterdamsche Bank from 1872 to 1920 and liberal 
senator, was chairman of the board of several affiliated companies in the Dutch Indies, both in the ―steam tram‖ 
and sugar industries. Other bankers that formed the core elite in the Dutch Indies came from the Rotterdamsche 
Bank(vereeniging), the Twentsche Bank and some private banks such as H. Oyens & Zn and Labouchere, Oyens 
& Co‘s Bank (Taselaar, 1998: 66-67). The directors of the colonial and Dutch banks occupied a central position 
in the network of Indonesian entrepreneurs. Four clusters of banks of Dutch origin could be distinguished in the 
Dutch-Indies organised around the Dutch Trade Company – ―Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij‖, the Dutch-
Indian Trade Bank – ―Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank‖, the Dutch Bank – ―Nederlandsche Bank‖, and the 
Amsterdamsche Bank. The Dutch-Indian Trade Bank and the Dutch Bank cooperated closely (Taselaar, 1998: 
67). 
269 The State Postal Savings Bank was established by the Social Liberals Kerdijk and Sasses. 
270 Cf. Archives Rabobank Nederland, 1914 
271 Some 80 per cent of these directors lived in Holland - about fifty percent in Amsterdam, 20 percent in 
Rotterdam and 9 percent in Den Haag. 
272 As in England, representatives of old private banking firms occupied almost half of the interlocking 
directorates – 389 positions in Dutch limited liability companies in 1911. Notable examples of these private 
banking firms were the Amsterdam-based Wertheim & Gompertz and H. Oyens & Zoon and the Rotterdam-based 
Jan Havelaar & Zoon and R. Mees & Zoonen (Schijf, 1993: 68; cf. Eisfeld, 1916). 
273 Compared to their 35 % share of the population, Catholics were very underrepresented with their 5 percent. 
274 The percentage decreased from about 14 percent in 1901, to 6 percent in 1919 and 2 percent in 1930 (Buning, 
1957: 283-291). 
275 General Assembly Savings Union (Spaarbankbond), 1917: 20.  
276 Co-operative banking from the beginning enjoyed a rather favourable scientific press coverage. So, Westerman 
in 1923 argued that at the beginning of the century few would have predicted that the co-operative banks would 
be so successful. On the other hand, Van Hengel, director of a commercial bank in Amsterdam, despite the steady 
growth of co-operative banking, in 1929 expressed great concern about their policies (Van der Valk, 1939: 478). 
He posited that co-operative banks up to then had profited from favourable agricultural market conditions, which 
had protected them from large losses. As such, Van Hengel claimed, the fundamentally flawed practice of paying 
overly high rents and demanding low rents, remained hidden. Surely, a longer period of agricultural depression 
would lead to the same disillusions that commercial banks had experienced during the 1920‘s (cf. De Vries, 1973: 
15). 
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277 Het ―plan voor de oprichting van een hypotheekbank?‖ van de ―eigenlijke grondlegger van het Nederlandse 
hypotheekbankwezen...Mr. Ph. J. Bachiene‖ in 1840 werd ―via het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken en de 
Gouverneur van Zuid-Holland‖ volledig afgekraakt door ―de Kamer van Koophandel te Rotterdam....Het werd 
noch nodig – omdat iedereen te allen tijde een hypothecaire geldschieter kon vinden – noch nuttig geoordeeld – 
want de bevordering van de landbouw en nijverheid bestaat niet in het gemakkelijk maken voor een ieder om land 
te kopen of zaken te doen. De Kamer vond het plan zelfs gevaarlijk; hypothecaire leningen moesten slechts 
verschaft worden indien dat niet anders kon en zeker niet aangemoedigd worden. Onbelaste goederen waren 
immers een werkelijke rijkdom van het land― (Janssens, 1992: 22-24). 
278 The pre World War Two housing policy in the Netherland was based on private investment with legislation 
authorizing the construction of social housing, dating back to 1901, being ‗used only as a stopgap ‗ (Van Weesep 
and Van Kempen, 1993: 185) 
279 To keep the management of housing out of politics, municipal developments…are turned over to semi-official 
societies operating quite independently of the city government. Housing societies in Holland are almost 
invariably founded and administered by the tenants or would-be tenants themsevels. Groups usually center around 
some common interest, either religious, political…(Bauer, 1935: 285). 
280 This Associated was presided by directors of large companies such as Unilever. 
281 A clear victory came with the 1913 elections, when the question « free trade or protectionism» first emerged as 
an important political issue. These elections were decisively won by the free trade supporters – the majority of the 
Catholic minister Kolkman was defeated (De Boo, 1989: 31; De Vries, 1974: 275). 
282 The catholic Savings banks, for instance, only joined in 1925.   
283 Contrary to the situation in England, the enclosure movements in the Netherlands had been weak.  ―Organic‖ 
traditions of small family entities still prevailed in much of the country, especially in the provinces of Brabant and 
Limburg 
284 In the river-clay districts and in Limburg horticultural exports expanded vigorously; in the Betuwe the 
conservation industry, which was strongly orientated to exports, greatly helped the expansion. The export of 
market-garden products was above all of importance around Venlo, whereas in the north many vegetables were 
shipped to England by way of Haarlingen...Zeeland and north-west Brabant, where formerly the economy had 
been determined by madder, was now  a region where sugar-beet covered most of the surface. In the course of the 
nineteenth century - if we may thus summarize the development of the agricultural sector -  a certain 
intensification in the regional division of labour had taken place, which was related to a further specialisation in 
the various agricultural areas. This implies among other things that in the so-called Outer Provinces, agriculture, 
like industry, and sometimes hand in hand with industry, became an important basic factor, in the sense of 
creating and spreading income and employment. Hence these areas provided a good sales-potential for the 
business of Holland. They indeed performed the part of 'draught horse' with regard to the wealth of the nation as a 
whole. Agriculture itself owed its increase of wealth not only to more specialisation and enlarged production, but 
also to its improved selling outlets. The economic position of the isolated farmer had once been weak, because he 
did not know the market value of his produce and because, moreover, among other difficulties he was not often 
free to sell to the highest bidder, for he was in debt to the shopkeeper who was also his chief customer. By 
forming associations for the auction of produce like butter, eggs and vegetables, the farmers managed to change 
themarket-structure to their advantage and to obtain better prices (De Jonge, 1971: 37). 
285 Farmers had to change the way they conducted their business: agriculture had to become more intensive. The 
soils had to be improved and fertilised, and investments had to be made in a bigger livestock (Campen et al, 1948: 
150). 
286 Small farmers profited most from the innovation of the co-operative organisational form. This new 
organisational form helped them get rid of the dependence on local monopolists and the diseconomies of small-
scale production of butter and the marketing of inputs. As such, the innovations after 1880 strengthened the 
position of small farmers, so as to lead to a decline in the proportion of wage workers in the total agricultural 
labour force and an increase in smallholdings at the expense of large ones (Jonker, 1988). 
287 The first two episodes of especially the Catholic co-operative bank in the Netherlands provide a good 
illustration of this first relational dynamic. Drawing, on the one hand, on the Regent tradition – freedom of 
conscience, cosmopolitan economic autonomy and reaction against established monopolies, and, on the other 
hand, the Orangist tradition – protection of authentic liberties, unity, and a strong central executive – the catholic 
Co-operative central bank successfully mobilized a maximum of catholic participants, while reaching a settlement 
with the other elites. 
288 With the establishment of the system of pillarisation and corporate subsidiarity in the late 1910s and 1920s, 
farmers took for granted membership in confessional Unions and Co-operatives. 
126 
 
                                                                                                                           
289 Before the advent of the Christian Unions in 1896, there was no centrifugal force for the promotion of 
agricultural catholic interests. 
290 According to the regulations of July 4th 1896 the Dutch Farmer Union was a national organisation with 
individual members. Yet, to increase its grasp locally, the Union decided to form provincial unions, with fateful 
consequences.When the Dutch Farmer Union in 1897 effectively launched its agricultural program, it appeared it 
was substantially curtailed in its operations by the already functioning provinical unions. In particular the North-
Brabant Christian Farmer Union (NCB) and the Limburg Christian Farmer Union (LCB) were not intent on 
waiting for national decisions, but started forming their own institutions (70). For instance, shortly after its 
foundation in 1896, the NCB proceeded to institute a « Commission for RaiffeisenKassen ». This Commission 
first of all had to draft statutes for the future co-operative credit banks. Not surprisingly, the foundation of co-
operative banks in North-Brabant originated with the local farmer unions, with the full support of the NCB and its 
spiritual advisor Van den Elsen. These catholic  co-operative banks subsequently founded the catholic  Central on 
december the 24th 1898, with the support of the NCB and the LCB). Formally, the co-operative banks have 
always been independent of the politically engaged farmer unions.  Informally, however, the influence of leaders 
like Van Elsen was fundamental in the local banks. To cope with the provincial urge for independent initiative, 
the Dutch Farmer Union had to change its centralist organisation structure to a federal one. In addition, it had to 
transform its ideology from a general christian to a purely catholic organisation. 
291 Fearing the influence of non-Catholics, the catholic central bank posed an additional membership condition: it 
was also necessary to be a member of a local farmer union. Though the co-operative banks formally have always 
operated independently of the farmer unions, in 1905 a statutory amendment was drawn up which specified that 
the NCB and the LCB (the Christian Unions from the provinces of North-Brabant and the Limburg) would get 
two representatives in the Supervisory Board of the Central Bank. The protestant-neutral Central, on the other 
hand, did not feel anything for compulsory membership in a Farmer Union pertaining to a specific denomination.   
292 More than any other type of bank in the Netherlands, Catholic co-operative banks overtly relied on the 
protection of a special interest organisation: the catholic Farmer Union, established in 1896. Inspired by the 
encyclical Rerum Novarum, the catholic  leader Van der Schueren envisaged a Union that combined economic 
activities with a religious-moral purpose. Van der Schueren immediately announced that the ―Farmer Union‖ 
would actively pursue ―the promotion of purposive improvement of laws and regulations in favour of land 
ownership‖. (Smits, 1996: 32). As such, he pointed to the need of political intervention to improve the condition 
of farmers.  More importantly, he noted that only on the condition that the Farmer Union would be protectionist, 
it would have a right to exist. On the other hand, Van den Elsen, the spiritual advisor of the provincial union in 
North-Brabant, at first was against an active meddling of the farmer union with politics. He presaged it would 
mean the demise of the Union: ―If the Farmer Union itself becomes an electoral union and meddles with politics, 
then politicians will start meddling with the Union…using the Union for political purposes, thus robbing it of its 
working environment and labour force, diverting it of the the righteous path, and importing in the Union the 
discord proper to politics» (―Geen politiek in den Boerenbond‖, in: De Noordbrabanter, May 23th 1897). 
293 On reason they could is that, contrary to their great-Christian counterparts, Catholic co-operative leaders 
convincingly argued that only a sufficient degree of centralisation of their movement would entail an adequate 
response to corrupt cooperative practices such as the « evil of the truck system » practised by some butter 
factories.   
294 Its strategy, which was followed by catholic co-operative banks, can best be summarised by the following 
mottos  « In Unity lies our Strength » and « For farmers and by farmers » (cf. Van Campen et al., 1949: 94). 
295 CCB gedenkboek 1949: 167. 
296 ―The public housing policy of Holland, although it did not really begin until after the Act of 1901, has so far 
been the most effective - both in terms of houses per population, lowness of rental in proportion to wages - of any 
national effort. Relatively more slum-areas have been demolished as well. Moreover, this has been accomplished 
at an outright cost to the Government relatively lower than in most of the other countries… (Bauer, 1935: 282).  
The Act of 1901, first of all, obliged all authorities to set up minimum standards of light, space, ventilation, 
sanitation and occupancy (Bauer, 282-2 83)…finally,, it set up a whole system of public aid for the financing of 
public-utility housing. State loans are provided through the agency of the local authorities…Public-utility 
societies…must be authorized by the Government, must engage only in low-cost housing, and must limit their 
dividens to four per cent (later six per cent). Members are not allowed to buy their houses. A central Housing 
Commission passes on the projects (Bauer, 1935: 283). 
297 For instance, in contrast with their savings and commercial counterparts, no major mortgage banking mergers 
took place in the 1920s. 
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7.   ENGLISH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1815-1930) 
 
7.1      Changing geopolitical opportunity structure (phase 1) 
 
As in the Netherlands, the period post the Napoleonic Wars brought to surface 
several contradictions between geopolitical and domestic dynamics, to do with the 
emergence of two different opportunity structures for nation-building. During the 
Revolutionary Wars (1793-1815), the city of London had decidedly replaced Amsterdam 
as the Western centre for servicing international and inter-continental commerce. When the 
French armies occupied Europe‘s major commercial cities, London‘s primacy became 
overwhelming, especially given the dominance of the Royal navy in the seas around 
Europe and the oceans around the world
298
. A further tipping point was the 1821 
Restoration Act, which reacquainted the Bank with the discipline of the gold standard - by 
imposing full convertibility of banknotes into gold.  The Act was the result of moderate 
Tories winning the argument that a return to the gold standard was all that was needed for 
a system of sound finance to resurface. That is, a system in which the Bank of England 
would always be able to redeem paper money with gold, and would only lend on ―real 
bills‖.299  Real bills were those which represented actual commercial undertakings (like a 
purchase-order for goods on consignment), rather than speculative undertakings with no 
relation to the productivity of the real economy. Since provincial joint-stock banks were 
much better able to embody the real bill principle – and its direct democracy consequences 
– than existing financial intermediaries, the 1821 Act unintentionally opened the door for a 
second Act in 1826, which loosened restrictions on joint-stock banking.
300
  When these 
joint-stock banks started joining up with the London-based clearing system – in which the 
Bank of England played a prominent lender of last resort role, England gradually acquired 
fame as the home of the soundest, most democratic financial system in the world. 
Ultimately, the untinentional consequences of the 1821 Act would greatly amplify 
London‘s international statuture as the home of the ―gold standard‖ (Fetter, 1965; Knafo, 
2006), and heart of the emerging Pax Brittanica. 
a) The decline of London as the guardian of “Anglican nonconformism” 
Remarkably, while London‘s popularity as the heart of the Pax Brittanica soared 
from the 1820s onwards, the centrality of London in English extra-parliamentary politics 
had crumbled in the period 1790 to 1830 (Read, 1964: 50) – to never be fully restored.  
Due to its enormous physical growth, its fragmented administrative and political 
structures, and an intense subdivision of local identities and interests, London could no 
longer play the role of domestic centre of opposition and representative of popular opinion. 
In fact, as the financial and governmental apparatus became ever heavier, wealthier and 
more centred on the city, London gradually became associated with British state interests, 
rather than with independent city-state interests and alternative English, Welsh or Scottish 
identities (Keene, 2004: 477). 
 All in all, London's relative decline as a centre of domestic opposition was a 
―happy accident‖, an opportunity for England to reinvent its traditions in a more successful 
guise. It provided the industrial communities in the outer provinces with the opportunity to 
speak out strongly and unitedly in name of English traditions of liberty and property 
(Read, 1964: 52), as was the case before the end of the sixteenth century. This was 
particularly the case in the emerging towns of Birmingham, Sheffield, Liverpool and 
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Manchester. While the bulk of landlords and Whig financial interests in London associated 
with the tradition of Anglican voluntarism, industrial entrepreneurs in the provincial towns 
invented a new brand of voluntarism based on nonconformist values, belatedly coined 
―voluntaryism‖ - after the libertarian political thought of the aristocrat Auberon Herbert 
(Herbert, 1885, 1894; Hutchinson Harris, 1943; Mack, 1978).
301
  Voluntaryism was a 
subtle mixture of traditional Dissenting ideals and political repupblicanism (Ellens, 1994:  
269); it was ―a version of laissez faire with religion and education at its heart, couched in 
the language of political liberty‖ (Helmstadter, 1979:  149).   
 The interaction between both groups led to some remarkable outcomes: 
provincial origins notwithstanding, it were the new industrialists that showed the less 
qualified free trade tendencies; most notably, they demanded the abolition of London-
centered imperial monopolies such as the East India Company (Read, 1964: 52)
302
.  The 
main unintended consequence of these industrialists‘ efforts was to give the Pax Brittanica 
and ―Britishness‖ a ―quasi democratic‖ status. According to the new liberal elites around 
the Western world, Britain – not so much England, harboured the best available system of 
government, and stood for an unprecedented commitment to sound money and open 
commerce among all nations.  This status helped the British State to define its actions in 
terms of an international ―public good‖ in the period 1815-1914. As a result, it was able to 
unobtrusively co-opt other nations in its pursuit to institute a stable international monetary 
system, allow the unimpeded movements of capital and migrants, and safeguard property 
rights throughout world trade (O‘Brien, 2002:  10, 13-14, 19, 21, 53).   
b) Anomalies in English history of democratic settlements 
In many ways, the period 1815-1870 was an anomaly in English history.  This 
would pose many problems for those firms that experienced their heydays in this period – 
such as consumer co-operatives and freestanding companies; these firms inevitably 
became imprinted with ―successful habits‖ most appropriate to this idiosyncratic period. 
What made these four decades so anomalous?  For the first time in more than three 
centuries, popular opinion in England had not been centred in London, but in the new 
industrial cities. Second, these latter cities were staunchly non-conformist; the relative 
absence of Anglican institutions there meant that industrial entrepreneurs would remain 
more or less out of reach of dynamics of ―secular Anglicanism‖303 and Anglican 
democracy before the 1870s.  This situation was related to historically exceptional 
demographic movements, and would not be repeated in the twentieth century. Third, 
during these four decades British leadership in international affairs was based on a credible 
―cosmopolitan free trade‖ position, not cynical impressions of imperial preference. 
Furthermore, the Liberal Party arguably was the most important political organisation in 
this period, as it was best able to translate the above three dynamics in political leadership.  
Finally, in this period North-American and European nationalisms were still fledgling. 
This would soon change, in particular with the rise of Germany. In face of the rising tide of 
nationalism in the US, Canada, Australia and Europe in the 1880s, British policy became 
confined to preserving as much as possible of the existing free trade regime (Howe, 2002: 
94). Confronted with Bismarckian power politics and its own neglect of English 
nationalism, the British government saw no other recourse than to occupy Egypt in 1882, 
participate in the new imperialism (1882-1902) and fight in the Boer War (1889-1902)
304
. 
All this shed an unfavourable light on the intentions of English cosmopolitanism and on 
the competence of the Liberal Party (O‘Brien, 2002: 10, 13-14, 19, 21, 53).  Soon, the 
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Conservative and Labour Parties would replace the Liberal Party at the heart of 
government. 
The first two exceptional dynamics were also collapsing. Most notably, by the 
1880s popular opinion again came to be concentrated in London and nonconformists was 
losing its radical appeal. How did all these changes impact on English democratic 
settlements? What kinds of settlements would emerge between Anglicans and 
nonconformists, provincial entrepreneurs and the London-centered financial establishment, 
landlords and the working classes
305
 from the 1880s up to 1930? Since I am interested in 
the strategies of financial firms, I in particular shall consider democratic settlements in 
terms of concerns of national debt, savings, share investments, and owernship 
arrangements. These concerns played a major role in English democratisation dynamics. 
For instance, from the end of the eighteenth century through the nineteenth century, public 
creditors of the national debt – most notably the Bank of England – were depicted as 
parasitical dealers and rentiers who lived a life of frivolous luxury at the expense of the 
state, national savings, and the liberties and rights of hard-working tax payers (Daunton, 
2001: 112).
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7.2    First strategic interactions (phase 2) 
 
7.2.1.     Civic organisations and political parties  
        
       i) Liberals 
While the real start of the Liberal Party as a nation-wide organisation started only 
in the 1860s with the ascendancy of Gladstone, the origins of the Party go as far back as 
the end of the eighteenth century
307
. In many ways, the Liberal Party grew out of the 
Whigs, in particular the reform-oriented Whigs such as Fox and Grey – the latter 
eventually carried the First Reform Act in 1832. Naturally, many radical nonconformists 
identified with the Liberal movement. But the Liberal Party would also be a safe-heaven 
for reform-oriented, ―High Church‖ Tories such as Gladstone, and even Irish-catholic 
Tories such as Lord Palmerston.
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 Although many of self-confessed Liberals claimed to 
be enemies of ―old corruption‖, there was only one issue that united all strands of Liberals: 
―free trade‖.  Remarkably, liberals not only reinvented Whig traditions of free trade and 
sound money; they also reinvented Tory traditions of voluntarism and local self-
government.  This duality surfaced most clearly in the Party‘s State model. On the one 
hand, Liberals held that in an emerging democracy Parliament should be dominant over 
local interests – especially when this would do away with Old Corruption at the local level. 
On the other hand, they favoured a policy of Local Acts through which cities could garner 
greater powers when this was seen as expedient for  business or civic stability reasons.    
From 1870 on, Liberal votes came increasingly from urban workers and trade 
unionists; as democracy advanced – the third Parliamentary Reform was passed in 1882, 
most Whigs and leading businessmen left the party.  The appeal of the new Conservatism 
for former Gladstonians had three reasons. First, former dissenters now increasingly 
considered themselves part of the establishment. That is because, by the mid-1880s, 
Gladstonian Liberalism had by and large completed its work of ―reforming‖ England in the 
eyes of those ―radicals‖ that earlier united around the liberal-nonconformist 
democratisation project. In search of new democratisation projects, a new generation of 
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Advanced or New Liberals emerged as champions of the question of Irish land reform and 
the Third Reform Act. The new liberal moral ideal of social justice for all men just 
sounded too subversive and too threatening to property rights for the new establishment of 
landowners and business men (Perkin, 1989:  46).  Second, Conservatives raised the 
―Church in danger‖ cry in 1885 when faced with the liberal Chamberlain‘s309 policy of 
disestablishment; in doing this they won over many middle-class Anglicans from the 
Liberals. By that time, nonconformists‘ main religious and political grievances had been 
addressed.
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 It thus came as no surprise that nonconformist businessmen decided to 
side with Chamberlain on the issue of Irish Home Rule. After all, Catholicism was a bigger 
enemy than Anglicanism. Third, with the industrial sector declining and ―orthodox‖ 
finance setting the tone, the landed aristocracy, City merchants and industrialists 
increasingly formed a conservative block able to buttress a more radical stance towards the 
defense of their property.
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 While provincial manufacturers did not rely on the City for 
investment funds, their fortunes as exporters were becoming more directly dependent on 
the development of the financial service sector in the south-east: foreign investment placed 
through London aided the export performance of staple industries at a time when they were 
under severe competitive strain. Finally, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
Labour Party and the Liberal Party were outbidding each other for the votes of the 
collectivist-minded.  Polarisation ensued, which served the Conservative party well; it now 
was the only party able to assume the central position of defender of liberty and property in 
popular opinion (Soldon, 1974: 233).  
How did the Liberal Party‘s relation with the City of London evolve in the same 
time period? Since 1818 the City's parliamentary allegiance had been almost wholly Whig. 
Yet in the reform crisis itself, there is little evidence that haute finance - as opposed to the 
ranks of City shopkeepers who looked to the liverymen for political leadership - felt any 
enthusiasm for political democracy.(Kynaston, 1994: 96).  In 1831, it became clear that the 
City would be in favour of reform, not because it was desirable, but because the emerging 
mood in the City was that free trade and an enlarged franchise were becoming inevitable - 
and that therefore it was better to adjust to it than to fight it (Kynaston, 1994:  125).  The 
City remained staunchly Whig and later Liberal up to the 1870s, when a major electoral 
shift took place.  In 1874, the City returned three Conservatives and one Liberal
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. Not 
surprisingly, as a result, the Liberal Party increasingly criticised the City for its 
conservative policies.
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 This despite the fact that, by the late nineteenth century, as 
Britain's visible trade deficit widened, the wellbeing of the eocnomy was increasingly 
dependent uopon the 'invisible' earnings provided by the City.
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 It is only after WWI, 
when the Liberals were desperate to regain power, that they returned to their traditional 
economic prescriptions and reasserted that the ‗the bankers of London were the ―very 
linchpin of national financial safety…influenced not in the slightest degree by what is 
know as Party Politics‖. On the contrary, the bankers were now acting ―solely and 
absolutely in the interests, not only of those great institutions which are given into their 
charge, but of the nation itself‖.316 
Before WWI, in the period 1906-1914, the main appeal of the Liberals on the 
working classes and middle classes lay in their position of being reformers that were not 
dangerously in advance of national opinion. Still, it remained a delicate operation. For 
instance, when Lloyd George introduced the Bill that led to the National Insurance Act
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in 1911, he stipulated a compulsory scheme of contributions by employers, workers and 
the state.
318
  Not surprisingly – in light of the working classes‘ ingrained suspicion of State 
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intervention – workers and friendly societies criticised the compulsory nature of the Bill. 
In order to overcome resistance, Lloyd George emphasised that Victorian traditions of 
voluntarism and self-help had been incorporated in the Act, in casu the contributory 
principle and the involvement of friendly societies and insurance companies in the scheme 
(Pugh, 1982).  
Up to 1922, the Conservatives had teamed up with Lloyd George‘s Liberals to 
form a coalition against the rise of Labour. The Conservative aim had been to attract the 
ex-Liberals away from Lib-Lab positions and mobilise the new, unattached voters around 
their national cause. Yet, when the Liberal Coalitionists‘ seats started falling to Labour in 
1919 and 1920 by-elections, the Conservatives came to the conclusion that they should get 
accustomed to the inevitable, namely a Labour Party as the main alternative for 
government. Thus, the alliance with Liberals was not needed anymore. Coupled with the 
rise of a broad conservatism in the 1920s, this definitively set in the demise of the Liberal 
Party‘s currency. 
ii) Conservatives 
As the Liberal Party grew out of the Whigs, so the Conservative Party grew out of 
the Tories. The label Conservative had first been suggested in the 1820s by leading Tories, 
but was only officially adopted under Robert Peel after the 1832 Tory defeat, the Great 
Reform Act. As the leader othe Conservative Party, it had been Peel, and not the Liberal 
descendants of the Whigs, that repealed critical protectionist policies such as the Corn 
Laws, and officially launched the era of free trade. What is more, it were the Tories who 
first introduced a critical fiscal corrollary of political democratisation, namely the income 
tax (Imlah, 1958: 153).
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Still, these issues would create a severe split in the Conservative Party.  Unity was only 
refound when the party – including Lord Derby – discovered that the 1867 franchise had 
not meant the end of the Conservative Party. Conservative members and MPs subsequently 
would find out that Disraeli's « gamble of extending the franchise to the urban masses » 
had been justified in the interests of the party after al, since it would strenghten rather than 
weaken the electoral position of the party not only in the longer term, but even in the very 
short term (Feuchtwagner, 1968: 10).  This master move pre-empted the Liberal cause, 
gave Disraeli‘s  speeches and campaigns about « Tory democracy » in 1872 and 1873 
credibility, and helped the Conservative party win the elections of 1874, something it had 
not done since 1846. Despite slogans of Tory democracy, this does not mean that the 
Conservative Party had now found a solid foundation of popular support. While the party 
enjoyed considerable electoral success in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
this owed as much to divisions within the Liberal party over the question of Irish Home 
Rule. As soon as the Liberal Party had its act together again, at the beginning of the 1890s, 
they  regained power, albeit only for a few years.  
Despite Peel‘s early concessions, a particular problem for the Conservative Party 
was its desire to return to protectionist roots without having the public support for it. Thus, 
the Conservatives, led by Chamberlain
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, proposed a system of tariff reforms, as a way to 
unify the empire, revive British industry and stimulate employment by protecting 
manufacturers from foreign rivals. Holding on to the policy of cheap food through free 
trade, the Liberals opposed Chamberlain‘s tariff reforms. In addition, the continued 
willingness of the Conservatives to ensure public funding of the Church of England, and 
its religious instruction in schools, once again antagonised Nonconformists. With the 
support of Wales, which rose in revolt behind Lloyd George and Nonconformity, and 
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allied to the ―free trade‖ rallying cry (Gildea, 1987: 345-346), the Liberals forged a wedge 
in the Conservative party and finally brought the Conservative government to its knees in 
1905.  
The Liberal Party, which at the end of the nineteenth century had become a mass 
party relying on working-class votes, was quick to react and take over government. Taking 
advantage of the turmoil caused by the Boer War, the rivalry with Germany and the defeat 
of the Conservatives, a new movement within the party put the ―social question‖ decisively 
onto the agenda of domestic politics. According to the « New Liberals » the core English 
concept of «liberty » had been too narrowly defined in terms of legal, political and 
religious liberties: the chief restraint upon liberty for most men was economic or social in 
nature. In other words, the individual‘s material welfare should be of equal concern to the 
state as the individual‘s moral condition (Pugh, 1982: 109). Together with some ―socialist‖ 
fractions like the Fabians
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, these self-confessed ―progressives‖ forged a link between the 
condition of the working classes and the fate of the empire (Cronin, 1988: 217). The 
Conservative strategy here was to ensure ―the organic structure of society‖, by preventing 
social conflict ―thereby safeguarding existing social relations‖, especially those to do with 
property and Empire (Green, 1998: 314–15). Because the Conservatives had pushed for 
more active and interventionist policies, the government‘s resignation gave a license to the 
Liberal Party to implement reforms, including with regards to State finances. To achieve 
the fiscal capacity necessary for implementing their modest vision of social reform and 
paying off the South African War debts, ―new liberal‖ policies were devised including  
progressive taxes, new taxes on land and higher levels of inheritance taxes.  
It is only after WWI that the Conservatives returned to power; by then, it had 
become very hard to reverse the Liberal Party‘s policies.322 Especially, because they were 
compromised by the coalition with the Liberals during WWI. Still, with the support of 
businessmen and large sections of the middle class, the Conservatives from 1922 
advocated a freezing of the taxation base of the State. How did the City react? While the 
City did not explicitly oppose high levels of taxation, it expressed its worries abouth the 
national indebtedness and loss of foreign confidence that an expansion of the taxation base 
could engender. The City echoed the demands of business and of the middle classes for 
―economy‖ and for restricting the scope of state commitments and activities. In addition, 
the City pressed the conservative government to return to the gold standard, not only 
because it would guarantee the continued role of London
323
 in world finance, but also 
because it would provide an automatic check on the profligacy of governments and thus 
would obstruct any unsound schemes for state intervention.  
Fearful of the demagogic tendencies of politicians like Lloyd George, the 
Conservatives agreed to reimpose Treasury control over the budget. In fact, the Treasury 
managed to achieve a degree of control unseen before in England. So, the permanent 
secretary to the Treasury became the official head of the civil service.
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  The Treasury 
even won the right to appoint officers within other departments to supervise financial 
matters. The restoration and expansion of Treasury control in the early 1920s formed part 
of a much broader conservative stabilisation of British politics after the war (Cronin, 1988: 
223-224): a conservative movement expressing the need to minimise the danger of 
overexpansive state commitments by restricting points of access to the government 
apparatus.  
All in all, the Conservatives always seemed to fall back on Disraeli‘s anti-
Gladstonian speeches in 1872, in which he launched the ideas of ―England and Empire‖ 
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and ―Anglican democracy‖.325 Both ideas built on Disraeli‘s 1845 ―One Nation‖ speech, in 
which he called for a reconciliation of the north and south of the country, and a 
Conservative State able to enforce the rule of law, enlist and protect the entire nation, thus 
fostering a sense of national identity and unity (Disraeli, 1845; Gilmour, 1978: 86; Norton 
and Aughey, 1981).  In the 1920s, the Conservatives relaunched these old adages, with two 
aims: to relaunch the Conservative Party as the only ―national party‖ (Blake, 1997: 126-
127, 130), to accuse both Liberals and Labour of effecting the disintegration of the Empire 
of England, and to focus on interests common to the middle and working classes.  
Especially the nationalist element would prove be a great trump card for the Conservative 
Party, most notably in its ability to credibly launch accusations of anti-nationalism towards 
first the Liberals and later Labour. ―Anglican democracy‖ throughout history would prove 
especially successful at profiling the Conservatives as the only party catering to the 
interests of the lower middle classes – such as shopkeepers and small family businesses.  
 iii) Labour 
In many ways, the Labour Party was more a spin-off of Liberal radicalism than a 
descendant of Marxist socialism.  The early emergence of Liberal radicalism and the 
important role of Nonconformist religion in the liberal and subsequently labour 
movements have a lot to do with this. As noted by Hobsbawm (1971: 141), while most 
continental labour movements passed through a stage of bourgeois-revolutionary 
Jacobinism
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 before developing their independent theories, in the English Isles alone was 
bourgeois revolution fought and won before secular ideology had reached the masses of 
the middle classes.
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  In addition, by the 1890s trade union membership stood at only 1.5 
million to 2 million, in a labour force of over 13 million. This was not such a large basis 
for an organised proletarian movement. Further, there is evidence that many English 
workers, though dissatisfied with their lot, were not basically alienated and entertained 
quite positive attitudes towards the political and social system (Pugh, 2002: 73). The 
working classes had enough in common to hold a working-class party together but not 
much else. Since the people it could hope to represent did not necessarily stand in a 
common relationship, or, except in a general way, to each other, the leadership of the 
Labour Party was compelled to attenuate the ideological rigour of its politics almost to 
vapidity (McKibbin, 1984:  40-41).  Two of the prime assumptions of any Marxist party – 
a rejection by much of the working class of existing social institutions and a belief in the 
unity of ―economics‖ and ―politics‖ – simply did not hold. The Labour Party was not free 
to choose between Marxism and reformism but only between varieties of reformism. 
Already in the 1880s working-class political representatives stood in 
parliamentary elections as Liberal-Labour candidates
328
. After the 1885 General Election 
there were eleven of these Liberal-Labour MPs. Some socialists like Keir Hardie, the 
Liberal-Labour MP for West Ham, began to argue that the working class needed their own 
independent political party. This feeling was strong in Manchester and in 1892 Robert 
Blatchford, the editor of the socialist newspaper the Clarion joined with Tom Garrs, and 
Richard Pankhurst to form the Manchester Independent Labour Party. The activities of the 
Manchester group inspired Liberal-Labour MPs to consider establishing a new national 
working class party. Under the leadership of Keir Hardie, the Independent Labour Party 
was formed in 1893. It was decided that the main objective of the party would be "to 
secure the collective ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange".
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Apart from the Fabians (see next section), from the 1880s until WWI, the 
mainspring of the labour movement were the chapel, the trade union, the municipal 
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council, and increasingly defectors from the Liberal Party or so-called Lib-Lab MPs. 
Chapel adherents mostly did not come from the upper-scale Nonconformists – most 
notably the Wesleyan Baptists:  from the 1870s these departed en masse to join the 
Conservatives. This left the labour movement crowded with lower ranked Methodist 
leaders
330
, a labour aristocracy whose status in the eyes of the higher classes was declining 
rapidly (Hobsbawm, 1964a), a self-defeating predilection for free trade in face of the 
lurking rise of joint-stock companies, and a lack of credibility amongst the workers 
themselves.
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  It was not until it appeared that the employers themselves had suceed in 
enrolling the state on their side  - with a series of anti-labour court decisions culminating in 
Taff Vale – that a significant section of the labour movement was convinced to take 
political action by forming the Labour Representation Committee in 1900.
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  Even then, 
the purpose was largely defensive (Cronin, 1988: 212). 
Prior to 1900, the notion that the State could not effectively steer the private 
economy and that there was a rather close limit to the taxable capacity of the nation had 
taken on an almost mythical power. This myth was thoroughly ingrained in the presocialist 
and voluntarist traditions within the labour movement. Despite the fact that WWI shattered 
the myths by visibly increasing the State‘s fiscal and administrative capacity, however, the 
Labour Party and Trade Unions would remain wary of plans to bring about social and 
economic reform through state action – for example, of economic proposals put forward by 
Keynes and the Liberals – throughout the interwar period (Cronin, 1988: 220).  In 
particular,  compulsory national insurance for workers in certain trades had by no means 
been welcomed by most union leaders, whether Liberal or Socialist, who up to 1914 were 
far more concerned to win from employers wages high and secure enough to obviate 
dependence on the state than to ask the state to take over their friendly society functions 
(Runciman, 1993; Thane, 1984). 
All in all, while suffrage reform enormously increased the working-class 
electorate, the Labour Party had great difficulty in developing a style capable of winning 
an electoral majority in the interwar period. Quickly, Labour saw its credibilty undermined 
as a practical alternative to Conservative public minimalism and the dwindling Liberal 
Party.  By default of a practical alternative, the ideological conservatism of crown, 
parliament, and nationality, coupled with a libertarian pattern of industrial relations would 
impede the emergence of a distinctive socialist strand of labour in England comparable 
with its continental counterparts . Still, the eclipse of Liberalism would assure Labour the 
place of main contender against Conservatism. 
Not surprisingly, the ideas on economic policy coming from Edwardian Labour 
were hardly distinctive (Pugh, 1982: 124-125). They shared the Liberal loyalty to ―free 
trade‖, the New Liberal predilection for graduated taxation, and the Fabian dogma of ―land 
nationalisation‖ to finance social reform. Before WWI, the Labour Party never accepted 
state ownership and state operation of industry as a general principle. Even limited forms 
of state control like tariffs were automatically ruled out. Almost totally distinct from 
Fabianism before 1914, the pre-WWI socialism of Labour was not so much economic as 
humanitarian and fraternal, owing its inspiration as much to Christianity as to politics. This 
led some Labour leaders to adopt a relatively pacific, Gladstonian approach to international 
affairs
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. Other influential leaders within the party, however, advocated a lofty, public-
spirited imperialism
334
. While the New Liberals and Fabians were forging a link between 
the working classes and the ―social question‖, Labour leaders did not see their movement 
as essentially working-class or preoccupied with the class struggle. In fact, most labour 
135 
 
leaders regarded the ―rough‖ working classes, and in particular the impoverished slum 
populations as too passive and too dependent to respond to their ―sophisticated‖ appeals. 
Instead, they targeted ―the skilled artisan, the trade unionist, the member of the friendly 
society, the young workman who reads and thinks‖335.  
The First War was a major watershed for the Labour Party: the war had exposed 
previously obscured weaknesses in the British economy and industry. This has led to a 
new, albeit ill-defined emphasis on planning the economy.  Above all, it gave a new 
grounding and new force to the claims for nationalisation entrenched in the new 
constitution. Nationalisation was to be the way both to detach the rentier from his 
monopolistic surplus, but also to make possible the application of science and the 
realisation of economies of scale blocked by private ownership. In sum, Labour's New 
Social Order was to a significant degree a society based on greater efficiency, secured 
largely by municipalisation and nationalisation, but also via regulation of private industry 
(Tomlinson, 1993: 23). 
Up to 1920, the Labour movement was politically weak and dominated by an 
amalgamation of trade unions and other affiliated organisations, on which it depended for 
the provision of funds and electoral support. These unions were shaped by the Radical 
ideas of political egalitarianism and economic individualism. By the 1920s, the working-
class base of the Liberal Party had eroded sufficiently to allow for a shift in the balance of 
power in the movement: the Labour Party gained predominance.  
 iv) Fabians 
The emergence of the Fabians, and the competition for votes with the New 
Liberals triggered many of the above evolutions in the Labour Party. The Fabian Society 
was founded in 1884, at a time when ―socialist‖ ideas enjoyed a revival, largely due to the 
realisation that English industry was losing its former dominance, and the growing 
awareness of the extent of urban poverty.  Sidney Webb and Beatrice Potter were among 
the most prominent Fabian members.  The influence of Sidney Webb in particular, quickly 
led to a view of socialism quite at odds with continental practices, where organised 
socialism was much stronger. In contrast with England, the continental movement had for 
the most part embraced Marxism, with its emphasis on the labour theory of value, capital 
accumulation and its correlative focus on profits. In England, on the other hand, the 
Fabians, drawing on a history dominated by agrarian capitalism, proposed a political 
economy focused on landed property, rent and population growth (Sweezy, 1949: 244-
247). For the Fabians the nationalisation of landed property and rent was the ultimate road 
of « transition to Socialism » (Shaw, 1889: 167).
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 Though this might sound 
revolutionary, this does not mean that the Fabians intended the road to this end-goal to be 
immediate and revolutionary. Much to the contrary, the Fabians‘ radicality was transposed 
in another version of the English doctrine of the emergence of moral force through 
voluntarism and laissez-faire: the Fabians emphasised "the inevitability of gradualism"
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and thought highly of evolutionary reform within the law over a lengthy period of time
339
. 
In addition, the currency of Fabian ideas rose exactly at a time when the English 
aristocracy was shifting its investment strategy to financial assets rather than the property 
of land. 
The influence of Fabianism on the New Liberalism at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was evident (cf. Hobsbawm, 1964c). So, during the Boer War, Sydney 
Webb advised the Liberal Roseberry to refashion his Party into a vehicle of National 
Efficiency
340
, which would clear the slums, abolish the sweated trades, eliminate efficiency 
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in government, restore British commercial supremacy, adopt policies of reform in housing, 
sanitation, poor law, and education, together with a national minimum standard of life.
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 v) Trade Unions 
The first trade unions were set up as friendly societies – often without being 
registered as such due to the Combination Acts.  After the repeal of the Combination Acts 
in 1824-1825, the trade unions went their own way. The trade union movement quickly 
grew from about 100,000 members in 1842 to 1,200,000 in 1874. A major factor in this 
growth is that the movement, after the fiasco of Owen‘s Grand National Consolidated 
Union in 1834, managed to get some sense of unity, first informally through the common 
denominator of non-violent Nonconformity, and then formally through the Trade Union 
Congress of 1869. The extinction of general trade unionism after 1850 had reduced the 
unions two three small groups:  the traditional craft unions, the textile unions and the 
miners‘ unions. These trade unions were largely confined to the so-called labour 
aristocracy
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, for two reasons. Only the high-paid worker could afford the subscriptions as 
high as one shilling per week. Second, only a highly organised trade, able to restrict entry 
to the occupation, could maintain a high rate of wages. Not surprisingly, trade unions‘ total 
membership was small:  probably under 100,000 in 1842, under a million by 1870. In fact, 
they represented less than 15 percent of all industrial wage-earners, earning from 30 to 140 
percent more than unskilled men in the same industry. As testified by a contemporary, they 
were snobbish and exclusive in their attitude towards the common working people:  ―the 
artisan creed with regard to the labourers is that the latter are an inferior class and that they 
should be made to know and kept in their place‖.344 
            Embracing the ideal of ―voluntaryism‖, the trade unions held aloof from general 
unionism and mass politics. This earned them a a freedom of action unique in Europe 
(McKibbin, 1984: 28); especially after Disraeli‘s Conspiracy Act legalised the principle of 
trade union agreements or combinations in 1875. This legislation did not endow the trade 
unions with new rights; rather, it constituted a recognition of the fact that the labour 
aristocracy was a privileged community capable of upholding a ―civilized‖ lifestyle akin to 
the one of the establishment.
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  Not surprisingly, this period coincides with the emergence 
of unionism-transcending leaders such William Newton and William Allan; for these 
leaders unions‘ focus should not only be on their members‘ narrow interests, but also on 
the large ideal of improving the universal human condition.
346
  
By 1918, the English trade unions‘ membership had grown to over four million 
people, with an enormous influx of semi-skilled workers.
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 Yet, since large portions of 
labour were organised along craft lines, the Trades Union Congress remained a loose 
federation without much central control over its members. Still, the sheer numbers 
represented by the unions put them in a position of strength in their negotiations with the 
State about the best means to secure industrial peace during WWI and the interwar period. 
In the process, the British State structurally substituted negotiation with organised labour 
and capital for unilateral action.Yet, the internal weakness of both union and employer 
organisations also meant that the State could not use these associations as vehicles of 
industrial reorganisation, as nations with more corporatist arrangements could. In sum, 
England‘s union – and  employer – associations rendered them more effective as veto 
groups than as positive contributors to an active industrial policy (Hall, 1987: 282). 
With regards to economic policy, trade unionists such as Bevin were amongst the 
few during the interwar period to protest that the domestic consequences of monetary 
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policy came a poor fourth in the Bank of England's eyes – that is behind the defence of 
sterling, adherence to the gold standard and the position of London as an international 
financial centre (Kynaston, 2000: 197-198). 
vi) Co-operative movement 
For a history of the English co-operative movement from Owenite and Chartist to 
Rochdale and Christian Socialist influences, I refer to Appendix A, section 9. By the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the co-operative movement had become a very 
visible phenomenon in the great industrial cities. Even though the Rochdale Co-operators 
were vastly more practical than their predecessor, they had not given up entirely on the 
long-term purpose of creating a self-supporting Co-operative Community – they wouldn‘t 
before the mid twentieth century. A discussion ensued about what roadmap the movement 
should follow. This discussion in the 1850s turned into a struggle between, on the one 
hand, the ―federalists‖ – nonconformist liberal radicals in the northern part of England 
advocating federal wholesaling, and, on the other hand, the ―individualists‖ – Anglican 
Christian Socialists
349
 in the southern part of the country promoting producer co-
operation.
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  The notion ―federalist‖ denoted a preference for a Wholesale department 
that would own and control all productive societies, managing them on a profit-making 
basis and turning all of the benefits over to the retail stores in the form of a dividend. 
―Individualists‖, for their part, were those who sought to bestow on the co-operative 
workshops the same semi-autonomous position as enjoyed by co-operative stores. While 
individualists accused the federalists of totally subordinating production to consumption, 
the federalists in turn argued that the individualists were advocating the multiplication of 
industrial partnerships and individualistic, competing workshops. Further, the 
individualists would deny the consumer his rightful profits by establishing a myriad of 
joint-stock companies.  
The accusations of both camps were misleading.
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  So, one of the most 
prominent individualists, the Christian Socialist Neale, advocated as much the setting up of 
retail stores and a wholesale department as the establishment of a people‘s bank. In 
addition, the ―individualists‖ were strongly in favour of profit-sharing amongst the 
workers. Likewise, many prominent federalists until the 1880s were as much in favour of 
co-operative consumption as co-operative production. What is more, both individualists 
and federalists held the same views on two important points. First, they agreed with Robert 
Owen‘s creed that establishing the Co-operative Commonwealth would not be viable 
through fostering antagonism based on class.
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 Second, they both advocated the view that 
Co-operators in a first instance should adhere to the prices fixed in the open market; when 
the Co-operative movement would have grown big enough, the superiority of Co-operation 
vis a vis Competition would automatically ensue. More implicit differences made that the 
antagonism between both parties grew to exaggerated proportions. The northern co-
operators saw free trade as the embodiment of their independence; they adopted the liberal 
rhetoric of a ―free market‖ and its moral implications for all spheres of life as an antidote 
to landlords‘ authoritarianism and paternalism (Coats, 1972:  133). Closely allied to the 
trade unions, they saw the co-operative movement not so much as a means of 
emancipation of the whole working class, but more as a means to safeguard a ―free 
lifestyle‖ for all those capable of upholding a certain standard of independence and self-
help. The southern co-operators, on the other hand, while increasingly being branded a 
―junta‖ within the movement, had more paternalistic motivations as they targeted the 
emancipation of the whole working class, and especially the worst-off.  They were aloof of 
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the ―egotism― and urge for independence of the trade unions, because the restrictive 
practices of the unions tended to lower the status of the working population as a whole by 
keeping the unskilled from bettering their position (Backstrom, 1974:  42-43). 
Though most of them were not allowed to vote until the 1867 Reform Act and 
beyond, northern Co-operative leaders clearly favoured the radical stream of Liberalism 
and the principle of voluntaryism – a support they were able to make felt locally. The 
Christian Socialist leaders in the south, on the other hand, were more inclined to favour the 
Conservatives and the principles of Anglican democracy and voluntarism. What group 
made most impact in the field of politics, more particularly concerning the legal status of 
Co-operation? The legal troubles of Co-operation were due to the deficient state of the law 
in relation to associations in general, and associations engaged in trading or productive 
ventures in particular. After the victory of the Anti-corn league and the defeat of Chartism, 
a Whig-Liberal-Radical alliance provided almost unbroken parliamentary majorities from 
1846 to 1874 (Hobsbawm, 1964b:  260). This alliance - backed up by Nonconformist 
business entrepreneurs who were trying to remove the obstacles to their participation in 
national life through the Liberal Party (Pugh, 2002:  67) – favoured a form of politics 
which excluded the market as a space of contestation between working-class labour and 
upper-class capital (cf. McKibbin, 1984). Co-operatives did not put this preference for a 
laissez-faire vis a vis the market in danger; their leaders did not see the market as a 
politicised enemy, but as a moral friend of ―voluntaryism‖.  Favouring a laissez-faire style 
vis a vis market organisations, and scared off by the union of engineers‘ attempt to defeat 
employers in a lock-out by embarking on Co-operative production, the Liberal government 
did not make any provisions to get Co-operatives out of their legal limbo. Favouring a 
laissez-faire style, and very much organised on a local basis, Northern Co-operators were 
not asking explicitly for such provisions either.  
Due to Christian Socialist lobbying the new Conservative government in 1852 
placed the first Industrial and Provident Societies Act, specifically designed to meet the 
needs of Co-operatives, on the Statute Book. The Christian Socialists included skilled legal 
draftsmen – Ludlow, Hughes and Neale – and had influential friends in Parliament. Apart 
from the legal competence of the Christian Socialists, why did Conservatives decide to 
support the I & P Act? In fact, in contrast with early Trade Unionism
354
, which suffered 
under both Common and Statute Law from deliberate oppression, the legal disabilities 
early Co-operatives were suffering of were not the result of any coordinated, deliberate 
attempt to hamper their growth. This was even more true from 1852 on, when the 
connection between Co-operation and Trade Unionism officially became less close. 
Conservatives
355
, for their part, feared most the prospect of class conflict in an 
industrializing society. Representing order and stability, authority and the High Church, 
Conservatives were anxious not to be drawn into a competition for votes by appeasement 
of material demands by the Liberal Party – which presented itself as the party of progress 
and reform, of the Low Church and Dissent.  Since Co-operators generally were not 
involved in politics and focused on moral improvement rather than material demands from 
the State, Conservatives did not see Co-operatives as a threat. 
In the 1870s, a Joint Parliamentary Committee was set up to act as a watchdog on 
parliamentary activities. While the Christian Socialists‘ Co-operative Union urged direct 
parliamentary representation, Co-operative societies would not commit funds. The 
advocates of an old version of neutrality in the Co-operative movement were still in the 
ascendant on the eve of WWI (Adams, 1987: 52-54). The national leadership of the Co-
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operative Union was making repeated attempts to drag a largely indifferent and even 
hostile membership into closer alliance with the Labour party and the trade unions.
356
  
Following the dire experiences of WWI, during which Co-operatives suffered 
disproportionately due to their underrepresentation in various governmental distribution 
committees and draft tribunals, a motion in favour of direct national and local 
representation was finally approved in 1917. The Co-operative Part was born.  
Because an independent Co-operative Party was too small to have an impact in 
Parliament, safety in numbers was sought through an alliance with the Labour Party: since 
1927, the Co-operative and Labour parties have an agreement not to compete for votes and 
to put forward a number of Labour Co-operative candidates.  The rise of Labour‘s currency 
amongst co-operators was most helped by political-economic changes in post-WWI 
England.  The old labour aristocracy that was so prevalent in the Co-operative movement, 
began to be cut off not only from the managerial and small-master class with whom it had 
merged, but also from the vastly expanded white-collared ―professionals‖, a new and 
politically Conservative labour aristocracy (Hobsbawm, 1964b: 274-275).  Another 
explanation for the dramatic rise of Labour‘s stock amongst co-operators, is the changed 
experience of co-operative political activity through direct representation in the years 
between 1917 and 1921 (Adams, 1987: 49, 53, 64).  By the early 1920s, the Labour Party, 
Trade Unions and Co-operatives were represented as the three collectivist pillars standing 
together in opposition to an ―unholy alliance of Liberals, Tories, landlords and capitalists, 
united to make common cause against the workers and uphold the system of plunder and 
privilege‖357. Still, when the Co-operative movement turned to the labour movement for 
political support, the ambivalence within labour towards the state meant that neither the 
Labour party nor the Unions were wholeheartedely in favour of the extension of state 
activity wrought by the war and envisioned by many as the basis of reconstruction.
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7.2.2  Economic organisations 
i) Bank of England 
   By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Bank of England was at the 
heart of the English financial system. Even country bankers who were not yet members of 
the Clearing House, or did not deposit their reserves with London agents – private bankers 
and bill brokers, were already developing the habit of keeping those reserves with the 
Bank of England (Thomas, 1934: 19-20).  By 1812 a striking 75 percent of the £33 million 
in capital held by al 732 banks in England was in the Bank of England (Colquhoun, 1815: 
80-81). Still, the Bank also had its share of detractors. So, after the Napoleonic Wars, 
English radicals – such as Thomas Paine, William Cobbett and David Ricardo – claimed 
that, since the Bank of England was a locus of ―old corruption‖, it should be stripped off 
all note-issuing authority.
359
  According to its critics, the Bank of England had damaged 
both its reputation and the prospects of maintaining its exclusive privileges by attempting 
to retain for itself the vast sums which were accruing to it from its functions as banker to 
the State and manager of the National Debt.
360
  While these claims had failed to find 
support among the Tories, the attacks moved to the center of political discourse when the 
Whig party took power in 1830, making reforms of the Bank of England inevitable.  Some 
of the restrictions on the formation of joint-stock companies that had existed from 1708, 
were repealed in 1826. Reason for this sudden enthusiasm for joint-stock companies, in 
particular in the guise of provincial banks, was the Bank of England‘s 1825 liquidity crisis. 
Eager to fend off claims of Old Corruption and  address the problem that credit was too 
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concentrated in the Bank, Lord Liverpool‘s ministry had responded by eliminating the 
Bank‘s ability to issue £1 notes and encouraging the establishment of well-funded joint-
stock banks in the provinces, which he hoped would diffuse the demand for credit in future 
crises (Alborn, 1998: 57). These banks should be funded on the same sound finance 
prescriptions: bankers should only lend on ―real bills‖, i.e. be able to discern which bills 
qualified as ―real‖ by keeping tabs on the regular habits of their customers. 
In a further bid to counter claims of Old Corruption and disentangle political and 
economic vested interests, Peel championed the 1844 Bank Charter Act. While granting 
the Bank of England the national monopoly on the issue of bankotes, the Act restricted the 
Bank‘s liberties of note-issuing to its ability to convert notes in gold – a restriction which 
was regularly eased in times of banking crisis (Marchal and Marchal, 1977). During that 
same year, Peel introduced a Joint-Stock Bank Act. One important unintentional effect of 
the latter Act was to give a new generation of joint-stock bankers – those enamoured with 
principles of objective expertise and administrative efficiency – an excuse to steer away 
from their original direct democracy principles. The Act listed several new conditions that 
in effect precluded the further establishment of new small joint-stock republics operating 
on direct democracy principles: a minimum paid-up capital of £50,000, a minimum share 
price of £100, a ban on the practice of lending on the security of shares, and a requirement 
that banks issue monthly statements of their assets and liabilities (Collins, 1988: 72-3).  By 
default of further ―vulgar competition‖ for customers by new joint-stock banks, established 
joint-stock banks like London & Westminster could publicly side-step direct democracy 
principles and carry forward the growth strategies they were trying to put in practice (cf. 
Alborn, 1998: 114).  In sum, the 1844 Joint-Stock Bank Act was a happy accident for a 
new – or metamorphosed –generation of joint-stock bank leaders eager to get away from 
the volatile mix of local politics and business of the past, and intent on administrative 
efficiency and large-scale growth. The practical vehicle for this shift to administrative 
efficiency was the inland bill of exchange, which by the mid-nineteenth century replaced 
the bank note as the dominant form of currency in England. 
Returning to the case of the Bank of England; in spite of the restrictions imposed 
by Peel‘s 1844 Bank Charter Act, it prospered exceedingly, partly due to the increased 
popularity of bills of exchange rather than bank notes; to the point that, with the 
experiences of severe banking crises in mind – during the 1830s and from 1844 to 1866, an 
important minority in the City effectively lobbied for a bigger political role for the Bank of 
England.  This support allowed the Bank to continue its close relationship with the 
Treasury and successive Ministries, and to function as the de facto controller of the 
Nation‘s paper currency and the regulator of the national credit (Thomas, 1934: 18-19).  In 
sum, in the eys of many, the Bank of England represented that third party, without formal 
allegiance to any branch of government, without which the growth of the financial 
structure and the development of an organised system would have been impossible 
(Powell, 1915). The reconstruction period after the First World War allowed the Bank of 
England to consolidate its independence and centrality in the financial system. In 
international comparisons, the Bank of England was continuously presented as more 
democratic than its continental counterparts: the Bank of England altogether was more 
effective at avoiding the ―prodigal government inflations‖ of continental countries, where 
central banks were subordinated to the Treasury
 361
 On the other hand, central banking 
came into the forefront of economic discussions about post-war reconstruction. Stability 
was the keyword, especially with regards to the cash-ratios of commercial banks. To 
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ensure stability commercial banks ultimately could count on the Bank of England, a lender 
of last resort operating at interest rates of its own choice. Again, the Bank of England 
seemed a comparatively more effective instrument of stability. Without a doubt the long 
existence of a highly liquid bill market facilitated the Bank‘s task enormously in 
comparison with its continental counterparts (Sayers, 1952: xi-xiii)
362
: the historical 
continuity provided by City institutions in England was far greater than in other Western 
countries, even the Netherlands.
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ii) Savings Banks 
From the turn of the eighteenth century, Conservatives like George Rose started 
encouraging the setting up of special-purpose friendly societies:  Savings Banks. The 
original purpose of Savings Banks
364
 was to alleviate poverty by encouraging providence 
and thrift among the working classes
365
. It grew out of paternalistic efforts in the late 
eighteenth century, with the Society for Bettering the Condition of the Poor – founded in 
1796 – representative of the movement (Horne, 1947). The savings banks that followed the 
lead of this Society in all kinds of guises in the next decades – ―penny banks‖,  ―Sunday 
banks‖, ―benefit banks‖ – however, had little success in England. The origin of a 
successful savings bank movement in Britain in fact was laid in Scotland, with the 
formation of the Ruthwell savings bank in 1810 and the Edinburgh Bank for Savings in 
1813. Following these two savings banks, many hundreds other savings banks were 
founded in Scotland in the ensuing years. One of the reasons why the movement developed 
more slowly in England was that, while in Scotland Savings banks received an interest on 
the savings they deposited at commercial banks, this facility was not yet available in 
England (Cameron, 1967:  29-30).  With the so-called Rose
366
 Act of 1817, the 
government agreed to pay interest on deposits placed by the savings banks in a special 
State-guaranteed Fund. In return for this guarantee, the savings banks gave up a substantial 
proportion of their powers to the government-owned National Debt Commissioners 
(Fairlamb and Ireland, 1981:  194-195). Savings banks now became Trustee Savings 
Banks (TSBs)
367
. The 1817 Act further specified that savings were to be deposited with the 
Commissioners in the Fund, which would be held in custody by the Bank of England. As 
such, the trustee savings banks contributed to the reduction of the national debt as a 
counterservice for State support. Finally, the Act decreed that no trustee should receive any 
financial benefit from his office.  
The strong paternalistic undertone of the trustee savings banks was not only 
demonstrated by the degree of State involvement, by also by the willingness of 
landowners, clergymen and merchants to lend their support as trustees or as contributors to 
the start-up costs of the banks. This earned the TSBs severe criticism from other friendly 
societies – their only real competition for working class savings during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Advocates of other friendly societies accused the TSB leadership of 
encouraging undue parsimony among workers, making ―misers" of working men and 
thereby discouraging them from paying their weekly club dues. The TSB leadership 
replied by pointing out that many friendly societies occasioned "a good deal of money 
spent in entertainment", were liable to having their funds "embezzled by artful men" and 
faced future insolvency owing to unsound actuarial assumptions (cited in Alborn, 2002: 3). 
Drawing on Malthusian and Methodical images of thrift, the TSBs easily won the 
argument. 
  While in 1817 fewer than 80 savings banks existed in England and Wales – half 
the number of savings banks in Scotland – by the 1840s there were more than 500 savings 
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banks with about a million depositors, and total deposits amounting to £30 million. While 
the self-avowed purpose of TSBs was to encourage providence and thrift amongst the 
poorest workers, a majority of depositors were members of the lower middle class:  
shopkeepers, relatively better-off artisans, tradesmen and domestic servants (Cameron, 
1967: 30; Gosden, 1961: 136-137). Because of their connection with government finance, 
the TSBs could not contribute directly to the formation of a working man industrial capital. 
Membership in savings banks fluctuated with the business cycle over the following three 
decades, passing one million in 1844 . By then over £25m in savings bank deposits had 
been invested in the National Debt. As investment vehicles for the rising middle class, 
public trust in the banks remained high through the late-1840s. Nearly all the banks that 
formed up to that point were on the "trustee" model, whereby middle-class volunteers 
(often local clergymen) acted as trustees and managers in a part-time capacity.  
During the period 1848 to 1850, savings banks experienced a series of scandals. It 
became public that more than £229,000 in deposits had been embezzled by official trustees 
in several savings banks across England and Ireland. Hardest hit were the members of the 
Rochdale bank: more than two-thirds of their £100,000 in life savings had been stolen and 
mostly spent by the actuary, George Howarth, before his death in 1849 (Gosden, 1961:  
222-25). In 1861, William Gladstone decided to combat the public's failing trust in the 
trustee banks. He argued that the State was best positioned to operate a ―working man‘s 
bank‖; in 1861 the Post Office Savings Bank was founded.  Because postal officials were 
more tightly supervised than local volunteers, and since the thousands of post offices 
spread over Britain made it easier than ever for the public to deposit and withdraw money, 
the public legitimacy of the Post Office Savings Bank was guaranteed.  
    iii) Commercial banks 
 Before the advent of joint-stock banks, private and overseas banks dominated 
the banking scene. These latter banks‘ business had evolved gradually, by virtue of  fit-of-
absentmindedness really, from an original predominant focus on trading. For instance 
Barclays‘ private banking business grew up in the country districts of England, carried on 
by successful traders who had correspondents in London.  In coordination with other 
associations of traders, the Barclays set up a Clearing House system by which transactions 
were made possible between the country agents and a London bank without transporting 
cash.  English merchants in the colonies gradually developed into overseas bankers in 
much the same fashion, through the bill of lading on London, which became the most 
valued form of international currency.
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Joint-stock banks were amongst the first joint-stock companies to be established 
in England, starting from the 1820s. As regional suppliers of credit to industry and trade, 
English joint-stock banks shared many of the assumptions of friendly societies, most 
notably by acting as a ―subscriber democracy‖ and keeping a large overlap between 
borrowers and shareholders (Alborn, 1998:  5, 65-66, 85). Where did this emphasis on 
direct democracy in joint-stock banking come from? Following the vitriolic attack of 
liberals on the ―old corruption‖ and the lack of accountability of the Bank of England, a 
debate raged at the highest level about whether the Bank of England should remain a 
vehicle of ―virtual‖ representation of popular opinion, or rather would have to be 
decomposed in a series of institutions of direct representation.  Joint-stock bankers drew on 
this critique to present themselves as ―direct representatives of the people‖. Joint-stock 
bankers claimed they would not deal on the virtual and patronising basis of upper class 
―honour‖, but on the clear and present basis of rules that would not be altered ―for rich or 
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poor‖370.  To ensure their success they tapped into emerging middle-class associations such 
as reading societies and stock companies, which had emerged as early as the late 
eighteenth century.   
The English system of joint-stock banking was very much in its infancy in the 
period 1826-1832, as it was subjected to open hostility from the bank of England and from 
the established private bankers. These last parties did not hesitate to frighten people from 
becoming either shareholders in or customers of the new institutions (Thomas, 1934:  
94).
371
 Joint-stock companies remained unincorporated and had to face the uncertainties of 
unlimited investors‘ liability and non-transferability of shares up to well into the mid-
nineteenth century.  While some joint-stock companies such as the Bank of England and 
the East India Company had long been granted legal permission, others, such as by default 
of de jure legitimacy, cultivated the notion of ―public utility‖ to at least gain de facto 
legitimacy (Pearson, 2002:  6)
372
. With the expansion of industry and commerce, however, 
the need for new organisational forms able to carry large-scale operations in sectors such 
as the railways became particularly pressing.  The legislation of 1844, 1855, 1856
373
 and 
1862
374
 
375
 finally catered to these needs (Gamble and Kelly, 2000a:  28-29)
376
.  
Cottrell (1980) demonstrated that country joint-stock banks developed close 
relationships with local businesses, rooted in close communal ties, interlocking 
directorships and the mutual benefits arising from a prosperous local economy. In many 
cases, bankers and industrialists were the same people. The advances were often small-
scale and short-term, but in practice were easily converted into long-term loans. Banks like 
Lloyds often began by offering temporary advances to firms. As confidence grew between 
both parties, a system of rolled-over advances – both in volume and duration – soon 
became established between both parties (Sayers, 1957: 95-96). This actually endangered 
the stability of banks who became habitually involved in lending to industry (Cottrell, 
1980). In effect, the banking crisis of 1878 – witnessing the spectacular crash of the City of 
Glasgow Bank – was attributed « directly to the banks becoming too closely identified 
with local firms and over-lending as these firms attempted to expand ». This crisis forced 
bankers to re-appraise their proposition. What private bankers considered « vulgar 
competition » was slowly becoming a thing of the past
377
. Private and joint-stock banks 
alike increasingly focused on the relatively safe profits available in international finance - 
overseas markets, and gradually withdrew from industrial finance. To futher rationalise 
their business, they followed the spirit of the time and engaged in an amalgamation boom 
which heralded the rise of the Big Five national claring banks at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Private and joint-stock banks merged and set their headquarters in London. By 
1917, two thirds of the resources of the banking system in England and Wales were 
concentrated in the five major clearers
378
 (Barclays
379
, Lloyds
380
, Midland, National 
Provincial and Westminster) and the number of joint-stock banks fell from 109 in 1886 to 
38 in 1914  (Collins, 1989 ; Kennedy, 1976: 160). This merger movement reduced the 
banks‘ propensity to lend.  Centralisation and the widespread development of branch 
banking meant that much of the local feel and commitment to the local economy was lost, 
although geographical concentration of branches ensured that this persisted to some extent. 
Interestingly, joint-stock clearers were not considered a core part of the City until the 
consolidation of the amalgamation movement just before WWI (Ross, 1989: 32-34). 
 iv) Building Societies 
In face of the large migration influx to new industrial areas such as Birmingham 
and Manchester from the end of the eighteenth century on, building societies emerged 
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from the friendly society movement as providers of a solution to the lack of housing for 
urban immigrants.  Like Co-operatives, Building Societies appealed mostly to the better-
off of a nonconformist signature
381
.  Up to 1845, most building societies were of a 
―terminating‖ nature:  their purpose was to raise subscriptions of members and allocate 
shares to members from accumulated funds until all members were serviced and the 
society could be terminated.
382
  Building societies started shaking off their purported roots 
with the working class as soon as the mid-nineteenth century, concurrent with the joint-
stock banks‘ riddance of their ―direct democracy‖ roots. The development of ―permanent‖ 
building societies, in which the rigid tie between investors and borrowers typical of the 
terminating society system was broken, enabled this movement. As investors could now 
join at any time and withdraw money at will, the character of the societies changed from 
self-help vehicles to agencies for the investment of capital.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, the activities of permanent building societies 
had become almost indistinguishable from joint-stock banks. In the beginning of the 1870s 
– the heydays of laissez-faire policy – Building Societies of a permanent character were 
not only criticised for failing to provide members with the same rights as other friendly 
societies. Their policy of renting houses rather than building them was in danger of 
discrediting the whole concept of a Building Society. On initiative of the Home Secretary 
Bruce, the reforming Liberal government headed by Gladstone, set up a Royal 
Commission to investigate what corporate status building societies should receive. Despite 
pressures from the Building Society Association, the ―union‖ of building societies, 
Gladstone‘s government, on the basis of the Commission‘s report, decided that if building 
societies wished to have the privileges and protection granted to such mutual associations 
as friendly, co-operative and provident societies, they should be prepared to accept the 
same degree of public supervision by the Registrar, and grant the same rights to members. 
This, however, was unacceptable to the Building Society Association (BSA), which was 
suspicious of the reforming Liberal Government‘s intentions. In face of this resistance, the 
government prepared a Bill which provided that ―all Building Societies should become 
joint stock companies and be subject to the provisions of the Companies Act‖.  However, 
the Building Societies stood increasingly united in their Association, and the Association 
successfully formed a united front with Conservative backbenchers, resulting in an 
alternative Bill of their own. As a result, the parliamentary Bill was successfully opposed.  
Fearing another round of parliamentary hostility, the Building Societies expressed their 
wish that a ―new tribe of treasury officials‖ would come and replace Gladstonian Finance 
(Cleary, 1965:  93-97).  
The BSA was served hand and foot. After the parliamentary defeat of Gladstone 
in 1874, a new Royal Commission was set up by Assheton Cross, Home Secretary in 
Disreali‘s government administration, and nota bene sponsor of the Building Association‘s 
proposals in earlier Commission sessions. Not surprisingly, this commission came to 
entirely different conclusions. The Commission reported that there were two main 
differences between building societies and public limited joint-stock banks. On the one 
hand, building societies confined their investements mainly to property; the security of 
investment provided by property made it possible for the building societies to lend for 
much longer terms than banks. On the other hand, building societies were, like other 
friendly societies, founded on membership rather than, like companies, on capital. Instead 
of a vehicle for ―those who seek to make capital‖, building societies were seen as a vehicle 
for ―those who seek, having made it [capital], to use it‖.  What is more, the Royal 
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Commission judged that ―originating with the working class they [building societies] must 
have had a great influence in training that class in business habits. There is no 
reason…why the law should look upon them with disfavour‖ (cited in Cleary, 1965:  91).  
Building societies‘ distinct corporate status was reaffirmed in 1874 through the passing of 
a new Building Societies Act. While marking them off from commercial banks, this Act 
provided building societies a measure of continuity with their friendly society past.  
v) Co-operative Bank 
Though the Co-operatives of the Victorian movement in a first instance were 
retail shops
383
, they had to compete for funds with friendly societies such as savings banks. 
Indeed, by deferring refunds to the end of the year, and by paying dividends in proportion 
to members‘ payments, one of the attractions of the retail Co-operatives was that it also 
served as a working-class savings agency. In 1849 the earlier established Rochdale 
Savings Bank failed due to fraud of the trustees. After this failure, the Rochdale co-
operative effectively was left as the best working-class savings institution in town. This 
helps explain why the Rochdale Co-operative by 1850 was larger than other Victorian co-
operatives. 
The question of a co-operative bank first was taken up in the 1850s in the co-
operative movement. During this decade the growth in number and size of retail societies 
began to become problematic in terms of cash-management.  For instance, the treasurer of 
the Hazel Grove Society was reported to stash the cash under his care as far underneath a 
board of the bedroom floor as possible (Bonner, 1970:  337). It is the Christian Socialist 
faction that first brought up the banking issue officially, in a conference organised in 1852. 
Yet, co-operators distrusted banks because they felt ―they were not for the likes of us‖384. 
Still, retail societies increasingly discussed the need for a bank of their own. In 1870, J.M. 
Ludlow, a leading Christian Socialist – later to become Registrar of Friendly Societies – 
stated at a banking conference held at Bury (Lancaster):  ―During all the late period of 
commercial distress or slackness, Co-operative Societies have either kept their money, not 
specifically invested, in their own hands, or at a Bank…it is certain that every pound thus 
locked up represents a dead loss of interest to the society in question…[especially] during 
a period of depressed trade and general straitness. On the other hand, all the money kept in 
Banks represents a direct payment by the Co-operative to the non-Co-operative world… 
With adequate Banking accommodation in the Co-operative movement, the dead 
loss…should have been turned into interest for the hoarders, profit to the movement 
generally ‖.385 386 In 1871 a Parliamentary Bill was passed – due to the influence of Neale 
and Ludlow – enabling Co-operative societies to deal in land buildings with little risk, and 
lifting many restrictions on buying, selling and mortgaging. As a result, the bigger 
societies undertook extensive building projects:  cottages, cotton and corn mills were 
erected on a large scale. The rush of capital development accompanying this expansion 
finally turned the demands for a co-operative bank in reality.  
The Christian Socialists associated the banking dispute with the wider question of 
creating a more effective Central Board. What they wanted was to unite all working-class 
institutions – savings banks, trade unions, friendly societies, co-operatives, industrial 
partnerships – in one co-operative movement via the agency of the Central Board. 
Christian Socialists like Neale and Ludlow wanted to establish a separate bank, open to the 
patronage of all labour organisations. The purpose of this People‘s Bank would be to draw 
together the ―accumulated resources of the industrial population into a great federative 
centre.‖387 While being cast in the role of individualists, this last statement clearly shows 
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how the Christian Socialists were as federative as the Co-operative Wholesale Society.
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The main difference was that the Christian Socialists focused on profit-sharing and 
common ownership rather than on individual shareholding and profit dividends. To 
achieve their purpose, the Christian Socialists tried to manoeuvre the Congress and the 
Central Board into a position of legislative authority within the Co-operative Movement. 
So, the strange habit took form in the movement that the leaders of the Central Board 
enunciated the merits of profitsharing and a separate bank in the annual congresses, while 
the CWS-directors like Mitchell regarded the Board and the Congresses as a nullity whose 
decisions they refused to implement because they would be adverse to the Movement‘s 
business interests. This tendency was confirmed when the CWS decided to set up a ―Loan 
and Deposit Department‖ under its own directorship and not as a separate bank. 
 Though the Christian Socialists kept advocating the idea of a separate Co-
operative Bank in the ensuing years, their influence had been irrevocably broken, as had 
already became clear in 1875 with the CWS decision to abolish any practice of profit-
sharing in its departments.
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 As such, the status of the Loan and Deposit Department 
remained undisputed. Instead of targeting the unification of the entire working-class 
beyond the CWS, the purpose of the Department was now narrowly defined as a support 
for the CWS in servicing the needs of  the nationwide co-operative retail societies 
(Fairlamb and Ireland, 1981:  201). In 1876 a consolidating and amending Industrial and 
Provident Societies Act removed the ban on banking by registered societies:  the Loan and 
Deposit Department could now also officially be called the CWS Bank(ing Department)
391
.   
In 1893, Henry Wolff, president of the International Co-operative Alliance 
reflected on the lack of success of the Co-operative Bank (Wolff, 1893:  242)
392:  ―In 
describing how in Germany alone some £150,000,000 a year was raised by credit co-
operatives – equivalent to some £120,000,000 a year by the standard of population of 
Britain, he noted that co-operative banking not only meant ―the democratisation of credit‖, 
but more fundamentally should be aimed at ―the democratisation of production‖. 
Considering that in the English part of Britain the Co-operative Bank raised a mere 
£605,623 in 1892, Wolff promoted the foundation of a People‘s Bank in England similar to 
the ones in Germany. He claimed that an English People‘s Bank would not only provide 
the small sums wanted by English workers but also implant habits of thrift and carefulness 
in them, so as to allow them to ―rise up higher in the scale‖. Subsequently he analysed the 
difficulties of transplanting the German model to England. He acknowledged that England 
lacks the ―small agricultural claimants‖ that Germany has, but also emphasized that a 
People‘s Bank could have the same productive virtues for urban workers who want to save 
money or pool working capital‖. Yet, as Wolff pointed out:  ―our whole country is more 
commercially organised‖, ―money is cheaper in the market and more plentiful in poor 
folk‘s pockets‖, the entire banking apparatus is ―well perfected and spread out over the 
whole country‖. Furthermore, England had ―no 3½ and 3¾ sper cent Savings Banks to 
compete with‖ and the number of Friendly Societies was more numerous and more 
generally supported in England than in any other country (Wolff, 1893:  241-247).
393
  
While a few People‘s Banks were initiated in England, they all proved to be shortlived. So, 
the Industrial Bank in Newcastle-upon-Tyne already collapsed in 1876,  the Manchester-
based ―The People‘s Bank‖ and ―The Pioneer Mutual Banking Society‖ stopped their 
operations in respectively 1912 and 1918, and the London-based ―The National Co-
operative Bank‖ and ―The International Co-operative Bank Limited‖ in 1921. In sum, 
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many calls for the democratisation of banking notwithstanding, People Banking in England 
remained an illusion.  
 
7.3  Firms‟ strategic positions in new settlements (phase 3) 
 
7.3.1 Emergence of democratic settlement 
 
a) Voluntaryism and the return of London 
As a result of the discrediting of the ―old abuses‖ of chartered companies such as 
the Bank of England and the East India Company, the majority view in English popular 
opinion by the mid-nineteenth century was that the small, provincial firm organized on the 
basis of principles of direct subscriber democracy rather than State-delegated authority was 
the best possible vehicle of democratisation (Gamble and Kelly, 2000a: 33). This 
represented a triumph for a new form of voluntarism: nonconformist ―voluntaryism‖ (see 
page 128). The landed establishment in the home counties grudgingly accepted this 
evolution; rather than making religious and political concessions, it preferred to deflect 
democratic grievances to the realm of economic competition. Their adaptation soon paid 
off: the worker movement joined the middle class liberals in a reformist movement that 
only obtained minimal efforts in the field of social legislation. Even so, it it is the very 
introduction of these minimum social reforms that gradually took the initiative in popular 
opinion away from provincial movements, in favour of a stronger central government 
apparatus based in London. This ―Londonising‖ trend had started as early as the 1830s and 
1840s, and was triggered by different dynamics. First, with the introduction of the New 
Poor Law of 1834 and the Public Health Act of 1848, a beginning had been made of 
centralised social reform which required detailed administration by a central government 
and civil service. Second, this centralisation trend accelerated quickly at the end of the 
nineteenth century, when increasing geopolitical competition called for more social reform 
and economic planning at home. Finally, as I shall elaborate in the next section, Whiggish 
Liberal and Fabian leaders were keen to include more and more people in a centralised 
suffrage system, so as to gain control over ―whimsical‖ popular opinion in the provinces. 
In other words, the enfranchisement of the masses was not expected to produce an 
intensification of movement politics based upon an active popular opinion; on the contrary, 
it was expected to lead to a strengthening of the power of Government at the centre (Read, 
1964: 207-208).    
The 1870s and 1880s were an age of catastrophe for Western agriculture: in 
Europe because of the flood of cheap food imports, in the new overseas producing areas, 
because of the glut in output and the rapid fall in prices. English farming was all the more 
vulnerable, because it had expanded its traditional and least competitive products, the basic 
bread grains – and especially wheat. The Great Depression therefore faced both English 
farming and the landed interest with an acute crisis. Since it proved to be impossible to 
shut out the competitive outside world in light of the overwhelming pressures for free trade 
in England, it could only adjust itself to the loss of its natural monopoly (Hobsbawm, 
1968: 167). With its rent rolls falling, the aristocracy was looking for a new investment 
strategy but also alternative sources of income. Both needs brought them into close and 
continuous contact with the City, which offered well-paid, light-duty jobs as well as 
investment portfolios to suit every taste and pocket (Kynaston, 1994: 381).  
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. The 1870s and 1880s witnessed the decline of nonconformist ―voluntaryism‖ – 
geared towards industrial self-suffiency in the provinces, and the emergence of imperial 
voluntarism – centered in a class society, and based on the monetary priorities of the 
world‘s banker, the City of London. This decline was largely due to geopolitical dynamics, 
in particular the emergence of nationalism and protectionism as a powerful force on the 
Western stage, and the need for the State, civic groups and business leaders to redefine 
their priorities. English nonconformists were not able to seize the opportunity to build a 
multi-ethnic and multi-regional English nation in this period – in the same way as their 
Dutch counterparts were able to.  The question is whether this was even a case of missed 
opportunity; for the reality was that English nationalism was still seen as an archaic and 
irrelevant aspiration in face of an already established British patriotism that seemed to 
serve everyone‘s needs far better.  
b) British, not English 
There were two main reasons why Britishness appeared to serve provincial 
champions‘ needs better than Englishness.  First, most of the battles in England about the 
desirability of market changes had been fought before the appareance of big business and a 
class society: during the heydays of Cobden‘s and Mallet‘s cosmopolitan Pax Brittanica, 
when small provincial industrialists, aspirations of a classless society and genuine free 
trade still dominated the picture. Nevertheless, it can be argued that many working and 
lower middle class representatives suffered a ―fit of absence of mind‖ when imperial and 
monetary business priorities gradually took over from the turn of the twentieth century 
onwards.
394
  Apparently, the satisfaction with the status-quo amongst small and big 
business, finance and industry leaders was important enough to allow the organic 
integration of all these groups around the key notions of monetarism, neutrality and 
voluntarism (cf. Freyer, 1992a: 13-14).  Enthralled by the populist utopia that the extension 
of the suffrage would lead to a collectivist, classless society (Joyce, 1994), these 
representatives by and large did not see that the shift from provincial to imperial 
voluntarism also involved a shift from Nonconformist classless apirations to Anglican 
―class‖ attitudes.  Apart from the mirage provide by the extended suffrage, the deceptive 
ending of religious struggles by Gladstone was the other cause of this myopia.  In reality, 
attitudes of secular Anglicanism soon would fill the void of religious struggle. As noted in 
chapter 4, secular Anglicanism denotes the historical English habit to induce cooperation 
by discouraging extremity of beliefs and feelings in the name of national concord. It 
resurfaced with great vigour from the 1870s onwards, when the British empire faced new 
geopolitical threats. The spread of attitudes of secular Anglicanism in the Midlands and the 
Northern parts of the country through educational institutions, precipitated the decline of 
nonconformist faith.
395
 
396
  
A second reason why Britishness was more popular than Englishness is 
that, with the cosmopolitanism of people like Cobden and Mallet defeated, it became more 
and more clear that the British establishment‘s attachment to ―free trade‖ was selective and 
focused on providing distinct national advantages – most notably cheap food and sugar – 
to all English classes. This explains why Tariff Reformers‘ grievances about the sacrificing 
of national interests in favour of cosmopolitan capital in the City of London cut very little 
ice (Howe, 2002: 96). 
c) Empire, class and the tradition of neutrality 
The shift from nonconformist voluntaryism to imperial voluntarism meant that a 
clash of economic classes loomed large again. With the co-existence of revolutions in 
149 
 
Ireland, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, fears of a socialist revolution 
soared.The Boer War and the approach to WWI laid bare major deficiencies in domestic 
economic policy: impoverished workingmen made undernourished mass armies, British 
industry and management was not up to the challenge of a mass war economy, and the 
minimalist state apparatus was not able to mobilise the financial means to tackle these 
problems of ―national efficiency‖. The State apparatus and its ideological and financial 
basis, gradually expanded to tackle this threat through more active intervention.
397
 Anxious 
to avoid overextension, however, the government was keen to devolve as much 
responsibility as possible to civic grassroot groups and firms. But of course, this was 
nothing new: Gladstone‘s policy had been the same. 
All in all, the emergence of imperial priorities significantly reduced social 
mobility and increased income inequality between the English provinces.
398
  Stuck in the 
successes and concessions of the past, industrial and other provincial representatives did 
not argue for the need to counterbalance the nefast effects of these new priorities with a 
more English, provincial nationalism – for instance through the institution of well-
subsidised, non-imperial, educational institutions in the English provinces. Rather, they left 
it to the financial and upper class elites to infuse educational and civil servant attitudes 
with an imperial, British character. The result of all this was the institution of 
unnecessarily sharp distinction between classes: the distinction between the realms of 
necessity and freedom – respectively the domains of lower-class life and physical labor, 
and upper-class life and politics – would prove hard to eradicate in the twentieth century 
(cf. Ezrahi, 1990:  163).
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What mode of cooperation emerged as the main vehicle of consensual 
democratisation in England? The introduction of Gladstonian ―orthodox‖ finance400, the 
powerful ethos of the Treasury and the administrative continuity of the civil service – 
recruited mainly from elite public schools – guaranteed the ascendance of the neutrality 
principle as the main consensus principle. The neutrality principle reemerged from the 
taxation and civil service reforms of the late nineteenth century, and as a response to 
increasing class strife. The principle became entirely institutionalised in the first decades 
of the twentieth century, when Conservatives promoted the Treasury as an institutional 
bulwark against ―populist‖ Liberal or Labour demands401. The neutrality principled 
entailed that the State should never be seen as the prisoner of any particular interest, 
whether the City of London concerned for financial stability, industrialists anxious about 
their competitive position, Labour and unions pressing for a capital levy, or income 
taxpayers demanding an end to ―waste‖.  For instance, after WWI the Treasury and the 
City of London wanted to restore fiscal stability and the international soundness of the 
currency by maintaining taxes at much lower than wartime levels but far higher than most 
businessmen and many of the middle classes desired.
402
 As a result, workers – and 
international financiers – lost out much less than business and industry on the 
government‘s new tax policies.403 The neutrality principle involved more than just fairness 
to the domestic electorate and the international financial community, however. In practice, 
it involved a staunch commitment to only intervene as a last recourse.
404
  Intervention was 
only desirable if other more voluntary forces were not up to providing stability and 
distributive fairness, and the international position of the nation was in danger.
405
  On the 
other hand, the Treasury and revenue departments were very concerned that the fiscal 
system should not be used in the interests of one class or group against another, in a way 
that would threaten consent and trust in the state (Daunton, 2002: 361). What is more, the 
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Treasury from the late nineteenth century onwards had come to the opinion that taxation 
ought to exert an important function in redistributing wealth (Douglas, 1999: 151).  Thus, 
neutrality involved a positive, redistributive culture of compliance and equity which was 
most apparent in the restabilisation of taxation after the First World War.
406
  As a result, 
the credit of the British state survived and relations with the taxpaying public were re-
established with greater success than in many other countries.
407
  
 
7.3.2   Formal evolution of the suffrage 
The evolution of the suffrage in England was – as many historical evolutions 
there –remarkable, because it involved striking a balance between different British and 
English dynamics of democratisation. While the First Reform Act in 1832
408
 was hailed by 
―enlightened‖ elites around the world as a sign of the inherent democratic superiority of 
the British nation, the Conservatives – more English than British patriots – would always 
remain suspicious of the individualisation of the suffrage. The less radical Whiggish elites 
also were not happy about the trend of their time whereby legislation usually followed the 
demands of popular opinion.  They complained that the increased power of the provinces, 
and especially the constituencies was undermining the independence of Members of 
Parliament. MPs were in danger of becoming mere delegates, dictated by constituency 
committees or meetings passing messages to Westminster (Bagehot,1902: 342-343). 
Instead of either a variety of local popular opinions or an unpredictable mass popular 
opinion, Whig leaders such as Gladstone, Chamberlain and Webb preferred the dilution of 
popular opinion into a set of predictable, minority interests adhering to a few general 
principles. Knowing full well that popular opinion could not be ignored, these leaders saw 
its function in modern politics as being no more that the passing of a crude general election 
verdict every few years.
409
  
 
Table 7.3: Evolution of the suffrage in England 
1832 First Reform Act: voting rights extended to adult males who rented 
propertied land of a substantial value 
1867 Second Reform Act: all male householders are enfranchised 
1884 First Representation of the People Act: extension of Second Reform Act 
to the countryside 
1918 Second Representation of the People Act: universal suffrage for men; 
women over 30 years old with a certain property can vote 
1928 Third Representation of the People Act: women have equal voting rights 
to men 
 
Taking advantage of this exceptional Pax Brittanica period in which there seemed 
to be no need whatsover for ―petty‖ English nationalism, the Liberal Party was able to 
wrest further concessions from the Conservatives in 1867 and 1884. The 1880s witnessed 
two decisive shifts. The Conservative Party finally came to terms with the Reform and 
Representation Acts, having received conclusive proof that the much wider male franchise 
of tenants and small property-woners was not intent on undermining the established order. 
Also, in the 1880s the shift from British soft world influence to more nationalistic imperial 
interventionism became apparent. Conservatives felt much more in control in this new 
environment, which helps explain why the Conservative-dominated Coalition in 1918 did 
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not hesitate long about passing the Second Representation of the People Act. A decade 
later, the third and last Representation Act was also approved.  Clearly, politicians of all 
parties felt they had little choice but to approve these acts, if they wished to avoid system-
endangering protest resulting from perceived mass-radicalisation following wartime 
suffereing and the Russian revolution. But  the Conservative Party had its own reasons. 
Wartime participation had proven beyond any reasonable doubt that the country‘s lower 
classes were loyal to the English nation.  Furthermore, Conservatives were fully aware that 
those disenfranchised by residential restrictions included not just working men but also 
upwardly-mobile professionals. Intent on becoming the representative of « middle 
England », Conservatives enlarged the franchise. On the other hand, to mitigate the fears 
of their already enfranchised voters, they continued the defense of certain criteria of 
superior fitness (Garrard, 2002).
410
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7.3.3 Firms‟ strategies of democratisation 
In the subsequent sections, I expound how the ability with which the above  
variety of financial institutions has deployed the six strategies of democratisation underlies 
their differential growth patterns. To illustrate the discussion with some numbers, I 
visualise the growth of the different financial institutions in terms of respectively total 
amounts of deposits received and total assets accrued (figures 7.1 and 7.2). And in Tables 
7.4 and 7.5, I provide more specific growth and marketshare figures over the period 1900 
to 1930. Finally, Table 6.6 provides a ranking of the effectiveness with which commercial 
banks, building societies, savings and co-operative banks have deployed each strategy 
during the period 1900 to 1930. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 : Total Deposits England (1900-1930) 
(millions of pounds) 
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Table 7.4: Growth and marketshares of financial institutions (excluding insurance 
    companies and national savings bonds) in terms of deposits (£ millions) 
 
Year 
Building 
Societies 
Clearing 
Banks 
POSBs TSBs 
Co-
operative 
Bank 
1900 60 845 135 56 1.63 
1913 66 1074 187 69 5.3 
1923 125 1674 273 103 25 
1930 371 2519 290 133 44 
Growth x 6.18 2.98 2.15 2.375 8.3
412
 
Share % 11 75 8.6 3.9 1.4 
 Sources: Broadberry, 2006; Capie and Webber, 1985; Cleary, 1965; Co-operative Bank 
archives; Gosden, 1996; Sheppard, 1971; UK Central Statistical Office (various years) 
 
 
 
Table 7.5: Growth and marketshares of financial institutions (excluding insurance    
                companies and national savings bonds) in terms of total assets (£ million) 
 
Year 
Building 
Societies 
Clearing 
Banks 
POSBs TSBs 
Co-
operative 
Bank* 
1881 59 296 36.7 47.5 0.2 
1891 67.1 470 72.9 48.3 0.6 
1901 60.9 674.2 135.3 58 1.6 
1911 63.5 836.3 176.6 67.2 5.3 
1920 87 2097.4 267.1 93.8 10.8 
1929 312.7 2059.6 285 130.1 43.6 
Growth x 5.3 7 7.8 2.7 218 
Share % 11 73 10 4.5 1.5 
Sources: Broadberry, 2006; Capie and Webber, 1985;Cleary, 1965; Co-operative Bank 
Archives; Sheppard, 1971; Gosden. 1996; UK Central Statistical Office (various years) 
*Figures from private Co-operative Union archives, only available for 1882, 1892, 1902, 
1912, 1919, 1929 
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Table 7.6: Ranking English financial institutions per strategy of democratisation for 
the period 1900-1930 (1=highest, 5=lowest) 
 
 
Commercial 
banks 
Trustee 
Savings 
banks 
Post Office 
Savings 
Bank 
Co-operative 
bank 
Building 
Societies 
 
Strategy a 
 
1 3 3 5 2 
Strategy b 
 
1 4 2 5 3 
Strategy c 
 
1 3 3 5 2 
Strategy d 
 
1 4 2 5 3 
Strategy e 
 
1 2 2 5 2 
Strategy f 1 4 2 5 2 
 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1881 1891 1901 1911 1920 1929
£
 M
il
li
on
s
Figure 7.2: Total Assets English Financial Institutions (1881-1929)
Building 
Societies
Clearing 
Banks
POSBs
TSBs
Co-operative 
Bank*
 
154 
 
Strategy a     Help core customers fulfil their social class aspirations 
i) Commercial banks 
In comparison with their Dutch counterparts, English joint-stock banks 
emerged much earlier as champions of social and economic mobility, and completed a 
much more innovative cycle in the process: they started out in the 1820s as provincial 
champions of nonconformist industry, and slowly transformed into champions of City 
monetarism and Anglican voluntarism.
413
     
From the 1820s onwards, English joint-stock banks mobilised a large proportion 
of the industrial ranks in the provinces for their loan and paper notes business.  As if to 
prove their disregard for old gentlemanly arrangements, joint-stock banks started round 
after round of fierce and unregulated competition in the rate of interest paid.
414
  Becoming 
successful obviously required more than that. By default of adequate limited liability 
provisions in English law, joint-stock banks associated with men of influence in their local 
communities.
415
  These men were fully liable for a joint-stock bank‘s debts, and thus 
constituted a safeguard for the bank‘s stability.416  To distinguish themselves from Old 
Corruption, on the other hand, most joint-stock banks presented themselves as « small 
republics » holding on to principles of direct subscriber democracy ; in sharp contrast with 
the « virtual representation » practices typical of aristocratic City institutions.  For banks 
such as the National Provincial the desire to be independent from the City was very 
powerful; by establishing their own monetary circuit such banks tried to cut out London 
middle men – bill-brokers or agents. The philosophy here was that it would be better to 
substitute provincial solidarity for the waste of investing English money in foreign 
securities (cfr. Withers, 1933).   
Joint-stock banks‘ shift to City finance coincided with four developments. First, 
the international competitiveness of English industry was declining rapidly. Foreign 
investors rather than local industrialists were now the main engines of growth of English 
finance. Second, from around 1850 inland bills of exchange replaced bank notes as the 
dominant form of currency in England. While initially specialised in the issuing of notes to 
customers, joint-stock banks adapted to this by becoming deposit-taking institutions. The 
shift towards bills of exchange implied that joint-stock banks needed to trade with City 
brokers; the shift to deposit-taking involved the obligation of relying on a lender of last 
resort – the Bank of England – to safeguard the security of funds.417 Third, private bankers 
in the City were desperate to get rid of ―Old Corruption‖ connotations and upgrade their 
democratic status.  Fourth, the Bank of England had repeatedly criticised joint-stock banks 
for their overly democratic constitutions; allegedly these were to blame for the crashing of 
about 63 joint-stock banks between 1836 and 1838, and for subsequent crises between 
1847 and 1866.  As a result, even the Treasury urged joint-stock banks to improve the 
stature of their constitutents.
418
   
Because they were able to adapt to all the above developments, joint-stock banks 
managed to become the representatives of the financial and social aspirations of three 
important minorities in London, in chronological order: provincial industrialists, the 
―depositing public‖ and foreign investors.  
ii) Savings Banks 
       As its Dutch counterparts, the Post Office Savings Bank stepped in where the 
Trustee Savings Banks had left unfinished business. Still, the English POSB did more than 
that.The gradual retreat of the upper classes from the provincial urban centres meant that 
the trustees of many small TSBs ceased to operate in the 1890s, leading to both the closure 
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of smaller savings banks and transfers of deposits to Post Office Savings Banks - 
amounting to some £500,000 in 1894 and 1895. Despite this continuing haemorrhage of 
funds, the figures of TSBs as a whole improved in the 1890s, mainly due to structural 
factors beyond their influence. So, as a result of a steep drop in food prices and income 
inequality, real wages in the larger provincial towns and cities kept surging in the 1890s – 
reaching an all-time high by the beginning of 1897.
419
  Notwithstanding the restrictions on 
special investment departments, especially the larger TSBs were making big strides 
forward, to the extent that joint-stock banks started seeing them as serious competitors for 
deposits.
420
  
iii) Building societies 
       Building societies were fledgling vehicles of social and economic mobility 
before the 1930s. Still, initially set up to encourage thrift among the working classes, 
building societies from the mid 19
th
 century recruited a growing proportion of their 
investors among higher income groups (Moreh, 1966: 167-168).
421
 The shift towards 
higher income groups became more pronounced with each passing decade, and was 
influenced by several trends, most notably the shift of popular opinion from the industrial 
cities to London, and the declining popularity of direct subscriber democracy.   
Soon, building societies became ―the preserve of more substantial investors‖. In 
1913 shareholders with less than £100 invested accounted for 21.8% of the total share 
capital. The average holding in 1913 was $78 and in 1932, £169. In 1913, 55% of shares 
were held by people with between £100 and £500; in 1932, 47% were held by people with 
between £250 and £1,000. There was also a sharp increase in the importance of large 
shareholders, especially those with more than £3,000.
422
   
In table 7.7, I summarise the average amount (millions of £) due to each investor 
in various thrift organisations in 1930. Clearly, building societies were a class apart. 
 
         Table 7.7: average amount due (millions of £) to each investor in 1930 
Source: Cohen, 1933: 13 
Building Society (Share Accounts) 208 
National Savings Certificates 45 
P.O. Savings Bank Deposits 29 
Trustee Savings Banks 33 
Co-operative Trading Societies 23 
   
iv) Co-operative bank 
        Co-operative leaders put a lot of effort in stressing what a unique vehicle of 
democratisation they were providing their membership with. The crucial difference 
between the capitalist joint-stock form of collective ownership, where shares meant 
individual power, and the democratic, co-operative form, was that ―the extension of the 
cooperative method induces a great moral awakening among the shareholders‖ (Jackson, 
1911: 441). Nevertheless, the CWS banking department turned out to be an unsuccessful 
vehicle of democratisation, for several reasons. First, the Co-operative leadership felt that 
dependence on credit was incompatible with either ―respectable behaviour‖ or 
nonconformist traditions. As it was supposed to lead to prodigality and vice, credit mostly 
was only given to assist members through times of hardship (Johnson, 1985:  126, 138). 
This limited the appeal of Co-operatives to the emerging groups of entrepreneurial workers 
or middle ranks. In the end, much of the fragility of Co-operatives‘ success was due to 
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self-inflicted wounds.
423
  Most notably, the long-held belief that banking ―is not for us‖ 
and credit is bad, caused serious damage to the development of the CWS banking 
department.
424
  
 By default of a convincing credit proposition, the Co-operative Banking 
department offered little economic incentive. For one, other friendly societies, building 
societies and savings banks already catered for the financial needs of much of the working 
and lower middle classes. More importantly, the dividend practice
425
 – the flagship of the 
co-operative movement
426
 which was provided by retail Co-ops at a distance from the 
banking department – already absorbed much of the memberships‘ savings. This would not 
have be so worrying, if not for the reality that 75 percent of Co-op society accounts were 
not being entrusted to the C.W.S. Banking department in 1907.   
In order to change this, the CWS Board appointed Thomas Goodwin, a man of a 
more typical banking profile, as Bank Manager.
427
 Goodwin in 1910 inaugurated a deposit 
scheme, by which individual co-operators were able to open a deposit account with the 
Department through their own Co-op society. As a result, by 1927 only thirty-one small 
societies, representing a negligible 12,000 members, did not hold an account with the Co-
operative Bank (Redfern, 1938: 403). When in 1912 the Northumberland Miners‘ 
Association was refused accommodation by a joint stock bank during a strike, the CWS 
banking department promptly responded to an application for help. This increased 
considerably its authority  amongst Trade Unionists
428
. After that, Goodwin decided to 
launch a campaign to obtain Trade Union accounts, with great success.  After WWI, the 
number of current accounts had risen to 5,300, while total assets exceeding £10m. By 
1930, the Banking Department was transacting business on 9,684 trade union accounts.
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In order to facilitate further expansion, Goodwin decided to open branches in London, 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Bristol. In addition, he introduced a ―Retail Society Agency 
System‖, which allowed Co-operative Societies to act as agents for the acceptance of 
deposits and the encashment of cheques. Co-operative banking not only became more 
widely available, in many instances it became also more profitable for customers. So, 
when comparing deposit rates paid by London banks and the C.W.S.‘ banking department 
from the 1920s on, it becomes clear that the latter paid on the average about 1 percent 
more to Co-op members. Other organisations paid an additional ½ percent on debit 
balances and received ½ percent less (Barou, 1932: 99-100).  
In spite of all these efforts, the economic success of the CWS banking department 
remained disproportionally modest throughout the period.
430
  
 
Strategy b     Cater to customers of different social classes. 
i) Commercial banks 
        Joint-stock banks were very important for bringing consensus between the 
social classes.  Far from being the culprit of national economic decline, the highly liquid 
balance sheets of the English commercial banks and their adherence to strict risk-
minimizing criteria in the industrial loan part of their business, contributed immensely to 
the comparative stability of the English financial system from the end of the nineteenth 
century onwards. In many ways, joint-stock banking was the ultimate vehicle of ―secular 
Anglicanism‖ before WWII. Notwithstanding some vociferous attacks, this opinion was 
shared by most members of the public, in face of an abundance of evidence.  There were to 
be no significant bank failures after 1878, despite the financial difficulties of 1890, 1907 
and even the very troubled times of the 1930s. Undoubtedly, this stability was of great 
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benefit to industrial companies too (Collins and Baker, 2003:  56, 253-258).  In addition, 
joint-stock banks historically functioned as pioneering vehicles for the national 
redistribution of financial means. Indeed, while most joint-stock banks for some decades 
remained quite local or metropolitan in scope, some banks such as the National Provincial 
as early as the 1830s were advocating a policy of establishing nation-wide branches, so as 
to redistribute riches from the wealthier to the poorest districts in England (Alborn, 1998: 
91-92). These tendencies became consolidated with the amalgamation movement of joint-
stock and private banks.
431
  Started in 1890, this movement led to the formation of about 
twenty English joint-stock banks in 1914
432
. By 1914, a system of large banks with many 
branches had been set up; cheque payments became a widespread practice. As a result of 
the bank amalgamation movement, a dozen banks held two-thirds of the deposits of the 
country. By 1930, the ―Big Five‖ dominated the English banking sector: the Midland, the 
Westminster, the National Provincial, Lloyds and Barclays. A remarkably high per centage 
of directors in the Big Five – especially in Lloyds433  and Barclays – had a Quaker 
background; a smaller per centage had an outspoken Anglican or Unitarian background. 
By 1930, however, most directors could more readily be classified as being ―secular 
Anglican‖ than denominationally outspoken or practising.   
Commercial banks arguably were also the champions of ―Anglican democracy‖, both 
in terms of customer service and employee policies. Compartmentalising their services in 
terms of a panoply of social classes – low and high, domestic and foreign, commercial 
banks by the end of the nineteenth century had become a vehicle to integrate social classes. 
while managing to integrate most of these services. With regards to their employees, senior 
bank managers at firsts grudgingly had accepted the foundation of the Chartered Institute 
of Bankers in 1879 by a "grass-roots" movement of junior managers and bank clerks, 
undoubtedly because of the support of a few outspoken banking personalities. While the 
main objective of the Institute was to improve the bargaining and professional position of 
bank clerks, which had a rather low social status and low income, clerks‘ aspirations and 
the Institute‘s demands remained firmly integrated in the established norms of the time. In 
addition, the Institute provided a safe outlet for union aspirations at a distance from the 
Labour Party – from 1918 captured by the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE).434  
ii) Savings banks 
         The Post Office Savings Bank was a very successful vehicle of consensual 
democratisation, more than its domestic counterpart, the Trustee Savings Banks.  TSBs did 
manage to mobilise leading citizens representative of a broad spectrum of society to act as 
trustees. Indeed, Savings Banks‘ ―Committees of Management were representative of the 
best and most respected members of the local community drawn from many different 
spheres – town councillors, lawyers, clergymen, professors, business men, shopkeepers, 
representatives of labour‖ (Horne, 1947: 354).  Nevertheless, due to the occurrence of 
several scandals in the mid-nineteenth century about corrupted Trustees, and given the 
nation-wide presence of Post Office branches, the Post Office Savings Bank was widely 
perceived as providing superior security to the public. Soon, a number of Trustee Savings 
Banks in the south of England handed their business over to the Post Office Savings Bank. 
Nevertheless, many Trustee Savings Banks in the north and midlands remained 
autonomous. For Gladstone, the introduction of the Post Office Savings Bank encouraged 
self-help and thrift in the guise of small savings among ordinary people. For the City 
establishment, the Post Office Savings Bank and the Trustee Savings Banks functioned as 
a voluntary means to increase the commitment of the lower classes in Northern England 
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and the Midlands to a national banking circuit – i.e. decrease the possibility of class strife, 
while simultaneously increasing the liquidity of money transfers to the City of London.  
iii) Building societies 
        Building societies were a relatively successful vehicle of consensual 
democratisation. First, building societies successfully functioned as moderators of 
extremity of beliefs, with their origins in the nonconformist ideology and their swift turn to 
secular Anglicanism. They were generally seen as much more secure investment vehicles 
than Trustee Savings Banks, probably because building societies increasingly adopted a 
permanent character, and became led by middle class professionals rather than 
philantropists or working-class leaders.
435
  Also, building societies were rather unique in 
that they mobilised investments for different classes of investors and borrowers: from 
working class to upper middle class investors, and from nonconformists in the North and 
Midlands to Anglicans in the South.  All this made building societies an up-and-coming 
force of the tradition of ―Anglican democracy‖.436  
iv) Co-operative bank 
        The CWS banking department by and large was a failed vehicle of 
consensual democratisation. The department could neither convingly act as a vehicle of 
secular Anglicanism, nor Anglican democracy.  For one, the unresolved tension between 
federalists and individualists meant that any attempt at championing attitudes of secular 
Anglicanism was doomed. The federalists, who headed the Co-operative Union in London 
and initiated the idea of a Co-operative Bank, had roots in Christian Socialism, i.e. a 
branch of the Anglican Church. The « individualist » leaders at the helm of the CWS in 
Manchester, by contrast, almost all participated in the nonconformist chapel life.  Their 
Methodist or Congregationalist inspiration motivated them to reform working class 
manners and morals and inculcate workers with the self-discipline and self-reliance 
essential for successful association. Yet, many rank-and-file co-operators simply could not 
always maintain or afford the necessary level of enthusiasm. When their devotion wavered, 
as it often did, co-operative ideologues were often quick to castigate and condemn. The so-
called ―apathy‖ of the majority of members was a constant cause for complaint (Gurney, 
1996:  48-49).
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438
 The reaction from the Co-operative leadership stood in stark contrast 
with the attitude of building society and joint-stock bank leaders.  The latter cherished the 
apathy of the majority of their members/customers: it secured them sufficient revenues and 
provided them with the freedom to develop their preferred minority strategies.   
In response to the lack of success of the CWS banking department,
439
 John 
Downe, a leading co-operator, stated: ―We are learning rather painfully that every £ that is 
not with us is against us…the capital of our co-operators ranges round £1,000,000,000. Of 
this about 100 millions are entrusted to the co-operative movement. There must be many 
co-operators backing both their own side and the other – and principally the other‖(Downe, 
1921: 3-4) .  He further noticed that, though ―savings bank depositors and co-operators are 
the same people‖, why should these people ―prefer the former at 2.5 per cent interest to the 
store with 5 or 6 per cent?‖(9). While noting the drain of resources to Savings Banks, 
Downe emphasised that ―very largely the capital not in the co-operative movement is at 
some stage in its circulation, in the Joint Stock Company‖ (10).440  In sum, the CWS 
banking department ignored the reality of class at its own expense: it was decisively beaten 
by all other financial institutions when it came to the traditon of Anglican democracy.    
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Strategy c     Make State policy on economic citizenship by “fait accompli”  
i) Commercial Banks 
          Joint-stock banks were remarkably adept at anticipating political problems 
and needs in England, not only regarding calls for new joint-stock legislation, but also 
regarding the enlargement of the franchise and the broader issue of how to overcome 
distrust in the workings of a system of parliamentary democracy. The debate over the 
expansion of the franchise in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries paralleled discussions 
over bank shareholdings.  There was one difference: while the franchise reforms of the 
nineteenth century involved a web of rules that varied from one local constituency to 
another, the polity model of joint-stock companies by the second half of the nineteenth 
century was already founded with transparent and consistent rules that granted voting 
rights to shareholders.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, joint-stock banks had managed to become 
the democratic representative of three minority publics: not only local industrialists and the 
well-to-do depositing public, but also foreign investors.  Because the Clearing House 
provided provincial banks with access to the foreign loan market, foreign governments – 
together with the depositing public and industrial debtors – became important stakeholders 
in joint-stock banks‘ customer portfolio. Anticipating the increasing importance of the 
Clearing House, the six London-based joint-stock banks as early as 1854 had forced their 
way into the Clearing House – their membership request had been accepted after they en 
masse had threatened to pull all their assets out (Gregory, 1936: I, 167). More and more 
provincial joint-stock banks also were seeking access to the Clearing House system, often 
through acquisitions or mergers with private banks in London.  These banks too were 
anticipating that access to the Clearing House system would allow them to become the 
representatives of the « second » national debt – the Bank of England holding the first 
national debt. That is, while allowing them to continue their self-imagery of « democratic 
republics » - the blame for the demise of direct democracy was not on them but on the new 
reality that economic citizenship was conditioned on participation in this new machinery of 
sound finance. And in the eyes of the State and political parties, joint-stock banks 
continued playing the role of « testing ground » for future extensions of the suffrage. 
Joint-stock bankers were also very adept at anticipating the changing fortunes of the 
Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. Much of the joint-stock bank leadership deserted 
the Liberal cause in favour of the Conservative Party well before the Liberal Party had 
become threatening to their interests. One reason for this change in strategy was success. 
As joint-stock bankers now felt more part of the establishment, they heeded much more 
than before the criticism by the Bank of England that their organisational strategies were 
too democratic for their own good. Simultaneously, they were keen to stay at the forefront 
of new minority dynamics of democratisation. From WWI these dynamics most clearly 
had to do with who would be best able to contribute to the defense of the besieged British 
empire in general, and the world primacy of the City of London in particular. The new fit 
between organisational size and geopolitical opportunity structure helped joint-stock banks 
achieve just that.  
Arguably the most conspicuous organisational innovation in the English financial 
sector after 1914 was the long-delayed entry of domestic commercial banks into 
multinational banking. Several merger and acquisitions rounds had produced a Big Five of 
domestic banks with a surplus of cash and investment potential. The geopolitical 
competition with Germany – more than economic profit rationales – induced joint-stock 
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banks to use their increased size and investment potentional to enter multinational 
banking.
441
  During the First World War, the merits of greater integration between 
domestic and overseas banking were much discussed in a semi-political debate about 
competing economically with Germany after the end of military hostilities. German 
multinational banking, with its closer ties between domestic and foreign banking 
operations, contrasted starkly with the English example: English overseas banks generally 
had no links with domestic banks apart from correspondence relations. While English 
joint-stock banks were doing just fine, English overseas banks had become more 
vulnerable in the post-WWI environment of political and economic instability in many 
overseas countries.
442
  Overseas banks were too specialised in the finance of a few 
commodities produced by a few countries, and had to diversify their risks. By forming 
equity alliances with overseas banks and establishing subsidiaries in the Empire, joint-
stock banks came to the rescue, with the full legislative and moral support of the 
government and parliament – but not always the Bank of England, which worried more 
about the stability of the domestic banking system (Jones, 1990: 139).
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ii) Savings Banks 
       The POSB was only marginally more successful than its Dutch counterpart in  
becoming a vehicle of minority democratisation. Because of government regulation on 
deposit rates, the Post Office Savings Bank was often running a deficit.
445
  To avoid such a 
deficit, postal officals tried to attract better-off savers. The government encouraged this 
trend by raising the cap on annual and total deposits to £50 and £200 respectively.  The 
Post Office Savings Bank further improved its position by  following the establishment of 
universal elementary education in 1870, with a publicity campaign targeted to children.
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In turn, Trustee Savings Banks tried to attract more lower-middle class depositors by 
opening special investment trusts, empowered to buy higher-yielding municipal bonds.  
Following the example of the Post Office Savings Bank, TSBs allied with local elementary 
schools to form "penny banks" (Alborn, 2002:  4-5; Brabrook, 1898; Gosden, 1961:  256-
257).
447
 TSBs also lobbied  for increases in the maximum annual and total deposit levels. 
Urged on by the TSB Association
448
, in 1892 the newly elected Liberal government 
introduced a Bill to enlarge investment opportunities at TSBs by raising the limits on 
annual deposits and State bonds. The large clearing banks, which had developed out of a 
series of recent mergers, objected strongly to the big increase in annual ordinary account 
deposits at a time when they themselves were attempting to build their deposit business by 
borrowing ideas from thrift organsiations. Despite assurances from the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the Association failed to secure the inclusion in the Bill of a clause widening 
the investments available to special investment departments - a clause which would have 
helped to accommodate the larger savings bank investors. Still, the Savings Bank Act of 
1904 allowed TSBs with ordinary deposits over £200,000 to open special investment 
departments and to invest those funds in any security covered by the Local Government 
Loans Act or any loan secured on the local rates. In addition, the Act made it easier for 
TSBs to amalgamate. This led to a considerable expansion of the deposits in the TSB 
departments: from a mere £4 million in 1900 to about £15 million in 1914. Finally, 
because the government felt that the expansion of the TSBs in the past had been blocked 
by certain State policies, in 1929 a new TSB Act was passed that made provisions for 
loans to set up new TSBs.
449
 The money for the loans came from the Closed Banks Fund, a 
fund consisting of surplus assets transferred from those TSBs which had closed with the 
arrival of the Post Office Savings Bank (Fairlamb and Ireland, 1981: 196). 
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iii) Building Societies 
Building Societies for a long time remained relatively low-profile vehicles of  
minority democratisation. This was not only due to the fact that only a very small portion 
of English families could afford to invest in a house. The building societies had gone 
through a particularly troubled period from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to 
WWI.
450
  
This would all change from the 1920s onwards. The origins of this change in 
fortune lay much further in the past: the remarkable triple shift in building societies‘ 
allegiance away from direct to virtual democracy principles – i.e. from terminating to 
permanent building society principles, from nonconformist working classes to secular 
Anglican lower middle and middle classes, and from the Liberal Party to the Conservative 
Party‘s influence sphere. These shifts did not occur overnight, but by fit-of-
absentmindedness over a long period of time. First, trapped in a Red Queen race with 
Labour for the ―progressive‖ vote, Liberals‘ aggressive attitude towards the Building 
Societies Association drove the latter in the arms of the Conservatives.  With the help of 
Conservatives, the 1874 Building Societies Act was passed, allowing building societies 
much more financial freedom than friendly societies in general, and Co-operatives in 
particular. So, permanent societies were permitted to issue small denomination ―paid up‖ 
shares akin to modern ordinary shares rather than only subscription shares involving 
longer-term saving. In addition, building societies could borrow from depositors up to two-
thirds of the sum secured by mortgages (Boddy, 1980: 7-10).
451
  Also, in 1895 the Building 
Society Association reached an agreement with the government, allowing building 
societies to pay interest free of income tax in exchange for a composite tax payment from 
the societies themselves.
452
 Largely unintentionally, and spread over many decades, this 
agreement would prove crucial for building societies‘ long-term success. Largely 
unintentionally, since the original intention of the arrangements was no more than to 
simplify the administrative procedures concerning the taxation of building society 
interest.
453
 The assumption was that such simplication would not cause the Inland Revenue 
to lose any tax revenue.
454
 In other words, there was not an intention to give special 
protection to building societies through the composite tax arrangements – since the vast 
majority of building society investors were small investors who were not liable to the 
standard rate anyway. 
Yet, when income tax rates rose after WWI, building society shares  
and deposits became more attractive to those liable to this tax, i.e. the middle classes. More 
substantial investors soon became more interested in building societies‘ services. Some of 
these were people who before 1914 had invested in houses to let and who had now to find 
an alternative (Cleary, 1965: 189) – the Lib-Lab coalition‘s stance on land rentiers had 
effectively destroyed the private rental option in England.  Building societies provided one 
such alternative.  By 1930, the average shareholding in building societies was considerably 
higher than in the various popular savings institutions and close to that of the average 
investor in industrial securities.
455
 As noted by Cohen (1933: 13-14): ―these figures serve 
as a corrective to the idea that the proprietors of British industry were necessarily rich men, 
and the owners of the building societies necessarily poor people‖.  In fact, building 
societies were becoming the preserve of neither the very rich or poor, but a cross-section of 
the middling ranks.  
 Immediately after WWII, the Board of the Inland Revenue proposed to abolish 
the income tax arrangements, but in 1950 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that 
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he intended to bow to the ―fait accompli‖ and give the arrangements permanent effect and 
statutory sanction – especially in view of the need to stimulate housing in post-WWII 
England (cf. Price, 1958; BSA, 1973; BSA, 1978) 
iv) Co-operative bank 
       The CWS banking department was not a very successful vehicle of minority  
democratisation, to put it mildly. Not only had the Co-operative movement long been 
denied full legal access to the banking sector, friendly society legislation, which co-
operatives had to abide by, by and large amounted to a pre-emptive act of consensus 
politics. Although many friendly societies were established on the initiative of working 
people themselves, the constitutive term ―friendly‖ and its concomitant legal restrictions 
effectively pre-empted any possibility of self-regulation in the name of a purpose that did 
not serve the interests of the establishment. With a State registry of friendly societies 
holding a close eye on friendly societies‘ every move, escape was impossible.456  
 
Strategy d    Translate State policy on economic citizenship  
i)  Commercial Banks 
       In spite of all possible criticisms, joint-stock banks, and in particular the Big  
five, were key consensual vehicles of ―economic citizenship‖. In many ways, they led the 
way in ensuring that the soon to be enfranchised classes would embrace a minimum level 
of economic citizenship - and not disrupt the stability of the political system or diminish 
the effectiveness of the State. Already by the 1860s, joint-stock banks‘ increasing grip on 
the ―depositing public‖ – this newly enfranchised class of conservative investors – and 
their growth into mammoth financial institutions, convinced the Bank of England directors 
that if they were to maintain control of the money market and remain legitimate in the eyes 
of the depositing public, they should find a way to include joint-stock banks into the 
reserve and bill clearing system (Cassis, 1994).
457
 Plans were soon made to turn the 
London Bankers‘ Clearing House into a common reserve and a more inclusive agency for 
canceling checks (e.g. Lubbock, 1860); membership of the Clearing House had come to 
signify a new power-sharing relation among the elite joint-stock banks in the province and 
private banks in London.   By the 1890s joint-stock banks also made themselves 
increasingly accessible to the lower classes – the soon to be enfranchised classes. In the 
first phase of their existence, joint-stock banks had been happy to cede the lower class 
depositors to the savings banks; joint-stock banks had even supported the foundation of the 
Post Office Savings Bank in this regard. By 1890, however, joint-stock bank directors did 
not associate saving with improved thrift and social order anymore. With the suffrage 
extended, the nonconformist threat vanished, and the demarcation lines between classes 
firmly laid, the new saving habits of artisans, women and children were now seen as an 
untapped commercial resource. Joint-stock bankers were convinced that their superior 
administrative efficiency  would allow them to compete for these deposits without the risk  
either of being stigmatised, or to experience diminishing profits.   
In addition, in terms of fiscal policy, joint-stock banks manoeuvred themselves in 
a ―position incontournable‖. They secured for themselves a role of lender of last resort and 
pillar of State monetary policy – alongside the Bank of England – by forming a fixed 
deposit-rate cartel and voluntarily maintaining a more liquid asset portfolio than 
economically necessary. A number of factors induced joint-stock banks to adopt this 
―lender of last resort‖ role.  First, they had more ready access to the City‘s highly liquid 
and expanding money markets than other financial institutions. Second, political pressures 
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to hold more liquid portfolios arose from the public debate about the adequacy of cash 
holdings, a debate that became more animated after the two crises in 1857 and 1875.
458
 
459
  
The banks were gradually forced towards agreement because of national war-time financial 
policy, and, in 1917, the large banks agreed on maximum rates for deposits in town and 
country.  By 1918 the deposit rate was effectively 2 per cent below Bank rate (Clegg, 
1969: 167-168).  Unrecognised by many observers, this in effect meant that joint-stock 
banks accepted to be vehicles of taxation policy; the artificially low deposit rate policy 
promoted by the Big Five amounted to an ―implicit taxation on bank depositors‖ (Johnson, 
1968: 137).  Finally, in contrast with for instance the US, the English judiciary through the 
first part of the twentieth century remained commited to a ―Free Trade consensus‖ 
favouring self-regulating, restrictive practices of business.
460
 In practice, this meant that 
English courts remained by and large passive – ―neutral‖ – and applied a ―rule of 
reasonableness‖ with regards to cartels (Freyer, 1992a: 124, 152).461 462 
ii) Savings Banks 
       Not surprisingly, as a State enterprise, the Post Office Savings Bank was 
more adept than the TSBs at turning State policy into a vehicle of consensual 
democratisation. Up to the 1850s, the City of London bankers had willing enough to see 
their funds used through the Savings Banks to reduce the national debt and the pressure for 
higher taxes.
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464
The City also recognised savings banks as ways of spreading the values 
of self-help and thrift, so as to pre-empt class conflict and ensure that the English workers 
would remain more ―individualistic‖ than their continental counterparts (Morgan and 
Sturdy, 2000:  69- 71). Yet, the deficiencies of Trustee Banks‘ voluntarist principles, 
convinced the City bankers that a move in the direction of a Post office Bank, fully 
guaranteed by government was needed.  The City saw such a governmental Bank as a 
means to achieve the political effect of attaching the masses to the side of order and law. 
The Post Office‘ superior security would allow it to attract capital away from trade unions 
and friendly societies, and ―end the war between capital and labour in a more natural way‖ 
(cf. Alborn, 1998:  106-107; 138-139).
465
  
iii) Building Societies 
       By the 1920s, building societies were finally making their mark as vehicles of 
consensual democratisation. As noted by Daunton (1987: 31-32), after WWI, building 
societies were still only minor financial institutions, the main reason being that fewer than 
one in ten of British households owned the house in which they lived.
466
  Building 
societies would soon become more central institutions of State policy. During and after 
WWI, private rented house property became a peculiarly isolated element of capital which 
lacked political support. Indeed, the relentless attacks of New Liberals and Fabian 
socialists on landed property and rent, had turned private renting into a morally repugnant 
form of capitalism. To fend off calls for nationalisation, Conservatives sacrificed the cause 
of privately rented housing in favour of a focus on home-ownership balanced by a 
minimum of council housing.
467
  
 Because building societies were gradually becoming the preserve of not only the 
working but also the middle classes, they gained a lot of support from the Conservative 
establishment. One of the biggest fears of the Conservative Party and its well-off 
constituents was that the enfranchisment of the working class « could sweep away 
property, decorum, the constitution » (McKibbin, 1998:  67).
468
 The coalition government 
feared that it was being deserted by middle-class voters
469
 - especially the lower middle 
classes – and that financial stability was in danger.470 Churchill‘s 1925 budget therefore 
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incorporated a lot of incentives to middle-class families, amongst which the 
encouragement of home-ownership. Building societies provided one vehicle for such 
incentives. 
Thus, building societies gradually became vehicles of the ―neutrality‖ principle, 
i.e. the principle that no class would be treated in a privileged manner, but that the market 
would be left to play its autonomous role in so far as this benefited all parties in the longer 
term. Clearly, the substitution of the ―permanent‖ organisational form for the 
―terminating‖ form – which the BSA Act allowed, had been a crucial aid for building 
societies in their bid to enforce this long-term neutrality principle. The terminating form 
too often was characterized by a lack of funds to afford construction of enough houses; this 
had made investing in building societies a rather risky and unstable prospect. The 
permanent form allowed societies supplement funds for building houses with funds from 
people wanting to save, but not necessarily wanting a house. However, the ‗permanent‘ 
form had the advantage of widening the investor base and offering a stable and relatively 
risk-free form of saving, while managing more efficiently the inherent conflict of interest 
between the groups of investor and borrower members (Cook et al., 2001; Hird, 1996).  
iv) Co-operative Bank  
                    With the panoply of savings banks, Post Office Banks, trade unions and 
friendly societies, and in view of the lack of unity in purpose between all these working-
class institutions, it is not surprising that the CWS banking department was not a 
successful vehicle of consensual democratisation. Three path-dependencies pre-empted 
such an effort. First, during the first decades of its existence, the CWS Banking 
Department only catered services to societies and not individuals. Far from being a 
conscious decision, this reality was a remnant of the Christian Socialists‘ predisposition to 
producer co-operation, the co-op store managers‘ insistence on payments in cash, and the 
decision of the Co-operative Wholesale Society to only deliver intermediary services to the 
retail societies and not the members directly. Second, by default of a strong community 
feeling spanning the whole working class and the lower middle class, the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society, the savings banks, the Post Office Banks, other friendly societies and 
the trade unions were keen on maintaining an independent position, in which each would 
be responsible over her own funds. Finally, contrary to savings banks and building 
societies, the City establishment did not see co-operatives as trustworthy vehicles for class 
neutrality. It is only when the pretense of class neutrality had been firmly established in the 
financial world that Co-operators by law and governmental consent were allowed to fully 
participate in deposit and credit endeavours.   
 
Strategy e       Become a champion of national character 
i) Commercial Banks 
Reading the history of English joint-stock banks is like reading the history 
of how British national character always trumps English national character.  During the 
half century leading up to WWI English joint-stock banks banks shifted away from their 
roots in English ―direct subscriber democracy‖ roots. This shift from the provinces to the 
City was prompted by the increasing importance of foreign and colonial customers in 
joint-stock banks‘ portfolio: these customers obviously were not interested in the English 
domestic scene, but rather in the fortunes of the City of London. To legitimise their moves, 
clearing banks had to engage in a delicate patriotic balancing act between ―world-state‖ 
and ―Englishness‖ aspirations.  Regarding the latter, clearing banks for instance used the 
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failure of the City of Glasgow Bank‘s deposit policy in 1878 to distinguish their more 
―conservative‖ lending and limited liability policy – a symbol of English soundness 
superior to Scottish traits of ―parochialism‖ and ―being too trusting‖. Simultaneously, 
joint-stock banks emphasised that they were the same old ―corner shops‖, just much bigger 
and efficient. To back up these claims, they guaranteed that the local branches of acquired 
provincial banks would retain a considerable amount of autonomy. Especially Barclays 
bank – after its transformation into a limited liability joint-stock bank, was adept at this 
strategy.
471
  
To bridge English and British nationalities, joint-stock banks increasingly 
presented themselves as institutions with a public mission – increasing national efficiency 
and guaranteeing national security, rather than mere profit-oriented private institutions.  
This effectively shielded the world of private finance they were now closely associated 
with – through their boards etc… - from democratic scrutiny.  Confronted with further 
criticism about their lack of investment in English industrial areas, joint-stock banks 
pointed out they did not more to cater to the specific preferences of English depositors. 
Unlike continental European customers, who were willing to let banks use their savings for 
the benefit of national industry, English depositors tended to withdraw their deposits from 
any banks that pursued such a policy (cfr. Joseph, 1911: 10).  This of course was not out of 
lack of patriotism. On the contrary, it was a sign of patriotic distinctiveness, a 
confirmation of the tradition of Anglican nonconformsm, and of the English custom of 
turning to the highly liquid market of bills of exchange in London for a better return. 
Finally, all criticism on  English joint-stock banks melted away by WWI ; it had become 
clear that their branch deposit system served as a model for monetary authorities 
throughout the world (Nevin and Davis, 1970: 82). 
 
 
In terms of secular Anglicanism, it had equally become clear by the early 
twentieth century that industrial protests were becoming counterproductive in geopoliticla 
terms; Britain's visible trade deficit had greatly widened and the wellbeing of the national 
economy was increasingly dependent uopon the 'invisible' earnings provided by the 
City.
472
 Priorities of ‘British character‘ and the stability of the empire eclipsed English 
authenticity and provincial industry; as testified by the former‘s prominence in both public 
schools‘473 and joint-stock banks‘ leadership.474 A majority of the English elites associated 
the Empire with not only material wealth, political and social stability, but also the 
formation of character, forged and continuously renewed by imperial struggle and duty 
(Tidrick, 1990).
475
  Fearful of falling back into petty provincialism and materialism, and 
becoming another loser in the Darwinian struggle, some leading English bankers 
voluntarily considered British character more of a priority than economic profit rationales. 
Thus, following the early efforts of private overseas banks, joint-stock 
banks became flagships of the political and monetary consolidation of the British 
Empire.
476
 With the decline of the Pax Brittanica, the British State had been eager to  
consolidate its grip on the Commonwealth markets, and preserve the unique British 
identity – of Anglican nonconformism. In reaction, joint-stock banks from the beginning of 
the twentiethy century turned membership of the Clearing House into a symbol of 
allegiance to an imperial club – and the duty of strengthening imperial character 
(Mackinder, 1900: 155). In a next phase, shortly before the First World War, joint-stock 
banks challenged the traditional dependence on correspondent relationships. Two of the 
―Big Five‖ joint-stock banks, Lloyds477 and Barclays, gradually established subsidiaries in 
the imperial hinterland, mainly in Australasia and Southern Africa. Most striking is that, 
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although profits made in the Commonwealth remained well below par, this subsidiary 
policy was sustained throughout the following decades (Jones, 1990: 138).
478 479
 
ii) Savings Banks 
           Savings banks were building national character by inducing the constituent 
nations of Britain, in particular Scotland and England, to contribute to the greater good of 
the British Treasury‘s needs. In other words, savings banks were used to link the altogether 
pettier Scottish and English nationalisms  to the one publically avowed nationalism – 
Britain.  Remarkably, both the POSB and the TSBs were gradually superseded by National 
Certificates as a preferred vehicle of British saving (table 7.8).  
 
Table 7.8: Growth record of special-purpose savings institutions      
                  (Total assets in £ million)  
   (Based on Gosden, 1996: 158; Broadberry, 2006: 261) 
Year 
Trustee Savings 
Banks 
Post Office Savings 
Bank 
National Savings 
Bonds 
1911 67.2 63.5 24.8 
1920 93.8 267.1 477.8 
1929 130.1 285 552 
 
This was not all bad news for savings banks. Indeed, because savings banks 
were regarded as a main priority for the stability of the financial system, and ―public 
finance‖ in particular, savings banks‘ customers who acquired national savings certificates 
during WWI from their institutions, were entitled a 5 per cent compound interest on a tax-
free basis (Horne, 1947: 310). As a result, during the period 1914-1920, the balances due 
to depositors in the trustee savings banks increased by 22 million and that due to 
depositors in the larger Post Office Savings Bank by 76 million. 
iii)  Building Societies 
        Different from savings banks, building societies have always been a 
peculiarly English rather than British phenomenon. Already in 1871 had James Higham, 
the Secretary of the Fourth City Mutual Building Society in London, drawn attention to the 
fact that, while there were over 2,000 building societies in England, very few had been 
established in Scotland.
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  This evolution would persist, with England subsuming virtually 
the entire building society asset base, downgrading both Scotland and Northern Ireland to a 
highly symbolic fringe status.  Thus, building societies were vehicles of a less public, but 
clearly English nationalism.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill, in 1929 
expressed his admiration for the way building societies were helping to turn England into a 
nation of savers and homeowners.
481
 Nevertheless, with regards to Churchill‘s goal of 
building a nation of home-owners, building society leaders were still enviously looking at 
the United States – where the movement of home-ownership had advanced more than in 
England. This inspired some building society leaders to claim that the idea of home and 
home-ownership was « characteristic of the English-speaking race …our proverb 'An 
Englishman's house is his castle' is typical of the mental attitude of the race, and it is not be 
wondered at that the Building Society is essentially an English invention and has reached 
its greatest developments in English-speaking Countries ».  In even grander terms: « it is 
significant that the origins of the Building Society Movement date from the closing years 
of the eighteenth century, and it may be regarded as an English symptom of the general 
urge towards freedom and democracy which produced the French Revolution. It is 
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coincident also with the advent of the industrial age‖ (Hodgson, 1929: 5-16).  While these 
claims would remain more ideal than reality in the next decades, the notion of home-
ownership as a pillar of English democracy and English national character was already 
embryonically present in the 1920s (Hodgson, 1929: 7).  
iv) Co-operative bank 
                        The Co-operative movement was not a very successful proponent of 
national character.
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  This is remarkable, given that England is often referred to as a nation 
of shopkeepers and the Co-op movement for many decades had a leading stake in 
England‘s retail shopping market. It is less remarkable, if one considers that the Co-op 
movement abdicated from active influence in an alternative ―public school‖ system, thus 
leaving this institution at the mercy of a form of Tory imperialism which remained 
characteristic of it for a long time (Hobsbawm, 1968:  141; Wilkinson, 1962, 1963). 
Generally speaking, Co-operative leaders were confused about where they stood in relation 
to the national character. While Fabian leaders advocated a lofty, public spirited empire, 
nonconformist leaders were both anti-imperial and against any notion of English 
nationalism. The latter leaders still dreamed of a Co-operative Commonwealth that 
escaped the bounds of any established national framework; a new system of international 
co-operation developed from the bottom-up. To mobilise support, they rallied against the 
―reactionary‖ forms of nationalism and imperialism in vogue at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  As a result, Co-operative endeavours, such as the CWS bank became associated 
more with the realm of necessity or idealism, rather than with a real national alternative. 
Especially since the CWS refused to jump on the bandwagon of London-centered financial 
capitalism.
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 To compound the Co-op movement‘s misery, internationally, the Co-
operative movement was not very organised, since the differences in dynamics and success 
rate of types of co-operatives were still too large to allow close co-operation beyond 
national borders.  
 
Strategy f   Become a champion of the national economic interest 
i)  Commercial banks 
           More than their Dutch counterparts, English joint-stock banks managed to  
present themselves as vehicles of a new public-private equilibrium, vehicles of a new 
―neutrality‖.  While their Dutch counterparts were only very tangentially involved in the 
extension of the suffrage, and the broader issue of integrating a much larger franchise in a 
concept of the public interest, English commercial banks led the way in these matters. 
First, joint-stock banks were the ones most successful in jumping on the bandwagon of 
middle class radicalism in the 1820s, which led to the first extension of the suffrage in 
1832. Drawing on provincial aversion for the ―old corruption‖ of the Bank of England – 
the ―virtual‖ representative of the people, new joint-stock banks successfully presented 
themselves as the direct representatives of the people
484
, and the true, decentralised 
guardians of the national debt of the country.   
Remarkably, in order to do this credibly, provincial joint-stock banks – those 
nonconformist ―classless‖ endeavours –  applied the most conformist ordering principle of 
the public interest: its compartmentalisation in terms of private economic interests and 
classes.  Joint-stock banks from the onset had distinguished between the financially 
respectable and non-respectable: initially, this distinction was applied across the still 
murky divide between labour aristocracy and emerging middle classes. As soon as the 
respectable/non-respectable distinction mapped more clearly on the distinction 
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working/middle class, however, joint-stock banks followed suit.  They referred customers 
below a certain level of means and respectability to the savings banks. In doing this, joint-
stock banks reinforced the dividing line between necessity and freedom, philanthropy and 
voluntarism: the boundary between ―working-class‖ savings banks of a philanthropic 
nature, and middle-class joint-stock banks of a profit-oriented nature. By and large the 
State supported this dividing line, as it meant the substitution of predictable minorities for 
the unpredictable fluctuations of a dispersed popular opinion.    
Joint-stock banks went through a transition period in the 1880s and 1890s, when  
they tried to find a new balance between issues of economic profit and the public interest. 
At some point, joint-stock banks fiercely protested the government‘s preferential treatment 
of savings banks, and claimed that the government, in cause the Post Office Savings Bank, 
was stealing their customers.
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486
  An interesting debate ensued in joint-stock circles 
between those anxious to see a more « neutral » State, and those anxious not to position 
joint-stock banks as private interests unduly interfering in matters of the public interest.
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Apart from this transition period, however, the private joint-stock banking lobby 
time after time managed to present itself as a vehicle that prioritised the public interest 
over its own petty interests. As noted above, by the 1850s a view of the Clearing House as 
a « public institution » that represented the « people » was emerging (Gilbart, 1851: 282). 
By the turn of the twentieth century, membership of the Clearing House came to signify 
service to « England and Empire », the dominant national interest motto of the times. In 
fact, the causality between allegiance to the Clearing House and service to the Empire had 
become strangely muddled : «it was in order to maintain London‘s status as ‗the world‘s 
clearing house‘ that ‗ we have been driven to increase our Empire‘ » (MacKinder, 1900: 
155).  
Besides the Clearing House, joint-stock banks served the national interest through 
membership of other public-private vehicles. For instance the Committee of London 
Clearing Bankers was ‗the ‗Cabinet‘ or ‗War Council‘ of finance (Pownall, 1914: 38). To 
represent domestic rather than imperial issues, finally, joint-stock banks counted on the 
Institute of Bankers (1878) and the Central Bankers Association (1895).
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 All these 
banking bodies flourished in the the culture of  lofty imperialism and the atmosphere of 
National Efficiency championed by Fabians and Conservatives alike.
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 Even the New 
Liberals after WWI asserted that ‗the bankers of London were the ―very linchpin of 
national financial safety…influenced not in the slightest degree by what is know as Party 
Politics‖.490 
 In sum, English joint-stock bankers were rather succesful at arguing that, at the 
end of the day, they showed tremendous restraint in their commercial endeavours, and 
always submitted to what was in the national economic interest.  After all, the joint stock 
banks provided the credit on which rested the whole edifice of the City of London as a 
world financial centre. Also, English clearing banks consciously limited their business to 
traditional banking activities such as the granting of short-term loans, discounting and the 
granting of overdrafts. As a result, in 1909 the compounded total assets of the three leading 
British joint stock banks – Lloyds Bank, London County and Westminster Bank and the 
London City and Midland Bank – were roughly the same size as the largest German bank, 
the Deutsche Bank, and the largest French bank, the Credit Lyonnais.  
ii) Savings Banks 
          The TSBs and the Post Office Bank were explicitly used to support British 
monetary and fiscal policies, thus earning them praise for acting in the public interest.  The 
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POSB was seen by many as a very efficient way to both serve the public interest – 
increasing the monetary liquidity of the national debt and credit system centred in London, 
and serve the interests of the poorest of savers.  The perception of TSBs, however, was 
different. Not only was it a qualitatively inferior servant of the public interest. Privately, 
constituents considered TSBs the ―lowest form of providence‖ and the least mutual of all 
self-help institutions – together with working-class life insurance providers (Alborn, 2002: 
1).  In other words, TSBs were perceived too much as vehicles of the public interest and 
not enough as vehicles of class and economic mobility. To counteract these perceptions, 
the Trustee Savings Banks Association was established in Manchester in 1887.  
Unfortunately, throughout much of its history the Trustee Savings Banks Association 
failed to act as central provider of administrative functions to many savings banks.
491
 Still, 
one of the notable of the Association was the lifting of limits on deposits in 1915 as well as 
the Act of Parliament of 1929. 
iii) Building Societies 
To be perceived as vehicles of the public interest, building societies 
shunned any direct involvement in special interest politics.
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 For instance, the Building 
Societies Association resisted the temptation to take advantage of the possibility provided 
by the 1906 Housing of the Working Classes Amendment Bill, to borrow money form the 
government to build houses. Leaders of the Association of Building Societies stressed the 
non-party character of the association. For instance, the Association avoided extreme 
opposition against the Liberal government in 1909 when it proposed to tax increments in 
land value, in light of the prominent presence of Liberals and nonconformists in the 
building societies movement. Instead, the Building Societies Association preferred to focus 
its political efforts on a few issues of central importance, with great success (Cleary, 1965: 
166-167).  
Although building societies benefited clearly from certain economic policies, 
the claim that fiscal advantages accrued to mortgage lending from the 1920s  
onwards as a result of an active pro-home-ownership policy has not passed the test of 
historical validation (Ball, 1983). Neither has the claim that the growth of home-ownership 
was the result of a natural and ingrained desire for property. What historical research has 
made clear is that fiscal advantages accrued to owner-occupation indirectly because it 
remained the only real option between the rent-option which the Liberal and Labour 
Parties eschewed and Labour‘s nationalisation option which the Conservatives abhorred. 
Up to the 1930s, both owner-occupation and local council rented housing were fiscally 
stimulated to the detriment of private rent housing (Daunton, 2002). All of this in the name 
of promoting a unified national economic interest, i.e. a policy that was not seen as overly 
sectarian, but relatively neutral by any special interest.  However, it is only when home-
ownership started involving a significant share of the national population – from the late 
1950s onwards, that building societies would become recognised as central to that national 
economic interest.   
iv) Co-operative Bank 
                         Probably the biggest flaw in the English co-operative movement‘s strategy 
is that, starting with Owen, leading Co-operators did not trust political intervention or 
lobbying for two reasons. First, Owenites considered it their ultimate duty to create a Co-
operative Commonwealth outside the existing political framework. They were more than 
happy to let the minimalist liberals carry on with their laissez-faire policies.
493
  Second, the 
Rochdale pioneers associated habits of provincial voluntaryism – which developed in the 
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least ―imperial‖ Pax Brittanica decades of the 1840s, 1850s and 1860s – with success. 
Unfortunately, as pointed out above, this period turned out to be rather exceptional in 
British history. When this exceptional period was over, the movement did not know what 
to make of British Imperialism, preferring to hold on to an oldfashioned neutral stance 
(Gurney, 1996: 105). As Co-operators held on to their nineteenth century version of the 
tradition of neutrality, their influence on the political scene dwindled – despite their 
gigantic presence in English retailing markets.
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  With the coming to power of the 
Conservatives and the advent of imperial policies, Co-operators‘ position in politics 
became increasingly marginal, by default of an active political strategy of their own (for a 
more exhaustive history of Co-operative politics, see Appendix L).
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  When Co-operative 
leaders finally opened their eyes to the reality of politics it was too late: they scrambled to 
start a political party of their own. The Co-operative Party‘s efforts to influence national 
policy through the parliamentary system was limited, and often even had 
counterproductive effects.
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The fate of the CWS banking department – which enjoyed very few legislative 
privileges and economic success – is all the more striking when compared with the much 
more successful route taken by one of its original creations, the Co-operative Permanent 
Building Society. The society had been formed in 1884 by the Guild of Co-operators 
(CPBS); although the term "co-operative" was incorporated into its name the CPBS was 
never a co-operative society in the legal sense, it was and remained completely 
independent, and its relations with the movement were no more than ones of affinity. Thus, 
while the CPBS attracted considerable cash deposits from the Co-ops, the leadership of the 
CPBS steered away from fraught Co-operative politics, to associate with the BSA and the 
rest of the building societies.  After 1930, the CPBS would grow into England‘s fourth 
largest building society. 
 
 
                                                 
298 Up to 1914, the British State maintained a huge navy at a level of technological and managerial efficiency that 
was capable of defeating the combined fleets of any two potential rivals. 
299 While James Mill (1808)  was the father of the Real Bills doctrine, Adam Smith also warned against the 
overissue of credit by joint-stock banks (cf. Alborn, 1998: 56-57; Perlman, 1989: 77). 
300 In that year, Parliament passed legislation altering the terms of the Bank of England‘s monopoly and allowing 
the formation of other joint-stock banks, that could be owned jointly by an unlimited number of people, known as 
shareholders, each of whom could buy one or more shares (or stocks) in the bank. 
301 The political ideas of Auberon Herbert, who served as a Liberal representative for Nottingham in the House of 
Commons from 1870 to 1874, are usually associated with the late Victorian Individualist thinkers primarily 
influenced by the philosopher Herbert Spencer. Although Herbert derived his political philosophy of 
Voluntaryism from Spencer‘s thinking it also owed much to J. S. Mill. Voluntaryism was based on a Lockean-
Spencerian conception of individual natural rights that asserted self-ownership and the moral obligation for 
individuals to respect the rights of other people. Rights protection against force and fraud constituted the 
primary purpose of government, which held only the same rights as its individual creators. Herbert, aptly 
describing Voluntaryism as the system of liberty, peace and friendliness, applied these principles to a range of 
situations from street maintenance, to collective property purchase, and, finally, to the voluntary support of the 
state. Voluntary taxation was the most controversial component of Herbert‘s theory, emphasising its 
distinctiveness. Although Herbert resisted socialist and new liberal attempts to expand the role of the state, his 
reasons for doing so shared little in common with conservative critics of this direction. Herbert, a republican and 
democrat, repeatedly attacked privilege and advocated significant change including land reform and universal 
suffrage. His position represented that of a radical reformer seeking to promote Voluntaryism as the basis for 
friendly co-operation among free individuals at home and abroad. An internationalist, Herbert opposed aggressive 
imperialism, but also supported national self-determination, including Irish Home Rule (Edyvan, 2006). 
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302 The demand for freer trade with the East was, however, strong nearly everywhere, except in the older clothing 
districts of East Anglia and the West Country which supplied the East India Company and which feared that they 
would lose business if its monopoly were abolished. 
303 See chapter 4 for an explanation of the meaning and description of the development of ―secular Anglicanism‖ 
304 In particular, from the late 1890s,  the Conservative Party in particular, but also the Liberal Party, expressed 
their dismay about the growing economic and military might of Germany. Some German leaders like Wagner and 
Schmoller were calling for  a protectionist trade policy, and forged a political-economic link between national 
security and protecting German agriculture. The two scholars also urged an aggressive program of territorial 
expansion. Germany, they wrote, needed more space to ensure a high standard of living in an age of vast and 
autarkic empires -- and to settle the country‘s rapidly increasing population. Schmoller called for creating a 
German country with 20 to 30 million inhabitants in southern Brazil. Wagner dismissed "idle pretensions like the 
American Monroe Doctrine" as an obstacle to German colonisation. In addition to overseas adventures, 
Schmoller and Wagner foresaw a dominant German role in European affairs. Both expressed the view that 
German hegemony should extend throughout what came to be referred to in pan-German circles as 
Mitteleuropa.For dependence on foreign food supplies could be crippling in the event of war. Furthermore, 
protectionism would preserve the large peasantry that supplied the backbone of a strong army. Remarkably, in 
England, all parties agreed that a certain Germanisation of education had to take place. This implied the 
chartering of civic universities, the restratifying of secondary education, the creation of Imperial College and 
junior technical schools. The War itself led to a much closer involvement of the universities and industry in 
research in a whole range of products from drugs and explosives to glass and steel. 
305 Down to the end of the eighteenth century and beyond, the word ―class‖ was used interchangeably with the 
traditional concepts of ―ranks‖, ―degrees‖, and ―orders‖. Indeed, until then, the word class did not have overtones 
of social strife and antagonism, but rather of tradition and paternalism, as illustrated by the radical Robert Owen‘s 
initial use of the word interchangeably with the ―lower orders‖ (Owen, 1816:  14). Nevertheless, several 
developments made the position of the establishment increasingly uncomfortable. For one, the looming imbalance 
between population growth and food supply which became apparent in the 1820s was weakening the dominance 
of agriculture and increasing the need to move towards a more open economy (Cain and Hopkins, 1986:  515). 
Also, accusations of ―old abuses‖, for instance concerning the Bank of England, gained strength. In addition, 
when under pressure of nonconformists and liberals, the formal repeal of the  paternalist legislation took larger 
proportions, the working ranks became increasingly exasperated, so as to awaken in them the spirit of class 
conflict (Perkin, 1969:  188).  Class conflict would actually only reveal itself with full force in the 1880s. 
306 Even proponents of military action had criticised the government for waging wars against Napoleon; they 
deemed the government to be squandering their huge contributions to the Treasury.  A large bloc of the propertied 
classes obviously supported the military and legal measures taken by the ministry in order to defend property 
against revolutionary levelling, and the overwhelming majority at least showed themselves willing to pay for the 
war effort…the propertied were paying most of the bill for a war fought in defence of property (cf. O‘Brien, 
1988:  13). 
307 As early as 1839, some of the more radical Whigs had adopted the name Liberal Party. 
308 When as soon as in the 1820s the demand for authority-sharing by the bourgeoise became irresistible, the 
landed esatblishment reacted in a flexible manner. In face of growing attacks on the ―Old Corruption‖, from 1782 
to 1832 a number of reforms were carried through, with the aim of separating politics and administration. Arch-
conservatives like Lord Liverpool were brushed aside, and the minimum necessary concessions were made, for 
instance by passing the first Reform Act, abolishing the Corn Laws, and reforming the civil service and public 
schools reforms. Despite their visibility, these measures did not make much difference in practice (Mueller, 1984:  
94-96, 101-102; Stone and Stone, 1984:  421).  Most notably, the notion of office as private property fell into 
terminal decline during this period. It was gradually supplanted by what would become an axiom of mid-
Victorian ―good government‖:  that office was a public trust, and that consequently civil officers should be 
subject to uniform standards of recruitment, performance and compensation (cf. Harling, 1996:  22; Rubinstein, 
1983).  Less symbolic were the changes with regards to the status of banking. 
309 Joseph Chamberlain (1836 - 1914), originally a Liberal, resigned in 1886 over the Home Rule question for 
Ireland. He subsequently became leader of the Liberal Unionists and a leading advocate of preferential trading 
agreements with members of the British Empire. 
310 The decline of radical dissent and liberalism and the move of the better-off  Nonconformists to the 
Conservatives had to do with the remarkable success of the ―voluntaryist cause‖ – the separation of church and 
state and the promotion of voluntary religious affairs – under Gladstonian liberalism. To understand this we need 
to analyse one of the reasons for the massive support of Nonconformists for the Liberal Party:  the so-called 
"church rates" controversy. The church rate was an ancient tax required of all ratepayers, be they Dissenters, non-
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Anglicans, or Anglicans for the upkeep of parish churches of the Church of England. From the 1830s, the 
Dissenters determined to tolerate the situation no longer . When Gladstone  decided to champion the Dissenters' 
"voluntaryist" cause in the 1860s, he established the relationship that would give the Liberal Party the solid basis 
of electoral strength it needed to carry out the ―great liberal reforms‖ after 1868. Gladstone and the 
Nonconformists increasingly worked together  to build a moral society based on religious liberty, free trade, fiscal 
probity, and balanced budgets. As a result, religion by 1868 had become freer of state control. What neither 
Gladstone nor the Nonconformists, however, had anticipated is that the state, in becoming more liberal, 
increasingly became denuded of religious influence. Though the controversy over church rates had not led to 
Disestablishment, it had contributed to a large extent to the rise of a secular liberal state in England. As such, 
Gladstone in fact had inadvertently defeated his own primary purpose , namely to maintain a Christian conscience 
in the State. Likewise, this outcome defeated the Nonconformist purpose pronounced until as late as 1834 to rely 
on state sanctions to enforce nondenominational Christian religion in public life. As many Dissenting leaders 
were more antagonistic to the forces of irreligion than to the Church of England (Ellens, 1994:  45-47; 269-271), 
they increasingly took refuge to the Conservative Party, which, more than the liberals, knew how to promote 
Anglican Christianity on a large scale in face of increasing irreligion, i.e. by using the Anglican Church as a 
symbolic rallying cry for Englishness and imperialism.  
311 As nonconformity ceased to expand much from the 1870s on (see Appendix C), the movement of ―competitive 
private enterpise‖ lost one of its powerful supports (Hobsbawm, 1968:  141). Still, the decline of middle class 
nonconformism until the turn of the century was masked by the growing electoral weight of a generalised 
―nonconformist conscience‖, as evidenced in the practices of the businessmen who rose to affluence and 
influence in that period. In other words, the dwindling role of religion as a mediating factor between politics and 
the market could not be the only or even main reason for the decline of Liberalism. 
312 The move away from Gladstonian Liberalism to the Conservative Party, was facilitated by the reassertion of 
London as the dominant policy center in England and the concurrent emergence of a new capitalistic social class 
from the wreckage of  ―Old Corruption‖. 
313 In 1880 the same happened, despite it being a Liberal year overall. Sunday opening and temperance reform 
were what some of the old City liberals were about, not slum housing and unemployment...as old-style 
Gladstonian Liberalism ran out of steam, the Liberal agenda was moving irrevocably towards more materialist 
and therefore, to its upper middle-class and aristocratic supporters, more threatening considerations (Kynaston, 
1994:  369). 
314 At the turn of the twentieth century, the decline of the British supremacy vis a vis its German and US rivals 
was at the centre of discourse. With the threat of industrial unrest ever present, promoters of National Efficiency – 
such as the Webbs – repeated their calls for more ―productive‖ industry instead of ―unproductive‖ rent-seeking. 
Under growing pressure from the nascent Labour party, the Liberal government after 1905 had absorbed this 
message and linked it to the social question.  As a result, the ―cosmopolitan capital‖ of City of London financiers 
increasingly came under attack, having to endure a steeply graduated taxation, super tax and land taxes. Indeed, in 
the period 1904-1914 the Liberal governments consistently boosted themselves on being able to put the ―wider 
needs of the British State and people‖ above the particularistic interests of the City. WWI undermined the 
political economy of free trade, the gold standard and limited government expenditure which had suited so well 
both the Liberal Party and the City of London (Howe, 2004: 135-136). 
315  Many politicians appreciated that it would be counterproductive deliberately to antagonise the City. Especially 
since some of the City's leading figures, usually either merchant bankers or private bankers, moved freely inthe 
same social world as the leading politicians of the day, meeting as a matter of course and more or less as equals at 
clubs, dinner parties and country house parties (Kynaston, 1994:  372). 
316 Liberal parliamentary chairman MacLean at the 1921 International Finance Conference at Brussels , cited in 
Howe (2004: 147). 
317 This Act was meant to cover workers against sickness and unemployment. 
318 If wages were below a certain level, the workers‘ contribution was reduced; the employer was liable to pay the 
balance. Contributions were collected by employers when they paid workers; a stamp was stuck on each workers‘ 
card (Chappell, 1980: 201). 
319 Initially the income tax was introduced as a temporary measure to cover the national deficit. Income taxation 
would put an end to taxation of vital commodities, which too often meant taxation of poverty and distress.  
Property owners agreed with that measure, as they were afraid of a popular revolt.  
320 Joseph Chamberlain argued that: "If tomorrow it were possible, as some people apparently desire, to reduce by 
a stroke of the pen the British Empire to the dimensions of the United Kingdom, half at least of our population 
would be starved." 
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321 The term ―national efficiency‖ seems to have been coined by Sydney Webb in 1901, within the context of the 
Boer War. 
322 After 1910, it was obvious to the Conservatives that, if they were to win another election and safeguard the 
status quo from future Liberal attack, they had to gain a bigger share of the northern urban vote. They set out to 
do this in 1913 by abandoning imperial preference because the ‗dear loaf‘ cry raised against them by the Liberals 
in 1906 and 1910 had been so successful. The Conservative Party together with the Labour Party still represented 
a solid wall of opposition to any fundamental changes in Britain‘s internationalist economic policy, a wall which 
Tariff Reformers could not bring down (cf. Cain and Hopkins, 1993: 199). 
323 New York was gradually supplanting London as the premier world financial centre from WWI onwars.  
Indeed, during WWI New York already surpassed London as the largest city in the world, corresponding to the 
rise of the North-American empire over that of the British Empire in financial, industrial and political power 
(Lukacs, 1984 : 161). 
324 By the early twentieth century the Treasury was the key department of central government, not because there 
was a singly authoritative statement giving it this position but because it had acquired important responsibilities 
piecemeal, in an unplanned fashion, over hundreds of years. During the nineteenth century, the relationship 
between Treasury and Parliament in relation with the control over public expenditure became more clearly 
established. Also the Treasury's responsibilities for personnel management became more established. Following 
the First WWI the Treasury's general responsibilities for public policies were further consolidated after the Aldine 
Report on the Machinery of Government (Chapman, 1997: 29). Stating that the "the Treasury is a Department of 
control and supervision rather than administration", the Aldine Committee claimed that "the interests of the tax-
payer cannot be left to the spending Departments; that those interests require the careful consideration of each 
item of public expenditure in its relation to other items and to the available resources of the State, as well as the 
vigilant supervision of some authority not directly concerned in the expenditure itself" (Haldane, 1918: 18-19). 
325 Disraelian Anglican democracy in effect meant both the reorganisation of the party machine so as to make it 
more open to the urban middle class and the promotion of policies appealing to the working class (Blake, 1997: 
147-148). 
326 Jacobinism in Britain denoted radicalism that was sympathetic to the French Revolution.  
The name refers to the Jacobin Club, the extreme radicals in the French Revolution. The government of Pitt the 
younger regarded radicals, such as Paine, Tooke, and members of the Corresponding Society, as advocates of 
Jacobinism in Britain and acted with increasing severity against social or political unrest. It suspended habeas 
corpus (1794-1801) and introduced such legislation as the Combination Acts. 
327 As we shall further elaborate in chapter 13, the Netherlands provides an intermediary case in this regard. 
328 Participation in politics by non-gentlemen was severely hindered by the fact that up to 1911 MPs did not get 
any salary. 
329 Leading figures in this new organisation included Hardie, Robert Smillie, George Bernard Shaw, Tom Mann, 
George Barnes, John Glasier, H. H. Champion, Ben Tillett, Philip Snowden, Edward Carpenter and Ramsay 
Macdonald. 
330 The most important distinction within the working class was between the ―respectable‖ and the ―roughs‖, a 
division that coincided with the difference between the chapel- and churchgoing. Indeed, for the urban working 
class, the chapel was usually superior to the church, which was for the dependent poor (Perkin, 1989:  107). 
331 For instance, in 1895 the so-called Independent Labour Party had only 35,000 members. 
332 The Committee was a forerunner (1900-06) of the Labour Party. It was founded in February 1900 after a 
resolution drafted by Ramsay MacDonald, and moved by the Amalgamated Society of Railway Workers (now the 
National Union of Railwaymen), was carried at the 1899 Trades Union Congress (TUC). The resolution called for 
a special congress of the TUC parliamentary committee to campaign for more Labour members of Parliament. 
Ramsay MacDonald became its secretary. Following his efforts, 29 Labour members of Parliament were elected 
in the 1906 general election, and the Labour Representation Committee was renamed the Labour Party 
333 ―The British Labour Party has never been purely insular or nationalist. From the very first days of working-
class British organisation we have endeavoured to link ourselves with similar movement across the sea (1) Our 
sympathies at all times have been on the side of nations struggling for social and political freedom whether living 
under foreign dictatorships or under our own government‖ (Lansbury, 1935: 2). 
334 The Fabian Society was probably the  socialist grouping that was most outspoken in its support for the war and 
imperialism...The Independent Labour Party, which had been founded in 1893 and had its strongest support in the 
north of England, was the most unambiguous of the socialist organisations in its opposition to war and 
imperialism. ILP criticism of the South Arican War was often expresed in moralist and pacifist terms that came 
close to the discourse of liberal war critics and to some extent reflected the influence of protestant sectarianism in 
the working-class culture where the party recruited its membership (Kaarsholm, 1989: 115). 
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MacDonald was one of those who resigned from the Fabian Society when it split over the question of support for 
imperialism, in 1900 during the Boer War. In this 'socialist' organisation a poll showed that 259 supported George 
Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb's argument for a 'lofty and public-spirited Imperialism', and only 217 voted for 
the anti-imperialist position. The  majority Fabian line thus became support for imperialism and the congenial 
doctrine of national efficiency, in alliance with the Liberal-Imperialists, Roseberyy, Asquith, Grey, Haldane and 
so on (Davin, 1989: 209). 
335 Ramsay MacDonald, The Socialist Movement. 1911: 93, cited in Pugh, 1982: 75. 
336 Land nationalisation was the earliest and most complex of nationalisation movements of the nineteenth 
century. A land question existed when the political RAdical movement was born, and that movement was faced 
with a social structure in which nearly all land was privately owned, and a good deal of it accumulated in large 
estates. To political reformers of the early nineteenth century the landowning class was the main target; for the 
wealth, prestige and political power which landowning on a large scale then gave to the few seemed the main 
obstacle to a democratic form of govenrment. To remove or curtail the income of great landowners was a popular 
battle-cry for reformers (though it roused no echo from tenant-farmers, who produced quite different grievances 
in their petitions for Government help). This view of land as the source of income and power to landowners 
remained a popular view right into the twentieth century, long after landowners as such had ceased to be the 
dominant governing class, or to draw their main income from the land (Barry, 1965:  17). 
337 As a solution to the problems of population growth and rent expropriation, the Fabians proposed a so-called « 
socialisation of rent », meaning « the socialisation of the sources of production by the expropriation of the present 
private proprietors, and the transfer of their property to the entire nation ».  
338Presidential Address to Labour Party Conference, 1923. This well-known Fabian phrase was first outlined in 
the Fabian Essays (Shaw, 1889). The Fabians‘ emphasis on gradualism can be explained by their focus on the 
landed class. In the past, the landed classes had demonstrated their « voluntarism » in, on the one hand, confining 
their opposition to socialism to the arena of constitutional politics and, on the other hand, accepting defeat with 
good grace – as they had largely done confronted with increasing Reforms. Therefore the Fabians predicted that « 
we need not seriously anticipate that the landlords will actually fight » (Shaw, 1889: 179). 
339 Some citations (Report on Fabian Policy, 1896, Fabian Tract No. 70) might help in clarifying the nature of 
Fabianism. ―The object of the Fabian Society is to persuade the English people to make their political constitution 
thoroughly democratic and so to socialise their industries as to make the livelihood of the people entirely 
independent of private Capitalism…‖  
―To bring about the maximum amount of public control in public administration do we want to organise the 
unthinking persons into Socialist Societies or to make the thinking persons socialistic? We believe in the latter 
process‖ (Beatrice Webb‘s diaries, 1896) 
―Socialism, as understood by the Fabian Society, means the organisation and conduct of the necessary industries 
of the country…through the most suitable public authorities, parochial, municipal, provincial, or central‖ 
―The Socialism advocated by the Fabian Society is State Socialism exclusively‖  
―The Fabians…are ‗intellectuals‘ par excellence. Their Socialism is municipal Socialism‘the commune, not the 
nation, should become at least temporarily the owner of the means of production…from this follows their tactics, 
not to fight the Liberals decisively as an enemy, but to drive them onto Socialist conclusions…‖ (Friedrich Engels 
to Richard Sorge, 18 January 1893) 
340 The sort of 'national government' which the advocates of efficiency were anxious for Britain to have would be 
one that, by ignoring all factional and sectional agitation, could take a 'strong line' in its dealings with foreign 
powers. Discontented 'have-not' groups, like Labour, the Irish Nationalists and the Nonconformists, all suffered 
from the prevalence of this consensus approach to politics. The label, 'anti-national', could so easily be tagged on 
to these divisive elements within the community. Particularly favoured as a whipping-boy by those who extolled 
efficiency was the provincial chapel-going radical, engaged in his implacable vendetta against the Established 
Church, the brewers and the landed interest; with his atomic conception of society, this sort of Dissenter seemed 
to express all that was most negative and factional in the national life...few Nonconformists were prominently 
identified with the national efficiency movement and...many staunchly opposed it. By contrast, the Church of 
England found it much easier to come to terms with the cult of efficiency, perhaps because of its traditional 
concern with the problem of 'authority' and 'discipline'. Another reason for this, however, may be the continuance 
within Anglicanism of that 'Broad Church' tradition of thought (Searle, 1971: 97-98)...Writers and theologians of 
this persuasion were concerned to attack the atomistic and mechanistic modes of thought characteristic of 
Utilitarianism and to commend an ordered and hierarchical society held together by 'natural' relationsihps and a 
set of common values (Searle, 1971: 31). 
341 In fact, the Webbs were more Whig paternalists than socialists. So, they attempted to bring leading imperialists 
of all parties together in a club called the Coefficients, who were to represent professional experts in every field 
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of government. The rallying cry National Efficiency effectively appealed to the three major classes, which 
facilitated the formation of a professional status group  that could count a broad basis of legitimacy. This group of 
professionals ―in service of society‖ would increasingly tackle the ―threat of socialism‖, Anglican convervatism 
and ―New Liberal‖ pressures for an inclusive welfare program through casting all economic problems in a new 
moral light. This ensued in for instance contributory national insurance (Perkin, 1989: 158-161). 
342 Fabians saw efficiency as largely involving issues of providing healthy and efficient workers for the company, 
rathr than changes in company organisation and practices. This focus on the National Minimum chimed in with 
the New Liberal emphasis on the 'Condition of England' question and can be seen as both progressive for its time 
and rather neatly linking issues of welfare and efficiency. But as a programme for industrial efficiency it must be 
deemed strikingly narrow...The S.D.F. and I.L.P. had little distinctive to say, and at a latter stage guild socialists 
were in principle hostile to regarding industrial efficiency as a key issue (Tomlinson, 1993: 22). 
343 The Labour aristocracy in nineteenth century England never amounted to more than 10 percent of the working 
class population (Hobsbawm, 1964b:  279). The rise of trade unions thus had as much to do with urbanisation and 
its corollary of new respectable ranks, as with industrialism alone (Perkin, 1969:  119). 
344 Thomas Wright, 1873, Our New Masters:  275 
345 The 1875 Act extended to trade unions an almost archaic corporate immunity. So, the unions received the kind 
of associational privilege previously allowed to many upper- and middle-class institutions, such as Oxford and 
Cambridge colleges. Yet, whereas these self-policy bodies ruled themselves within a clear legal framework, the 
unions notoriously operated within no framework at all (McKibbin, 1984:  28). 
346 The respectability of trade union leaders and the acceptance of their members of such a style struck a French 
observer of the last decades of the 19th century. When comparing this with the French leadership style accepted at 
that time, he argued (De Rousiers, 1897: 309, 322):  ―the leaders of the English trade unions rapidly become 
gentlemen… without anyone blaming them for it‖   
347 By 1975, union membership covered 50 percent of the work force.  
348 Guild socialism, the most elaborate doctrine of workers‘ control in England faded quickly after the end of the 
first World War. Its proposals had little appeal to the militant and experienced socialist leaders of the time, who 
saw in the existing political machinery opportunities for achieving effective power. Among the intellectuals the 
preference of Fabians like the Webbs for Government or municipal ownership (or consumer control) was not to 
be overcome…Of course, there was a sharp difference of principle between concepts of workers‘ control, 
concerned with power within industry, and public ownership aiming at the well-being of the whole community. 
The 1960s saw a revival of workers‘ control as a programme among militant trade unionists (Tivey, 1973: 22-23). 
349 The Christian Socialists in 1849 established  the Society for Promoting Working Men's Associations, they 
sought through its instrumentality to bring together groups of workpeople employed in particularly unfavourable 
conditions, advancing to them the necessary capital for starting in business as co-operative associations, or self-
policy workshops. In these workshops, the workers ruled their own affairs, selecting their managers, committees, 
&c., and distributed among themselves, as bonus on wages, or in other ways, the surplus arising from trading. 
About twenty such associations operating in the tailoring, shoe-making, printing, baking, needleworking, and 
other trades were established in the early eighteen-fifties, but only one of these - the Shoemakers' Association - 
survived beyond a decade, the difficulties indicated above proving too great to be overcome in the conditions then 
prevailing. The Christian Socialist Group broke up about 1854, its members continuing to serve the co-operative 
cause in varied capacities. The failure of the workshop movement has been attributed to the perpetual 
disagreement between the promotors themselves, i.e. Ludlow, Neale, Maurice and Kingsley. 
350 The influence of Christian socialism and Nonconformity on Co-operation made Co-operative discourse 
increasingly Christian in tone.  Sentences like ―proselytising into Co-operation‖ or ―the heresy of our day:  the 
making of profits as an end‖ became very common in Co-operative Congress Reports from the 1850s onwards. 
Even the noun efficiency was couched in Christian connotations. So, in 1880, a piece about education in the Co-
operative Congress Report stated ―we require an efficient staff of missionaries, men able, willing, and ready to 
teach principles – and the practices to follow up‖  E.V. Neale (ed.) 1880. The twelfth annual Co-operative 
congress Report. Manchester:  Co-operative Union Ltd.:  65. In the same report (63-64), the achieving of purpose 
by Co-operators in light of their growing economic figures, was compared to the rise and fall of the Christian 
Church:  ―the facts exhibited in the early Christian Church are equally facts in co-operation. The growth in 
popularity has had a co-related decline in purity; and the advance in wealth a decline in principle‖. 
351 As Chartism could be seen as the political dimension of the way of life of the producers in early industrial 
Britain, the end of Chartism also meant the end of the hope that the property of the labourer, his labour, could be 
given the same protection in law as the property of the landowner or the industrial entrepreneur (Thompson, 
1984:  337). From then on, laissez-faire became standard policy in England. The City of London directors of 
joint-stock companies were the main beneficiaries of this move. Despite the fact that the huge legal privilege of 
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limited liability was increasingly granted to joint-stock companies of all sorts, nothing substantial was conceded 
to the ―public‖ in return for it, in the shape of accountability, disclosure provisions or particular governance 
structures to ensure that companies acted in accordance with the public interest. Having given companies a basic 
framework, the laissez faire proponents argued, the State needed to leave them to manage their own affairs, 
having no desire or business to force on ‗these little republics‘ any particular constitution. Of course, in the mean 
time, especially joint-stock banks‘ organisational style became increasingly ―undemocratic‖; as their operations 
internationalised they increasingly operated in a field devoid of public scrutiny.  
The subsequent evolution of English company law demonstrates that laissez-faire principles proved to have 
greater influence in shaping the constitution of the company than did the interests of small investors or the 
working class. Unlike in some other countries there was no attempt to entrench public interest provisions in the 
constitution of companies. While ―economic organisations‖  were still treated as private associations, they were 
granted extensive public privileges. In this way the rights and legitimacy of individual property were transferred 
to the new legal personality of the company, and the foundations of the dominance of the doctrine of shareholder 
value were laid in English policy (see Gamble & Kelly 2000). Most leading co-operators embodied the ―anti State 
intervention‖ turn of the 1840s and 1850s and were antagonistic vis a vis ―collectivism‖. Instead, they held on to 
the ―free trade finance‖ style as epitomised by the joint-stock banking style and as materialised in its Co-operative 
equivalent, the dividend scheme. Paradoxically, leading co-operators were increasingly critical of the joint-stock 
capitalist form, with its purported focus on material exploitation and its lack of democratic scrutiny. Nevertheless, 
by closely allying with promoters of free trade, co-operators helped to neutralise the calls for more public scrutiny 
of joint-stock organisations. Thus, they helped to delegitimize common ownership or profit-sharing and to 
legitimise individual shareholding and profit-seeking.   
As a result, Producer Co-operators had to seek safety outside the movement, through the foundation of a separate 
Co-operative Producer Federation, with headquarters in Leicester. All the above factors provided for an 
organisation style for worker co-operation of a relatively low status in England, as became increasingly apparent 
after 1877. Since the passing of the 1855 Limited Liability Act and the 1856 Joint Stock Companies Act, there 
had been a continual and cumulative increase in joint stock enterprise. (Interestingly, the public concern that rose 
in the 1850s about the unlimited liability of firms, was especially vociferous amongst those concerned to provide 
safe channels for the savings of poorer people thus, the 1855 Limited Liability Act came into being mainly 
through the pressures of this group (cf. Tivey, 1978:  24)).  The introduction of limited liability for joint-stock 
companies had promoted a great increase of companies that were speculative or fraudulent and soon proved 
abortive. This had given a blow to joint-stock companies‘ status.  Already from 1867, but certainly after 1877, 
however, fraud and speculation among joint-stock companies notably declined, leading the government 
Committee covering the years to conclude in 1899 that  (Todd, 1932:  63-71). 
352 In fact, later analyses coined the federalist group ―individualistic‖, because of their antagonism vis a vis 
socialist collectivism and their preference for a ―free trade finance‖ style, i.e. a style ensuring a separation of 
politics and economics as favoured by liberal elites in the nineteenth century (cf. Gurney 
, 1996:  187). 
353 ―Capital and Labour…employers and workmen…How sharply defined and widely severed these two classes 
are in our time – how dangerous their antagonism has become to the commonwealth‖ Proceedings of the Co-
operative Congress, 31 May 1869:  13. 
354 Especially the Whigs were sensitive to hostile trading and manufacturing opinion as expressed by Trade 
Unions. 
355 Conservatives  
356 as late as 1914, the Co-operative Congress blew the whistle on the Labour cause within the movement. The 
Co-operative Union Central Board received instructions to ―maintain the neutrality of the movement in respect of 
party politics…and not to employ co-operative men or money to the advancement of the Labour party or political 
organisations or movements‖ (Co-operative Congress Report, 1914: 510). Even the 1917 resolution only sought 
to establish independent co-operative political activity; a class-based alliance with Labour was still out of the 
question. Antagonism for ―socialist collectivism‖ and a preference for a voluntarist style still were very much 
present in the movement. 
357 Co-operative Congress Report, 1921: 488. 
358 It was up to external threats and the impetus of war economy to create new sets of demands about how to 
effectively use state demands. The expansion of the state apparatus during war thus largely preceded the 
elaboration of a clear Labour program for state intervention. 
359 According to these prominent protestors, the Bank of England Charter precluded « the public from making any 
demand on the Bank for a participation in the advantages from the public deposits » (Ricardo, Proposals for an 
Economical and Secure Currency:  59). 
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360 And in face of the enormous growth in public funds and commitments, Old agreements obviously had become 
inequitable. 
361 See for instance the following comparison between French and English central banking (Bankers‘ Magazine, 
1889:  395):  « In this country the Bank of England is still the chief power amongst banks, but it is like the 
constitutional monarch, who reigns and does not govern. In France, on the contrary, the system of banking is 
nothing apart from the Bank of France, which is autocratic, imperial, indispensable ». 
362 Bills of exchange, handled in the London market, were excellent earning assets, in abundant supply in  a 
highly competitive market, in which the indivdual banker could participate as much or as little as he liked, 
without consideration of customers‘ goodwill. But it was not until this market‘s own liquidity at all times was 
demonstrably assured by the recognition of the Bank of England as lender of last resort that the commercial 
bankers could safely keep their cash ratios at all times at an unchanged (and conventional) minimum. 
363 ―The direction of development was set by the establishment of the institutions of the City which built and 
reinforced a system for dealing with money between the government and the rich and wealthy long before the 
industrial revolution. As other sources of wealth were created outside the landed aristocracy and the merchant 
class of London and the major seaports, new financial institutions emerged. Over time, however, they became 
integrated into the circuit of monetary and social capital which centred on the City and reinforced the power of 
the insiders. Thus the City was eventually strengthened and revivified by the supply of new capital from the 
industrial areas of Britain…The middle classes in particular were incorporated into this process through the new 
banks and insurance companies which promised them safe havens for their funds and the prospect of sustaining 
their class position and that of their families in times of illness and old age. On the other hand, the English 
working class stood predominantly outside of this system. (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000:  70-71). 
364 Joseph Townsend, David Ricardo, Jeremy Bentham, Frederick Eden, George Rose, Patrick 
Colquhoun, and a host of other English writers advocated such an institution as a cornerstone of a new approach 
to public welfare. Even Thomas Malthus, who remained famously skeptical of all other efforts to relieve poverty, 
found in the savings bank a public institution based on sound political-economic principle and in accordance 
"with the lessons of nature and providence." "Of all the plans which have yet been proposed for the assistance of 
the labouring classes," he wrote 
in a 1826 edition of the Essay, "the savings banks... appear to me much the best, and the 
most likely, if they should become general, to effect a permanent improvement in the condition of the lower 
classes of society." 
365 While holding the friendly societies legal form, the trustee savings banks differed from other friendly societies 
on two accounts.  On the one hand, the leadership and control of the savings banks was not in the hands of the 
members who contributed and benefited, as in friendly societies, but in the hands of the providers – paternalists 
who were seeking to improve the condition of the poor while stopping short politically subversive movements. 
These providers more often than not came from the Society for Bettering the Condition of the Poor. This society 
played an active role in the foundation of the early savings banks and in securing the legislation which facilitated 
the growth of the trustee savings bank movement. 
366 George Rose was first Secretary to the Treasury, and later a Tory MP. He formed a close alliance with Pitt – 
the younger – and was a staunch supporter of the Combination Laws (cf. Horne, 1947:  72-73). 
367 The trustee principle was defined in the 1817 Act as:  to receive deposits of money for the benefit of the 
persons depositing the same, and to accumulate the produce of so much thereof as shall not be required by the 
depositors, their executors or administrators, deducting only out of such produce so much as shall be required to 
be retained for the purpose of paying and discharging the necessary expenses attending the management of such 
institution according to such rules, orders and regulations as shall have been or shall be established for that 
purpose but deriving no benefit whatsoever from any such deposit or the produce thereof‖. 
368 Thus first the country bankers, and then the merchant bankers abroad, created the famous bill on London, 
which by the punctuality of payment of their London agents ultimately obtained world-wide repute (Ackrill and 
Hannah, 2000). 
369 British overseas banks in the nineteenth century, while headquartered in Great-Britain, conducted no domestic 
banking, and initially had no shareholding links with domestic banks.  On the other hand, British domestic banks 
did not open foreign branches until shortly before WWI.  The British overseas banks were joined by corporate 
banks from other countries – most notably Germany, France and Japan – later in the nineteenth century. These 
latter banks, however, generally had more limited branch networks and were generally linked to domestic 
banking institutions in their home economies (Jones, 1993:  38). 
370 As we shall see later, soon joint-stock bankers would disavow their claims of direct democracy in favour of 
branch networks, sleeping partners and autocratic managers (Alborn, 1996:  85). 
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371 The passing of the Banking Act of 1826 was not followed by the rapid establishment of joint stock banks 
throughout the country . The main factor which restricted the establishment of joint stock banks under the new 
law was that the Act made no attempt to limit the liability of shareholders to have the whole of their property 
taken in execution in respect of the debts of the bank if judgment were obtained against the proper officer of the 
company…the fact that the liability of members in the first joint stock banks was unlimited was naturally an 
extremely strong deterrent against the investment of money in such institutions by persons of wealth and position 
(Thomas, 1934:  91). Or as Joplin (1837) put it:  « the severity of the law [with regards to unlimited liability] and 
the great respectability and personal influence of the private bankers throughout the country, prevented the public 
for some time from availing themselves of it ». Another serious disadvantage under which the early joint stock 
banks worked was that they were not permitted to draw bills on London under the value of £50. Since the 
majority of bills wanted in the country were for sums below this amount, the joint stock banks were unable to 
supply them. The country bankers‘ application to the Treasury for removal of this prohibition from the 1826 Act 
was opposed by the Bank of England (Thomas, 1934:  93). 
372 In fact, this is exactly what one of the early labour aristocracy Co-operatives did to defend itself against legal 
lawsuits by antagonistic private merchants. So, the Birmingham Flour and Bread Company, which in legal terms 
acted as an unincorporated joint stock company, in face of its prosecution in 1811 claimed that it was acting in the 
public interest, both by showing its close identification with the locality in which it operated, and by relying on 
the status and reputation of its original founders. 
373 With the 1856 Joint-Stock Companies Act, general limited liability was introduced (Warren, 1903:  45). 
374 Before then, it was common to establish parternships under trust law. Clauses were included in partnership 
deeds to provide for share transfers and the limitation of liability (Pearson, 2002:  7). 
375 One of the reasons for this delay was the historical stigma of the South Sea Bubble in 1720 which still created 
political hostility to the joint-stock company in the beginning of the nineteenth century. One observer hated the 
joint-stock system so much that he denounced it as ―the sole and sufficient explanation of the miseries of the 
country. No words were too strong to condemn what was then considered to be a malign perversion of industry, 
destruction of commercial probity, and of a well-ordered social life‖ (quoted in Gamble and Kelly, 2000:  29) 
376 Since the Bank of England and the East India Company performed ―public functions‖ which a central 
government agency could have performed, both acted as supports of the ideal of the laissez-faire state.  In order to 
fulfill that role, they had to, on the one hand, preserve their traditional, ―pre-modern‖ structures of patronage and 
chartered monopoly, and, on the other hand, keep up with the ―modernisation‖ of industry and commerce 
(Alborn, 1998:  7). The danger was always that these company‘s political agency would be seen more in light of 
public functions, i.e. the structural sphere of politics, than as a modern ally of economic action. Only the Bank of 
England succeeded in sustaining this delicate balancing act between traditional structures and ―modern‖ agency; 
the East-India company finally was nationalised by Victorian politicians in 1858. 
377 The Chairman of Lloyds Bank Sir Thomas Salt (1886-1898) testified to the distress caused by the chaotic 
pahse of banking history during the last century…[he declared] in 1898 that ‗before my banking days are done I 
may see anything like vulgar competition between large banks given up altogether‘‖ (Clegg, 1969: 169). 
378 « Most of the mergig firms indeed had a Quaker background…Many of them, it is true, were still proud of 
their Quaker ancestry and treasured Quaker connections, but only two fo the founding directors…were still 
practising Quakers » (Ackrill and Hannah, 2001: 57). 
379 « By the inter-war years, Barclays had absorbed a good deal of modern corporate banking culture. Apart from 
Goodenough‘s reforms of the private banking branches, a large majority of employees after the 1916-1920 
mergers came from the former joint stock banks‘ branches, not from the former private partnerships. Yet the old 
private banking families retained a disproportinate presence in senior management, and their influence 
strengthened when the deputy chairman from the joint stock line, Sir Herbert Hambling, predeceased 
Goodenough in 1932…In sum, the expansion of the bank did not lead to any major modificaiton of the origianl 
merger aims: preservation of the traditions of private banking within the corporate structure »  (Ackrill and 
Hannah, 200: 63-85) 
380 Twenty persons who left substantial mark in the history of the Lloyds Bank (before WWII): « of the twenty, 
nine were sons of bankers and three others married bankers ‗ daughters. Nine had sons or sons-in-law who 
followed them in to banking. Seven were born Quakers ; these belonged mostly to the earlier 
generations…Including the one born a Quaker, eight of the twenty belonged to the Church of England ; two 
others (both in Birmingham) were Unitarians. Only three went to a university…Three were active in politics, all 
of them Consevative » (Sayers, 1957: 61). 
381 For instance, the Building Societies Gazette, founded in 1869, enjoyed early financial support from the 
nonconformist journal Christian World. 
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382 According to the 1836 Building Societies Act, a building society is established ―for the purpose of raising, by 
monthly or other subscriptions of the several members of such societies, shares not exceeding the value of £150 
for each share…,a stock or fund for the purpose of enabling each member thereof to receive out of the funds such 
society the amount or value of his or her share or shares therein, to erect or purchase one or more dwelling house 
or dwelling houses, or other real or leasehold estate, to be secured by way of mortgage to such society until the 
amount or value of his or her shares shall have been fully repaid to such society‖ (1872, Royal Commission on 
Friendly and Benefit Building Societies (2nd report), Parliamentary Papers, XXVI). 
383 With urbanisation came decreased dependence on the moral economy of local markets and increasing 
dependence on impersonal money mechanisms. This allowed food retailers to acquire a monopoly situation in 
many urbanizing localities. In addition, while the Truck Act of 1831 had made it illegal for employers to pay 
wages in kind or in tickets which could be used in making purchases only at a particular shop – usually the 
property of the employer – the practice lingered. It is against this background of monopoly situations and the 
breakdown of local ―moral economies‖ – as translated in practices of food adulteration , high prices and usury in 
the form of credit trading, that Victorian Co-operative shops were established. 
384 Report issued by the Co-operative Union Information Services Department, 1989. The Co-operative Bank and 
Retail Societies:  1. 
385 Pamphlet in the Co-operative Union archives:  Ludlow, J.M. 1870. Co-operative Banking. On Co-operative 
Banking as applicable to Co-operative Trade and Friendly Societies:  4. 
386 Another argument Ludlow used capitalised on the run for shares that Co-op shops sometimes experienced:  ―a 
run upon a Co-operative Bank is better for Co-operative Societies than a run upon their Societies 
themselves…Co-operative Banks might at least serve as buffers in this respect to the Societies Pamphlet in the 
Co-operative Union archives:  Ludlow, J.M. 1870. Co-operative Banking. On Co-operative Banking as 
applicable to Co-operative Trade and Friendly Societies:  5. 
387 Neale, E.V. 1876. ―Co-operative Banking‖, Co-operative News, VII:  467. 
388 On instigation of the federalists, the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) was set up in 1864 as a trading 
partnership of Co-operative retail stores. The purpose of its foundation was ―to dispense with all needless 
individual and joint-stock investors of capital for profit, whether in shopkeeping, wholesale dealing, or 
manufacturing‖ (1868 Pamphlet in the Co-operative Union archives:  The Co-operative Wholesale Society. What 
is it? Manchester:  Co-operative Printing Society:  7).  This regarded the relation ―between the consumers of 
commodities and their producers‖ and the purpose was ―to economise the cost of living, and at the same time to 
remove ‗all temptations to adulteration and every other form of cheating‘‖  (1868 Pamphlet in the Co-operative 
Union archive. The Co-operative Wholesale Society. What is it? Manchester:  Co-operative Printing Society:  2).   
The purpose of the CWS was largely federalist: improving the situation of the stores and their consumers. To 
counterbalance this initiative, the individualists, with leading nonconformist co-operators like Holyoake lending 
them their support, initiated the formation of a central organisation in London in the 1870s, first known as the Co-
operative Central Board and later coined the Co-operative Union. The Co-operative Union furnished legal advice, 
published literature and propaganda, promoted cooperative education, and organised the Annual Congresses, held 
every spring from 1869. Leadership of the Board was largely in the hands of the Christian Socialists: the annual 
conferences were used as a counterweight for the CWS and as a platform for Christian Socialist propaganda about 
working class union and co-operative workshops. In 1873, the CWS entered manufacturing:  the first factories 
were built and run as ordinary joint stock companies. While these companies at first held to the Christian Socialist 
profit-sharing principle, already in 1875 did the CWS directors decide to abolish all profit-sharing principles and 
to return profits to consumers via the dividend scheme. As we shall see later, the so-called ―banking dispute‖ 
between federalists and individualists was instrumental in bringing about this turn. 
389 The banking dispute ushered in the demise of the Christian Socialists in the movement. The failure of the 
Industrial Bank, an industrial partnership that asserted to be co-operative, was instrumental in this. This bank was 
established in 1872  by a co-operator from Newcastle, J.H. Rutherford. Well-known as the managing director of 
the Ouseburn Engineering Works near Newcastle – one of the new industrial partnerships, Rutherford started the 
Bank for motives that differed markedly from the Christian Socialist banking enthusiasts.  Most notably, his main 
motivation seems to have been to finance his Engineering Works. In contrast to the Christian Socialists Neale and 
Ludlow, the leading co-operator Holyoake applauded the initiative, stating that Ludlow ―must have been 
gratified‖ by Rutherford‘s interest in a Co-operative Bank. In addition, Rutherford shared the Christian Socialism 
antagonism vis a vis the CWS; this made it easier to opportunistically identify Rutherford‘s initiative with the 
latter. Rutherford only aggravated things by consistently downgrading the CWS and its new Deposit and Loan 
Department. What is more, in spite of Neale‘s and Ludlow‘s strong disapproval of individual shareholding in 
federal schemes, Rutherford continued to claim that his initiative was representative of the Movement‘s true 
ideals. By combining the Christian Socialist idea of profit-sharing with the idea of individual stockholding, 
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Rutherford‘s  initiative had the effect of helping to scapegoat the Christian Socialists as ―individualists‖, 
especially when already in 1876 the Industrial Bank went bankrupt (cf. Backstrom, 1974:  102-128). 
390 From the 1880s onwards, Fabian leaders such as Beatrice Potter definitively closed the Christian Socialist 
chapter.  Armed with the catchprase "the inevitability of gradualism", the Fabians attacked the so-called 
‘idealists‘ in the Co-operative movement that sought to revive producer co-operation. Instead of producer co-
operation they favoured a consumer co-operative takeover of the whole of industry. In this takeover, workers 
would be relegated to the role of wage-earners protected by trade unions. According Beattrice Potter and Mitchell 
– chairman of the CWS argued – profit-sharing methods were not necessary, since the dividend method already 
had done away with profits, and federal consumer co-operation was able to organise production efficiently on 
behalf of consumers (Birchall, 1994; Potter, 1899). 
391 Banking business under the I&P Act was only permitted if the society did not have withdrawable share capital. 
In fact, this limitation still is applied in the consolidated I&P Act of 1965. 
392 While the Co-operative shops associated with the Co-operative Wholesale Society were much more successful 
than the Co-operative Bank, the membership and total assets of the Co-operative Wholesale Society were much 
smaller than the ones mobilized by either other special-purpose friendly societies – be it savings banks, fire 
insurance societies,…- or trade unions. This despite the fact that one of the leading principles of Co-operation had 
been the principle of total inclusion:  women, children, men, all were free to associate and take part in the life of 
the Co-operative movement (Gurney, 1996:  89). Several elements caused this, both political and economic. First, 
the population targeted by the co-operative movement was fraught with antagonism, be it between the labour 
aristocracy and the unskilled workers, the ―respectable‖ and the ―roughs‖, the Anglican, the Nonconformist or the 
Catholic Irish. Not only were antagonisms between the ―respectable‖ leadership and the ―rough‖ rank-and-file 
hampering total inclusion. In addition, leadership itself was divided between the nonconformist-liberal Co-
operative Wholesale Society in the north and the Anglican-conservative Co-operative Union in the south. This is 
the political reason why co-operation failed to attract the poorer workers before WWI. The economic reason of 
course is that the dividend scheme was not workable for poorer people with little to spend, let alone to save or 
invest in a dividend return.  
 To put things in perspective, the membership of friendly societies increased from under a million in 
1815 to over three million in 1849 and to an estimated four million in 1872, heavily concentrated in the industrial 
counties of the north and midlands. Already at the mid-century about half the adult male population belonged to 
friendly societies of one kind or another. In 1872 the friendly society movement counted four times as many 
members as the trade unions, and twelve times as many as the co-operatives societies. (Perkin, 1969:  381-383). 
The known membership of those friendly societies which made a return in 1872 was 1,857,896; that of trade 
unions making a return 217,128 and that of co-operatives 301,157 (Gosden, 1961:  7). 
393 Wolff added:   a main disadvantage of the English situation is that ―we are handicapped by our free 
institutions, which produce a more shifting population, whose movements cannot be so steadily followed.‖ By 
this he also meant that the role of religion and local communities was less crucial as a mobilisation factor in 
twentieth-century England. In addition, English banking legislation forbade banking by societies with 
―withrdawable shares‖. 
394 In England employer organisations,  Trade Unions, working and middle classes all approved of the benefits of 
free trade and the Pax Brittanica.  So, the investigation of the 1886 Royal Commission on Depression in Trade 
reported that Free Trade and nongovernment intervention were consistent even with the view of the family 
business constituency.  Finally, in contrast with for instance the US and the Netherlands, three out of four English 
citizens lived in towns by the turn of the twentieth century, thus removing most of the grassroot support for an 
urban-rural divide – though an elite struggle was certainly waged in terms of an « urban citizen » – « landed 
interest » divide (cf. Freyer, 1992a:  13-14).  
395 By 1885 the struggle for religious equality – the gradual disestablishment – was almost complete. With the 
ascendance of nationalist and imperialist sentiment from the 1890s, the role of religion changed to a mediating 
factor for internal national antagonisms, to a uniting factor in face of international ―imperialist‖ competition (cf. 
Gilbert, 1976:  206-207) . While Nonconformist adherence dwindled, the Church of England experienced 
increases in communicant participation between 1885 and 1914 which were more rapid than population growth in 
England. In fact, already from the 1870s, the number of radical nonconformity adherents amongst the leading 
middle-class businessmen gradually declined. What is more, a split amongst the nonconformists became apparent 
between the lower-ranked Methodist radicals and the middle-ranked, status-quo oriented Wesleyan Baptists. 
396 For a picture of  the evolution of formal religious affiliation – as against active membership – see Appendix C. 
397 The British Empire -- which according to contemporaries had been acquired in "a fit of absence of mind" was 
now seen as a prized asset, even a life-or-death necessity. And its health demanded some centralisation of 
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economic decision making. How this centralisation happened, however, was largely unplanned, as a result of 
piecemeal change and different dynamics coming together (e.g. Robinson and Gallagher, 1953). 
 
398 Regional GDP/Person (Britain = 100)  
1871 1881 1891 1901  1911 
South East  115.2 117.8 120.1 121.7  124.6  
London  141.9  139.0  150.4  154.9  165.6  
Rest of SE  89.5  93.9  86.9  87.4  86.3 
East Anglia  97.0  92.3  83.0  76.9  76.8 
South West  88.6  92.1  84.9  81.5  85.7 
West Midlands  84.8  84.5  79.6  81.7  78.4 
East Midlands  106.2 100.4  96.4  90.3  90.6 
North West  106.0 102.0 100.6  97.9  97.2 
Yorks & Humb.  94.1  92.9  92.6  91.9  89.5 
North  91.3  85.1  85.4  82.9  79.2 
 
399 For example, after the 1902 Secondary Education Act, the hitherto underprivileged, new middle classes were 
allowed to construct for themselves an education system based on the model of the Victorian public school 
(Hobsbawm, 1968: 141). This system would help to institute a rigid divide between the working-classes and the 
higher classes. Public school education, while historically initiated by the Anglican Church for disadvantaged 
children all around the nation, from the latter part of the eighteenth century emerged as a vehicle for independent 
schooling of children of the upper and upper middle ranks. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, finally, 
public schools became vehicles for the mutual accommodation of the lifestyles of emerging business elites and 
the aristocracy . They became Victorian vehicles of character formation, preparing children of the propertied 
elites for service in public office, armed forces and colonial government. The anti-catholicism that developed 
during the English Revolution Reformation lingered in the nineteenth century, though in an increasingly latent 
fashion. Despite the legal emancipation of Catholics in 1829, and the – fragile – union of Dissenters and Catholics 
in their bid against Establishment, anti-catholicism was still very much present.  
400 By focusing on the social blessings of free trade and cheap government, Gladstone made a moral case for the 
government‘s disengagement from the daily lives of its citizens, and strengthened it by compelling all of the 
enfranchised to pay income tax to the Treasury in recognition of the financial duties attached to citizenship. 
401 The prime concern of Treasury officials was with the use of taxes to extract revenue for the state rather than to 
shape the eocnomy and society, or the desire to stimulate growth or create justice.  Of course, politicians did wish 
to use th tax system in pursuit of differnet normative assumptions about the desirable shape of society, as well as 
with an eye to more immediate electoral advantage. On the whole, officials condoned the politicians' 
programmes, always provided that they did not threaten the apparent equity of the fiscal system and did not 
undermine consent (Daunton, 2002). 
402 They also advocated paying off the debt through a sinking fund. 
403 Inland Revenue, 1922.  ―Industry and the Weight of Taxation‖, Memorandum by the Board of Inland Revenue.  
Public Record Office, T1711203, C.P. 3649; 1972 Report of the Committee on National Debt and Taxation. 
Cmnd. 2800. 
404 Remarkably, this principle was often adopted by English courts too in their rulings about anti-competitive 
cartels. 
405 This official position was more homogeneuous than for instance in the US, where many civil servants chagned 
with the administration and the insitutional structure was more fragmented, with competing centres of power 
between different branches of government wand within the executive (cf. Smith, 1993: 6-11). 
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406 In the middle years of the nineteenth century, many economic assumptions were suddenly called in to 
question, including the usefulness of customs duties. On a few occasations, notably in 1842 and in 1860, some 
reforming Minister made a bonfire of dozens or even hundreds of these taxes, with negligible loss of revenue 
(Douglas, 1999: 149-150). In the closing years of teh nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, there 
was a swing the other way. Customs duties came into favour again in certain quarters, though for two very 
different reasons. Some people perceived that direct taxation posed a serious threat to the wealthier classes, and 
spoke of 'broadening the basis of taxation'. Other people, who were fearful of the effects which foreign 
competition might have on their livelihoods, moved to Protectionism under the new name 'Tariff Reform'. 
However, the major change in fortune for customs duties did not come fore either of these reasons, for in the 1914 
was a spate of new customs duties was applied in order to discourage imports of luxury goods and thereby tosave 
shipping space. These taxes, the 'McKenna Duties' were continued after the war, save for a brief interrupotion in 
1924, and gradually acquired 'respectability'. The efforts of the City to acquire a role of arbiter of ―neutrality‖ 
were remarkable in this regard. Thus, the City against any short term logic opposed the Liberal Party in its 
defence of the liberal international economic order and what have traditionally been conceived as the City‘s 
central interests in this order. Indeed, having to choose between the economic costs of tariff reform and the 
political threat of socialism, the City of London had uncharacteristically decided to endorse tariff reforms. In 
addition, given, on the one hand, the City financiers‘ disdain for the ―social question‖ and, on the other hand, the 
move of Edwardian liberalism towards policies of progressive taxation and social reform, further alienation 
between the Liberal Party and the City was the result (cf. Howe, 2004: 144). 
407 Priority was given to compliance and balance - to th eneed to ensure that taxpayers paid with a minimum of 
resentment, and taht taxes were not seen as offereing selfish advantages to one group over anothre. Indeed, the 
poltiical programmes might even sustain consent and protect therevenue by adjusting the tax system to chaning 
electoral and political circumstances. Thus gneral tax breaks to family men were accepted by the Tresury and 
INland Revenue; any scheme which offered more speicifc tax breaks and loopholses was firmly opposed a a 
threat tho the revenue and to the fairness of the fiscal regime (Daunton, 2002: 362).. 
408 As noted by Weber (1958:  100), the aristocratic, landed families and the king controlled the patronage of an 
immense number of election boroughs until the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832.  
409 This is how the role of the mass democratic electorate since its beginnings in 1867 and 1884 has to be 
interpreted. As argued by Joseph Chamberlain in 1886:  ‗The problem is to give the democracy the whole power, 
but to induce them to do no more in the way of using it than to decide on the general principles which they wish 
to see carried out and the men by whom they are to be carried out. My Radicalism, at all events, desires to see 
established a strong Government‘. The Webbs, for their part, argued that the people as a whole do not exist:  the 
people are a complex of minority interests. The Webbs joined Whig leaders in demonstrating how fears that 
democracy would lead to mob government had been proved false (Read, 1964:  208). They pointed out that the 
more the Welfare State had advanced the more it had become interested in particular rather than general 
categories, with the consequence that legislation and administration had been forced to become more 
specialised…‘legislation and governmental administration necessarily become, in all highly-organised 
communities – however Democratic they may be – more and more the business of elaborately trained experts, and 
less and less the immediate outcome of popular feeling. Nothing was more inexact than the forecast that so 
alarmed our fathers, that Democracy meant government by the mob. The more strong and effective becomes the 
Democratic feeling, the more will legislatures and governments be driven to grapple seriously with the real 
grievances and needs, not of the people in the abstract, but of the people as they really are‖ (Webb, 1908:  662-4). 
410 Multiple votes from property and education were greatly reduced but not wholly abandoned, and 
Conservatives continued defending them on grounds of superior fitness until 1948. Until 1928, similar 
considerations restricted women‘s enfranchisement to those over 30, who were ratepayers in their own right, or 
ratepayers‘ wives. This emphasis on maturity, property and marriage was a very different reward for war-service 
from that accorded men – since the 21 to 29 year-olds excluded were most likely to have taken paid war-work, as 
well as being dangerously unattached to men. Both considerations rendered their fitness suspect …reinforced by 
the perceived need to get women back into the home to replace the lost generation (Garrard, 2002: 97). 
411 Certain sorts of fitness still received additional reward by virtue of their business and university votes. Indeed, 
so persuaded were politicians by these traditional notions of quality that graduates were actually granted five 
further seats in 1918. In the early 1920s business voters numbered around 200,000 (217,000 by 1945) and 
graduate-electors 60,000. Property and education were thereby rewarded with up to two votes (additional to that 
gained by simple residence). Effectively, it also rewarded manhood and Conservatism (the business vote alone is 
believed to have swung constituencies rightwards on 18 occasions between 1922 and 1945, quite aside from the 
two seats regularly bequeathed by the City of London). (Garrard, 2002: 82). 
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412 Calculated from 1913, given that deposit-taking had not really started before policy-wise and in face of the 
dominance of the consumer co-operative dividend.   
413 Most Dutch commercial banks from the onset focused on an « old Regent » clientele of investors in the City of 
Amsterdam. Also, Dutch banks adopted the joint-stock form relatively late, and remained largely divorced from 
industrialisation dynamics before the end of WWI – with the exception of the Twentsche Bank. 
414 The limit to the rates which they could allow was, of course, governed by the return which they could 
themselves earn, and hence deposit rates came to be regulated by Bank rate.  Remarkably, the first London joint-
stock banks offered as much as 1 percent below Bank rates. These rates were much higher than could be found 
among the country banks, while even Lombard Street and the West End preferred to offer fixed rates on fixed 
deposits. Clearly, competition was undermining the old ways (Clegg, 1969: 165). 
415 The existence of a large capital, contributed by local men known to be of substance who were fully liable for 
the bank‘s debts, constituted a safeguard for a bank‘s stability. Such shareholders could be relied upon to confirm 
the independence of the institution « by transacting all their business with it, by circulating its paper, by bringing 
the weight of their influence with their commercial acquaintances to bear upon it, and by supporting the bank at 
the period of any run or panic » (cited in Thomas, 1934: 98-99). 
416 « The promoters of the early banks aimed at getting local shareholders of good repute and known wealth, 
especially members of the local ‗resident gentry‘ who were thereby brought to bring in favour of the bank all ‗the 
influence and weight of their characters and station to give it importance, credit and success‘  »… »the connection 
of the local gentry and wealthy citizens not only added to the public security, but also gave the bank management 
confidence….To this end most of the banks from the outset adopted the principle of giving their shares a high 
nominal value, and of calling up only a portion of that value, keeping the surplus as a reserve available for the use 
of the directors when required, the main reason for this being that there was a disinclination among the landed or 
gentry classes to take up shares in a bank if the nominal value was too low. Shares of low nominal value tended to 
be taken up by men of small means and small repute, and it seems that the gentry classes did not always care to 
mix themselves, even in the matter of bank investments, with those humbler members of society (Thomas, 1934:  
99). 
417 For the difference between bank notes and deposits is that the first are guaranteed by and redeemable against 
gold reserves, the latter not.   
418 This created a niche for a restyled brand of reform-oriented Whig bankers in London, willing to ―rescue‖ the 
provincial joint-stock banks from stigmatisation. In fact, already from 1833 on these Whig bankers had tendered 
their services to willing provincial banks (Alborn, 1998:  57-58). 
419 Working and lower middle class families with members in continuous employment had never had more money 
to save and spend. 
420 So, total deposits with the Liverpool and Manchester savings banks climbed from £3 million each to almost £4 
million (Moss and Russell, 1994:  106-109).    
421 From the evidence given by the secretaries and directors of BSs before the Royal Commission of 1871, we 
learn that many BSs operated largely within the working classes, though some derived their capital from investors 
of all classes (Report of the Royal Commission, 1871; cited in Moreh, 1966: 168). 
422 The number of shareholders of building societies in 1938 was about 3.7 times as great as that for 1922. The 
size of the average shareholding increased by 1.8 times over the same period (Cleary, 1965: 188).   
423 There was an increasing disconnect between Co-operative leadership and membership: the leadership was 
becoming increasingly isolated in its prioritisation of a ―Co-operative Commonwealth‖  and membership was 
becoming more and more indifferent in its prioritisation of ―cash value‖.   
424 Retail co-ops recruited very disproportionately from amongst the skilled and secure workers, i.e. the labour 
aristocracy.  Co-ops were well aware of this, and saw it less as a problem than the healthy result of their desire for 
respectability and financial probity. Indeed, they were resistant to broadening their membership ; when attempts 
were made before 1914, as the Co-opeative Women‘s Guild found, they generally failed...That participation in 
civil organisation was most richly evident amongst  skilled and secure working men is unsurprising. On the 
negative side, friendly-societies and union membership required the ability to pay regular subscriptions – 
necessaryily if the organisation was to survive and fulfill its functions. Only relatively well-paid, or at least 
secure, workers could afford these. Friendly societies even fined members for non-payment. Co-operative 
societies‘ prohibition on credit, and emphasis upon the quality as much as the price of what they sold, similarly 
disadvantaged those without secure and reasonably substantial wages. There were also more positive reasons for 
the participatory predilections of such workers. Genuinely skilled work required a series of informed decisions 
about what to do ; thus the use of intellectual as well as manual facilities. Once required to exercise them, their 
possessors were quite likely to apply them to other areas of life. Skilled jobs often permitted some leisure, and 
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thus opportunities to make such applications. Such workers also often saw their skill as a species of « property » 
(Garrard, 2002:  178; Joyce, 1980). 
425 The automatic character of the dividend for many decades provided Co-operative members with a remarkable 
calculability in face of income irregularities:  Indeed, as a method of democratic sharing the dividend was a 
recognised means by which individuals were able to negotiate the family budget. The dividend was paid out on a 
regular basis - originally quarterly, but latterly half yearly – according to purchases made.  The successful 
dividend practice was on account of the Consumer Co-op outlets, however, at a distance from the Banking 
department of the Co-operative Wholesale Society. 
426 The Co-operative dividend embodied a mixture of nonconformism and liberalism – ―consumption for the 
greater good‖ – that was well-matched with the dominant tradition of democratisation of the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century namely  voluntaryism, but much less with the rise of Anglican imperialism, National 
Efficiency and the emergence of a new class of white-collar workers. Still, during the second and third quarters of 
the nineteenth century, Liberal elites saw Co-operatives as a prototype of how to the market enabled outsiders to 
achieve respectability through ―democratic‖ means.  The City establishment was less enthusiastic about the Co-
operative dividend, as it represented a hidden form of savings in the hands of Co-operative Commonwealth 
zealots. Still, they were not overly alarmed, as the extension of retail credit was constanty criticised or 
underemphasised by Co-operative leaders themselves.  
427 Walter Bagehot‘s well-known definition of the qualities required for success in banking springs to mind here: 
‖any careful person…who is experienced in figures and has real sound sense, may easily make himself a good 
banker…banking is a watchful but not a laborious trade‖ (Balfour, 1950: 117). 
428 As a result, by the mid-1970s more than 90 per cent of the National Trade Union business was handled by the 
Co-operative Bank. 
429 Some other labour organisations, clubs, mutual aid societies, etc... followed the lead of the trade unions. 
430 Founded in 1872, the growth of the CWS bank was very slow. In 1873, total assets of the CWS Bank 
amounted to £188,672, in 1882 they totalled only £214,256. By 1892 some progress had been made with a total 
amount of £605,623. Only a few hundred accounts were held in this period, mostly by co-operative societies (see 
table 7.2). That, apart from a low resource base, the CWS Bank did not enjoy much discursive legitimacy either is 
very clear:  it is estimated that as late as 1907 75 percent of the societies affiliated to the CWS did not hold an 
account at the CWS Banking Department (Redfern, 1938:  403). 
431 This amalgamation movement has made banking safer – banks are no longer dependent too much upon the 
wealth of one area – but it has also made it much more monolithic, despite elaborate attempts to maintain a 
measure of local freedom. The history of the Midland bank, the name of which reveals its provincial origins, may 
be taken to illustrate the trend. It started in 1836 as the Birmingham and Midland Bank; but in the later years of 
the nineteenth century it began to expand rapidly and to absorb other banks, finally in 1891 entering the capital by 
taking over the Central Bank of London. The Midland was already three times as large as this London bank, but 
the Londoners made it a condition of amalgamation that the head office of the combined banks should be in 
London. A January half-yearly meeting was to be held in Birmingham and a July half-yearly meeting in the 
capital, but in 1912, significantly, the Birmingham meeting was given up, and the centralisation of the Midland in 
London was complete. By the 1960s the only large bank with headquarters outside London was Martins of 
Liverpool. The District Bank, with headquarters in Manchester, became linked with the National Provincial Bank 
in1962; this merger produced little local opposition, in contrast to 1904 when Manchester‘s spirit of provincial 
independence was still strong and prevented an attempt to merge the District Bank and the Lloyds Bank.  The old 
joint-stock bankers‘ adage ―Satan controls the hearts of Londoners‖ clearly had lost its resonance (Read, 1964: 
221). 
432 Barclays, one of the biggest banks, was formed from a number of private banks. 
433 Twenty persons who left substantial mark in the history of the Lloyds Bank (before WWII): « of the twenty, 
nine were sons of bankers and three others married bankers ‗ daughters. Nine had sons or sons-in-law who 
followed them in to banking. Seven were born Quakers ; these belonged mostly to the earlier 
generations…Including the one born a Quaker, eight of the twenty belonged to the Church of England ; two 
others (both in Birmingham) were Unitarians. Only three went to a university…Three were active in politics, all 
of them Consevative » (Sayers, 1957 : 61). 
434 Finally, the Institute would soon prove to be a handy means of cooperation between banks: it provided a 
minimum standard of technical competence for the growing number of salaried clerical staff in banking. 
435 While the smaller, terminating societies became more and more an isolated working class endeavour, the 
larger permanent societies almost invariably came under the executive direction of the respectable middle classes. 
436 [Anglican democracy entails a commitment to] a Commonwealth that embraces all – all classes, all sections, 
all interests – in a common life. The glory of our national history is a glory shed by the light of the vision of the 
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Commonwealth…the light has been often been dimmed…when a landed class, in the course of the sixteenth 
century, pursued low aims of private gain. It was dimmed again when a capitalistic class, during and after the 
industrial revolution, followed a policy of individual enrichment, and when the working class in a just resentment 
began to adopt a policy of retaliation and class warfare…The readjustment and reconstruction of the national 
economy in the true spirit of the Commonwealth is the supreme task of the future...wealth should be made to 
serve the Commonwealth, and industry to produce not wealth for a few, but welfare, abundant welfare, for all 
(Bentinck, 1918: 137-139). 
437 The individualists, on the other hand, while being highly critical of the trade unions, not only needed the 
unions‘ support to make co-operative workshops workable, but also were in dire need of the unions‘ funds to 
make their concept of a people bank viable. 
438 From the end of the nineteenth century, a consistent theme amongst leading co-operators was the opposition 
they drew between what they perceived as the ‗purifying‘ and morally elevating effects of participation in their 
movement and the degenerate and vulgar forms of mass entertainment favoured by leisure entrepreneurs. The 
consistent tendency of these - mainly nonconfirmist – leaders to antagonise ‗low‘ culture as debasing and 
demoralising, and to relentlessly emphasise the improvement of manners and morals, undoubtedly created 
distance and suspicion amongst the less financially independent working class strata. In addition, their attempts to 
build a rational alternative to ―irrational‖ capitalist modes of pleasure and entertainment failed: the working 
classes retained their autonomy in the sphere of recreation. As we will see in the next chapter, in the longer term 
this failure was to have particularly harmful effects for the position of retail co-operatives. While the moral 
economy of co-operation no doubt lingered on within many local communties during the interwar years and 
beyond.  But the overwhelming tendency remained that young working-class consumers were increasingly 
attracted to the delights and diversions of an expanding mass culture, which narrowed their role to that of passive 
reception (Gurney, 1999: 76, 141, 162). 
439 In a study of the potential of co-operative banking in Great Britain, Barou (1932) calculates that in 1928 wage-
earners – equivalent to small investors for the purpose of this study - in  Great Britain represented at least 75 
percent of the total population. While their total resources amounted to only 10 to 14 per cent of those of the 
whole nation, and while the average savings of the individual wage-earners were very small, the total of these 
savings represented approximately half of the total amount of the banking deposits in Great Britain. Of a total 
savings amount of £1,146 million only £100 million originated from co-operative societies. The rest of the 
amount was accumulated in the Post Office Savings Bank, Trustee Savings Banks, other Industrial and Provident 
Societies, Friendly Societies, Building Societies, Trade Union Funds and Industrial Assurance Funds. Barou 
(1932: 37) concludes that if ―even part of these savings could be accumulated in co-operative institutions and 
usefully employed, they would provide a great asset for the betterment of conditions of the working classes‖. It 
were especially the savings institutions that played an important role in the accumulation of working-class 
savings: the total amount of deposits at British savings institutions in 1928 amounted to 70 per cent of the bank 
deposits. These deposits were mainly  Invested in State securities. Not surprisingly, this prompted Barou (1932: 
41) to conclude that ―the ‗poor‘ could find much better use for their money in co-operative credit institutions, but 
the latter are not popular enough to attract the bulk of their savings‖. 
440 The argument of Downe goes even further than this. He attributes the price and unemployment crisis of the 
1920s to Commercial Banks: ―the control of industry is passing rapidly into the hands of the financier, until the 
money power invested in a score of men enables them to shut down the whole of a country‘s employment at 
will‖. Therefore ―if we are to escape from our bondage, study of money questions, especially finance, is 
essential‖ (Downe, 1921: 3). 
441 What were the avowed reasons for the clearers to move into multinational banking ?  
From the major clearing banks, Barclays came closest to having a strategic justification for its foreign expansion. 
The chairman F.C. Goodenough agreed with the widespread contemporary view that English manufacturers 
would need the active assisatnce of their bankers in postwar world markets. In order to give this assistance 
Barclays needed foreign branches. Barclays invested in the Anglo-Egyptian Bank and the Natinoal Bank of South 
Africa. Lloyds, on the other hand, justified its acquisition of the London and River Plate Bank in 1918 by the 
argument that it could thereby better serve its customers in Latin America. Although Montagu Norman – 
governor of the Bank of England – opposed the overseas expansion o fthe clearing banks, he encouraged Lloyds 
to acquire Cox and King in 1923. As became obvious with the mobilisation of support of the clearers to Anglo-
South American after 1931, Norman hated bank failure even more than the transgressing of self-imposed market 
boundaries (Jones, 1990: 46-47). 
442 As the independent English multinational banks were mostly concentrated in one single region or even 
country, they were highly exposed to nationalistic sentiments in that particular foreign area. In their bid to reduce 
risks they were eager to diversify by entering into geographical mergers or at least acquire a clearing bank as a 
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shareholder. The reasons for overseas bankers to ally with clearing banks were obvious ; this would provide them 
with a secure access to funds at a time when uncertain conditions made capital market agents less willing 
suppliers than before 1914. 
443 Banks in Latin America and the West Indies in particular felt the need for such diversification, and actively 
sought mergers and alliances.   
444 Although Montagu Norman – governor of the Bank of England – opposed the overseas expansion o fthe 
clearing banks, he encouraged Lloyds to acquire Cox and King in 1923. As became obvious with the mobilisation 
of support of the clearers to Anglo-South American after 1931, Norman hated bank failure even more than the 
transgressing of self-imposed market boundaries (Jones, 1990: 46-47). 
445 Forced to commit to a 2.5 % on all deposits, its appeal entirely depended on the Consol interest rate. 
446 To teach the virtues of saving to children the POSB distributed stampbooks to thousands of local schools. 
447 By 1900, the total sum of deposits at Post Office Bank stood at 135m. Compared to this figure, the £1,629,271 
accumulated by the Co-operative Wholesale Bank appeared bleak. 
448 The Trustee Savings Bank Association was established in 1887 « to watch over and protect the interests of 
depositors and to provide the means of affording the help of advice and cooperation in matters of a general 
character in which savings banks or their depositors may be interested » (Robie, 1992:  16). 
449 In 1926, the government had set up the so-called ―Bradbury Committee‖  to review the formation of municipal 
savings banks. One of the recommendations made by the Committee was that, rather than establish new savings 
banks, the TSBs should be encouraged to expand. Actually, this tendency had become apparent as early as the 
1890s. Indeed, the TSBs for at least half a century carried the burden of the ―old savings bank deficiency‖. This 
deficiency consisted of three elements, two beyond and one within the authority of Savings Banks. On the one 
hand, Parliament had deliberately pursued a policy of attracting savings bank depositors with an ―uneconomic 
rate of interest‖ in the early years. On the other hand, the savings bank moneys at times had been invested and 
sold by the National Debt Commissioners in pursuance of ―state policy‖ . The purpose of securing the best 
income for the Savings Bank Fund did not have priority in these instances (Horne, 1947: 272). Finally, these two 
elements contributed to the third: the fraud by trustees that led to the scandals of the mid-nineteenth century and 
the establishment of Post Office Savings Bank a decade later. 
450 Confronted with falling prices, interest rates and property values, building societies reacted by by maintaining 
mortgage rates. While this allowed them to attract increasing volumes of savings, falling property values and the 
rising volume of surplus funds meant that demand for loans backed by adequate mortgage security was 
inadequate to absorb the societies‘ funds. Hence, building societies extended their business into increasingly risky 
areas. Competition between building societies soared in the form of more generous advances against poorer 
security, an extension into increased finance of commercial enterprises and an increase in more purely banking 
business. Not surprisingly, as a result, many building societies ran into difficulties. The demise of the societies  
―Liberator‖ in 1892 and Birkbeck in 1911, shook investors‘ confidence in the building society movement. 
Following a further Building Societies Act in 1894, the boundaries of trustworthy building society business were 
more sharply delineated from other financial activities. This allowed the movement to recover its membership and 
asset totals by 1919. 
451 Starting with Owen‘s self-sufficient agricultural communities, provision of housing for members has always 
been a major concern for the co-operative movement. Not wanting to stay absent in the housing market, the 
Rochdale Pioneers set up a Land and Building Company in 1861 to provide for co-operative housing on its own 
lands. In addition, the Rochdale Pioneers set up an independent Co-operative Building Society, later to change its 
name to Nationwide Building Society. This does not mean that building societies should be considered a part of 
the Co-operative movement.  Indeed, English building societies, while having originated in the urban movement 
of mutual self-help, were quite different entities than co-operatives, both in political and economic terms (Barou, 
1932). For one, in contradistinction with the building societies, the Rochdale Equitable Pioneer Society preferred 
to directly build and provide housing on its own lands .  On the other hand, the member versus capital ownership 
problem was solved in an almost opposite way in Building Societies. The ultimate proof of the profound 
difference between the Building Society and Co-operative movement is that the Co-op Board deemed it 
appropriate to grant the Co-operative Building Society not only legal independence, but also political, as the 
Society‘s affiliation to the BSA, an association pursuing very different purposes than the Co-operative Union, 
demonstrates. 
452 As a result, a given rate of building society interest represented a higher gross (of tax) rate when there was an 
increase in income tax rates, and it was this gross rate which was relevant to an income tax payer keen to compare 
the yields of alternative investments. 
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453 The intention of the arrangements was to save the Inland Revenue from routine clerical work in taxing or 
paying rebates to investors, many of whom did not understand income tax, but they also gave to building society 
members the advantage of a simple straightforwards investment free from tax complications. 
454 The arrangements began in 1895 and continued until 1932 – afterwards the same basic principles were retained 
on more informal grounds. 
455 The average shareholding shown in the industrial societies varied approximately from £250 to £700 at par 
whilst the average shareholding in the building society movement as a whole was £208. The returns for the 
average of the 47 large societies was even larger, and was actually £240. 
456 This in fact meant a movement from local authority – administration through a local court of law – to 
administration through a central government department (cf. Gosden, 1961:  10). Of course, while at the local 
level working people had some influence, at the central government level this influence was minimal. 
457 While this would involved an economic decentralization of credit functions away from the Bank of England, it 
also implied a renew political centralisation and civic legitimacy  for the Bank. 
458 Still, it was not until the cheap money period of the 1880s that real progress was made towards a deposit-rate 
agreement. 
459 After the  the near-collapse of the merchant bank Barings in 1890 the debate became more animated again (cf. 
Pressnell, 1968). By the 1900s, although competitive bidding had still not disappeared, it was usual for the banks 
in any town to offer similar rates on deposits, and this was coming to be expected by the public. 
460 Courts generally refused to intervene in disputes, taking an "attitude of neutrality towards economic groups 
struggling for enforcement of their economic aims" which indicated a recognition that economic competition 
moved faster than competition laws could reasonably change (Freyer, 1992a: 214-215; Pollard, 1962). 
461 All the labour struggles did was to reinforce support for self-regulating, restrictive practices. This was in great 
contrast with the US, were the confrontation between small and big business continued. While English courts held 
on to the principles of Free trade and freedom of contract, advocates of small and big business appealed and 
obtained much more Supreme court intervention. After WWII, British organised labour gave up much of its 
evolutionist theory and became more concerned about antitrust than its US counterpart (Freyer, 1992a: 324-332). 
462 In England the ―rule of reasonableness‖, while in principle aligned with the old common law doctrine, dating 
back to Queen Elizabeth, that all restraints to trade were contrary to public policy and therefore void – allowed for 
a relaxation of this doctrine as needed by the ―special circumstances of a particular case‖…The principal result 
was to sustain extensive business self-regulation maintained through loose, restrictive agreements which ensured 
the comparatively greater control of family firms (cf. Freyer, 1992a: 124). 
463 « Throughout Britain the government was keen to foster the expansion of other independent thrift 
organisations, which would not make any demands on the Treasury, in the same way that the savings banks and 
annuities did. Legal protection was given to building societies in 1836 through the Benefit Building Societies 
Act‖  (Moss and Russell, 1994:  46-47). 
464 The foundations of TSB‘s success lay in the heydays of Liberalism. For Gladstone, deposits invested in TSBs 
provided an extra source of revenue for the Treasury in managing the national debt. This extra revenue enabled 
him to reduce income tax in 1861. TSBs would retain this reputation of providing an indirect source of income 
taxation in political circles, long after the Liberal heydays.   
465 Savings banks became especially popular after 1870. The Post Office Savings Bank, more than the older 
Trustee Savings Banks was responsible for this evolution. By 1871, a decade after the first government savings 
bank branch opened, the Post Office Savings Bank was administering more accounts in Britain (over 1.4m) than 
all the Trustee Savings Banks combined. By 1886, it surpassed the trustee banks in that category as well, with 
over £50m in deposits. As the Post Office system increased in scope, the sort of customers who visited its 
branches changed. Initially, the Post Office Savings Bank had attracted workers from lower down the economic 
scale than the trustee bank depositors; its average deposits were half the size of those held by the latter banks. By 
the 1890s, more lower-middle class customers were looking to deposit money with the Bank. 
466 In 1919, 80 per cent of the households still rented housing from private landlords. 
467 Private rented housing was a matter of urban lower-middle classes anyway, certainly not a core constituency of 
the « landed » Conservative Party at that time. 
468 The extension of the franchise to this 'lower depth' in 1918, the militancy of unions, and the demands for a 
capital levy, all contributed to the sense of panic...mobilised by the Anti-Waste League and provided an 
alternative to the anti-rentier rhetoric of labour. The League won three by-elections in 1921, and 
469 'We must take counsel', Lloyed George warned Austen Chamberlain, 'lest we find ourselves caught between 
labour in the North and [middle-class] anti-waste in the South'" (cited in McDonald, 1989: 650). 
470 There was a danger that short-term bills would not be renewed when they fell due, so driving the govenrment 
to borrow from the Bank of England. credit would expand, purchasing power rise and prices and wages spiral 
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upwards in a vicious circle. Such a situation gave power to 'the holders of Treasury bils -that is the banks, the 
market and to a certain extent, the investor generally - to force th eGovernment at any time to create new credit, 
and that measn the whole cycle of inflation restarted' (cited in Daunton, 2002: 76-77). 
471 For instance, Barclays‘ self-avowed aim with the mergers and transformation in a public limited company was 
the preservation of the traditions of private banking within the corporate structure. The preservation of these 
traditions would be guaranteed by the continuing independence of local management teams (Ackrill and Hannah, 
2001: 63). 
472 While population growth had been biggest in the industrial provinces in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
London and the south-east provinces experienced the highest rate of growth of employment after 1850 and 
enjoyed the largest per capita incomes in England (Cain and Hopkins, 1987:  2). 
473 This English usage of the word "public" contrasts strongly with the expectations of many English speakers 
from around the world. Outside the British Isles people usually refer to fee-paying schools as private schools or 
independent schools; many would assume that the word "public" should imply public financial support. Indeed, in 
many countries "public school" is the commonplace name for a government-maintained school where instruction 
is provided free of charge; in England such a school would commonly be called a state school, a local authority 
school, or a foundation or community school. Usage in Scotland has its own particular nuances; as in England 
nowadays, there is a tendency to avoid the phrase "public school" altogether, and to speak of "state schools" or 
"council schools" on the one hand and "private" or "independent schools" on the other. However, contrary to 
practice in England, the phrase "public school" is used in official documents (and still sometimes colloquially) to 
refer to Scottish state-funded schools. When the term is applied informally to independent schools located in 
Scotland some interpret the usage as an Anglicism or a parody of English usage 
474 The multinational banks which operated in countries not settled by Europeans continued to recruit their future 
executives from Britain, and from a particular social and educational background within Britain. These staff 
followed a similar career path, working their way up from junior to manager and occasionally beyond. The 
remained a small group…The smallness of numbers and the similar background encouraged a group identity, 
corporate loyalty, and willingness to abide – in general – in the tradition and practices of the institution…Public 
schools, and occasionally grammar schools, were the only sources of recruitment for the British overseas 
banks..‘character‘ assumed an even greater importance after 1914…Common backgrounds, social and sporting 
links, and lifelong employment bound together the executive staff of the British overseas bnaks. Formal training 
was conspicuous by its absence…In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the recruitment of university 
graduates was not a high priority for banks which prized ‗personality‘ over intellectual ability or academic 
training (Jones, 1990: 169-170).  
475 As the British empire spread throughout the world in the 18th and 19th cents, another character-forming 
institution, the Anglican church followed – or in some cases led the way. Two overseas dioceses in 1800 
increased to 72 in 1882, and to 450 dioceses (in 28 provinces) in the 1990s 
476 One reason why the Empire came into existence as a collection of colonies each with an identity and a fiscal 
autonomy of its own was that Britain‘s predominance in world trade enabled her to fit the colonies into an 
international trading system, of which she was the hub, in a way that other European colonial powers could not 
match. In the early 1830s, well before the introduction of self-government in the colonies of settlement, the 
London private banks began to spread their branches in the shadow of the British flag. Throughout the area of the 
future Commonwealth they were an integrated private banking network. Surpluses were left with the head-office 
in London and the policy gradually arose, for commercial convenience, of maintaining a fixed parity between the 
local currency and the Pound Sterling. Thus the Sterling Exchange Standard arose: that is to say the acceptance of 
sterling as the ultimate means of international payment. Although down to 1914 London was the unquestioned 
world banker, there was a tendency for it to become more closely indentified with the Commonwealth. Before 
1870 foreign countries borrowed more in London than did the colonies. But thereafter the proposition raised by 
other parts of the Commonwealth steadily increased. By 1914 42% of British overseas investment was going to 
countries of the future sterling area. Between 1926-1930, nearly 60% was being raised by these countries. 
477 Through a series of acquisitions Lloyds acquired the entire British overseas banking branch network in Latin 
America as well as a number of branches in India. Lloyds also created a branch network in Continental Europe. 
Finally, Lloyds took small equity stakes in British overseas banks in New Zealand and West Africa. 
478 Barclays was doing much better than Lloyds in this regard, mainly because it had managed to consolidate its 
imperial investments; in 1925 the three Empire banks [Colonial Bank (Barbados), Anglo-Egyptian Bank 
(Palestine, Malta and Cyprus), National Bank of South Africa] – with total assets of nearly £69 million (about 
one-fifth the siwe of the group‘s domestic balance sheet) – were merged into one company: Barclays Bank DCO 
(Dominion, Colonial and Overseas). 
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479 « Barclays bankers‘ hearts…were more in the British Empire … Goodenough and Hambling, in particular, 
were staunch imperialists ; in 1918-1930 Goodenough served as a member of the India Council, while Hambling 
was the government-nominated director of Imperial Airways in 1924-30. Barclays senior management was also 
on excellent terms with Jan Smuts and the leaders of South Africa and other political and business leaders in the 
Empire and nascent Commonwealth. Like many City men, they found the increasing dependence of Britain on 
American support in times of financial crisis profoundly distasteful and also perceived the German banks as a 
serious threat to Britain‘s international trading position unless an imperial counterweight could be created. 
Goodenough‘s wider conception of an imperial trade area with fixed exchange rates reamined an impractical 
dream but, in a more restricted sphere, his vision was concertely expressed by acquisitions » (Ackrill and Hannah, 
2001: 81) 
480 1871. Friendly and Benefit Building Societies. First report of the Commissioners. Minutes of evidence, 
appendix and index. XXV, vi: p.7. 
481 Winston Churchill (cited in Hodgson, 1929: 5-6): "I have followed with great interest the remarkable 
expansion of the Building Societies during teh dificult and often anxious years that have passed since 1918...it is a 
remarkable tribute to the efficiency of the Societies that their loans to houseowners have increased nearly 
fourfold...As Chancellor of the Exchequer I have constantly in mind the importance of increasing teh nation's 
savings. Toward this end, the Building Societie shave made and are making a great contribution. Their assistance 
to thrift is twofold. On the one hand, they attract a large volume of savings by the facilities for investment which 
they offer, and I am glad to know that the Societies are particularly interested in giving opportunities for thei 
investment of small sums. Directing these savings towards house purchase, they call into being a new body of 
savers pledged out of tehir future earnings to set aside a part for the redemtpion of the Societies' advances. At the 
present moment some half a million people are in this way saving steadily year by year to become the owners of 
their homes. The stream of saving thus set flowing by the Building Societies will not stop when the immediate 
purpose of house ownership is achieved. The habit of saving will survive and the nation will continue to benefit 
from the work of the Societies long after their primary aim has been attained. 
482 While the Co-operative movement wanted to educate the working classes into a very different type of 
geopolitical world and internationalism, it completely lacked the clout to do this. The labour aristocracy – which 
constituted the core of the Co-op movement – had not struggled for an education system infused with the purpose 
of elevating their status to a more respectable – new labour aristocracy or even middle class – level. The main 
reason for this neglect again was that co-operators had sought to incorporate three different educational 
influences:  first, nonconformist humanism that was poised against class-conflict – since ―God made all men 
alike‖ there was only ―one true redemption‖ in the secular world , second, aristocratic notions of independence 
and internal freedom – leading to the veneration of autodidactic traditions, and third, radical advocacy of 
working-class specific ―really useful knowledge‖ – in casu the need to teach a working-class version of political 
economy demonstrating the injustice of social structures. ….. Co-operative leaders entrusted the care of education 
facilities to the minimalist Liberals. While the Liberals had expanded compulsory elementary education, they had 
also allowed secondary education for workers to disappear .  So, before 1870 the autodidact nature of working-
class education and the centrality in English popular opinion of  ―really useful knowledge‖ had mitigated the 
negative effects of this lack of respectable education for the working classes, from the 1870‘s the result was that 
limited liability companies in all kinds of industries recruited fewer of their leaders from the working class, and 
more from existing business families, clerks and respectable men already in office. With the decline in industrial 
opportunities, on the one hand, and the disappearance of educational opportunities, on the other hand, upward 
mobility for the working class was becoming very limited (Perkin, 1989:  426-427). 
483 The existence of an international and ―democratic‖ intermediary for joint-stock sharetrading, the London Stock 
Exchange, of course was a major comparative disadvantage for co-operatives. The Owenite financial exchange of 
the 1830s had gone bankrupt and was not reinvigorated afterwards. 
484 Bankers such as Thomas Attwood personified commercial joint-stock banking for most of the nineteenth 
century. Far from seeking an image of impartiality and neutrality, such bankers combined the roles of leading 
provincial politician, leading provincial banker, and leader of popular opinion. The highly local banking system, 
which made the combination of these roles possible, played a key part in financing the Industrial Revolution and 
giving the Pax Brittanica a distinctly democratic flavour (Read, 1964).  
485 Take for instance this article in the Journal of the Institute of Bankers in 1893 (JIB 1893 XIV (VIII) Gilbart 
Lectures:  404-405):  ―I allude to the institutions known as Trustees‘ Savings Banks and the Post Office Savings 
Banks. The object of the establishment of banks of this sort was…to afford special opportunities for the 
cultivation of thrift among a class of the community not supposed to be usually addicted to that virtue, and that 
object was, undoubtedly, a laudable one, and if their operations were confined to facilitating or encouraging the 
deposit by the town artisan, the agricultural labourer, or the domestic servant of a portion of his or her weekly 
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wages, which might otherwise be expended in less desirable methods, I do not think any of you would be 
disposed to complain of such a limited and legitimate rivalry to your business…But if one comes to look at the 
figures set out in the Government returns relating to Trustee and Post Office Savings Banks, one cannot help very 
much doubting whether the operations of such institutions have not now extended a long way beyond the objects 
contemplated at the outset, whether the very large amounts which come to their coffers can really have had their 
origin and source in the savings of the wage-earning class, or whether such banks are not rather, for some reason 
or other, being utilised by persons for whose benefit they were never designed, and who, but for some advantages, 
real or supposed, which they derive from taking their money to these particular class of banks might, and 
probably would, open accounts with an ordinary private or Joint Stock Bank.‖ 
486 Joint-stock banks were particulary scathing about the democratic passions that seemed to have inspired the 
Treasury into giving savings banks a preferential treatment. This protest, however, waned as fast as it had waxed.  
It soon become clear that the Treasury was not such a democratic pioneer after all: it refused the Post Office 
Savings Bank another raise in interest rates, even though the Bank‘s rate of 2.5 % became increasingly 
uncompetitive after 1900 (Gibson, 1908).     
487 The first group stressed that both « the money in the hands of the Savings Banks, and the money in the hands 
of the Commercial Banks, belongs to the community » and that « the proprietary, or shareholders‘ interest, is 
minor as compared with the public interest ». Thus, it is normal that « the public within defined limits shall have 
the choice between an ordinary bank and a Savings Bank ». But « to couple with that choice competitive 
attractions in favour of the Savings Bank, which are only rendered possible by a total disregard of the canons of 
sound finance, is a question in which the whole community is interested ».  That is because, « to check the growth 
of the deposits of the ordinary banks is to starve the commerce of the country…until those responsible for the 
finances of both classes of Savings Banks [Post office and Trustee] hold more cash than they do now to meet 
sudden emergencies, the practice is not to be commended». In effect, this group argued that  « we are in danger of 
crossing the line that divides economics from politics. The chastening fear of the ballot-box is ever before the 
eyes of the politician, and he needs to be very sure of his ground before he dare grapple with a problem the 
consequences of which are wrapped up in obscure considerations of finance. » (Pownall, 1903: 173, 176). In 
reaction to this group, another group maintained that « this nterest question is not for us as bankers at all. The 
question whether the Government thinks it is good for the State, and for the maintenance of thrift amongst the 
poor, that they shall pay a little more interest than they can make, is a question as between the tax-payer and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, with which we, as bankers, have nothing to do. It is quite clear that we do not want 
the deposits of these poor people; they are nothing to us, we are not going to allow interest on them. Therefore, I 
ask you in this matter to remember that if you express an opinion in favour of rigidly restricting interest to what 
the Government can make, that you should not do it as bankers, but that you should do it simply as tax-payers » 
(Harvey, 1903: 204-205). 
488 The establishment of the latter association meant that for the first time joint-stock banks had a « representative 
body capable of speaking with great weight on behalf of all the banks of the country » (Lord Hillington of Glyns, 
1895: 90 cited in Alborn, 1994: 146). 
489 The banking community‘s mechanisms for internal consultation, the central role of the Committee of the 
London Clearing Bankers and the occasional use of the press… 
Bankers, to say the least, passive in Parliament, associations preoccupied with problems of a primarily technical 
order…The government and Treasury alike certainly had connections with the banks other than through the 
professional associations, some of which were offical and others more private in nature…the private links were of 
two kinds:  private consultations and social, friendly and even, in some cases, family relations…it was public 
knowledge that Chancellors of the Exchequer asked the most influential City bankers for advice, and, even more, 
that senior Treasury officals were more or less constantly in touch with these same eminent financiers…the 
bankers shared the same social life as the politicians, frequented the same circles and belonged to the same clubs 
(Cassis, 1994:  290). 
490 On the contrary, the bankers were acting ―solely and absolutely in the interests, not only of those great 
institutions which are given into their charge, but of the nation itself » (Liberal parliamentary chairman MacLean 
at the 1921 International Finance Conference at Brussels , cited in Howe, 2004: 147). 
491 Initially only 26 of the 389 trustee savings banks (TSB) became members. The work of the association was to 
be directed by a Council of Management comprising representatives from not fewer than 14 of the larger TSBs. 
The day to day affairs were to be guided by a trio of honorary secretaries made up of the actuaries of the 
Glasgow, Manchester and Liverpool savings banks. But for a long time it remained ineffective in persuading 
hundreds of small savings banks to speak and act as a single body. 
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492 By separating subscriber-democracy from modern management, building societies from the mid-19th century 
onwards imitated the moves made by joint-stock banks, namely to cast off their overly ―democratic‖ past and turn 
their back on direct involvement in local politics (Alborn, 1998: 5). 
493 By default of tangible liberal support, it was up to the ―Tory‖ Christian Socialists to provide Co-operators with 
the necessary legal protection and autonomy.  Through the intervention of Christian Socialists Co-operators were 
gradually granted corporate rights, be it within the limited, paternalistic framework of friendly societies. In 
particular, it lasted until 1876 before Co-operatives gained the right to provide financial services, many decades 
after  Savings Banks and Building Societies. 
494 Co-operators would soon feel the brunt of their failure to produce an effective political pressure group. Of 
course, a Joint Parliamentary Committee was set up in the 1870s, though with little support of either the 
membership or the nonconformist leadership. After the defeat of Gladstone in 1874, the lack of effectiveness of 
the Co-operative Committee compared to for instance the Building Society Association became really striking. 
So, while previous Liberal-minded Commissions had accused Building Societies of abusing their special 
corporate rights, the next Tory-led Royal Commission not only reaffirmed Building Societies‘ distinct corporate 
status, but also allowed them much more financial freedom than other friendly societies, in particular Co-
operatives. 
495 This was especially true because the CWS for a long time failed to convert the trade unions to the co-operative 
cause Historically, the Christian Socialists had mostly earned contempt from the unionists, who branded them 
―utopian idealists‖. The banking dispute ushered in the demise of the Christian Socialists in the movement. This 
was very unfortunate, since Christian Socialists were the only Co-operative leaders with sufficient political 
currency and willingness to help the Co-oprative Bank forward in the tumultuous decades 1870 to 1920. 
496 In contrast with continental working-class movements, English Co-operators – while against excessive profit-
making – did neither contest market deficits by political means, nor actively tackle political deficitsUp to WWI 
and even after, many Co-operative leaders saw the market as a class-neutral institution, the friend of moral 
improvement and the enemy of the exploitative trade monopolies. During the heydays of the Liberal Party and the 
Pax Brittanica, this non-interventionist strategy fitted perfectly. Far from being seen as a threat by politicians to 
the established capitalist system, co-operatives became acknowledged as a way of encouraging working class 
thrift and protecting workers‘savings during these years.  For many politicians they were hardly distinguishable 
from capitalist experiments in profit-sharing and worker participation. Though the Co-operative movement 
supported the Reform Bill of 1867, it can hardly be said to have agitated for it; the movement was more 
concerned with its own organisational problems (Youngjohns, 1954:  55). Nevertheless, before 1867 the Co-
operative Societies were entitled to nominate voters if the rateable value of their premises was of £ 10. 
497 With regards to fiscal policy, the Co-operative Party consistently favoured the abolition of tariffs, subsidies 
and restrictions upon the flow of trade and was opposed to commodity taxation in general. On the other hand, 
with respect to competition policy, the Co-operative Party continually pressed for the restraint of trusts and 
combines, and opposed the national economic planning of the ―thirties on the grounds that being based on the 
profit-making motive it would ‗perpetuate waste and existing inequalities of wealth and income, concentrate 
economic control in the hands of powerful self-seeking corporations and encourage nationalism and war‘‖ (Co-
operative Party Conference Report, 1935; cited in Bonner, 1970: 191). 
498 This was for instance the case when the Co-operative MP Alexander raised the issue of ―profiteering‖ as 
symptomatic of the rise of trusts and price-fixing associations in the House of Commons in 1922. While the 
Labour government had been very slow to act upon Alexander‘s call, after the fall of the Labour government in 
1924, the Conservative government decided to take up the issue. A commission was set up to investigate the 
issue. However, despite interviewing several leading Co-operators such as Alexander, the president of the 
Commission, Geddes, refused to take notice of their grievances. On the contrary, Geddes concluded that Co-
operation ―was really indistinguishable…from any big capitalist trust‖ (First Report of the Royal Commission on 
Food Prices [Cmd. 2390] Volume II, Minutes of Evidence, 1925: 182).; there actually was no real difference 
between ―profits‖ and dividend ―surplus‖, ―consumer‖ and ―member‖. Not suprisingly, captains of industry such 
as the Vesty brothers – who controlled the Union Cold Storage Company Ltd. – were completely exonerated of 
any ―dishonest trading or of profiteering against dealers in wheat, flour, bread or meat‖. 
499 In fact, there existed a substantial discrepancy between the positions of the Labour and Co-operative Party 
with regards to how the relation between the political and the economic should be managed. While the Co-
operative Party favoured the extension of consumer co-operation, Labour made plans to increase the sphere of 
wholesaling, to the dismay of local Co-operative Societies which felt their sphere of action was being limited 
500As a result of this failed attack – and the blocking of Alexander‘s Trust and Combines Bill, leading Co-
operators emphasised even more the need of state regulation of the market, and in particular ―monopolies‖, so as 
to protect the rights of consumers. As could be expected, this insistence found only resistance amongst the 
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Conservatives: their view of the company was more influenced by a traditional view of social order than by free 
market ideas. More importantly, it found only lukewarm support from the Labour Party, which by then had 
become the big brother of the Co-operative Party. This was not entirely surprising, as politicians had got used to 
associating cartels in for instance the banking sector with the public interest. From a larger perspective, the 
agenda for company reform centred entirely on the need for greater publicity and disclosure, and remained firmly 
within the frame of reference provided by existing company law (see also endnotet 195).  So, the Co-operative 
Union, insisted that for companies ―registered under the Companies Acts, including private companies, it was 
necessary in the public interest to require full publicity in accounts in order to prevent the exploitation of the 
consumer.‖ Also, the Union expressed ―the necessity for greater stringency in the auditing of the accounts of 
public companies‖  (Co-Operative Congress Report, 1929. Co-Operative Union; Manchester  92). 
501 Neither the Labour Party and the trade unions, or the Co-operative movement developed any clear strategy 
regarding the framework within which companies operate, appropriate changes to their internal organisation, and 
the social responsibilities they should assume. The movement for constitutional reform of the ―firm‖  in the 
nineteenth century was not sustained. While the trade unions sought to drive better bargains with employers, they 
rarely endeavoured to get a direct voice – for instance a seat – in the governance structure of economic 
organisations, mainly because their members did not push them on this issue (Phelps Brown, 1959: 214-215). 
Concerns for trade union independence kept trade unions from establishing firm commitments to worker 
representation on administrative and management Boards. Instead, the Labour movement in the 1920s turned to 
issues of socialisation and the need for public ownership as the only viable means to secure the public interest in 
industry. Though Labour leaders recognised large sections of private industry were there to stay, most of them 
concentrated their activism on the socialisation of ‗key‘ industries, and on the role of planning bodies such as the 
‗supreme economic authority‘ or the National Investment Board. Voices raising the issue of the re-organisation of 
economic activity along co-operative lines did exist, but were weaker. 
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8 DUTCH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1930-1965) 
 
8.1   Changing geo-political opportunity structure (phase 1) 
 
 a) The emergence of a Green Front 
The world crisis that started after the 1929 crash of the New York Stock 
Exchange, opened the proverbial pandora box for Dutch imperial and world-state 
pretensions. Several fledgling dynamics emerged that would put remaining ambitions of an 
Amsterdam-centred colonial and financial empire to rest; in favour of an identity of a small 
industrial, export-oriented nation with a low-cost comparative advantage, and a more 
chartalist conception of monetary exchange.
502
  The demise of the Amsterdam 
prolongation market and the re-emergence of agricultural protectionism in the early 1930s 
opened a window of opportunity in popular opinion to discuss the issue of national 
monetary management (Dillen, 1964: 529).  This would be the first major debate on 
monetary policy in the Netherlands since the Patriot Revolution. The debate started in 
1933: should the Netherlands retain the gold standard or should the country devalue the 
guilder – pride of the Dutch imperial nation (Griffiths and Schoorl, 1987).  There was 
virtually no political pressure to devalue (Griffiths, 1987), except from the Catholic Party 
RKSP (Goudriaan, 1937: 35) and the agricultural lobby (De Boo, 1989; De Vries, 1974: 
275). The Dutch government, led by the Protestant Anti-Revolutionary Party and 
supported by Holland circles of high finance, chose to maintain parity with the gold 
standard longest of all Western countries, until 1936.
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 Ultimately this stubbornness 
would cost the Dutch ―Regent capitalists‖, in particular their Reformed Protestant leader 
Colijn, dear – dampening Dutch colonial and transatlantic aspirations.  The devaluation of 
the guilder in 1936 was not the result of a well-considered policy but was forced on the 
government after the collapse of the gold bloc with the devaluation of the French and 
Swiss francs (Van Zanden, 1997: 150). It would be viewed as a vindication of Catholic 
protests against the gold standard. The balance of power in the Dutch christian nation was 
about to change, with Catholics rapidly emancipating from Protestant prejudices, and the 
so-called ―Green Front‖ gaining strength. The Green Front was a cross-denominational 
alliance of agricultural unions involving all denominations – but providing especially 
Catholic leaders with a valuable testing ground for their aspirations of emancipation.
504
   
  Organised in a system of hierarchical pillars, many Dutchmen in the provinces 
came to support the Green Front; if their leaders took issue with the primacy of colonial 
interests and Regent capitalism, so would they.  Contrary to England, the first Western 
country to have outsourced its agriculture, where Empire was associated with ―cheap loaf‖ 
and the formation of national character, grassroot support for imperial notions was fragile 
in the Netherlands.  Ultimately, the colonial lobby would prove no match for the Green 
Front, and its ambitions for a more ―chartalist‖, industrial Dutch nation. While the British 
State successfully redirected its world-state efforts to the Commonwealth with its policies 
of imperial preference and central bank coordination, relations between the Dutch Indies 
and the Netherlands quickly deteriorated in the first half of the 1930s. By default of 
geopolitical alternatives, cooperation between he Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies 
simply had to become more important. Yet, the colonial department in The Hague did not 
manage to gain much influence in Dutch trade policy. The metropole – Amsterdam – had 
to help its overseas territories, but in the eyes of many Indonesians and colonial Dutchmen 
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failed to do so. Domestic interests trumped world-state aspirations, turning what officially 
was mutual help into a one-sided safeguard for Dutch industry‘s exports – primarily from 
the textile industry in Twente.  In terms of aspirations of a Commonwealth, Dutch colonial 
policy had reached a dead end by the late 1930s already (Taselaar, 1998: 623).
505
  The old 
claim by Regent capitalists that, without its colonies and a monetary policy geared towards 
international financiers, the Netherlands was in danger of being relegated to a position of 
benign agrarian dwarf (Nobel and Fennema, 2004: 15) was fast losing relevance. The final 
nail in the colonial lobby‘s coffin was WWII.  The country‘s occupation by the German 
army and Japan‘s invasion of Indonesia stripped Dutch high finance of its riches and 
consolidated a level-playing field between the Holland city-states and the outer 
provinces.
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  During WWII, only a minority of die hards believed the loss of colonies 
would represent a serious break with Dutch Republican history.  Finally, by the end of 
WWII proponents of a rentier world-state could no longer claim the higher ground from 
champions of a new agricultural-industrial nation.
507
  
 b) The loss of the Dutch Indies: a “happy accident” 
In the short term, the loss of the Dutch Indies undoubtedly constituted a 
significant economic setback. Within a longer term perspective, it actually was a blessing 
in disguise, pushing quarrelling Dutch elites towards a new clarity of mind. As geopolitical 
parameters changed drastically after WWII, an ability to start with a clean sheet was a 
major geopolitical advantage. In spite of their resentment for some US traditions such as 
―happy mediocrity‖, many English elites believed in a continuity between the Pax 
Britannica and Pax Americana. The new Dutch elites, by contrast, harboured no such 
illusions. This pragmatic stance provided the Dutch with a better point of departure to 
reinvent their historical success model of ―Dutch nonconformism‖ – associated with the 
Republic‘s Golden Age: reinforce local privileges and traditions by pioneering a low-cost 
and pragmatic geopolitical vantage point; a vantage point conducive to a spill-over of the 
benefits of dominant international standards, techniques and agreements.   
More than ever, the Dutch would endeavour to protect their own traditions from 
external shocks, by keeping abreast of impending geopolitical changes and joining forces 
with the new standard-creating social classes in foreign city-states – the competition 
bureaucrats of Brussels, the monetary authorities in Frankfurt, and the Eurodollar 
speculators of London. 
With world-state aspirations defeated, and Dutch Catholics and social democrats 
firmly in control, the Dutch government seemed warier than its British counterpart about 
the nature of US ―Empire of Liberty‖ aims. All the more since the purported aim of 
Marshall-help in a few years time had changed from overtly economic to overtly 
defensive, political aims: to fight Soviet communism and halt the march of socialism in 
Europe.
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 Buttressed by the primacy of provincialism – the supremacy of the Green Front 
and the system of denominational pillars in post-WWII Netherlands, the government did 
not wish to pass ethical judgements on the changing democratisation aims of the US 
government. Rather, governing Catholic and social-democratic elites saw US Marshall aid 
as a happy accident. Besides helping them get on with the overwhelming job ahead, this 
aid package served to overcome remaining opposition of the colonial establishment (Eng, 
1987: 242).  
c) The emerging EEC 
The newfound clarity of mind about the Netherlands‘ position in the world would 
come in very handy in face of the emerging European Economic Community. While the 
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British engaged in a massive amount of geopolitical wrangling and soul-seeking, the Dutch 
from the onset were committed to using European collaboration as the main platform to 
punch above their geopolitical weight.  All in all, this timely realisation provided the Dutch 
with a unique window of opportunity to anticipate further changes of the European context 
in the 1950s and 1960s. With the French and Italian in turmoil about their position in the 
world, and the Germans in an entirely disproportional position of weakness, the 
Netherlands more than any of the other EEC members by the beginning of the 1950s was 
able to punch above its weight in the laying out of prototypical European traditions.  The 
national ―emancipation‖ of Dutch Catholics from 1939 was extremely timely in this 
regard. After WWII, Catholics for many decades would be at the centre of government 
proceedings and nation-building efforts. Obviously, Dutch Catholics were less wary of the 
establishment of a ―Catholic‖ European Community (cfr. Elazar, 1996: 93) than 
Protestants and Conservatives.   
 d) A new low-cost base 
Even before the 1950s and 1960s, Dutch leaders had paid due respect to their 
reputation of pioneering pragmatism.  In the immediate aftermath of WWII, they used the 
experience of German occupation – and the willing adoption of German corporative 
practices – to complete the modernisation of the Dutch governance system and economy in 
an accelerated tempo. Faced with a small home market, and the destruction of its – limited 
– industrial base and infrastructure, Dutch policymakers decided on a course of rapid 
industrialisation and export growth. With the grandeur of colonial Regent capitalism out of 
the way, the Dutch in effect went back to the humble roots of their success in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century: a low-cost economic base.  Testifying to the birth of a new 
national consensus, all denominational groups early on agreed ―to restrain wages and 
produce more cheaply than in neighbouring countries‖ (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997: 92).  
Yet, while all parties wanted to obtain some ―some control over economic development‖, 
most of them did not want to resort to ―nationalisation as done by the British Labour 
Government‖ (Scholten, 1987: 138).  After all, nationalisation was not a policy to the 
liking of the US government.  And no pragmatic Dutchman would needlessly upset the 
dominant geopolitical player.  Instead of nationalising industries and changing existing 
political institutions, all groups agreed to leave the pre-WWII system unchanged (Blom, 
1977: 248) – except for the nationalisation of the Dutch Bank.  To accommodate new 
realities, supplementary public-private vehicles of policy-making were set up; in particular 
the Labour Foundation (1945) and the Social and Economic Council (1950). Both vehicles 
were modelled on the collaborative example set by the ―Green Front‖ in the 1930s, as well 
as the German corporatist legacy  – a version of the ―Woltersom Organisations‖509 
modified to give better representation powers to labour. 
 
8.2  First strategic interactions (phase 2) 
 
i) Social-democrats 
The threat of ―totalitarian‖ fascism combined with the electoral defeat of 1933510, 
emboldened moderate, non-Marxist voices within the socialist party to put forward a 
―social-democratic‖ alternative.  These voices called for a new political and economic 
socialism – a ―democratic socialism‖.511  Testifying to the growing influence of Dutch 
traditions rather than socialist internationalism in the party, the Socialist Party conformed 
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to the official line of the other Dutch parties in the question ―devaluation or gold standard‖. 
Anxious to avoid being accused of debasing the currency, the socialist party stopped short 
of giving its political support to proponents of devaluation (Griffiths, 1987). 
Another sign of growing conformism to Dutch traditions, the idea gained 
currency that the Party should give up its exclusive focus on the working classes, and 
become a ―people‘s party‖ – inclusive of both the middle classes and the confessional 
citizenry.
512
  A rising number of leading members recognised that a viable socialist state 
could not do without the spiritual foundations of Christianity and humanism, the main 
historical pillars of Dutch society.  Thus, the new people‘s or democratic socialism was to 
be based on a broadly ―religious‖ or spiritual basis.513  While this new policy helped to 
attract reformed and catholic citizens to the party, it was not to be ―confessed‖ officially to 
avoid more fractious relations and splits within the socialist family.
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All the same, the Party from 1937 onwards moved in an openly social-democratic 
direction – implying an end to the Marxist struggle against Dutch national character and 
historical traditions. In the 1937 manifesto, the system of parliamentary democracy – from 
a mere means to total socialist reform – became a social-democrat principle in its own 
right. All of a sudden, social-democrats 1935 ―Labour Plan‖ – elaborated on instigation of 
moderates such as Vos and future Nobel Prize winner Tinbergen, became acceptable to the 
other pillars. Testifying to the new respect for even Orangist traditions of democratisation, 
the new social-democratic leadership proclaimed that as long as a majority of the people 
were in favour of the royal family, and this family did not obstruct the democratic process, 
the party would be well advised to acknowledge the monarchy‘s right to exist (Tromp, 
2002: 156-159).
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 Clearly, already before WWII, the SDAP had made it clear it was ready 
and eager to assume responsibility in government (Daalder, 1990: 209) – and it did for the 
first time in 1939.       
During WWII, social-democratic ambitions soared.
516
  In response to the German 
occupation, there had been an upsurge of nationalism among all denominations in Dutch 
society, resulting in the emergence of a social-democratic People‘s Movement.517  After 
the war this Movement tried to take advantage of this cross-denominational window of 
opportunity; it called for a national breakthrough of the old religious, ideological and 
regional lines. To that end a new Social-Democratic Party – PvdA – was established in 
1946-1947. With the creation of this new Labour Party, socialism as the embodiment of a 
totalitarian ideology was formally rejected. After all, US Marshall aid was conditional on 
European countries distancing themselves from the perceived evils of totalitarian regimes 
– whether fascist, nazist or communist. With the old antitheses of anti-nationalism and 
anti-religion defeated, the only remaining enemies of social-democracy were unbridled 
capitalism and dictatorship (Bank, 1978: 196; Knegtmans, 1992; Tromp, 2002: 204-208).   
Similar to British Labour‘s recurring ―nationalisation‖ theme, the post-WWII 
Social-Democrats‘ Party program (1947) had as its core the concept of ―socialisation‖.  
Key positions in industry, banking and transport were to be socialised (Bank, 1978: 196-
197). In spite of the Labour Party‘s participation in government from 1946 to 1958, only a 
fraction of its socialisation and Keynesian ―Labour Plan‖ program was realised.  For 
instance, the social-democrats‘ legislative proposal to use the public corporation as a 
general-purpose instrument of government policy was effectively ignored (Wansink, 
1986). Indeed, the type of public corporation adopted in actual law by the Minister of 
Economic Affairs Van den Brink differed substantially from the socialist ideal – being 
Catholic in nature. The nationalisation of the Dutch Bank (1947) and the second banking 
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law (1952) did not even meet the socialist ideas halfway.  Ironically, only in the 
agricultural sector – where social-democrats were at their weakest – did a public 
corporation, the ―Landbouwschap‖ take root (Tromp, 1986: 236-237). Then again, it took 
root precisely because its functioning was based on established traditions of living-
together-apart, proportionality and pacification – established in pillarisation movement 
from the 1920s onwards and in the Green Front from the 1930s onwards.  
From 1959 to 1965, the Labour Party did not participate in the coalition 
governments. During this period, the three christian parties (ARP, CHU en KVP) governed 
in coalition with the liberal party VVD.  This prompted the social-democrats in 1959 to 
quietly renew their assumption of ―historically determinism‖; namely that society was 
gradually moving into a socialist direction. In recognition of their failures in government, 
they toned down their prior focus on socialisation. And in anticipation of things to come, 
they lay much more emphasis on State intervention, and the strategic conquest of political 
power in general (Lier, 1982).  
ii) Catholics 
The Labour Party‘s avowed purpose in the immediate aftermath of WWII was to 
reorder the multiparty system with its purportedly ―conservative bias‖ into a more 
simplified national structure along Anglo-American or Scandinavian lines.  Yet, not for the 
first time socialists would be outmanoeuvred by Catholic realism. 
Catholics successfully pre-empted Labour‘s breakthrough attempts, not in the 
least by siding with the most ―reasonable‖ socialists as early as the 1930s. Two elements 
brought Catholics and moderate socialists closer. There was growing opposition against 
the ―elite decadence‖ of the Colijn government518 (Zwart, 1996: 30). And Catholics and 
Socialists demonstrated a growing willingness to foster each other‘s emancipation in 
Dutch national consciousness through compromise: the common goal would be to achieve 
―corporatism without fascism, and planning without socialism‖ (Teulings, 1977: 135).  
Regarding the first part of the equation, corporatist ideals emerged as early as the 1930s 
amongst catholic politicians and business people. The latter part of the equation was the 
result of the Labour Plan devised by Vos and Tinbergen in 1935.  The latter socialist 
moderates proposed the establishment of a general economic council. Since execution of 
this plan was preconditioned on social-democratic participation in government, Catholic 
support had to be ensured. Thus, corporatist ideas were integrated in the plan from the 
onset.  In spite of the Catholic Party‘s leadership‘s apprehension for social-democratic 
membership, it saw the Labour Party as the least unwelcome partner in government, 
starting with the 1939 coalition. Catholics wanted to avoid at all cost a return of the 
reformed protestant Colijn to the government.  A coalition with social-democrats was all 
the more feasible since the latter seemed to have given up their aversion for Catholic 
aspirations of a ―corporative organisation of society‖, and a business world dominated by 
―public corporations‖.519 Even though the Catholic purpose with public corporations 
differed markedly from social-democratic ideals, namely to ―substitute a society of 
professional estates for a class society‖ fraught with the ―unnatural opposition between the 
two classes of employers and employed‖.520 521  
A second element contributing to the failure of Labour‘s radical breakthrough was 
purely coincidental. The Allied advance was briefly stalled after the WWII liberation of 
the southern provinces of the Netherlands – where Dutch catholics were concentrated. This 
provided the Catholic Party and clergy with the opportunity to quickly reorganise in face 
of the socialist threat. When it became clear that the People Movement still managed to 
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make some inroads, the Catholic Church stepped in – under pressure from the leaders of 
lay organisations such as the agricultural co-operatives.  As early as 1946, the Catholic 
Church reaffirmed its opposition – first stated in a 1918522 - to Catholics‘ membership in 
non-Catholic political, trade union, and even cultural organisations.  While membership in 
the Labour Party was considered reprehensible, membership in the socialist trade union 
NVV was regarded as a far worse violation of episcopal interdiction (Windmuller, 1969: 
121-126); for the latter was still based on a Marxist platform.
523
 All in all, the Catholic 
Church‘s intervention – first backed up by the less reform-oriented Reformed Protestant 
Labour Union – cut short hopes of a more unified national society; and the new social-
democratic élan that was born in the years of occupation soon disappeared (Wilterdink, 
1991: 25).
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A final element explains the failure of the breakthrough movement; the years 
from 1939 to 1966 arguably were more the heydays of Catholic than Social-Democratic 
political emancipation.
525
 Within the confessional coalition of the interbellum, the Catholic 
Party RKSP had never been able to occupy the prominent position that it could have 
claimed on the basis of the sheer size of its membership (36.42 % of the population in 
1930). Although three cabinets in the period 1918-1939 were led by a catholic – Ruys de 
Beerenbrouck, economic inferiority and cultural prejudices pre-empted the translation of 
size to political power (Bosscher, 1980: 32-33).
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 The 1939 cabinet crisis finally set in the 
―definitive catholic emancipation‖ from Reformed Protestants (Schoffer, 1968; Bosscher, 
1980: 33).  Growing opposition to the Reformed Protestant minister-president Colijn 
within the Catholic party and pillar precipitated the crisis. In contrast with the Reformed 
parties – the ARP and the CHU, the Catholic Party RKSP had to come to grips with 
growing left-leaning opposition within its own rank and file.
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 As the Catholic Party 
shifted towards a more ―social‖ course, it developed new principles such as ―personalism‖ 
to pre-empt a socialist ―breakthrough‖. Distinct from liberal individualism, personalism 
implies a certain solidary conception of the individual‘s responsibility to and for the 
society around him. Distinct from collectivism, personalism is linked with a form of 
pluralism that allows for the voluntary grouping of different ―spiritual‖ families in for 
instance a corporative structure. With regards to labour, the doctrine of personalism holds 
that it is not a commodity, but a moral achievement by an ―individual with reason, 
responsibility, and potentially infinite value‖ (Fogarty, 1957: 28-29). Personalism and 
corporatism in essence were very effective reinventions of the Dutch traditions of living-
together-apart and pacification. As such, they  provided an elegant solution to an age-old 
Dutch problem: how to allow mutually interdependent, but antagonistic cultural and 
political groups to maintain their autonomy to a perceived optimum, within the framework 
of a national sovereignty.   
Through the principle of personalism, Catholics ensured that allegiances to one‘s 
religion, family or village would remain at least as authoritative as centralizing or 
territorial State or Church tendencies. Its introduction was especially timely in view of the 
imminent construction of new European allegiances. The other Catholic concept of 
―corporate subsidiarity‖528 would prove equally useful; it allowed for a reinvention of the 
Orangist pacification principle, i.e. the principle that rivalling factions should depoliticise 
and resolve civic differences – religious or otherwise – in elitist decision-making bodies. 
As a complement to personalism, corporate subsidiarity allowed for the gradual building of 
a Dutch national consciousness. It also served as a stepping stone to the enshrining of the 
subsidiarity
529
 tradition in the trappings of the emerging European Community.  
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iii) Reformed protestants 
During the period 1939 to 1952, Reformed Protestant parties, especially the ARP, 
suffered from the so-called ―heritage of Colijn‖: a ‖mentality, worldview and specific 
social-economic, colonial and geopolitical notions‖ that hampered the renewal of 
Reformed Protestant thought in the national consciousness that was emerging after WWII.  
Colijn‘s defense of an inflation-proof guilder until 1936 caused the ire of the working and 
lower middle classes, and boosted support for leftist Catholics and Social-democrats who 
accused Colijn of privileging Regent capitalists – involved in colonial affairs – above the 
interest of the common people
530
 (cfrr. Bosscher, 1980: 12, 127).  Catholics and Social-
Democrats convincingly argued that the Reformed protestant constituted no more than a 
throwback to not just the pre-WWII period, but even the pre-WWI period dominated by 
the scriptural Reformed Protestant Kuypers. 
After the breakdown of their rather patronising relation with the Catholic Party, 
Reformed Protestant forged a new alliance with the Liberal Party – that is those Liberals 
who had not left for the Social-Democratic Party. Yet, given their exclusion from 
government, opposition was growing within Reformed Protestant circles. The farmer boy 
turned professor in economics, Jelle Zijlstra, was considered a rather unorthodox 
Reformed Protestant. Without relinquishing his Christian traditions, Zijlstra opted for a 
very pragmatic, Keneysian approach to politics, earning him the position of Minister of 
Economic Affairs in the third Drees government. Drees being a social-democratic, old-
fashioned members of the Anti-Revolutionary Party were rather unhappy. Anti-
Revolutionaries such as Mekkes opined that the Social-Democrats were undermining the 
State of Law by promoting the sectarian interests of one group – the propertyless.  This 
amounted to the subordination the Christian ―idea of justice‖ to the politics of economic 
interest groups (Zwart, 1996: 123, 132). 
Zijlstra‘s predilection for economic planning meant he was very close to the 
stance of social-democratic economists. Yet, he remained in the Party to ―reform it from 
within‖ (Zwart, 1996: 128).  Against all opposition, Zijlstra eventually would catapulted in 
the driver‘s seat of his own party, largely be virtue of his many practical successes as 
Minister of Economic Affairs; that is, while keeping him in important government 
positions – most notably the position of Minister of Finance from 1959 to 1963.  All in all, 
however, the Reformed Protestants were unable to stamp their mark on the 1950s or 
1960s; they did manage to come up with inventive concepts of democratisation such as 
Catholics‘ corporatism and personalism.  
iv) Liberals 
 After WWII, most Liberal-Democrats joined the new social-democratic Labour 
Party. The descendants of Regent Capitalism and laissez-faire liberalism, changed the 
name of their allegiance from Free Liberals to the Freedom Party.
531
  Given that it 
reminded the electorate of not only the failed monetary policies of the 1930s, but also 
pauperism, unemployment and capitalistic greed, the Party‘s new leadership eschewed all 
references to the term ―liberal altogether; emphasising  ―christian‖ and ―economic 
freedom‖ instead (Maas, 1991: 90). In addition, the party took a more positive approach to 
social legislation issued by the State. The Party to its own detriment would not give up one 
historical legacy: it continued to  support the colonial lobby against national independence 
movements. The Freedom Party‘s lack of electoral success soon ushered in the foundation 
of a new party: the People‘s Party for Freedom and Democracy (1948).532  In spite of the 
name change, this Party at its core promoted the same issues: the primacy of social justice, 
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spiritual freedom, self-reliance and the necessity to counter ―socialist state-absolutism‖ 
(List, 1995: 57-65). And it advocated against State corporatism as its predecessors; 
although the Party‘s reaction to the Catholic variants of corporatism and personalism was 
altogether more mellow – given that the latter variants were grounded in a similar 
Christian heritage.
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v) Dutch Bank 
            As the Bank of England, the Dutch Bank‘s role over time changed from finance 
company for business to finance company for private banks. Yet, compared to the Bank of 
England the Dutch Bank merely was a fledgling lender of last resort, and vehicle of 
monetary management.
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 Prompted by the impending world financial crisis, the Dutch 
government established a state commission to investigate the advisability of a more 
structured supervision on private banks. While its work was cut short by World War II, the 
Dutch parliament after the war quickly adopted a first general-purpose Bank Act (1948), 
followed by a more detailed Act in 1952. The Dutch Bank was nationalised and given 
responsibility for both macro-economic stability and stability of the financial system.
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The 1952 Act followed the lead of the US‘ Glass Steagal Act (1933), aimed at preventing 
financial conglomerates coming into existence that would be too powerful.  In terms of 
preventing the concentration of power, the 1952 Act stipulated the separation between 
banks and business, prohibiting French-style banques d‘affaires as well as collaboration 
between banks and insurance companies by means of share participations. It also granted 
the Dutch Bank the formal powers to approve bank mergers.   
 The legal powers of the Dutch Bank had not been created from scratch as with 
the US Federal Reserve in 1913. Already before 1948, the Dutch Bank had given proof of 
its growing authority as a vehicle of banking coordination. In 1946, the Bank concluded a 
―gentleman‘s agreement‖ with 42 commercial banks and the two central co-operative 
banks on a tighter management of monetary flows – all banks agreed to send figures every 
month to the Bank. Buoyed by the two Bank Acts, the Dutch Bank‘s authority grew 
rapidly, both as a lender of last resort and as a supervisor. This authority had a very Dutch 
trait; it was based on the principle that the Dutch representative organisations had to be 
consulted before any general instruction could be given. The Minister of Finance 
designated the Dutch Bankers Association
536
 as the representative organisation for 
commercial banks; the two Central Co-operative banks negotiated directly with the Dutch 
Bank.  
 Ultimately, the means of credit control were very similar in Britain and in the 
Netherlands – apart from the requirements calculated to ensure the solvency and liquidity 
of banking institutions (which have always been set out more formally on the Continent 
than in Britian). As the Bank of England, the Dutch Bank‘s emphasis was on regulating the 
liquidity of the economy by influencing directly (through cash reserve requirements and 
other means) and indirectly (through the several types of open market operation) the 
liquidity of the various groups of banks. Both the Bank of England and Dutch Bank 
complemented this emphasis with attempts to maintain a consistent interest rate structure – 
by periodically changing the level of Bank Rate and by varying the rates at which the 
Treasury or Ministry of Finance were willing to offer securities to the market. Ultimately, 
the efficiency of these controls depended on the prestige and integrity of the central bank. 
While the Bank of England‘s moral authority was unquestionable, the Dutch Bank‘s 
authority was considerable (Wilson, 1962: 232-233), but more contestable from a private 
banking viewpoint – given the primacy of prior consultation with banks. In effect, the 
201 
 
Dutch Bank‘s authority became comparable to the Bank of England‘s only after the 1956-
‗7 episode of balance-of-payments deficits and inflationary bank note circulation, which 
drained banks‘ liquid assets (Barendregt and Visser, 1997: 188). 537 
 In terms of credit controls there was one major difference between the Dutch 
Bank‘s and the Bank of England‘s post-WWII reconstruction approach; one that would 
have important consequences for the further development of democratic settlements. In 
contradistinction with the UK government and Bank of England, the Dutch government 
and Bank from the onset put on a par all credit-creating institutions - including the 'fringe' 
institutions – after WWII.  Clearly, the Dutch harboured few illusions about the remaining 
world-state potential of the City of Amsterdam. The English, by contrast, tenaciously hung 
on to their world-state prerogatives, putting the Bank of England on an almost self-
defeating supervision path in relation to London-based foreign and secondary banks. 
 vi) Interest group politics  
   Contrary to English interest group politics, which demonstrated enduring signs 
of pathological dysfunctionality (Grant and Sargent, 1987; Grant, 2007), the soundness of 
Dutch interest group politics received a boost from the 1930s onwards. As mentioned 
before, during the 1930s the Green Front had set the prototype for national interest group 
politics. During WWII, German occupation increased the readiness of all parties to bury 
their differences above a minimal threshold. Ironically, Dutch industrial, labour and 
political leaders learnt a lot from the German themselves as to the practicalities of this new 
collaborative platform. German corporatist practices were eagerly adopted as the basis of a 
new democratic settlement; a new system of ―democratic corporatism‖ was created in 
which the factors capital and labour would stand on an equal footing. Employers struck a 
deal with the trade unions: if they would be able to discipline their membership on a 
national rather than local basis, and renounce the strike weapon, the trade union 
representatives would be granted a seat in all central organs of social-economic decision-
making. And while employers would remain the ―lords of their own home‖ – precluding 
undue State interventionism, management would have to share authority with a new 
enterprise council representing the interests of all employees (Teulings, 1977: 136-137). 
 Arguably, the Dutch civil service‘s evolution parallel to the movement of 
pillarisation was more conducive to sound interest group politics than what one observed 
in England. The Dutch civil service has never been dominated by one department such as 
the British Treasury.  Rather, a healthy interplay between the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs developed after WWII. And while the British civil service kept fishing 
its members from the same public school waters – putting into peril its ability to remain a 
credible champion of the tradition of neutrality, the Dutch civil service‘s composition 
evolved in line with the emancipation of new groups – allowing it to successfully reinvent 
the tradition of proportionality.  Reflecting the legacy of the Dutch Republic, civil servants 
in the Netherlands have always predominantly come from the larger cities and towns, with 
especially the Holland cities Amsterdam and Rotterdam being disproportionately 
represented before WWII.  Gradually, however, with the emancipation of Catholics and 
social-democrats, the composition of the civil service became more proportional, in terms 
of religious, geographical and social class origins (see tables 8.1a and 8.1b). 
For instance, compared to their share in the working population in 1947 (37%), the roman-
catholics were underrepresented in the nation-wide civil service (30%), especially in the 
higher echelons in the Hague. The members of the Dutch Reformed church, on the other 
hand, were slightly better represented (32% of working population versus 37% of the civil 
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service). Still, compared with the situation in 1871, the situation of the Roman-Catholics in 
the Hague had significantly improved – from 6.5 to 12 percent of the highest civil service 
echelons, from 7.5 to 18 percent for the middle echelons and from 9 to 23% for the lowest 
echelons (Braam, 1957: 247-248). 
 
Table 8.1a: Size of the civil corps as percentage of the working population per 
province (1947) 
(Source: Braam, 1957: 79) 
Province Percentage 
Zuid-Holland 5.7 
Noord-Holland 4.0 
Zeeland 4.0 
Limburg 3.6 
Utrecht 3.4 
Gelderland 3.1 
Groningen 2.9 
Overijsel 2.7 
Friesland 2.6 
Drenthe 2.6 
Noord-Brabant 2.6 
 
   
Table 8.1b: Categorisation of civil servants in terms of social class 
(Source: Braam, 1957: 215) 
 
Origin All civil servants 
Lower 
civil servants 
Middle civil 
servants 
Higher civil 
servants 
Manual 
workers 
22 26 16 6 
Small 
bourgeoisie 
65 62 70 63 
Farmers 5 5 4 5 
Upper classes 8 7 9 27 
 
 
               vii) New vehicles of national policy-making  
 What also contributed to a sounder system of interest group politics was the 
establishment of new vehicles of national policy-making after WWII. As early as May 
1945, employers and employees established the Labour Foundation as a consultative forum 
for the two groups.  The Labour Foundation functioned as an advisory body to the 
government on industrial and social issues. In particular, it negotiated wage guidelines 
with employers and employee organisations - in partnership with the government.
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 An 
sich, the Labour Foundation was not a solution to the moot point of what degree of state 
intervention would be acceptable to all parties. While the social-democrats were in favour 
of a planned economy, the anti-revolutionaries favoured a small State. The catholics, for 
their part, took a position somewhere in the middle.
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 After five years of heated debate, a 
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corporatist compromise was finally reached; in the form of the Social and Economic 
Council (SER - 1950).  At the top of the corporatist food chain, the SER was constituted as 
a tripartite council, comprising representatives of the ―recognised‖ trade union and 
employer organisations, as well as expert economists appointed by the government. The 
SER turned out to be a hugely successful mediator of democratic settlements, for two 
reasons. First, policy-making via the SER extended to most sectors of economic life, 
including fiscal policy, wage agreements, price and profits control. Second, the 
recommendations of the SER bypassed parliament, to go directly to the cabinet. The 
cabinet mostly followed these recommendations. All the above elements provided the 
building blocks for the emergence of a system of ―consociational democracy‖ in post-
WWII Netherlands (Lijphart, 1968) - a system that did not allow any economic, civic or 
political group to dominate matters, but rather gave everyone a proportional say. 
viii) The Green Front  
 From the 1930s onwards, farmer unions had more success in applying for public 
assistance than any other Dutch interest group, and this in spite of the declining percentage 
of the working population involved in agriculture. Where agriculture before the 1930s had 
been treated in a rather stepmotherly fashion, from 1930 it was allocated sizeable public 
assistance, amounting to about 20 % of total government spending between 1934 and 1937 
(Van Zanden and Griffiths, 1989: 64). As the single most organised pressure group in the 
Netherlands, the ―Green Front‖ was peaking at exactly the right moment; the popularity of 
expanding government budgets and a more elaborate civil service corps increased vastly in 
the 1930s.  The Dutch government intervened with several new compensation and subsidy 
measures, including a guarantee of maintaining prices higher than the world market 
equilibrium.
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 Testifying to the ―proto-modern‖ character of these measures, most of them 
would be implemented in the first agricultural directives of the European Community.  
The Green Front was keen to maintain a healthy balance between public 
intervention and private initiatives. So, when in 1934 government decided to reform the 
crisis organisations into centrally guided state organisations, the farmer organisations 
joined to decry this form of elusive state socialism. On the other hand, in 1935, the 
government complied with the request of the farmer associations to form a ministry of 
Agriculture (and Fishery), which was headed by Deckers, the ex-secretary of the Catholic 
farmer union (KNBTB). Deckers immediately ordered the institution of a committee to 
analyse the restructuration of agricultural crisis policy. The committee concluded that the 
state-guided crisis-organisations were not efficient and advised the minister to substitute 
self-regulation and self-administration by the farmer associations for State influence on 
agricultural policy. The Catholic minister was quick to approve of these corporatist 
proposals. Yet, the advent of WWII prevented the effective implementation of the planned 
reforms. As such, farmer unions‘ wish to be able to deal with a competent ministry of 
agriculture led by people ―that understand and love farmers‘ lifestyle‖ could only be 
realised after WWII. 
After WWII, guaranteeing stable production prices remained the core of Dutch 
agricultural policy – and later EEC agricultural policy.  Also, the Green Front‘s pre-WWII 
proposals – laid out in the 1939 Commission Van Rhijn but stopped short by WWII – were 
revived. This Commission argued that agriculture, because of its economically vulnerable 
position and its importance for the Dutch people, deserved special attention from 
government. And because the agricultural community was already organised on a very 
sophisticated basis, it should be allowed to self-regulate rather than depend on supervision 
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by a State agency.  Subsidiarity should be at the core of agricultural policy (Smits, 1996: 
115). Practically speaking, agricultural representatives would establish a public 
corporation on their terms; membership of this corporation would be compulsory for 
farmers. The government was quick to consent. As early as 1945 the Commission‘s 
proposals were realised: the ―Agricultural Board‖ was established, a  private body invested 
with public authority in which farmer unions had a decisive say.  It was  regarded as the 
authoritative voice of organised agriculture
541
, a voice moderate in tone, whether it 
concerned the national or regional levels,  matters of production, distribution, or 
rationalisation, or even conditions of employment.
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 The Board‘s powers were extensive; 
including the authority to levy taxes directly from its members. 
 
8.3         Firms‟ strategic positions in new settlements (phase 3) 
 
8.3.1 Renewal democratic settlements 
 
a) Role of happy accidents 
  Several unintentional developments – ―happy accidents‖ – contributed to the 
success of Dutch democratic settlements after WWII.  The ravages of WWII had created a 
new level-playing field between finance and industry, the Holland city-states and the outer 
provinces – among others by drastically reducing regional income inequality 
(Somermeijer, 1965).
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 The loss of the Dutch Indies provided a new geopolitical clarity of 
mind amongst all quarrelling groups, away from rentier capitalism to a rediscovery of the 
roots of the Dutch historical success model of Dutch nonconformism. And the discovery of 
natural gas in the 1960s would allow for more generous tripartite compromises and the 
gradual emancipation of the Dutch people.  Less unintentionally, the continued success of 
democratic settlements also had to do with the great interpretative flexibility of the 
―consociational‖ settlement on which all parties had concurred. Leaders of all 
denominations and affiliations were able to interpret the existing system in their favour. 
So, social-democratic leaders explained consociational processes as the best available 
means of institutionalising a voice for workers in State policy. Liberal leaders, on the other 
hand, though being out of office from 1948 to 1951, viewed the system as a mode of 
accommodation without direct state intervention, which left enough tactical scope for 
employers. Confessional leaders, finally, deemed a measure of corporatism convenient in 
their quest to reconcile divergent interests within their own pillars. The appeal of the 
―consociational‖ model amongst the great majority was confirmed by consecutive election 
results. The elections of 1948, 1952 and 1956 resulted in government coalitions 
commanding the support of 73 to 87 percent of the Lower House. The success of new 
national policy vehicles, the Labour Foundation and the Social-Economic Council in 
particular, also reflected the effectiveness of the consociational system. While the Labour 
Foundation provided generally accepted advice, the Social-Economic Council almost 
without opposition maintained wage terms.  For instance in 1951 the Council mediated an 
agreement under which labour, business, and government jointly agreed that nominal 
wages should be pushed down by 5 per cent. Remarkably, the Social-Economic Council 
managed to maintain wage moderation from 1945 up to the early 1960s – a period of 
strong macro-economic growth and close to zero unemployment.  
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b) Success of low-cost consociationalism 
All in all, the consociational system of living-together-apart, pacification and 
proportionality – the reduction of any political contestation to a problem of proportional 
distribution (cfr. Lijphart, 1968: 116-130; Van Mierlo, 1986: 98), was successful. 
Government expenditure greatly increased in post-WWII Netherlands, more so than in the 
UK (see Appendix F).  But because labour productivity and GDP per capita increased 
more than in competitors such as the UK (see Appendixes G and U), government 
expenditures were perceived as fully justified and the Dutch State was strengthened in the 
process.  The geopolitical performance of the Netherlands compared positively in other 
terms too. The construction of a social security system and greater access to advanced and 
vocational education resulted in a constantly declining income inequality pattern from 
1945 to 1980 (Hendrix, 1998). Up to the late 1960s, however, comparative income 
inequality figures remained somewhat ambiguous: while regional income inequality 
decreased much more than in the UK, national income inequality decreased less (see 
Appendix E). In terms of social mobility, the consociational system of hierarchical pillars 
and elite control has often been blamed for low levels of social mobility (f.i. Ganzeboom 
and Luijkx, 2005). This is certainly true when social mobility is considered within each 
pillar. Yet, equally important, the upside of the consocational system was that it provided a 
national emancipation platform for previously marginalised groups, in particular Catholics, 
and more recently social-democrats. Indeed, as national blocks Catholics and social-
democrats made substantial progress in terms of social mobility.  In terms of the tradition 
of Orangist democracy – the principle that issues of social mobility and integration should 
be resolved according to the established rules of one‘s own particular group, the Catholics 
by far were best positioned in the Netherlands (see tables 8.2a and 8.2b). But if Catholics 
were to pacify sources class strife in the entire nation, they needed the help of social-
democrats who had the largest labour union following (see Appendix V). 
 
Table 8.2a: Relation electoral and religious affiliation in the post-WWII period 
(Source: Fogarty, 1957: 359; based on a Report by PVDA‟s research centre) 
 Catholics 
Reformed 
Strict 
Observance 
National 
Church 
Reformed 
No religion Total 
Out of every 1,000 
voters there are 
 
355 95 370 180 1,000 
      
These voted:      
Catholic 
(KVP or KNP) 
325    325 
Protestant 
(ARP, CHU or 
SGP) 
0 90 155  245 
Liberal (VVD) 5  45 30 80 
Miscellaneous 0  5 10 15 
Labour (PVDA) 20 5 150 80 255 
Communist (CPN) 5 0 15 60 80 
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With the benefit of hindsight, the consociational system was all the more 
successful, since it produced several useful by-products. It induced all parties to renew 
traditions of democratisation in their own terms, within the competitive framework of an 
increasingly centralised umbrella of national sovereignty. In many ways, the different 
denominations competed with each other in terms of the same systemic assumptions, 
derived from two landmark consociational agreements: the 1917 Pacification agreement 
and the 1920 Primary Education Act.  These two building agreements served to both 
formulate anti-competitive veto points, and share competitive goals. Regarding the issue of 
veto points, all Labour unions after WWII rejected strikes as a bargaining means. In terms 
of shared goals, after WWII all denominations tried to deliver the best educational 
institutions – somewhat unintentionally raising national labour productivity in the process.  
Geopolitically speaking,  the system brought into being a society that looked fragmented 
and hierarchical, but was more conducive to dynamic settlements about the main post-
WWII question: how to reconcile domestic protection mechanisms with international 
competitiveness? That is, how to provide the social security system and educational access 
all West European populations demanded, yet produce a low-cost economy?  
 
 
Table 8.2b: Mobilisation of social classes in terms of religious affiliation after WWII 
(Source: Fogarty, 1957: 369; based on a report by PVDA‟s research centre) 
 
Commun
ist 
Labour Liberals Catholic Protestant 
 
Total 
 
Manual 
Workers 
45 135 5 135 90 410 
Clerical / 
managerial 
workers 
5 75 15 70 40 205 
Independents 
(Shopkeepers 
/ professions) 
5 30 40 50 50 175 
Farmers 0 5 15 40 25 85 
Pensioners 15 15 5 25 0 85 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 40 
Total 70 260 80 320 230 1,000 
 
The most remarkable result of the highly fragmented consociational system is that 
it brought into being a greater national consciousness than the famed consensus society of 
post-WWII England and more of a level-playing field between established and outsider 
groups. And while the consociational system was highly hierarchical, it vastly increased 
the social mobility of catholic and social-democratic minorities in ―Protestant‖ 
Netherlands. That is, while producing less of a class-ridden society than England.  And 
without hampering economic growth. In sum, the greatest paradox of the consociational 
system is that, while it was premised on citizens identifying primarily with their own pillar 
and only secondarily with national parliamentary politics, it produced the informal 
building blocks to make the latter work.  It would take a breakdown of the formal 
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consociational system and a failed ―breakthrough‖ experiment in the 1970s for this 
emerging reality to dawn on the majority, however. 
c) Housing policy and housing associations 
Housing policy provided one of the other foundations of the emergence of a 
national consciousness and a stronger State after WWII.  In contrast with England, the 
main focus of Dutch housing policy throughout the second half of the twentieth century 
was the social rental sector. This was quite surprising. During the 1920s and 1930s, the 
view that had come to dominate in the Netherlands was that the social rental sector should 
play a residual and marginal role in the housing market – which should be dominated by 
private ownership and a for-profit rental sector.
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 This did not bode well for housing 
associations – specialists of the social rental sector.  But it was not necessarily good news 
for Dutch mortgage banks either, as no tax advantages were introduced to mobilise people 
for their services. As mentioned in chapter 5, given the country‘s historical dependence on 
the international capital market, the Dutch Bank and the Ministry of Finance were and 
remained opposed to the establishment of a separate domestic capital regime for home-
ownership (Helderman, 2007).  They chose not to disturb the status-quo that institutional 
investors and private landlords preferred.  
Nevertheless, after WWII Dutch housing in the space of a few years was 
transformed from a decentralised to a centralised policy regime of national importance.  
After WWII, the growth in the Dutch housing market for a remarkable 60% was on 
account of the non-profit rented sector, i.e. the housing associations. Two factors laid the 
basis of this – compared to England – distinctive trend.  The highly regulated character of 
the housing market was an important factor:  82 % of post-WWII house production in the 
Netherlands was realised by means of government subsidies.
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 And co-operative housing 
associations were largely organised according to consociational lines of demarcation – 
confessional and social-democratic (Lundquist, 1992: 59).  This fit earned them consistent 
political support from confessional and social-democratic elites.  Nevertheless, different 
from other sectors such as agriculture where authority was delegated to statutory company 
bodies
546
, the government decided to monopolise responsibility for housing policy. The 
government was reluctant to give private actors, such as institutional investors, private 
landlords, the building industry, mortgage banks and the housing associations, a full public 
licence to implement housing policy.  The careful implementation of the tradition of 
proportionality in housing policy – the Dutch version of English ―tenure neutrality‖, was 
simply too important to leave to the vagaries of private actors, especially after the 
traumatic housing crisis of the 1930s.
547
   
d) Resounding success of agricultural modes of public-private collaboration  
The home-ownership sector was not at the forefront of innovative interest group 
politics in the post-WWII Netherlands; housing associations which focused on the social 
rental sector ultimately would become the champions of a new Dutch mode of public-
private collaboration. But that was as late as the mid-1960s.  The consociational heydays 
(1930-1965) were marked by the success of another sector altogether: the agricultural 
sector.   
Leaders of agricultural interest groups were exceptionally successful during this 
period – as demonstrated by the disproportionate share of government subsidies going to 
agricultural education and production facilities from the 1930s to the 1960s (Van Zanden, 
1997). Before WWII, only the confessional parties had been in favour of granting the 
agricultural sector – the Green Front – the privilege of a separate government department 
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and civil service corps. The sector was adamant on this point: it wished to break away 
from the prejudices of the old Regent class in charge of the department of Economic and 
Home Affairs, and deal with a separate, more specialised department.
548
  The mere partial 
support for the Green Front‘s demands before WWII was not surprising: many top 
functionaries of the Catholic Party and – to a lesser extent – Reformed Protestant Party 
hailed from agricultural regions in the outer provinces, while government and civil service 
personnel predominantly came from the major Holland cities.   
With the demise of old Regent priorities of empire and high finance, and the 
emancipation of Catholics and social-democrats from 1939 onwards, cross-denominational 
support for the agricultural sector soared. All of a sudden, the agricultural cause seemed to 
have ardent supporters in all political parties (cfr. Robinson, 1961), including the social-
democratic party PvdA and the liberal People‘s Party for Freedom and Democracy.549 That 
is, although the bulk of the agricultural population continued to vote for the catholic and 
protestant parties. All opposition to a separate Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery 
foundered; as early as 1945 the Ministry was established. Similarly, resistance against the 
―pillarisation‖ of government departments and the civil service all but vanished (Van 
Hezewijk, 1988).  The common agricultural policy around which all parties rallied was  to 
construct an economically responsible sector, able to compete internationally through its 
specialised nature. To shelter the sector from the vicissitudes of seasonal changes and 
crisis-prone world markets, the government agreed to expand social security provisions 
and deepen the quality of and the access to vocational education (Smits, 1996: 181).   
 Testifying to the exceptional strength of the agricultural lobby, agricultural 
matters were not managed through the Labour Foundation or the Social-Economic Council 
– as most other economic and social matters were, but through the Agricultural Board.550  
The Dutch government and the Agricultural Board maintained very close relations; the 
nature of their relationship has often been characterised as a ―partnership‖. The 
Agricultural Board was also very influential in the Dutch Parliament‘s Second Chamber – 
the equivalent of the British House of Commons. This influence was a consequence of a 
combination of factors: the prestige and expertise of the public corporation, the almost 
single voice with which the agricultural members of the Second Chamber appeared to 
speak, and the confessional parties‘ strong dependence on the agricultural vote (Robinson, 
1961: 61-64).
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  Although it possessed great influence there, the Agricultural Board, with 
the approval of the Minister of Agriculture Mansholt, often simply obviated the 
parliamentary system to act on its own terms. Grievances about this rather extraordinary 
arrangement were virtually non-existent, at least in the public realm. For instance, by the 
beginning of 1962, out of a total of 802 competition disputes settled by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, only 6 were related to the agricultural sector, compared to 14 to the 
banking sector, 32 to the textiles sector and 72 to the chemical industry (Mulder and Kok, 
1962).  
But this was only a symptom of a deeper underlying cause. The principal reason 
for the overwhelming consent as to this extra-ordinary arrangement was the sheer 
economic and cultural dynamism of the agricultural sector.  Indeed, of all Dutch economic 
sectors, the agricultural sector probably was the one that most fundamentally changed – for 
the better - in the after war period. The sector had accumulated several structural problems 
during the first part of the twentieth century: modest increases of the demand for 
agricultural produce, a low labour productivity, and an industry structure with a lot of 
small businesses.  While the agro-industrial sector was considered a declining industry 
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before WWII, from 1950 it quickly transformed in a growth industry, experiencing the 
greatest increase in labour productivity, and the most rapid investment and production 
growth of all Dutch economic sectors (Van Zanden and Griffiths, 1989: 222). For a start, 
the agricultural industry enjoyed an enormous growth in capital input. Marshall aid and 
later the credit facilities provided by the Co-operative banks boosted investments in more 
efficient machinery to geopolitically competitive levels.
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The agricultural sector‘s clout reached far beyond the national level.  Evidently, 
the announcement that Mansholt would become the first European Commissioner for 
Agriculture in 1957
553
 was greeted with great enthusiasm. Mansholt immediately resolved 
to transplant the Dutch agricultural model – based on traditions of proportionality and 
pacification –  to the policies adopted by the European Food and Agricultural Department. 
All this gave the farmer unions and co-operative banks – especially the Catholic ones – 
unprecedented access to centres of decision-making, both at the Dutch and European level. 
More generally speaking, the agricultural sector was at the vanguard of efforts to reinvent 
the Dutch nation‘s historical success model: combine greater protection of one‘s provincial 
traditions with a more pragmatic openness to dominant geopolitical traditions and 
standards than geopolitical rivals. In modern terms, the Dutch success model entailed 
marrying more elaborate local protection mechanisms – such as Dutch productivity 
support schemes and EC price subsidies – to a low-cost, pragmatic approach to 
international competitiveness – a ―liberalism by default‖ to provide  uninterrupted access 
of Dutch entrepreneurs to the world market.
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 Compared to for instance France, the 
Netherlands‘ comparative advantage was that a large group of its farmers had consistently 
been in favour of such a ―liberalism by default‖ policy (cfr. VVD, 1952: 3) – not 
surprisingly, given their country‘s historical legacy as an agricultural export nation.  Since 
the time of the Republic, Dutch trade policy has been based on the ―unassailable‖ 
assumption that the majority of the Dutch public benefits from an uninterrupted access of 
its entrepreneurs to the world market (De Boo, 1989: 15).
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e) Emergence of a contiguous West German success model 
The emergence of the EEC would provide the Dutch with a unique opportunity to 
enshrine their age-old combination of ―liberalism by default‖ and protection of provincial 
traditions in a geopolitically more relevant guise. Besides the visible benefit of opening 
Franco-German markets
556
, the Dutch were served hand and foot by the emergence of a 
very contiguous West-German model. Albeit for entirely different reasons, the Dutch as 
the Germans lacked a national identity around which all parties could rally after WWII.  
As the West-Germans, Dutch elites for strategic reasons opted to rally around a notion of a 
threatened "European" rather than "national" heritage (Kroes, 1991: 6).  Especially for 
Dutch Catholics and German Ordoliberals the threat in this regard was not only 
Communism, but also the corrupting influence of US consumerist, middle class traditions. 
Similarities between Dutch and German opportunity and threat structures did not end here. 
As the Dutch, West-German leaders after WWII grappled with a more fundamental issue: 
how to reconcile a ―profound distrust‖ of plural democracy and the vagaries of mass 
popular opinion, with the need to rally everyone around an effective economic 
reconstruction policy? (cfr. Manow, 1999; Nörr 1994:174).  The West-German solution to 
this problem crystallised around 1948, and has often been labelled ―Ordoliberalism‖. The 
dominant ideological interpretation of Ordoliberalism was one of a free trade policy 
couched into a – for German traditions – ground-breaking liberal philosophy of non-
interventionism. The more nuanced interpretation advanced in the ―varieties of capitalism‖ 
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literature is that post-WWII West Germany developed a system of corporatist economic 
coordination within a liberal market environment – i.e. a blend of old and new that can be 
labeled a ―social market economy‖.  
Both labels and classifications very much are myths. Liberal and socialist 
measures alike were adopted to keep appearances and facilitate consensus; it was 
―liberalism and socialism by default‖.  The real nature of the Federal Republic‘s post-
WWII settlement reflected a modernisation of age-old traditions.  For instance, while 
German Ordoliberals in the end did accept the necessity to adhere to a measure of non-
interventionism in the name of US-style liberal democracy, they did this to safeguard as 
much as possible of the non-liberal authority structures inherent in age-old German 
traditions.  Ordoliberals held the system of liberal democracy responsible for the economic 
decline and social turmoil of the late Weimar Republic. Demonstrating a pro-state 
orientation, but with a strong anti-parliamentary bent (Vorländer 1997: 6), they favoured 
neither a free market economy – symbol of disorder – nor a corporatist welfare state – an 
inflationary byproduct of mass democracy.
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 Yet, with the preferred authority structures 
so tarnished by labels of state interventionism and ―Führertum‖ (Rüstow 1932:70), and the 
US Empire of Liberty so much in the ascendancy, Ordoliberals realised they had to trade 
domestic political rights for internationally recognised property rights. The compromise 
settlement that emerged from negotiations with North-American occupiers and social-
democrats was the trading of a politically incontestable framework of ―economic self-
governance‖ for a generous corporatist welfare state. Employers moulded the former part 
of the compromise into the West-German myth of ―an export-oriented Republic‖; as well 
as the myth that the Bundesbank‘s independence should be unassailable. As a result, it 
became commonly accepted in the post-WWII Federal Republic that a strong Deutsche 
Mark and a low inflation climate guaranteed by they Bundesbank were necessary to make 
the West-German variety of democratic capitalism work. The latter part of the compromise 
– a corporatist welfare system, on the other hand, was framed as continuous with the 
successful Bismarckian welfare state rather than the failed National-Socialist State.  
Together, the two parts of the compromise colluded into an even greater myth: the 
European social market economy, a supposedly ―fundamental post-war political 
innovation‖ (Lehmbruch 1992: 33).  Within a European Economic Community context, 
not only Dutch social democrats, but also Dutch liberals eagerly adopted this myth; the 
former feeling vindicated, the latter conscious of the fact that ―liberal‖ had become a dirty 
word in post-WWII Netherlands. North Americans appreciated the myth too, as it steered 
clear of communism, and echoed of their own ―politics of productivity‖ settlement558 – the 
US variety on the British model of ―liberalism by default‖. 
With its many veto points, the West-German state was only a semi-sovereign state 
(Katzenstein 1987; cfr. Schmidt 1989); important decisions were effectively sheltered from 
‗undue political interference‘, and room for general political discretion was substantially 
restricted. All this sounded very pleasant in Dutch Catholic and agricultural elites‘ ears; 
especially since the European identity was variably seen as ―Catholic‖559, keen on 
subsidiarity – easily interpretable as ―living together apart‖- and proportionality – 
guaranteeing a place for both small and medium nations, small and medium enterprises, 
and ―against State interventionism and dirigisme in international economic relations‖ 
(Elazar, 1996: 93; Elazar, 1998; Kreile, 1977: 808; Schackleton, 1991). Arguably, the 
legitimacy and weight of the West-German model helped the Dutch translate their own 
consociational system into mainstream European policy. After all, Dutch 
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consociationalism and West-German Ordoliberalism shared several system features: a 
model of decentralised and functional interventionism, incorporating many veto points for 
parliament and allowing for targeted intervention in specified domains by specialised, 
extra-parliamentary agencies – such as the Bundesbank and the Federal Cartel Office560 in 
Germany, the Social Economic Council, Central Planning Bureau
561
 and Agricultural 
Board in the Netherlands (cfr. Manow, 1999).
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 The central role of veto points and 
specialised, extra-parliamentary agencies has often been neglected in explaining the 
success of not just the West-German, but also European model. Another system may have 
rendered the idea of an amicable, peaceful European Union a far-fetched dream in a 
continent so devoid of collaborative principles that it engaged in two self-destructive civil 
wars. Now, however, veto-points and autonomous extra-parliamentary agencies would 
limit space for political manoeuvre and conflict to such an extent that partisan interest 
groups and political actors had no choice but to resolve conflicts by way of bargaining and 
amicable agreement. If we brand this particular way to arrive at amicable agreements a 
tradition of democratisation, it indeed comes eerily close to the Dutch pacification 
tradition. As the Dutch pacification tradition, the European pacification tradition emerged 
in response to both domestic and geopolitical challenges; in particular an awareness of the 
impossibility to challenge US dominance.  
 
8.3.2  Financial institutions‟ strategies of democratisation 
               In Figures 8.1 and 8.2, I visualise the growth of the different financial institutions 
in terms of total amounts of deposits received and total assets accrued. In Tables 8.4a and 
8.4b, I provide more specific growth and marketshare figures. Table 8.5 provides a ranking 
of the effectiveness with which commercial banks, mortgage, savings and co-operative 
banks have deployed each strategy during the period 1930 to 1965. Finally, in the 
subsequent sections, I expound on the above variety of financial institutions‘ ability to 
deploy the six strategies of democratisation; and how their differential abilities underlie 
their differential economic success.  
 
Table 8.4a: Growth and marketshare of varieties of banks (total assets) 
(millions of Guilder) 
Year Commercial 
Banks 
Co-operative 
Banks 
General Savings State Postal 
1930 4181 579 480 491 
1940 2537 582 538 624 
1945 5381 2993 1161 1998 
1950 5265 1975 1241 1603 
1960 11684 5163 3202 2995 
1970 48568 19376 9125 6641 
Growth x 11.6 33.5 19 13.5 
Share % 58 23 11 8 
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Table 8.4b: Growth and marketshares of varieties of banks in terms of deposits 
(millions of Guilder) 
Year Mortgage Commercial 
 
State 
Postal 
General 
savings 
Co-
operative 
1930 52 2100 440 430 525 
1935 35.7 1300 565 485 468 
1940 37.5 1469 535 480 514 
1945 39.5 3400 1820 1050 2433 
1950 52.1 1342 1400 1120 1810 
1955 37.5 5405 1730 1870 2300 
1960 73.5 7872 2660 3000 4730 
1965 102 11000 4220 5400 9100 
Growth x 1.96 5.23 9.59 12.56 17.33 
Share % 0.4 36.9 14.1 18.1 30.5 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.5:  Ranking of Dutch varieties of financial institutions per strategy for the 
period 1930-1965  (1=highest, 5=lowest) 
 
 
Commercial 
banks 
General 
Savings 
banks 
State Postal 
Savings 
bank 
Co-
operative 
banks 
Mortgage 
banks 
Strategy a 
 
1 3 4 1 5 
Strategy b 
 
2 3 3 1 5 
Strategy c 
 
1 3 4 1 5 
Strategy d 
 
2 3 3 1 5 
Strategy e 
 
1 3 3 1 5 
Strategy f 
 
2 3 3 1 5 
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Strategy a    Help core customers fulfil their social class aspirations 
i) Commercial Banks 
       Two of the Big Four commercial banks became remarkably innovative 
vehicles of socio-economic mobility from the late 1950s onwards, in stark contrast with 
their pre-WWII credentials.  The fact of the matter is commercial banks had no choice but 
to shed their pre-WWII reputation – ―instrument of Regent capitalism‖.  For one, their 
prior source of assured income had all but dried up – low-risk stock market flotations, 
business deposits and mercantile finance. The volume of international trade in the 
immediate post-war years was not only too low, but also too restricted by tariffs and 
quotas. Lest being branded archaic elements in a rapidly changing world, Dutch 
commercial banks simply had to adopt a more domestic course (cfr. Jonker, 1991: 122-
169).  
In the 1950s, commercial banks started offering medium term credits to small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), to compensate for the concurrent loss of large business 
deposits (see table 7.4b, period between 1945 and 1950). The general public, by contrast, 
for much of the 1950s still perceived commercial banks as exclusive institutions who were 
not interested in people banking. At long last, two banks entered the retail banking fray in 
the late 1950s: the Twentsche Bank and the Amsterdamsche Bank. The Twentsche Bank 
introduced deposit-bankbooks, the personal loan (1958), the salary account (1959), 
investment funds and budget credits. The Amsterdamsche Bank, for its part, launched the 
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use of consumptive credits in the Netherlands – one of the earliest signs of US middle class 
traditions of consumerism creeping in.  Both banks pioneered the use of competitive 
interest rates on savings, transfer payments practically free of charge, as well as the 
development of attractive new insurance and investment products. In many ways, these 
banks‘ pioneering activities heralded the start of commercial retail banking in the 
Netherlands (Van Zanden and Uittenbogaard, 1999: 343-349).  The pursuit of savings 
deposits in particular was needed to meet the increased demand for medium term credits 
from Dutch SMEs – and the concurrent decline in SMEs‘ deposits. By 1960, commercial 
banks had managed to capture 8 percent of the savings market from the specialised 
institutions – the State Postal Savings Bank and General Savings banks. This share had 
increased to 16 % by 1970 (see table 8.6).   The only commercial bank to lag in these 
developments, the Rotterdamsche Bank, reconsidered its deteriorating economic results in 
the beginning of the 1960s
563
; upon which it accepted the proposal of the Amsterdamsche 
Bank to merge in 1964 – the Amro bank was born. 
 
Table 8.6: Shares of different varieties of banks in the savings market  
(in percentages) 
 1950 1960 1970 
State Postal Savings 32 24 18 
General Savings 29 28 25 
Co-operative Banks 37 39 42 
Commercial Banks 1 8 16 
 
ii) Savings Banks  
      By the 1930s, general savings banks had managed to get their share of the 
Dutch savings market back to its original peak – attained first at the turn of the century.  
The State Postal Savings bank‘s business was prone to less variability. After 1950, the 
whereabouts State Postal and general savings banks followed a more synchronised pattern; 
unfortunately, a declining one.  As the general Savings Banks, the State Postal Savings 
Bank tried to mobilise potential savers, not by luring them away from competitors with 
more attractive services, but by linking their calls for more saving fervour to the argument 
that consumerism was bad – neither in customers‘ individual interest nor the public 
interest. This type of paternalism was not very strategic in face of the slow, but steady 
infiltration of US middle class, consumerist traditions in the increasingly affluent 
Netherlands. More than anything, the emerging popularity of commercial banks‘ 
consumptive credit services symbolised this infiltration. From the end of the 1950s 
onwards, the savings bank lost marketshare to commercial banks – and to a lesser extent 
the co-operative banks – at an alarming rate. That is because the State Postal savings bank 
was unable to compete on interest rates as the other varieties of banks could. Also, their 
target population of the lower ranks was not the most interesting one in an increasingly 
affluent Dutch society. 
iii) Co-operative banks 
      In contradistinction with the savings banks, Co-operative banks adapted rather 
successfully – albeit grudgingly – to new social class aspirations after WWII.  For one, 
they started offering agricultural credit services on a more generous basis, timidly in the 
1930s, more ambitiously in the ensuing decades. Gone were the days Co-operative banks 
were credit vehicles by law, but savings vehicles by practice. This resulted in an enormous 
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expansion of their activities and balance total. The most important elements accounting for 
this expansion were the land consolidation, which forced farmers to make large 
investments, and the modernisation of agriculture, which induced the acquisition of 
expensive machinery (Brusse, 2000: 227).  
 Contrary to commercial banks, co-operative banks made this transition in a very 
gradual way. Although their business had suffered somewhat in the wake of the financial 
crisis at the turn of the 1930s, Co-operative banks remained unfamiliar with issues of 
credit overextension and bankruptcy.
564
 This explains why the growth of Co-operative 
medium credit services to SMEs demonstrated a more steady pattern since the 1930s (Van 
Seenus, 1945: 114).  Surprisingly, the Dutch scientific press was increasingly united in its 
positive appraisal of Co-operative Banks. For instance, the influential, but generally 
critical Verrijn Stuart in 1938 spoke highly of the increasing importance of Co-operative 
Banks for agricultural credit, especially concerning short term credits. Similarly, Valstar in 
1938 praised Co-operative Banks for the invaluable service done to agriculture and 
horticulture. Van Stuijvenberg, finally, in 1949 argued that the credit co-operatives 
succeeded in cultivating the niche of agricultural credit provision in an exceptionally 
successful fashion (Van Stuijvenberg, 1949: 76-94).
565
  
iv) Mortgage banks 
      Mortgage banks remained a very flawed vehicle of social mobility in the post-
WWII period. For one, contrary to their English counterparts, the building societies, they 
could not use a growing deposit and share basis as a growth platform. Troubled by a 
legacy of bankruptcy and other mismanagement scandals, Dutch mortgage banks during 
the interwar period by and large held on to a ―purity‖ principle that precluded them from 
engaging in other financial functions than those guaranteed by first mortgage bonds. They 
did open up their services to private placements during the 1950s; but only those of the less 
popular kind – those without the short-term, easy withdrawal facilities offered by 
commercial and co-operative banks. After a brief recovery in the first post-WWII decade, 
the boom years of 1955 to 1970 witnessed the increasing diversification of commercial 
banks in the mortgage lending business; as well as the expansion of pension funds‘, real 
estate and insurance companies‘ stake in the market. As a result, the special-purpose 
mortgage banks soon lost ground again. The Co-operative Banks of course had long 
established their own specialized mortgage banks, who now were reinvigorated through 
cross-selling practices. Not surprisingly, the latter mortgage banks slowly but surely 
expanded their share in the mortgage lending market from about 10 to 20% (see Appendix 
R, Table 3).  
 
Strategy b   Cater to customers of different social classes 
i) Commercial Banks 
        By virtue of adopting a pre-eminent role in the post-WWII retail banking 
revolution, Dutch commercial banks emerged as champions of consensual democratisation 
– in contention with the Co-operative Banks. Commercial banks not only diversified into a 
great number of retail and SME services.
566
 They put great emphasis on branch 
development in the provinces.
567
  This allowed them to gain access to an increasing 
diversity of aspiring social classes, in particular the vanguard of the financial 
―breakthrough‖ movement: the emerging non-denominational group of aspiring middle 
classes, and even farmers – albeit initially only that small minority of a liberal signature. 
Different from the Co-operative banks, however, the question has always remained for 
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commercial banks whether the latter were core customers or not. The answer was that as 
soon as the opportunity structure for international ―Regent club‖ aspirations improved – in 
the latter 1960s, commercial banks such as AMRO and ABN would jump on the 
opportunity to give those customers priority. 
ii) Savings banks 
       From the 1950s onwards, savings banks were vehicles of consensual 
democratisation in secular decline; by default of an alternative strategy to their self-
destructive anti-consumerism – self-destructive in an increasingly prosperous society with 
an emerging middle class consciousness.   
iii) Co-operative Banks 
      In terms of reinventing the tradition of Orangist democracy, the Catholics 
were best positioned in the post-WWII years. Catholic co-operative banks had additional 
advantages. Not only did the Catholic pillar represent the biggest chunk of the social class 
of farmers.  Almost all farmers were co-operative members. Only 10 % of farmers – 
mostly of a liberal signature – did not belong to any cooperative, 20% belonged to 3 co-
operatives and 40 % to 4 or more co-operatives (Abma, 1956: 49-50).
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Catholics weren‘t unfavourably placed regarding the tradition of pacification 
either – the principle that rivalling factions and classes should depoliticise and resolve 
differences behind closed doors; at least, when applied to sources of strife within one‘s 
own pillar. This observation applied less to inter-denominational sources of strife. The 
episcopal interdiction of membership in non-Catholic organisations and vice versa explains 
Catholic Co-operative leaders‘ reluctance to provide services to non-farmers and non-
Catholics. Unfortunately, this reluctance limited their abilities to foster consensual 
democratisation. The opportunity structure for protestant-neutral co-operative leaders was 
almost the opposite; arguably less able to foster total consensus within a denominational 
pillar, they held a distinct advantage as to the fostering of cross-denominational 
consensus.
569
 Indeed, it were the protestant-neutral banks who first to take advantage of the 
lack of ―modern‖ appeal of Savings Banks; by gradually expanding their work area to 
urban regions, and by introducing a service differentiation between members and 
customers. 
 
Table 8.7:  Comparison total assets of Big Four banks and Co-operative banks 
at the end of 1960 (millions of Guilder) 
(Source : Wilson, 1962 : 201) 
 
Bank Total assets 
Amsterdamsche Bank 2,509 
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij 2,308 
Rotterdamsche Bank 1,621 
Twentsche bank 1,535 
Co-operative Banks 5,163 
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Strategy c   Make State policy on economic citizenship by “fait accompli”                      
i) Commercial banks 
       It is only by the 1960s, when commercial banks‘ activities in consumptive 
credits and Eurodollar markets were getting off the ground, that it became clear that 
commercial banks would shape policy as much as be shaped by it. Before the 1960s, Co-
operative banks clearly had an edge over commercial banks, be it regarding the State‘s 
encouragement of credit services to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), or personal 
saving services. 
Commercial banks were first brought into contact with medium term credits to 
SMEs during the early post-WWII years, when Minister of Finance Lieftinck proposed the 
establishment of a national Reconstruction Bank, the ‖Herstelbank‖ (1948).  A joint 
venture between the government and the financial sector – the commercial and co-
operative banks, this bank played an important role in the recovery of Dutch industry over 
the decade following World War II. Testifying to their willingness to advance government 
policy, Commercial banks participated for 49 percent in the share capital of the 
Herstelbank and were closely involved in the operations of the bank. 
Clearly, the Herstelbank was not an indefinite project. From the 1950s onwards, 
commercial banks started helping SMEs back on their feet without State intervention. 
From the earliest post-WWII years, banks adhered to the fundamental principle of non-
engagement in industry, as industry spokesmen at the time had expressed reservations 
about banks‘ influence on their strategic decision making processes. In doing this, banks 
anticipated and respected the 1952 banking act – which stipulated the separation between 
banks and business, prohibiting French-style banques d‘affaires. 
 In terms of providing medium term credit, commercial banks more than co-
operative banks suffered the competition of a more special-purpose entity in the SME 
market, the « Nederlandsche Middenstands Bank » (NMB). Founded in 1927 on 
instigation of a State Committee, the NMB was rather successful. Its total assets amounted 
to 731 million guilder by the end of the 1950s, hardly a ridiculous figure in comparison 
with  the Big Four‘s own performance (see table 7.8). It would remain a formidable 
competitor through the second half of the 20
th
 century. 
ii) Savings banks 
        Arguably, general savings banks‘ statutory autonomy from the State added to 
the perception that they were more innovative than the State Postal Savings Bank, 
anticipatory rather than reactive vehicles of democratisation. For instance, general savings 
banks several decades before the establishment of a State-Sponsored Savings Council 
(1948) had anticipated the need to encourage the unlikeliest groups of citizens, including 
the young, non-voting ones, to become more diligent savers. Another explanation for the 
lagging expansion of the State Postal Savings Bank in the post-WWII period were legal 
restrictions regarding the level of interest the State Postal Savings Bank could offer. Both 
types of savings banks were on an equal footing, however, when it came to their capacity 
to anticpate the State‘s increasing tolerance for middle class, consumerist US traditions 
from the late 1950s onwards. 
iii) Co-operative Banks 
     From the 1930s to the mid-1960s, Co-operative banks peaked as aspirational 
vehicles of economic citizenship. They were best able to anticipate policy changes in the 
agricultural sphere, enabling the Dutch State to make policy largely on the basis of fait 
accompli – including at the EEC level. From the 1930s onwards, co-operative banks made 
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direct government intervention in the agricultural sector largely unnecessary – although 
first hesitantly (Brusse, 2000).  To spare themselves further criticism of the social-
democratic and liberal parties, co-operative banks fully adopted their new ambitious guise. 
From the early 1950s, co-operative banks were instrumental in carrying forward the aim to 
produce an economically responsible farming and truck marketing businesses. Partly due 
to their credit services – increasingly conditional on a willingness to engage in ambitious 
rationalisation plans, Dutch agriculture from a lagging student became the European 
favourite in terms of specialization, export-orientation and labour productivity – the 
agricultural share of the national labour force declined from 22.4 % in 1930 to 12.7% in 
1960 (see Appendix X). In sum, co-operative banks helped to pioneer an entirely peaceful 
cultural revolution in the Netherlands which was the envy of other EEC member states; 
ultimately leading to the wholesale adoption of the Dutch model at the European policy 
level (cfr. Smits, 1996).    
In terms of anticipating monetary policy, the co-operative banks made substantial 
progress too. They gained a clear vantage point during WWII, when they managed to keep 
the German administration at bay, in contrast with the savings and commercial banks.
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The Catholic co-operative bank enjoyed an additional bit of good fortune. Since the 
southern part of the country had already been liberated in September 1944, the Catholic 
Central was accorded the function of Central Monetary Institution in advance of other 
financial institutions. The appointment of the director of the Catholic Central, Huijsmans, 
as Minister of Economic Affairs in 1945 further improved Co-operative Banks‘ vantage 
point regarding future policy changes.  
Significantly, co-operative banks beat commercial banks to the punch when it 
came to expanding retail and credit services to the Western cities of the Netherlands.
571
 
Significantly, co-operative banks were instrumental in boosting the modernisation of the 
agricultural industry – thus carrying forward and anticipating the fledgling regional policy 
of the Dutch government and the EEC.
572
  At its inception in 1952, Dutch regional policy 
was aimed at combating structural unemployment figures, with special attention to the 
rural areas in the North and South of the country. Regional policy evolved towards the aim 
of boosting the modernisation of old industries. In particular, from 1959 the new 
overriding purpose was to boost industrial and economic activity away from the Randstad 
– the ―home counties‖ of the Holland financial establishment (Bachtler, 2001).   
Finally, Co-operative banks anticipated the declining importance of agriculture 
for the Dutch economy, by unobtrusively expanding their services to non-agricultural 
customers and SMEs. While 20 percent of the Dutch working population was engaged in 
agriculture in 1930, and in 1947 19 percent, the figure declined thereafter to reach 9 per 
cent by 1965. Co-operative banks‘ greater attention to the non-agricultural section of the 
population manifested itself particularly through efforts to attract savings as well as by 
establishing offices in urban areas. By 1965, more than 50 per cent of savings deposited 
with Co-operative banks in 1965 originated from the non-agricultural population. 
iv) Mortgage banks 
      The destruction of large swathes of housing during WWII must have filled 
some of the more eager mortgage bank leaders with a sense of anticipation. Indeed, the 
post-WWII housing boom should have been good news for the mortgage banks. That is, 
were it not for a few dire lessons learnt a decade before. The 1930s had been a disastrous 
decade for mortgage  banks, and their ambitions to shape policy more than be shaped by it.  
The house market crisis in the mid-1930s for the first time revealed the extreme volatility 
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of the combined conditions of an uncoordinated mortgage market and a booming housing 
market
573
, with devastating long-term effects for Dutch mortgage banks. The crisis to a 
significant extent was attributable to the unwillingness of private capital providers – 
mortgage banks, private landlords, pension funds, insurance companies and other 
institutional investors – to work together. Worse, the general perception was that these 
capital providers in fact were engaged in a rather immoral competitive race to sell as many 
mortgages as possible in a declining housing market (Bakker Schut, 1935; Glasz, 1935: 
28). Not only did the mortgage banks‘ economic results rapidly deteriorate – after a short 
growth spurt in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In many ways, the traumatic experiences of 
the 1930s politically forever closed the doors to a specialised mortgage banking sector and 
corresponding capital-regime for home ownership in the Netherlands, akin to the English 
building society sector and the German system of Bausparen – with their corresponding 
specialised system of fiscal incentives. The Dutch central bank was able to impede a 
separate capital regime for housing, in a way it was unable to regarding co-operative banks 
and the agricultural sector. 
After WWII, the government did not express a preference for any type of tenure 
or private housing vehicle. Yet, largely unintentionally, the tide would slowly turn in 
favour of the social rental sector and housing associations. The general expectation in the 
first WWII years was that building costs would soon decrease as they had after WWI. In 
other words,  the need for general subsidies would be temporary and rents after a few years 
would be adjusted to their normal cost-price level
574
 (Siraa, 1989: 82).  Yet, contrary to 
what had happened in the 1920s, building costs continued to rise faster than general 
inflation, which in turn led to the need for continued bricks-and-mortar subsidies. All this 
was to the advantage of housing associations, whose non-profit character impelled them to 
keep rents below the market clearing level anyway.  Because rent made up a relatively 
large share of the outgoings of average household income, it was of great significance to 
national income policy. Any sharp rent rise was likely to prove politically controversial. 
By the 1960s, housing associations‘ low-rent policy had become so electorally 
incontournable that they inevitably ended up being the ―preferred providers‖ of housing 
(Commissie De Roos, 1946; Faber, 1997).
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Beyond all this, mortgage banks suffered from a Dutch housing policy, which in 
comparative perspective – in terms of value and magnitude – lagged behind the Western-
European average. This was especially the case for the middle and wealthier classes who 
were eager to buy private property, but who were not given the same incentives as in other 
Western-European countries by a government keen on retaining a consociational grip on 
the economy (Feddes, 1995). 
 
Strategy d   Translate State policy on economic citizenship  
i) Commercial Banks 
      In many ways, commercial banks started to translate State policy about 
economic citizenship – the promotion of savings – out of necessity. With the inflow of 
business deposits largely stemmed, and foreign incomes very much on the wane, 
commercial banks were rather desperate for new cheap ways to finance their expansion 
strategies. To take up their emerging, supplementary role as retail finance providers and 
compete credibly with the savings and co-operative banks, commercial banks had to 
expand considerably. The entrenched position of the co-operative banks and the State 
Postal savings system pre-empted a simple branching out strategy. At least two of the Big 
221 
 
Four banks, the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM) and the Twentsche Bank, 
simply lacked the means to finance such a strategy anyway. The former still smarted from 
losing its Indonesian business after nationalisation in 1960; the latter drifted somewhat 
aimlessly about, its board unable to decide how to stem the slow erosion of profits and 
capital. Twentsche did attempt to expand its deposits base by introducing simplified 
private accounts in 1959, but the bank failed to attract new customers in sufficient 
numbers. There was no alternative but to merge really. Keen on keeping a competitive 
commercial banking sector and having as many retail finance outlets as possible in the 
country, the Dutch Bank allowed several commercial banks to merge.  In 1964, NHM and 
Twentsche agreed terms for a merger into ABN Bank. The Amsterdamsche Bank and 
Rotterdamsche Bank felt they had no choice but to follow suit; they merged into Amro 
Bank later in 1964. The two new banks followed a different expansion strategy; while 
ABN remained true to its roots by pursuing a dual domestic-international strategy, Amro 
Bank focused exclusively on the Dutch market (Barendregt and Visser, 1997). 
ii) Savings Banks  
      Co-operative banks proved to be more resilient and stable savings vehicles 
than the other banks engaged in savings during WWII. Indeed, German occupation caused 
a lot more turmoil and turnover in withdrawals and deposits at the Savings than at Co-
operative Banks – although the latter wasn‘t spared altogether (Van Campen et al., 1940 : 
346-351). For one, the continued withdrawals at the general Savings Banks and the State 
Postal Savings Bank in 1941 even resulted in a negative balance: 48,8 million guilder for 
the State Postal Savings Bank, and 13.2 million guilder for the General Savings Banks.
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Not surprisingly, when the Ministry of Finance in 1948 launched the National 
Savings Council
577
, not only the general Savings banks and the State Postal Savings Bank 
were invited to join the council; the co-operative banks were too. The main motive for the 
foundation was to halt the decline of savings, by encouraging saving habits amongst both 
adults and children (Dankers et al., 2001: 276). Clearly, co-operative banks remained more 
successful savings vehicles after the institution of the National Savings Council, while 
either type of savings banks seemed unable to stop the tide of decline after 1950 (see Table 
8.7). 
iii) Co-operative Banks 
      In terms of translating State policy about economic citizenship in a set of 
economic propositions adapted to non-core customers, Co-operative Banks were at least on 
a par with commercial banks.  As early as the end of the 1930s, Co-operative Banks 
received recognition by a cross-section of economists and politicians for their stable and 
competent management; they had become mainstays of Dutch agricultural life and policy 
(Sluyterman et al., 1998: 44). Remarkably, this recognition to a significant extent was due 
to co-operative banks‘ competent management of non-core businesses: i.e. promoting 
savings and paying out agricultural subsidies to local agricultural co-operatives.  When 
during the Second World War Co-operative Banks yet again proved to be highly reliable 
entities, nothing could stop them from becoming mainstays of financial policy too. 
Although the financial establishment only slowly and grudgingly accepted the Co-
operative leaders amongst their midst.  Derogatory sneers in the vein of ―those farmers‖ or 
those ―outer province people‖ would linger for decades.578  Nevertheless, when Minister of 
Finance Lieftinck in July 1945 launched plans for a large-scale monetary reform – 
entailing the handing over of paper money to banks by all citizens – he appealed to an 
equal extent to Co-operative and Commercial Banks to implement these measures. In spite 
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of the enormous increase in working load, the Co-operative Banks were quick to show 
their approval: ―The Minister appealed to our organisation for the monetary reform; though 
this gives us mountains of work and many worries, we have to consider that we now have 
arrived at our rightful place.―579 The monetary reform induced almost every household to 
open a bank account. Because Co-operative Banks had the most extensive regional spread, 
in many cases they were the preferred bank for new depositors.
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 Remarkably, almost 
none of the opened accounts was closed between 1945 and 1950. 
Apart from receiving a pivotal role in the government‘s monetary reform plans, 
the Co-operative Banks were also entrusted payments of war damages, government 
subsidies within the scope of agricultural policy, and many more measures to do with post-
war reconstruction. Because the vastly increased working load was now surpassing the 
capacity of Co-operative Banks, these had to streamline their operations, for instance by 
rationalizing the system of transfer by giro. This had the positive effects of further 
expanding the services and familiarising many househoulds with transfers by giro. The two 
Central Co-operative Banks increasingly became intermediaries between local co-
operative banks and State policy, as executed by the Dutch Bank, particularly with the 
passing of the second banking law (1952). Astoundingly, with the passing of that law Co-
operative Banks, Savings Banks and Commercial Banks for all legal purposes – except for 
the fiscal privileges of the first two – would all be considered on a par, under the common 
denominator of ―banks‖.  
By 1957, already some 47 percent of savings originated from outside of the core 
group of agricultural and horticultural farmers. The ―petty bourgeoisie‖ accounted for 
some 8.5 percent, the working-class for some 15.4 percent, and small and medium 
enterprises accounted for some 11 percent. Similarly, by 1958 only some 63 percent of 
credits and loans were attributed to farmers. The remaining 37 percent went either to 
public bodies (21 percent) or private persons (16 percent). The increase of credits offered 
by the Co-operative Banks in the post-WWII period (1948-1958) was similar to the 
increase experienced by the Commercial Banks. While credits rose at a percentage rate of 
245.4 percent at the latter banks, credits increased with respectively 256.2 and 213.2 
percent at the catholic and protestant-neutral Co-operative Banks (Van Campen, 1959: 19, 
24-26).
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Finally, the two Co-operative Centrals had set up two mortgage bank subsidiaries 
in the first decades of the twentieth century. These subsidiaries were making substantial 
inroads in the mortgage bond market. Before WWII the two subsidiaries together 
accounted for about 5 to 10 percent of the market. In the period 1956-1965 this percentage 
doubled, fluctuating between 10 and 20 percent (see Appendix R, table R.3).    
iv) Mortgage banks 
   The first decade after WWII was somewhat disappointing for the mortgage 
banks, as the housing market was subject to rent controls and dominated by government 
financed housing corporations and local councils. Nevertheless, the mortgage banks had 
profited from their exemption from all kinds of post-WWII legislation on financial 
services. So, mortgage banks were allowed to issue bonds on tap, rather than being subject 
to the so-called ―calendrier‖, a waiting list for bond issues administered by the Dutch Bank 
with a view to preventing disruptions of the bond market. Able to circumvent the 
calendrier legislation, which was in force from 1946 until the deregulation of the Dutch 
capital market in 1986, mortgage banks could use mortgage bonds to immediately adjust 
their credit interest rates to changes in market conditions, and attune the volume of 
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borrowing to the volume of lending. In addition, in contrast to other bonds, mortgage 
bonds could be sold directly by the mortgage bank issuers, either through the own 
branches or through other Commercial banks. The only thing mortgage banks were not 
allowed to do was to attract funds for periods shorter than two years. Because of these 
advantages, mortgage banks kept funded themselves exclusively by issuing mortgage 
bonds – complemented by some private placements.   
Nevertheless, mortgage banks would fail to play a pivotal role in housing policy. 
Things had seemed to brighten up when the government, in an effort to stimulate home-
ownership, in 1956 began to grant subsidies to owner-occupiers of newly built houses and 
enabled local authorities to provide mortgage guarantees.
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 Yet, what should have been a 
boost to mortgage banks‘ ambitions turned out to be very mixed blessing indeed.  For one, 
mortgage guarantees were meant for low-income groups, not exactly mortgage banks‘ 
target group. Also, while providing a temporary fillip to mortgage banks‘ balance sheets, 
this measure sowed the seed of future difficulties. The availability of government 
guarantees meant that specialised knowledge of the housing market was no longer a 
prerequisite to prosper in the mortgage loan business.  After all, home owners who 
defaulted on their mortgage would be bailed out by the State; so not much was gained by 
the financier if he had an accurate idea of the value of the house in case of foreclosure. As 
it happened, this made it attractive for non-specialised types of banks – savings, 
commercial and co-operative banks – and institutional investors – such as insurance 
companies – to enter the home loan market. Eventually, the measure entirely eroded the 
distinctive competence of mortgage banks and precipitated the ultimate foundering of 
independent mortgage banks in the late 1970s (Barendregt and Visser, 1997: 179-180). 
But the writing was on the wall much earlier than this. Unable to shed their anti-
interventionist roots (Janssens, 1992: 35), mortgage bank leaders simply did not fit in the 
Dutch government‘s intensely interventionist housing framework – ―the most 
comprehensively interventionist in Western Europe‖ (McCrone and Stephens, 1995: 75).  
As early as the 1950s, the tide was definitively turning to the advantage of the social rental 
sector and the housing associations – the latter holding a much more positive view of 
government policy. The 1964 advisory report of the De Roos Committee confirmed what 
most observers had long concluded: housing associations‘ were and should be the 
government‘s ―preferred providers‖ of housing (Commissie De Roos, 1946; Faber, 
1997).
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 That is, at least in the social rental sector; but of course this sector accounted for 
more than 60% of new housing. 
 
Strategy e  Become a champion of national character 
i) Commercial Banks 
   To become a champion of Dutch national character one has to excel at the 
country‘s historical success model of ―Dutch nonconformism‖:  reinforce local privileges 
and traditions by pioneering a low-cost and pragmatic geopolitical vantage point; a vantage 
point conducive to a spill-over of the benefits of dominant international standards, 
techniques and agreements.   
Commercial banks came second in the race to become such champions after 
WWII. Devoid of its colonial legacy, the intensely provincial character of the Netherlands 
had become blatant to any observer. This suited Co-operative Banks better; as did the first 
phase of the creation of a European identity. The European Economic Community up to 
the 1970s focused on agriculture more than financial services or monetary union. 
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Commercial banks came a close second, nevertheless. After all, in so far as it existed, the 
Dutch national identity throughout the prior five centuries had been pervaded by notions of 
sound finance and Regent capitalism. While waiting for better times, the Big Four 
commercial banks adapted to the situation, by expanding throughout the outer provinces of 
the Netherlands. Their strategy of branching out consisted foremost of buying up banks in 
the provinces to fill outstanding gaps.  More than English clearing banks – including the 
comparatively devolved Barclays –  Dutch commercial banks‘ City headquarters allowed 
provincial institutions and branches to retain their local identity – in recognition of the 
Dutch predilection for local particularisms and provincial traditions (Wilson, 1962: 202-
203).
584
 The two bank mergers in 1964 further boosted commercial banks‘ national 
champion potential. For one, despite the restrictions set out in the second banking act 
(1952), the Dutch Bank approved the two bank mergers because it wanted to strengthen 
the position of Dutch banks in the EEC and the international financial playing field at 
large. Furthermore, the merger between Amsterdamsche and Rotterdamsche in Amro 
signalled the pacification of acrimony between the two financial establishment in both 
Holland cities. The second merger, finally, testified to the willingness of the bank 
representing the old textile industries in Twente to modernise in conjunction with the 
mother of all colonial banks, the NHM.  
ii) Savings Banks 
  Co-operative banks beat general Savings Banks to the punch in terms of regional 
spread; State Postal Savings Bank did enjoy a good regional spread. Yet, their legal 
inability to engage with international developments, meant they were no match for Co-
operatie Banks‘ exemplary role at the forefront of emerging international standards and 
agreements – in casu the new European agricultural model.   
iii) Co-operative Banks 
   More than any other banks, the symbiosis of the Co-operative banks during the 
period 1930-1965 symbolised the unintentional emergence of a new post-WWII national 
consciousness. This feat was largely unintentional, since co-operative banks considered 
themselves champions of consociational particularism more than anything else. But several 
things conspired to turn co-operative banks‘ predilection for consociationalism in a 
platform for a new Dutch national consciousness. For one, protestant-neutral co-operative 
leaders as early as the 1930s interpreted the fragmented nature of agricultural 
consociationalism as a practical source of creating ―unity in diversity‖.  Thus, they boldly 
stated in 1938: ―Something is happening in the agricultural sector whose importance 
cannot be underestimated. Many thousands of people of all kinds of beliefs and ranks are 
striving to serve to bring to fruition our sources of national life and welfare. Not to enrich 
themselves, but to serve purely altruistic aims. Thus a great strength of the entire nation 
lies in the agricultural sector‖.585 The post-WWII development by Catholic co-operators of 
the notion of ―personalism‖586 as an alternative to both US consumerist traditions and 
social-democratic ―breakthrough‖587 aims, provided another practical vehicle for the 
creation of Dutch unity in diversity. With their principle of personalism Catholics initiated 
an ingenious re-linking of the national tradition of living-together-apart to the new reality 
of a growing Dutch State apparatus – personalism entailed a form of pluralism that allowed 
for the voluntary grouping of different ―spiritual‖ families in a corporative structure, by 
extension the State. The establishment of a national Agricultural Board, in which leaders 
of both Co-operative Banks had a seat, further helped pacificy ideologically moot points in 
the pragmatic name of international efficiency.
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  Finally, in defiance of the official orders 
225 
 
of the two Co-operative Centrals, the two groups of local co-operative banks came ever 
closer together during the late 1950s and 1960s, thus providing a pioneering example of 
increasing unity in diversity on the ground. 
iv) Mortgage banks 
   Mortgage banks simply could not follow the example of English building 
societies and become the champions of modernised national traditions, in spite of housing 
policy emerging as a main focus of national reconstruction efforts after WWII. For one, the 
historical stigma on the mortgaging of real property lingered well into the 1960s 
undermined; it had been reinforced by the failure of private investors and mortgage banks 
during the 1930s.
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 Furthermore, arguably since the 1950s, and certainly since the early 
1960s, housing associations‘ combined the role of national champion of high-quality, low-
cost housing and spatial desegregation, with a maximum strategic involvement of a variety 
of local grassroots groups – fostering variety in the housing stock, and facilitating local 
solutions to problems of urban renewal and social neighbourhood development (Primus, 
2006).  Further compounding mortgage banks‘ problems, they were weakest in those 
provinces where housing associations were weak too. Thus, while in the provinces of 
Holland, Zeeland and also Friesland, 68 to   85 % of the growth in housing supply was 
attributable to subsidised  housing. In the two core cities Amsterdam and Rotterdam this 
figure amounted to almost 100 percent. Not surprisingly, growth of the housing stock in 
these provinces was low. In the high-growth provinces of North-Brabant and Limburg, on 
the other hand, only 47 % of new housing was on account of social subsidies. Contrary to 
the situation in the former provinces, in the latter, predominantly catholic provinces, 
private ownership thus accounted for a sizeable part of new housebuilding (cf. Feddes, 
1995: 432-433). In these provinces, however, the mortgage bank subsidiary of the Co-
operative Bank prevailed. 
 
Strategy f    Become a champion of the national economic interest. 
i)  Commercial banks 
   During the 1930s and the first post-WWII years, commercial banks‘ influence 
on government policy through for instance the ―Ondernemersraad‖, the main City lobby in 
those days, paled in comparison with co-operative banks‘ influence (Taselaar, 1998).590   
While the Ministry of Finance out of necessity after WWII increasingly put commercial 
and co-operative banks on a par, commercial banks celebrated their difference by 
establishing a new Bankers‘ Association (1949).  This new Association was charged with 
the task to preclude the possibility of undue political interference, by ensuring a formal 
delimitation of the powers of the authorities – culminating in the second banking act 
(1952).  
The Association also functioned as a cartel, facilitating price agreements about 
tariffs and provisions. Due to commercial banks‘ closeness to the Dutch Bank, the 
Association soon grew in stature – as demonstrated by the Dutch Bank‘s approval of the 
great bank mergers in 1964, in defiance of the second banking act.  
ii) Savings Banks 
     Rather than function as a public-private protoype of modern national economic 
interest promotion, savings banks were unable to safeguard their private interests from 
increasing government encroachment. Already during WWII,  the general and State Postal 
savings banks had suffered greatly from German encroachment in their affairs. After 
WWII, unwanted State interventionism continued. For instance, the Savings Association 
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was not at all happy with the social-democratic Minister of Finance‘s initiative to set up a 
Savings Council in 1947
591
.  In effect, this legal decision took away from the savings banks 
the private prerogative on the promotion of savings. Worse, it publicly confirmed co-
operative banks‘ equal stature as a savings institution.  The State Postal Savings Bank, for 
its part, perceived the institution of the Savings Council as a sign that it should try harder 
in becoming the  champion of national savings (Veluwenkamp, 1981: 30-32). Furthermore, 
the State Postsal Bank endeavoured to safeguard its existence by increasing its public 
economies of scale, seeking a merger with the public Giro – money transfer – system.   
iii) Co-operative Banks 
     Co-operative banks‘ interest group representatives were most successful 
during the period 1930-1965. I have discussed the comparative success of the agricultural 
lobby since the 1930s in attracting a disproportionate share of Dutch government 
subsidies. From the 1950s, European agricultural subsidies supplemented domestic 
government income – co-operatives‘ access to European policy was ensured with the 
appointment of Manshold as the  the first commissioner for agriculture in 1957.  
Furthermore, after WWII, all political parties aligned with the agricultural interest, 
allowing for the establishment of an Agricultural Board largely operating outside of the 
framework of parliamentary democracy.
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 Also, contrary to commercial banks, co-
operative banks had long represented the interest of small business, and the virtues of loca 
community and family life. This interest belonged to the core constituency of the powerful 
religious parties (Van Waarden, 1992b : 156), in turn benefiting Co-operative Banks‘ 
political clout.  Finally, co-operative banks‘ business model of intra-community finance set 
the tone in the post-WWII period; it was actively promoted by the Dutch government in 
the 1950s and made up more than than 70 percent of industrial investments up to the mid-
1960s (Van Zanden and Griffiths, 1989: 217). 
One direct sign of Co-operative banks‘ influence were the fiscal privileges 
accruing to them. In spite of commercial banks‘ protestations., the dividend payments by 
Co-operative Banks to members would remain non-taxable
593
. Although the profits that 
were not paid out to members were taxable, though at a lower rate than for Commercial 
banks (Sonnenschein, 1959: 149). The Co-operative Banks only paid 20 percent of 
corporation tax, compared to 45 percent for the Commercial banks – and 0% for the 
savings banks. In the 1960s the two Central Co-operative Banks acted together to thwart 
plans to abolish the fiscally preferential treatment of cooperatives.  
 The only apparent downside after WWII was Co-operative banks‘ lack of access 
to the Bankers‘ Association. There were several reason for this. First, commercial banks 
labeled their co-operative counterparts special-purpose agricultural banks, not banks in 
their own right. Second, legally speaking, the Co-operative Centrals‘ confederal decision-
making structure meant they did not meet a crucial condition: they could not formally 
impose binding cartel regulations with all affiliated local banks – albeit they wielded great 
influence in practice. Third, and most importantly, the Co-operative Banks were happy to 
confer separately with the Dutch Bank and through their own lobby organisations.
594
  In 
sum, Co-operative banks did not need the Bankers Association.  After all, through the 
Agricultural Board and the National Co-operative Council, the leaders of the central Co-
operative Banks gained direct access to the Minister and the Department of Agriculture. In 
addition, the Agricultural Board was very influential in the Dutch Second Chamber – the 
equivalent of the English House of Commons. This influence was a consequence of a 
combination of factors, namely the prestige and expertise of the public corporation, the 
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almost single voice with which the agricultural members of the Second Chamber appeared 
to speak and the strong dependence on the confessional parties upon the agricultural vote 
in elections (Robinson, 1961: 61-64).
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 A final reason for the comparative success of Dutch co-operative banking in 
presenting itself as the most appropriate vehicle of the national economic interest, was the 
relative closeness of the co-operative model to post-WWII provisions to encourage 
collaboration between capital and labour in firms. After a first Catholic proposal in 1919 
for the institution of work councils – a proposal backed by Catholic employers as long as it 
did not involve giving further powers to the trade unions, in 1950 a law was passed which 
obliged every entrepreneur and director to give workers a voice in company affairs through 
a special-purpose Council (De Jong, 1971).
596
 The increasing affinity between the for-
profit company model and the co-operative model – at least in terms of grassroots worker 
representation – may go some way in explaing why the animosity against private 
enterprise amongst co-operators all but vanished in the 1950s. 
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What is more, to most 
farmers, the existence of non-cooperative endeavours now was a favourable condition for 
the sound functioning of cooperatives (cfr. Abma, 1956: 51).  
iv) Mortgage banks 
    Above I maintained that the traumatic experiences of the 1930s politically 
forever closed the doors to a specialized mortgage banking sector and capital-regime for 
home ownership in the Netherlands, akin to the English building society sector and the 
German system of Bausparen – with their corresponding specialised tax incentive systems. 
This explains why, in spite of valiant efforts by the Mortgage Banking Association, the 
Dutch Bank was able to impede a separate capital regime for housing, in a way it was 
unable to regarding co-operative banks and the agricultural sector – allied in the Green 
Front. 
One legacy of the past would keep haunting mortgage banks‘ efforts to influence 
policy: their sheer distrust of government interventionism – grounded in their nineteenth 
century Liberal legacy (Janssens, 1992: 35). Mortgage banks had signaled their willingness 
to participate in a common interest group association as early as 1928 – after the 
bankruptcy of a major mortgage bank in Hilversum. A first association was launched in 
1936 – ―Controle-orgaan voor het Hypotheekbankbedrijf‖. Faced with German occupation, 
this association ceased to exist only six years later. It took another ten years, for a new 
Mortgage Association to emerge (1952). Yet, confronted with the much better organised 
housing associations, those usurpers of post-WWII housing policy, this was to no avail. 
 
                                                 
502 For a short clarification of the difference between monetarism and chartalism, see Chapter 4, endnotes 43 and 
44. Plato is sometimes portrayed as the first proponent of the Chartalist theory of money. For Plato money comes 
into being only once a society has organized itself along continuous market lines, and social custom and 
legislation give money a unique symbolic importance in a system of real exchange – where "goods trade for 
money and money trades for goods, but goods do not trade for directly for goods" (Clower, 1965). Aristotle, on 
the other hand, can be seen as a predecessor of metallism and even monetarism, with his insistence that money is 
not just a veil, but a commodity in its own right – ―if money is going to be used in the market of commodities as a 
medium of exchange, it must itself be one of these commodities‖ (cfr. Schumpeter, 1954, History of Economic 
Analysis). 
503 The debate hinged on whether to aim a stable currency, or whether to aim at stability in the labour market and 
in levels of production. In the middle of 1934 those supporting devaluation formed their own organisation, the 
Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Waardevast Geld », in which well-known economists sat alongside businessmen 
and politicians, not as representatives of the organisations to which they were affiliated but as individuals. By 
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means of petitions and public discussion the association tried to focus attention on the arguments for devaluation 
and to put pressure on government policy (Griffiths and Schoorl, 1987). They were not very successful . The most 
significant pressure on the cabinet came from the president of the Nederlandsche Bank, Trip, a fiery supporter of 
the gold standard. The arguments against devaluation varied from moral considerations – devaluation amounted 
to debasing the currency, or, worse, a breach of promise- to warnings that leaving the anchor offered by gold 
would lead to inflation. Reference was often made to hyperinflation in Germany in 1923 (Griffiths, 1987). 
504 In face of an international economic depression and worsening cost/benefit ratios in the Dutch gricultural 
sector, Van den Heuvel, chairman of the protestant farmer association CBTB and member of Parliament for the 
Protestant party ARP, openly called for state intervention in the form of price subsidies for sugarbeets, potatoes 
and wheats. In the typical Regent conciliatory way, the government reacted by installing a committee composed 
of representatives of the farmer unions, Co-operative Banks, land-laborer organisations and agricultural issue 
groups. The catholic farmer union (KNBTB) called upon the government to cut taxes, improve planological water 
and road schemes,  subsidize export and production in general, and introduce an export-negotiation tariff. Apart 
from asking state intervention, the best line of action for farmers would be to further improve agricultural 
innovation and know-how, introduce better bookkeeping techniques and rationalize production methods. Since 
protestant and liberal leaders called for comparable actions, the farmer unions were quick to agree on a program 
of urgency that was subsequently sent to the minister of interior and agriculture in June 1930. 
505 From early 1934 onwards, a quota system was forced on the Netherlands Indies, which fixed the quantities or 
the origin (mostly from the Netherlands) of goods imported into the country. The Dutch government wanted to 
help the textile industry in Twente, where thousands of jobs were at stake….This caused growing unease and 
anger among Indonesian politicians, made worse by the refusal of the government to give any substantial help to 
the sales of the netherlands Indies products, such as sugar and tea, on the Dutch market (Taselaar, 1998: 623). 
506 Before WWII, the Dutch interest in Indonesia – both economic and political – was sizeable. While officially 
the economic contribution of the colonies amounted to some 13.7 per cent of the national income , the real effect 
of the Indonesian presence was much bigger. Apart from boosting industrial export, the Dutch Indies were of 
immense importance for the financial establishment in Amsterdam. It led to the trebling of the nominal capital 
value of all companies quoted on the Amsterdam stock exchange from 837,000,000 guilder in 1913 to 
2,323,000,000 in 1939. 
507 Not before 1948 did the colonial lobby realise it should support Indonesian independence in return for the 
protection of Dutch economic and financial interests in the country. During the 1950s, the Netherlands 
industrialised quickly and the Indonesian contribution to the Dutch economy became less important. As 
mentioned before, this development had been foreshadowed during the 1930s, official rhetoric on economic 
cooperation notwithstanding. The nationalisation of Dutch economic interests in 1957-1958 hardly damaged the 
Dutch economy. The Dutch colonial lobby had by then become so irrelevant,, that it was unable to influence 
Dutch policy on West New Guinea. The representatives of old-fashioned regented capitalism no longer had a role 
to play (Taselaar, 1998 : 624-625). 
508 This was the Truman-doctrine of ―paranoid democratisation‖. 
509 These organisations were named after the Committee headed by the Rotterdam banker Woltersom, who, 
following the German corporatist model, was in charge of accommodating and arranging the Dutch economy in 
six major corporate sectors. For a short period after WWII the Netherlands even had a Cabinet Minister for 
Corporatist Organisation. 
510 In the 1933 elections the socialist party – SDAP – for the first time in her young existence lost parliamentary 
seats – two – compared to the previous election. 
511 Banning was the first person to use this term (cfrr. Knegtmans, 1992: 91).  
512 Following the influence of Hendrik de Man (1927), who had distanced himself from Marxist ideology, the idea 
that socialism needed a ―moral‖ dimension gained influence. 
513 Banning, 1933. 
514 Obviously, these proposals encountered fierce opposition from the Marxist section of the party. To 
accommodate Marxist grievances, the new social-democratic leadership proceeded to deny an explicit connection 
between life principles and socialist politics. 
515 This followed several crucial antecedents. The SDAP in 1926 had temporarily and in 1933 definitively stopped 
boycotting the opening of the Dutch Parliament by the Queen. 
516 Andeweg (1989 : 46): ―the liberation had the effect of unleashing dreams and plans for a renewed country : 
―The experience of the occupation, during which long-time political foes had become allies in the Resistance, and 
during which visions of a more harmonious and co-operative world had developed, resulted in a conscious 
attempt by politicians from various parties to reorganise the party system, and to break through the political walls 
separating the subcultural pillars in Dutch Society.‖ 
229 
 
                                                                                                                           
517 Nederlandse Volksbeweging 
518 The relation between the Catholic Party and Colijn‘s Reformed Party (ARP) deterioriated rapidly during the 
1930s; the former lost faith in the latter‘s ―reforming― élan and accused it of showing symptoms of "elite 
decadence" (Zwart, 1996: 33, 40-42). 
519 The Dutch Catholic bishops reaffirmed that the christian worldview was centred on the ―corporative 
organisation of society‖ and, more particularly with regards to the business world, on ―public corporation‖.  (De 
katholiek in het openbare leven van deze tijd, Bisschoppelijk Mandement 1954, Utrecht: p. 24) 
520 Ibid, p.24-25. More precisely, the 1954 document was based on Pope Pius XI‘s opinions, as laid down in the 
encyclical Quadragesimo anno, in which he stated that ―a perfect recovery will occur only, when, with the 
elimination of above-mentioned opposition, orderly corporations are established in society…whereby people are 
not classified according to the position occupied in the labour market, but according to the societal functions 
performed by each one‖ (cited in the episcopal 1954 document on page 25).. 
521 As early as 1935 social-democrats portrayed corporatism as a justified ―preparatory phase‖ of socialisation.  
While many socialists still objected to confessional notions of a corporatist State based on ―organic‖ traditions, 
they now envisioned a State as the representation of free public opinion. Political parties organised on the basis of 
the ―voluntary membership of individuals who share the same principles‖ were to form the new foundation of the 
―general interest the state should defend‖. All in all, with each passing decade of failed radicalism, social-
democrats became softer in their approach.  They increasingly used the same Christian rhetorics in their 
discourses about the moral elevation of the people, not in the least because of the inflow of reformed intellectuals 
(Stuurman, 1983 : 240-243). In sum, Dutch sociali-democrats gradually moved to a position in which the 
acceptability of capitalism is toned down to a political judgement whether the economic organisations in question 
are sufficiently ―in service of community‖ (Socialist Program, 1947). Special attention is given to a more 
balanced rule of law with regards to the relation between labour and capital. The emphasis on public corporations 
and the socialisation of ―the principal means of production in the fields of industry, banking and transport‖ should 
be seen in this light, as part of the general strategy to solve the labour-capital antithesis (SDAP Program, 1937 : 
article 3). Important for the SMEs in general, and the farmers in particular, is the acceptance of a mixed economic 
order, a ―democratic-socialist society‖ in which alongside public corporations, private ―small businesses put on a 
sound basis…can perform an important function‖ (SDAP Program, 1937 : article 13).    
The party programs of 1882 and 1895 were very deterministic in their vision on the historical development of 
society and the role of socialism in this. While Dutch socialists as late as the 1970s believed that history was on 
their side, the contradiction between historical predetermination – the transition from capitalism to socialism – 
and immediate necessity – economic issues within the current capitalist regime – forced them as early as the turn 
of the twentieth century to tone down this determinism (cfrr. Tromp, 2002). 
522 Especially socialist and anarchist organisations were targeted in 1918. 
523 Thus, the curious situation arose that, while even prominent Catholics could retain their Labour party 
membership and seats in Parliament, very few Catholics considered it spiritually safe to retain an NVV 
membership card, attend NVV meetings or even read NVV literature. 
524 Subsequent documents reemphasised the need for Catholic unity in all social and political affairs, condemning 
uncompromisingly a broad range of non-Catholic ideas and their organisational carriers (e.g. De katholiek in het 
openbare leven van deze tijd, Bisschoppelijk Mandement 1954, Utrecht : 45). The most notable Catholic 
antagonisms expressed in these documents were liberalism, humanism, family planning, the socialist press and 
radio, the NVV, the Labour Party and of course the Communist Party. In particular, the document warned that ―a 
breakthrough of the Labour Party would lead to an equally big destruction of the own catholic party. This came as 
a shock to the social-democratic trade union NVV. Its leadership believed it had managed to reassure the Catholic 
Unions that it was less interested in stealing its members than in fair worker treatment, freedom of choice and 
even differentiating itself explicitly from the Communist Party. In fact, it also came as a surprise to Catholic trade 
union leaders, who found the isolationist and anti-ecumenical document of the bishops not particularly 
consociational. As a result, there  were reports of inter-union rapproachements. However, when the president of 
the Protestant federation, M. Ruppert, heard about  impending interunion relations, he placed his organisation 
squarely behind the catholic bishops. This dealt the final blow to the socialist breakthrough movement. Still, 
practical collaboration continued through informal channels, especially between the catholic and socialist trade 
unions. 
525 A sample survey carried out by the Netherlands Institute of Popular opinion in 1956 (NIPO survey, 1956) 
provides a picture of what the relationship between religion and politics looked like according to the 
consociational model elite control and denominational pillars. The catholic KVP had the most loyal and exclusive 
voters‘ base : almost 95 percent of practising catholics voted on the party. One third of Labour voters were 
secular, another quarter were non-practising official Calvinists. Non-practising official Calvinists also provided 
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the main support for the Liberals. The anti-revolutionary ARP also held a firm grip on practising Reformed 
Christians. The problem with the protestant-christian population, however, was that the Dutch Reformed Church, 
in contrast with the Roman Catholic Church, had known several schisms, the two most notable being the 
Secession (Afscheiding) of 1834 and the Protest of 1886 (Doleantie). As such, the protestant voters‘ base was 
much more diluted – in the sense of being spread over several parties, sometimes even secular – than the catholic 
voters‘ base (see also Appendix U). 
526 For instance, it was taken for granted that the real leader of the RKSP, Nolens, in 1918 could not become 
minister-president because he was a priest, while the Reformed Protestants could delegate the preacher Kuyper to 
the position of minister-president of the reformed preacher Kuyper. 
527 This opposition was influenced by the so-called Michael-movement of the Delft professor in work legislation 
Veraart, and principally relied on Catholic workers. 
528 Taking their lead from the Pope‘s Rerum Novarum, Dutch Catholics‘ understanding of corporate subsidiarity 
differed from the Reformed Protestant doctrine of ―own circles‖, in that it purposively provided for, on the one 
hand, state-business collaboration, and, on the other hand, a distinction between the public and the private sphere. 
More particularly, the Catholic tradition was in favour of the State delegating public authority to private 
corporations, be they employer-employee councils, pastoral councils, or unions. Thus, unlike the Reformed 
Protestant tradition, the Catholic tradition prescribes not only harmonious co-operation between Capital and 
Labour, but also with the State. Remarkably, even more than the Protestants, the Catholics were against modern 
notions of the sovereignty of the people. As such, while being in favour of some democratisation as a means to 
gain corporate rights, the Catholic leaders clearly foresaw an elite/participant boundary of active versus passive 
democratisation. Indeed, in its peculiar, but clearly defined combination of a logic of outsider and a logic of 
establishment, the Catholic tradition arguably is the one drawing most on republican guild traditions (cf. Van 
Waarden, 1992a). 
529 By subsidiarity is meant that a higher instance – for example the State – cannot take over a task that a lower 
instance can fulfill, unless the lower parts seriously fail to fulfil their tasks. 
530 Some Catholic intellectuals such as Veraart (1938: 108) accused the government Colijn of semi-fascism, from 
which the Catholic party should emancipate as soon as possible.  
531 Partij van de Vrijheid 
532 Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 
533 In terms of trade union and educational presence, in 1951, the Dutch christian democratic trade unions counted 
533,000 members versus 405,600 for the social-democratic and 111,700 for the liberal trade unions. A communist 
trade union had split off the socialist trade union after WWII; it accounted for an estimated 163,800 members in 
1951 (cfr. Fogarty, 1957: 212). Even more tellingly, in 1951 539,347 Dutch students attended public (neutral) 
education, 869,424 private catholic schools,  and 508,176 private protestant schools. The system of specifically 
socialist education was much less elaborate. While the public shool system was dwarfed by the private school 
system, it is also very telling that public university and higher education counted 23,779 students, while students 
attending catholic and protestant universities and higher education institutions merely numbered a respective 
1,968 and 1,435 (Fogarty, 1957: 346). 
534 National recognition of the Bank of England‘s actual if not official lender of last resort duty came at the end of 
the eighteenth century, in response to wide-spread Tory criticism of the Bank of England‘s unwillingness to help 
out small provincial banks during the crash of 1793. This induced Francis Horner as early as 1802 to claim that 
the Bank of England was ―a national establishment, not merely influencing, by the superior magnitude of its 
capital, the state of commercial circulation, but guiding its movements according to views of public policy 
(Horner, 1957: 51-2).    
535 In 1952 a separate act was passed that provided a more detailed legal basis for the regulation and supervision 
of the banking sector, called Act on the Supervision of the Credit System (Wet Toezicht Kredietwezen, Wtk). 
536 Nederlandse Bankiersvereniging 
537 Despite the improvement in banks‘ liquidity position in the 1960s – caused by inflationary finance policies and 
private sector balance-of-payment surpluses, from the mid-1970s it  became customary for banks to be in the red 
with the Nederlandsche Bank (Barendregt and Visser, 1997 : 188). 
538 Agreements would then be formally issued by the Board of Government Mediators (CvR). 
539 Catholics‘ main purpose with corporatism was to harmonise class interests by constructing a functional 
framework in which communal conflicts would transcend conflict between different sections. The socialist 
doctrine, on the other hand, was to have labour fully represented in decision-making about the economy, so that it 
could contend on equal terms with the representatives of capital (Gladdish, 1991: 35).  
540 The first intervention measure was announced in August 1930: a compensation was granted for imports made 
by Dutch sugar industrials. Many more measures followed between 1930 and 1932, such as the Wheatlaw (1931) 
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and the Crisis Dairy Law (1932). For the first time in the existence of the Dutch unitary State – and reminiscent of 
the corporatist order of the Republic – the administration of laws was delegated to non-State agencies: the farmer 
associations (Smits, 1996 : 101).   In 1933 all crisis regulations were integrated in a comprehensive law, which 
gave government the right to designate agricultural products as crisis-products, and regulate prices and production 
without much parliamentary meddling. The by State regulation guaranteed agricultural prices (on wheat, butter, 
cheese…) were substantially higher than the world market prices, that had tumbled throughout the years of 
depression (Van Zanden and Griffiths, 1989 : 73-86). In case of export, differences with the world market prices 
were bridged by subsidies. The financing of these regulations and subsidies mainly came from three sources: 
levies on the import of agricultural produce, state revenues, and consumers, who had to pay for the higher food 
prices with a decline of their spending power.  The amounts that the State had to pay were especially high 
between 1933 and 1936: more than 200 million guilder per annum on a total agrarian income of about 450 
millions and a state budget of less than 1 billion guilder. 
541 Except on matters relating to education and to the Government‘s agricultural extension service. 
542 The ―Landbouwschap‖ came into being by Royal decree. Membership in the Landbouwschap is compulsory 
for all those engaged in agriculture, whether they belong to one of the six private agricultural unions or not.  As a 
body for the promotion of the general interests of farming business, the Landbouwschap had autonomous 
legislative authority regarding the  
a) promotion of animal health, quality of agricultural produce 
b) regulation of production, storage and land cultivation 
c) internal distribution 
d) rationalisation and normalisation 
e) conditions of employment for agricultural workers.  
543  Compared to England, the structure of income inequality in the Netherlands after WWII can be explained 
much less by regional variations. Remarkably, differentiating between incomes on the basis of region/province of 
residence would account only for 2 to 3 % of the variation in the Netherlands. On the other hand, income 
inequality figures within the different Dutch provinces are relatively similar to those found within the English 
regions (cfr. Somermeijer, 1965: 101). 
544 For instance, in 1920 Minister Aalberse introduced a new premium subsidy for private for-profit providers in 
order to stimulate for-profit housing investments. In 1921, he also ended the rent-freeze Act and in 1925, 
municipalities were even prohibited from providing financial contributions for social rental dwellings. As a 
consequence, the share of social rental dwellings in the total building programme decreased from almost 87 
percent in 1920 to 15 percent in 1927. By 1927, the housing stock was thought to be large enough for the 
remaining temporary financial and regulatory measures to be abolished. However, the booming private housing 
market soon revealed its downside when overinvestment in middle-class dwellings in the cities led to vacancy. 
Meanwhile, the housing associations had become almost completely marginalised. Between 1925 and 1940, their 
share in the total housing construction was not more than 10 percent. In 1936, the Cabinet abolished individual 
housing allowances, which had been meant to provide temporary support for unemployed tenants in paying their 
rents, in order to encourage for-profit landlords to lower their rents. This measure only worsened the conditions in 
the lower segments of the housing market, however, since it stimulated demand for cheaper dwellings which 
could not be met by the private market (Gerrichhauzen, 1990; Helderman, 2007). 
545 The government‘s annual building quotas and programmes developed into the most important instrument for 
national housing policy, a development that was accompanied with the subsequent growth of the Ministry of 
Reconstruction and Housing. 
546 Publiekrechtelijke bedrijfsorganen (PBO‘s) 
547 Immediately after the war in 1946, an advisory report was published which confirmed that housing policy was 
too important to be left to the vagaries of the market. Recommendations included a long list of structural 
measures needed to regulate and stabilize the housing market (Commissie Plate, 1946, ―Towards new housing 
politics‖). 
548 This led to the temporary establishment of such a Ministry in 1935. However, the tide changed again in 1937, 
when, in face of international turbulence and the imminence of a second world war, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs took charge of agricultural affairs. 
549 For instance, a 1952 manifesto of the People‘s Party for Freedom and Democracy read: ―In matters of 
agricultural policy the guideline should be the conviction that the existence of a vigorous, autonomous 
agricultural sector is of great importance to the the soundness of national life‖ (VVD, 1952: 31). 
550 Landbouwschap 
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551 The difference with the authority of the English organised agriculture is revealing. While in England, the 
National Farmers‘ Union also enjoyed a close relationship with the Government, the Union is not pressing its case 
in Parliament, nor are there quasi-official parliamentary spokesmen for the Union.  
552 Other causes of this second ―green revolution‖ were the growth of cattle farming, horticulture and  finishing 
companies (mostly pigs and chickens). In addition to this growth of production, the number of companies in 
arable and cattle farming was almost halved in the period 1950 and 1974, while in horticulture the decrease was 
―limited‖ to 30 percent. The agrarian labour force decreased even more, mainly through a reduction of the 
number of wage labourers and helping family members. The mobility of this labour force to other economic 
sectors peaked in the 1960‘s. 
553 At the basis of the European Common Agricultural Policy laid the twin fears that Europe might become too 
dependent on food imports from abroad, and that agricultural productivity might not keep pace with population 
growth. The main goals of the Common Agricultural Policy, as outlined in article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, were 
to increase agricultural productivity, to assure a reasonable standard of living for the agricultural population and 
to maintain reasonable consumer prices (Everts, 1985: 306). 
554 For instance, the Dutch Economic Competition Act, though a very mild law [in comparison with the US 
Sherman Act], has a substantial extraterritorial scope, with potentially as far-reaching consequences with regards 
to the protection of national interests in foreign trade as the Sherman Act. It may apply to conduct domestic and 
abroad by both Dutch and foreign firms; agreements which inhibit either Dutch exports or imports indeed are 
seen to infringe the public interest. In practice, however, the Dutch anti-trust law does not appear to have been 
applied to any other than Dutch nationals, and then only for activities in the Netherlands (Rahl, 1970 : 113-115). 
555 Dutch trade policy has either been couched in technical-neutral language, or been characterised by political 
strife without policy effects. In both cases an « inner circle » of Regents has been able historically to monopolise 
the process, either by default of strife or because of the lack of an organised alternative during the rare episodes of 
political strife (De Boo, 1989: 149). 
556 Economically, the EEC rested on a Franco-German ―entente‖ which opened French markets to German 
industry in exchange fro Germany subsidies to French agriculture. 
557 Ordoliberals‘ opposition to the reconstruction of the welfare state continued in the 1950s, albeit unsuccessfully 
(cfrr. Abelshauser 1997; Hockerts 1980: 377-394).   
558 The so-called ―a-political‖ politics of productivity emerged first in the Progressive Era and the War Production 
Board of 1918. It was then championed by Herbert Hoover under the form of a ―business associationism‖ that 
would bring about impartial efficiency and eliminate wasteful competition (Hawley, 1973, 1974). It provided the 
basis for the New Deal settlement.  Through the politics of productivity elites sought to transform political 
conflicts between East Coast promoters of financial and economic liberalism and Midwest proponents of 
domestic industry into problems of output and impartial efficiency. This, it was hoped would mean that rivalling 
groups would adjourn class conflict for for a consensus on national growth (Maier, 1977: 607, 613). 
559 It is significant that the European Community is the product of Catholic Europe. The states that originally 
formed the Community, and that even today form the majority of the members, are states whose predominant 
religion and whose predominant spirit of organisation came out of Catholicism, at least partially reflecting the 
same spirit that sought to unify European Christen-dom from the late Roman Empire or the early Middle Ages 
onward. The European Community reflected a certain school in this Catholic or post-Catholic world, closer in 
theory to that of Montesquieu and de Toc-queville than to that of the Bourbons or the Jacobins, but it came out of 
a civilization that had long sought unity on a hierarchical basis and, through France and Spain, was primarily 
responsible for inventing the modern state. When one listens to Jacques Delors talking about Europe, one hears 
the voice of that spirit. The predominantly Protestant nations of Europe, for the most part, did not at first join in 
the European Community. Denmark is an exception. The Netherlands, with a large Catholic-background 
population that may now be a majority, is something of an exception. ..The European Community, to the extent 
that it was founded by French-men – it was founded essentially by Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer of 
Germany – who came out of the Toquevillian tradition, was an answer to the Jacobins. But the leaders were 
themselves raised in the patterns of Jaco-bin thinking. In the end, it seems that they have been overwhelmed by 
their own culture to expect that a federal Europe means a strong central govern-ment in Brussels, a strong 
bureaucracy to effectuate the activities of that central government, and a hierarchical structure of power acquired 
from the Catholic Church modified by a Catholic concept, namely subsidiarity (Elazar, 1998: 133-134). 
560 Kartellamt 
561 As a co-author of the SDAP‘s Labour Plan of 1935, Tinbergen was commissioned to create the first draft of 
the Central Planning Bureau in the years 1945-1946. Based on Tinbergen‘s recommendations, the Bureau 
produced ―objective forecasts‖ as the basis on which policies could be settled unanimously by all parties. Since it 
was not possible for politicians to monitor all statistical extrapolations, this Bureau slowly but surely acquired  
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authority as a body of governing experts.  All the more so when, by the late 1950‘s it became clear that the 
policies implemented on the basis of technocratic policy, had allowed the Netherlands to achieve a very healthy 
competitive position (Gladdish, 1991: 40).   
562 In other words, the proliferation of veto points institutionalized Germany‘s Verhandlungsdemokratie. It thus 
imposed very effective restraints on the unrestricted effects of political competition and partisan politics and on 
the sovereign powers of an elected government. At the same time, however, the restoration of the German welfare 
state along traditional corporatist lines insured that the ordoliberal order would not result in the free rule of the 
market, but would instead work through the organized interests of capital and labor offering them multiple 
opportunities for long-term coordination (Manow, 1999). 
563 The Rotterdamsche Bank eventually did follow the lead of its competitors, but with a severe time lag; it only 
started offering personal loans from 1963 onwards. Probably because the bank owned a specialised savings since 
1931, it did not show much interest for savings products either. Finally, due to its misfortune with credit services 
in the 1920s, the bank was less accommodating in providing credits too. As a result, between 1960 and 1963, the 
Rotterdamsche Bank‘s earning capacity decreased from 11.4 to 7.2 %. 
564 Clearly, the 1929 international financial crisis did not leave the Dutch agricultural sector unaffected. From 
1930 a downward trend in the amount of savings deposited at the Co-operative Banks became noticeable. In 1931 
the same happened to the amount of credit loans. The measures taken by the government to redress the 
agricultural depression from 1933 were insufficient. Because of the increasing influence of protectionist 
regulations on international markets, Dutch agricultural export stagnated. This period of stagnation lasted for ten 
years.  Nevertheless, most Co-operative Banks weathered the storm without much difficulty, thanks to their 
historically conservative credit policies. 
565 He further expected credit co-operatives to limit the negative side-effects of agricultural price cartels. 
566 In the first post-WWII decades, Dutch commercial banks derived the bulk of their resources from deposits. For 
the thirty-three commercial banks, capital and reserves at the end of 1959 amounted to about 12 per cent of the 
balance sheet total (for the Big Four 6.9 per cent), and deposits to 78.7 per cent (for the Big Four 81.9 per cent). 
Time deposits, including savings deposits, accounted for 37.2 per cent of total deposits (for the Big four 33.4 per 
cent), so that the greater part of total deposits derive from customers' current accounts are repayable on demand. 
Savings deposits amounted to 16.4 per cent of total time deposits and balances held by customers in foreign 
currencies to 10 per cent of total customers' deposits (excluding time deposits). From the banks' point of view, the 
main disadvantage of teh time deposit is the added cost of the interest payment which competition for deposits 
may force up to a high level and it is known that big borrowing customers (which unlike the smaller firms tend to 
use more than one banker) are inclined to play one bank off against another in seeking higher rates of interest on 
deposits fixed by special arrangements. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Dutch banks traditionally 
pay a low rate of interest on demand deposits in order to compete with the giro transfer systems (which pay no 
interest on demand deposits) and, in the smaller towns, with the agricultural credit banks. They make no charge 
for keeping current accounts so long as these remain in credit (Wilson, 1962: 205). 
567 For once, the Rotterdamsche Bank was the pioneer in this regard. The first really rapid expansion of branches 
took place in the decade following the Second World War, when the larger banks in Rotterdam and Amsterdam 
began buying up small provincial institutions that they later converted into branches of their own. In addition, 
these city banks opened many offices de novo (Wilson, 1962: 202-207). 
568 In the mid-1950s, 39% of all farmers opined that cooperatives were more profitable, 10 % that they rendered a 
better service, and 56% that they were more reliable than their non-co-operative counterparts (Abma, 1956: 49-
50). 
569 Indeed, the culture of the Catholic Co-operative banks in comparison remained one of somewhat narrow-
minded economy; their motto still was ―in isolation lies our strength‖, and ―he who is not a farmer and well 
known, we distrust, and how many times justifiably‖ (De Vries, 1973: 14). 
570 Also, during WWII, the agricultural sector suffered less than other sectors from the impact of the war : farmers 
profited from the high agricultural prices and the growth of the black market. As a result, the savings balance and 
marketshare of the Co-operative Banks increased rapidly. 
571 Undoubtedly, social-democrats‘ increasing support helped Co-operative banks expand in the West. The Social-
democrats had been traditionally weak in the provinces of Utrecht, Limburg and North-Brabant, the mainstays of 
the Co-operative Banks. But they traditionally were strong in the Holland provinces, Drenthe, Groningen and 
Friesland, where Co-operative banks were weaker. 
572 Regional Policy had not been included as a formal topic in the Treaty of Rome (1957). The assumption was 
that regional policy was the responsibility of Member States, and that economic integration would automatically 
eliminate problems, anyway. There was also a reluctance to impose regional policy, to avoid the criticism that 
competition rules were circumvented from the beginning. Yet, Robert Schumann from the beginning had argued: 
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―The regional repercussions of the common market will be its true test‖.  Only in 1965, when it became clear that 
economic integration was not that automatic after all, did the EEC avow to the aim of a regional policy - the First 
Commission Communication on Regional Policy was presented in that year.    
573 In 1934, the housing market collapsed and in 1935-36, construction decreased by 40 percent. In order to 
maintain private investment levels, the Cabinet decided to lower the capital costs by means of a general interest 
rate conversions. These measures unintentionally worsened the housing market crisis (Bakker Schut, 1935; Glasz, 
1935). 
574 By means of so-called ―bricks-and-mortar subsidies‖ the government endeavoured to bring rents below cost 
price in the first decade after WWII. 
575 The Committee came out firmly in favour of re-establishing the housing associations as the ‗preferred 
provider‘ of social rental dwellings and advised the Cabinet to abolish the Refund Decree, which had been the 
cause of the crisis among housing Immediately after the Second World War, the Netherlands had to face immense 
housing (Helderman, 2007). 
shortages, worse than those in most other European countries. 
576 The Liberal-Protestant Central, on the other hand, already in july 1940 registered a surplus of 4.5 million 
guilder, while the Catholic Central registered a positive balance of 1 million guilder in august of the same year. 
From that moment on, the ascending trend amongst Co-operative Banks did not stop anymore. So, the credits on 
deposit books at Co-operative Banks already in 1942 exceeded the corresponding amounts at both the Postal 
Office Bank and the General Savings Banks. Some more figures are further proof of the differentiating position of 
the Co-operative Banks during WWII. The number of deposit books opened at local banks affiliated to the 
Catholic Central increased from 166,669 per ultimo 1940 to 333,686 at the end of 1945. The average amount of 
money deposited also rose sharply, from 738 guilder in 1940 to 1,830 guilder in 1945. By way of comparison, the 
average amount deposited at the Postal Office Bank totaled 221 guilder in 1940 and 556 guilder in 1945. The 
corresponding figures at the General Savings Banks are 327 and 580 guilder; at the combined Co-operative Banks 
(affiliated to Utrecht and Eindhoven) 771 and 1,714 guilder. Noteworthy is that the highest average balance per 
deposit book in 1945 was registered at the Co-operative Banks affiliated to Eindhoven (1,830 guilder). Finally, 
credit services at Utrecht local banks got going again in 1945, while for local banks affiliated to Eindhoven this 
lasted till 1946. Yet, some Co-operative Banks faced serious financial problems, which caused the Centrals to 
tighten control measures to avoid any more financial problems. During these depression years, the Co-operative 
Banks had to take up some of the new tasks in the system of agrarian protection initiated by the government. So, 
the local banks took charge of paying out the vast numbers of subsidies that government had promised specific 
groups of farmers.  As such, the Co-operative Banks played a role of intermediary between the State and the 
population of farmers. To accommodate the increased working load, both Central headquarters were expanded. 
More importantly, the role of intermediary between the State and farmers entailed more intensive contact between 
both Centrals and between all local banks. 
577 Nationale Spaarraad 
578 Interview with Herman Wijffels, October 2004. Obviously, the fact that the income inequality between City 
and outer provinces had been leveled to a great extent during WWII, facilitated the integration of Co-operative 
Bankers in the financial establishment somewhat. 
579 Centrale Ringvergadering Utrecht, november 9th 1945. 
580 The money that was handed in had to be deposited in separate, blocked accounts. Most of this money had to 
stay blocked on these accounts, at least for a few months. This led to a substantial increase of transfers from one 
blocked account to another by giro. Though the increase of the number of savings accounts at local banks 
affiliated to Eindhoven from 1944 to1945 with 50 percent already was phenomenal, the increase at local banks 
affiliated to Utrecht even attained 70 percent. 
581 After WWII, the Catholic Co-operative Banks caught up with their protestant-neutral counterparts: while the 
latter in 1948 held credit saldi 3.96 times bigger, this differential had decreased to 1.76 in 1958, a normal figure 
given the difference in territorial size covered by the two types of banks (Van Campen, 1959: 22). 
582 This last measure made it possible for financiers to lend up to 90 percent of the building costs, instead of 65 to 
70%. 
583 The Committee came out firmly in favour of re-establishing the housing associations as the ‗preferred 
provider‘ of social rental dwellings and advised the Cabinet to abolish the Refund Decree, which had been the 
cause of the crisis among housing Immediately after the Second World War, the Netherlands had to face immense 
housing (Helderman, 2007). 
shortages, worse than those in most other European countries. 
584 The unprecedented waves of amalgamation and centralisation in the pre-WWI and post-WWII period 
notwithstanding, by 1960 there still were thirty truly independent provincial banks in the country. Thirty was an 
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inordinately large number compared to the vastly bigger England – testifying to the continued existence of 
comparatively strong local particularisms in the Netherlands. 
585 Directors of  the Cooperatieve Centrale RAiffeisen Bank, Utrecht, Mei 1938 (cited in Balen, 1938: V). 
586 As distinct from individualism, personalism implies a certain solidarist conception of the individual‘s 
responsibility to and for the society around him. Instead of collectivism, personalism is linked with a form of 
pluralism that allows for the voluntary grouping of different ―spiritual‖ families in for instance a corporative 
structure. With regards to labour, the doctrine of personalism holds that it is not a commodity, but a moral 
achievement by an ―individual with reason, responsibility, and potentially infinite value‖ (Fogarty, 1957 : 28-29) 
587 Small business, financed without external capitalisation, predominated Dutch industry until the 1970s. Small 
business was politically influential because it belonged to the core constituency of the powerful religious parties 
(Van Waarden, 1992b : 156). As these parties were keen on promoting and preserving the virtues of core 
communities in business, be it the family or the local association, they did everything they could to prevent cycles 
of self-destructive mutual competition. Until the 1960s a prudent and conservative financial policy was dominant 
in the Netherlands. External financing was very limited. Internal financing of investments was even emphatically 
promoted by the Dutch government during the fifties. As such, more than 70 percent of industrial investments in 
the postwar period could be financed through internal capitalisation (Van Zanden and Griffiths, 1989 : 217). 
588 One of the ideologically moot points was that efficient farming in the eyes of the Agricultural Board also 
entailed a reorganisation of smaller family businesses. This point had been advanced by a State Committee 
dominated by Free Liberals as early as  1936 (Commissie van advies dienst kleine boerenbedrijven, 1936). Yet, 
the Catholics maintained the importance of the family as the binding agent of a prospering agricultural 
community. Though at first reluctant to agree, the KNBTB in the 1960‘s faced the changing realities in the 
agricultural development. The Catholic Farmer Union (KNBTB) now substituted family businesses that both 
intensified and reorganised their activities for marginal farms as the model of catholic farming.   
589 Up to the 1960s, mortgage banks sometimes received requests from their customers to send them blanco 
envelopes mentioning only an address, so as to hide the fact that their property had been mortgaged (Janssens, 
1992: 22-24). 
590 The relation between the Ondernemersraad and the government worsened considerably in the post-WWII 
years on account of the latter‘s New Guinea policy. New Guinea was still economically as worthless as it was 
before the Second World War but the stubbornness with which the Netherlands held on to the island now 
threatened the interests of Dutch entrepreneurs in Indonesia. The Dutch government knew of course that the 
entrepreneurs didn‘t agree with its New Guinea policy but it took that for granted. The group Rijkens (named 
after the President-Director of Unilever, P Rijkens), of which Van Oldenborgh and some other members of the 
executive of the Ondernemersraad were members, was equally unable to change the mind of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, JMAH Luns, and some other members of the cabinet (Taselaar, 1998). 
591 This was a remarkable reversal of the pre-WWII socialist doctrine that saving was detrimental to the working 
classes, as it was part of the capitalist doctrine.  
592 The social-democratic party (PvdA) from the end of the 1950s increasingly maintained links with the 
agricultural Co-operatives, the Catholic Co-operative Bank in particular. 
The Social-democrats had been traditionally weak in the provinces of Utrecht, Limburg and North-Brabant, the 
mainstays of the Co-operative Banks. On the other hand, they traditionally were strong in the Holland provinces, 
Drenthe, Groningen and Friesland. 
All this gave the farmer unions and co-operative banks – especially the Catholic ones –  
unprecedented access to centres of decision-making, both at the Dutch and European level. 
593 The different laws were : Besluit op de Winstbelasting (1940) and Besluit Vennootschapsbelasting (1941). 
594 Generally speaking, leaders from the Catholic Central Bank were much more politically active in agricultural 
interest group politics – both domestic and European – than the neutral Liberal-Protestant Central, which was 
keen not to irritate its target populations of both protestant-christians and liberals with overly value-rational 
claims. As a result the political skills of Eindhoven directors were much more developed. For instance, the 
Eindhoven director Van Campen actively co-operated with the government in bringing about a draft of the Credit 
Control Law, in contrast with directors of other banks, who were rather hostile to this law that affirmed the 
increasing role of the Dutch Bank in supervising the banking sector. One of the reasons why Van Campen was 
happy with this law, was that, from then on, Co-operative Banks together with savings banks would enjoy the 
same supervision, and indirectly legitimacy, as Commercial banks. This provided further proof of the success of 
Co-operative Banks. 
595 The difference with the authority of the English organised agriculture is revealing. While in England, the 
National Farmers‘ Union also enjoyed a close relationship with the Government, the Union is not pressing its case 
in Parliament, nor are there quasi-official parliamentary spokesmen for the Union.  
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596 The Law of May 4, 1950, Stb. K 174;  
The organisational evolution of Co-operative banking after the foundation of the two Centrals basically entailed 
two elements: integration and a broadening of the field of activity. The institution of the two Centrals obviously 
was a first sign of the integration tendency. At first, the main responsibility of the Centrals consisted in 
maintaining a good liquidity position for the Co-operative credit system. Gradually, however, the Centrals 
induced more centralization in the sense of standardization of banking techniques, more stringent regulations and 
more extensive control of the management of local banks. For instance, …To counterbalance the tendency of 
centralization, the Utrecht local banks organised themselves in so-called ring assemblies. Because the Liberal-
Protestant Central was suspicious about these forms of interlocal consultation, it lasted until 1921 for the Central 
to officially recognise the ring assembly representatives as discussion partners. To reinforce the communication 
between the local representatives and the Central Bank directors, a ―central ring assembly‖ was established. 
Though similar attempts of inter-local consultation were also attempted by Eindhoven local banks, it is telling 
that the Catholic Central Bank systematically blocked these attempts of co-decision making until 1969, with the 
institution of a central ring assembly (De Boer, 2003: 14).   
597 Another reason being that private prices were now usually as fair as those of cooperatives. 
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9   ENGLISH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1930-„68) 
 
9.1    Changing geopolitical opportunity structure (phase 1) 
 
a) The unintentional consequences of monetary nationalism 
The 1930s and 1940s brought to surface several contradictions between 
geopolitical and domestic dynamics, again opening opportunities for two types of nation-
building: a provincial and industrial nation, and an imperial, financial nation. Following 
the world slump of 1929-1931, popular opinion became much more conscious of monetary 
problems. An outbreak of monetary nationalism ensued, resulting in widespread support 
for the subjection of central bankers to greater government control (Sayers, 1952).  
Chartalism, i.e. the German doctrine of ―real‖ money – authorised by a declaratory fiat of 
the government and invested in productive domestic forces, appeared to gain legitimacy as 
a policy principle. Still, there was the issue that, since the nineteenth century, Britain had 
accepted the role of the world‘s banker and the obligations it entailed to maintain large 
reserves for the settlement of debts in order to secure the stability of sterling.  The long 
held habit of world banker did not fit well in a chartalist picture; the former had been too 
deeply ingrained in the British imperial psyche. In addition, the balance of interest group 
politics in Britain was unique: no other country at the time had such a small agricultural 
industry, and so many national interests living off international remittances, loans, 
shipping, etc… Even the United States, Germany, and Sweden had fewer foreign 
investments; and they did not manage a reserve currency. This, together with British 
labour‘s love story with ―cheap loaf‖, made the case of interest groups in favour of 
domestic protectionism – most notably the metal producers of Birmingham and grain 
farmers – comparatively weak (Aldcroft and Richardson, 1969; Gourevitch, 1984: 121). 
England would not be the core part of Britain, if by a ―fit of absence of mind‖ the 
world finance crisis did not lead to unanticipated consequences. First and foremost, 
chartalist policies and the direct involvement of the government in economic and financial 
matters during the 1940s worked in favour of financial institutions and businesses located 
in London, and against those in previously important financial and commercial centres like 
Liverpool and Glasgow. Many provincially based businesses had become large 
nationalised industries run from London, and dependent on London‘s financial and 
commercial markets and services. They were followed by the private sector where large 
public companies absorbed numerous local concerns through mergers and acquisitions. All 
this induced an enormous switch of fund-raising activities to the City.  As a consequence, 
the City of London in the 1950s acquired a prominence within the British economy that it 
had never previously possessed, largely courtesy of the government. There is no evidence 
that this outcome was consciously intended by any party, however (Michie, 2004: 41).
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A second unanticipated consequence of the world slump of 1929-1931 was the 
unostentatious and relatively undeliberate coming into being of the sterling area in the 
Commonwealth and the further transformation of the British world-state into an imperial 
state. In the 1930s, the last cosmopolitan remnants of Britain‘s free trade approach were 
formally replaced by a system of imperial preferences that limited free trade to the colonies 
and other countries within an emerging sterling bloc. On the outbreak of WWII, sterling 
convertibility was suspended. Free movement of goods and payments was confined to the 
so-called sterling area.
599
 Britain‘s agreement at Bretton Woods in 1944 to move towards 
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convertibility
600
, meant that after WWII « world-state » considerations again would dictate 
foreign policy.  Foreign policy would now have to be aligned much more with US policy, 
however.
601
 As the US was Britain‘s principal creditor, the British government was eager 
to act as a good ally in return for pledges of a predictable Federal monetary policy and a 
lack of interference with sterling-based arrangements for trade and payments. Thus, after 
WWII British empire and prosperity was framed increasingly on a discriminatory 
proposition whose viability depended needed US toleration, dollar underwriting and 
strategic protection. 
b) Continuity between the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana? 
What the British government underestimated was that much more than for 19th 
century Britain, for the US foreign policy was the shield of its republican traditions 
(Lippmann, 1943), and the key to its long held ambition of spreading itself around the 
world as an « Empire of Liberty » (Foner, 1998 : 77; Tucker and Hendrickson, 1990). US 
leaders saw foreign policy not only as a means to expand the frontier of economic 
opportunity beyond its domestic borders, but also as a way to promote traditions of 
« Americanisation ». For instance, the US European Recovery Program was launched to 
put a brake on nationalisation programmes in Europe, most notably the UK Labour 
government‘s nationalisation plans – one of the main reaons it had been elected (Harris, 
1949). The Program was also intended as a weapon against the spread of Communism 
after WWII.  Thus, the British empire was propped up temporariliy to serve the US 
«democratic cause» of saving capitalist countries from communist annexation. Of course, 
the more US aid was required in competing with the communist Sino-Soviet bloc for 
nationalist good will, the more British imperial areas came under US influence. With 
competition for third world influence heightening between the dollar and the rouble blocs, 
the Suez crisis in the late 1950s provided the turning point needed for a legitimate 
extension of US foreign policy aims.  In the early 1960s, president Kennedy finally 
substituted an overarching vision of the « New Frontier » - an expanding commercial 
world republic based on national invitation – for the declining safety of « Old » Europe‘s 
sway in imperial matters (Louis and Robinson, 1994: 463, 492-495).     
There were huge differences between the British imperial tradition, which was 
accommodating and of a «broad church» type, and US « Empire of Liberty » traditions, 
which entailed assimilation through the spread of business education, and the association 
of democratic capitalism exclusively with US traditions. The US traditions in questions 
were « Real Whig voluntarism », i.e. the Christian belief in industry, sobriety and self-
discipline, « happy mediocrity »
602
, i.e. the belief in middle class individualism, 
egalitarianism and consumerism as a way to reconcile social class or religious differences 
in the name of national unity, and «pluralism» - a belief in the superior democratic 
capacities of the market and civil society.  I shall expound on these traditions to a greater 
extent in chapters 10 and 11. Suffice to point out here the workings of one of these 
tradiitons, « happy mediocrity ». British governments, in particular Conservative ones, 
underestimated the domestic and geopolitical effects of this US tradition. Domestically, it 
undermined the very basis of all Tory traditions of democratisation, namely the organic 
integration of different classes and ranks in one functional Commonwealth.  Instead, the 
spread of happy mediocrity gradually did away with the legitimacy of ranks, and gave way 
to the very un-British idea that all were equal.  In more realist geopolitical terms, happy 
mediocrity translated in an absolute aversion for « communism » - the Soviet equivalent of 
happy mediocrity – and the branding of the Old Continent‘s colonialism and socialist 
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tendenies as corrupt. More importantly, it implied a limit on British and European 
competitiveness. To help counter the threat of communism and compensate for the loss of 
empire, the US Congress had voted in favour of its government‘s plans to support 
European economic recovery, on the unspoken condition that European competitiveness 
would not become a threat to US competitiveness. Voluntary bi-lateral agreements with 
indebted and militarily dependent European countries – as well as Japan – would guarantee 
this.  
A large part of the British political class does not seem to have understood that 
the United States was not the British heir of a liberal international order after all – in so far 
as such an order had existed at all (see chapter 11). In particular, too many of the 
governing classes glossed over a glaring difference: the much more pronounced moral 
absolutism underlying the US‘ Empire of Liberty discourse  and its « good against evil » 
divide. They probably did not notice this difference because US government officials‘ 
apparent predilections were their main reference point. Having to cope with a much more 
pronounced anti-Statist legacy, US government officials in actual reality were forced to go 
beyond the Realpolitik aims they shared with their European counterparts, and draw on the 
normative discourse that resonated most in popular opinion, namely evangelical opinion.  
c) The religious factor 
Evangelicalism was fast becoming a political force to reckon with in the US, due 
to its importance in the movement of American suburbanisation
603
 (Hudnet-Beumler, 
1994), and its leaders‘ realisation since the Great Depression that they had to engage with 
national popular opinion to avoid another such catastrophe, and avert the threat of 
communism. The religious right accepted to trade its support to the Cold War State in 
return for a different system of public-private relations between the welfare system, foreign 
policy and American Constitutional notions of liberty. The new public-private relations 
sanctioned by evangelicals were based on first the principle of ―subsidiarity‖, entailing 
limited growth of governmental agencies, and second fiscal and funding support for 
private and non-governmental agencies that spread ―good‖ American values. Thus, starting 
from the end of WWII, the US federal government broadened its use of religious agencies 
in its pursuit of the expansion of higher education, defense-related research, hospital 
building, community development, and foreign aid (Schafer, 2006: 13-14, 17-18).   
The marriage of evangelical and geopolitical aims in the US since WWII had 
further reaching consequences for American notions of liberty than often allowed. Not 
only did the principle of subsidiarty and the above funding and taxation innovations serve 
to escape the Constitution‘s checks on religious interference in politics. The very link 
between the constitutional order and christian virtues was explicitly renewed in the post-
WWII period, most notably when the words ―under God‖ were added to the constitutional 
Pledge of Allegiance. While this addition might have disturbed the constitutional 
separation of church and state dynamics, it had the effect of improving the ―anti-
communist spirituality‖ of the American constitution (Miller, 1964: 41).  In the words of 
president Eisenhower, ―when God comes in, communism has to go.‖ (Pierard and Lindner, 
1988: 197).  In sum, maybe the natures of the Pax Americana and Pax Brittanica differed 
more than many members of the British political class wanted to believe.
604
  
d) The restoration of the City 
Religion obviously was only part of the geopolitical story. It also consisted of a 
monetary strategy, and this was probably the main cause of confusion between the 
American and British empires. In monetary terms, president Wilson and the Federal 
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Reserve Bank supported the internationalisation of private finance, a message that 
resonated with London-based financiers. Contrary to British strategy which was focused 
more on exporting capital  than on encouraging domestic investment, the US strategy was 
to combine domestic industrial expansion with the international expansion of finance and 
commerce.
605
  For such a policy would allow the US to continue on a self-centred 
expansionary course without having to fear external constraints on domestic policy.
606
 
Meanwhile, the British government was trying to persuade the sterling Commonwealth to 
settle for economic austerity, as this was the only way to keep member countries from 
drawing heavily on their balances and destabilising the sterling area. Closer monetary 
cooperation with European governments, for its part, at first was excluded.
607
 During the 
1950s, the colonies became less important for the accumulation of sterling balances and 
the saving of dollars. At the same time, external and internal pressures for independence 
further destabilised the sterling area. After the Suez crisis in 1957, Britain finally decided 
to move towards European convertibility. 
All this led to a third unanticipated consequence: the gradual restoration of 
London as a cosmopolitan centre of finance from the late 1950s, most notably through the 
development of the Eurodollar market (Krozewski, 1996: 48). Arguably, the reemergence 
of London as an international centre was not entirely unplanned. After all, Harold Wilson 
since 1951 had endeavoured to make the City of London more open to overseas banks than 
any other financial centre in the world (Miller, 1974: 271-272 ; Strange, 1971: 64 ; 
Strange, 1986).
608
 Nevertheless, the emergence of a Eurodollar market in London was 
entirely unplanned. It occurred as American banks sought to avoid stringent controls at 
home, and as the English tradition of voluntary self-restraint meant that there was very 
little formal regulation for overseas banks.  
US Clearing banks eagerly took advantage of this opportunity to expand in 
London, by opening foreign subsidiaries and affiliates in investment banking activities –  
domestically forbidden under the Glass-Steagall Act. North-American authorities largely 
tolerated, if not actively supported this strategy. In particular, the Federal Reserve Bank, to 
which the US legal framework on banks‘ foreign activities left large discretionary leeway, 
espoused a very permissive approach.  Foreign expansion was encouraged as a means to 
support the financing of US direct investments in Europe and assist US multinationals‘ 
expansion abroad.
609
  Thus, the US government and the Federal Reserve Bank did not 
subject the activities of US bank‘ foreign branches to capital controls, and offshore dollar 
loans were exempted from the voluntary credit restraint programme (Battillossi, 2002: 15-
17). 
 
9.2         First strategic interactions (phase 2) 
 
i) Conservative Party 
In many ways, the adoption of chartalist policies would have served that part of  
the Conservative Party which favoured protectionism hand and foot.
610
  But then again, the 
leadership of the Conservative Party – and of the Labour Party – was in the hands of those 
who opposed any fundamental changes in Britain‘s internationalist economic policy.611  
Instead of chartalist policies, the Conservative government supported policies of 
financial ―rationalisation‖. In practice, this led to the perpetuation of trade restraints, 
mainly with an eye on retaining the confidence of the middle classes and family 
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enterprises. In the 1930s, a Parliament dominated by the Conservative Party even enacted 
legislation explicitly promoting cartelisation, or business 'self-government' under official 
supervision. For instance, the Finance Act of 1935 granted cartelized industries clear tax 
advantages (Freyer, 1992: 214-215).
612
   
While cherishing continuity, the Conservative leadership was keen to dispel the 
reactionary label foisted on it by their Labour opponents during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Labour had successfully reinvented Conservative history by depicting the latter party as a 
ruthless defender of laissez-faire, a party refusing to enroll State authority in the battle 
against poverty and unemployment. After WWII the otherwise very popular Churchill and 
his Conservative MPs were not re-elected in government; they had underestimated the 
desire of the English people to create a ―new Jerusalem‖ out of the rubble of war (Jefferys, 
1997).  All this led to an emergence of a generation of Conservative leaders who were 
conscious that their party would not recover its working class support unless it addressed 
itself to the social conditions of the depressed industrial areas.  In other words, MPs such 
as Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and Robert Boothby, sought a revival of Disraeli‘s 
―one nation politics‖, but this time based upon more government planning (Macmillan, 
1938, 1966; MacMillan et al., 1927). When the Conservative Party came to power in 1951, 
its leaders Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill followed the electoral imperative of 
maintaining the allegiance of important groups of voters who benefited from the social 
reforms put in place between 1945 and 1951. This does not mean that Conservatives 
enthusiastically subscribed to any notion of state socialism; at most some leaders confessed 
to a form of ―paternal socialism‖.613 Most Conservatives rejected the use of the state as an 
agency of overly egalitarian strategies in social policy; they wished to safeguard private 
enterprise and the existing social and economic hierarchy as much as possible. To counter 
exaggerated State demands, Conservatives promoted the usual ―service to the country, 
responsibility and moral integrity‖. But they did much more. Leaders such as MacMillan 
tried to revive a form of ―one nation politics‖ by turning Britain into a ―property-owning 
democracy‖614 and making ―every man a capitalist‖.615  Home ownership616 was to be the 
cornerstone of this policy. The aim of Conservatives was to spread wealth creation rather 
than redistribute wealth. This implied amongst other that economic growth would be 
prioritised, even at the expense of growing inflation, eventually leading to the infamous 
―stop-go‖ patterns of growth and regulation in the 1950s and 1960s (Martin, 1988: 407).617  
Finally, the Party, in alliance with civic organisations such as the People‘s League 
for the Defence of Freedom and the Middle Class Alliance, committed publicly to the anti-
communist and pro-family measures enshrined in US policy.
618
   This commitment 
transpired in calls to « set the people free » from socialist controls, and achieve greater 
national unity in face of the Cold War (Butler, 1963: 3-7; Jones, 1996: 242-243).
619
  
It would be a mistake to depict Conservative policy after WWII as completely 
aligned with US policy. In fact, the dominance of Labour immediately after the war and 
the growing influence of US-style middle class consumerism had caused a ―moral panic‖ 
amongst many Conservatives. Clearly, the Conservative motto ―set the people free‖ did not 
entail that individualism and diversity would be allowed to breakdown traditional authority 
(Francis, 1996: 67- 70).
620
 The middle way between English and US traditions of 
democratisation for Conservatives was to foster a form of Britishness which could be used 
both to attack Labour on the ground of anti-patriotism
621
 and to keep US-influences 
sufficiently at bay.  Most notably, the initiative to found the BBC as a bulwark of 
voluntary restraint and ―secular Anglicanism‖ allowed the Conservative Party to convey its 
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particular interpretation of the ―nation‖ through the media (cf. Nicholas, 1996: 128, 131-
135).
622
  
ii) Labour Party 
After WWII, the Labour Party finally had the opportunity to do something about 
the old grievance – expressed most vociferously by the trade unionist Bevin – that the 
domestic consequences of monetary policy came a poor fourth in the Bank of England's 
eyes, behind the defence of sterling, adherence to the gold standard and the position of 
London as an international financial centre (Kynaston, 2000: 197-198). Despite Labour‘s 
official predilection for more chartalist control, and the enormous opportunities that 
presented themselves directly after WWII, the nationalisation of the Bank of England 
remained a technical and symbolic exercise. The Bank retained control of the Bank rate, 
and the rest of the financial sector remained virtually untouched. As such, postwar Labour 
missed the opportunity to take control over the domestic flows of capital within the 
financial sector (Hall, 1987: 283)
623
. 
The more general point is that Labour‘s ineffective wielding of the threat of 
nationalisation induced the very lack of formal regulation that opened up a foreign 
exchange market beyond the control of any English authority. Fear of nationalisation had 
confirmed the resolve of London bankers, the Bank of England and the Treasury to eschew 
formal regulation of any kind, as this could be seized upon as proof of sectional 
favouritism and the need of nationalisation in the public interest.
624
  
Also, Labour‘s development of the centralised welfare state and various 
nationalisation projects
625
 accelerated dynamics of bureaucratic centralisation in London. 
This undermined one of Labour‘s strongholds of chartalist policy since WWI, the local 
authorities.
626
 Local authorities steadily decreased in importance, to the point of being 
reduced to a role of ―government‘s agents for the administration of education and the 
building of houses‖ in the 1950s627 (Read, 1964: 240).  
 Finally, it is often claimed that, after WWII, British organised labour gave up 
much of its evolutionist theory and became more concerned about antitrust than its US 
counterpart (Freyer, 1992: 324-332).
628
 Still, Labour supported Conservative measures of 
cartelisation and trade restraints in principle (Pollard, 1962). That is remarkable, given that 
the domestic political scene remained dominated by the ―labour versus capital‖ question. 
Indeed, the ultimate aim of an important faction in the Party – which grew from a position 
of minority to leadership – was to abolish the capitalist system and replace it by 
socialism.
629
 Against this faction, there was a very influential group in the Labour Party 
which was against collectivist doctrines of national economic planning. This group 
accepted the necessity for free consumer demand and tried to devise methods by which 
publicly owned enterprises – i.e. those without the desire for profit – would respond to it. 
The compromise between the two groups ultimately would be to focus nationalisation 
purposes only on a few industries of special public interest, such as utilities. Also, the 
public enterprises that were devised to run the nationalised entities were granted a 
considerable degree of autonomy from the State (Tivey, 1973: 24). The Conservatives 
agreed in principle, and the first steps towards nationalisation of utilities were taken as 
early as the 1930s, only to be interrupted by WWII. 
 The truth is that, in contrast with its highly ambitious party programmes, once in 
power Labour‘s leadership was highly deferential to the traditional national understandings 
of the global nature of British interests and objectives.
630
 The commitment to full 
employment, growth and welfare was uneasily combined with the belief that Britain 
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should remain a world power, a ―first class country‖ with extensive international interests 
and responsibilities.
631
 This implied high levels of overseas spending, advocacy of an 
―independent deterrent‖ as a symbol of world power, the maintenance of the City as a 
leading international financial centre and the pound as a strong, global currency (Shaw, 
1996: 214-215).
632
 Rather belatedly, when Harold Wilson came to power in 1964, a 
Labour government did engage in a taxation spate, partly to deal with the emergence of 
two nations, a manufacturing nation in the North of England predominantly voting for 
Labour and a service nation in the South predominantly voting for the Conservatives (see 
Appendix O for historical voting figures per region). A Selective Employment Tax was 
introduced, partly as a revenue-raising device, partly to deflect labour from service 
industries to manufacturing industries (Douglas, 1999: 134).
633
  
 With regards to influences of Americanisation, while Labour was in favour of 
strengthening the « North Atlantic Allicance »
634
, it was not immune to fears of « industrial 
materialism ». Nevertheless, it was the the Labour Party – not the Conservatives – that 
received most favourably ideas of business education.  Starting in the late 1940s, Labour 
became quite keen on management education, seeing such training initiatives as an integral 
part of its overall strategy to improve industry‘s productivity (Tiratsoo, 1998: 367). When 
Conservatives took over in 1951, they were not dismissive of business schools, just much 
more reluctant to intervene in industry: existing institutional arrangements were 
sancrosanct. This changed somewhat in the 1960s, both with the ascendance of Harold 
Wilson‘s Labour Party, and the emerging consensus in England that there was a growth 
crisis. This caused a renewed concern with management education. Still, even at this peak 
point of interest, the government‘s enthusiasm for change was not overwhelming. 
Ministers were quite willing to cede the FBI an important directing role in deciding how 
the new institutions should be organised and paid for (Tiratsoo, 1998: 368).
635
 
 iii) Liberal Party 
 After the disastrous 1924 election, in which the Liberals‘ leader Asquith‘s 
decision to support a minority Labour government had polarised the political choice 
between Conservatives and Labour, 
636
the Liberal Party was relegated to a distant third 
place position; the electorate increasingly opted for a straight choice between the other two 
parties.  Unable to achieve any direct influence on government, despite their early support 
for Keynesian economics, the Paty split again in the 1930s and continued to decline until 
the mid-1950s. By 1957 there only remained five Liberal MPs. Despite the political 
irrelevance of the party itself, its thought leaders Keynes and Beveridge did make a large 
impact on post-WWII government policy. Revival of the Liberals as a political party rather 
than just an intellectual force was announced in the second half of the 1950s, but not 
realised. The party was bogged down by organisational difficulties, resulting in yet another 
loss of votes and seats under Wilson‘s 1964 Labour government. 
iv) Co-operative Party 
Remarkably, while the Co-operative Party achieved very little in the interwar 
years
637
, its numerical and financial strength kept improving.
638
 So, while membership of 
affiliated societies by 1929 amounted to less than 3 million, by 1930 it had jumped to 3.25 
million and by 1935 it surpassed 4 million (Carberry, 1969: 35). Still, according to many 
the Co-operative movement remained ―politically less powerful than if it was officially out 
of politics‖ (Longden, 1941: 513-514). The main reason for this failure to match economic 
power with political clout was that the Co-operative Party did not manage to define its role 
in relation to the Labour Party (its partner), and the Co-operative Union (its boss), in a very 
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compelling way, despite the win of several « Labour and Co-op » seats at each election. 
There was a dreadful lack of clarity as to the political philosophy of the [Co-operative] 
Party  (Campbell et al., 1977). The Co-operative Party mainly followed the lead of and was 
dwarfed by the Labour Party.
639
 Most signicantly, the Co-operative Party missed the 
chance to argue for a more democratic and consumer-led forms of nationalisation than 
those set up after WWII.
640
 
641
 As further proof of its relative failure, despite the huge size 
of the movement after WWII, the Co-operative Party unsuccessfully fought against Price 
Maintenance (RPM)
642
 legislation – which basically sanctioned the cartelisation practices 
of its rivals.  
Generally speaking, the Co-operative movement after WWII became even more  
entrenched in a defensive ―ouvrièrisme‖. The main rationale behind this retrenchment was 
that, by default of effective influence on policy agencies, Co-operators should at least 
attempt to protect the integrity of their lifeworld from alien influences. In doing this, Co-
operative leaders willingly increased the associational isolation of the working classes and 
consolidated the stratification of society in class terms (McKibbin, 1984).  
v) Treasury 
In the nineteenth century, relations between labour and capital were not embraced 
by State politics (McKibbin, 1984), which hurt the hand of employers and benefited the 
hand of Trade Unionists and Co-operators considerably. By contrast, in the twentieth 
century, market questions came increasingly under the jurisdiction of civil servants, who 
used their status of a neutral, third party to convert their views of in practice. Crucially in 
this regard, civil servants civil servants kept coming from the same privileged strata of 
society in post-WWII England (Savage, 1996: 179). And the Treasury more than ever was 
the most prestigious and powerful of government departments, responsible for both 
domestic and international economic policy.
643
  
The Treasury usually takes the side of those actors most steeped in traditions of 
secular Anglicanism.  This is one reason for the apparent alignment of City and Treasury 
interests, the other reason being the Treasury‘s focus on maintaining the integrity of the 
fiscal constitution. This appearance of alignment could be misleading, however:  alignment 
often had less to do with preferred policy goals or sectional interests than common enemies 
and aversions.  By contrast, civil servants victimised the Labour Party more than once; 
Treasury officials in particular regarded the Labour Party as unfit to govern.
644
  
Even after WWII, when the Labour
645
 Party secured a majority in Parliament, this 
did not change. For one, Labour was hampered in its advocacy of postwar reforms by its 
participation in the wartime coalition and by its legacy of suspicion towards Keyneysian 
reform in particular. While the main initiatives for change for a long time came from 
Liberals, the enormous opportunities for reform demonstrated by WWII, convinced Labour 
of the efficacy of some state solutions. Nevertheless, despite the promises in the post-war 
Labour manifesto, the Labour Party was not ready to challenge the legitimacy of private 
enterprise, as its Co-operative ally was willing to do.
646
  As a result of this lacuna, the 
formulation of policy increasingly rested with the civil service (Mercer, 1995: 93-94). 
Afraid of hurting its good relations with the business elites, and faced with a dire state of 
the balance of payments and the opposition of the Treasury
647
, Labour policy-makers did 
not dare to engage in a comprehensive nationalisation of the financial sector. 
From 1946 to 1959 access to the capital market was subject to official control, 
exercised for the Treasury by the Capital Issues Committee. This control dated from 1936, 
but was consolidated in the Borrowing Act of 1946. It proved useful in regulating overseas 
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borrowing, but on the domestic front the Radcliffe Committee found it ‗impossible to resist 
the broad conclusion that this control had no significant impact on the pressure of total 
demand‘648. What this Act did achieve, however, was the control of the queue of borrowers 
in the interests of government issues (Thomas, 2004: 288). 
vi) Bank of England 
Since 1933, the Bank of England informally assumed several new roles. It 
increasingly became the day-to-day manager of sterling and an alternative source of 
official advice regarding sterling (Davies, 1994: 379).  Also, throughout the 1930s the 
Bank of England was unceasing in its pursuit of central bank cooperation within the 
empire.
649
 Finally, the Bank of England had been involved in industrial rationalisation 
practices in the 1930s.  Under pressure of popular opionion and the MacMillan Committee, 
the Bank of England had attempted to imitate the German model of industry 
rationalisation. In particular, the Bank had encouraged financial institutions to cooperate in 
creating the Bankers Industrial Development Company, with the aim of supporting 
schemes of rationalisation in the staple industries (Ross, 1989: 41). This was an essentially 
defensive attempt by the bank to extricate itself from its industrial holdings, and, in 
particular, fend off calls of nationalisation and intervention in monetary policy.
650
  
Bank officials of the City saw themselves as the representatives of an 
internationally oriented financial community. Considering themselves the custodians of the 
exchange rate and financiers for the public debt, they tended to oppose devaluation, any 
alterations to the financial system, and expansionary measures that might lead to higher 
borrowing or balance of payment difficulties. In particular, the Bank of England acted as a 
powerful force for fiscal conservatism in both the interwar and postwar periods (Hall, 
1987: 283). 
After WWII, under pressure of the US government, the British government 
officially handed over powers of ―rationalisation‖ to the Bank of England.  Rationalisation 
policies were aimed not at industrial efficiency, but at preserving the stability of the 
banking system without direct state intervention (Mercer, 1995: 29).
651
  By the 1950s, 
large swathes of the economy had come under state ownership, and the Bank of England 
had monopolised most foreign exchange funds.  Also, the Bank of England could tighten 
or ease credit whenever the government required. Opportunities foru international central 
banking only really became available from 1958 with European convertibility. Thereafter 
central bank co-operation through Basle was repeatedly used to assist the British 
government its bids to prop up the sterling (Cottrell, 1995: 139). 
vii) London Stock Exchange 
In the 1930s, the resonance in popular opinion of arguments of free trade 
cosmopolitanism decreased rapidly.  In response, the City of London showed signs of 
becoming more concerned about its public image. The Stock Exchange, for example, in 
1937 set up a voluntary fund to help make good future losses sustained by the public at the 
hands of defaulters. Also, the Stock Exchange tried to reassert its domestic national roots: 
―The London Stock Exchange is a national institution. It adheres to no party; it subscribes 
to no party funds. It does not engage in party politics. But an organisation so intimately 
concerned and bound up with the national economy must at all times play its part in the 
affairs of the nation (Braithwaite, Chairman of the LSE, 1951: 2).
652
 
 The  Stock Exchange for centuries had been the quasi-offical regulator of the 
securities market and its members were able to charge fixed commissions at their own 
discretion.  After WWII, however, a significant part of the City became dependent upon 
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either government business or protection for its livelihood. The government decided what 
was in the national interest and expected the City to adhere to its agenda (Michie, 2004: 
42).
653
 From the end of the 1950s, however, a new dynamic beyond government or Bank 
of England control would develop: the Euromarkets. 
All in all, up to the 1960s, there was a high level of continuity between the 
Labour and Conservative governments‘ approach to to the City. Both promoted the 
interests of the City to meet their policy goals of supporting sterling, the balance of 
payments, and London as an international financial centre (Schenk, 2004: 338-339). 
 
9.3 Firms‟ strategic positions in new settlements (phase 3) 
 
9.3.1     Renewal democratic settlements 
 
    a)  Misintepretation of English traditions of sound finance 
    As we have seen in chapter 4, English principles of sound finance are grounded 
primarily in the tradition of voluntarism, and only secondarily in the tradition of City 
monetarism. Because of its association with the Golden Age of Empire and the rise of 
―unilateral liberalism‖, however, the tradition of City monetarism came to be associated 
more with geopolitical success than Tory voluntarism. Hence, it could not simply be 
abandoned after the decline of the global financial system in the 1930, especially since the 
more closed Commonwealth system allowed for the co-habitation of both traditions. As 
demonstrated by the actions of the government and Bank of England – who encouraged or 
at least turned a blind eye to the entry of overseas banks and investors in London‘s 
financial markets, hopes of the City returning to a status of world financial centre were 
never lost.  More remarkably, the visible decline of the British empire in the period 1930 to 
1965 – a period of national ―relocalisation‖ rather than globalisation – did not trigger a 
search for an English identity. English political parties, business leaders and media were 
far too deferential to traditional understandings of the global nature of national interests 
and objectives to allow this. Conservative and Labour elites alike did everything they 
could to allow the old British identity to survive: the identity based on the primacy of 
―England and Empire‖ minus those traits that might antagonise the Scots and the Welsh. 
English elites were very suspicious of any North-American tradition of ―happy 
mediocrity‖ creeping in the British identity. Still, in order to ensure the continuity of the 
British identity, they had no choice but to agree to the integration of British military and 
financial interests in a new concept of Pax Americana.  
b)  Consolidation of interwar class and inequality trends 
All in all, the 1940s and 1950s saw a consolidation of those trends that set in 
during the interwar period.
654
  Despite Labour‘s attempts to universalise policy principles 
on the basis of need rather than ability to pay, the resonance of ―England and Empire‖ and 
―Anglican democracy‖ ensured that the distinction between the realms of necessity and 
freedom – respectively the domains of lower-class life and physical labor, and upper-class 
life and politics – would remain firmly in place. England and Empire denoted the idea that 
maintaining the world class status of England depended on the formation of character that 
continuous imperial struggle and duty brought about (Tidrick, 1990).  Anglican democracy 
pointed to the principle – (re)invented by Disraeli – that domestic stability can only be 
achieved if policies are inclusive enough of middle and working class interests. The two 
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principles reinforced each other in fostering ―the natural acceptance of hierarchical 
distinctions‖ in England (Norton and Aughey, 1981, 66-79; Crewe and Searing, 1988).  
Their success not in the least had to do with the Conservatives‘ strategy to systematically 
brand the Labour movement as anti-national – for instance with regards to the special 
rights of English workers in the Commonwealth, despite accusations of xenophobism.
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 It was also facilitated by the attitude of the civil service and courts: by and large both 
entities snubbed social-democratic aspirations of active interference and staunchly adhered 
to the rather passive principle of neutrality.   
After 1945 class struggle gave way to self-sufficient class consciousness. While a 
small part of the lower ranks was still considered ―roughs‖, the working classes now 
presented a rather homogeneous and self-confident appearance, with little aspiration after 
middle-class values (Marwick, 1996: 43).  Notwithstanding the persistence of severe 
regional income inequality (see table 9.1), regional economic growth figures converged to 
some extent, due to the temporary decline of the City as a centre of world finance (see 
table 9.2). In terms of social mobility, post-WWII England actually did much better than 
the caricature of Thatcherite meritocrats allowed for.  For instance, especially when 
Labour was in power, government cabinets were more inclusive of ministers with a lower 
middle and working class background, as well a less privileged educational background 
(see Appendix O).  As a matter of fact, the post-1950 period produced a greater degree of 
inter-generational mobility than the post-1980 period (Blanden et al. 2004; Breen, 2004).      
 
 
Table 9.1: Regional variations in weekly income per head 1963 and 1964 
Source: Banks, 1971: 64; Table 8 
 
% of UK (100) 
% of London and S.E. 
(index=100) 
London and South-
Eastern 
126.7 100 
Midland 112 88.4 
Southern 107.3 84.5 
Eastern 98.7 77.9 
North-western 95.3 73.7 
North-Midland 93.3 73.7 
South-Western 91.3 72.1 
Northern 80 63.2 
 
Remarkably, this suited Conservative aspirations of national unity rather well, 
especially regarding the issue of housing. Towards the end of 1940s housing had emerged 
as the centrepiece of Conservative social policy proposals. The Labour government had 
placed severe restrictions on building for owner-occupation and encouraged local 
authorities to meet the mortgage needs of house purchasers, a tradition building society 
competence. Labour‘s housing policy was targeted at general needs, rather than focused on 
more specialised aims such as slum clearance and quality.
657
 Unfortunately, congestion and 
materials shortage in the building industry led to public disaffection with socialist housing 
policy. Conservatives jumped on this weak spot, hoping to use housing as a showcase 
policy to demonstrate the virtues of free enterprise. Under the Conservative governments 
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of Eden and Macmillan, home-ownership finally became an actively pursued fiscal policy 
(cf. Daunton, 1987: 76-78).  Eventually, Conservatives hoped, their housing policy would 
not only turn Britain into a property-owning democracy, but also help to bridge the north – 
south divide in Britain through wealth creation rather than redistribution.  
c) The two North-South divides in Britain 
One error of judgement made by the Conservatives in this regard was to ignore 
the fact that with the decline of the British Empire, new links between the State and its 
associated nations – in particular England and Scotland – had to be made to reinvent a 
viable British Union. This issue was especially relevant since it referred to the fact there 
were two divides in Britain, not one; and that encouraging voluntary investment in home-
ownership was bound to be more successful with regards to the first than the second 
divide. One divide in Britain was between what can broadly call the north and south of 
England, the former comprising the ―manufacturing heartland‖ of the country – the West 
Midlands, North West and Yorkshire Humberside, the latter London and the old 
agricultural heartland that had become the home of the new services, light engineering, 
electrical and consumer goods industries – the South East, East Anglia, South West and 
East Midlands (Martin, 1988). Importantly, in terms of traditions of democratisation, while 
the manufaturing heartland was the cradle of nonconformist ―voluntaryism‖, the growing 
influence of Anglican church and educational establishments in the spirit of ―secular 
Anglicanism‖ in the the northern half of England, gradually reproduced a weak form of 
Tory voluntarism there. This form of voluntarism was neither entirely nonconformist or 
conformist, but still was much closer to the Home Counties‘ traditions of democratisation 
than the ones produced in for instance Scotland with its own national, ―non-established‖ 
Church, its own legal and educational traditions (Dickson, 1988).  
 
Table 9.2: Rates of GDP Growth per UK region (% per year) 
 
 1871-1911 1911-1954/5 
 
Real GDP Real GDP/Head Real GDP 
Real 
GDP/Head 
South East 2.19 0.96 1.42 0.78 
London 2.33 1.14 0.56 0.58 
Rest of South East 1.94 0.67 2.44 1.32 
East Anglia 0.44 0.16 1.57 1.22 
South West 1.04 0.68 1.54 1.05 
West Midlands 1.53 0.56 2.54 1.77 
East Midlands 1.59 0.36 1.92 1.29 
North West 1.86 0.54 1.32 1.04 
Yorks & Humb 1.89 0.63 1.61 1.25 
North 1.75 0.40 1.55 1.27 
Wales 2.14 0.80 0.98 0.80 
Scotland 1.95 1.06 0.84 0.67 
Source: Crafts, 2004: Table 5, based on for 1954/5, Annual Report of the Commissioners 
of the Inland Revenue, Cd. 341 (1958), for 1971 and 1981, Regional Trends, for 1991 and 
2001, Cope et al. (2003). 
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This brings us to the second divide in the British Union: the divide between the 
bulk of English regions and the so-called ‖industrial periphery‖, comprising those regions 
whose employment base for more than a century had been specialised in an industrial 
activity whose productivity declined much earlier than those of the manufacturing 
heartland: coal mining. The industrial periphery consisted of Wales, Scotland and the 
Northern region of England – excluding Humberside and the North West.  With the 
apparent decline of the Empire, and in the wake of Irish independence, the divide resurged 
most clearly in the form of Scottish nationalism (Devine, 2000).
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 The resurgence of 
Scottish nationalism took some to consolidate in popular opinion. The demise of Hardie‘s 
Scottish ―evangelical socialism‖, its replacement by a more bureaucratic, London-centred 
Labour Party (Knox and MacKinlay, 1995: 174-175), and the resurgence of the Scottish 
Conservatives after WWII had appeared to substantiate claims that Scotland was just 
another part of the North of Britain. Conservatives even suggested that Scottish 
nationalism in effect amounted to a call for more rather than less Union (Morton, 1999). 
Yet, under many observers‘ radar, the Scottish National Party as well as many Scottish 
Labour dissenters, revived the indigenous tradition that viewed civil and religious liberty 
as the peculiar achievement of seventeenth-century Scottish Presbyterians (Pentland, 2005: 
1001). In effect, this was the beginning of the end for the resonance of English 
constitutional liberties in Scotland – liberties referring to the English Revolution 
mythology of ―Liberty and Property‖. The main reason why this change remained 
unperceived for a long time – the public calls for devolution in the 1970s, is that it looked 
continuous with the hybrid make-up of Scotland since the union of 1707; since then 
Scotland had retained the body of its civil society while ceding political control to a 
Parliament based at Westminster. 
In their efforts to differentiate themselves from English traditions of liberty, 
Scottish nationalist leaders promoted more homegrown, public provision and less 
Westminster-based  regulation in the name of the « age-old » Scottish system of 
―democratic intellectualism and common sense‖ as well as greater « equality of 
opportunity through public provision » (Kay et al, 1998).
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  These calls proved to be quite 
resonant, as the regional development of the Scottish NHS in Scotland would demonstrate, 
with a little help of the British Treasury (Bruce and Forbes, 2001; Hunter and Williamson, 
1991: 167; Stewart, 2003).  The comparatively greater poverty and unemployment in the 
Scottish industrial periphery, combined with the greater diffusion of State assistance and 
the revival of homegrown traditions of public provision meant that Conservatives‘ 
property-owning democracy calls fell on rather deaf ears. Indeed, the rate of owner 
occupation in Scotland – and to a lesser degree in the North of England – remained far 
behind the rates of owner-occupation in England – with English rates of respectively 32 
and 51 percent in 1953 and 1971, and Scottish rates barely reaching 30% in 1970. The 
opposite was true for the rate of council-rented housing. 
 
9.3.2  Formal evolution of the suffrage 
 The disproportion between population and representation was allowed to grow 
very significantly after the 1918 redistribution. Up to 1948, certain sorts of fitness still 
received additional reward by virtue of their privileged business or university status. 
Indeed, so persuaded were politicians by imperial notions of quality and character that 
graduates were actually granted five further seats in 1918. By the early 1920s business 
voters numbered around 200,000 (217,000 by 1945) and graduate-electors 60,000. 
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Property and education were rewarded with up to two votes (additional to that gained by 
simple residence). Effectively, it also rewarded manhood and Conservatism (the business 
vote alone is believed to have swung constituencies rightwards on 18 occasions between 
1922 and 1945, quite aside from the two seats regularly bequeathed by the City of 
London). Only in 1948 were these remaining qualifications to a fully democratic franchise 
finally expunged, along with the six-months residency qualification and two-seat 
constituencies. In 1969, adulthood was redefined from 21 to 18. 2001 witnessed the 
enfranchisement of the homeless (Garrard, 2002: 82-83). 
 
9.3.3 Firms‟ strategies of democratisation 
In Figure 9.1, I visualise the growth of the different financial institutions in terms 
of total amounts of deposits received. In Tables 9.3 and 9.4, I provide more specific 
growth and marketshare figures (in terms of both deposits and total assets) over the period 
1900 to 1930 
 
        Table 9.3: Growth and marketshares of a variety of English financial institutions 
(in terms of deposits) 
Year 
Building 
Societies 
Joint-stock 
Clearing 
Banks 
POSB TSBs 
Co-
operative 
Bank 
1930 371 2519 290 133 44 
1938 759 2277 524 243 70 
1948 1038 5912 1970 764 90 
1964 4331 7971 1793 1591 180 
Growth x 11.67 3.16 6.2 11.9 4.1 
Share % 27.5 50 11.5 10 1 
Sources: Broadberry, 2006; Capie and Webber, 1985; Cleary, 1965; Co-operative Bank archives; 
Gosden, 1996; Sheppard, 1971; UK Central Statistical Office (various years) 
 
       Table 9.4: Growth and marketshares of a variety of English financial institutions  
(in terms of total assets) 
Year 
Building 
Societies 
Clearing 
Banks* 
POSB*** TSBs*** 
 1929 312.7 2059.6 285 130.1 
1932 469.3 2205.6 305.7 161.9 
1937 710.4 2496.4 470.5 235 
1951 1357 6464 1875.9 956 
1960 3166 8259 1822.5 1314.6 
1968 8298 11817 1800 2200 
Growth x 26.5 11.7 6.3 16.9 
Share % 34.4 49 7.5 9.1 
Sources: Boddy, 1980; Broadberry, 2006; Capie and Webber, 1985;Cleary, 1965; Co-operative Bank 
Archives; Sheppard, 1971; Gosden. 1996; UK Central Statistical Office (various years) 
*Figures for London clearing banks from 1951 onwards     
**Figures from private Co-operative Union archives; data for 1932, 1937, 1951 missing; data for 
1960 and 1968 extrapolated from available archival figures on 1963 and 1972 
***Figures of POSB and TSBs for 1968 are rounded extrapolated figures  
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.  I also provide a ranking of the variety of financial institutions for the period 1900 to 
1930 in table 9.5, based on the respective financial institutions‘ effectiveness in terms of 
each strategy.In the subsequent sections, I expound how the particular strategies of 
democratisation followed by the above variety of banks – their particular deployment and 
combination of the four logics of democratisation – underlies these differential growth 
patterns. 
 
Table 9.5: Ranking of English financial institutions per strategy of democratisation 
for the period 1930 to 1965 (1=highest, 5=lowest) 
 
 Clearing 
banks 
 
Trustee 
Savings 
banks 
Post Office 
Savings 
Bank 
Co-
operative 
bank 
Building 
Societies 
Strategy a 3 3 3 5 1 
Strategy b 1 2 4 5 2 
Strategy c 3 3 3 5 1 
Strategy d 1 3 3 5 2 
Strategy e 1 3 3 5 2 
Strategy f 
 
1 3 3 5 2 
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Strategy a     Help core customers fulfil their social class aspirations 
i)  Clearing banks 
      Summarised quickly, starting with the world financial crisis of 1929-1931, 
clearing banks were fast becoming mediocre vehicles of minority democratisation – social 
and economic mobility. The Bank of England‘s duty to act as the banker of the world 
rather than just of England, meant that domestic stability came to depend even more on 
clearing banks‘ liquidity position.  Thus, a new gentleman‘s agreement came into effect 
that stipulated that one third of clearing bank assets should be held in liquid form, as a 
means of cushioning their cash reserves from seasonal and other shocks (Jasay, 1956: 
247). This agreement, as well as further « voluntary » restrictions on their operations, 
resulted in clearing banks becoming static, introverted organisations. Not surprisingly, the 
growth of a panoply of gentleman‘s agreements was accompanied by an even greater 
influence of the old, private banking families in the senior management of clearing banks 
(e.g. Ackrill and Hannah, 2001: 85).  
By 1960s, the English banking system appeared to be entirely dominated by the 
Big Five clearing banks, which used the discount market as a home for their surplus funds 
(Grady and Weale, 1986: 4). This appearance was somewhat deceiving, however. While 
remaining the largest English financial institutions in terms of total assets, clearing banks‘ 
growth figures for many years had lagged behind the ones of their competitors – be it with 
regards to domestic price competition, or vying with overseas banks for a share of the 
Eurodollar market. So, between 1959 and 1965 clearing banks deposit business grew by 
just under 5 per cent annually, compared with an average annual growth of approximately 
6 per cent annually in GNP. Meanwhile, deposits with overseas banks grew by over 25 per 
cent a year and building societies‘ shares and deposits by just over 10 per cent a year.  As a 
result, by the end of 1970 the total amount of deposits in North-American banks in London 
and in English building societies exceeded those of the London clearing banks.   
In an international perspective also the performance of English clearing banks 
was poor. As in other Continental European countries, more than half the English public 
had no contact with the banking system until the growth of white collar and skilled blue-
collar worker wealth in the late 1950s and 1960s. The difference is that, while in the 1950s 
and 1960s a ―banking revolution‖ occurred in continental European countries with a weak 
retail banking legacy such as Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, the English retail 
banking sector experienced no such thing.
660
 English clearing banks‘ motto ―the customer 
must be won, not by the rate of interest offered, but by the range and standard of facilities 
provided― (Clegg, 1969: 169), clearly lacked effectiveness and entrepreneurial spirit.  
Thus, from being comparatively ahead of continental retailing evolutions, English retail 
banking after WWII fell behind. The more general point here in terms of traditions of 
democratisation is that the version of the tradition of Anglican monetarism held by the 
clearing banks and the Bank of England was in dire need of reinvention in terms befitting 
the contemporary situation of foreign fringe banks in the City and soaring building 
societies – whose financial dealings were not included in official monetary matters. 
ii) Building Societies 
      Building societies gradually became the new champions of social and 
economic mobility in England, hesitantly at first in the 1930s, but increasingly confident 
with the housing boom in the 1950s and 1960s.
661
  The collapse of the stock market in 
1929, so soon after the new issue boom of 1928, disillusioned new investors in particular 
and persuaded them that building societies provided a better mix of security and revenue.  
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This gave the necessary momentum to a shift that had been underway for some time: the 
shift from a working class clientele to investors from higher income groups.
662
  Slowly, a 
distinction became apparent between depositors and shareholders, the latter earning a 
higher interest rate – and greater attention from the middle classes.663 664 When after 
WWII, the increase in the size of the average share continued, it became finally clear that 
building societies could no longer be regarded as the custodians of working-class savings 
only, as was almost universally assumed in the year 1931 (Baker, 1947).
665
  This trend was 
to continue afterwards (Moreh, 1966: 167-169).
666
  Throughout the Macmillan period 
(1957-1963), the most important source of new personal savings in England was that 
represented by funds placed with building societies – and insurance premiums. The 
building societies re-lent large amounts of these savings to British industrial companies 
through the new issue market (Nevin and Davis, 1970).   
iii) Savings Banks 
     The Trustee Savings Banks and the Post Office Savings Bank remained 
moderately successful vehicles of minority democratisation in the period 1930 to 1965, the 
former especially for the lower middle classes, the latter in particular for the smallest 
savers.  As building societies, TSBs in particular received a boost in the early 1930s, when 
yields on securities were relatively low, and the purchase of annuities provided a very 
profitable outlet for funds. This allowed especially the TSBs to attract funds away from the 
gilt-edged market at the expense of the growth of commercial bank deposits. With their 
higher rates of interests and buttressed by the housing boom, building societies increased 
their total assets sevenfold in the 1950s, TSBs threefold, while the figures for the POSB 
remained almost static (Gosden, 1996: 149-150).  With regards to deposits, between 1959 
and 1965 the average annual rate of growth in deposits with the TSBs was 9 per cent; the 
rate for POSBs was less than 2 per cent. While the POSB had grown at a very high rate in 
the 1940s (Nevin and Davis, 1970: 214), its comparatively – vis a vis other European 
countries – late introduction of a postal giro system in 1968, meant that it already had lost 
a big chunk of the ―aspiring‖ working classes to building societies and working classes. 
iv) Co-operative Bank 
      During periods of austerity and rationing – such as WWII – Co-operative 
membership boomed. When in the 1950s disposable income and credit opportunities 
soared, however, the methodist and Webb legacy of catering exclusively for ―rational 
wants‖ and avoiding credit services seriously hampered Co-ops‘ growth and led them to be 
stigmatised as ―old-fashioned‖. To examine the causes of the lack of success of the Co-op 
movement - including the CWS banking department, an inquiry was launched in 1955. The 
Co-operative Independent Commission Report
667
 identified several problems. There was 
too great a concentration of activity in the north, and not in the south and west – the 
wealthier area. Second, in highly urbanised England, the Co-op movement was weakest in 
the larger towns, strongest in the country and small towns. Third, the Co-op image was in 
need of updating to appeal to a younger generation.  
 
Strategy b    Cater to customers of different social classes 
i) Clearing banks 
The English establishment considered clearing banks vital to maintaining 
consensus between the social classes, and embodying principles of national unity, status 
quo and ―safety first‖. In particular, clearing banks were seen as vital to invigorating the 
Disraelian tradition of Anglican democracy, i.e. the infusion of English people with a 
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natural acceptance of hierarchical distinctions in a system of integrated social strata. 
Barclays and Lloyds proved most adept at achieving this. When it came to fostering a 
sense of inclusion in a Commonwealth amongst all ranks and walks of life, English banks 
largely missed out on the new retail banking revolution – that had started in some 
Continental European countries such as the Netherlands in the 1950s. Certainly in 
international comparative perspective, English clearing banks were fast becoming old-
fashioned in their attitude to the lower and managerial ranks, certainly by the 1960s.  
ii) Building Societies 
 Building societies were fast becoming important vehicles of consensual 
democratisation, given the increasing preponderance of « property-owning democracy » 
ideas. The building societies mobilised and canalised the money of all classes (see table 
9.7), merged it with the surplus funds of solicitors, societies, churches, clubs and 
companies and made it available to wage and salary earners who were willing and 
sometimes not even able to undertake the purchase of a house. In the 1930s, the movement 
offered an ―ideal form of investment in a stormy world‖, and ―the response was at times 
embarrassing‖ (Elkington, 1935: 55; Cleary, 1965: 190). Different from bank or industrial 
company shares, there was no variation in the capital value of a building society share, 
while the rate of interest is consistently above that of gilt-edged securities.
668
 This 
reputation would stay with building societies for many decades to come, pushing their 
shares to an unprecedented popularity in the 1950s and 1960s. 
                     The fact that building societies did not have to make profits as such, enhanced 
their popularity even more. Instead of maximising their profits, building societies tried to 
maximise mortgage loans while maintaining a stable, socially acceptable level – which 
since the mid-fifties has often been below economic equilibrium levels. Having highly 
liquid liabilities greatly helped in this regard.  Since many investors were prepared to trade 
off liquidity against yield, building societies had access to relatively cheap money, and as a 
result were able to reduce the net cost of funds (Moreh, 1966: 2). 
 
Table 9.7: Proportions of social classes who invest in building societies and                
trustee savings banks 1961/2 
(Moreh, 1966: 170) 
Social Class 
Per cent of investors per social class 
Building Societies 
Trustee Savings 
Banks 
Upper middle class 21 15 
Middle class 16 17 
Lower middle class 14 22 
Skilled manual workers 9 24 
All classes 12 22 
 
iii) Savings Banks 
        As ever, both the POSB and TSBs dutifully played their roles as vehicles of 
consensual democratisation. In comparison with building societies, one thing stands out: 
TSBs also managed to attract funds of both the middle and working classes, albeit more at 
the lower end of the class spectrum than building societies (see table 9.7). In sum, 
investment possibilities at building societies were slightly less inclusive towards the lower 
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classes than at TSBs, but much more geared towards diminishing resentment for the upper 
classes and conveying a feeling of an integrated society. This gave the building societes an 
edge in terms of Anglican democracy. It also gave them an edge in terms of ―secular 
Anglicanism‖. As most house buyers did manage to keep up their repayments of building 
society mortgages, and as house ownership conveyed a much greater commitment to a 
property-owning democracy than savings, building societies were more useful vehicles for 
discouraging extremity of beliefs and feelings in England than the more old-fashioned and 
paternalistic savings option.
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iv) Co-operative Bank 
       Immediately before and after WWII, the Co-op movement was ―at the peak of 
its development‖ (Birchall, 1994: 136).671  Despite the immense visibility of the Co-
operative Wholesale Society, the economic success of its banking department remained 
disproportionately modest, reaching marketshares of less than 1%.
672
 As the world of 
clearing banks, the CWS world was fast becoming a static, introverted « club », a world 
everyone knew each other (Whiting, 2000: 48-49). Unfortunately, contrary to clearing 
banks‘ club, the Co-operative club was operating in the lowest social class regions.  
 
Strategy c Make State policy on economic citizenship by “fait accompli” 
i) Clearing Banks 
        Clearing banks were relative failures when it came to introducing innovative  
conceptions of economic citizenship, due to their ineptness at reinventing either traditions 
of ―voluntarism‖ or ―monetarism‖.673  Voluntarism to some extent implies an ability to act 
freely from political control. That is where clearing banks were running in trouble. They 
were overburdened by political considerations.
674
 Not only did the Bank of England 
formalise the gentleman‘s agreements of the 1930s in terms of liquidity and reserve ratios. 
It also discouraged product innovation and competition on the basis of interest rates. All in 
the interest of stability, the Bank of England even opposed Barclays‘ development 
corporation in the late 1940s (Jones, 1993: 56-57).  With regards to the tradition of 
monetarism, clearing banks suffered a cruel fate. As they were considered the main 
vehicles of a stable monetary system,
675
 the Bank of England appealed to clearing banks‘ 
self-restraint in matters of exchange controls
676
 and interest-rates, again to the detriment of 
their competitivity. For one, the exchange controls were not watertight at all; since the 
1930s problems of monetary policy had been aggravated by flows of foreign money into 
and out of deposits in London
677
. Overseas banks – to whom the Bank of England‘s 
appeals did not extend – from the 1950s would take advantage of this to dominate the 
emerging Eurodollar business in London.
678
 In other words, overseas banks were quickly 
becoming the new champions of monetarism in London. Remarkably, overseas banks‘ 
version of monetarism was the result of a relatively intentional US Fed policy, and a 
relatively unintentional offshoot of the Bank of England‘s policies. 
Not everything was the Bank of England‘s or the government‘s fault, 
however. Clearing banks‘ failing overseas strategy was due to their exaggerated embrace 
of the politics of imperialism.  Although most clearing bank leaders soon realised that the 
profitability of their overseas‘ ventures and clientele was remaining below par, they gave 
little thought as to how to exploit and organise their considerable banking empires. For 
instance, throughout the interwar years and into the 1950s Lloyds‘ management exhibited 
a disturbing lack of strategic control over its operations in the different Commonwealth 
regions.  Only Barclays was able to create some organisational logic for its overseas 
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ventures, by creating a multiregional overseas bank. Still, even this logic was deficient, 
especially with regards the integration of overseas and domestic operations (Jones, 1993: 
50-51).
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ii) Building societies 
       Building societies became the new champions of the English tradition of 
voluntarism after WWII; partly because they were lucky. They made use of the 
government‘s and Bank of England‘s unrelenting support for a ―world-state‖ type of 
monetary policy –  in an epoch of rising chartalist pressures – to which only the clearing 
banks were subjected. Until the mid-1930s, building societies – especially those in the 
North where the movement was very strong – were relatively isolated from the finance 
market and the monetary policies of Treasury. Piggybacking on the housing boom of the 
1930s, building societies grew bigger and integrated more in the capital investment market. 
This also meant they became increasingly subjected to pressures of monetary credit 
controls and interest rate fluctuations. In this tit-for-tat circle, building societies more and 
more consciously relied on interest rate fluctuations to pursue their purposes; relying not 
only on the savings of small investors but also on funds of a more volatile nature.  
 Yet, in spite of their growing role as a financial intermediary, the Bank of 
England did not waver from its prior views: building societies were special-purpose 
organisations, of little importance to monetary policy.
681
 The old theory was that, contrary 
to clearing banks, building societies were not able to create credit – as they could not lend 
more than savers deposited with them (Reifler, 1959: 301). Thus, building societies‘ 
lending was to be excluded from monetary policy measures of credit restraint (Boddy, 
1980). This exclusion from monetary supervision, together with their ability to embody the 
―property owning‖ democracy and ―every man a capitalist‖ mottos after WWII, helped 
building societies enormously in their quest to become the new flagship of English 
voluntarism.
682
  
Apart from being relatively unimpeded by Bank of England rules, and sheltered 
from the commercial competition of both clearing banks and foreign banks (Reid, 1992: 
12), other dynamics also helped turn building societies in a desirable vehicle of economic 
citizenship. There obviously was fiscal policy. Fiscal policies that actively encouraged 
home ownership followed each other in a fast tempo. Testifying to the level of support for 
home ownership by governments of both parties since the mid-1950s, the building 
societies received their biggest fiscal break when Harold Wilson‘s Labour Party came to 
power in 1964. The budgets of 1965 and 1966 introduced a new Capital Gains Tax – 
designed to collect 30 per cent of gains realised on assets - with some notable exceptions, 
most notably owner-occupied houses and life insurance policies.
683
   
In a rather unobtrusive fashion, building societies provided a type of economic 
citizenship which was far removed from socialist working-class ideals, yet highly 
effective. Not only did building societies‘ trump card, the composite tax deductions, 
benefit wealthier building society investors proportionally more. Building societies added 
to the distinction between higher and lower forms of economic citizenship in a highly 
innovative way. Staying true to their origins – and the State‘s desire to avert the threat of 
socialism and spread property ownership – building societies provided mortage rates lower 
than the market clearing level. On top of that, however, building societies introduced a 
highly appealing distinction between a low-risk, low-gain desposit proposition, and an 
average risk, high-gain shareholder proposition.    
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 All in all, building societies became especially popular amongst those aspiring to 
a higher level of economic citizenship in the 1930s, 1950s and 1960s. In the 1930s, the 
economic citizens came from aspiring working classes and lower middle classes.
684
 From 
the mid-1950s, citizens from the middle and higher middle classes in particular became 
interested in building societies as a way to ensure their economic citizenship.
685
 
             iii)  Savings Banks 
Savings banks were outflanked by building societies in their bid to become the 
prime vehicles of economic citizenship innovation. Still, by allying themselves with the 
National Savings Movement from the 1950s onwards, especially the TSBs were doing 
relatively well. In 1950, TSB‘s balances amounted to about 15 per cent of National 
Savings. By 1970 this percentage had doubled, as the TSB‘s Special Investment 
Department was able to offer a better rate of interest than its National Savings Bank 
counterpart 
               iv)  Co-operative Bank 
 The Conservative government had never been partial to the CWS and its banking  
Department. On the contrary, it had repeatedly attempted to take away any fiscal advantage 
the CWS possible could have received on account of its mutual status – in contrast with the 
treatment received by building societies.  If one adds to this the lack of influence of the 
Co-operative Party on economic policies, the lack of resolve of Labour when in power, it 
becomes clear why the CWS banking department could not possible be an innovator in 
terms of economic citizenship; especially given Co-ops image of ―outdated‖ organisations 
in the 1950s and 1960s (see also proposition f).   
 
Strategy d    Translate State policy on economic citizenship   
i) Clearing banks 
              Clearing banks were happy to play the role of bulwark of stability for the 
State, Bank of England and Treasury, to the detriment of their competitive resilience.
686
  
Indeed, by 1951, the role of the clearing banks had changed from being the primary 
dispensers of short and medium-term credit to the private sector to a role of mere manager 
of the money supply.
687
 Partly because they were scared of what the enlarged electorate 
would do with its new powers if clearing banks antagonised them
688
 
689
, partly because 
they had no choice, clearing banks accepted to bear the burden of the Treasury‘s and 
government‘s unwillingness to let go of the primacy of monetarism, despite a post-WWII 
popular opinion largely in favour of more active chartalist policies.  Essentially, clearing 
banks were acting as the ―chartalist‖ substitute for an avowedly active fiscal policy. Those 
bankers who asked for a change in competition policy in order to confront the inroads 
made by overseas banks and building societies were told by the Bank of England such a 
change would not be desirable: if they were allowed to compete directly in price an offset 
would have to be sought in increased taxation in order to replace the present ―implicit 
taxation on bank depositors‖.690    
Another point to the credit of clearing banks is that, while their Commonwealth 
ventures were far from profitable, they held on to them to keep the imperial flame alive 
and reinforce a sense of « special relations » and « unity » within the Commonwealth.
691
 
ii) Building Societies 
      Building societies were champions of both the traditions of Anglican 
democracy and neutrality, in that they most successfully embodied the rising Conservative 
mood in England, while retaining enough of a reputation of defender of the working 
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classes and provincial autonomy not to chase away the Labour electorate in its Northern 
and Midlands bases. With their emphasis on private property and their solid middle class 
profile, the building society movement would soon provide ―a good deal of the ballast that 
kept the ship of state on an even keel‖ (Bellman, 1928: 31). The Conservatives went as far 
as to depict building societies as ―the antidote to all disease that threatens the body 
politic » and the stability of the English nation: « bad houses breed Bolshevism: good 
houses make for civil content and peace…Building Societies are rendering untold service 
in this direction »
692
 (Boddy, 1980: 24-25).  
The Conservatives were especially content that building societies managed to 
persuade several millions of people – who were hourly paid and who perhaps thought, 
financially, no longer than a week ahead –  to undertake a regular commitment for up to 
twenty-five or even thirty years.
693
  The Labour Party also came to appreciate building 
societies‘ work.694 In spite of the acrimony between the Labour government and the 
movement after WWII,
695
 Labour leaders realised that the building societies not only 
maintained socially acceptable rates, but also ―got down to the business of housing the 
low-paid classes‖.696   
The reason why building societies were very successful exponents of Anglican 
democracy  and the principle of government neutrality in market affairs, is that, while they 
subjected all types of investors to a regime of passive democratisation, they managed to 
remain appealing. Building societies provided everyone with a rightful place in the 
Commonwealth by « severely attenuating » the property rights granted to both investor or 
borrower members (Thompson, 1997). While building societies‘ compulsory adherence to 
the « straight-jacket » of « statutory law » (Wurtzburg and Mills, 1976: 3) restricted 
property rights, it was tremendously effective in solving the inherent conflict of interests 
between investor and borrower members. In particular, it provided a long-term answer to 
the needs of homebuyers for low-cost loans and the needs of investors in search of a low-
risk form of saving with an above average return (Cook et al., 2001).   This meant that the 
government could entrust a large chunk of housing policy responsibilities to building 
societies, and credibly present intervention in the housing market as a last recourse 
mechanism.   
iii) Savings Banks 
The later 1930s and 1940s were dominated by the heavy financial requirements of 
the State and the post-war construction. As illustrated in table 9.3, the Post Office Banks 
grew disproportionately fast compared to the Trustee Savings Banks in trying to meet 
these requirements (Horne, 1947: 272). As argued above, building societies were greater 
champions of Anglican democracy than TSBs. This is true not only in terms of 
institutionalising all social classes in an system of naturally accepted hierarchical strata. It 
was equally true in terms of increasing a majority of people‘s ownership of economic 
policy – despite the existence of conflicting preferences amongst these people. Building 
societies were key switching points in realising the government‘s most important domestic 
policy: building a property-owning democracy. The POSB, for its part, was too focused on 
the lower ranks to lay claim of champion of Anglican democracy. Rather, it served to 
buttress the co-operative principle of neutrality, in that it helped the government to 
maintain a policy of relative non-interventionism, while avoiding grievances of unfairness. 
iv) Co-operative bank 
 During WWII, the Co-op movement earned a central place in the affairs of state, 
country, economy and individuals‖ (Sparks, 1993: 3).  As mentioned above, after WWII, 
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the Co-op movement quickly declined in importance. While remaining a very modest bank 
operating in a small niche after WWII, the Co-operative Bank nevertheless lived its second 
era of branch expansion in the postwar decades. Thanks to the Co-operative Party‘s 
connection to Labour, and due to Labour dominating municipalities in the North and 
Midlands, the CWS banking department was able to expand its activities to municipal 
finance – between 1946 and 1951 about 100 councils transferred their banking business to 
the Bank. 
 
Strategy e     Become a champion of national character 
                      i)   Clearing banks 
        Clearing bank leaders saw themselves as saviours of national character in  
more than one regard. Clearing banks still cherished their Commonwealth ventures, as they 
were a way to keep the ―imperial flame‖ alive (e.g. Ackrill and Hannah, 2001: 270).697 But 
after WWII, clearing banks also became increasingly preoccupied with domestic living 
standards, the health of British industry, and the need to sacrifice deposit rate competition 
in favour of economic stability.
698
 As noted by Balfour, President of the Institute of 
Banker: ―the banks have to recognise their responsibility to the community and the nation; 
for their business is one which can have far-reaching effects on the life and eonomic 
activity of the whole country. It is not just that higher deposit rates would make it 
impossible to go on providing, in the national interest, certain kinds of finance (notably to 
exporters) at very advantageous rates. The banks believe, in the light of their experience, 
that in more fundamental ways they serve the country‘s interests best by removing deposit 
interest rates from the areas in which they compete…widening of the area of competition‘ 
between the banks, to include interest rates, could prove to be at the expense of a potential 
loss of stability‖ (cited in Clegg, 1969: 178). 
  There were disparities between clearing banks‘ capacities to deliver on both 
goods, i.e. keeping the imperial flame alive and maintaining attractive and accessible 
services across England.  In terms of the former good, I mentioned above how Barclays 
was more adept than its British competitors at giving economic sense and purpose to its 
overseas business. With regards to the latter good, there did exist important differences 
between clearing banks‘ overdraft services to industrial companies. For instance, the 
chairman of the North-East regional board of Lloyds in the 1930s – later to become a vice-
chairman of the national entity – testified to having been in despair about requests for 
finance supported by the regional board being turned down by the main headquarter board. 
Because Barclays had left its local boards more autonomy, it managed to gain considerable 
business from Lloyds during these years (Carnevali, 1995).
699
  
 In 1957, Barclays finally advanced the Midlands Bank in terms of total assets, due 
to its greater ability to recombine London-centred imperatives and provincial autonomy.  
Barclays‘ policy of staying in touch with provincial traditions by maintaining a 
decentralised loan- and deposit decision-making structure at long last started to pay off – 
the Midland from its inception had one of the most centralised decision-making structures 
in English banking. Barclays itself attributed this success to the better training of its local 
directors in the post-WWII period (cf. Tuke and Gillman, 1972: 20-23). In addition to 
being more respectful of provincial traditions, Barclays had experienced more internal 
contestation of the imperial cause; Barclays‘ Quaker background undoubtedly caused part 
of its top personnel to be more left-centre and pro-decolonialisation than other clearing 
banks.
700
 
701
 One way or another, Barclays by many on the international scene was 
260 
 
considered one of the best banks in the world in the 1950s and 1960s, undoubtedly because 
of its international spread and the lingering resonance of British principles of sound 
finance. 
On the downside, all English clearing banks experienced growing problems after 
WWII to attract those individuals whose qualities were most likely to be promoted as 
champions of a modern national character, given their unpreparedness to hire university 
graduates at a time when « the extension of State-aided higher education is skimming the 
cream off.. [our] future source of personnel».
702
 In particular, the division between 
gentlemanly and managerial classes in banks such as Barclays and Lloyds would soon 
cause these banks trouble in face of the more unified managerial practices of US banks. 
              ii)  Building Societies 
If clearing banks functioned as a private substitute for a public policy of 
chartalism, building societies functioned as a private substitute for a public search of an 
English identity.  During the housing boom of the 1950s and 1960s, home ownership and 
the building society movement rapidly became a symbol of the distinctiveness of the 
English nation, a nation fond of « Liberty and Property ». As early as 1930, building 
society leaders had foreseen this: ―born and nurtured in the English tradition, the building 
society has proclaimed a practical ideal of self-help which has spread across the seven 
seas‖ (Bellman, 1930: 5). Because of the geographical spread of their portfolio, the 
building societies were remarkably adept at playing the role of champion of English 
national character. While underrepresented in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the 
movement was very strongly represented in as diverse English regions as Yorkshire and 
Humberside, the Midlands, the South West and the home counties. In other words, 
building societies were amongst the very few private organisations that managed to bridge 
the North-South divide in England – but not the North-South divide in Britain between the 
Scottish «industrial periphery» and England.  
The building societies‘ steady growth for a large part was attributable to, on the 
one hand, the mobilisation of emerging propertied groups in the provinces – mainly from 
the boom towns in the Midlands, and, on the other hand, a consolidation of the property 
establishment in the suburbs of the South-East. The London area functioned as something 
of a go-between. It was from this center of speculative finance that building booms  
emerged – for instance in the 1930s, in the 1970s and in the late 1980s with the conversion 
of some major building societies to PLC status. At the same time, it was in London that the 
house price/wage ratio rose most during speculative booms (cf. Speigh, 2000).   
 iii)  Savings Banks 
As mentioned above, the TSBs and Post Office Banks during each world war 
relied on the trick of advocating savings as a patriotic duty: by saving  depositors would 
help buttress the war Treasury. Because WWII and its aftermath brought attractive interest 
rates on annuities, National Savings Bonds allowed especially the TSBs to continue with 
this moderately successful strategy (see table 8.5). 
iv)  Co-operative Bank 
 The Co-operative movement remained a very flawed proponent of national 
character. Clinging to the dream of an international Commonwealth, Co-operative leaders 
unconvincingly professed that they were « destined to play a big part in helping to rescue 
the world from the curse of competitive greed and imperialism » (Lansbury, 1935: 7). 
Banking being the ultimate British symbol of imperialism, these claims did the credibility 
of the CWS banking department no good.  
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Also, more than clearing banks, the CWS had trouble recruiting future leaders of 
the English nation. As with clearing banks, co-operative management was recruited from 
inside the movement, from those who entered Co-operative employment at the age of 
fourteen or older. The number of entrants with a grammar school or university education 
was negligible (Ostergaard and Halsey, 1965: 190). As a result, during the 1950s and 
1960s the Co-operative Board was effectively sheltered from the threat of a ―managerial 
revolution‖. When after WWII, working-class wealth grew to a point that, working-class 
children increasingly attended higher education, this, however, would considerable weaken 
recruitment of the best candidates for management to the movement.
703
  
 
Strategy f     Become a champion of the national economic interest 
i)  Clearing banks 
Clearing banks consolidated the public-private settlement they had so 
successfully initiated with the government, Bank of England, the Treasury, political parties 
and ―imperial‖ interest groups from the beginning of the twentieth century. Before the 
1930s, Clearing banks had managed to portray themselves as staunch defenders of the 
public interest, whilst remaining aloof of overtly public responsibilities, and retaining the 
privileges that accrued to that secretive world of old banking families and publicity-shy 
private ventures. Given the steady decline of the empire – largely unnoticed for a long time 
– and the increasingly ―visible hand‖ of the Bank of England704, this settlement 
unfortunately did not have much future, forcing clearing banks‘ private business into an 
increasingly ―public‖ role.705  This constituted an open invitation to the media to single out 
clearing banks rather than the government or Bank of England for a poor press. In view of 
the growing popularity in the 1950s of the view that Britain was in secular decline, 
criticism became especially scathing. Accusations that clearing banks were unresponsive 
to British industry‘s needs had been around since the late 1920s – most of these 
accusations have been found to be unwarranted
706
, and could easily been fended off as 
Marxist propaganda.
707
 But criticism had now taken an entirely new dimension: the 
banking industry was accused of being ―the worst managed of our major industries‖ and 
the Big Five chairmen were depicted as lacking ―either the character or the will, or it may 
be the knowledge and experience, to take the big decisions‖. The banks had won for 
themselves the unenviable distinction of ―always following, never leading…in sheep-like 
fashion‖.  
The Chief General Manager retorted that it was the Bank of England which 
had done a ―lot of harm in preventing contact between Treasury and clearing banks‖. On 
the other hand, he was also critical of the Westminster‘s directors‘ condescension for 
management, and the two-class system in full swing in the clearing bank world, except 
maybe in Barclays where the directors were traditionally practising bankers rather than an 
almost random collection of the great and good (Kynaston, 2001: 344-345). Beyond this 
criticism, however, clearing banks remained the City establishment‘s bulwark in linking 
political and economic realities. After the nationalisation of the Bank of England, the 
Labour Party, for its part, called a truce with the clearing banks.
708
  
ii)  Savings Banks 
Nothing much had changed for savings banks: the TSBs and the Post Office 
Bank were still used to support monetary and fiscal policies, thus earning them praise for 
acting in the public interest.  The TSB association was still relatively powerless in securing 
special advantages for itself. The POSB was entirely at the mercy of the Treasury‘s 
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policies. One difference for the worse with the past was that National Savings Bonds now 
clearly outcompeted savings banks in terms of collected deposits, testifying to savings 
banks‘ decreasing centrality in defending the public interest.     
 iii)   Building Societies 
 Throughout the 20
th
 century, building societies followed the same strategy: to 
be perceived as vehicles of the public interest, they shunned any direct involvement with 
party politics or any conspicuous lobbying endeavours.
709
  The downside of this strategy 
was that, while the societies were well respected locally in the communities – which bore 
their names, they were not as close to the government as the clearing banks.  Things started 
to change in the 1930s, when the Building Societies Association (the BSA) managed to get 
more grip on the movement.
710
  To counter fears of inflation and to help building a 
property-owning democracy, he BSA organised a building society cartel and endeavoured 
to keep mortgage rates as low as possible. Governments, trying to combat inflation through 
policies of influence and persuasion, closely watched these rates and on one occasion paid 
a subsidy to prevent their rising (Reid, 1992: 12).  
The building society cartel appeared to both follow and run counter to the 
economic model of a price setting cartel. On the one hand, the building societies engaged 
in a deliberate rationing of the mortgage loan supply. The availability of loans undoubtedly 
paid a part in raising the costs of house purchase, also because lenders sometimes had to 
take recourse to high interest loans from other financial intermediaries because of the 
scarcity of building society funding (Boleat, 1986: 177). On the other hand, the cartel did 
not tend to keep prices up, but instead kept lending rates below the market clearing level. 
In addition, and also in defiance of the economic price-setting model, the cartel was not 
used by the few very large societies
711
 to drive out their comparatively inefficient small 
counterparts. The BSA‘s cartel was sticky in that it made the supply of mortgages 
dependent on the supply of deposits (Pawley, 1993: 28-31)
712
.  
 From the mid-1950s, governments ensured societies total dominance of 
housing finance.  Banks were fenced off from entering the field – by the lending cubs 
through which governments then helped influence the economy. Foreign financial groups 
were also excluded by exchange controls from playing in the UK market.  
 The Governor of the Bank of England first invited the Chairman of the 
Building Societies' Association in September 1957. Since then, a representative from the 
building societies and the Bank of England have met informally once a month to discuss 
the movement of the bank rate.
713
 Obviously, this increased building societies‘ influence 
on both housing and bank rate policies. Especially, since these informal negotiations did 
not impact negatively on building societies‘ ―non-party‖ character. Building societies 
remained on a good footing with both the Conservative and Labour Parties – both of whom 
regularly mentioned in electoral manifestos their influence on building society policy. This 
is remarkable, given two realities. First, after WWII, Aneurin Bevan – a member of the 
Labour government – had attacked the societies as ―voracious money-lenders‖, supporting 
speculative house builders and encouraging people to take on mortgages that would turn 
into ―gravestones  around their necks‖ (Redden, 1986: 51).  Second, from the late 1930s 
building societies were playing a part in the control of all the services connected with 
housing provision - planning, building, finance, and the sale of property.
714
  
 All this should have made them vulnerable to continued public criticism in 
the 1950s and 1960s. That is, were it not for the BSA, which almost always seemed to 
know how to manoeuvre itself in a position of ―saviour‖ of public-private agreements to 
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ensure a steady supply of homes of a reasonable quality.
715
 For instance, building societies 
helped the government in its quest to ensure that houses were built to acceptable standards 
and purchasers protected against shoddy work. Pressure had long been exerted on the 
National House Builders Registration Council (NHBRC) 
716
 to take care of this matter. 
Established in 1936, the NHBRC‘s purpose was to set standards and to control by 
inspection and certification the houses erected by house building firms subscribing to the 
scheme. But only about 30 per cent of all new private houses were covered by the scheme. 
The issue was resolved by the BSA recommending to its members that from 1st September 
1968 no advance should be made on a new house unless it was certified by the NHBRC or 
had been erected under the supervision of an architect. Once this had been done, 
housebuilders throughout the country rushed to join the certification scheme (Ashfort, 
1980: 185). 
 iv)  Co-operative Bank 
       The 1930s had not been a good decade for the Co-op movement, as Neville 
Chamberlain pressed ahead with the removal of the co-operatives' mutual status in 1933, 
ranking them similar to joint-stock companies with their trading surpluses equivalent to the 
profits of a private business (Whiting, 2000: 50).
717
  Given the steadfastness of Co-ops 
during WWII, however, the CWS banking department was one of the first banks to be 
recognised by the Bank of England and the Treasury as an ―Authorised Bank‖ under the 
Exchange Control Act of 1947.  This, however, did not mean Co-operative Banking was 
all of a sudden taken seriously in the City.  It simply fits in the picture of a decade of 
efforts by leading figures in the City to show more concern for their image in domestic 
popular opinion.
718
  Consider the following testimony by the Bank of England president 
Norman after having received a visit from two leading figures in the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society after the 1935 election. The Co-operative leaders apparently claimed to 
be ―so big and important‖ that they ought to have ―a seat on the Court‖. Norman added that 
―at present I do not think we need to take [this] too seriously‖ but at the same time he 
thought it best to cover himself by opening an account for the Co-op (quoted in Kynaston, 
2000: 378-379).
719
  
 If anything, Co-ops‘ lobbying efforts became even more counterproductive 
after WWII. Co-ops were getting an increasingly bad press, and were depicted as 
hopelessly old-fashioned. Several national newspapers produced damning reports, 
accusing the CWS leadership of being ―more interested in social and political aims than in 
shopkeeping‖720, and finding Co-ops wanting with regards to modern standards of 
professional expertise
721
 (cf. Ostergaard and Halsey, 1965: 191).
722
   
 
                                                 
598 The failure of industry to rise in status in twentieth century England was also due to the split between 
commerce and finance centered in the City of London and industrial manufacturing centered in the North. The 
first of the status groups, bankers, were more economically dominant and normatively authoritative; they were 
richer, possessed a more historical pedigree, and their style was more likely to be accepted by the old elite. 
Indeed, the new elites were ―traditionalist, Anglican, and, in a very real sense, conservative.‖(Rubinstein, 1977: 
623). 
599 Discriminatory measures were implemented against the rest of the world. These measures also allowed the 
Bank of England to manage transactions with the dollar area through a pooling system. Furthermore, the 
measures provided a mechanism whereby other members of the sterling area accumulated sterling balances 
whenever their exports were not balanced by imports. 
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600 « Washington‘s terms for a post-war dollar loan to Britain were contingent upon adherence by the United 
Kingdom to the Bretton Woods agreement, together with its associated trade-policy regime » (Cottrell, 1995: 
114). 
601 It has been argued that only after WWII did England‘s dependence on the US become so acute that her global 
leadership had to be shared and later surrendered (McKercher, 1999). Others argue that this happened muh 
earlier. Gladstonian Whig policies of economising on defence expenditures had left the English increasingly at 
the mercy of benevolent, but ulitmately foreign military strength, both within the empire, and with regards to 
Europe and the United States (cfr. Cain and Hopkins, 1993: 668-679). Most notably, from WWI the British 
Empire relied more and more on US military strength. But from the end of the nineteenth century it also 
increasingly relied on the voluntary cooperation of for instance the Indian army and government – indigenous 
Commonwealth elites in general – in ensuring the sharing of economic profit, civil restraint, and political 
authority. These tendencies became more pronounced from 1939, to the extent that after WWII British empire 
and prosperity was framed increasingly on a discriminatory proposition whose viability depended needed US 
toleration, dollar underwriting and strategic protection. 
602a) Americanisation traditions such as happy mediocrity have their roots in the American Revolution. The defeat 
of Tory loyalism and the ascendancy of the Puritan Radicals in the American Revolution, facilitated a settlement 
between the latter group and Whig moderates – the position of those elites who acquiesced to British dominance 
as long as the mother country did not interfere in economic and taxation matters. The ensuing settlement 
embodied many of the features ascribed to the denominator ―Puritan‖ or ―Real‖ Whiggism (Robbins, 1959). Led 
by Samuel Adams,  Puritan Radicals were staunch supporters of evangelical egalitarianism and individualism 
(Fowler, 1997). Secular Whigs, by contrast, were convinced that civil society should seek to transform all men‘s 
natural rights into civil liberties while restricting active political rights to the property (Dickinson, 1981)- Striking 
a balance between Puritan radicalism and secular Whiggism, leaders such as Franklin promoted democratisation 
in terms of a civic virtue of ―happy mediocrity‖, with an eye on producing a secular, middle class society which 
would overcome tendencies of both religious extremism and class rigidity (Carlson, 1975: 5-7). A tradition of 
Americanisation through education – the inculcation of the virtues of happy mediocrity – took firmly root in these 
years; a tradition which would leave a lasting imprint on North-American constitutional history in general, and 
the prominence of business education in particular. Clearly, the invention of this tradition helped leaders in the 
US to create and inculcate a distinct national identity to replace the political and cultural ties that had bound 
Americans to England and to Europe. 
 b) Traditions of Americanisation were first promoted by European Puritans – obviously ethnically white – intent 
on building a model Christian commonwealth, a nation which from the beginning, considered itself charged with 
responsibilities beyond those of other nations. In particular, the Puritans of Massachussets Bay Colony set out to 
establish in their community the best religion, the best government, and the best society yet obtained in an 
imperfect world. By maintaining the purity of their colony's way of life, they believe they could create an 
educational example for the entire world (Carlson, 1975: 3-4).  The spread of this puritan doctrine in the US and 
later the entire Western world was greatly helped by its early infusion – some would say ―dilution‖ – by 
Whiggish principles, in particular universal fiscal and economic doctrines.  This infusion mitigated the racist and 
elitist core of the puritan doctrine, and allowed the US to develop a sense of mission, a commitment to 
demonstrate to the world how a nation should provide liberty and justice for all. While waiting expectantly for 
other nations to copy US patterns, some Americans worried lest the example lose its purity. The United States 
was an experiment in which people of many religions, races, nationalities, political ideologies, and economic 
levels came by general invitation from around the world to create a new nation. Although they were proud of the 
policy of unrestricted immigration, these Americans wanted to ensure that such diversity would not destroy what 
they believed was freedom's prototype. To overcome the heterogeneity that they feared threatened the unity and 
example of their country, they relied on education. These proponents of education who sought to uphold freedom 
by indoctrinating norms of belief in religion, politics, and economics eventually became known as Americanisers. 
They applied their remedy for diversity, the Americanisation of education, to nearly all areas of life. Their quest 
for doctrinal orthodoxy also led them to seek for uniformity in high visibility areas like personal appearance, 
language, and personal habits...Americanisation of education in the interest of liberty thus became, paradoxically, 
an imperious demand for individual conformity to societal norms. 
c) Benjamin Franklin – the most revered member of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, often referred to as 
the ―first American‖ – came to champion the different Tory, Puritan and Whig traditions. He expertly and 
conveniently transformed his visions in line with the changing opportunity structure of the relation between the 
US and Great Britain (cfr. Crane, 1954; Brands, 2000). Given this contradictory background, Franklin came to 
embody the elite settlement which would infuse the United States with a constitutional and historical destiny. 
Before becoming a revolutionary patriot, Benjamin Franklin was a Tory loyalist, an influential supporter of the 
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British-American connection (Potter, 1983: 107-182). Noticing the changing tide in the American colonies – 
where the once acquiescent press was rapidly becoming aligned with Puritan Radicals such as Samuel Adams – 
Franklin removed his support from the loyalist cause. Realising that British Parliament would never grant the 
expanding colonies autonomous status within the empire, and increasingly revolted about the corruption and 
luxury of the English ruling classes, forced him to rethink his commitment to the empire and embrace the vision 
of an independent, republican future for his continent (McCoy, 1978, Pocock, 1980: 280; Strourzh, 1969: 7-32). 
Above all, Benjamin Franklin, himself a product of Puritan New England, was influential in educating the Puritan 
Radicals to adopt a more secular and nationalistic mission, by encouraging members of the various Protestant 
sects to modify their principles in the interest of civil harmony (Carlson, 1975: 6). 
603 From the 1960s the suburbanisation movement in particular has been sustained by a Republican coalition of 
disaffected white evangelicals and middle class people (Wilcox, 1996; McGirr, 2001). 
604 Some commentators argue that British leaders might have been charmed by the notion that the US Empire of 
Liberty – the Pax Americana – would be a continuation of the ―Anglo-Saxon‖ genius of the British Empire - the 
Pax Britannica – with its universalist ideology of liberty and free trade (Gamble, 2007; Watt, 1984). 
605 This obviously did not happen overnight, but was the result of US pressure since WWI. On the eve of WWI, 
―Antlanticism‖ provided a basic frame of reference for the financiers in the City of London, Wall Street and 
Amsterdam engaged in the operation of the international circuit of money. This frame of reference was 
consolidated after the Bolshevik Revolution and President Wilson‘s crusade for liberal-internationalist democracy 
– the universal application of North-American political and economic traditions – against ―evil‖ Communism. 
With Russia out of the continental circuit of money capital, European financiers were forced to focus more on the 
Atlantic finance circuit. This tendency was even reinforced when, under the pressure of US demands of 
decolonisation after WWII, Western countries gradually gave up their continental interests (cfr. Van der Pijl, 
1984).   
606 « Amercian officials and politicians were concerned that central bankers should play the smallest role in the 
new post-war world, with Morgenthau stating in 1946 that his primary objective had been to ‗move the financial 
centre of the world from London and Wall Street to the United States Treasury‘ and to create a new concept 
between nations of international finance under the control of ‗sovereign govenrments and not of private financial 
interests‘ » (Cottrell, 1995: 110). 
607 It would challenge Britain‘s arrangements for trade and payments by effectively countering the discriminatory 
strategies that protected its balance of payments and reserve position. 
608 From the mid-1950s in particular, the Bank of England vigorously promoted the City as a site for banking with 
a « liberal » approach to the regulation of financial institutions‘ international activities. During the 1960s, for 
example, the Bank of England encouraged the development of the eurodollar markets with a compartively « lax » 
regulatory environment (Kynaston, 1997). 
609 the Fed‘s purpose concerning US banks‘ international activity was to enhance their competitiveness in foreign 
and international markets. he banks‘ ability to compete in international markets was also regarded as having 
beneficial consequences on competition at home, since foreign expansion of banks from Chicago or California 
challenged the traditional monopoly enjoyed by New York money centre giants – such as Citibank and Chase 
Manhattan – in providing international banking services. 
610 It has to be noted that the Conservative Party far too often is identified with Tory traditions alone; in fact the 
most resonant motto has always been ―a good Conservative is both a Whig and a Tory‖. Given this, it is not 
surprising that Conservative Party policy has long reflected an uneasy blend of paternalism and libertarianism (cf. 
Francis, 1996: 58). Depending on domestic and foreign pressures of democratisation, Conservative policy has 
tended towards either a Whig radicalism of laissez-faire capitalism or a Tory radicalism of paternalist protection. 
So, while in post-WWII England, Conservative leaders such as Eden made it clear that they were neither ―a party 
of unbridled brutal capitalism‖, nor ―the political children of the laissez faire school‖ (Conservative Party, Annual 
Conference Report 1947: 420), in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries the desire to woo middle-class 
businessmen and citizens ushered in a shift away towards the defence of the free market. 
611 This transpired most clearly in Conservative support for the US-policy to ―smash the Communist menace‖ by 
means of both more reform and the suppression of Soviet subversion from the 1920s onwards. 
612 Similarly, from the 1920s to the 1940s the English judiciary had reinforced the triumph of cartelisation which 
preserved the independence of small firms. In fact, the courts tended to push the principles of neutrality and self-
restraint to new limits, sustaining broad substantive results benefitting the established business order based on a 
so-called "get-along" ethos. For instance, the courts sanctioned the use of business coercion to enforce restrictive 
practices. According to a contemporary observer in the famous monopoly-case "Harris Tweed Case", from the 
1920s to the 1940s comparatively loose contractual arrangements gave way to tighter structural organisation, 
mostly in the forms of trade association. The prinicipal object of these assocations purportedly was to maintain 
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minimum prices by a rigid control of wholesalers and retailers...These associations concluded "agreements with 
different sections of the trade by which both wholesalers and retailers undertook not to supply or buy from price 
cutters". The "principal means of enforcement" hereby was the "black list system" (Freyer, 1992: 216-217). 
613 In 1956, Macmillan reaffirmed what he had said some years before, namely that "Toryism has always been a 
form of paternal Socialism" (The Star, London, June 25, 1936). 
614 This catchphrase was first pronounced by Mr. Eden in 1945 (Lewis, 1954 : 3), and more prominently Winston 
Churchill.. 
615 The movement for wider investment in industry by wage earners and other small investors‖ (Conservative 
Political Center, 1959  Everyman a capitalist.  London). 
616 Towards the end of the Conservative opposition period – at the end of the 1940s, housing had emerged as the 
centrepiece of Conservative social-policy proposals, the heart of promises to spread property-ownership and the 
construction of a ‗property-owning democracy‘. Under Bevan, housing policy had taken on a universal character 
based upon need rather than upon the ability to pay ; licenses to build privately were restricted, and those homes 
which were built privately were limited in size and standard. The bulk of new housing was provided through the 
local authorities, and targeted at general needs rather than focused on slum clearance. But congestion and 
materials shortage in the building industry led to public disaffection with socialist housing policy ; this was the 
weak spot which the Conservatives, promising to unleash the productive forces of the market, hoped to use as a 
showcase policy to demonstrate the virtues of free enterprise. The 1950 conference pledge to build 300,000 
houses a year. 
617 As expressed by the ―One Nation Group‖ of Conservative MPs in the early-1950s: ―to promote a unified 
prosperous democracy, with management and men working together for an ever improving standard of living and 
a financial surplus to provide generous help for all those who needed it…strengthening the weak without 
weakening the strong‖ (One Nation Group, 1976; Macleod and Maude, 1950; Martin, 1988). This would ensure 
that Britain would not become more egalitarian, just wealthier. 
618 The Conservatives failed to avert the cutting of the House of Lords veto under the 1949 Parliament Act. This 
was a major defeat, both given the Conservative depiction of the House of Lords as a constitutional safeguard for 
the rights of free-born Englishmen, and the domination of Labour in the House of Common (Francis, 1996: 61-
63). 
619 After WWII, and especially during the 1951-64 administrations. the Conservative Party contracted the « Santa 
Claus syndrome », meaning that the Party was gripped by the contradictory tendencies to « avoid terminal decline 
through the failure to get elected, while at the same time guiding policy along lines compatible with the broad 
aims of Conservatism: a free-enterprise economy which maintains incentives for individual achievement, the 
maintenance of the institutions of the state, Church and family, and the defence of the existing social and 
economic hierarchy » (Jones, 1996: 243). 
620 Part of the Labour and Conservative Party leadership feared that England had been diverted from its true moral 
nature by industrial materialism. Especially during the Great Depression in the 1930s these factions maintained 
that ―quality‖ in the sense of political freedom and moral leadership should substitute quantitative materialism in 
England, so as to allow the nation to return to its true historical character (Wiener, 1981: 111-113, 120, 128-129). 
621 Anti-patriotism was an umbrella term for a diversity of themes, most notably lack of restraint, subversion, 
unconstitutionality and class violence. 
622 Personal ties between the Conservative Party and a variety of new mass media – e.g. newsreel cinema and 
radio the popular press – from the 1920s onwards helped to secure the identification of ―people democracy‖ and 
Conservatives‘ interpretation of Britishness.  The Labour Party clearly was less successful in establishing such 
ties, both with mainstream and new popular media. 
623 The Bank of England remained a private corporation until 1949. Even after its nationalisation, it retained the 
right to hire its own staff, deal directly with the prime minister, and take public positions at variance with 
government policy. 
624 From 1952, Labour favoured compulsory registration of all restrictive agreements, and their calling up for 
examination in front of a special tribunal. The onus would then be upon the industry concerned to prove that their 
practices were not agains the public interest (Freyer, 1992a: 203). As such, the financial community increasingly 
retreated into overly ―protective‖, private self-regulation. In the same vein, the threat of nationalisation 
discouraged a more imaginative approach between banks – or other financial investors – and industrial companies  
after WWII. 
625 By the 1950s, gas and electricity had been nationalised and hospital government had been regionalised. 
626 Between 1900 and 1918 the rise of new-liberal and Labour ideologies of State centralisation along with the 
decline of business interest in local government service and fears among Conservatives of socialist 
municipalisation all conspired to radically change the dual policy ethos. Local government became agents of the 
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welfare states rather than autonomous representatives of lcoal interests.  By the 1920s, the Labour Party had taken 
political control of many large city govenrments at the expense of local Conservative and Liberal politicians. This 
indirectly led to the ousting of the remaining businessmen, who a generation previously had built city government 
in the spirit of businessmen‘s clubs. The loss of interest of businessmen in local government was also caused by 
the grwoth of community-transcending, reginoal or national joint-stock companies and businesses (cf. Dearlove, 
1979: 79-105; Montague-Harris, 1939: 36-38). 
627 In 1950, local expenditure comprised no more than 25 per cent of total public outlay on current account, 
compared with 55 per cent in 1905. 
628 Remarkably, neither in the private nor in the public sector was the function of the roles of trade union leaders 
and officials different in the 1950s and 1960s from what it had been in the 
1920s and 1930s. Clearly, Ernest Bevin – the Minister of Labour in Churchill's WWII coalition government, did 
change the relation between organized labour and the state, but only temporarily. After WWII, Bevin did not use 
all the powers which were thrust into his hands, as he – as a typical English labour union leader – was concerned 
not that the state should take control of the relations between the trade unions and the controllers of capital as it 
would in a socialist society but, on the contrary, that the unions should be better placed once the war was 
over to improve the pay and conditions of their members through free collective bargaining of the traditional kind 
(Runciman, 1993: 61-62). 
629 The method of attaining socialism from a very early stage was agreed to be Nationalisation Acts of Parliament.     
630 ―Both [the Labour and Conservative] parties agreed that it was Britain's role to maintain peace, law and 
stability in the world...Not only did the leaderships and majorities of the two main parties appraise Britain's major 
national interests in fundamentally similar terms, they also held similar views on maintaining her world role. 
Wchever party had been in power, the general trends of her postwar policy would probably not have been 
appreciably different‖ (Frankel, 1975: 33-34). 
631 Labour usually made the moral, altruistic case for imperialism; the argument based on a nation's duty to the 
world (Porter, 1968:186).                          
632 Many Labour supporters ―had been inspired as much by a revulsion from the ugliness and materialism of late 
nineteenth-century industrial society as by a hatred of poverty and injustice‖ (Marquand, 1977: 403). So, the 
Fabians were moralists intent on bringing about a higher, simpler life-style:  a ―frugal and earnest living‖. 
According to Beatrice Webb, a leading Fabian,  the ―keynote‖ of socialism had to be ―extreme social ascetism‖ 
(cf. Wolfe, 1975: 212).  With the decline of both Liberalism and nonconformism, the Church of England - in 
alliance with the City and the Treasury - asserted itself as an authoritative force in the shaping of a policy beyond 
the classical antinomies -  Right versus Left, and the market – financial versus industrial capitalism, labour 
against capital – in the first half of the twentieth century.   
633 Partly also as a 'payroll tax' to control what was popularly called 'over-full employment'. All employers would 
be required to pay a tax of 25 shillings (£1.25) a week for each adult male employee, and smaller sums for 
women and young people. The tax would be refunded to manufacturing industry, with a bonus on top; while it 
would be refuneded to certain other kinds of industry without a bonus. 
634 E.g. Labour Party Manifesto 1955: ―Faced with actual aggression in Korea and the threat of it elsewhere, the 
Labour Government did not shirk the heavy burden of rearmament. It took the lead in building up the North 
Atlantic Alliance. We believe that in the absence of all-round disarmament, the democratic powers must be strong 
and united, and their defensive power sufficient to deter aggression‖ 
635 The « peak organisations » in Britain, be they trade union or employers‘ associations through the 1950s and 
1960s continued to be unenthusiastic about the whole idea of business schools. At first, Labour‘s nationalisation 
programme and its related programme of state-sponsored management programmes shocked many employers and 
put them on the defensive. From the mid-1950s, other factors became more significant. A long period of 
Conservative ascendancy calmed business anxieties about state interference, and official policies began to be 
judged on their merits. However, the management education issue still raised hackles. Some employers feared 
that measures to « professionalise » managers would make them too independent. They wanted functionaries who 
could be relied upon to execute company policy, not a nascent « third force » standing between capital and 
labour…there were judged to be obvious dangers in allowing academics and « theorists » a say in how and what 
managers should learn…they were purveyors of the very kind of abstract knowledge that was most widely reviled 
in business circles. For all these reasons, it was judged, organised business would have to act very carefully. The 
FBI and its allies must operate tactically…The peak organisations achieved the difficult balancing act of 
moderating American enthusiasms while not deflecting them completely. In a speech of 1970, the president of the 
Confedeartion of British Industry (the FBI‘s successor) was candid about the lack of consensus [about the value 
of American-style business educaiton]  : « Industrialists and academics…do not agree about where British 
management education is going…The academic world, on the whole, does not want to know about industry‘s 
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needs…objectives are irreconciliable » (The Economist, 21 November 1970). The key point for many was that 
the required skills and competencies [of a good British manager] could not be learned through formal training. « 
Character » was most probably innate, though some were prepared to admit that it might be developed at a good 
private school or Oxbridge college (Tiratsoo, 1988: 366-368). 
636 Other thought leaders, such as the editors of the New Statesman, were accused of parochialism because of their 
warnings about the Americanisation of Britain; ―They worry about the U.S. stake in the British economy—now 
$3 billion and growing by $450 million a year. ‗The takeover men are constantly on the lookout for more.‘ 
warned the New Statesman's Francis Williams. ‗American films. American books. American songs shape the 
pattern of our thinking.‘‖ (―Britain: Sunny Acceptance‖, Time. 9 June 1961) 
637 The Co-operative movement had vehemently argued against resale price maintenance agreements. While the 
Final Report of the Greene Committee on Restraint of Trade (1930-1931) concluded that although resale price 
maintenance was sometimes inconsistent with the public interest, it deemed the problem not significant enough to 
justify any major change in the law (Freyer, 1992: 214). 
638 One of the only victories it could claim – not for long – was when in 1930, the Co-operative Party secured that 
the Committee on Restraint of Trade would consider the practice of withholding supplies from alleged price-
cutters. 
639 One of the reasons why the policies of Labour and the Co-operative movement were not very aligned, is that 
the former was trying to get rid of its stigma amongst the lower middle classes. Labour stood for everything that 
had threatened the middle classes after the war. The point where the labour movement and the lower middle class 
came into sharpest conflict was over the tax treatment of the Co-operative society, because the shopkeepers felt 
the co-op was using an essentially bogus claim to be a mutual society to avoid taxation on its profits and so gain 
an unfair advantage over smaller traders. Certainly, families with any connection to shopkeeping usually had 
strong feelings about the co-ops (Whiting, 2000: 47). 
640 They also might have tempered Labour‘s more centralised, producer dominated forms with some genuine 
consumer ownership and control, so as to make the nationalised industries and welfare services more efficient, 
more popular and more politically secure than they turned out to be during the 1980s (Birchall, 1994: 131-132). 
641 The Co-operative movement‘s failure to dominate the political agenda in terms of issues around which the 
nation would rally, became painfully clear after WWII. While the Labour Party in theory had unprecedented 
possibilities for realising the political agenda of its closest allies, the Trade Unions and the Co-operative 
movement, these allies did not exercise nearly as much sway over the formulation of post-WWII policies of the 
business community (Mercer, 1995: 103). 
642 i.e. the practice to fix the price at which retailers may sell through loyalty rebates or withholding supplies from 
price-cutters through stop-lists. 
643 As noted by Blank (1977: 687), Opie (1968) and Wallace (1975), twice in the postwar period  a rival 
governmental department was created whose primary responsibility was to be domestic economic policy – but not 
financial  
policy. The first was the formation of the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1947. The second was the foundation 
of the Department of Economic Affairs in 1964. In both cases, however, the Treasury soon reasserted its control 
over the entire scope of domestic economic and financial policy. 
644 For instance, during the 1929-1931 Labour government, the Treasury worked assiduously to sabotage 
proposals for the relief of unemployment. In response to the financial world crisis, the Treasury argued that it was 
impossible to further increase taxes, as Labour ministers proposed. As a result of this lack of taxation capacity, 
the Labour government had no other option but to cut unemployment benefits, thus precipitating its own demise. 
In fact, the permanent officials were joined by business leaders, press leaders, financial institutions, and 
politicians, most notably Conservative but also some Liberal M.P.s. As if that were not enough, the Labour 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Snowden, shared these prejudices. The Labour defeat further disabled the Party‘s 
resolve to deal constructively with the question of how to use the State to intervene in the economy and deal with 
social problems. Not suprisingly, the Party program remained underdeveloped during the interwar years, and a 
profound pessimism gripped Labour (Cronin, 1988: 225-226). It thus fell to the Conservatives to effectively run 
government during the 1930s and make incremental adjustments to meet the economic crisis. 
645 In practice, the ―fiscal constitution‖ entailed several aspects. First, it entailed financial stability for the sake of 
the stability of not only the City, but also the entire world system, especially in times of world depression such as 
the 1930s. Second, the Treasury was concerned to preserve the integrity of the tax system as a precondition for 
political stability and order. For instance, the Treasury was concerned that the repayment of debt should provide 
funds for industrial investment (Daunton, 2002: 165-166).  
646 In fact, the Labour government policy towards private enterprise not only bore little relation to the views of the 
mass organisations allied to the Labour Party, but also to the views within its own parliamentary faction. 
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647 For instance, Bevan‘s plans to nationalise the industrial assurance companies were opposed by the Treasury. 
648 Radcliffe Committee 1958-9, Report: 163-164, cited in Thomas, 2004. 
649 Central banking in the dominions had begun in the 1920s in South Africa and Australia, and had been 
recommended for India. In the 1930s, as the search for economic stability intensified, central financial institutions 
in these coountries were strengthened; Canada and New Zealand also felt the need for similar bodies. The Bank 
of England had always wished to shape these institutions in its own image and pressed, with varying degrees of 
success, for private central banks whose freedom from competition with other banks and independence from 
government would enable them to manage the money supply on sound principles in a way long taken for granted 
in Britain (Cain and Hpkins, 2002: 476). 
650 Bank of England president Norman in the interwar period had consistently refused to admit a connection 
between "fluctuations in the volum of credit and fluctuations in employment', i.e. a connection between Bank 
policy and unemployment (Kynaston, 2000: 200). 
651 By WWII the triumph of rationalisation did not prevent the increased influence of those promoting 
competition. Britain's faith in Free Trade was gradually displaced by a new consensus favoring official promotion 
of business cooperation within large, self-regulating units. Labour supported the new consensus, believing that 
price stability helped to maintain employment. Small business supported the consensus because it sanctioned the 
preservation of relative independence through horizontal and vertical restrictive agreements. The managers of 
large firms such as ICI supported the consensus because it legitimatized the the corporate economy emerging 
from the merger wave, without arousing concern about monopolistic abuse. During WWII, however, some pro-
competition economists, Labour leaders and Tories became convinced that cartelisation inhibited the attainment 
of full employment and a free market economy once victory was won. Prominent London newspapers endorsed 
this argument, and the US pushed the same view in bi-lateral negotiations of major international agreeemnts. By 
the end of the war a policy compromise emerged which reflected the tension between those favoring government 
intervention to policy but otherwise allow monopolistic practices and those demanding official action to prevent 
such restraints. Established in the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act of 1948, the compromise reflected the 
presumption that investigation and publicity were sufficient to prevent abuse (Freyer, 1992: 217). 
652  The quote continues: ―The Stock Exchange is indispensable to the National Economy…The Insurance 
Companies, (Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks),  the Building Societies, the Co-operative Societies, the 
Trade Unions, the Churches, Pension Funds, Charities and Trusts of all descriptions need the Stock Exchange for 
the investment and realisation of their funds. It is the same with the individual. The Stock Exchange provides no 
small party o the security behind the pay packet and the salary, the pensions and the savings‖ (11). 
653 WWII-regulations forbade new issues without Treasury consent. Applications to raise capital were vetted by 
the Bank, which had authority to permit access to the market to UK borrowers undertaking work in the national 
interest. Other cases were referred to an advisory body, the Capital Issues Committee, but problematic ones 
tended to involve the Bank. These controls continued in the immediate post-war years, though they were relaxed 
in the 1950s and the Capital Issues Committee. 
654 The old republican tradition of voluntarism was still represented by its international/domestic counterparts of 
―England and Empire‖ and ―Anglican democracy‖. 
655 Starting with the Aliens Act of 1905 which targeted Jews in particular, and which sought to give Englishmen 
―protection against foreigners‖ and ―safeguard their duties‖, Conservatives systematically wielded the anti-
national argument to marginalise Labour (e.g. 1928. ―What Conservatives have done for British workers‖, 
Conservative Political Centre Handbook). Fear for ―aliens‖ culminated in Enoch Powell‘s calls to halt 
immigration in the 1960s.  
656 In 1948, while Labour governed the country, the British Nationality Act was passed; this act considered 
everyone born within Britain's colonies a British citizen.  
657 Labour leaders were keen to support public housing for general needs and for slum clearing, as made concrete 
in the 1924 Wheatley Act and the 1930 Greenwood Act. However, Labour  did not stand firm enough on its feet 
to continue its efforts in this direction. First, MacDonald‘s Labour government could not overturn the decision of 
Law‘s 1920 Conservative government to restrict subsidies to local authorities that wished to build houses, depsite 
the growing shortage of houses. Nor could they prevent ―private― corporations, such as the building societies, 
from enjoying the same subsidies, even when these latter organisations did not engage in building new houses. 
Finally, because of Labour‘s ambivalence, in 1933, only two years after the Labour government had been 
replaced by MacDonald‘s Tory-dominated National Government, subsidies to local authorities to build housing 
for general needs were abolished and the role of public housing confined to slum clearance and rehousing. In 
doing this, the Conservatives sent a clear meassage that working-class housing needs should be met by the private 
sector, not the public sector 
658 Purportedly, civil society in Scotland is fundamentally different from that in England (Nairn, 1977: 132). 
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659 Calls for a distinctive Scottish system of public-private provision have been raised in every century since the 
union in 1707. Most notably, with regards to the education principle, Scottish leaders of opinion as early as the 
1830s argued against English laissez-faire and class-driven educational ideology. Rather, Scots saw the the way 
forward in adapting and modernizing the Scottish tradition of public provision (Anderson, 1983). 
660 Nevertheless, clearing banks‘ focus on non-price competition only, led them to increase their branches quite  
impressively, from 9,794 in 1950 to a peak of 12,315 in 1968  
661 With the freeing of the housebuilder from the licensing system, building for sale increased throughout the 
years to 1960. Over 100,000 were built by private entreprise in 1954 and thereafter the number increased 
gradually to 170,000 in 1960. By this time the local authorities‘ total had declined from 239,000 houses in 1952 
to 128,000. House prices held steady throughout the 1950s following upon the rapid rise in the 1940s. The total 
increase from 1950 to 1960 was no more than 10 per cent. In the same period the index of average earnings 
doubled and this factor made for a ready sale of houses. The raising of rents undoubtedly encouraged families to 
buy either as sitting tenants or as first-time purchaseser of vacant-possesion houses. The number of houses in the 
private-rented sector continued to decline as landlords sold (Ashfort, 1980 : 149). 
662 « This change in the type of investor has been brought about by the growing recognition of this investment in 
recent decades, by the scope it provided for the use of funds in a satisfactory manner, and by the consistent 
advocacy of these investments by newspapers and a number of brokers" (Cohen, 1933: 17). 
663 Deposits did not always carry a lower interest rate than shares. In fact, this was only due to phenomenal 
historical changes in the deposit rate. The rate first declined from 35.8 per cent to 12.8 per cent in 1931. And after 
a temporary rise to 21.4 per cent in the 1930s, it fell sharply again afer 1950 to 6.5 per cent in 1964 (Moreh, 1966: 
140, 167-168). 
664 Another factor responsible for the fall in the deposit ratio was the gradual abandonment of the system of 
issuing shares in fixed units. Under such a system. sums smaller than the unit could not usually be paid into or 
withdrawn from a share account. Also, interest on shares could not be compounded. Hence many people had to 
open deposit accounts for one or both of the following purposes 1) payment or withdrawal of small sums, 
2)compounding of interest...ONly in 1959, the Woolwich Equitable BS, the fourth largest by volume of assets, 
put an end to the £25 share unit, accepting funds in 'pounds and fractions thereof'. Within 9 monhts, £1.5 million 
in respect of some 16,000 balances were transferred from deposit accounts and in general added to existing share 
accounts, follwoing the introduction of facilities for compounding share interest. The number of deposit accounts 
thus transformed more than a third of the deposit accounts by number and about 17 per cent by value. The process 
continued thereafter, though at a reduced price (Moreh, 1966: 138). 
665 "During the past 15 years there has been attracted to the BS movement a more substantial type of investor, 
whose aggregate holdings in BSs may now tend to rival those of the numerically superior working-class 
investors. The constitution of membership in BSs has thus been gradually yet inexorably transformed. They can 
They now cater for a much wider public, the substantial investor and the small man alike, and this comprehensive 
nature of membership now may prove to be a permanent feature in the structure of our own movement" (Baker, 
1947: 402). 
666 In 1963, about three-quarters of the 72 largest BSs by size of assets paid 1/4 per cent (net) less on deposits than 
on ordinary shares, while the remaining one-quarter maintain a differential of 1/2 per cent net. The reason given 
for the differential is that deposits are safer than shares. As deposits are limited by law to two-thirds of mortgage 
assets, which themselves are, on the average, less than 85 per cent of total assets, depositors are well secured 
against losses. Deposits are a prior charge on the assets of a building society. In a year in which losses occur, 
depositors are paid the interest due to them, while shareholders lose part or the whole of their interest, and even 
part of their principal. In the case of a winding up, depositors' claims are satisfied before any shareholders are 
repaid (Ashworth and Stoddart, 1963: 16; Moreh, J. 1966: 104-110). 
667 with Hugh Gaitskell – deputy leader and later leader of the Labour Party – in the chair, and a committee of 
authoritative Co-operative and retailing experts 
668 Through the 1920s the the yield on Consols and on building society shares ran very much together. After 1931 
there was a sharp divergence; building societies become more attractive than Consols. This gave investments in 
societies a further attraction after 1931. 
669 From the 1930s onwards – the decade in which building societies first grew to prominence, there had been less 
house repossessions. For instance, an Economist survey of the top 108 building societies shows that only 319 
houses had been repossessed in 1938 as opposed to 317 for 1935 and 104 for 1925 (The Economist, July 1 1939: 
11). 
670 Especially since, as we shall see in the discussion of strategy e, building societies managed to unite the English 
regions around a common purpose where all other economic, civic or political organisations failed.   
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671 The Co-op registered 28 percent of the population for rationing and sold 23 percent of grocery sales in 1951 
(Morelli, 1998: 49).   
672 Only one tenth of the working class made use of the retail co-ops (Whiting, 2000: 48); an even smaller per 
centage used the banking department. 
673 This is what best distinguishes ―progressive‖ Tories from the Social Democrats whose new party they never 
crossed over to join (Norton and Aughey, 1981, 66-79; Crewe and Searing , 1988). 
674 «In 1960 the banking system was dominated by the clearing banks, which used the discount market as a home 
for their surplus funds. The major merchant banks, involved in financing trade, were members of the Accepting 
Houses‘ Committee. There was also a group of small merchant banks and some foreign-owned banks registered 
as companies in the UK, but these only held a small proportion of total bank deposits, and the bank of England 
did not regard them as important » (Grady and Weale, 1986: 4). 
675  « the monetary policy of the authorities in the period from 1960 to the introduction of competition and credit 
control in 1971 rested on the assumed dominance of the clearing banks and the discount market in the 
transmission mechanism…The major feature of the 1960s was, however, the growth of non-clearing banks and 
rival money markets. (Grady and Weale, 1986: 64-65). 
676 As is generally known, the control mechaiiism devised by the 'new orthodoxy' hinges on a gentlemen's 
agreement, backed, probably unnecessarily, by the oft-quoted and never-invoked paragraph 4 (3) of the 1946 Bill 
of England. By means which are not pertinent to our purpose, the authorities secured an informal understanding 
from the clearing banks to the effect that no individual bank will let its total 'liquid' assets (cash, call money, and 
bills), fall below 30 per cent. of its total assets on the average of four meelis in any month (except fractionally, 
temporarily, and with good reason). Presumably, this undertaking was sought because the 
authorities mere slightly apprehensive that lower ratios may be chosen in its absence. For obvious reasons, only 
minima and no maxima were at this stage imposed. Much has beell made at various juiietures of the current 
monetary controversy of the fact that, at least siiice the 1930's, the major London clearing banks were carrying 
something either side of onethird 
of their assets in 'liquid' form, supposedly as a means of cushioning their cash reserves from seasonal and other 
shocks, so that the new orthodoxy merely transformed an established practice into an officially sanctioned  
rule (Jasay, 1956: 247). 
677 The collapse of the international gold standard turned the pound into a non-metallic currency. Movements of 
foreign capital on such a currency have the same effects as to those of shifts in the liquidity preference of an 
unchanged group of resident investors. 
678 Traditionally, the U.S. banks have been very favourably treated by British bank regulators, mainly because of 
the absence of any formal British bank legislation and the Bank of England's reliance until recently on moral 
suasion. Indeed, up until the mid-1960s U.S. branches were largely unregulated. All a branch needed to operate 
legally as a British bank was the tacit permission of the Bank of England, which was nearly always given. Once 
in business there were no reserve requirements, no interest ceilings, and no formal capital requirements. However, 
from 1965-71 they were subject to credit ceilings on sterling loans made to British residents. Yet, despite these 
ceilings, the U.S. banks were still in a very favourable position when compared to the heavy restrictions imposed 
at that time on the British domestic banks. The giant London Clearing Banks were, for example, subject to two 
reserve ratios (an 8 percent cash and 28 percent liquid asset ratio) and interest ceilings on deposit and loan base 
rates, as well as to quantitative and qualitative limits on the size and composition of their sterling loan portfolios. 
Neither the Clearing banks nor the Bank of England were entirely happy with this situation, the former because 
they felt aggrieved by the blatant inequities of the then current regulatory structure, and the latter because it felt 
its grip over monetary policy weakening, as the domestic Clearing banks shrank in size relative to the U.S. and 
other overseas banks (Goldberg and Saunders, 1980: 639). 
679 Except for the Indian branches, the other banks were run as independent units…Lloyds diluted its overall 
control of the Continental subsidiary and the Latin American operations, subsequently exercising little control 
over their activities (Jones, 1993: 50). Barclays made rather more progress than Lloyds. After acquiring banks 
operating in the West Indies, Egypt and Southern Africa, Barclays merged them into Barclays (DCO) in 1925. 
This was a new bank which was controlled by the domestic bank, but not wholly owned by it. Unlike the Lloyds 
group, DCO was a unified entity. There was also a much closer relationship between Barclays and DCO than 
between Lloyds and its overseas affiliates, with staff transfers between the two banks…Only Barclays, by 
creating a multiregional overseas bank with real management links to the domestic parent, was able to reap some 
internalisation advantages. Arguably the main consequence of the entry of British clearing banks into overseas 
banking was the retention of the substantial and unprofitable British branch networks in regions such as Latin 
America, the West Indies, parts of colonial Africa and Continental Europe (Jones, 1993: 51). Anglo-South had 
been absorbed into Lloyds‘ Latin American interests, but it was clear that Lloyds was unwilling or unable to forge 
272 
 
                                                                                                                           
its diverse overseas banking empire into a unified multinational banking group. Only Barclays (DCO) had 
developed as a more integrated organisation…Lloyds allowed itself to continue for decades in a position of 
ownership without control (Jones, 1993: 184). 
680 The above elements seriously lowered clearing banks‘ odds of reinventing a working version of voluntarism. 
Especially since other financial institutions such as overseas banks and building societies – who were not yet 
considered of central importance in managing monetary flows, were free to change their interest rates and engage 
in product innovation. As we shall see in the next paragraphs, this allowed especially building societies to attract 
deposits away from clearing banks, and become the new champions of voluntarism.   
681 As the Committee on the Working of the Monetary System noted in 1959: ―The societies…are ‗mutual‘ rather 
than ‗commercial‘ in their nature. The word ‗share‘ has in this movement a different meaning from ordinary 
usage in the context of a joint stock company‖. The Committee described a building society as‖'primarily a 
promoter of thrift and of home ownership‖. Only in this regard did thet ―have social and economic importance‖ 
(Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, 1959, Cmnd 827: paras, 285-286). 
682 This is somewhat paradoxical, given that, following the 1962 BSA Act, building societies could ―only those 
things‖ and ―operate only in the manner which is envisaged by legislation‖, ―unlike most normal corporate bodies 
which are free to decide their functions and method of operation within the general law of the land‖ (BSA, 1983: 
5). 
683 Other taxes were introduced. The Selective Employment Tax (SET) was  more complicated tax, designed 
partly as a revenue-raising device, partly to deflect labour from service industries to manufacturing industries, and 
partly as a 'payroll tax' to control what was popularly called 'over-full employment'. All employers would be 
required to pay a tax of 25 shillings (£1.25) a week for each adult male employee, and smaller sums for women 
and young people. The tax would be refunded to manufacturing industry, with a bonus on top; while it would be 
refuneded to certain other kinds of industry without a bonus. By contrast, the new Corporation Tax was designed 
essentially as a streamlining operation, or a belated recognition of the enormous part played by corporate bodies 
in modern life. Insted of corporations paying both Income Tax and Profits Tax, the revenue would be collected in 
the form of a consolidated tax (Douglas, 1999: 134). 
684 During the 1930s larger depositors were not welcome as the societies did not wish to become commercial 
deposit takers. There was a realisation by the societies that some large commercial depositors were apt to treat 
deposits with the societies on a short term basis. Several societies, especially the smaller ones, would not accept 
deposits of a size considered substantial so as to protect against circumstances where the withdrawal might come 
at a time difficult for them to meet their obligations. The larger societies, however, could afford to take larger 
deposits, owing to the size of their asset base. 
685 The 2nd November 1954 marked the beginning of a property boom in the UK that was to last almost 20 years. 
That afternoon, the Conservative Minister of Works announced in the House of Commons that building licenses 
were to be dropped...Building Societies became big business. For the first time they started setting up many 
branches. 
686 WWII-expenditure was half met out of taxation, half out of the issuing of Treasury bills – which led to the 
trebling of the national debt. The clearing banks absorbed such a huge amount of Treasury deposit receipts 
(TDRs) that by 1945 these government securities constituted by far the largest single item in their assets. The 
weight of borrowing ensured the government a commanding position with regards to clearing bank assets and 
rates. As the rates on Treasury bills and Treasury deposit receipts were lowered by the government, so the banks 
had to lower the maximum rate on all deposit accounts. This did not only curtail competition for deposits. It also 
diminished the historical differences between banking terms in London and in the country. With government 
paper amounting to two thirds of their assets, the Bank of England maintained the cash base of the clearing banks 
at the level required to support the rising volume of deposits, as determined by both government demands and the 
requirements of the private sector (Wadsworth, 1953: 17-19). 
687 With the steady growth of bank deposits substitutes – such as BS deposits and shares –the clearing banks‘ 
share of the economy‘s liquid assets had dropped from 60 per cent in 1920 to some 42 per cent in 1950 (Nevin 
and Davis, 1970: 134). 
688 As testified by the President of the Institute of Bankers in 1950: ―The tremendous question to which we await 
the answer at the opening of the second half of the century is whether the majority of the enlarged electorate in 
whom that power now, for good or ill, permanently resides will exercise it with a full sense of responsibility to 
the nation as a whole or not….the circumstances of the times, therefore…call more than ever for a concentration 
of effort on raising the general level of the standard of education of the people, and in particular its awareness of 
underlying economic realities…the banking community has an important part to play in the economic education 
of the general public » (Balfour, 1950: 110-111). 
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689  This fear had its origins in the old Conservative mantra that  the untimely enfranchisment of the working class 
« could sweep away property, decorum, the constitution » (McKibbin, 1998:  67). 
690 H.G. Johnson, ―Observations on the bank merger proposals‖, The Bankers‟ Magazine. September 1968: 137. 
691 ―The share of the Barclays group assets in overseas banking (only 4% when the modern bank ventured into 
overseas retail banking in 1919), was already about a quarter by 1945, and rose to 42% by 1970 and even 56% by 
1980. This international commitment was exceeded, proportionately if not absolutely, by some samller, free-
standing British overseas banks (like Standard Chartered and the Hongkong & Shangai Bank), until recently 
operating largely abroad. Latterly it was also emulated by other British clearing  banks and by some foreign 
banks. Yet, remarkably, the Barclays group in 1980 still had more branches abroad than all American banks 
added together…Barclays has been one of the leading and truly multinational banks for longer than any rival 
bank. Barclays Bank DCO (Cominion, Colonial & Overseas) in 1945 was not only the largest British overseas 
bank, but also, as a stand-alone, the sixth-largets London-based bank (ranking just after the smallest of the ‗Big 
Five‘ domestic banks). » (Ackrill and Hannah, 2001: 268-269). 
692 Indeed, the only recorded mortgage strikes were in the thirties, while strikes against rent increases were 
recurrent and fiercer. This is another reason why the building societies movement was popular amongst 
conservatives.  
693 In 1937 Sir Enoch Hill estimated that since 1919, ten million people had been helped by the building societies 
to provide accommodation for themselves (The Building Societies Gazette, March 1939: 185). 
694 Building societies had emerged with massive surplus funds from WWII; they were eager to invest these funds 
in the expansion of home-ownership . Initially, however, the Labour government elected in 1945 held back this 
potential; it preferred to invest in public housing, for which subsidies to local authorities were increased. With the 
return to power of the Conservatives in 1951, however, the taxation and licensing conditions for an expansion in 
owner-occupation would soon become much more favourable.   
695 After WWII, the Labour government had encouraged local authorities to meet the mortgage needs of house 
purchasers, a tradition building society competence., this made the relations between the Building Societies 
Assocation and government less than cordial (Clearly, 1965: 243). 
696 Building Society Gazette, June 1939: 497. 
697 There were many within the parent Barclays bank, including Tuke, its chairman from 1951 to 1962, who 
viewed overseas ventures with scepticism and doubted if all could become profitable. Yet he did value DCO, and 
the Goodenough family, in particular, kept the imperial flame alive (Ackrill and Hannah, 2001: 270). 
698 As testified by the President of the Institute of Bankers: ―Never, I believe, has our country had to face a more 
critical situation than that which confronts us today. Not only our position as a great power is at stake, but also the 
living standards of our people, which depend upon our competitive capacity in a world increasingly 
industrialised. Intensive education of the people in the economic facts of life is urgently needed, and in these 
circumstances a new responsibility rests upon the banking profession‖ (Balfour, 1950: 117).  
699 See also Lloyds Bank Archives, Winton Files, Report of an interview with Lord Runciman, January 24 th, 1974 
(cited in Ross, 1989: 57). 
700 Unusually among the twentieth-century banking families, Barclays‘ president Seebohm had been actively 
brought up as a Quaker.More sympathetic to decolonisation (and to left-centre causes in Britain) than most 
bankers, he was a politically centrist inhabitant of the conservative world of banking,  a fitting leader for the 
overseas bank as it forged a more internationalist and less imperialist future in the 1960s. He oversaw the 
conversion of the DCO into Barclays Bank International, a wholly owned subsidiary of Barclays, in 1971, passing 
on the chairmanship of the new bank to another domestic family banker, A.F. Tuke, in 1972 » (Ackrill and 
Hannah, 2001: 270). 
701 Nevertheless, Barclays‘ post-war overseas expansion centred on the dominions of the white Commonwealth. 
(Ackrill and Hannah, 2001: 308-309). This focus, as well as its support for the South African Apartheid regime, 
would  leave it vulnerable for anti-racist democracy campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s. 
702 « Many of the more able young men who before the war would have come to us directly from school now find 
their way to the universities. The remainder, the report argues, are now below the average in ability and 
enterprise, which clearly implies that the banks, in depending on recruitment direct from the schools, are now left 
with only the mediocre or worse » (Balfour, 1950: 114). 
703 This tendency was reinforced by the bifurcation between activists and non-activists that had become noticeable 
in the Co-operative movement as early as the beginning of the twentieth century. Activists, i.e. those participating 
in the Co-operative Union‘s gatherings, were mostly ―old-style‖ Co-operators who had attached to the movement 
primarily for ideological reasons. By contrast, non-activist members, saw the ―Co-op essentially as a shop‖ and 
had ―no intention of joining in any Co-operative activity‖; they were heavily critised for their ―apathy‖ by the 
activists. One important reason for this bifurcation was that membership in the movement had become heavily 
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biased towards the urban industrial workers and the miners and only included one in four of the professional and 
business classes. The composition of the Co-operative Boards, on the other hand, was drawn in the main from the 
descendants of the old skilled artisan class (Ostergaard and Halsey, 1965: 84-85; 100-101).   
704 The necessary monopolizaztion of foreign exchange funds (overseas balances) by the Bank of England made 
the local Clearing banks more dependent upon the central bank as the only direct source of dunds, and tended also 
to multiply the business contacts that are so important in establishing the central banker‘s influence . The 
succession of government deficits during and after the war operated in the same direction. Government debt 
operations, on the technical side of which the central bankers are inevitably active, became both bigger and more 
frequent, and the increased weight of government paper in the portfolios of Clearing banks made the latter more 
sensitive to these operations. Here again, therefore, there was work for the central banker and the opportunity for 
gaining influence in the wider world of bankers. Rising national debts have thus tended to strengthen central 
banking throughout the Commonwealth as well as outside it» (Sayers, 1952: xv-xvi). 
705 Arguably, the Bank of England was not helpful in recognizing shifting competitive realities – whether regards 
the entry of US banks in the London Euromarkets providing cheap money to their headquarters and US 
multinationals – by preventing the merger between for instance Lloyds and Barclays in 1968 (cf. Jones, 1990). 
706 It has now become clear that accusations by part of the business community and « Marxist-Leftist » academics 
– a somewhat awkward alliance – that the financial establishment in the City of London was diverting funds away 
from industry to « unproductive » uses, uttered as early as the end of the nineteenth century in the academic 
literature were largely unfounded.  For instance Tolliday (1988) has argued that a more historicised, actor-
centered account of bank-industry relations in twentieth-century England would clearly reveal this. He thereby 
explicitly pointed to the path-dependent nature of the flawed nature of the relation between banks, industry, and 
govenrment. Banking and government were both more extensively involved in promoting and shaping industrial 
reorganisation in the interwar years than is often recognised. Although they were not always successful in 
achieving their aims, they were crucially important not only in steel but also in cotton textiles, shipping, electricty 
supply, coal, agriculture, aircraft, oil, armaments and railways…These interventions make up a vital part of the 
prehistory of developments such as nationalisation, the growth of the mixed economy, and the growing role of 
financial institutions in industry since WWII.  The failure of so many of these attempts highlights [that] Britain‘s 
traditional industries were declining because their markets were breaking down, but the institutions that might 
have had the potential to generate effective reorganisation of the economy had been formed by the same historical 
developments that had shaped the crisis in which they were intervening (Tolliday, 1987: 169).  
707 The 1930 Macmillan Committee…was created to consider the extent to which the financial institutions were 
responsible for the parlous state of industry in 1929…Surprisingly, however, the vice-president of the Federation 
of British Industries, James Lithgoz, commented on this investigation as follows:  « there is, to my mind, far too 
great a tendency both for labour and industry to seek to put the blame on some third party, the popular scapegoat 
at the moment being the bankers ». (James Lithgow to Walker, March 5 1930. FBI Finance and Industry 
Committee – Correspondence, Minutest and Related Papers – Modern Records centre (MRC) CBI Predecessors 
Archive MSS 200/F/3/E1/3/7). The Bankers Magazine, for its part, noted that « the present committee is a result 
of a prolonged attack upon the banking system by the Socialists » (Bankers Magazine, January 1930: 8),  
 arguing that « if bankers are to be criticised for their general attitude towards industry during the past ten difficult 
years, it has been rather that they have been too ready to stand by industry in the matter of banking facilities »  
(Bankers Magazine, February 1930: 165) . 
708 In the 1960s the Bank of England protected the banks from takeover by American banks, yet allowed them to 
proceed with their various merger schems at a leisurely pace. 
709 Building societies maintained that they did not receive a preferential tax treatment. For instance, they noted 
that :‖despite the [Building] Association‘s repeated claim that building societies as bodies which do not work for 
profit, should not be subject to profits tax, this burden, known in its earlier days as the National Defence 
Contribution, has been continuously imposed on societies by the Government since 1937 and, indeed, twice 
increased since the new basis was settled in 1958. (―Building Societies 1961-1962‖, Building Societies Year 
Book 1962: 26)]. 
710 At the beginning of the 1930s there was no tradition of commercial management, active publicity or keen 
competition within the movement. Each building society was an independent economic unit responsible for the 
conduct of its own affairs…According to Bellman (Bellman, 1928: 21): the societies had an ' individualistic 
approach to business...each society having regard only to what it may be pleased to call its own interest'. 
711 As soon as 1970, the largest five building societies accounted for more than 50% of all building society assets 
(BSA Bulletin, October 1987). 
712 Building societies‘ interest rates on deposits tended to lag behind increases in the general level of market 
interest rates, resulting in a loss of competitiveness and a reduction in inflows to shareholders‘ accounts. With a 
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fall in inflows, the building societies generally employed non-price rationing devices to limit mortgage supply. 
This caused excess demand for mortgages to run high (Pawley, 1993: 31).  
713 Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, Cmnd 827,1959, Vol XV11, par. 296. 
714 Building societies had interlinking relationships with landowners and builders/developers through common 
directors. They distributed largesse to local accountants, solicitors, bank managers and surveyors in the form of 
instructions and commissions on deposits received and clients introduced. It was almost impossible for an outside 
shareholder or depositor to have any say in the management of the society. 
715 An exception to this rule were the events leading to the Building Societies‘ Act of 1939.  The excesses of the 
building boom and the unease expressed in Parliament about the close relationship between the builders and the 
building societies had led to the passing of this Act (The Building Societies Act 1939, 2 and 3 Geo 6, Ch 55). The 
1939 Act would regulate matters and put into statute many of the provisions of the Building Societies' 
Association code of conduct which the societies themselves had been unable to enforce. It also made other 
changes to the manner in which the societies operated. For example, it became impossible for one solicitor to 
represent both sides. The common practice was that the building society's solicitor would be used by the society 
and the buyer and often the seller too, enabling the speedy processing of the building society application forms 
and the issue of a Land Registry certificate. More importantly the 1939 Act made it very difficult for the societies 
to accept collateral security, and therefore the builders' 'pool' method of arranging addition security for the 
purchaser was ended.  
716 Established in 1936, this Council was not solely a builders‘ organisation; building societies, architects and 
others were represented on the governing body. 
717 However, as a practical outcome, the surplus put to reserve was taxed at profits, but the divid remained free of 
tax. Therefore the crucial component of teh co-ops' operations or the working class consumer - the element of 
forced saivng - remained intact" 
718 The Stock Exchange, for instance, decided in 1937 to set up a voluntary fund to help make good future losses 
sustained by the public at the hands of defaulters. 
719 As such, the Bank was now authorised to carry out all types of foreign exchange business. This, however, 
would remain a largely symbolic gesture, that would not bear fruit before the 1970s and 1980s, when the Co-
operative Bank would issue its own Travellers‘ Cheques with a world-wide cover (Fairlamb and Ireland, 1981: 
202). 
720 ―Co-operation Spring Cleaned‖, The Times; cited in ―From Market Research Department. Press Comment on 
―Independent Commission‘s Report‖, Market Research Department WE/DB/00055/2, Co-operative Union, 18th 
May, 1958.  
721 A reporter of the Manchester Guardian wrote: ―The Co-operative movement has been slipping behind the 
times…Too many co-op shops wear an appearance of drab mediocrity‖( ―Reform for Co-ops‖, Manchester 
Guardian; cited in ―From Market Research Department. Press Comment on ―Independent Commission‘s Report‖, 
Market Research Department WE/DB/00055/2, Co-operative Union, 18th May, 1958).  
And according to the News Chronicle: ―the Co-operative movement…needs livening up and modernising…In 
some areas the Co-ops have lost trade by charging too much in order to maintain or increase the dividend…‘They 
sell at market prices and treat the dividend as a residual‘‖ (―Co-op needs livening up, says report‖, News 
Chronicle; cited in ―From Market Research Department. Press Comment on ―Independent Commission‘s Report‖, 
Market Research Department WE/DB/00055/2, Co-operative Union, 18th May, 1958). 
722 For a more comprehensive description of the CWS‘ bad press and how its model of democratic management 
failed, see Appendix A, section 11..  
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10   DUTCH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1966-2007) 
 
10.1    Changing geopolitical opportunity structure (phase 1) 
 
 In chapter 8 we saw how, in spite of the continued fragmentation of Dutch 
economic, civic and political life, the interpretive flexibility of ―low-cost 
consociationalism‖ allowed all rivalling pillars to rally around a common national 
framework. As early as 1962, the framework was starting to break down. The contradiction 
between the imperative of wage moderation and the immensely increased competitive 
powers of Dutch employers were simply becoming too stark. After the ravages of the two 
world wars, there was talk of a West European Golden Age. Would the Netherlands, 
prominent supporter of the EEC, live up to its ―embarrassment of riches‖ myth again, as in 
the seventeenth century? The summer of 1962 saw the start of a long period of large wage 
hikes and labour unrest which would only come to an end in the early eighties (Van 
Empel, 1997: 13-14).  Employers were increasingly unable to withstand wage pressures; 
the overheated economy had led to labour shortages, prompting employers to engage in a 
scramble to woo labour away from each other. Employers even started using ―black 
wages‖ — under-the-table payments above and beyond official wage guidelines – to attract 
employees. As a result, real-wage increases an average of about 
8 per cent a year in the 1960s. Publicly, bickering continued; privately the consociational 
elites could not entirely renounce on the old settlement, although the practical will to 
respect it had all but vanished.  
a) Natural gas and the “embarrassment of riches” thesis 
 Further contributing to a loss of urgency to the renewal of the old settlement 
was the discovery of natural gas in 1959, and its exploitation in the 1960s by a public-
private partnership - in which the Dutch government held a majoritarian 50 percent share 
block.  The otherwise fortuitous discovery of natural gas proved a severely mixed blessing 
(Hemerijck, Unger and Visser, 2000: 213), for several unintentional reasons. The 
appreciation of the currency that followed the gas export boom reduced the profitability of 
manufacturing and service exports to an extent that total exports decreased markedly 
relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the 1960s. The problem of the crowding 
out of previously competitive export products and services by natural gas proved relatively 
short-lived. From the late 1960s onwards, exports of goods and services increased from 
less than 40 per cent of GDP to nearly 60 per cent, a high ratio by international standards 
(Gylfason, 2001). Less shortlived was the effect of an appreciating currency on fiscal 
reflation and wage cost growth, which left the Dutch economy in a fragile geopolitcal 
position. Thus, the 1970s oil crises hit the Netherlands particularly hard; gradually laying 
bare just how much the fundamentals of Dutch post-WWII success had become disrupted. 
Nevertheless, as with every problem of strategic drift, it only became clear to a majority 
with a considerable time lag. Growth rates in the Netherlands remained well above the 
OECD average up to 1975.  This in turn fed back into the social-democrats‘ rather 
overbearing attitude during their spell in government with the two other ―New Left‖ 
parties (1973-7).  
 As in a replay of the ―embarassment of riches‖ thesis – the inability of the 
Dutch Republic to combine newfound wealth and the discipline of its low-cost roots – 
natural gas exports provided the government with a dysfunctional ability to spend. 
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Abundant social programmes were launched to compensate for the lack of a tripartite 
middle ground. Unfortunately, this development added to the wage and inflationary 
pressures created by the breakdown in consocational bargaining; as well as fuelling 
unemployment and inactivity levels. And the Dutch currency kept appreciating. All these 
dynamics together had a dramatic downward effect on the competitiveness of the Dutch 
economy (Nickell and van Ours, 1999). From 1975 onwards, GDP/capita growth, as well 
as the level of employment and the balance of payments declined at rates well below the 
Netherlands‘ Western European competitors, and in line with the declining economies of 
Great Britain and Spain (Cox, 1982: 21). 
 By early 1982, government expenditures stood at a staggering 55 per cent of 
GDP. Unfortunately, the bulk of these increased government expenditures only fed back 
into the further break down of the post-WWII settlement. By the mid-1980s, social-
security payments alone had reached 20 per cent of GDP. At the same time, for every five 
people employed, four people were collecting some form of benefit.  In a new variety of 
the embarrassment of riches theme – the decline of the Dutch Republic from the first 
modern economy into a passive rentier economy, the Netherlands came to experience a 
―crisis of inactivity‖ in the 1980s (Hubers and Stephens 2001: 279). More than ever, the 
Dutch felt the geopolitical weight of being part of a small, open economy; and more than 
ever they sought to resolve their problems through greater integration in the European 
Community.  
b)  A new phase of Europeanisation 
   As early as the mid-1960s, the six EEC members had created plans for greater 
economic and monetary union. These plans have to be seen on the background of major 
achievements by the EEC in the 1960s: the early completion of the transition period 
leading to a full customs union, the establishment of the common agricultural policy and 
the creation of a system of EEC-specific resources. The fact that this was still a time of 
great prosperity in Western Europe speaks to the strategic character of the plans, contrary 
to the UK government‘s crisis-ridden approach to Community membership and monetary 
union.  Obviously, the UK government held a trump card the others did not possess: the  
attractiveness of the City of London as an alternative path to international relevance.  EEC 
members such as the Netherlands were under no illusion that their own city-states would 
be able to become primary centres of international finance. By default of a homegrown 
alternative, they sought to build a common geopolitical platform to tackle impending 
changes – the Bretton Woods system, in particular its main patron the US, exhibited severe 
signs of fatigue.  In 1969, the six EEC heads of government agreed to the creation, in 
stages, of an economic and monetary union within the Community.
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 Economically, there 
seemed to be sufficient commonality of purpose between the EEC members as to monetary 
union: deepen the internal market so as to contribute to higher economic growth. 
Politically, differences reigned supreme.   
These differences were in danger of creating irreparable havoc for the European 
Community in the early 1980s, when the slow demise of the Iron Curtain ushered in a 
more problematic, contested phase of Europeanisation. Well before the official Cold War 
détente and the coming to prominence of Gorbachev‘s glasnost and perestroika, the 
reference point in security debates had started to change. Up to the early 1980s, 
discussions of security had taken place in an East-West framework, pre-empting any overt 
contestation of the meaning of Europe – contestation of the meaning of Europe effectively 
had been relegated to a secondary concern during the Cold War. With the threat of a 
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nuclear war receding, the more symbolic war over the meaning of Europe could start anew. 
For the French, Germans, Russians and North Americans, the codeword Europe signified 
different geopolitical characteristics, boundaries and values (Jahn et al. 1987; Waever, 
1989, 1990). The contrast between French and German approaches of course was of 
special importance within the EC. In short, while the French are more interested in the 
outer geopolitical influence of Europe, Germany is keener on the growth of German 
influence within Europe. In other words, for the German establishment, the big issue on 
Europe is whether relationships in the region can be changed so that their country could 
unfold as a nation, civilisation and economy with less hindrance from the East-West 
division or other political borders. For the French establishment, by contrast, Europe is 
about France using regional political structures to regain its civilisation mission and 
economic leadership in the world (cfr. Schubert, 1988).  Somewhat reducing complexity, 
the Russians were not able to push their concept of Europe as an ―Open House‖ faced with 
the strategic priority of providing stability to the foundering Soviet empire. But further 
complicating the issue of ―what Europeanisation‖, American interventionism in the project 
was becoming more forceful, although more constructive to for instance the issue of 
German reunification than the British with their ―balance of power‖ approach.  
c)    A new phase of Americanisation  
   Yet, there was more to new-style US interventionism. Before the early 1980s, 
before it had become clear the Cold War had effectively if not formally been won, the US 
government had remained aloof about its geopolitical agenda of ―liberalisation‖ and 
―regulatory capitalism‖. It did not want to risk destabilise its European, Arab, Asian or 
African allies. By the mid-1980s, fears of instability caused by a zealous US foreign policy 
were disappearing fast. More confidently than in the first post-WWII decades, foreign 
policy would become the shield of US traditions of democratisation. Starting with the new 
conservative movement in the late 1970s and Reagan‘s coming into power in the 1980s, 
establishing the US‘ ―Empire of Liberty‖ destiny became a conscious policy choice. This 
transition was similar, but altogether less contested than the Victorian establishment‘s turn 
from a logic of ―empire acquired through fit-of-absentmindedness‖ to one of a conscious 
choice to civilise other people. During the 1980s and 1990s, the US government 
relentlessly pushed for more externally imposed ―liberal‖ democratic prescription and 
attempts to replace States by a-political regulatory bodies (Schmitz, 1995).  This ―end of 
history‖ doctrine of liberal capitalism – which in effect meant regulatory capitalism (Cook 
et al., 2004; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004; Majone, 1994, 1997; Manzetti, 2000) – became 
known as the Washington consensus.
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  It was given shape among others through the 
system of sound finance propagated by the IMF and World Bank – two such purportedly 
―a-political‖ regulatory bodies.   
 In terms of a specific tradition of democratisation, US regulatory capitalism 
most clearly embodied the ―Council of Wise‖ tradition. This US tradition has its origins in 
the constitutional founding fathers‘ distrust of the ―inflationary‖ instincts of the masses and 
their belief that popular participation in government had increased to such an extent as to 
be incompatible with free government (Dietz and Hamilton, 1960: 131). In order to 
provide the disciplined propertied classes with constitutional safeguards against the 
irrationality of the masses, the founding fathers ensured a central place in the democratic 
system for institutions governed by a ―council of wise men‖ – in their own image. A 
council in which American leaders of the revolution ―grouped themselves with Theseus 
and Moses, Lycurgus and Romulus as founders of a ‗new order of the ages‘‖ (Pocock, 
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1988: 56). The most notable US examples of this ―Council of Wise‖ traditions are the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve – which was explicitly modelled on the Supreme 
Court. These institutions historically have been perceived by US citizens as ―essential to 
the preservation of their liberties‖ (Burns, 1979: 381-382) and the fight against corruption.   
How would the Dutch tackle all the above problems, and adapt to a more 
confident US imperialism as well as a more contested phase of Europeanisation? 
 
10.2 First strategic interactions (phase 2) 
 
 i) The emergence of a national consciousness  
Apart from geopolitical and economic inflationary reasons, low-cost 
consociational system broke down due to an altogether different type of inflation: an 
inflation of Catholic and social-democrat expectations. During the heydays of 
consociationalism, roughly the 1920s to 1960s, elites had legitimised the hierarchical 
nature of the system by referring to the need of community and how each individual 
should act from a sense of duty (Te Velde, 1993 : 275). By the 1960s, most people had 
been inculcated with this sense of duty, allowing them to move on to the next level: 
individualisation and the quest for new rights. As such, one could well brand 
consociationalism a platform for the emergence of traditions of contestability and mobility 
in the habits of the majority, preparing more and more individuals for a less duty-bound 
application of their electoral choices. In sum, consociationalism, rather unintentionally, 
functioned as the stepping stone to a vigorous system of parliamentary democracy. 
Arguably, the discovery of natural gas sped up the entire process. After all, 
democratisation also entails the trading of property for political rights; the newfound gas 
riches allowed the government to subsidise this trade-off. Eager to re-open their case for a 
―breakthrough‖ of societal divisions, the social-democrats in particular were in favour of 
that last point. 
Some may have anticipated that consociationalism would produce a level-playing 
field for a more sophisticated democratic rivalry. What few had anticipated is that this 
level-playing field would be used to revive the social-democratic dream of a breakthrough. 
What even fewer had anticipated is that this social-democratic breakthrough for the first 
time in Dutch history would produce a national consciousness; an Orangism which was 
based more on allegiance to a unitary nation-state than on local allegiances and privileges; 
and this, without relying on the threat of foreign invasion or war. Finally, what none could 
have predicted is that Catholics, long sufferers of a minority complex in this nation with 
protestant overtones, would be the ones to open up the Pandora box of national 
consciousness – by virtue of greater individualisation and dissent in their own ranks than in 
the Protestant pillar. Nevertheless, the Orangism that finally emerged would be neither 
overtly Protestant nor Catholic in nature. Instead it would take on the ―secular Christian‖ 
character anticipated by 1930s social-democrats, not because the latter actively pushed for 
it, but because it fitted so opportunely in an emerging European tradition of ―secular 
Christianism‖.    
ii) Catholics  
By the 1960s, the old antagonisms between catholics and protestants, confessional 
groups and social-democrats were on the wane. Especially the former antagonism was fast 
becoming an issue for a minority of die-hards only (Duffhues and Felling, 1984). The 
demise of the old antagonisms spurred the left-wing of the Catholic Party and the fewer 
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radicalised representatives of the Reformed Protestant parties on to push for closer contacts 
with the social-democrats – who had been out of government since 1959. This ―New Left‖ 
alliance had the support of both the Catholic and social-democratic trade unions, but not 
their Protestant counterpart. When social-democrats were invited back in power in 1965, 
the New Left alliance piled pressure on the Catholic minister Schmelzer to introduce more 
ambitious government subsidies and public services. Schmelzer‘s inability to deal with this 
new type of pressure precipitated a radical turn in Dutch Catholic, and indeed, Dutch 
parliamentary history. Historically, the Catholic Party had always tried to avoid disruptive 
political actions.  The ―Night of Schmelzer‖ (1966), which led to the fall of the Cabinet-
Cals, broke that tradition most forcefully. Never before had the Catholic Party been seen to 
be responsible for the collapse of a government under the leadership of one of their own 
party members.  This unprecedented sign of division at the top of the Catholic hierarchy 
was merely a reflection of the emergence of an altogether more serious grassroots division: 
a division between capital and labour. Growing discontent about the proposed scale of 
deficit financing amongst Catholic employers, small businessmen, and farmers (Bakvis, 
1981: 138) induced Schmelzer to take sides against the left-wing of the party.  
The Night of Schmelzer effectively ushered in the breakdown of the 
consociational system. Its destabilising effects rapidly became clear in electoral terms. 
While the Catholic party (KVP) in 1963 could count on 84 per cent of the Catholic vote, in 
1967 its share had dropped to 63 per cent. By 1972 it was down to a staggering 38 per cent 
(Bakvis, 1981: 133).  
Prior to the Night of Schmelzer, the Catholic party had  been the forum in which 
the major socio-economic interests – employers, workers, SMEs and farmers – could 
resolve their differences. This was no longer the case from 1967 onwards. While there was 
no open rupture between the Catholic Party (KVP) and Labour Union (NKV), relations 
became distinctly cooler after the 1966 cabinet crisis. While the NKV and Protestant trade 
union were moving in the direction of a merger or federation with the socialist NVV – 
patronised by the PVDA, the KVP was moving in the direction of a merger with the 
protestant parties ARP and CHU – parties by and large positioned right of centre. This tug-
of-war enabled the social-democratic PVDA to attract parliamentary candidates from 
NKV-affiliated associations, while the KVP found it increasingly difficult to attract 
representatives from the NKV. In 1968, the disciplinary link between party (KVP) and 
trade union (NKV) had become so loose, that the Catholic Union leader P.J.J. Mertens 
could openly argue that an elite of 200 people, a Regent club concentrated in the Hague, 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam, monopolised power in the Netherlands (Helmers et al, 1975). 
In 1970, the relation between KVP and NKV further deteriorated, when the latter, in 
conjunction with Protestant Labour temporarily withdraw from the Social-Economic 
Council, in protest against a wage act that attempted to restore wage moderation. By 1976, 
communication between Catholic Labour and Catholic Party had become extremely poor.  
To the point that some KVP leaders openly claimed that it ―was no longer possible to talk 
rationally with many of the NKV leaders‖ (cited in Bakvis, 1981: 141). Finally, at the end 
of the 1970s, the catholic and social-democratic unions merged in the FNV (Federatie 
Nederlandse Vakbeweging), the largest trade union federation in the Netherlands – 
representing some 1.2  million employees members compared to the 360,000 of the 
Protestant trade union (CNV) and the Federation of White-Collar Staff (MHP) with 
160,000.
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iii) Social-democrats 
Out of government since 1959, social-democrats had quietly re-adopted their 
assumption that Dutch society was gradually moving into a socialist direction.  A renewed 
faith in historical determinism spurred social-democrats to abandon their prior, explicit 
focus on socialisation in favour of the less glamorous, but more strategic emphasis on the 
conquest of political power. The new goal was to speed up State intervention and the 
realisation of a socialist Netherlands (Lier, 1982). When social-democrats returned to the 
coalition in 1965, they relentlessly pushed for even more generous welfare provisions, 
seeking closer relations with the Catholic Labour Union (NKV) in the process. Whether 
they intended to or not, social-democrats‘ closeness to the NKV shattered the cohesion of 
the Catholic Party, triggering the fateful ―Night of Schmelzer‖ (1966).   
Social-democrats and some Catholics started calling for the end of the 
―undemocratic‖ system of pillars and the start of a new era of pluralism and direct 
―democratic‖ justification (Dudink, 1997: 276)726. Their calls could not have come at a 
more propitious time. Buttressed by unprecedented levels of economic growth, successive 
governments allowed for a multiplication of welfare state provisions – including state-
directed schemes of income maintenance and a wide array of administrative provisions for 
the management of social conflict. All these provisions were fast making individual 
households less dependent on churches, unions, extended family and other consociational 
facilities, contributing to the erosion of the system.
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  The Netherlands was moving to an 
era of ―post-material‖ and ―post-religious‖ politics in an accelerated tempo.  Feeling that it 
could not keep abreast with dynamics of secularisation (see Appendix C), even the Dutch 
Catholic Church started changing its attitude towards social, economic and political 
questions (Windmuller, 1969: 126-127)
728
, providing a degree of legitimacy to calls for 
more choice between rights, and less obedience to pre-ordained duties.   
The breakdown of the consociational system spawned new political parties, most 
notably D‘66 – the ―New Liberals‖ – and PPR – the self-proclaimed ―New Left‖. These 
parties sought to share the spoils of the social-democratic dream of a national 
breakthrough.  The Dutch electoral system of proportional representation provided a very 
low electoral threshold for new political movements seeking parliamentary representation, 
allowing the latter two parties to enter the Second Chamber with no further ado. With a 
fresher agenda than their social-democratic counterparts, the D‘66 and PPR reflected on 
issues befitting an age of post-material politics. In alliance with these two fringe parties, 
the social-democratic PvdA introduced several new terms in mainstream political parlance. 
A new altogether more secular trinity of terms was launched.  The new secular religion 
was to be full of secular participation, politicisation and polarisation (Daalder, 1990: 241-
242). ―Participation‖ meant ―speaking up against authority‖, whether based on function, 
competence or tradition.  The term ―politicisation‖, for its part, was used in two different 
senses, which surprisingly were both positive. It was meant as a rallying cry, to denote that 
everything was potentially political, and that individual expression should not be held back 
by existing legal, customary, moral, organisational, family, or denominational boundaries. 
But the term ―politicisation‖ also alluded to the purported collective desire to break with 
consociational practices of passive democratisation. Indeed, according to some 
consociationalism had reached the ―furthest borders of what is admissible in a non-
authoritarian state‖.729  To do away with bad consociational habits – keeping a lid on 
conflicts and avoiding real choices in the process – social-liberals proposed a strategy of 
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―polarisation‖.  The cosy consociational club of politicians and businessmen had to be 
disciplined, and confronted with the need for bold and clear political alternatives.  
By the early 1970s, few people in authority contested the argument that the old 
consociational elites had definitively lost the God-given right to define political issues and 
communal boundaries.  Secularisation, and the emergence of new political parties in a 
more polarised democratic system, ensured this (Gladdish, 1991: 50).
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  The summit of 
the era of 3P‘s – participation, politicisation, and polarisation – came with the social-
democratic cabinet Den Uyl (1973-1977) and its motto: the ―equal distribution of 
knowledge, income and power‖.  With Den Uyl, the shift from esoteric to exoteric politics 
was completed – redefining the role of Prime Minister and party leaders in the process. 
Before 1971, Dutch Prime Ministers were not the party leaders, served a maximum of one 
term and were regarded as rather disposable by their party. Starting in 1971, election 
campaigns were held much more from a prime-ministerial vantage point. The subsequent 
Prime Ministers Den Uyl (social-democratic PvdA), van Agt (confessional CDA) and 
Lubbers (CDA) were true primi inter pares in their party; and they all served two terms. 
Also, parliament increasingly became a ―workshop for professionals‖ able to withstand 
public scrutiny (Fennema and Schijf, 1984: 16).
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In 1977, the Dutch social-democratic party (PvdA) substituted the principle of 
voluntarism for its old doctrines of ―historical determinism‖ and ―institutional 
socialism‖732.  Based on a new individualism, the 1977 program led the social-democrats 
to make abstraction of the particularities of Dutch history, in favour of a vision of a new 
society in which each individual would have equal opportunities. Post-materialist values 
dominated the 1977 agenda to the detriment of the old class strife: the Third World, the 
environment, the position of women, and democratisation (Tromp, 2002: 363-364). 
iv) Merger into one Christian-Democratic Party 
As early as the late 19
th
 century, Protestant leaders such as Kuyper realised that 
turning the Netherlands into a truly Christian nation and the Dutch State in an instrument 
of God-given justice was an impossible dream. Thus, Protestants settled for the principle 
of ―sovereignty in the own circle‖, and a negative view of State intervention. Catholics did 
share Protestants‘ predilection for the principle of ―sovereignty in the own circle‖; yet 
Vaticanum II had emboldened them to push for a stronger State also.
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 This dual 
perspective gave Dutch Catholics an edge over Protestants from the late 1930s onwards, 
allowing them to champion the mixed principle of subsidiarity after WWII. Because this 
principle fit so well in the emerging confederation of the EEC, it enabled Catholics to 
consolidate the constituent Dutch traditions of subsidiarity – pacification, living-together-
apart and proportionality – at the ―European State‖ level. This provided the Dutch with a 
geopolitical buffer against US attempts to ―liberalise‖ European markets with their own 
anti-cartel and big business principles. In sum, Dutch Catholic leaders eclipsed Protestant 
leaders when it came to the traditions of pacification, living-together-apart and 
proportionality. Even regarding the tradition of Orangist democracy the Catholics were 
gaining the upper hand. Their principle of personalism provided an effective buffer 
between the contradictory demands of individualisation and loyalty to the own pillar.  
―City monetarism‖ was the only tradition Protestants managed to shield from Catholic 
encroachment. Presidents of the Dutch Bank were all Protestants. Interestingly, it is also in 
this domain that one could find the most innovative, unorthodox Protestants such as Jelle 
Zijlstra. Zijlstra was the one who first urged a return to principles of ―sound finance‖ when 
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he became interim Minister President in 1966, and President of the Dutch Bank from 1967 
to 1982.  
Yet, were differences between Protestant and Catholic convictions still relevant in 
a country that was secularising at an alarming pace? Where in 1956 less than 25 % of the 
Dutch population was not confessionally affiliated, in 1980 this figure had dramatically 
risen to 50 percent and in 1995 even to about 60 percent.
734
   This element, and several 
others made a merger between the Protestant and Catholic parties only a matter of time.  
One other element was that in face of the de facto institutionalisation of an important role 
for the Dutch State, Protestants meanwhile had softened their views on State-led 
distributive justice (Klink, 1990: 337).  Also, the alienation of the Catholic trade union 
from the Catholic Party in effect meant that grassroots left-wing pressures in the latter had 
all but vanished; making a common centre-right programme with Protestants a distinct 
possibility.
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In a replay of the end of the nineteenth century confessional front, Catholics and 
Protestants joined forces against both liberal and socialist excesses.  In their new capacity 
of Christian-democrats, they blamed socialists for the ―inflation‖ of the welfare state and 
its corollary of dependence. This was a rather obvious reaction against the rising levels of 
government expenditures during the reign of the social-democratic Den Uyl.
736
 More 
farsighted were Christian-Democrats‘ attacks against liberalism – in a period in which 
Dutch liberals arguably were still very weak. In a nutshell, Christian-democrats blamed 
both domestic and foreign liberals for the advent of individualism and consumerism, and 
the disintegration of ―group discipline‖ and a ―restrained lifestyle‖ – core ingredients of 
the post-WWII Golden Age. Christian democrats corroborated the argument first made by 
Lord Kahn, that the international wage explosion could be traced back to the Netherlands 
with the entry in 1959 of the Liberal party into the coalition government. This facilitated a 
breakdown in Dutch statutory prices and income policies, which had operatd so 
successfully since the end of WWII.
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  Generally speaking, the increase of wage-rates 
into double figures, together with the import of US dollar inflation, led to a general ―free 
riding‖ mentality in the Netherlands (Bosman et al., 1976: 34).  
To restate their position in the political field, the three main confessional parties, 
the Catholic KVP and the Protestant CHU and ARP, merged in one confessional party, the 
Christian-Demoratic CDA.  In order to formulate a viable alternative to either a socialist or 
liberal national identity, Christian-Democrats stopped whining about ―de-pillarisation‖ and 
secularisation, and started emphasising the virtues of ―self-reliance, speaking up for 
oneself and privacy‖. Essentially, they reinvented Catholics‘ ―personalism‖ principle in a 
more modern guise.  Also, and surprisingly given their historical distrust of the democratic 
capacities of the masses, Christian-Democrats were keen to reinforce the controlling 
function of parliament and re-establishing the ―democratic quality‖ of intermediary public-
private vehicles such as housing associations, as a precondition for a ―responsible 
society‖.738 ―Solidarity‖, ―public justice‖, ―sustainability‖, and ―decentralised 
responsibility‖ were the biblical principles that Christian-Democrats launched during the 
1980s and 1990s. Christian-democrats conceptualisation of the State had become very 
republican: the State should be the main vehicle of public justice, setting the conditions 
that will allow people and their organisations to take their responsibility according to 
norms of sustainability and solidarity (Klink, 1990: 336-337). 
 
 
284 
 
 
v) Survival of consociational traditions without the formal consociational  
        system 
     All in all, social-democratic polarisation, and the adversarial atmosphere 
between State, employers and trade unions, was in large part an opportunity for public 
fronting (cf. Hendriks, 2004) . Old consocational contacts at the top were never completely 
severed, even when industrial conflicts almost turned into war in 1977.  Representatives of 
capital, labour and government still met each other within a small circle of elites behind 
closed doors. With the evident complicity of the press, meetings were kept secret and 
outcomes confidential; especially the social-democratic would not understand the 
continuation of this ―consociational club‖ atmosphere (Van Bottenburg, 1995: 183-185).   
In sum, all in all the episode of polarisation, politicisation and participation during 
the 1970s was a ―temporary aberration‖, brought about revived hopes, particularly within 
the Labour Party, but also the Liberal Party, of capturing a majority of voters and changing 
the Netherlands‘ national identity for good. When the dust settled on these ―end of history‖ 
pretensions, the Social Democrats were quick to abandon their majoritarian strategy in 
favour of more traditional, quasi-consociational practices. Social-democrats came to the 
conclusion which Christian-Democrats had accepted much earlier: the Netherlands is a 
country of minorities which entertain no hope of becoming majorities (Andeweg and 
Irwin, 2002: 42). 
In a sign of things to come, already after 1971, and certainly from 1977 onwards, 
the core electorate of the three traditional parties – social-democratic, catholic and 
protestant – had stabilised (Thomassen and Van Deth, 1989: 63).739  This stabilisation 
occurred for economic reasons – the rapidly deteriorating performance of the Dutch 
economy; but also due to an underlying shift in the nature of electoral politics. Politics 
increasingly was a matter of high-profile competition between candidates to the position of 
Prime Minister. The fringe parties could not aspire to such a position, particularly after 
tying their fate to the larger PvdA in the early 1970s. In the second half of the 1970s, D‘66 
and PPR became increasingly marginalised in the battle between Joop den Uyl – leader of 
the social-democrats (PvdA) – and Dries van Agt – leader of the newly formed Christian-
Democratic Party (CDA). 
Before the 1980s, social-democrats had promoted a vision of the State as a body 
dedicated to limiting the excesses of capitalism and individualisation; an institution whose 
mission was to, on the one hand, subordinate profits to societal needs, and, on the other 
hand, subordinate individualism to community. In the 1980s, however, the social-
democratic party (PvdA) repositioned itself, so as to take more into account ―structural 
international developments‖  beyond domestic or even European influence. Given the 
international nature of market interdependencies, Party leaders argued, it was no longer 
desirable nor possible to depreciate ―the market economy‖ and the liberal motto of ―market 
discipline‖. From now on, what counted most – even more than capital-labour antagonism 
–  was success in surviving international competition. This represented a volte face from 
earlier positions. Dutch social-democrats now effectively considered free enterprise and 
market discipline as sounder allocation mechanisms of economic growth than an 
intervenionist State. The State from now on should intervene in a more selective way, and 
prioritise the self-organising capacities of citizens, local governments and organisations. 
As such, market democratisation would be turned into a more ―social‖ force, i.e. a force 
accessible to the population at large rather than to a self-selecting elite. Furthermore, a 
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thorough ―sanitation‖ of State bureaucracy in conjunction with an ambitious 
decentralisation of intiative were in order (cf. Kok, 1988 : 40-43; 92-93).  
Why did the social-democrat leadership feel compelled to make such a 
humiliating volte face? In spite of  relatively successful electoral outcomes, the PvdA 
failed to continue in government in 1977, due to the alliance between the newly found 
Christian Democratic party (CDA) and the Liberal party (VVD).  Shorn of its left wing, 
the CDA was prepared to countenance a less collectivist approach to socio-economic 
issues (Gladdish, 1991 : 66). Since the confessionals historically provided the switchpoints 
of popular opinion in the Netherlands, this put the social-democratic line of reasoning in a 
vulnerable position. Especially since the the Liberal Party (VVD) leadership had 
radicalised its policies considerably during the 1970s. Leaders such as Bolkestein (1978) 
riled against Den Uyl‘s ―state-absolutism‖ which posed an immediate threat to not just 
basic civic freedoms, employment and business profits but the entire democratic system. 
Clearly, the Liberal Party (VVD) had finally thrown off ―the shackles‖ of corporatist 
―political correctness‖, and yet again was willing to embrace the ―liberal tradition‖ – 
interpreted as a ―secular right‖ political position in the Netherlands.  
While social-democrats succeeded in regaining power in 1981, they may well 
have wished they did not. In comparative perspective, the 1981-1983 recession hit the 
Netherlands particularly severely. Many economic sectors suffered from overcapacity, 
firms ran into debts, and one of every 25 firms in manufacturing went bankrupt (Visser and 
Hemerijck, 1997: 13).
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 Faced with such overwhelming evidence, the majority of the 
electorate did not believe in State communitarianism anymore. Electoral shifts towards the 
Christian and liberal parties, as well as a decline of union power made this abundantly clear 
(Van Zweden, 1986; Albeda, 1986). Within the social-democratic party, prominent leaders 
distanced themselves from the polarisation strategy that had failed to materialise in 
government participation in 1977 (Daalder, 1990: 248). The coalitional nature of the Dutch 
political system eventually compelled the PvdA to become more of a centre-left than left 
party, if it were to have a decent chance to be invited in a government coalition again with 
the pivotal CDA. During the 1989 electoral campaign, Wim Kok, party leader of the PvdA 
and ex-president of the Federation of Trade Unions, told the electorate that his party had said 
goodbye to its historical ―socialist‖ pretensions. Kok argued that the appeal of the ―liberal 
tradition‖ had become so obvious that there was no realistic alternative anymore but to strive 
for a pragmatic coalition with the more right-wing parties. In 1995, Kok officially proceeded 
to casting off ―the ideological feathers of the past‖.  
Fortunately for social-democrat politicians and union leaders, they had helped keep 
consociational traditions alive during their heydays in the 1970s – although privately and 
rather secretly.  This explains why social-democrats already in the 1980s were accepted back 
in government by liberals and Christian-Democrats, be it as junior partners in a first phase. 
Also, employers and the government accepted to keep the unions as a bargaining partner. But 
now that the Labour Foundation and Social-Economic Council had lost much authority, what 
―a-political‖ authority would help mediate new rounds of bargaining and reinvent the 
consociational success formula?   
 vi) Revival of the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) 
    The experts of the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) would take up that role 
(Becker 2001a: 477). The CPB had been established alongside the Labour Foundation and 
Social-Economic Council in the early post-WWII years to embody the most important rule 
of the consociational game: de-politicisation. Of these three institutions of 
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labour/business/government collaboration, the CPB arguably exemplified most the ability 
to make policy on the basis of a-political scientific measures. While this ability was 
enshrined much more in US traditions of democratisation than in any Western European 
tradition (Ezrahi, 1990), it was pragmatically adopted by Dutchmen to institute a much 
needed common ground in their politically and religiously segmented country. Dutch 
consociational leaders used the CPB, Labour Foundation and Social-Economic Council to 
avert the worst dangers of mass parliamentary democracy, and continue old traditions of 
elitism and soft authoritarianism (Lijphart 1968: 135, 147-156).  
Formally part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the independence of CPB 
advice is guaranteed by protocol (Hendriks, 2005).
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 By the late 1980s, the authority of 
the CPB in the Netherlands had taken mythical proportions. Apparently, whenever the 
CPB publishes economic figures, politicians, capital and labour representatives, as well as 
the media and private advisory agencies held their breath (Klamerm 1990: 17). Product of 
social-democratic imagination, the CPB‘s position had not always been undisputed during 
the Cold War era. Yet, while the period of polarisation, participation and politicisation 
caused the Labour Foundation and Social Economic Council to suffer a secular decline of 
authority from which they would never really recover, the CPB proved a more resilient 
vehicle. Maybe because it had remained more low-profile, its authority was less 
undermined in the same period, allowing it to reinvent itself as the main vehicle of de-
politicisation in the 1980s.  By the 1990s, the CPB had become the eminent ―expert autho-
rity‖ in the Netherlands  (Van den Boogaard, 2000: 295-300). Compared to other Western 
European countries, the CPB enjoyed incomparable authority, which again exceptionally, 
it did not have to share with other scientific advisory bodies in the socio-economic field. 
 vii) Dutch Bank 
Dutch monetary policy after WWII had tended to be passive. In times of inflation, 
monetary growth generally accommodated increased government expenditures and rising 
wage demands. All the same, in times of economic depression, the Dutch bank – with its 
Keneysian policy of ―neutrality‖742 – did not attempt to spur economic activity through 
monetary expansion. After suffering a particularly rough patch in the 1970s and early 
1980s – prompting macro-economic labels of a ―Dutch disease‖ – goodwill for a 
European-wide monetary policy soared. In particular given the resonance of the Christian-
Democratic argument that Dutch inflation had ―largely been imported, especially through 
European commercial and central banks putting in domestic circulation a large amount of 
overvalued US dollars from 1951 to 1973‖ (Bosman et al., 1976: 11, 13-17, 34). When 
former Minister of Finance Wim Duisenberg became President of the Dutch Bank in 1982, 
he linked the Dutch guilder to the German Deutsche Mark. As this move engendered 
positive effects early on – owing to the strength of the German currency – Duisenberg 
became even more zealous in his bandwagon behaviour.  Most notably, he decided to 
closely follow the Bundesbank's interest rate policies, earning him the nickname ―Mr 
Fifteen Minutes‖. Ultimately, this copy-cat behaviour earned the Duisenberg his 1998 
appointment as the first president of the new European Central Bank in Frankfurt.
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In terms of its role as a banking supervisor, the Dutch Bank felt the sting of  
polarisation. In 1968, the Catholic Union leader – and ex-leader of the Co-operative 
Central Bank, Mertens claimed that an elite of 200 people monopolised power in the 
Netherlands (Helmers et al, 1975). A spate of large-scale bank mergers led to a fear that 
banks had too much market power and were exposing themselves to an unacceptably wide 
range of risks. Thus, starting in 1971 the Dutch Bank put out a number of unofficial 
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directives prohibiting mergers of general banks with insurance companies or mortgage 
banks, restricting bank participation in the equity of other companies (financial or 
nonfinancial) to 5% without explicit permission from the Dutch Bank, and limiting the 
value of share stakes held by banks to 60% of their capital.
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 Regarding the management 
of Eurodollar markets, the Dutch Bank held on to its post-WWII regulatory position of 
treating foreign and domestic institutions on a par – contrary to for instance the Bank of 
England. 
 Finally, the President of the Dutch Bank, Zijlstra, rather unsurprisingly supported 
the employer organisations during the period of polarisation, earning it praise from the 
latter, and lots of antagonism from the trade unions.
745
 Nevertheless, the Dutch Bank was 
vindicated in the 1980s, when an employer-led variation on the low-cost consociationalism 
theme resurfaced. 
 viii) Resurgence of “Conservative” Orangism 
The nineteenth century Conservatives distinguished themselves by being fierce 
supporters of Orangism and imperial protectionism in a country which had lost its old 
identity – the mighty Dutch Republic, and struggled to find its bearings in a changing 
geopolitical constellation.  As predicted by Rudy Andeweg (2000: 709), in a country 
where opposition politics had been smothered by renewed consociational consensus 
practices, it was only a matter of time before the population would react against this new 
version of ―Regent capitalism‖; particularly given the earlier rise of populist movements 
against political clientelism and elitist corruption in countries with similar characterics 
such as Belgium and Austria.  Less than a year after Andeweg‘s article was published, in 
the wake of the September 2001 New York attacks, the populist and recently converted 
Orangist Pim Fortuyn started his campaign against ivory tower Regent politics, against 
meaningless liberal capitalism, and in favour of a renewal of direct representative politics – 
conducive to a renewal of local traditions.  Fortuyn particularly targeted the silence of the 
―left Church‖ in the Netherlands about the issue of Muslim immigration.746   
After the murder of Fortuyn
747
 in the 2002 elections – by an ecological radical – 
the rather apposite Christian-Democrat Balkenende became Prime Minister. A throwback 
to the era of weak Prime Ministers, Balkenende, as the various political spin-offs of the 
Fortuyn movement, responded to the democratic crisis with variations on Fortuyn‘s own 
template. For instance, in 2005 Balkenende made a plea for a greater sense of national 
unity – in language, shared values, and in ―shared pride‖ about the country. He declared 
there was ―nothing wrong with orange sentiment‖. Even the social-liberal D66 minister of 
economic affairs Brinkhorst (2005) urged his fellow citizens to overcome their 
―Embarrasment of Pride‖ – a quip to the Golden Age‘s purported ―Embarrasment of 
Riches‖ – and to think about a ―renewed and recgonisable‖ identity as a condition for 
integrating newcomers. While this neo-patriotic turn may have looked like a striking 
departure from Dutch precedent, it was not. Not only did nationalist discourse remain 
muted. Rather than ideological, at the end of day it served no more than the pragmatic 
purpose of preserving local privileges and customs; in particular the tradition of living-
together-apart. Thus, in good Christian Democratic fashion, Balkenende consistently 
stressed the need for ties among people who can see things from the perspective of others 
(Lechner, 2008: 78-79). Paradoxically, as only elites seemed capable of doing this, this 
may well usher in a new period of elitist Regent politics. 
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10.3 Firms‟ strategic positions in new settlements (phase 3) 
 
10.3.1  Renewal of democratic settlements 
The most disrupting effect of the discovery of natural gas was that it greatly 
reduced the urgency of all parties involved to end their polarisation and politicisation 
practices – against the grain of Dutch traditions of pacification, living-together-apart and 
proportionality. Yet, the accumulation of macro-economic crises, and the fear of 
becoming the worst pupil in the European Community class, eventually sharpened the 
tripartite desire to come to a new settlement. As a small country with an open economy 
subject to fluctuations in the international market, the two oil crises of the 1970s hit the 
Netherlands particularly hard. Industries like coal mining, textiles and clothing and 
shipyards proved impossible to sustain (Hemerijck et al., 2000: 211).  Not only was 
unemployment becoming a ―normal‖ phenomenon again in the Netherlands; the new 
European talk was of a ―Dutch disease‖.748 Unemployment grew from 1-2% before 1973 
to a staggering 8-14% in the first half of the 1980s. Furthermore, these official figures 
more than likely underestimated the problem. The acceptance of the social-democratic 
myth during the 1970s had given certain elements of the workforce and part of the unions 
an overbearing civic attitude; made worse by the comparatively high levels of benefits and 
taxes, which made wage work less economically attractive.  All this meant the official 
unemployment rate most probably considerably  understated the combined rate of 
involuntary and voluntary unemployment (Cox, 1993: 173-174; Hemerijck, 1992; Huber 
and Stephens, 2001: 279; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997: 132). 
i) Transformation of Dutch disease into Dutch miracle 
 A number of attempts to re-establish nationwide wage guidelines had failed by 
the early 1980s, prompting the premature demise of the 1981 cabinet-Agt. But then, to 
virtually everyone‘s surprise, an agreement was concluded in Wassenaar in 1982. By the 
latter 1990s, the Wassenaar Agreement would take on mythical proportions in European 
popular opinion; turning talk of a ―Dutch disease‖ into praise for the new ―Dutch miracle‖. 
Why were the Dutch able to transform a tentative settlement such as the Wassenaar 
agreement into a sustainable pact?  And why did the Netherlands turn the corner ahead of 
the rest of the European Union? It certainly was not due to the far-sightedness of Dutch 
labour, business and government representatives. Instead, this small Dutch ―miracle‖, as 
all prior ones, was the result of two differentiating factors.  
 First, during periods of polarisation, part of the Dutch elites opted to 
complement fashionable attacks on the ―undemocratic‖ habits and assumptions underlying 
the old settlement, with the low-key and private reinvention of exactly those habits and 
assumptions.  Thus, the polarisation of the public debate during the 1970s notwithstanding, 
the more pragmatic social-democratic, confessional, liberal, employer and trade union 
elements throughout remained on speaking terms and kept demonstrating a willingness to 
compromise. This alternative consultation channel provided a new generation of leaders 
and policy vehicles with a means to anticipate the need for a settlement ahead of most of 
their European counterparts.  
 Second, Dutch elites did not force the pace of change and acceptance of the 1982 
Wassenaar Agreement on their citizens. Of course elites played up feelings of urgency 
during successive geopolitical crises.  Beyond feelings of urgency, however, they have 
relied on ―happy accidents‖ to gain a broad platform of support for the Agreement and the 
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adopted pace of change. ―Happy accidents‖ are dynamics that emerge fortuitously – rather 
than by design – to help a new generation of leaders construct a new settlement. What was 
the main happy accident which the new ―no-nonsense‖ governments749 led by the 
Christian-Democrat Lubbers made use of from 1982 to 1994 to transform Wassenaar 
agreement into a geopolitical success model? It was the ―late‖ labour emancipation of 
married Dutch women from the 1970s onwards and the concomitant change in employers‘ 
attitudes towards part-time jobs for married women. At the beginning of the 1970s, Dutch 
women‘s labour participation rate was way below the West-European level (Delsen, 2000: 
45).
750
  The Dutch consociational system and welfare state was built on and reinforced by 
the male wage earner family structure. The period of polarisation, participation and 
politicisation in the 1970s very gradually and modestly induced a change in assumptions 
and behaviours. By 1980 some 35 percent of Dutch women were employed (Huber and 
Stephens, 2001: 136). Assumptions and behaviours changed more rapidly from the early 
1980s. In 2003 almost 60 percent of Dutch women had a job or were looking for one – 
mostly a part-time job (CBS, 2003). This dynamic of a late behavioural breakthrough in 
the 1970s and comparatively greater female labour participation growth in the 1980s and 
1990s, by no means could be contributed to a conscious policy on the part of the 
government (Delsen, 2000: 44; Hemerijck et al., 2000: 217). Behavioural changes by 
women and employers in terms of greater demand and supply of part-time jobs, occurred 
autonomously. Nevertheless, the Dutch government benefited enormously from those 
changes in transforming the modest Wassenaar Agreement into a decisive step towards a 
new Dutch miracle in the 1990s.   
 In 1982, a new government was elected, with the Christian-Democrat Ruud 
Lubbers as Prime Minister.  The cabinet-Lubbers had gained power by presenting itself as 
the ―no-nonsense‖ monetarist alternative, needed to get the country back on track and get 
public finances in order. The government immediately froze public-service salaries, social 
benefits, and the minimum wage. Also, the Lubbers government threatened the ―social 
partners‖ – trade unions and employers associations – to quickly come to an agreement on 
wage moderation. And so did the social partners, to forestall further government actions. 
The unions accepted wage moderation and the end of automatic inflation in service of 
Dutch industry‘s competitiveness. Employers agreed to a reduction of working hours and 
the need to increase employment through new ―job sharing‖ practices. Finally, both parties 
accepted to decentralise collective wage agreements to allow for a greater degree of 
flexibility in meeting the needs of specific economic sectors (Andeweg, 2000: 706; Van 
der Wusten, 2001: 313-317).   
The consensus for many years – both in the national and international press – was 
that the Wassenaar meeting produced a weak social agreement on wage moderation. No-
one was surprised when at the beginning of the 1990s there was a near breakdown of the 
wage restraint formula. Yet, by the second half of the 1990s, ―Wassenaar‖ was 
internationally seen as the decisive step to Dutch recovery. Similarly, the immediate 
effects of Lubbers‘ ―austerity policy‖ rather unsurprisingly were ―unpopular‖.  Thus, when 
the government in 1983 announced it would cut public-service salaries, minimum wages, 
and social benefits by 3.5 per cent across the board, the public-sector unions organised 
their biggest strike since the war. Yet, Lubbers became he longest ruling prime minister in 
the Netherlands (1982-1994) (CPB, 1997: 83).
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Why did the monetarist policies of the Lubber cabinets and the Wassenaar 
agreement experience such a remarkable transformation of fortunes?  The short answer is 
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that Dutch elites not only benefited from happy accidents and the low-key reinvention of 
old habits at the domestic level, but also at the European level.  
ii) The importance of the European level 
Regarding Lubbers‘ monetarist policies, one favourable antecedent was that 
Dutch elites on the European scene had long supported monetary union proposals spanning 
the Werner report in 1970, the 1989 Delors report, the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, and 
culminating in the Euro currency‘s introduction in 1999.  Christian-Democrats‘ 1970s 
association of Dutch disease with the government‘s and Dutch Bank‘s inability to halt the 
importation of foreign inflation, may have contributed to this support.  Yet, the Dutch 
government did not see the European Community as a tool against US-dominance in the 
same way French governments and popular opinion did. Obviously, the Dutch too felt 
somewhat bothered that the US was freed from many adjustment pressures and was able to 
run large balance-of-payments deficits by virtue the dollar being the international reserve 
currency (Lucatelli, 1997: 26-34).
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 Contrary to France – a country unwilling to surrender 
its mission to civilise the world, the Dutch State‘s nonconformism had an entirely more 
pragmatic character. In spite of social-democratic governments‘ lip-service to a higher 
civilisation mission in the 1970s, most Dutch elites privately kept reinventing the old habit 
of viewing the European Community as a pragmatic geopolitical platform – needed to 
maintain the Netherlands‘ geopolitical position of early follower, benefiting from low-cost 
international spill-overs.    
   But Dutch influence on European monetary integration was minimal. To institute 
a European monetary union long-standing differences in geopolitical strategies between 
member states had to be accommodated, in particular the different German and French 
viewpoints on Europeanisation. For France, a European monetary or social policy could 
only come about if the EC became a political reality as well, a position the West-Germans 
opposed. By default of such a German willingness, De Gaulle had favoured a ―Europe des 
patries‖, respecting the full sovereignty of nation-states. Fortunately for the Dutch, after 
the monetary crisis of 1983-4, the French take on European policy shifted significantly.  
France started to work for the European Community to attain a state quality in as many 
areas as possible – the EC as a political actor with a territorial identity and a cultural 
mission. Furthermore, France gave top priority to monetary integration as a means of 
obtaining more influence on both European and international monetary policy – the former 
was dominated by the German Bundesbank, the latter by US dollar priorities. But where 
did the West-German willingness to compromise come from? The French during the 1980s 
often suspected the Germans of wanting a Europe which just faded out somewhere to the 
East, a Europe including neutral and even Eastern states; in other words, a very un-
statelike Europe unable to act in unity (Waever, 1990).
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 Paradoxically given its own 
imperial ambitions, the support  of the US government was crucial in convincing the West 
Germans. The US government saw both the reunification of West and East Germany, and 
monetary union as important ways to increase the stability of commercial exchange with 
Europe and pre-empt re-nationalisation threats in that continent.  Arguably, the US was 
also interested in a new European bargain because it saw the world in East-West terms; 
with the EEC already forming part of the US‘ Western expansion of the ―Empire of 
Liberty‖.754  In that perspective, greater union of Europe and Germany constituted a gain 
for US imperial ambitions, and a loss for the Russian influence sphere.
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 An autonomous 
European central bank, on the other hand, would be founded on principles akin to the own 
―Council of Wise‖ tradition of democratisation – thus helping to avert the threat of re-
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nationalisation of monetary policy. To make a long story short, the Bundesbank‘s 
reservations notwithstanding, the German government by the late 1980s was ready to 
surrender its informal monetary dominance to a new European monetary body; in return 
for its longheld aspirations of German reunification, and the larger aim of substituting 
European nation-building for the destructive German identity of the past.
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The key dynamics responsible for the belated making of the Wassenaar 
Agreement myth are similar to the ones responsible for the transformation of Lubbers‘ 
monetarist policies. The Wassenaar agreement co-developed with two largely autonomous 
dynamics, one domestic, the other European: the comparatively greater influx of women in 
part-time jobs in the 1980s and 1990s, and the growing need to find a ―model‖ to guide EU 
social policy in the same period.  
The original Wassenaar agreement was weak and all but comprehensive, entailing 
no more than another ―wage restraint‖ pact, not the active labour market policy that was at 
the heart of the Dutch miracle.  It was not until the end of the 1980s that a significant shift 
took place towards a more active labour market policy. By then, the "improper" use of the 
main disability scheme (WAO) led to a real and perceived crisis of inactivity (Hubers and 
Stephens 2001: 279).
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 Dutch policy-makers, politicians, the social partners, and the larger 
public alike, came to hold the low level of labour market participation to be the ―Achilles‖ 
heel of the Dutch welfare state (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997: 155).  By the late 1980s, 
about 850.000 people made use of the disability scheme. Yet, by the end of the 1990s the 
number of people making use of the disability scheme had increased to almost a million 
(CBS, 2004).  So, how did the Dutch realise the twin goals of cutting welfare costs and 
boosting labour flexibility and participation rates – core ingredients of the Wassenaar 
myth? In short, women entering new part-time jobs provided the proverbial ―cheap and 
abundant fuel‖ needed to turn Dutch disease in Dutch miracle – making female part-time 
jobs the equivalent of 16
th
 century peat.  
The late entry of women helped to both identify a problem all social partners 
could agree upon and solve the problem in way all parties could sell to their core 
constituencies. The accelerated entry of women in the labour market from the 1980s 
onwards boosted the number of part-time workers in the Dutch economy in a relatively 
short period – compared to most other advanced economies, where this occurred slowly, 
over a much longer period. Furthermore, active labour market policies had remained 
comparatively underdeveloped in post-WWII Netherlands.  In other words, most other 
advanced economies did not dispose of the cheap and abundant fuel of women entering 
flexible part-time jobs to the extent the Netherlands did. Seeing that the entry of women in 
new part-time jobs was already well underway, the Dutch social partners used it as a 
platform to build on and reinforce their active labour market policies. Hence, during the 
1990s a new policy focus evolved directed at active labour market policies, entailing the 
creation of permanent jobs in the public sector for long-term unemployed, the ―activation‖ 
of recipients of social security benefits, and the provision of subsidies to those employers 
hiring low-skilled workers in part-time jobs. Simultaneously, the government continued 
dismantling social security schemes.
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 The retrenchment of welfare provisions and the 
massive, voluntary adoption of labour flexibility schemes changed the original character of 
the 1982 wage restraint agreement.  Wage demands were increasingly pushed from the 
bargaining table, as unions negotiated extra-legal supplementary benefits at the expense of 
wage increases (Hemerijck, Unger and Visser 2000: 221-222; Cox 2001: 482-484).  The 
exchange logic behind the Wassenaar agreement had been transformed in one of lower 
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taxes for workers and lower social contributions for employers. Also, as unions and 
employers agreed to abolish residual differences in rights and fringe benefits between full-
time and part-time workers were abolished, they also concurred on the loosening of 
dismissal procedures as well as working time restrictions, though mainly for part-time and 
temporary workers. 
The Wassenaar agreement could not have taken mythical proportions if it were 
not for its fortuitous co-development with European leaders‘ search for an EU social 
policy ―model‖ from the late 1980s onwards.  Before 1985, European social policy had 
consisted solely of attempts to coordinate migrant workers‘ social rights (1958-1973), and 
the promotion of the equality of men and women (1973-1985). By the 1986 Single 
European Act, two shifts had taken place in European social policy.  In response to the 
macro-economic crisis of early 1980s, there had been a shift from the aim of harmonising 
social policy to respecting the diversity of national systems. In other words, the principle 
of subsidiarity was revived to protect smaller countries‘ autonomy and voice in the 
integration process (Hantrais, 2000: 26-27).
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 This suited the Dutch very well. 
Simultaneously, the French government made a U-turn with its stance on European 
integration
760
; meaning that the scope for a European social policy vastly increased. Thus, 
the problem of social exclusion and the promotion of social inclusion were adopted from 
French social policy in the late 1980s as guiding principles of EU social policy (Annesley 
2003: 148-149).  French lobbying notwithstanding, during the 1990s a rather un-French 
assumption developed at the heart of the EU‘s social policy. This assumption was very 
contiguous with the Dutch example of activation of welfare provisions and part-time jobs 
in service of greater labour market participation and economic growth. Given that the 
Dutch had felt the effects of subsequent energy crises harder, and turned the corner on 
unemployment earlier than their European counterparts, their policies were bound to 
become noticed at some point – particularly since the Dutch had consistently acted as a 
loyal, core member of the Union. Remarkably, the Frenchman Jacques Delors was one of 
the first to take notice.  He helped launch the debate on the European Union‘s mission to 
enhance growth and lower unemployment rates – among others through encouraging part-
time work – with his 1993 White Book on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment.761 
Labour market reforms were to become central to the coordination of macro-economic and 
employment policies.  
The criteria of a European employment strategy were first developed in the 1994 
Essen Council meeting (Sciarra, 2003, 2004), and consolidated in the Amsterdam Treaty 
and the 1997 European Employment strategy. These documents increasingly referred to 
flexible part-time jobs and the activation of welfare provisions in the spirit of Dutch 
agreements in the 1980s and 1990s.  European and OECD talk
762
 of a Dutch model and 
miracle fed back into the Dutch domestic process. While an IMF warning in 1991 that the 
Netherlands should not try to improve its competitiveness by wage restraint
763
 had 
increased pressure on the fragile wage moderation pact to near breaking point, the opposite 
was very much true from the mid-1990s onwards. In an epistemic community spanning the 
OECD, IMF, World Bank, European and US central banks, the Netherlands has acquired 
model status as the European country that had ―registered Anglo-American levels of 
growth and employment creation without the accompanying social trauma, inequality, and 
attacks on organised labour‖ (Levy, 1999: 258).764 Increasingly, trade union leaders prided 
in their support for the Wassenaar Agreement and the Dutch wage restraint formula 
responsible for international praise of the Dutch miracle (Becker, 2001a: 465; 2001b). In 
293 
 
1997, the chairman of the Dutch Federation of Unions no longer could hide his euphoria 
about the Wassenaar Agreement to a group of foreign journalists:  ―In the past 13 years, 
wage costs per unit of product rose almost 30 per cent in France and even 40 per cent in 
Germany. Here, on the other hand, they fell by over 1 per cent! Then we have 
employment. Employment rose by no less than 21 per cent in the Netherlands; that‘s 10 
times more than in France and four times more than in Germany‖ (Quoted in Van Empel, 
1997). As such labour union consent to the theory of a virtuous relation between wage 
moderation and job creation was absent even in most North American unions, Wim Kok 
congratulated himself and his country on their status of leading light of the ―Third Way‖.  
iii) The resurgence of the Central Planning Bureau  
A last happy accident Dutch policy-makers, and the Wassenaar mythology, 
benefited from was the resurgence of the Central Planning Bureau (CPB). In conjunction 
with the European Court of Justice
765
 and the Bundesbank, which later became the 
European Central Bank, the CPB would provide a very useful vehicle to reconcile the 
geopolitical dominance of US traditions of democratisation with the reinvention of home-
grown traditions – core ingredients of the Dutch historical success model. As mentioned 
above, during the 1980s the US government ushered in a new stage of more confident 
imperialism, in which it aggressively exported its traditions of democratisation to the rest 
of the world. The US traditions in questions were Real Whig voluntarism, happy 
mediocrity, and pluralism (p. 238). As soon as it became clear that Soviet communism was 
bankrupt and the Iron Curtain would come down, a US epistemic community, with the full 
support of the government, started pushing one tradition even more, the ―Council of Wise‖ 
tradition of democratisation. The latter tradition more than any other contributed to the end 
of history doctrine of ―liberal capitalism‖ which was so in vogue from the late 1980s 
onwards.  This governance style purportedly involved a ―weak state‖, regulatory bodies led 
by management specialists infused with norms of ―efficiency‖, and a strong emphasis on 
civil society and markets as the legitimate sources of democratisation. 
 How would the Netherlands adapt to the geopolitical dominance of US traditions 
of democratisation – in particular the Council of Wise tradition, the key extra-
parliamentary building block of the US ―liberal tradition‖?  In the post-WWII period, the 
Labour Foundation and Social-Economic Council had been the institutions that came 
closest to acquiring this ―Council of Wise‖ quality, as did the Bundesbank in Germany – 
all the more so given these three institutions‘ federal character. Unfortunately, the de-
legitimation of formal consociational institutions during the 1960s and 1970s involved a 
severe loss of authority for the Labour Foundation and Social-Economic Council. 
Fortunately, the Central Planning Bureau (CPB), an institution which had been co-founded 
with the former two in the early post-WWII years, was ready to take up the mantle of 
―Council of Wise‖ from the early 1980s onwards. The revival of the CPB was a crucial 
condition to the successful renewal of faith in the ―wage restraint formula‖ (Den Butter 
1991: 17; Donders and Graafland 1998: 346). As early as 1977, a first ―wage restraint‖ 
pact had been agreed upon by employees, unions and the State. Yet, by default of an ―a-
political‖ standard-setting authority, this pact remained highly contestable. This explains 
why government expenditures continued rising under the two succeeding governments (the 
cabinets-Agt of 1977 and 1981).
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  Yet, during the 1980s, the US epistemic community 
pushing the Council of Wise tradition gained more and more international prominence. In 
spite of their public adherence to the primacy of politics, Dutch elites across the board 
reacted by privately renewing habits of technical inner circle negotation – by civil servants, 
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pressure groups and government representatives -  was restored (De Boo, 1989: 145-146). 
This facilitated the resurgence of the CPB, whose experts historically had been at the heart 
of the Dutch epistemic community of technocratic policy-making.  
 During the 1980s, and increasingly so in the 1990s, political parties developed the 
habit of asking the CPB to check the economic effects of their party programs and policy 
proposals. The precondition of ―CBP approval‖ was taken seriously even by political 
parties in opposition. According to the CPB‘s head of the ―Macro-Economic Outlook‖ 
department, ―the CPB is expected to provide politically relevant analyses that at the same 
time are ‗rational scientific‘, moving beyond any political or ideological discussion‖ (Cited 
in Hendriks, 2005: 58).  The CPB‘s 1992 Macro-Economic Outlook constituted a turning 
point in the ill fortune of the wage restraint formulate in the early 1990s. The CPB linked 
the fact that employment growth in the Netherlands had been higher than in other 
European countries since 1983 to the wage restraint formula reintroduced with Wassenaar 
(CPB, 1992: 82-87).
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  This, together with the earlier acceptance of the social-democrats 
as junior parties in the Christian Democratic led cabinet, facilitated the unions‘ acceptance 
of the wage restraint formula, in turn contributing to the creation of the Wassenaar myth. 
Yet, it was only when macro-economic and employment figures improved substantially to 
the point of becoming the focus of international praise – from the mid-1990s onwards – 
that most of the media, employers and unions came to accept the CPB as an incontestable 
vehicle of proportional wisdom.
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iv) The problem of immigration 
 The above sections may have conveyed the impression that everything was well 
in the Netherlands in the period 1982-2007, by virtue of a highly symbiotic relation 
between Dutch and European traditions of democratisation. One policy issue where Dutch 
passivity and delegation to the European level totally backfired, with dire consequences at 
the beginning of the new millenium, was immigration.  The evolution of Europe‘s 
immigration policies, particularly regarding Muslim populations, reads like a catalogue of 
European Union growing up pains, and constitutes glaring proof of a continued lack of 
geopolitical leadership in this fledgling juggernaut.  With the benefit of hindsight, three 
strategic flaws stand out in European immigration policy.   
European and national policy-makers have pre-empted more imaginative and 
strategic regulation by attributing themselves with a delusive ability to control the temporal 
and cultural impact of non-European immigration.  Contrary to earlier migration waves, 
post-WWII migration stemmed from explicit, intentional calls for migrant settlement.  
Significant migration into post-war Europe began with labour migration in the 1950s, with 
male workers brought in on temporary contracts. These ―Gastarbeiter‖ of non-European 
origin – principally from former French colonies – were seen not as prospective citizens 
but as filling a passing need in labour markets. At no point did European policy-makers 
envisage the permanent settlement of these post-war immigrants. By the 1970s, however, 
large numbers of workers had not returned home, and they increasingly brought in families 
to establish full-fledged communities in European cities.  
For many years, a stalemate between liberal-democratic and social-democratic 
myths perpetuated a wait-and-see attitude on the part of European elites.  On the one hand, 
European elites motivated by the liberal tradition deemed that ‖integration would come 
about of its own accord‖,  ―under the aegis of increasing cross-border economic co-
operation‖. In other words, no specific political and social efforts were necessary (Cohen-
Bendit, 1993: 27-28), in spite of several historical realities. Unlike the US, Canada, or 
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Australia, European populations have never thought of themselves as ―nations of 
immigration‖ (Parsons and Smeeding, 2006: 3-5).770 And while neither the EU nor its 
member states had developed a working immigration tradition, by 2002 roughly 15 million 
immigrants – some  8 percent out of a total of 200 million migrants worldwide  had come 
to the EU, a region of the world accommodating only 6 percent of world population 
(United Nations, 2002).
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Social-democrats, for their part, in the wake of the West German social market 
economy credo, preferred to hold on the high modernity myth of a ―social‖ Europe. That 
is, rather than face up to the reality of permanent immigration and come up with clear 
criteria for permanent immigration. Stuck in an ideological position that bore little relation 
to dynamics on the ground, social-democrats adopted an attitude of protective silence 
towards immigrants (e.g. Garrard, 1971).
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 Social-democrats were content with the 
official ―return migration‖ incentives that were in place into the early 1980s (Koopmans, 
1999).   
With the benefit of hindsight one would think that neither liberals or social-
democrats could get around one major issue: the different type of State-religion relation 
adhered to by Muslim immigrants. Yet, for several reasons, some more opportunistic than 
others, European governments essentially ―outsourced‖ State-Islam relations to Muslim 
diplomats (Laurence, 2006: 263). For one, in the wake of OPEC‘s oil embargo of the 
United States and the Netherlands in 1973-4, European governments were eager to be on 
good terms with regional powers in the Arab world, who were the source not only of 
immigration but also of oil (Laurence, 2006: 265-266).
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 This ―home country identity‖ 
policy was not controversial, since guest workers and their offspring were not destined for 
European citizenship anyway. Islam could therefore be treated as an ―exogenous reality‖ 
(De Galembert, 2001).  The policy of encouraging the use of foreign funds for religious 
practice was also convenient, in that it deprived emerging anti-immigration parties of one 
argument in their ―integrate or leave‖ logic.774 The result of all this, however, was that by 
the 1980s  European Islam was organised in a powerful set of transnational communities 
that national frameworks found hard to reframe. 
At the end of the day, the way the European Union and its member states have 
tackled the issue of immigration has left a profoundly anti-democratic taste in incumbents‘ 
mouth. Clearly, the voice of the majority of European incumbents – national parliaments – 
since the 1970s was to restrict or curb immigration. Indeed, the fait accompli of permanent 
settlement of entire migrant families has never been sanctioned by national parliaments 
and a clear pro-settlement public debate.  On the contrary, it was the result of the 
reinforcement of constitutional human right guarantees by a rather invisible, unelected 
body: the European Court of Justice. Although the European Court of Justice to date is 
unendowed with the Council of Wise legitimacy its US counterpart possesses, it has played 
a key role in protecting immigrants‘ rights to settle against restrictions by elected officials 
(Joppke, 2000).   
This has increased distrust in the EU enormously, particularly since the fall of the 
Iron Curtain. The geopolitical priority of the Cold War had convinced most European 
parties they could not afford nationalist or xenophobic disputes. With the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, however, fear of Europea and xenophia were given free rein. To some extent 1989 
marked a watershed year that initiated a second phase of State-Islam relations, after which 
European governments sought to reassert state sovereignty over transnational Muslim 
networks.
775
 In more recent years, many national governments again have come to the 
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realisation that the old strategy of keeping Islam out of the public sphere, and using 
international diplomacy to manage the religion of immigrants was ill-judged.  Yet, all 
these efforts notwhithstanding, to date a coherent European immigration policy is still 
lacking. 
It would be wrong to scapegoat the European Union alone for the failings of 
nation-states‘ immigration policies, however. Even now, the harmonisation of immigration 
policy initiatives at the European level – the mandate of Tampere – is limited by the fact 
that few EU countries have anything resembling an immigration policy of any kind beyond 
a policy of restriction (Schain, 2006: 390). Given its long traditions of accommodating 
religious and civic minorities, the Netherlands should have been better placed than other 
European nation-states to deal with Muslim immigration. Unfortunately, the heydays of 
the Dutch and European social-democratic myth coincided with an accelerated period of 
secularisation and polarisation in the Netherlands. The relative homogenisation of the 
Netherlands and the unwillingness to break with the social-democratic – 1970s – and 
liberal – 1980s and 1990s – myths, entailed a certain decline of consociational traditions to 
deal with religion. This has brought about a declining ability to deal with outsider groups 
such as Muslim immigrants (cf. Muus, 2004: 265). It is only during the last few years that 
the Dutch Christian-Democrats have prioritised this problem and tried to revive and extend 
traditions of living-together-apart, pacification and proportionality to Dutch Muslims. 
v) The  Dutch “no” in the EU referendum 
    While it may be wrong to scapegoat the EU for nation-states‘ failings to 
reinvent their own traditions, for instance regarding migration, that is exactly what the 
French and Dutch populations did during the 2005 European Referenda. One key 
antecedent to the Dutch ―no‖ in 2005 was the reversal of the Netherlands‘s status from net 
receiver to net contributor in the 1990s – the result of shrinking agricultural subsidies. This 
reversal coincided with a growing feeling that the Netherlands was becoming an awfully 
small and ordinary member state in the fast expanding EU. Both issues dented Dutch 
confidence in the EU as the main platform to realise their historical success model of 
―Dutch nonconformism‖.  At the beginning of the new millennium, the Fortuyn movement 
started wreaking havoc. A Marxist turned Orangist, Fortuyn maintained that the 
Netherlands had become disconnected from its roots in Christian traditions after the anti-
authoritarian revolt of the 1960s. Unable to tackle the triumph of meaningless liberal 
capitalism with anything else but relativism (Fortuyn, 1997: 12), the Netherlands had 
become an ―orphaned society‖ (Fortuyn, 2002b). Similarly, he maintained, Dutch 
businesses operating in global networks had long lost touch with their country of origin. In 
sum, the Dutch elite had become "fatherlandless" (Fortuyn, 1997: 16-18). And, the EU, 
rather than helping the Dutch reinvent their roots, had played a perverse role in all this. 
Regarding Muslim immigration, the main problem was that "The Hague" and its European 
extension ―Brussels‖ had become a caricature of a closed, incestuous establishment out of 
touch with the people. Fortuyn attacked the "mess" - "puinhopen" – created by the   out-of-
touch political classes (Fortuyn, 2002a).  
After Fortuyn‘s death, several spin-off leaders jumped on the anti-EU 
bandwagon. For instance, in the wake of the EU referendum the conservative liberal 
Wilders stressed at every opportunity that the EU was becoming a superstate ―where the 
big countries will be in charge‖.  Furthermore, following Fortuyn, Wilders claimed back 
national control over immigration policies at the expense of the European Court of Justice 
and even national constitutional guarantees. The influential Elsevier, a magazine usurped 
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by the new Conservatives, opposed the European Constitution because it would undermine 
Dutch national ―solidarity‖ (Joustra, 2005; Van Tuyll van Serooskerken, 2005: 1049).  
Remarkably, from the other side of the ideological spectrum, the socialist (SP) leader Jan 
Marijnissen converged on the same themes. He objected to the ―federalisation‖ of Europe, 
arguing that such a Europe was too much in favour of big businesses and big countries, 
and eventually would turn the Netherlands into a ―powerless province‖ (Lechner, 2008).   
vi) A distinct housing policy 
 Another area where European and Dutch traditions and policy goals have 
collided, particularly in the last few years, is housing policy.  Dutch housing policy and its 
effects on housing tenure since WWII have been highly distinctive within a western 
European context. As we saw in chapter 7, fit-of-absentmindedness more than anything 
else explains why 60% of Dutch housing market growth in the post-WWII period has been 
on account of the non-profit rental sector, in particular hybrid public-private housing 
associations.  In sum, the Dutch government did not realise to what extent it was putting 
itself on a path-dependent track when it introduced a high degree of housing regulation 
after WWII. Given that the private housing market was in a shambles, and had remained 
underdeveloped compared to for instance England, the new regulatory policy proved 
incredibly successful; to the point that the government dare not withdraw its subsidy 
schemes from the 1950s and 1960s onwards, as it had planned.  In line with pillarised 
forces, housing associations built on this policy to extend their grip on the housing market. 
Long after the demise of pillarisation, the Christian-democratic and social-democratic 
umbrella housing organisations continued to grow.  
That is because these hybrid organisations, in comparative perspective, were very 
successful. While holding on to maximum private self-reliance, they successfully adopted 
the public functions of housing households with a modest income, fostering variety in the 
housing stock and reducing spatial segregation. All this gave the Netherlands a unique 
position in Europe in terms of tackling the problems of urban renewal and social 
neighbourhood development (Primus, 2006).  While Dutch housing performance has been 
extremely good within the EU (Norris & Shields, 2004), the European Commission‘s 
―liberal‖ turn in the late 20th century has led it to voice criticisms about the 
―disproportionate‖ size of the Dutch social rented sector.  
In spite of the rapidly increasing share of home-ownership in the Dutch housing 
market – from 35% in 1970 to 54% in 2000, the Dutch social rental sector in 2003 still was 
the largest of the European Union by a clear margin, with a market share of 36%. At a 
distance followed Denmark (27%), Sweden (24%) and the United Kingdom with a share of 
21% (Norris and Shiels, 2004). According to Brussels, Dutch housing associations provide 
housing for a much larger group than necessary to fulfill their universal standard remit, 
namely to house the low-income groups. In sum, housing associations are hampering 
sound commercial competition. And this argument overrides even the added legitimation 
of housing associations as low-cost promoters of integration and spatial integration of 
different social classes – which explains the comparatively low stigma on social renting in 
the Netherlands (Dieleman, 1994; Priemus and Dieleman, 2002).  
In response, the Dutch Housing Minister as early as 1997 has announced that each 
housing association would be split up into a parent with a public function and one or more 
subsidiaries with commercial activities— with the aim of making the Dutch housing 
association system more Brussels-proof (Primus, 2006). Furthermore, since the 1990s 
Dutch housing ministers have been eager to promote private home-ownership, no doubt to 
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satisfy their own belief in the superiority of the liberal tradition. The relative decline of the 
social rental sector, however, meant that the Dutch could not use it anymore as an effective 
anti-cyclical means from the 1990s onwards.
776
 What is more, the phenomenon of housing 
equity withdrawal which was created by the Dutch government‘s eagerness to adhere to 
the liberal tradition and the virtues of home-ownership, further weakened this cyclical anti-
dote. Thus, the process of housing equity withdrawal, i.e. the tendency of households to 
extract equity from the value of their houses to finance the purchase of other assets, has 
played a significant role in boosting consumption in the Netherlands since the 1990s, as it 
did in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Ireland. In effect, housing 
equity withdrawal has had a double cyclical impact, first boosting macro-economic 
consumption, and from 2001 onwards, acting as a major drag on the economy (De 
Nederlandsche Bank, 2003).
777
 In particular since housing prices in the Netherlands have 
risen comparatively more than in the surrounding countries.  
 
10.3.2 Formal evolution of the suffrage  
The reality of creeping individualisation, and increasing support for a social-
democratic breakthrough of consociational paternalism as early as 1967 had led to an 
immense formal amendment of electoral rules: the abolition of compulsory voting.  Since 
its introduction together proportional representation in 1967, compulsory voting had 
remained a much debated issue in the Netherlands.  Reasons given for the abolition were 
threefold: each citizen should be free to exert his individual right, it is difficult to enforce 
sanctions against non-voters, and political parties may become more dynamic if they have 
to more actively compete for attention. Furthermore, social-democrats insisted on the 
principle of active politicization; based on the assumption that the relation between 
compulsory voter turnout and actual interest representation was rather weak (Gratschew, 
2004).  The 1967 change had a significant, lasting effect on voter turnout. The first post-
abolition parliamentary elections in 1971 witnessed an immediate fall of 15.8 per cent. 
While in the period 1917-1967, voter turnout was consistently above 90%, it dropped to 
79.1% and 82.9% in the parliamentary elections of 1971 and 1972. The first six elections 
after abolition (1971–86) produced a turnout average of 84.1 per cent; the average for the 
most recent five elections (1989–2003) has been 78.3 per cent (Bennett, 2005).778 These 
turnout rates were still higher than in many other voluntary voting systems in Western 
Europe – such as the UK. 
 Beyond absolute turnout figures, one relative trend become more pronounced 
from 1971 onwards: especially the lower social classes turned out in lesser proportions to 
vote (Irwin, 1974). Prior to the abolition of compulsory voting in the Netherlands, there 
had been only a 4% difference between the voting levels of the ‗top‘ and ‗bottom‘ classes. 
After  abolition the difference in turnout among different social groups jumped to 21% 
(Rogers, 2005). 
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10.3.3 Financial institutions‟ strategies of democratisation 
In Figures 10.1 and 10.2, I visualise the growth of different Dutch financial 
institutions in terms of total amounts of deposits received and share of the savings market. 
In Table 10.1, I provide total asset figures: I document growth and marketshare figures 
over the period 1970 to 2006. Given the merger of the State Postal Savings Bank with the 
NMB in a commercial bank in the 1989
779
, and the increasing insignificance of remaining 
savings banks
780
, I shall only making passing mention of mortgage banks and savings 
banks. The comparative focus of the following sections really is on the Co-operative 
Rabobank and the major commercial banks. Finally, in table 10.2 I provide a comparative 
ranking of commercial and co-operative banks  in terms of the six strategies. 
 
 
Table 10.1:   Growth and proportional shares of building societes versus banks 
 in terms of total assets (millions of Guilder and Euro) 
Dutch Guilder currency 
Year 
Co-operative 
Banks 
Commercial 
Banks 
General 
Savings* 
State Postal 
Savings** 
1970 19,376 48,568 9125 6641 
1980 94,215 275,805 25,606 19,130 
1985 125,006 390,333 34,216 29,884 
1988 161,576 938,616 - - 
Euro currency 
Year RABOBANK ING ABN AMRO FORTIS 
1994 122,091 160,000 229,000 - 
1995 133,192 180,000 248,000 - 
1996 152,068 221,000 272,000 - 
1997 194,222 282,000 379,500 300,524 
1998 249,718 395,000 432,100 340,262 
1999 281,218 492,815 457,900 406,109 
2000 342,920 650,172 543,200 438,083 
2001 363,679 705,000 597,400 482,970 
2002 374,720 716,000 556,000 485,765 
2003 403,305 779,000 560,400 523,250 
2004 483,574 866,000 727,500 614,085 
2005 506,573 1,158,639 880,800 728,994 
2006 556,455 1,226,307 987,100 775,229 
Growth (x) 
since 1997 
2.86 4.35 2.6 2.58 
* By the mid to late 1980s general savings banks had adopted the for-profit joint-stock company 
form. 
** State Postal Savings Bank merged with the Postcheque- en Girodienst (the national postal cheque 
and payment service operator) in 1977. In 1979, the Amsterdamse Gemeentegiro was added to the 
merger. In 1986, this consortium was privatised.  
Source: Annual Reports Rabobank, ING, ABN AMRO, FORTIS 
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Table 10.2: Comparative ranking of commercial banks and co-operative Rabobank 
(1=highest, 4=lowest) 
 
 
Commercial banks 
 
 
Co-operative bank 
 
 ABN AMRO ING FORTIS RABOBANK 
Strategy a 
 
1 1 3 3 
Strategy b 
 
3 1 4 2 
Strategy c 
 
1 3 1 3 
Strategy d 
 
3 1 3 2 
Strategy e 
 
4 1 3 2 
Strategy f 
 
1 1 3 1 
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Strategy a   Help core customers fulfil their social class aspirations 
i) Commercial Banks 
      The mobility of what aspiring social classes did commercial banks serve from 
the late 1960s onwards? After a few subdued post-WWII decades, the AMRO and ABN 
banks found their ―Regent club‖ stride again.  Both banks rapidly renewed their stake in 
the international financial system, allowing them to benefit from the burgeoning 
Eurodollar markets – ABN more than AMRO had retained a considerable stake throughout 
the post-WWII period.  By  1975 Eurodollar business accounted for 33 percent of ABN‘s 
total assets, 35 per cent of AMRO‘s and 23 percent of the small and medium enterprise 
bank NMB (Sluyter et al., 1998: 248). What is more, by virtue of AMRO‘s and ABN‘s 
increasing involvement with large industrial corporations, they soon acquired a pivotal role 
in a new international network of interlocking directorates by the beginning of the 1970s; a 
network with its centre of gravity in the European Union, but with clear bridges to Anglo-
American companies – provided by Royal Dutch/Shell and AMRO bank in particular. By 
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the end of the 1990s, the 1991 creation ING Group – comprising the old State Postal 
Savings Bank, NMB, and the Dutch insurance group Nationale Nederlanden
781
, and 
FORTIS Bank – a Belgian Dutch savings-insurance conglomerate782, had eclipsed the 
1990 creation ABN AMRO as pivotal players in the highest European banking and 
industry classes (cf. Heemskerk, 2001).   
Still, commercial banks did not simply reinvent their pre-WWII roots. They had 
started a modest retail banking revolution from the late 1950s onwards, and kept investing 
and diversifying in a variety of retail products and services, including mortgages from the 
1970s onwards.  For a commercial bank such as ABN AMRO, however, retail banking 
was not a core business, but a safe and profitable way to get access to money and retain 
minimum liquidity levels.  At the turn of the twenty-first century, ABN AMRO‘s long 
neglect of « core depositors » - i.e. core retail customers‘ checking, savings and money 
market accounts – in favour of easier, albeit less loyal and more volatile wholesale 
depositors , came back to haunt it.  In addition to being more volatile in times of trouble, 
wholesale deposits are generally more expensive than core deposits, putting a strain on net 
interest profit levels – the difference between what banks pay depositors for their funds 
and what they earn by loaning that money back out. During the 1990s, commercial banks 
such as ABN AMRO were able to ignore the erosion of core deposits as wholesale money 
markets were burgeoning – as did fee income – and merger efficiencies were rife. By the 
turn of the 21st century, however, fee income had plateaued and much of the financial 
industry had been consolidated.  ABN AMRO reacted by investing more in its retail 
banking operations during the last few years; yet, by then it had become structurally 
disadvantaged compared to more established retail banks such as ING and Rabobank. 
Ultimately, this failure led to the sales of ABN AMRO to a European consortium of banks 
in 2008.   
ii) Co-operative Rabobank 
     As long as ―non-core deposits‖ – such as Eurodollar deposits – were cheaper 
and more ready available in international money markets, Rabobank – formed out of a 
merger between Catholic and Protestant-neutral co-operative banks in 1972 – was bound to 
be comparatively disadvantaged in its service to new social class aspirations. For instance, 
by 1975 Eurodollar business accounted for only 6 percent of Rabobank‘s total assets.783 
And the margins widened further during the next decade.  
While Rabobank was disadvantaged as to the aspiration of making money militantly and 
instantly in international money markets, it had other, more low-key, domestic assets. By 
virtue of its early sidelining of confessional principles and its anticipatory shift towards a 
non-agricultural customer base in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Rabobank was at the 
forefront of drawing in more small and medium enterprises, and middle class people with 
home-ownership aspirations in the financial system. From a follower in the post-WWII 
period (apart from the agricultural industry), Rabobank by the 2000s had grown into the 
overall market leader of Dutch small and medium enterprise, with a share ranging between 
30 and 50 per cent, depending on the particular industry.
784
 This was an astounding 
success, given that the bank was up against the competition of the government-sponsored 
SME bank NMB, which by virtue of having been in existence for more than fourty years, 
had taken a significant headstart.  And after the demise of specialised mortgage banks at 
the beginning of the 1980s, Rabobank‘s mortgage bank became the uncontested leader in 
the mortgage market too, with shares fluctuating between 25 and 30 per cent in the last 
decades.
785
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 Nevertheless, during the heydays of the liberal tradition (1982-2003), the classes 
of customers who felt most attracted to Rabobank services were not the most glamorous 
ones. A 2000 report
786
 concluded that ―with the economic boom of the last years‖ 
consumers of financial services had ―more money to spend‖, had become ―more 
knowledgeable‖, had adopted a ―more hedonistic lifestyle‖ and ―partly out of necessity‖ 
take charge of their financial affairs. With regards to market position, Rabobank 
comparatively attracted most customers in the following spheres : the ―Family Inc.‖ and 
consumers looking for ―safety‖ in uncertain times.  The ABN AMRO bank, on the other 
hand, attracted more ―financially ambitious consumers‖. The Postbank, finally, is 
positioned as the bank of ―financial outsiders‖, i.e. those looking for an easy, cheap and 
minimal solution to financial affairs. While the Postbank was generally considered an 
―anti-bank‖ by virtue of its lack of bureaucracy and ―bombastic‖ outlets, and the ABN 
AMRO bank‘s style were often perceived as ―business-wise‖ and ―commercial‖, 
Rabobank‘s services were depicted as the ―familiar‖ and  ―humane‖, but also ―average‖ 
solution to financial affairs. In sum, Rabobank held its own, but not more than that. 
 
Strategy b  Cater to customers of different social classes. 
Comparison commercial and co-operative banks 
 How did commercial banks do in terms of tempering resentment and extremity of 
feelings between groups and providing all social classes with a means to fulfil their rightful 
aspirations?  By fit-of-absentmindedness rather than design, Dutch commercial and co-
operative banks turned out to be highly complementary in this regard. First, all banks from 
the late 1960s onwards took the turn to becoming Allfinanz providers, which implied a 
willingness to cater to a variety of social classes.   
 
10.3: Ranking of market leadership of major banks in the Netherlands 
(1 = highest, 4 = lowest) 
 
Payment 
services 
Savings 
Consumer 
credit 
Mortgages 
Investment 
banking 
Private 
banking 
ABN AMRO 3 3 2 3 1 1 
RABOBANK 2 1 3 1 2 4 
ING 1 2 1 2 3 3 
FORTIS 
NL* 
4 4 4 4 4 2 
(Source: Boonstra and Groeneveld, 2006: 32) 
* FORTIS market leadership in the Netherlands only, not Belgium 
 
In table 10.3, I provide a ranking of the market leadership of varieties of banks in 
Dutch financial services. The different services by an large correspond to different social 
classes. Savings is an activity most popular amongst the lower and middle classes, 
payment services is an almost universal service, consumer credit services are directed 
mainly to the lower and middle classes, mortgages are most affordable for the wealthier 
and settled middle classes, while investment and private banking are the remit of the upper, 
international classes. ING, with its low-cost banking division – the commercialised State 
Postal Savings Bank, and Rabobank top the savings, mortgages and payment services 
rankings. Rabobank has also long topped the rankings  in terms of other universal service 
denominators: publicly available cash machines and deposit-taking branches (see tables 
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10.4 and 10.5). ABN AMRO, for its part, tops the ranking of the upper classes services.  
All banks, however, are active in the different banking services. 
 
 
Table 10.4: Number of publicly available cash machines in the Netherlands 
(beginning of 1992) 
ABN AMRO 711 
NMB Postbank (ING) 765 
General Savings Banks 523 
Rabobank 1332 
 
 
Table 10.5: Deposit-taking branches in the Netherlands, 1981 
(Source: Boleat, 1981 : 63) 
Institution Number of Branches 
Rabobank 3,102 
General savings Banks 641 
Commercial banks 2,258 
 
 
ING undoubtedly has the most breadth and relative depth in most services, 
followed by Rabobank. Contrary to Rabobank and ING, who championed the small and 
medium business market, ABN AMRO, by contrast, clearly has become the bank for the 
upper classes and large multinational companies. That is, in spite of its constituent banks‘ 
early efforts to become Allfinanz providers in the 1970s – during which they built a range 
of new products and services to attract the widest possible clientele, plus a country-wide 
branch network to distribute them.
787
  In 2001, ABN AMRO‘s marketshares were as 
follows : 40 percent in Corporate banking, 25 % of SME banking, and some 17 % in retail 
banking (about 20 percent in savings and lending and some 15 percent in mortgages).
788
 
When comparing trajectories to the status of Allfinanz provider, it is interesting to see how 
Rabobank followed a much more gradual path than ABN AMRO
789
: non-core businesses 
were integrated upwards into an Allfinanz Group since the mid-1960s – with the 
acquisition of the securities bank Schretlen in 1965, the collaboration with life insurer 
Interpolis since 1969 and the establishment of the finance company Lage Landen that same 
year, the foundation of the property developer Rabo Vastgoed in1978, and the acquisitions 
of an asset management company (Robeco), a securities bank (Stroeve) and a venture 
capital company (Gilde Investment) in the 1990s and 2000s.
790
 Contrary to ABN AMRO, 
Rabobank's core business is still with individuals and small corporate clients, as can be 
seen from the fact that it accounts for some 45% of all savings deposits and for almost 60 
% of the loans granted to individual clients. The relative significance of interbank and 
securities transactions, by contrast, is far smaller (Klein, 1995: 67). Testifying to 
Rabobank‘s development beyond its narrow roots, by 1987 the banks‘s total outstanding 
loans in sectors other than agriculture exceeded those in the agricultural sector for the first 
time. By 2005, Rabobank‘s agricultural loans amounted to a mere 8% of total outstanding 
credit.   
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Strategy c Make State policy on economic citizenship by “fait accompli”  
i) Commercial banks 
        During the 1980s, the Dutch government would assert its desire to reduce its 
role in the housing market, and eagerly participate in the deregulation of capital markets as 
well as other European ―Single Market‖ objectives. During the heydays of polarisation, 
politicisation and participation, however, few parties could avow to this. In the shadows of 
the triumph of social-democratic civilisation aims, commercial banks did some of the 
government‘s dirty geopolitical work: invest in a European vantage point conducive to the 
low-cost spill-over of international trends. By virtue of their early participation in 
European banking consortia and the Eurodollar markets, as well their growing involvement 
in the mortgage market, commercial banks in effect facilitated the making of policy by fait 
accompli by several State entities: not just the Dutch government, but also the European 
Court of Justice and the European Commission.  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) verdict in the 1979 ―Cassis Dijon‖ case 
officially kickstarted the primacy of ―mutual recognition‖ over ―complete harmonisation‖ 
in European competition and integration law. ―Mutual recognition‖ is a European 
governance response to the challenge of US-led globalisation; it entails that common 
concerns should be tackled in a manner that  accommodates diversity and respects the 
institutional integrity and political autonomy of member States in all matters where 
uniformity and centralisation are not necessary or not possible (Scharpf, 2001: 13).  
Mutual recognition does not do away entirely with European-wide harmonisation of 
standards. Yet, it limits these standards to the bare minimum, and decisively lays the 
initiative with member nations – through the double principle of home-country control and 
minimal European harmonisation.   
With its 1979 verdict, the ECJ could have invoked a mountain of trouble on itself. 
The European Commission had not come to similar conclusions yet; the threat of a 
panoply of immobilising lawsuits and political interventions was rife. That is, if it were not 
for the confluence of two happy accidents that helped push European collaboration in a 
constructive direction. There was the experimental, preparatory work done by European 
banking consortia since the late 1950s that had led to contiguous conclusions – reducing 
the potential burden on the ECJ to uphold European competition and integration law. And 
by the early 1980s, social-democratic governments in the large member nations had been 
voted out of power, facilitating the emergence of a new majority consensus within the 
European community: by default of more monetary and market integration the US and 
Japan would outstrip European countries‘ growth and innovativeness.791 Somewhat 
lagging the ECJ approach, the European Commission pondered on what basis a monetary 
union and European-wide system of market integration and capital deregulation should be 
based: complete harmonisation or mutual recognition?  By the mid-1980s, the Delors-led 
Commission concluded that the principle of complete harmonisation approach was 
faltering, and mutual recognition was preferable.  
How exactly did commercial banks provide the ECJ and European Commission 
with the ability to make policy by fait accompli? By virtue of their experimentations in 
European consortia since the late 1950s, banks paved the way for the practical superiority 
of ―imperfect harmonisation‖ and ―mutual recognition‖ across member states (e.g. Hertig, 
1994; Ornito, 2007). In particular, German, French, Belgian and Dutch banks – the 
Deutsche Bank, Credit Lyonnais, Societe Generale de Belgique, and Amsterdam bank – 
pioneered experimental forms of European collaboration and integration, supported at a 
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distance by their respective central banks. They launched the ―Bachelors Club‖ (1958)792, 
the European Advisory Committee (1963) and the European Banks International Company 
(1970), for several reasons, ranging ranged from domestic market protection to a unified 
European vision (Slager, 2004: 99). North-American banks posed a serious threat to 
European banks‘ previously unchallenged home markets; having followed their own 
multinational companies overseas, US banks now started to aggressively pursue the 
business of European multinationals.  Thus, European banks wanted to have a platform of 
―mutual consultation‖ as to the handling of investment banking business of an international 
nature such as the Eurodollar markets; including the setting up of joint international 
branches in London. Also, partner banks wanted to prevent competition with each other in 
the home markets, as well as sharing the risks and costs of setting up international 
investment branches.
793
  Furthermore, European banks wanted to position themselves 
favourably in the common economic and monetary union, or the envisioned ―Europe 
bancaire‖ (Ross, 2002; Vries et al., 1999: 364). 
The European banking consortia of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s have been called 
flawed, and rather ineffective in the creation of a competitive Europe bancaire (Ross, 
1998). That is undoubtedly the right qualification if one considers the discrepancy between 
the initital intentions of some of the consortia‘s partner banks‘ – a fully ―harmonised‖ 
European joint-venture with own branches –  and the ultimate demise of most European 
consortia in the 1980s. Yet, it is a less correct qualification if one considers some of the 
unintentional consequences of the banking consortia: particularly, the development of an 
informal tradition  of ―mutual recognition‖ from an initial tentative goal of mutual 
consultation.  The mutual recognition principle from its very first use in the Treaty of 
Rome had been geared towards standardisation across professional communities (EEC, 
1987). One of the more unintentional consequences of European banking consortia was the 
creation of a professional community – supported at a distance by members‘ central banks 
– that could set the pace of administrative regulation rather than be dictated episodically by 
national or European State entities.  As EC pressures for harmonisation of competition 
rules grew, banks managed to perpetuate their special status, maintaining up to 1981 that  
normal competition rules did not apply to them because they were entrusted with ―the 
operation of services of the general economic interest‖ (Williams, 1994). By 
experimenting with different ways to fend off the US challenge and build a European 
bancaire ahead of forceful public pressures of European harmonisation, banks by fit-of-
absentmindedness pioneered changes in European competition law – with implications 
beyond the Europe bancaire.
794
  
In the wake of the liberalisation of international finance from the late 1960s
795
, it 
were banking consortia such as EBIC
796
, ABECOR and InterAlpha
797
 who paved the way 
for a type of economic enterprise in Europe that was increasingly transnational – resulting 
in calls for a new European directive on Companies, and calls for member states to consent 
to minimal standards of mutual recognition.
798
 One lesson the banking consortia learnt by 
the late 1970s is that a full-blown European joint-venture bank such as EBIC
799
 – with its 
own branches in all member states – did not work. In other words, a full joint-venture – 
implying harmonisation of practice across all member-banks – was not practical. Yet, 
EBIC provided a powerful learning platform. Established in London, it encouraged 
member banks such as AMRO to establish their own branch in London, and acquire 
interests outside their home countries. What did work much better than European-wide 
harmonisation, was informal bilateral collaboration between for instance the Societe 
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Generale – a predecessor of FORTIS – and AMRO bank – predecessor of ABN AMRO.  
The two banks came to work closer together to facilitate a minimum framework of mutual 
recognition – facilitating a possible cross-country merger – in the European Community.  
While the merger between Societe Generale and AMRO finally did not happen, it 
unintentionally paved the way for another Belgian-Dutch banking merger, FORTIS.  
Given the long history of cross-border banking collaboration, and in anticipation of the 
formation of the European Union (1992), the Dutch Bank substantially loosened its 
restrictions on Dutch banks‘ home market power, which no longer was considered a threat 
given the larger competitive framework of the European Union.
800
 Beyond mutual 
recognition between Benelux banks, the attitude of Dutch banks towards a entry of other 
European banks also evolved markedly. During the 1990s, Dutch banks had reacted 
defensively towards National Westminster‘s attempts to acquire Dutch Van Lanschot 
Bankiers and intrude the home market, forming a Dutch consortium. Yet, by 2007 the 
development of a pan-European tradition of mutual recognition had evolved to such an 
extent that the former Dutch champion ABN AMRO could be acquired by a pan-European 
(Belgian-Spanish-Scottish) consortium. In sum, the development of the mutual recognition 
principle in the EU has gone a long way since the first European bank consortia. IN the 
process, Dutch and European authorities have learnt to accommodate to the formation of a 
European competitive level-playing field at the pace of private banks as much as public 
regulators.   
ii) Co-operative Rabobank 
        It was much harder for co-operative banks such as Rabobank to remain one 
step ahead of European regulation and be at the forefront of the development of the mutual 
recognition movement. The sheer variety of Co-operative legal forms in the European 
Community was bewildering; furthermore, home governments have long seen Co-
operatives as purely domestic vehicles.
801
 Thus, on the European and international scene, 
Rabobank had to follow the way paved by commercial banks. At the end of the day, this 
would not be such a bad thing for Co-operative banks. For one, it prompted the European 
Commission to create a level-playing field for commercial and co-operative banks, starting 
with the first European banking directive in 1977 – both were labelled European credit 
institutions henceforth.
802
 It also prompted co-operatives such as Rabobank to learn from 
the experiences of commercial banking consortia and avoid marginalisation in face of the 
burgeoning triumph of the ―liberal tradition‖ in the European Commission.  
Up to the 1980s, Co-operative banks had been able to anticipate Dutch and EEC  
regional policy. Coinciding with the oil crisis, and the EEC taking up the mantle of 
regional policy promoter
803
, the purpose of Dutch regional policy from 1973 shifted 
towards goals of efficiency in fewer areas. The EEC in 1975 established the European 
Reconstruction Development Fund, with the objective to correct regional imbalances due 
to the predominance of agriculture, industrial change, and structural unemployment. This 
played right into the alley of Co-operative banks, who had long been promoters of the 
gradual modernisation of agriculture – including the shifting of agricultural workers to 
other industries, and who had been busy shifting their assets towards non-agricultural 
SMEs for a while now. Thus, in one regard, Rabobank led the way in facilitating European 
policy by fait accompli: the reform of common agricultural policy in response to the 
formation of a new geopolitical consensus around the ―liberal‖ tradition – driven by a US 
looking for new horizons for its agricultural productivity.  Holding the accounts of close to 
100% of Dutch agricultural co-operatives, Rabobank facilitated a comprehensive 
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rationalisation of these entities‘ businesses, providing them with a low-cost, internationally 
competitive vantage point in European and worldwide  dairy markets.
804
 Thus when the 
European Community decided to freeze price-support measures in order to stop inflation 
and control production levels, Dutch agricultural co-operatives found themselves relatively 
well prepared.  All the same, Co-operative banks‘ seminal role in regional and agricultural 
policy waned in the 1980s, for the simple reason that remaining regional disparities in the 
Netherlands had largely been reduced and agricultural co-operatives had gained a new 
maturity by the end of the decade (cfr. Bachler, 2001: 13). 
 Together with its uninterrupted mutual consultation in the UNICO consortium, 
Rabobank‘s continuous commitment to the reduction of regional disparities and 
agricultural modernisation ultimately would give it a competitive advantage in Europe; 
allowing it to make a significant contribution to the development of the mutual recognition 
tradition in the European Union. Thus, when the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development was founded in 1991, Rabobank‘s industry and regional expertise provided it 
with a good vantage point in the financial reconstruction of the Central and Eastern 
European food and agricultural industry. Ultimately, it allowed the bank to acquire a 
majority stake in one of the biggest agricultural and SME banks in Poland, Bank 
Gospodarki Żywnościowej, with the help of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (2008).  
  Beyond Europe, Rabobank proved rather successful in facilitating policy by 
fait accompli on the domestic front. The co-operative bank led the way in re-stabilising the 
mortgage market with its non-profit aims after the housing market crisis in the 1970s, the 
collapse of specialised mortgage banks in the 1980s and during the increasingly 
consumerist, credit-driven 1990s and 2000s. For instance, Rabobank has often been the 
champion of a reasonable mortgage rate at fixed long-term conditions - which protected 
mortgagees against the vagaries of consumerist fashions and macro-economic disruptions. 
All in all, during the last decade, Rabobank has been amongst the best performing 
European Co-operative banks, together with its Finnish, French and Spanish counterparts 
(Barros et al. 2006). 
iii) Demise of specialised mortgage banks 
       In the first half of the 1970s, rising inflation and optimism about the 
country‘s economic prospects led to a higher demand for inflation-proof investments, most 
notably  housing property. In response, Commercial banks developed new types of 
mortgages that allowed consumers to convert credit into greater spending power. Savings 
banks as early as the late 1960s had diversified in mortgages. In order to tackle the 
increasing competition of these banks and spread their risks, some of the bigger mortgage 
banks branched out into various retail-estate activities, including property development 
and investment for their own account. Fuelled by high inflation and lagging interest rates, a 
real estate boom took place in the second half of the 1970s, which the mortgage banks 
profited a great deal of. The result was an explosive growth in demand for owner-occupier 
houses – by institutional investors and individual households – that could not be met by 
new supply in such a short time. House prices increased rapidly. While the property 
development and mortgage businesses of commercial and mortgage banks continued to 
expand, the Nederlandsche Bank remained impassive until 1977, when some restrictions 
were introduced to limit greater credit growth, with minimal effects. At the end of the 
1970s, the second oil crisis and the breakdown of the Western monetary consensus hit the 
overheated Dutch housing market particularly hard.  It is only then, in 1979, that the Dutch 
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Central Bank, fearing solvency problems, decisively curtailed the overheated housing 
market – among others by limiting the supply of mortgages and restricting practices of 
growth on credit.
805
  All this came too late. By 1980, the Dutch owner-occupier market had 
collapsed completely (Van Dongen et al., 1982).
806
  
When the boom burst, mortgage banks more than other banks felt the crunch. 
After all, contrary to mortgage banks, commercial, cooperative and savings banks could 
fund themselves with relatively cheap savings deposits, and keep their interest rates 
attractive after 1979.
807
 Apart from the Rabohypotheekbank
808
, the biggest Dutch mortgage 
bank – owned by the co-operative Rabobank, none of the independent mortgage banks 
were able to weather the financial and regulatory turbulence of the early 1980s (Barendregt 
and Visser, 1997: 179-182). The Rabohypotheekbank had weathered the storm by sticking 
to its knitting, restricting itself to the core mortgage business, as well as by relying on its 
mother company‘s many branches to sell its bonds and attract private placements.  
With the benefit of hindsight, and as long feared by the leadership of the 
Association of Mortgage Banks, the mortgage banks would pay for the lack of specialised 
prudential mortgage arrangements in the Netherlands.  For instance, the Dutch government 
did not provide mortgage banks with the ability to finance their new real estate activities 
by mortgage bonds. Thus, instead of a risk-spreading exercise, real estate diversification 
turned out to be the principal cause of mortgage banks‘ demise during the 1980 real estate 
crunch. 
 
Strategy d   Translate State policy on economic citizenship  
i) Commercial banks 
       During the heydays of social-democratic polarisation, political attacks on  
Commercial banks‘ ―undemocratic‖ level of market control were rife. Criticisms 
notwithstanding, Dutch commercial banks‘ made great strides in not only the wholesale, 
but also retail markets, helping to bring the percentage of Dutch adults with a current 
account to virtually 100 percent by 1988 – less than 5 percent of Dutch workers were still 
regularly paid in cash. In the UK these figures were respectively 65-70 percent and 30 
percent (Gardener and Molyneux, 1990: 87). Commercial banks‘ cooperation with 
Rabobank in providing a universal payment system to Dutch employees since the 1970s 
accounts for much of this retail banking revolution in the Netherlands.
809
 As soon as 
polarisation waned, and the liberal tradition emerged triumphant, criticism on commercial 
banks died down. This allowed commercial banks to focus more on international 
wholesale banking and other high-yielding commission fee services, while becoming 
increasingly ―universal‖ in scope.810 During the 1990s and 2000s it became clear to ABN 
AMRO that this would not offer the desired long-term results. Most notably, ABN 
AMRO‘s relative lack of focus on retail banking in its first home market and its 
overstretch in its second US home market in time would come back to haunt it. ABN 
AMRO‘s cost structure soared during the 1990s, opening the way for the entry of a low-
cost retail bank provider: the privatised State Postal Savings Bank which formed part of 
the conglomerate ING. ABN AMRO somewhat lost out on another breakthrough ―low 
cost‖ retailing evolution: the emergence of insurance-banking conglomerates such as ING 
and FORTIS after the Dutch Bank‘s loosening of banking and insurance regulation in 
1990. Contractual savings such as life insurances and pensions arguably became the most 
important State-sponsored vehicles of economic citizenship from the 1970s onwards, and 
certainly during the privatisation of pension provisions in the 1980s and 1990s.
811
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Yet, while ING and FORTIS acquired respectively 14.7 and 10.7 percent of the 
Dutch insurance market (by 2005)
812
, and were able to fine-tune their cross-selling 
capabilities in the process – making their branches much more cost effective and 
profitable, ABN AMRO was only a timid follower in this regard.   
ii) Co-operative Rabobank 
      One key to Rabobank‘s success was its successful organisational adaptation to 
the demise of confessional boundaries, and the emergence of a unitary Christian-
Democratic Party. In 1972, the Catholic and Protestant co-operative banks finally merged. 
Furthermore, Rabobank beat the commercial banks to the punch when it came to a new 
financial vehicle of economic citizenship: mortgages. And it was very competitive in the 
life insurance market. Long before the belated breakthrough of home ownership in the 
1990s, Dutch policy makers had praised the potential of home ownership as an important 
road to economic citizenship, due to its important social benefits: a better spread of 
property, capital generation, a better social integration, distribution of wealth, familism, 
self-fulfilment and self-determination, more privacy and more decision power as to living 
conditions (Elsinga, 1995).  By virtue of its most resilient mortgage bank, 
Rabohypotheekbank, and its tendency to treat customers not only on the basis of harsh 
economic profit ratios, Rabobank by the 1980s gained the reputation in government and 
Dutch Bank circles of being the rightful leader of the Dutch mortgage market.
813
  
Paradoxically, the 1970s triggers of Rabobank‘s mortgage success – inflation, the 
rise rise of housing prices and the slower growth of the real average disposable income, 
had significantly dented the bank‘s potential regarding an older vehicle of economic 
citizenship: free savings.  The fiscal privileges accorded to contractual savings since the 
1970s and increasingly so in the 1980s also ate away at the Dutch free savings market, 
turning it in a relatively mature market. From about 50 percent at the beginning of the 
1970s, the share of contractual savings reached a staggering 90 percent in the nineties.
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Especially popular was the fiscally deductible life insurance product called 
―koopsompolis‖. Fortunately for Rabobank, its Catholic branch had long collaborated with 
Interpolis – a life insurance company formed in 1969 from among others a Catholic 
Farmer Union (KNBTB). Before the commercial banks, Rabobank developed 
―koopsompolissen‖ in cooperation with Interpolis, with the risk share going to the insurer 
and the savings share to the bank (Sluyterman, 1998: 219). Rabobank Group acquired 
Interpolis in 1990 to reap the fruits of more product integration and cross-selling services.  
Once this objective had more or less been reached, in 2005, Rabobank exchanged 
Interpolis for 37% of the shares in Eureko, the largest insurance group in the 
Netherlands.
815
 
Rabobank‘s refusal to comprehensively cut bank its extensive branch network 
across the country, while long the object of derision among profit-minded commercial 
banks, has belatedly been revalued by politicians. The social-democratic party (PVDA) in 
2005 launched a legislative proposal – the law ―Crone‖ – to this effect; maintaining that 
every Dutch inhabitant should have a banking branch at its disposition within a radius of 3 
km. Only Rabobank fulfilled this last condition.  
Finally, by virtue of its leadership in the SME market, Rabobank, together with 
ING, is a champion of that distinctive vehicle of economic citizenship cherished by the 
European Union. Yet, all good things do not come from the European Union after all.  
As we discussed earlier, the protective silence of Dutch and European elites about 
immigration, and the gradual weakening of Dutch consociational traditions imparted a 
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declining ability to deal with outsider groups such as Muslim immigrants (cf. Muus, 2004: 
265). By the 1990s, the protective silence was slowly evaporating to produce feelings of 
extremism. Yet, firmly associated with the social-democratic myth and the old boy club of 
Regent leaders, Rabobank‘s leaders failed to enact the first signs of growing extremity. As 
the commercial banks, Rabobank had neglected immigrant groups – for instance Turkish 
would-be entrepreneurs – in the inner cities. Albeit Rabobank was rather weak in the inner 
cities, this did not serve its image of consensus-enhancing vehicle too well. For by 1991, 
more than eighty percent of the breadwinners of Turkish and Moroccan origins and about 
60 percent of Surinam and Antillean origins belonged to the lower economic classes. Only 
35% of the autochthonous Dutch breadwinners, on the other hand, belonged to the lower 
classes (Roelandt, 1994: 184).  It is only after the ―happy accident‖ of the Fortuyn 
movement, which, shattered the protective silence in favour of a more Orangist 
government policy, that Rabobank started focusing on the target group of Muslim 
Immigrants – partly to reinforce its originally weak position in the cities, partly to reinvent 
its ability to integrate religious divisions in a confederal framework. 
 
Strategy e   Become a champion of national character 
i)  Commercial Banks 
     To become a champion of Dutch national character one has to reinvent the 
Dutch legacy of ―Dutch nonconformism‖: reinforce local  privileges and traditions by 
pioneering a low-cost and pragmatic geopolitical vantage point; a vantage point conducive 
to a spill-over of the benefits of emerging international standards, techniques and 
agreements.   
    The above historical success model essentially is a small nation legacy. The 
demise of ABN AMRO as a national champion can only be understood if one considers 
how the dominant part in the merger, ABN bank, failed to adhere to this small nation 
model since the international financial liberalisations of the late 1960s. For one, ABN bank 
was so rattled by prime minister‘s Den Uyl‘s overbearing social-democratic propositions, 
that it deemed the Dutch home market too small for its intentions from a very early stage 
onwards, when its domestic retail base had not been consolidated yet.
816
  The more 
fundamental reason for the bank‘s final demise, was that, in spite of the post-WWII 
settlement in favour of the primacy of the EC for the Netherlands – the reconstruction of 
Dutch and European traditions of democratisation in parallel, ABN was still steeped in the 
old Dutch imperial-colonial legacy.   ABN therefore considered the acquisition of a low-
cost vantage point in the surrounding European Community countries – a second European 
home market – too mean an international object too.  ABN since the late 1950s 
differentiated itself from AMRO, the Societe Generale and Dutch savings banks – 
constituent predecessors of FORTIS, and Rabobank by a less than wholehearted 
participation in European banking consortia (cf. Slager, 2004: 233). Indeed, ABN only 
halfheartedly participated in for instance EBIC, much in the same way Midland Bank, with 
its preference for a consortia of English-speaking banks, did (Ross, 2002: 139).    
Perceiving more of a continuity with the British and US ―liberal tradition‖817, 
ABN felt attracted towards the universal shareholder capitalism myth; namely that 
becoming a world market leader solely depends on a company‘s superior market 
entrepreneurship, not the geopolitical and historical limitations of one‘s nation-state 
affiliation.  Thus, ABN set sight on the US and by the 1990s South America
818
 as its two 
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new home markets, creating very high expectations in the process amongst its increasingly 
internationalised shareholders. 
After its merger with ABN in 1991, AMRO could not set the balance right; the 
former half very much dominated the merged entity‘s international strategy. The merger 
propelled ABN AMRO to the 16th position on the world list of banks in that year, 
prompting the bank to formally announce its first-tier international banking ambitions.
819
 
The Dutch market was taken-for-granted; ABN AMRO labeled itself ―The Bank‖ in the 
Netherlands. Meanwhile, ABN AMRO was in danger of overstretching itself 
internationally. In the years ensuing the 1979 acquisition of Midwest-bank Lasalle, ABN‘s 
ventures in the US had looked like a stroke of good luck; the bank had been able to take 
advantage of historical regulatory impediments on US banks‘ interstate activities to 
acquire itself a strong competitive position in the Midwest.
820
 During the 1990s, these 
impediments were largely abolished, making it much harder for ABN AMRO to withstand 
US home competition, and turn a profit.  Many banks from larger, more ambitious nation-
states –  English and Japanese – exited from the US in those years; the general expectation 
was that to compete effectively, large interstate investments in a critical operational mass 
would be necessary (Tschoegl, 1987).  The giant HSBC stayed, and so did the smaller 
ABN AMRO. In spite of its faltering efforts to bring LaSalle in the fold of Amsterdam 
corporate management (Westerhuis, 2004)
821
, ABN AMRO acquired other banking 
operations around Lasalle to become no less than the largest foreign bank in the United 
States.
822
 In a further bid to adopt the ―liberal‖ banking model, the bank moved its equity 
trading business to the City of London (1993).  
Meanwhile, closer at home, ABN AMRO‘s attempts to acquire a European bank 
failed. It therefore settled for another large retail market outside the US, namely Brazil – 
with the 1999 acquisitions of Banco Real and Bandepe. ABN now had three home retail 
markets: the Netherlands, the United States and Brazil. While ABN AMRO was making a 
handy profit by the year 2000, its share price was seriously lagging behind. One of the 
main reasons for this was that, in the eyes of institutional investors, The Bank had not 
managed to become a first-tier international bank, fuelling evaluations of its international 
ambitions as ―unsustainable‖ and a case of ―overstretch‖.  All the more since ING and 
FORTIS had emerged on the domestic horizon in the 1990s, fortifying their shares in the 
Dutch retail,  SME and insurance markets. The latter two banks‘ choice to expand 
internationally with low-cost, pragmatic propositions more in tune with the long-term 
vantage point of a small European nation.  Most notably, ING‘s and FORTIS‘ hedging of 
bets across the combination banking-insurance in complementary international markets 
had earned them a better share price performance.
823
  
Devoid of this low-cost vantage point, ABN AMRO faced a soaring cost 
structure, which aggravated matters in institutional investors‘ eyes. ABN AMRO‘s 
management reacted by announcing the closure of a third of its Dutch branch network and 
a quarter of its Dutch retail operations staff. It had done this, because it did not accept the 
lessons drawn at the end of the 1990s by for instance Barclays: European banks need to 
scale down their investment bank operations to lower-margin fixed income, Treasury and 
commodities markets. In another desperate move, ABN AMRO after a long battle with 
Italian authorities and competitor banks, finally acquired the European bank it craved, 
Antonvenenta. This pricy acquisition proved a Phyrrus victory, and ultimately dealt ABN 
AMRO the death blow. By virtue of its embrace of universal shareholder capitalism, US 
private equity firm TCI deemed ABN AMRO so weakened and overstretched, that I 
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demanded no less than the split up of the bank in service of the ideal of shareholder value 
maximisation.  With ING refusing a merger in 2007, ABN AMRO‘s game as an 
independent bank was up. 
In sum, ABN AMRO resolved to play cavalier seul and become a world leader in 
investment banking, even though the success model of the small nation to which it was 
affiliated was far less grand – relying on low-cost, international spill-overs rather than 
home-grown world market innovation and domination.  
Arguably, FORTIS belatedly also overplayed its hand. This champion of a core 
part of Old Europe – the Benelux, with origins in the savings bank movement and Belgian 
haute finance, was long renowned for its gradual, complementary expansion. Under 
pressure from institutional investors to outgrow its modest, regional ambitions FORTIS, 
contrary to ING and Rabobank, overexposed itself to subprime packages sold by US 
banks. The losses incurred in this reckless move are now putting great strain on the 
feasibility of FORTIS‘ participation in the European consortium that acquired ABN 
AMRO in 2008. 
ii) Co-operative Rabobank 
    At the beginning of the 1970s, Rabobank‘s lack of international presence was 
no cause of concern. Of the four major players in Dutch banking – ABN, AMRO, NMB 
and Rabobank – only one, ABN, had offices abroad in the early 1970s.824 Following the 
herd of commercial banks, Rabobank first took a stake in the consortium bank London and 
Continental bank (1972), and started an ultimately short-lived joint venture with Bank of 
America - Rabomerica International (1974).
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 Reflecting the limitations of the Co-
operative legal form – in which the control of capital ultimately is with local banks, 
leaving the central bank little financial leeway to engage in costly international 
acquisitions – Rabobank developed a correspondence network across the EC in alliance 
with UNICO – the consortium of Northern European Co-operative banks founded in 1977.  
One unintentional breakthrough moment for Rabobank central office‘s internationalisation 
plans was the approval of a guarantee system across local banks in the wake of the 
mortgage and energy crises in 1980. This cross-guarantee system rendered all local banks 
and daughter companies within Rabobank group mutually accountable for each other‘s 
liabilities. At the end of the day, it gave the central bank not only greater supervisory 
powers, but also a greater measure of strategic and financial leeway. Added to its virtually 
impregnable retail and SME basis in the Netherlands, this spectacularly increased 
Rabobank‘s solvency, catapulting it to the highest possible international credit rating – a 
―Triple A‖ rating.  
Under pressure to maintain this high rating, and with the advantage of a capital 
and reserve basis that was growing faster than total assets, Rabobank‘s central 
management in the early 1980s also felt that the Netherlands was becoming too small for 
its ambitions (Pohl and Freitag, 1994: 787).
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  Yet, contrary to AMRO and ABN, 
Rabobank‘s internationalisation strategy remained far more gradual and grounded in its 
domestic, long term strengths. Foreign activities from the beginning in the 1970s served 
one purpose: to facilitate domestic clients‘ own internationalisation activities and broaden 
Rabobank‘s domestic competitive position (De Boer and Graafsma, 2002: 113). To stay 
with the times – the emergence of a G7-backed ―liberal democracy‖ consensus, 
management in the 1980s decided to open offices in a number of major OECD countries. 
Beyond this very modest aim, Rabobank made its first major international acquisition in 
1983. By virtue of its relations in the UNICO network – particularly German DG bank and 
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Spanish Banco Popular, Rabobank was able to acquire German ADCA.
827
 The bank started 
push more for acquisitions in the latter half of the 1990s, faced with the rising costs of its 
foreign branch network.
828
 This rather ambitious reorientation initially was not 
successful.
829
 For a moment, it seemed Rabobank did not have an international strategy 
after all.
830
  Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, the bank did develop a solid 
internationalisation platform, centred on entering strategic alliances with UNICO-partners, 
and opening branch offices in Europe, North American, Asia and South America to serve 
Dutch SME customers. From a position of strength, the bank also made a few 
opportunistic acquisitions of agricultural and SME banks such as Irish ACC Bank, US 
Valley International Bank, Polish BGZ and Paraguyan Banco Regional. Rabobank also 
very successfully copied ING‘s low-cost internationalisation formula of Internet-banking, 
although closer at home: in Belgium. Finally, in 2005 Rabobank integrated its insurance 
daughter Interpolis in the Dutch EUREKO group, a European insurance company which is 
expanding in eastern and southern Europe. 
By 2007, Rabobank ranked as the 24
th
 biggest bank in the world – discounting  
insurance business, compared to ABN AMRO that was ranked 13
th
, ING bank that was 
ranked 15
th
, and FORTIS that ranked as number 21.
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 In terms of tier-1 capital, i.e. the 
core measure of a bank's financial strength from regulators‘ point of view832, Rabobank 
advanced the other Dutch banks, however, with its 19
th
 position, followed by ING in 20
th
 
position.
833
 The bank was also considered amongst the safest banks in the world by several 
international rating agencies. The strength of Rabobank‘s international position, however, 
has always derived from its domestic position. The bank‘s management from about 2003 
onwards, was able to reinforce this position again. In the wake of Fortuyn‘s movement, 
which argued that the Netherlands had become disconnected from its  roots in religious 
traditions (Fortuyn, 2002b), and steeped in relativism after the triumph of liberal capitalism 
(Fortuyn, 1997: 12), the bank increasingly emphasised its ―Orange‖ character – and 
business label. Contrary to other banks and multinationals which may have lost touch with 
their country of origin and sense of purpose (Fortuyn, 1997: 16-18), Rabobank was 
positioned as an entirely grounded company. A company whose mission was for instance 
to give Dutch Muslims a place in the bank and society.  
In sum, while entering the mainstream of the banking world, Rabobank more then 
held its on as a national champion of the Dutch success model of Dutch nonconformism, 
on a par with FORTIS, although only second to ING.  If the threat of food shortage would 
become more acute again in the coming decade, and national globalisation were to become 
an obsolete term, the bank may well emerge as an uncontested national champion.  
 
Strategy f    Become a champion of the national economic interest. 
i) Commercial Banks 
      Commercial banks‘ role as champions of the national economic interest was 
greatly enhanced during the period 1968-2007, albeit as much due to management trying to 
escape domestic limitations than by virtue of a greater commitment to the domestic 
economy. By the mid-1970s, commercial banks such as AMRO held prominent positions 
in the Dutch network of interlocking directorates. By 1996 it were primarily top managers 
of non-financials that occupied commissioner positions on bank boards. Bank directors did 
not use directorates anymore to monitor and direct the Dutch economy. On the contrary, 
banks‘ own Boards of Directors act as rallying points - clubs - for the new non-financial 
―captains of industry‖ (Fennema, 2004: 44). This transition was the result of a remarkable 
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individualisation of banks‘ interest group politics during the 1970s and 1980s, in face of 
growing domestic criticism. By the 1990s, the reality of economic transnationalisation had 
become so ascendant that not Dutch banks but foreign banks were seen as the real menace 
to a sound financial system,  that is a financial system working in the national economic 
interest.
834
 This led to the renewal of the Dutch network of interlocking directorates in the 
1990s and 2000s. In this new network Dutch captains of industry – the new generation of 
Regent capitalists – congregated, often by virtue of their directorships in commercial 
banks.  
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, strong growth and increasing 
concentration in the banking sector led to criticism of the ―corrupting role‖ played by 
commercial banks. Banks came under sustained attack over their supposedly 
« undemocratic » level of control on the domestic market.
835
  According to several leaders 
of the breakthrough movement, banks were ―spiders‖ in the web of Dutch power relations, 
as the great number of directorships of bank managers in large companies and the 
historical links with the policy establishment demonstrated (cf. De Vries et al., 1999 : 351; 
Helmers et al., 1975).
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  Especially the managing directors of the two main Commercial 
banks – AMRO and ABN – were found to hold pre-eminent positions in Dutch economic 
life. Ultimately, this criticism came high on the agenda of the social-democratic Prime 
Minister Den Uyl (1973-1977), whose cabinet‘s motto was ―the equal spread of 
knowledge, income and power‖. The Dutch bank had started to respond to these pressures 
as early as 1971, by publicising a number of unofficial directives that prohibited mergers 
of commercial  banks with insurance companies or mortgage banks, and restricted bank 
participation in the equity of other companies to 5%.  Some of these directives were later 
codified in a 1978 banking law.
837
 Also, a new company law was voted – De Wet op 
deOndernemingsraden (1979) – which aimed to democratise control of the companies by 
means of an autonomous Employee Council.  Partly due to the strong collaboration of 
banks in the cartel organisation ―Nederlandsche Bankiersvereniging‖, profit margins and 
fees never came under pressure. Also, the 1979 law only applied to domestic activities; 
allowing banks to pursue international businesses at a distance from domestic 
democratisation pressures. 
This does not mean the international businesses of ABN and AMRO were not 
targeted for criticism; they were, particularly for their dealings with the white minority 
regime in South Africa. For instance, international organisations like the World Council of 
Churches, which had called for a boycott of the South African regime, compiled a blacklist 
of Western European companies maintaining ties with South Africa. ABN figured on that 
list. While anti-apartheid feelings were tangible in most Western countries, they were 
especially vociferous in the Netherlands. For the ongoing depillarisation of the Netherlands 
entailed the destruction of a ―living-together-apart‖ system that to some extent had 
parallels with the South-African apartheid system. Confronted with increasingly vociferous 
anti-apartheid groups, ABN decided to pursue a more cautious policy and stop trading in 
―Kruger rands‖.   
ABN had tried to escape domestic criticism by turning the US, and other faraway  
outlets into new home markets.
838
 AMRO, by contrast, had stayed closer to its domestic 
and European roots. By the mid-1970s, AMRO was at the top of the hierarchy of Dutch 
financial hierarchy.
839
   AMRO was also the core of the so-called transnational European 
network of interlocking directorates in 1976.
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Criticism on both banks died down somewhat during the 1980s, a difficult period 
of retrenchment for ABN and AMRO. While banks were accused of excessive caution – 
leading to the adoption of various government measures such as loan guarantees to 
encourage the provision of risk-taking capital, the Dutch Bank was conscious of ABN and 
AMRO‘s increasing international weakness. Faced with the growing need to be influential 
on both an international and domestic scale, the two most important Commercial banks in 
the Netherlands, ABN Bank and AMRO Bank as early as the late 1970s had expressed the 
wish to find a merger partner. Both banks felt too small to have a sustainable future. 
AMRO Bank found it always more difficult to meet the needs of an increasingly 
international business community in the Dutch wholesale banking market. Arguably, ABN 
Bank had been more successful internationally: it had expanded its international business 
mainly by establishing new branches and taking over foreign banks. All the same, ABN‘s 
international position was not very sustainable either. The bank had based its international 
expansion on the issuing of new shares, and the dilution caused by repeated issues 
translated in falling share prices. Meanwhile, domestically, both banks were in danger of 
being dwarfed by the Postbank and Rabobank; ABN Bank had a marketshare of only 7 
percent, while AMRO Bank barely did better with 9 percent.
841
  
ABN‘s and AMRO‘s wish to merge into a new champion of the national banking 
interest was stopped short by the so-called Structural Policy introduced by the Dutch Bank 
in 1974.  With the ascendancy of a neo-liberal government in the early 1980s, the lobbying 
of the bankers Nelissen of AMRO and Hazelhof of ABN in the Ministry of Finance finally 
bore fruit. Soon cracks in the armour of Structural Policy appeared, accelerated by 
increasing competition of foreign financial institutions in the Dutch market. After an 
earlier deregulation round of mergers between banks and insurance companies, the Dutch 
Bank in 1990 finally lifted the prohibition on bank mergers. The consensus among 
Minister of Finance Duisenberg and the three largest political parties – the christian-
democrats, social-democrats and liberal-democrats – was that the market for financial 
services had become ―global‖.842 Thus, all reacted favourably to the merger of the ABN 
and AMRO Bank in the new entity ABN AMRO (De Vries et al., 1999).
843
 The regulatory 
changes were timely enough to counter the threat of ―foreign invasion‖: while some 13 per 
cent of total banking assets in the Netherlands were owned by foreign firms in 1988, this 
percentage had gone down to 7.7 per cent by 1999. (cf. Belaish et al.2001). For ABN 
AMRO, however, regulatory changes did not lead to a decisive turning of the tide.  Not 
only had the ABN AMRO lost half of its key domestic connections by 1996 – since 
1976.
844
  It had also lost its pivotal transnational position (Carroll and Fennema, 2002 : 
410-412). FORTIS and ING Group now advanced ABN AMRO in degree of centrality in 
transnational networks of interlocking directorates (Heemskerk, 2001: 54, 62-63).  
 During the 1990s the so-called Anglo-Saxon ―corporate governance debate‖, in 
particular the ―universality‖ of shareholder democracy, gained resonance in the 
Netherlands. The main question asked was whether giving shareholders more decision-
making power and abolishing the increasingly distrusted Supervisory Board construction 
would open up the oligarchical governance structure of Dutch economy and render large 
companies more democratically accountable. For many years, the debate – which most 
applied to ABN AMRO – seemed to take a typical ―old boys club‖ turn.845 846 By 2007, 
however, things took a dramatic turn. Unable to defend itself any longer against the 
turmoil caused by private equity companies who demanded a split of the company in the 
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name of shareholder value maximisation, ABN AMRO was taken over by a European 
consortium of banks.  
ii) Co-operative Rabobank 
    The story of Rabobank‘s efforts to become a champion of the national 
economic interest is essentially the story of commercial banks recounted from the less 
conspicuous vantage point of a not-for-profit underdog.  Rabobank also was a pivotal link 
in the Dutch network of interlocking directorates uncovered in the mid-1970s; yet it 
catered to organisations steeped more in the tradition of proportionality than in 
international capitalistic interests – organisation such as agricultural co-operatives, SMEs 
and the SER. In anticipation and response to the 1979 Law on Employee Councils, 
Rabobank tried to reinvent its dealings with both local banks and its members.  
Criticism on commercial banks increased their openness to calls for equal access 
to banking interest groups. In a first stage this helped Rabobank and the savings banks to 
gain access to a so-called Discussion Group of the joint banks (College van Overleg, CVO, 
1971). In this discussion group, Commercial banks, Rabobank and savings banks 
―exchanged thoughts‖ about banking.  Still, a more important ―old boy banking club‖ 
existed in the banking sector, the Netherlands Bankers´ Association – ―Nederlandsche 
Bankvereeniging‖ – which Rabobank did not gain access to. By the end of the 1980s, 
criticism on cartel practices soared to the point that EC regulation rendered cartel 
agreements unlawful. Thus, the Netherlands Bankers‘ Association was discontinued in 
1989. On the initiative of amongst others Wijffels, the new president of the Board of 
Directors of Rabobank, a new body -called the Dutch Association of Banks – Nederlandse 
Vereniging van Banken – was established, in which Rabobank – at least officially – from 
the beginning took its place as an equal amongst equals.
847
  
During the 1970s, Rabobank still managed to retain some of the moral high 
ground. For instance the Catholic leader Bosman repeated the arguments against 
international financial globalisation, and in favour of a real Dutch economy - arguments he 
first made as a leader of the Catholic Co-operative Bank in 1970, now representing united 
Christian-Democratic opinion: ―high inflation leads to a war of all against all and to the 
overthrowing of democratic regimes‖. It also leads to the ―destruction of social 
cohesion‖848, the demolition of the cultural and technological capacities of the nation and 
societal stagnation (Bosman et al., 1976: 11).  By contrast, during the 1980s, heydays of 
neo-liberal austerity, Rabobank went through something of an identity crisis. This period 
coincided with the demise of the Green Front, and with a change in government policy 
from ―backing losers‖ to ―picking winners‖ (Knoester, 1989: 154).  In response, Rabobank 
all but gave up on the political resonance of its historical real economy link. Relinquishing 
the bank‘s distinctive interest group voice, the president of the Board of Directors, the 
social-democrat Wijffels, announced that, now Dutch farmers had become ―emancipated‖, 
Rabobank would never be a political organisation anymore.
849
 
850
  This does not mean 
Rabobank‘s identity crisis was over.  During the early 1990s, Rabobank‘s central 
management launched a broad discussion on the relevance of the Co-operative identity.  
After more than four years of discussion, local banks came to a different conclusion than 
their English building society counterparts: they would remain loyal to the Co-operative 
form. This legal form evidently limited Rabobank during the heydays of international 
―liberal capitalism‖. At times, it drove the bank dangerously close to becoming the 
champion of a countervailing social-democratic myth – customers should be helped no 
matter how unprofitable they are or how much it costs. Yet, attacks by the Fortuyn 
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movement on the vacuousness of the liberal tradition and the ―fatherlandless‖ of Dutch 
elites (Fortuyn, 1997: 16-18), provided the bank with the opportunity to reinforce its 
―champion of the national economic interest‖ credentials. In the best case it may take 
several years, however, for Rabobank to successfully reinvent a ―real economy‖ link 
between its 1.5 million members and co-operative strategy. 
 
                                                 
723 The Werner Report, prepared in 1970, presented a plan for the attainment of economic and monetary union. In 
March 1971, following the Werner Report, Member States expressed ―their political will to establish an economic 
and monetary union‖. Several important moves followed: in 1972 the ‗snake‘ was created; in 1973 the European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) was set up; and in 1974 the Council Decision on the attainment of a high 
degree of convergence in the Community and the Directive on stability, growth and full employment were 
adopted. Yet, by the mid-1970s the process of integration had lost momentum under the pressure of divergent 
policy responses to the economic shocks of the period. In 1979 the process of monetary integration was 
relaunched with the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the European Currency Unit (ECU). 
The success of the EMS in promoting its objectives of internal and external monetary stability has contributed in 
recent years to further progress, as reflected in the adoption, in 1985, of the internal market programme and the 
signing of the Single European Act. 
724 The Washington consensus emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s, in a context of of a failed Soviet model of  
Statism and the apparent success of the more open ―Asian‖ model. The Consensus entailed a set of monetarist 
propositions about the policies most likely to promote economic growth. These propositions more or less 
summarized the view then held by most of the senior officials at the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and other international development organisations. Major elements included: (a) fiscal discipline in the 
form of balanced public sector budgets, (b) liberalization (deregulation) of domestic financial markets, 
international trade flows, and international capital flows, (c) privatization of the means of production, and (d) the 
encouragement of competition (Williamson, 1990).  
725 This trade union configuration remained more or less stable in the decades thereafter (Teulings and 
Hartog 1998: 268). 
726 Against the background of the social-democratic party losing ground in the 1959, 1963 and 1967 elections, a 
new movement emerged in the second half of the 1960‘s and 1970‘s, often coined the ―new left‖ (Gladdish, 1991: 
52-53). The new left movement operated as a loose and somewhat fluid collection of individuals who met 
regularly, wrote books and made public pronouncements . New left promoters came from more intellectual 
occupations than the social democratic party‘s incumbents. When its sway in the party‘s executive grew from 
1966 onwards, new left promoters focused on greater democratisation both within the party (PvdA) and 
throughout public life. 
727 This trend of increasing independence of the individual was strengthened by the rise of discretionary incomes. 
Achievement oriented aspects of social roles, rather than the ascriptive ones which were basic to pillarized 
structures, gained the upper hand. 
728 So, in 1965, the episcopate even withdrew that part of the 1954 edict which had placed the socialist NVV off 
limits for Catholics : ―without wanting to express ourselves about the substance of contemporary socialism in our 
country, we note with satifsaction that the views toward Church and religion have become much more moderate 
in the present-day NVV and that a noticeable effort toward improved understanding is being made‖ (De 
Volkskrant, September 9, 1965, quoted in Windmuller, 1969 : 126). 
729 (De Hond, Algemeen Dagblad, May 20th 1986). That is although Catholics‘ principles of corporate subsidiarity 
and personalism were meant not as the authoritarian imposition of norms, but as a way to avoid exactly that, but 
without incurring unnecessary friction in the process (Gladdish, 1991 : 42). 
730 Elections were not anymore about who would ensure the continuity of an hitherto accommodationist system, 
but about the acquisition of a specific mandate to govern (Gladdish, 1991: 58-60). 
731 A first, more tentative wave of professionalisation had taken place a decade earlier. 
732 i.e. the belief that the realisation of socialism is dependent on sweeping institutional changes 
733 This difference was apparent even amongst the rank and file. A survey conducted in 1967 confirms the 
differences between Dutch Catholic and Calivinist voters regarding the preferred elation between State and 
religion. While only 35 per cent of Catholic voters was against and 52 per cent in favour of the separation of 
politics and religion, these figures amounted to respectively 80 and 14 per cent for Calvinists. Attitudes of 
members of the Dutch Reformed Church – the origins of the old regent class, on the other hand, were strangely 
similar to those of the Catholics, with figures of respectively 35 and 54 per cent (Bakvis, 1981: 166). 
734 Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport 1998 : 139 
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http://www.scp.nl/boeken/scrs/scr1998/nl/acrobat/h5.pdf 
735 As to the relation between religion and voting behaviour (and also income class), the following figures speak 
for themselves. In 1970, about 56 percent of the Dutch higher classes were affiliated to the catholic (33 %) or 
protestant-reformed church (23 %) . At least 32 percent of the higher classes , 42 percent of the lower middle 
classes, and 48 percent of the working classes showed a voting preference for a confessional party in 1970 – the 
catholic party KVP (21,9 %) and the reformed parties ARP (8,6 %) and CHU (6, 8 %) together won a 
parliamentary vote of 36,8 percent in 1971. At least 10 percent of all members of the higher classes, 20 % of the 
lower middle classes, and 39 percent of the working classes in 1970 showed a voting preference for the socialist 
party PVDA, which obtained 24,6 % of the parliamentary vote in 1971. Finally, at least 40 percent of the higher 
classes, 16 % of the lower middle class, and 6 % of the working class showed a voting preference for the liberal 
party VVD, which in 1971 obtained 10,3 % of the parliamentary vote. 
In 1996, the figures had changed somewhat. Only about 32 percent of the higher class was affiliated to a 
denominational church. Some 17 percent of all members of the higher classes, 20 percent of all members of the 
lower middle class, and 13 percent of all members of the working class, voted for a confessional party – the 
confessional party CDA  won 18.4 percent of the parliamentary vote in 1998. On the other hand, at least 46 % of 
the Dutch higher class, 19 percent of the lower middle class, and 18 percent of the working class voted for the 
liberal party VVD – which obtained 24.7 % of the parliamentary vote in 1998. Finally,  some 18 percent of the 
higher class, 22 percent of the lower middle class, and 42 % of the working class voted for the socialist party 
PVDA – which obtained 29 % of the parliamentary vote in 1998. The two relatively new parties of a left-liberal 
(D66) and left-green (Groen Links) signature together obtained more than 16 percent of the parliamentary vote in 
1998. 
736 What happened to Dutch government expenditures during the 1960s and especially 1970s was striking in 
Western European comparison. While the share of government expenditures in for instance UK national income 
declined enormously from the late 1940s onwards to grow moderately during the 1960s and 1970s, the share of 
Dutch government expenditures grew substantially in the 1960s, and exploded in the 1970s to approach WWII 
levels (see Appendix F). 
737 Lord Kahn. 1976. ―Thoughts on the Behaviour of Wages and Monetarism‖, Lloyds Bank Review. January  : 8. 
738 CDA, 1987. Discussienota over de verantwoordelijke samenleving. 
739 For instance, despite the 1970 split of more conservative Democratic Socialists away from the PvdA, the party 
did better in the 1972 election, when, as the dominant party within a progressive alliance with smaller left parties, 
it eventually regained office. 
740 Also, the net investment rate, which had decreased from seven percent in the decade before the first oil crisis 
to 4.6 percent in the second half of the 1970s, slumped to a mere two percent. 
741 The most important research document it has  delivered since the end of WWII is  the ―Central Economic 
Plan‖. Since 1961, it has also consistently pusblised a ―Macro-Economic Outlook‖. Both reports have become 
cornerstones of Dutch consocationalism. 
742 Dutch monetary policy in the period 1950-1979 was inspired by Keynesian economic theories: from 1950-
1959 the conjunctural budget norm, and from 1959-78 the structural budgeting norm. This changed completely in 
the 1980s, when monetarist theories supplanted their Keynesian counterparts: from 1983-1993 the  real deficit 
norm ,and from 1994 onwards the index-related budgetary norm (Zalm-norm) 
743 This was much to the chagrin of France, who wanted a French candidate. Still, a compromise was agreed upon 
whereby Duisenberg would serve for at least four years, upon which the Frenchman Jean-Claude Trichet, director 
of the Banque de France, would take over. 
744 Some of these measures were later codified in the 1978 banking law (Wet Toezicht Kredietwezen). 
745 „De opinie van VNO en NCW is eerder in het jaar (1974) ondersteund door de president van de Nederlandsche 
Bank - dr. Jelle Zijlstra - die in zijn jaarverslag een pleidooi houdt voor het herstel van het primaat van de 
particuliere sector. Een loonsomstijging die een redelijke vooruitgang biedt voor het reeel beschikbaar inkomen 
en een niet verder dalen van de rendementen van de investeringen zou een wezenlijke bijdrage zijn tot bestrijding 
van de inflatie en tot herstel van de werkgelegenheid, aldus Dr. Zijlstra. Zijn opvatting wordt hem niet in dank 
afgenomen door de vakcentrales― (Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen, 1975: 31). 
746 Fortuyn took advantage of an unexpected political opportunity. In the previous eight years, a left-right 
coalition led by the sober, moderate former union leader Wim Kok had perfected Dutch consensus politics, 
bridging old ideological divides for teh sake of finding business-like solutions. ON the issue of economic growth 
and state finances it had done well enough fo rhte governing parties to coast to victory in the 2002 elections. But, 
by default of a credible opposition by Christian Democrats or anyother Orangist alternative, "The Hague" had 
become a caricature of a closed, incestuous establishment out of touch with the people. Fortuyn attacked the 
"mess" - "puinhopen" - left by the elitist "purple"government (Fortuyn, 2002a). For years Fortuyn, an old Marxist 
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turned Orangist, had lamented the "relativism" of the Dutch who weree no longer interested in their own hereitage 
and no longer knew their history (Fortuyn, 1997: 7). Disconnected from its  roots in religious tradition aftr the 
anti-authoritarian revolt of the 1960s, the Netherlands had become an orphaned society (Fortuyn, 2002b). The 
global triumph of liberal capitalism encouraged such relativism, tempting people to turn life into a party without 
higher purpose (Fortuyn, 1997: 12). Businesses operating in global networks lost touch with their countryof 
origin, and the Dutch elite was becoming "fatherlandless" (Fortuyn, 1997: 16-18). To the arrival of cultuarlly 
differnt m inorities, the Netherlands repsonded with the typically relativist notion of the "multicultural" society, 
used as a magic formulae of "live and let live" (Fortuyn, 1997: 39). Regarding muslim immigrants, Fortuyn was 
firm in showing the flip side of "total football": the Netherlands was totally "full" (Lechner, 2008: 72-75). 
747 A Dutch TV show in 2004  organised a poll to determine the greatest Dutchman of all time. Remarkably, 
William of Orange lost out to Pim Fortuyn. The poll was taken by professional obsevers as a sign that the Dutch 
publc was looking for heroes who would confirm shared norms and help express pride in local traditions as  
response to globalisation (Veltman, 2004). 
748 The term ―Dutch disease‖ was coined to denote the practice of using natural gas sales to build an over-
generous social security system (VNONCW, 1997a: 45). 
749 While the PvdA went back to a less polarising coalition strategy after the 1981crisis, the liberals (VVD), in 
coalition with the Christian-democrats (CDA), became increasingly bullish  (Van Thijn en Van Wezel, 1986). 
Confronted with high unemployment rates, and a growing climate of political disillusionment and an economic 
cul-de-sac, the coming to power of the new prime minister Lubbers (CDA) ushered in a new democratic tradition. 
This tradition was couched in technocratic terms and slogans such as ―no nonsense‖ ―necessary cut-backs‖ or ―do 
the job‖.  The new governing purpose was to reduce ―the political‖ and to make the State ―recede‖. (Daalder, 
1990 : 249-250). More responsibility had to be laid with business life, societal groups, families and individuals. 
Competitive spirit was in again; new leaders had to be ―go-getters‖, Dutch citizens were presented as ―workers‖ 
with ―rolled-up sleeves‖,  and ―welfare entitlements‖ became ―welfare allowances‖. Meanwhile, a few ingrained 
Dutch policy traits were revived :  a modern version of the high-handed Regent tradition, of the 18th and 19th 
century, a conscious depoliticisation of political choices, an outspoken assumption that it was the ―government 
that governed‖ and no-one else. The media, on the other hand, seemed to adapt without too much resistance to 
this new situation.    
 750 In conjunction with employers‘ changing attitudes, the tax treatment of households has evolved to  
accommodate the belated advent of female emancipation and (part-time) employment (see Pott-Buter and 
Tijdens, 2002). From the start of income taxation in 1914 to 1972, the basic principle was to tax the incomes of 
married persons as one income, although some changes were made to the way they were added, initially (1941) to 
influence the level of taxation between couples and single persons and later (1962) to stimulate the employment 
participation of women. From 1973, the income from labour of married women was taxed individually (from 
1976 extended to disability benefit) while all other types of income and tax deductions not related to labour still 
had to be declared by the man or, later, the highest earner in the household. During 
the period 1973–1999, several important changes were made to the practice of applying the principle with 
important effects on female (part-time) employment participation and on household formation. Under certain 
conditions, people living together without formal marriage can since 1998 opt for ―fiscal partnership‖ 
and be treated on the same basis as married couples. The number of such new partnerships, however, remained 
very limited during the period under study and started to increase only after the major revision of the tax system 
in 2001, which enabled tax optimisation across partners (Atkinson and Salverda, 2005: 887). 
751 Lacking public support, the unions eventually settled for a 3-per-cent wage cut and a commitment to reduce 
the working week to 38 hours in 1986.  Government expenditures fell from 57.8 % of GDP in 1983 to 51.7 % in 
1990. 
752 The US‘ balance-of-payments deficit proved a major wedge that undermined the cohesion of the Atlantic 
partnership, as European governments began to complain about the international transmission of inflationary 
pressures stemming from the undisciplined economic policy of US authorities (Battilossi, 2002).   
753 Contrary to the German Mittel Europa predilection, the French Europe is necessarily Western Europe. Only 
Western Europe can attain French state qualities and become coherent enough to act decisively. This explains 
why it is unacceptable to the French to have a Europe with an unclear border or unclear membership. 
754 Through the commercial consolidation of the European Union and in particular through NATO, the US has 
tried to manage its Empire of Liberty stake in a way that makes it possible to stay on the continent with reduced 
effort. 
755 Contrary to the US, the British government – led by Thatcher – took a brutally negative view of German unity 
and European integration, at the price of losing influence.  Nevertheless, beyond Thatcher, a traditional British 
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angle on the German Question had long been that division was unnatural and unity was bound to come some day.  
The important thing was to avoid it coming about as a Soviet-German deal at the 
price of Western security. (Morgan, 1987: 88).   
756 Interestingly, Eastern Europe increasingly entered the French picture in the late 1980s; but not as not as a part 
of the acting Europe, but as the mission, as the task for Western Europe – the mission of the European 
Community to act and speak in the name of the East Europeans. Through its an unfortunate location and a tragic, 
undigested history, the biggest Mittel Europe country, Poland, confirmed and would keep confirming this rather 
patronising mission (Waever, 1990).  
757 In 1982 the budget deficit of the Dutch government stood at 10 percent of GDP, up from 3 percent between 
1969 and 1973 and 4 percent between 1974 and 1978 just over 4 percent (Van Bottenburg, 1995: 189). 
758 The embrace of active labour market policy, sometimes called ―flexicurity‖, by centre-left governments in f.i. 
the Netherlands can be seen as an extension of the logic of the competition state, as internalising the demands of 
more internationally active and mobile capital, embracing marketisation and openness, and pursuing policy in line 
with the purported realities of globalisation (Cerny, 1997). 
759 This shift was further consolidated with the 1992 Agreement on Social Policy, an annex to the Maastricht 
Treaty, which stressed the aim of respecting national specificity. 
760 The French business-government relationship has changed dramatically as a result of the search for more 
European integration.from 1983 onwards (Schmidt, 1996). The tensions between two competing strands of 
economic management policy, that is, of dirigisme (state direction) of the economy and liberalism, with its 
greater emphasis on the market, came to a head in 1983, when the socialist government, faced with abandoning 
either major elements of its dirigiste policies or the EC (and in particular the EMS that it had joined in 1979), 
decided to remain in the EC.(Loriaux, 1991). French exceptionalism could not last long in an increasingly 
interdependent global economy and in an integrating Europe. The strict monetary policies and economic austerity 
program that diminished government resources almost guaranteed the further liberalization of the economy, since, 
no longer able to stimulate industry through demand, governments had to turn to more supply-side measures in 
order to improve the competitiveness of French industry, with deregulation a top priority.(Poncet and Barbier, 
1989; Schmidt, 1988) By the 1990s, the traditional dirigisme, in which French governments set macroeconomic 
policy relatively independently of the international economic climate and engaged in "micromanagement" of the 
microeconomic sphere, had ended. 
761 The premise of the White Book was the realisation that the economic and social problems which emerged in 
the aftermath of the oil shocks of previous decades and the currency crisis in the beginning of the 1990‘s, were 
largely of member-states‘ own making. The White Book became the ideological, political and analytical base 
upon which a co-ordinated European approach to employment was developed. 
762 According to the OECD (1998: 41), the ―wage moderation for jobs‖ approach pioneered in the Wassenaar 
agreement was the single most important element of the ―Dutch model‖. It ensured pay restraint and social peace, 
with Dutch wagesincreasing less than in partner countries on average, and the Netherlands losing proportionately 
fewer days to strikes than any other European country. This set in motion a ―virtuous circle‖ of good international 
competitiveness, high profitability, strong investment and rapid job creation, with feedback effects on household 
confidence, asset prices and private consumption. Tax relief has underpinned disposable income, making wage 
moderation more acceptable, and reduced non-wage labour costs (OECD 1998, 41). 
763 NRC Handelsblad, 26 February 1991. 
764 The Dutchmen Visser and Hemerijck (1997: 41) were the first to draw attention to the Netherlands as proof 
that ―success can be achieved without a sharp rise in earnings inequality‖. 
765 For an explanation of the European Court of Justice‘s role vis a vis traditions of democratisation, I refer to 
chapter 11.   
766  The main goal of the first Christian-Democratic and Liberal government coalition of 1977 was to bring down 
the budget deficit. Thus, budgetary concerns increasingly substituted for the old concern of full employment  
(Delsen 2000: 22-26). 
767 The CPB calculated the effect in terms of employment if wages would not be moderated as well as if no 
‗decoupling‘ had taking place of public sector wages, related minimum wage and benefit levels to private sector 
wages.  
768 As noted by Hendriks (2005: 74), from time to time the impartiality of the CPB has been questioned in the 
Dutch media, however (NRC Handelsblad, February 23, 2002) and the foundation of research institutes to ‗coun-
ter balance‘ the CPB has also been suggested (Financiëel Dagblad, October 2, 2003). 
769 The point of no return in the creation of a Wassenaar mythology occurred in the mid-1990s when the Dutch 
employment performance was discovered by foreign media such as Le Monde, Wirtschaftswoche and Business 
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Week that started to talk about a ‗miracle‘ and a model case; from then onwards, the unions moved beyond 
acquiescence to actively help disseminate the myth (cf. FNV, 1999: 5). 
770 For instance, the Netherlands has always remained a reluctant immigration country, certainly since the period 
of depillarisation, (Amersfoort and Surie, 1987), but even before that since the percentage of immigrants in the 
Netherlands in the early 1960s was not higher than before the 1930s. Indeed, since at least the end of the 
eighteenth century, the end of the Dutch Republic, the Netherlands has ceased to be an openheartedly immigrant 
country, and at times witnessed strong emigration rather than immigration waves. In addition, up to the late 1970s 
the presence of immigrants in the Netherlands was seen as temporary  (Entzinger, 2004: 289). 
771 Then again, the proportion of foreign-born in most European countries is not very different from the eve of 
World War I, and is much lower than at many points in the nineteenth century (Parsons and Smeeding, 2006: 5; 
Zolberg and Long, 1999). 
772 In effect, social-democrats were stuck in the middle between contrary historical tendencies.  On the one hand, 
social-democrats never disavowed the romantic hope for the emergence of an international community of 
working people. This kept them from speaking out against foreign workers‘ entry in the country. On the other 
hand, the prevailing social-democratic attitude has generally been that significant immigration altogether is a bad 
thing, because it hides the underlying reasons of unemployment in the host country, and relieves governments of 
emigration countries from pressures to emanating from discontent voices in popular opinion.   
773 The Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) was institutionalised between twenty-one Arab states and the ten countries of 
the EC. The EAD met several times a year to discuss trade issues alongside the theme of ―cultural cooperation‖ 
(Benchenane, 1983). Thus, a rare European Community directive concerning migrant populations in 1976 
allowed for mother-tongue classes to be sponsorded by ―sending‖ countries, taught foreigners for third-country 
nationals in the EC…This was not a multicultural program; the intention was to facilitate the eventual re-insertion 
at home (Laurence, 2006: 265). 
774 Anti-immigration parties such as the Front National emerged by the late 1970s and 1980s in response to the 
increasingly visible impact of immigrants in big cities.  
775 There were several confrontational events involving Islam in the international arena that year…the post-
communist void in central Asia (after the withdrawal of soviet troops from Afghanistan) would soon reveal to 
Europe the extent of Saudi (and later Turkish) institutional and financial deployment and proselytising outside of 
the Arab world. These events reverberated within Muslim communities across the continent (Laurence, 2006: 
266). 
776 The Dutch government took a decisive turn in housing policy in 1990. Before 1990, housing policy had 
focused on the social rental part, with its combination of rent control and subsidised construction programs.  The 
emergence to prominence of the liberal tradition during the 1980s made the government uneasy about its old 
responsibility for realising the targets for housing construction set by the parliament – as well as its pivotal role in 
bargaining procedures with the different housing market parties involved. After a parliamentary inquire, housing 
policy was adapted: the construction and management of social rental housing were delegated to the non-profit 
organisations owning this part of the housing stock, most of the subsidies for construction were withdrawn and 
real rents were increased to a higher level, more conform to market clearing levels. Clearly, higher rents have 
contributed to increasing demand for owner-occupied housing. In conjunction with the growth in real income and 
the gradual decline of interest rates, higher rent levels have driven house prices up to levels unknown in the 
surrounding countries – Belgium and Germany. 
777 During the period 2001-2003, coinciding with a period of new polarisation in politics and civil society, the 
Netherlands was in recession, and its economic performance worse than in 1982. The Dutch economy lagged far 
behind that of the euro area, with Dutch growth rate in 2003 being 1.1 percentage points lower; Portugal being the 
only euro area country to record lower growth…Since 1999, Dutch exports of goods and services have expanded 
at a much slower rate than world trade…Dutch exporters are losing market sahre because they have become less 
competitive owing to the sharp rise in unit labour costs, stemming from the large wage increases, coupled with 
the slow growth in labour productivity…The very market turnaround in private consumption growth, one of the 
pillars of economic growth during the boom period, was the main contributor to the economic downturn in 2003 
(DNB, Annual Report 2003: 71-73). 
778 At the 2002 and 2003 general elections turnout was respectively 79% and 80% 
779 From a 49% stake in 1989, the Dutch government gradually relinquished all control, to retain a mere 1% share 
in the new entity ING. 
780 In addition, the NV (public limited joint stock) company has in the mean time become the customary legal 
form for the savings banks (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 260). 
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781 In 1989, the NMB merged with the largely privatised Postbank – the former State Postal Savings Bank. In 
1990, NMB-Postbank merged with Nationale Nederlanden, the largest insurer in the Netherlands in 1990, 
forming the Internationale Nederlanden Group (ING). 
782 FORTIS was created in 1990, as a merger between the VSB-bank -  a conglomerate of Dutch savings banks, 
the Amev insurance group and Belgium‘s AG insurance group.   
783 Based on an internal Rabobank, 5 April 1976. Nota ontwikkeling buitenlandbedrijf CB.  
784 Rabobank‘s market leadership is especially pronounced in the small enterprises, with about 2 to 9 employees 
(TNS NIPO, 2003). 
785 A 1990 report commissioned by the Rabobank‘s department of Communication and Public Relations read as 
follows on the ―corporate image‖ of the Rabobank and its competitors in the Dutch retail market. (―Onderzoek 
naar het Corporate Image van de Rabobank‖, Marketing and PR, July 1990). It concluded that Dutch ―banks do 
not yet have a distinctive corporate image, although the Rabobank and the Postbank appear to have some 
differentiating characteristics. For the Rabobank those are the aspects ‗friendly‘, ‗personal‘ and ‗agrarian‘ and for 
the Postbank ‗cheap‘, ‗easy‘, ‗homebank‘, ‗good accessibility‘ and ‗favourable opening hours‘, but also 
‗impersonal‘, ‗stiff‘ and ‗slow‘‖. Noteworthy also was that the customers of the Rabobank were ―significantly‖ 
more positive than the customers of the ABN.   
A 2000 report commissioned by the same department drew more refined conclusions (―Rapport : Strategisch 
Merkonderzoek financiele instellingen‖, Rabobank Group, April 2000). The main conclusion of the report was 
that with the economic boom of the last years consumers of financial services have ―more money to spend‖, have 
become ―more knowledgeable‖, have adopted a ―more hedonistic lifestyle‖ and ―partly out of necessity‖ take 
charge of their financial affairs. With regards to market position, the Rabobank comparatively attracted most 
customers in the following spheres : the ―Family Inc.‖ and consumers looking for ―safety‖ in uncertain times.  
The ABN AMRO bank, on the other hand, attracted more ―financially ambitious consumers‖. The Postbank, 
finally, is positioned as the bank of ―financial outsiders‖, i.e. those looking for an easy, cheap and minimal 
solution to financial affairs. While the Postbank was often typified as an ―anti-bank‖ because of the lack of 
bureaucracy and bombastic outlets, and the ABN AMRO bank‘s style was perceived as ―business-wise‖ and 
Commercial, the Rabobank‘s services were depicted as the ―familiar‖ and  ―human‖, but also ―average‖ solution 
to financial affairs. 
786 Report commissioned by the Rabobank‘s Corporate Communcation department (―Rapport : Strategisch 
Merkonderzoek financiele instellingen‖, Rabobank Group, April 2000). 
787 ABN Bank doubled its number of branches from 360 in 1965 to almost 720 twenty years later; AMRO Bank 
cast its net even wider, to 873 branches.  With economic growth boosting private incomes, the banks succeeded in 
attracting a fast rising amount of household savings by offering interest-bearing checking accounts, with an 
extraordinary rapid growth as a result. ABN‘s assets rose more than fivefold to almost 35 billion guilders in 1974; 
during the same period, AMRO realised an increase of more than 4.5 times to nearly 34 billion. 
788 Cf. Deckers, 2001. 
789 In 1975, ABN and AMRO both acquired a major private banking firm, in order to strengthen their core 
businesses of asset management and investment banking. ABN bought Mees & Hope, AMRO acquired Pierson, 
Heldring & Pierson. 
790 Further proof to this gradual upward integration, in 1994, management decided that the subsidiary Schretlen & 
Co should be transformed in a private bank for very wealthy customers. Also, to get a sizeable piece of the pie of 
the growing investment funds market, the Rabobank in 1997 acquired 50 percent of the shares of the investment 
consortium Robeco Group. Finally, in 1999 the Rabobank etablished the International Private Banking & Trust, a 
subsidiary in charge of managing the property of wealthy owners outside of the Netherlands. 
791 The assumption was that the dismantlement of tariff barriers had not been enough; nontariff barriers and 
market fragmentation within the European Community had become major impediments to economic growth. 
Thus, in the first half of the 1980s new initiatives were proposed to reactivate the process of European integration. 
The most far-reaching of these proposals was the draft treaty establishing a European Union that the European 
Parliament adopted in early 1984. 
792 The Banque de la Société Générale de Belgique had forged a colloborative agreement with the Amsterdamsche 
Bank and the German Deutsche Bank, in the so-called "Bachelors Club" – alluding to the informal nature of the 
association, whereby each bank retained managerial autonomy. In 1963 this group was joined by the Midland 
Bank and was renamed the European Advisory Committee. In 1970 the group was incorporated in Belgium and 
operated under the name of European Banks International Company (EBIC), subsequently adding the French 
bank Société Générale, the Austrian Creditanstalt Bankverein, and the Italian Banca Commerciale Italiana to the 
fold. The committee also sought transatlantic connections, founding the European-American Banking 
Corporation in New York in 1968. 
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793 In doing this, costs of opening own networks in other European countries were avoided or at least substantially 
lessened. 
794 The mutual recognition principle was geared towards professional communities from the onset; it had initially 
been used in the Treaty of Rome with regard to professional qualifications only (EEC, 1987). 
795 The years 1966 to 1969 saw a re-opening of the international financial markets for the first time since 1929. 
796 EBIC (European Banks International Company), the most extensive form of consortium banmking, was built 
up in the late 1960s and early 1970s by AMRO Bank, Banca Commerciale Italiana, Creditanstalt, Deutsche Bank, 
Midland, Société Générale, and Société Générale de Banque, with the ultimate goal of establishing a pan-
European global bank. It had six separate banking operations including London (EBC), New York (European 
American), European Asian and European Arab. Yassukovich who was managing director of EBC, remembers 
setting it up in London in 1974 amid strikes and power cuts, often working by the light of a paraffin lamp. He 
acknowledges that consortium banks "had their moment. They allowed member banks to experiment and were a 
way of sharing risk. But it was always clear to me that they didn't have a long-term future." 
797 ―The European banking networks, such as the EBIC-group, the ABECOR-Group and the Inter 
Alpha Group, however, did not work out as expected. First, they were undermined by the 
international expansion of the partners under their own names. Secondly, management was 
complicated and as a result did not function smoothly. Perhaps management hesitated to place 
their best personnel in the network. The joint ventures, more specifically, tended to behave 
too autonomously and the benefits for the partners were often unclear. Lending to developing 
countries, one of the objectives of the joint banks, caused heavy losses during the international debt crisis in the 
early 1980s, making the benefits recede even further. Therefore, European banks, including the Dutch banks 
(apart from Rabobank), decided to give up on the Banking Groups and instead gather strength through mergers in 
order to shape an international presence of own‖ (Sluyterman, 2004: ). 
798 The First EEC Directive on Company Law of 1968 in turn led to a thorough revision of Dutch Company Law 
in 1970 and 1971 (Chester and Vogelaar, 1973: 1-3). 
799 EBIC disbanded in 1984 because the member banks had evolved independently and the group had lost its 
meaning. 
800 Restrictions on banking-insurance alliances were also lifted in accordance with EU practice. This led to the 
formation of conglomerate groups holding substantial share stakes in large numbers of companies. 
801 Both reasons contributed to the failed merger with German cooperative bank Deutsche Genossengesellschaft 
as late as 1999. 
802 The Dutch Bank had long struggled with the concept of a money-creating institution in the Netherlands, given 
the movement towards despecialisation and the creation of universal banks  - hybrid organisations engaged in 
money creation, savings activities as well as capital market transactions. In parallel with the first European 
Banking Directive, this prompted the Nederlandsche Bank to abandon its earlier practice of breaking down the 
agricultural credit institutions‘ balance sheet into money-creating operations and savings banks activities. In 1986 
the State Postal and General Savings Banks were also integrated into the one category of money-creating 
institutions (Van Straaten, 1989: 175, 352). 
803 A Directorate-General for Regional Policy was first created in 1968, with its promoter Jean Rey stating: 
―Regional Policy in the Community should be as the heart is in the human body…and should aim to reanimate 
human life in the regions which have been denied it‖.  In 1973, the Thompson Report stated: ―although the 
objective of continuous expansion set in the Treaty has been achieved, its balanced and harmonious nature has not 
been achieved‖. Subsequently, in 1975, the European Reconstruction Development Fund was set up for a three-
year test period with a budget of €1,300 million. The objective was to correct regional imbalances due to the 
predominance of agriculture, industrial change, and structural unemployment. Finally, cohesion became a 
political priority in 1986 with the formal adoption of a Cohesion Policy in the Single European Act (1986), and 
the confirmation of the priority of a Cohesion Fund in the Treaty on European Union (1992).    
804 A strange paradox surfaced in the relation between the Co-operative Banks and Dutch agriculture. On the one 
hand, the importance of agriculture in the Dutch economy decreased sharply. Indeed, starting in the 1950‘s, the 
Netherlands, from being a nation heavily dependent on agriculture, was gradually turning into an industrial and 
service economy. The share of agribusiness in the national income fell from 21 percent in 1953 to 12 percent in 
1972 (Van Zanden and Griffiths, 1989 : 224). On the other hand, the soaring scale, rationalisation and 
mechanisation of farming operations increased the demand for large amounts of credits. Thus, while the 
significance of agriculture declined, the Co-operative Banks became more central to agricultural operations. 
Indeed, after WWII the share of Co-operative Banks in the financial business of farmers rose to 90 percent, a 
figure which remained the same in the following three decades (Graafsma, 2002: 73). 
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805 With the new Act of Supervision that came into force in January 1979, the Dutch Bank belatedly became the 
supervisor of mortgage banks in the interest of their solvency and liquidity, a sector which thus far had been, like 
the savings banks and the agricultural credit banks, characterised by self-regulation. Credit institutions were 
granted a period of three years in which to adapt their organisation and operations to the new legislation. 
806 Between 1980 and 1981, real house prices fell on average by 11 percent. The proportion of owner-occupier 
dwellings under construction fell from 64 percent in 1979 to 40 percent in 1981. In 1981 and 1982, around 100 
building contractors went bankrupt each month, resulting in the loss of between 40,000 and 50,0000 jobs. 
807 Initially, the mortgage banks had profited from their exemption from all kinds of post-WWII legislation on 
financial services. So, mortgage banks were allowed to issue bonds on tap, rather than being subject to the so-
called ―calendrier‖, a waiting list for bond issues administered by the Dutch Bank with a view to preventing 
disruptions of the bond market. Able to circumvent the calendrier legislation, which was in force from 1946 until 
the deregulation of the Dutch capital market in 1986, mortgage banks could use mortgage bonds to immediately 
adjust their credit interest rates to changes in market conditions, and attune the volume of borrowing to the 
volume of lending. In addition, in contrast to other bonds, mortgage bonds could be sold directly by the mortgage 
bank issuers, either through the own branches or through other Commercial banks. Against this, the only thing 
mortgage banks were not allowed to do was to attract funds for periods shorter than two years. Because of these 
advantages, mortgage banks kept funding themselves exclusively by issuing mortgage bonds – complemented by 
some private placements.   
808 The Rabohypotheekbank came into being in 1975 after the merger of the independent mortgage banks of the 
former Eindhoven and Liberal-Protestant Centrals. 
809 More recently, ING, ABN AMRO and Rabobank decided to cooperate in the implementation of a common 
Internet platform for payment services.  
810 The predominance of banks of the universal type became even more marked during the course of the 1980s. In 
many cases, specialised institutions - such as mortgage banks or credit institutions engaged in securitised lending, 
i.e. institutions whose core business is mediation in securities trading at the stock exchange - were taken over by 
universal banks.  In line with developments in other countries in Europe, the Dutch banks, too, endeavoured in the 
1980s to extend their traditional domestic operations to include high-yielding commission fee business, such as 
leasing, factoring, real estate transactions, the sale of insurance products and, above all, merchant and investment 
banking (Klein, 1995: 63-64). 
811 In the 1980s, fears of untenable collective provisions in face of an ageing population led the government to 
promote private insurance and pension provisions by granting those investments a fiscally preferential treatment. 
interest rree savings, on the other hand, did not enjoy an equivalent treatment.  
The increase of contractual savings to the detriment of ―free savings‖ went on unabated; by 1990 family saving 
portfolios consisted almost entirely of contractual savings (Dankers et al., 2001: 341-343). 
812 Source: PVK Staten 2005. 
813 After the 1979 housing market crisis, Rabobank arguably showed a more ―social face‖; it was more lenient 
towards customers with liquidity problems, regularly according them a temporary suspension of debt repayment 
(Sluyter et al., 1998: 236). 
814 Ultimately, this led to the marginalisation of savings banks. Another weakness of the savings banks was their 
branch network. While theoretically the most extensive – comprising 2400 branches all around the country, 
compared to 2200 each for the State Postal and the Co-operative Banks, and 1500 for the Commercial banks – the 
savings banks‘ branch network had very limited capabilities in terms of service provisions to the general public. 
815 By the end of 2005, Eureko was the Dutch insurance market leader with a share of 19 %. 
816 In doing this, ABN was only a few years ahead of changes in popular opinion. During the 1970s Commercial 
banks‘ international endeavours had to endure a lot of domestic criticism. However, a more general change of the 
political tide followed after the 1977 elections, which allowed the argument of uncontrollable international 
market forces beyond national macro-economic control to gain strength. 
817 As we shall see in chapter 11, the liberal tradition is a misnomer of ―universality‖ for entirely different 
contextual and historical contingcenies in England and the US.  
818 By virtue of its colonial past, ABN for many decades had built up a branch network in South East Asia and in 
the Middle East (Sijbrands, 1994). ABN‘s interest in Latin America had more recent origins; the 1967 acquisition 
of Hollandsche Bank-Unie, a bank with an extensive branch network in Latin America. Confronted with 
continued political turmoil in Latin America, and a wave of nationalisations in Saudi Arabia, Surinam, and Iran, 
ABN in the mid-1970s redefined its international strategy, in favour of a greater focus on stable regions suc as the 
US.  
819 Since their formation in 1964 both ABN Bank and AMRO Bank had gradually climbed the list of leading 
banks of the world – measured in total assets. By 1980 ABN Bank ranked in the top twenty, with AMRO Bank 
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somewhat lower. Later, the relative size of both banks declined in line with trends in the Dutch economy.By 1989 
ABN Bank had fallen to 48th place and AMRO Bank to 46th. With the merger, however, the combined balances 
of the new ABN AMRO Bank came to 400billion guilders, raising the bank‘s world ranking to sixteenth. This 
was vital for the bank‘s international public profile. 
820 Before Lasalle, ABN had acquired participations in American companies all over the US. Similarly, during the 
1970s,  ABN built up a branch network in for instance the East Coast. It is only with Lasalle that ABN started 
concentrating its US operations in the Midwest. 
821 The Dutch ABN directors experienced their share of problems in trying to find a middle ground between 
Dutch and US company traditions. Indeed, they found out the hard way that the management of the acquired 
company LaSalle found it impossible to cope with Dutch informal traditions. The LaSalle managers complained 
that ―there did not exist a clear philosophy for the American activities‖ , and that this was the reason why the 
company‘s performance was below par. They wanted much clearer formal procedures – involving a clear division 
of labour – and insisted that a high level of autonomy was absolutely necessary to ensure the viability of their 
endeavours. In response, ABN first formulated clear procedures and installed ―short, direct lines‖ between 
LaSalle and the holding ABN Company Inc, second gave in to pressures for a ―strong leader‖ in LaSalle, and 
finally accorded the US management a high level of autonomy from the Dutch Managing Board (Westerhuis, 
2004). Thus, just like Unilever in the post-WWII period (Jones, 2004), it appeared ABN Bank found no other 
solution than to give in more than it wished to the ―republican‖ strength of the US company traditions, even if this 
precluded organic integration in the own group‘s traditions. 
822 The US contributed over 25% of pre-tax profits by the year 2000 compared to 11% in 1990 (Slager, 2004). 
823 One of the constituent entities of ING, NMB, had transformed itself from a domestically oriented bank into a 
bank with high profile international operations in the 1980s - before merging with the Postbank in 1989. NMB 
engaged in a two-tier strategy, engaging in high-risk and high growth activities outside the Netherlands, and 
gaining market share inside the Netherlands. NMB built a corporate banking network in Latin 
America in the 1980s and experienced success by the end of the 1980s with the emerging market 
debt business which it had firs set up in New York in 1978. Domestically, NMB was less successful. The loan 
portfolio was expanded to quickly, and the merchant bank set up in 1986 was closed in 1991 (Slager, 2004). 
824 ABN had 136 foreign offices and 5.200 staff members abroad in 1972  (Sluyterman, 2004). 
825 This allowed the bank to engage in international capital market operations – most notably, take a stake in the 
Eurodollar markets. 
826 In 1980, a first discussion was held concerning the planning of publicity in the international market 
(―Bespreking inzake de publiciteitsplanning internationale dienstverlening‖, Rabobank Nederland, July 25, 1980). 
The main outcome of the discussion was that the domestic state of affairs, namely the position of the affiliated 
local banks, would always remain the starting point. The primary aim being to remain a strong ―domestic bank‖, 
internationalisation would serve to consolidate this position.  An important step forward in gaining visibility at 
the international level, was the establishment of an office in New York in 1981 and the application for a ―credit 
solvability‖ evaluation at US rating institutions. In the same year, the Rabobank was attributed a maximum 
Triple-A rating by these institutions (Vissers et al., 2003: 111). Apart from allowing the Rabobank to raise funds 
cheaply and put out funds dearly on international markets, this rating also helped the Co-operative bank to appear 
more modern and position itself favourable vis a vis upstream populations, be they in politics or in the market. 
Otherwise, the internationalisation policy of the Rabobank was not particularly successful. 
827 By 1988 Rabobank had reorganised the branch network of this former partner of DG bank to serve Dutch 
customers and focus on agricultural and food related finance activities. 
828 With the foundation of Rabobank International, Rabobank upgraded its London branch 1997 into a full-blown 
investment banking department (1997), with the aim of profiting from booming securities markets (De Boer and 
Graafsma, 2002). 
829 Two announced large scale mergers fell through. And Rabobank‘s investment banking by 1999 were 
proclaimed unsuccessful. They were considerably scaled down.  
830 A 2001 report of Rabobank‘s Economic Research department concluded : ―Not all parties have a clear 
European strategy. While the Rabobank Group and SNS Reaal Group do focus mainly on the Dutch retail market, 
ABN AMRO, ING Group and FORTIS do have clear European (international) ambitions‖ . The international 
strategy of these organisations mainly consists of exporting successful domestic activities – products or 
distribution formula. For instance, the ING-group‘s ING Direct initiative is based on the Postbank-formula. The 
same applies to FORTIS‘ concept of bankinsurance. Generally speaking, what is noteworthy is that the ―universal 
banking‖ or ―global banking‖ strategy – all products, to everyone, everywhere – of the last decades is being 
abandoned. For instance, ABN AMRO retracted her retail activities from a substantial amount of countries. In 
deploying an international strategy, apart from autonomous growth and takeovers, the track of implementing new 
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distribution channels such as Internet is being followed, for instance by ING with her Direct bank in Canada and 
the Rabobank with her new internetbank in Belgium‖. 
831 Global Finance, 2007.  
832 As first adopted in the Basel I Accord, the Tier 1 capital ratio is the ratio of a bank's core equity capital to its 
total risk-weighted assets - weighted for credit risk according to a formula determined by the Central Bank in 
charge. 
833 The Banker, July 2007. 
834Also, by the late 1980s, the post-WWII growth-oriented settlement had become entirely discredited (Gill and 
Law, 1989), and an international ideology of ―neo-liberal austerity‖ had gained the upper hand. More specifically, 
financial globalisation increased the incentives for governments to pursue national macroeconomic strategies 
which seek low and stable rates of inflation, through fiscal discipline and a tight monetary policy, since these 
appeal to global financial markets (Held, McGrew, et al., 1999: 230). 
835 A merger and takeover movement waved over the Netherlands. As a result, while in 1965 more than half of 
industrial companies‘ liabilities still came out of own equity capital, this percentage had decreased to 38 percent 
in 1973. Almost 80 percent of the increase of the balance now was on account of foreign capital, mostly short-
term. Dutch bankers played a key role in these rationalisation projects. Unlike  the industrial sector, however, 
banking did not suffer from the fact that the Dutch economy was turning from an « island of cheapness » into a 
focal point of the Western Europe services market. Much to the contrary, in spite of burgeoning levels of 
inflation, tense capital markets and rising interest rates, the banking sector thrived during these years of 
transationalisation, especially after 1974. In these years, Commercial banks took advantage of their strong volume 
growth in a protected domestic market to fare comparatively better than their industrial counterparts. 
836 Thus, a 1975 study revealed that 303 interlocks connected a group of 22 financial institutions with industrial 
corporations (Helmers et al., 1975). 
837 The ―Wet Toezicht Kredietwezen‖  
838 Economic transnationalisation such as the one attempted by Dutch commercial banks was an escape from the 
attempts by a radicalised ―1968 generation‖ of cadre in Western states to democratise economic production 
within the state framework (van der Pijl, 2001). 
839 ABN, AMRO and Mees & Hoppe together had 46 links with 64 industrial corporations. 
840 This network was formed by three Dutch (Royal Dutch Shell, AKZO and AMRO Bank) and five German 
firms (Deutsche Bank, Mannesmann, Volkswagen, Bayer, BASF). Royal Dutch/Shell, and to a lesser extent 
AMRO Bank served as bridges between continental and Anglo-North American firms. 
841 In addition, Dutch commercial banks‘ cost structure was not very competitive: despite the mass of cheap funds 
flowing in from savings accounts, the operating ratio – the  relationship between income and costs – of the 
Commercial banks declined from 2.0 in the early 1950s to some 1.3 in the early 1970s.   As noted by Slager 
(2004): ―Commercial banks‘ retail strategy was clearly running into the sand of 
spiralling costs (Figure 5). Between 1965 and 1975, costs rose from less than 60% to over 
80% of revenues. The banks did not immediately have to face the consequences of this selfinflicted inefficiency. 
The banking cartel limited price competition, and during the 1970s revenues soared, fuelled by firms taking loans 
to combat balance sheet erosion from rising inflation, by rapidly expanding consumer credit, and by a housing 
boom. Consequently, the deep recession following the second oil crisis hit the Commercial banks very hard 
indeed, notably AMRO Bank, which suffered the indignity of seeing its Standard & Poor rating reduced 
following the disclosure of heavy losses in 1984‖. 
842 Het Financieele Dagblad, 29 March 1990. 
843 Despite the renewal of domestic tranquility and cooperation, Dutch Commercial banks, for their part, had 
fallen back to a second-tier status at the international level by the 1990s. Compared to the mid-1970s, by 1996 the 
number of interlocks between finance and industry had gone down with almost 40 percent (Heemskerk et al., 
2003).  
844 Arguably, ABN AMRO still had a more central role in the domestic corporate network than other financials 
like ING, FORTIS and even the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) (Heemskerk, 2001; 54). 
845 The Dutch ―old-boys-school-network‖ has been facilitated by small physical and social distances. Formation 
of such a network is also facilitated by virtue of a similar educational background, and frequent contacts in 
various foundations, councils, boards and committees (Van Waarden 2001: 42-44; Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 
90). 
846 So, when asked in 2003 whether his taking up of a position in the Supervisory Board of ABN AMRO after 
having been Management Director of the same bank did not represent a conflict of interest and a typical case of 
oligarchical ruling, Jan Kalff answered : ―The system mostly works fine in most cases... Giving more authority to 
shareholders is not at all always a good idea… It is very questionable whether shareholders would be able to 
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solve the problems. They only convene twice a year…Calling for a shareholder assembly takes six weeks. And 
even then not everyone might be present. Then we would have to issue a second call.‖  Thus, his conclusion was 
that ―thousands of shareholders that come from all over the world‖ cannot fulfil supervisory tasks as adequately 
as a Supervisory Board (Interview with Jan Kalff in Risk Magazine, 
http://www.veraf.nl/nieuwsbrief1/PublicatieRiskM.htm) Jan Kalff was a former Chairman of the Managing Board 
of ABN AMRO. He stepped down as a member of the Supervisory Board of ABN AMRO on October 30, 2003. 
847 together with the Dutch Savings Union, the in 1986 established Postbank and all foreign bank branches 
(Sluyterman et al, 1998 : 212; www.nvb.nl) . 
848 Zijlstra, J. 8 June 1970 . Rede voor de Bank voor Internationale Betalingen. 
849According to a former strategy director of the Rabobank, ―in the period 1968-1980, the Rabobank from a 
‗societal-political‘ organisation turned into a purely banking enterprise (Interview with a former strategy director 
of the Rabobank on January 27th, 2003).  In fact, the Rabobank informally had taken a turn away from 
agricultural politics in the 1970s already. After the 1974 agricultural crisis, it became clear that the leaders of the 
agricultural ―green front‖ would not be able to rekindle corporatist arrangements. For one, in spite of its social-
democratic credentials, the Dutch government did not follow its Belgian, German, Danish and French 
counterparts; the latter decided to initiate additional support policies. In response, Dutch farmers on July 29th 
1974 showed unprecedented militancy against the Green Front‘s leaders. On August the 10th, the leader of the 
Catholic farmer association KNBTB, Mertens, expressed his disapproval with this militancy : ―We can achieve 
much more in negotiations with rational thinking partners, with well founded arguments, than with spontaneous 
and inconsiderate actions on roads and crossings‖ (Boer en Tuinder, September 1st 1974). Mertens‘ further 
statements about the necessity to get 30 percent of farmers to stop farming, though not being revolutionary in 
light of the existing policy to contain production growth by increasing labour-productivity and diminishing the 
number of agricultural labourers (Nooij, 1976), angered the increasingly self-aware farmer population . Faced 
with the lack of authoritative leadership in the agricultural movement, the directors of co-operative banks were 
compelled to demonstrate more self-reliant leadership. 
850 In contrast with the decades before, the farming community during the 1980s was only marginally represented 
in Parliament. For the co-operative banks, this not necessarily was a bad thing. For one, agricultural decision-
making had shifted largely to Brussels in the mean time (Everts, 1985: 311). Second, an overbearing influence of 
the Agricultural Board and Co-operative leaders on the Dutch parliament surely would have been badly received 
in popular opinion, given the greatly declined importance of agriculture for matters of national self-sufficiency. 
Third, the clientele of co-operative banks had grown beyond the narrow circles of agricultural life anyway. 
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11     ENGLISH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1969–2007) 
 
11.1 Changing geopolitical opportunity structure (phase 1) 
 
a) The question of the EEC 
Would the final demise of the British Empire result in a push for an English 
industrial democracy or would Britain reinvent itself as a world-state loyal to the policy of 
unilateral liberalism? Not surprisingly, domestic demand would prove less important in 
answering this question than the ease with which British elites could adapt to either US or 
European Economic Community (EEC) geopolitical strategies. While not entirely 
surprising, this is a point worth making in the context of democratisation dynamics, and 
the widespread belief that domestic policy issues almost always trump geopolitical issues 
in determining electoral behaviour. On the 1st of January 1973, the UK officially joined 
the EEC. Initially sceptical about membership, by 1961 several geopolitical and domestic 
realities had convinced the Conservative government that joining the EEC would help the 
UK regain ―a first-class country‖ status.  Geopolitically, the UK‘s strategy was to be at the 
centre of three circles of influence: the Commonwealth, the US and Europe. Before it 
became clear that the balance of British trade was significantly shifting from the 
Commonwealth towards the EEC, UK policy had been to hold on to imperial preference 
(Moravscik, 1999).
851
  
Domestically, several coalitions of elites encouraged entry into the EEC, for 
different reasons.  Anxious not to lose out on expansion opportunities in European 
markets,
852
 big businesses such as banks and multinationals by and large supported 
membership. Expansion opportunities did not only come in economic terms for big 
business; they also concerned the desire to escape the political and civic constraints of the 
domestic democratic system. Large banks and multinationals quickly realised that 
corporatist pressures and structures could not easily be transplanted to a supranational EEC 
level. Already in the process of forming their own government relations divisions – 
independent of existing industry and business associations – these big businesses saw the 
institutional insulation of European economic policy as one way out of the conundrum of 
domestic tripartism (Grant, 2007; Streeck, 2006: 23-24, 39).   
A second domestic coalition, a cross-section of the Bank of England-Treasury-
City nexus of elites, had its own, more indirect reasons for supporting EEC membership. It 
associated first-class-country status with a strong sterling, capable of functioning as a 
credible reserve currency for all nations engaged in commerce. One way to prop up the 
value of the sterling was entry in the EEC, especially since the UK was predicted to 
require quickly arranged and substantial external credits in the near future from the EEC 
Six. Finally, some industrial leaders – including the 1960 leadership of the Federation of 
British Industries
853
, Labour and Liberal politicians argued that the UK government for too 
long had pursued imperial grandeur at the expense of growth, and that it was now time to 
strengthen and reconstruct the domestic industrial base (e.g. Blank, 1978; Shonfield, 1958, 
1965).
854
 These calls gained strength as a process of slow divergence of regional 
unemployment – the infamous North-South divide – gained momentum. By the late 1970s, 
the unemployment-ridden North, which for half a century had consisted only of the old 
industrial periphery – Wales, Scotland and the utmost North of England, had been 
extended to the manufacturing heartland – including the North West, the West Midlands 
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and Yorkshire-Humberside (Martin, 1988: 397).
855
  All this occurred on a background of 
failed regional experiments by the National Economic Development Councils and the 
Industrial Reorganisation Corporation; as well as more a general sense of national 
decline.
856
  
The trade unions by and large were against membership in the EEC. Unions had 
long argued that entering the EEC would demand serious structural adaptation given the 
industrial and export success of some of the European late-developers, in particular 
Germany.
857
 Fear of a lasting trade deficit with countries such as Germany induced 
Conservatives to not only adapt their monetary policy to EEC requirements, but also – 
timidly – copy some of the more corporatist practices of EEC members such as wage 
restraint in return for full employment (Crouch and Dore, 1990: 12).  With Conservative 
―wets‖ such as Macmillan858 and Heath in the ascendancy, but Conservative ―dries‖ 
adamant to protect the liberties of the propertied from welfare state encroachment, any 
attempt at continental-style corporatism was bound to be half-hearted, however. Especially 
since, at the other side of the spectrum, trade unions and the Federation of British 
Industries (FBI) were at a loss about what to do with their newfound access points to 
policy-making.
859
  The expectation was that they and other pressure groups would become 
stronger given the necessary reforms. The opposite was true: attempts at reform only 
weakened the autonomy and sovereignty of these bodies (Cronin, 1988: 229-231).
860
  This 
again became clear with the coming into government of Labour after the oil shock of 1973. 
b) The fraught Union – Labour Party link 
 Prior to taking office in 1974, the leaders of the Labour Party had worked to 
put the union-party link back together after the breakdown of the 1965 National Plan
861
, 
and the failed attempts of the Wilson government (1964-70) to reform the unions.
862
  
Goodwill for Labour‘s friendly attempts initially had been created by the attempts of the 
Heath Conservative government (1970-74) to pass trade union legislation, which 
spectacularly back-fired.  Union leaders utterly rejected this infringement of their ancient 
liberties, ushering in the first major miners‘ strike of the 1970s.  After, there was only one 
party to turn to: Labour. The Labour government also felt emboldened because it felt it had 
received a mandate on party-union relations by the electorate. The Conservatives had 
fought and lost the 1974 election as a referendum on whether the government or the unions 
should run the country. Labour‘s victory meant it was entitled to conclude a new ―social 
contract‖ with the unions. The somewhat wishful assumption, on which this contract was 
premised, was that workers would voluntarily trade improved benefits and social services 
for lower wage demands (Cronin, 2006; Howell, 2005; Moran, 1971).
863
  Inflation had 
been identified as the main cause of the ―nation‘s grave economic problems‖ and the plan 
was to ask for voluntary wage and price restraint in return for expanded social services and 
a degree of industrial democracy (cf. Krieger, 1987: 40-41; TUC, 1973). These hopes were 
quickly disappointed, as inflation continued to gather pace in response to the oil crisis of 
1973–74.  
c) Sterling crisis: happy accident? 
The sterling crisis in 1976 unexpectedly gave the Labour government a way out 
of its electoral pledges on public spending.  When the Callaghan government swiftly 
applied for a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to stem the crisis, and 
opted for policies centred on price stability and private investment, it looked like it had 
buckled under the pressure of the IMF and City-Bank-Treasury nexus. Purportedly, this 
alliance‘s vigorous attacks on the forces of ―economic corporatism‖ were too much for a 
331 
 
government which finally caved in to demands to recompose social relations (Jessop, 
1980: 81–82). Some argue that a ―paradigmatic‖ shift in macro-economic policy followed, 
from Keynesianism to monetarism: inflation replaced unemployment as the pre-eminent 
concern of policy-makers, macro-economic efforts to reduce unemployment were rejected 
in favour of balanced budgets and monetary policy replaced fiscal policy as the principal 
macro-economic instrument (Hall, 1993: 284). The shift was neither as paradigmatic as 
Hall maintains
864
, nor was it forced upon the government by an all powerful City-Bank-
Treasury alliance. Throughout the post-WWII period, a majority of UK elites – including 
the centrist core of Labour leaders – had demonstrated their unrelenting support for a 
strong international position of sterling.
865
 Also, they had consistently favoured adaptation 
of interest rates in response to world changes rather than as a means to invest in domestic 
strengths (Blank, 1977; Shonfield, 1958).
866
 Given elites‘ immovable prioritisation of 
―world-state‖ considerations, their often unavowed assumption was that the source of the 
pound's continuing weakness lay in the domestic economy. The final shift to monetarism 
thus removed a long-standing contradiction in their macro-economic assumptions, rather 
than signified a paradigmatic shift.    
What did all this amount to in terms of the UK‘s position within the EEC? From a 
continental European viewpoint, the US‘ balance-of-payments deficit had proved a major 
wedge that undermined the cohesion of the Atlantic partnership. European governments 
found that their autonomy in conducting domestic economic policy was seriously curtailed 
by the transmission of inflationary pressures from the ―undisciplined‖ US economy. 
Contrary to the US government which used its hegemonic status to conclude favourable 
bilateral agreements, European governments could not afford to run payments deficits or 
surpluses for prolonged periods without having to resort to a general macro-economic 
adjustment.
867
  Things finally came to a head with the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971
868
 and the dollar crisis in 1978. How did the British monetarist fit in this 
picture? Some argue that the Labour government‘s turn was not simply about ―managing 
the British crisis‖, but about the revival of Atlanticism at exactly the time when continental 
European Atlanticism was at a historical low. After long deliberations between the Bank of 
England, the Treasury and the secretary of the US Treasury about the need to stabilise the 
London-New York link of financial capitalism, Labour ministers explicitly accepted the 
role of ―junior partners with the US in managing the international crisis, through policies 
to accelerate the free flow of capital‖ (Panitch 2000: 13).869  In particular, the Labour 
government was prepared to accept an accelerated ―globalisation‖ of the domestic policy 
regime – amounting to an accelerated ―Americanisation‖ as the discourse of globalisation 
at that time emerged in response to greater U.S. involvement with the international 
economy (Hirsch and Levin, 1999; Hirsch and, 200).  
With inflation levels showing no signs of abating, popular opinion warmed to the 
substitution of monetarism for post-war Keynesianism – although the first fifteen years of 
British monetarist policy (1976-1990) would result in higher average inflation levels than 
the ―Keynesian era‖ (1934 to 1976). The tipping point in popular opinion was reached 
during the infamous ―winter of discontent‖ of 1978-79 when a series of unofficial and 
official strikes helped bring down the Labour government. The general election of 1979 
was fought around the question of national economic decline and widespread calls for a 
wind of change. Led by Thatcher
870, who vowed to reverse the United Kingdom‘s 
economic decline by following through monetarist policies and reduce the State‘s reach, 
the Conservatives won the elections with a clear majority. Under the Thatcher government, 
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Labour‘s tentative changes would be fully consolidated. With Thatcher at the helm, 
experimental policies of private investment and price stability gained the evangelising 
fervour needed to turn the UK experiment into a global launching pad for the ―Washington 
Consensus‖871 – a set of monetarist policies championed by the US government, the IMF 
and World Bank (Harmon, 1997).  In one way at least, the 1976 sterling crisis, and 
subsequent ―policy shifts‖ proved a happy accident for the economic growth of the UK, in 
particular London.  Both in terms of outward and inward foreign investment, London from 
all the world‘s city-states benefited most from the US-initiated de-regulation of capital 
markets and the expansionist fiscal policy of the early Reagan era.  In retrospect, acting as 
a launching pad for the US‘ new geopolitical strategy meant that the UK could benefit 
from a large chunk of that country‘s budget and trade deficits in the 1980s; all of which 
considerably fuelled the recovery of its economy (Gamble 1988: 98; Gifford, 2006: 469).   
Under Thatcher the Atlanticist approach to economic management would 
decisively be prioritised over European plans for monetary co-operation; plans on which 
the British position was increasingly cautious, and even outright hostile (Jenkins 1991: 
446). Of course one could argue that the European Community was just a bureaucratic 
chimera, a utopia that in practice was being superseded by a European movement of 
financial democratisation more akin to the UK. Indeed, with the establishment of the City 
as the main hub of Eurodollar transactions in the 1970s, and the introduction of Big Bang 
legislation in the 1980s, London was fast becoming the centre of a more Anglo-American 
type of European democratisation – which soon would extend to non-EC members from 
the Soviet Federation.    
 
11.2 First strategic interactions (phase 2)  
  
i) Conservative Party 
Membership of the European Union has always been a contested theme in both 
the Conservative Party (Baker et al. 1993a, 1993b) and the Labour Party (Daniels, 1998). 
Still, up to the 1980s the Conservatives arguably acted more as the ―Party of Europe‖. 
Relatively independent of trade unions – which have always equated EEC membership 
with economic liberalisation, and geared towards protecting national traditions and 
interests on the international scene, the Conservative Party led the way in presenting 
Europe as a possible substitute for the Commonwealth.  After all, if it were not for 
unabated Conservative support, the Labour government would not have been able to 
override the ―no‖ vote at its own Party Congress and clinch majority support for the ―yes‖ 
campaign in the 1975 referendum on EEC membership. Clearly, a considerable part of the 
Conservatives has always been Euro sceptic, and increasingly so since the Thatcher era. 
Up to the 1980s, Conservative Euro scepticism had not really surfaced in the mainstream, 
as the debate on Europe was largely confined to within the parliamentary party. Arguably, 
the EEC issues that so exercised MPs and (shadow) ministers ―were not issues that really 
registered with the party‘s grass roots‖ (Crowson, 2006: 45). That is, up to the arrival of 
Thatcher, with her increasingly outspoken geopolitical preference for a new Anglo-
American alliance (Gamble, 2007). In a first stage, Thatcher supported EEC membership 
because it would help the UK consolidate its position as entry point in European markets 
for US and Japanese firms. This is how Thatcher‘s decision to sign up to the 1985 Single 
European Act – which aimed to create a unified economic area by the end of 1992 – 
should be interpreted. When Jacques Delors spelt out the emerging ―social dimension‖ of 
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the EEC, Thatcher finally let loose her most radical anti-European instincts: ―We have not 
successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed at 
a European level, with a European super state exercising a new dominance from Brussels". 
More and more Conservatives would join in, depicting the EEC as part of the problem 
rather than the solution for the UK, on two accounts: the ―socialist‖ nature of the EEC and 
the ―jealousy‖ of continental financial centres of ―London‘s primacy and will‖. In 
conclusion, many Conservative MEPs agreed with the comment that ―European and 
monetary union will remove all characteristics of sovereignty which characterise a proud 
and independent nation, and which still today give to the British one of the few binding 
characteristics of discipline that entitle us to call ourselves a great nation‖.872   
It is under Major‘s government, that the decisive shift in the balance of power in 
the Conservative Party took place. His government‘s move toward monetary union and the 
adoption of a European exchange rate mechanism backfired horribly.
873
 The humiliation of 
Black Wednesday blew to shreds the Conservative reputation as the party best able to 
manage the economy.  Furthermore, it opened up a gap behind Labour in the polls that has 
persisted to the present day. While some argue that Europe became the ―achilles' heel‖ of 
late twentieth-century Tory politics (Turner, 2001: 38), the turn to Euro scepticism did the 
party no harm among voters. This became clear with William Hague‘s accession to the 
leadership in 1997, and the fact that only his outspoken Euro scepticism earned him 
majority support in popular opinion (Baker 2001). For instance, a survey organised before 
the 2001 election showed a preference for the Conservative position on Europe over 
Labour's of 44% to 28% (Worcester and Mortimer, 2001: 29).   
In geopolitical terms, Thatcherism has induced the emergence of two discourses 
in the Conservative Party, one ―hyper global‖, the other ―intergovernmental‖. According to 
hyperglobalists, governments have learnt that in an open world economy, they are nothing 
more than ciphers for financial market policies which they do not themselves determine 
(Gill, 1998). Intergovernmentalists, by contrast, are still wedded to national parliamentary 
democracy as the supreme base for ordered, legal and democratic government (Lynch, 
1999).  The US being the global cheerleader, and ―federal Europe‖ the imagined enemy of 
national parliamentary supremacy, Thatcherism in effect has shifted the middle ground in 
the party to the ―Anglosphere‖, a globally leading region in which English-speaking 
nation-states – in particular the US and the UK – share traditions and special relationships. 
In recent years, commentators have made sense of Thatcher‘s position through the 
narrative of the « Anglosphere » -  a new narrative of Anglo-American hegemony 
(Gamble, 2007: 13). Although Thatcher did not use the word, and only recently has 
explicitly condoned its use, I shall use it to retrospectively make sense of her action – fully 
recognising that her strategy did not enjoy any retrospective benefits, but was the result of 
some sort of logical incrementalism.   
Thatcher‘s rejection of the EU, and her evangelical recombination of hyper-
nationalism and hyper-globalism, has induced many Conservative Party to take refuge in 
regional Anglosphere values; denoting a belief in low taxation, low government spending, 
deregulation and privatisation, combined with a strong attachment to national sovereignty 
and the nation state as the guarantor of national identity and national independence.
874
 In 
this view, the national policy-making constraints of globalisation are welcomed because 
they rule out the kind of social democratic measures which are viewed as incompatible 
with British national identity, forcing the government to set the people free whatever its 
ideological predilections (Baker et al,. 2002: 409 et al.; Holmes 1996; Howell, 2000). 
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Again, the Conservative Party reinvented a form of Britishness; but because Thatcher saw 
the US as part of the solution – and the EU as part of the problem, Britishness now also 
included those features of ―Americanisation‖ that were considered acceptable because they 
did not overtly go against the grain of notions of ―Englishness‖, ―Welshness‖, 
―Scottishness‖ and ―Irishness‖.  In practice this meant that for instance the US tradition of 
―happy mediocrity‖ now was welcomed as a morally salutary influence, especially since it 
seemed to encapsulate a modern version of the home-grown tradition of secular 
Anglicanism. 
The consolidation of assumptions of an ―Anglosphere‖ naturally led to a 
substantial rewriting of history.  By the mid-1980s, a new official discourse had emerged, 
the first part of which sounded very familiar.  The UK‘s comparative advantage is to 
export capital, invest it profitably in those markets with the highest return, and act as the 
financial entrepot of global markets (Gifford, 2006; Hirst and Thompson, 2000).
875
  
Furthermore, as the UK supposedly was not good at manufacturing productivity, and as 
trade unions were not to be trusted, the UK‘s comparative advantage wass to provide a 
flexible and relatively cheap labour force, with little countervailing trade union powers.  In 
policy terms, all this translated in the financial service sector enjoying disproportionate 
attention from a Conservative Government desperate to reduce public expenditure (cf. 
Appendix F) and render membership of the Anglosphere incontestable. Foreign and 
domestic financial services organisations were co-opted as partners in the twin moves 
towards the privatisation of pension - and other social security – schemes, and, the 
diffusion of ―shareholder capitalism‖ amongst as many people as possible (Morgan and 
Sturdy, 2000: 98-100). 
The backlash of Thatcher‘s disregard of the principle ―a good Conservative is 
both a good Whig and a good Tory‖ finally erupted in 1989 with her introduction of the 
―Community Charge‖. This tax was reinvented by opponents as the ―Poll Tax‖ after the 
hated 13th century Poll Tax which in the 14th century was a major cause of the Peasants' 
Revolt.  Presented as yet another infringement by the State of the ancient principle of 
voluntarism – a Tory principle, protests against the Community Charge were so vehement 
that her opponents in the Conservative Party finally managed to plot a successful ―coup‖ 
and remove Thatcher from the party leadership (Marwick, 1996: 398).  
Nevertheless, with Thatcher England had made the comprehensive turn to 
Anglosphere assumptions. This meant that, for the first time in its history, the Conservative 
Party is left without a prominent defender of national protectionism in its ranks – apart 
from protection of the special Anglo-American relationship. The decline of the British 
Union undoubtedly gave further impetus to this development. Admittedly, by the 1990s the 
Party still proclaimed itself the core of the ―Union‖, but during the Thatcher years it had 
failed properly to restore its historic links (Baker et al. 2002: 403). Thatcher‘s rule sped up 
the emergence of a strong Unionist faction in Northern Ireland, and caused a further loss of 
support  in Scotland and Wales. For instance, while the Conservative party had held 50 per 
cent of the Scottish vote in 1955, it found itself with no Scottish seats and less than 20 per 
cent of the Scottish vote in 1997 (Seawright, 1999). Clearly, the Party leadership‘s 
decision to fight for a No/No vote in the Scottish Parliament referendum in September 
1997 had further isolated it from core Scottish opinion and underlined how much the Party 
had become an ‗English party‘, centred on the south and east of England (Baker 2001). 
In terms of the European Union, the erstwhile significant school in the 
Conservative Party that viewed European collaboration – which could be interpreted as a 
335 
 
form of protection – pragmatically, as a way to secure markets and a greater say in world 
affairs, is dwindling.  In contrast with membership of the ―globalising‖ Anglosphere, 
which is often considered culturally pre-existent and non-negotiable, support for European 
regionalism is considered open and renegotiable. Moreover, contrary to membership of the 
Anglosphere, membership of the EU is often poised in negative terms when it comes to the 
real crunch issues – i.e. issues of coordination rather than cooperation (see chapter 1 for a 
distinction between these terms). Finally, while Conservative support for the EU mostly is 
expressed behind closed doors, amongst elites, criticism of the EU very often is publicly 
advertised. That is because EU-bashing has become an important means to garner popular 
support for the Party. In effect, the explicitly pro-European wing of the Conservative Party 
has been reduced to former power holders such as Kenneth Clarke, Michael Heseltine, 
Edward Heath, Geoffrey Howe, Leon Brittan and Chris Patten, who often are operating 
without the support of most Conservative MEPs (Baker and Seawright 1998). 
The emergence of David Cameron as the new Conservative leader has only 
reinforced the above patterns. Cameron tries to differentiate himself from his predecessors 
Thatcher and Howard by reinventing the old ―Anglican democracy‖ adage in a more 
compassionate guise. If one strips the compassionate bit from his arguments, however, 
what is left is exactly what Howard and Thatcher advocated, namely the need to foster 
―personal responsibility‖876 to counter a drift towards either totalitarian ―collectivism‖ or 
vacuous ―individualism‖.877 With regards to the role of the State, Cameron argues what 
Conservative leaders have consistently proclaimed, namely that the State‘s role merely is 
to act as the promoter of various forms of voluntary efforts to increase social cohesion 
(Packer, 1996: 50). Beyond this, Cameron rehearses a mantra of ―freedom‖ that is 
grounded in an Anglicised version of North American principles rather than concrete 
home-grown traditions – exemplified by flimsy references in his speeches to the future of 
internet applications such as ―Facebook‖. He revels in a public aversion for the EU‘s 
―social chapter‖, unintentionally supporting British businesses‘ tendency to go cheap, and 
negating those citizens wishing less income inequality and a higher quality of life nation-
wide a voice – as well as keeping the economic globalisation discourse incontestable. 
Finally, by invoking greater attention for manufacturing skills, Cameron intends to bridge 
the north-south divide in Britain.
878
  Unfortunately, since the 1960s and increasingly so, 
the centre of new manufacturing skills in Britain is the south of England; only a stronger 
English identity could go some way in countering the overheating of the south and the 
―under heating‖ of the north of England. This would mean giving up on the primacy of a 
British identity and a focus on the modernisation of English identity and union; a very 
practical idea given the Conservatives‘ hopeless position in Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
yet an unthinkable act given the Conservatives‘ predilection to see the British Empire as 
the apex of their history.   
ii) Labour Party 
      In 1979, electors ousted Labour because of its alleged economic 
mismanagement, but equally because it could not control trade union militancy
879
, prevent 
winters of discontent as well as a general feeling of national decline.
880
 At least three other 
failures of ―Old Labour‖ during the 1970s and 1980s would usher in the emergence of 
―New Labour‖ in the 1990s.  There was the continuing decline of industry in the North, 
and Labour‘s failure to halt the acceleration of a North – South divide in favour of a 
London-based service and ―new industries‖ economy. This failure was aggravated by the 
Labour government‘s incapacity to enforce respect for the English traditions of secular 
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Anglicanism and Anglican voluntarism in the North – the litmus test of a ―party worthy to 
govern‖ for voters in the Home Counties, and increasingly the Midlands too.  Finally, there 
was the loss of successive elections against an increasingly authoritarian Thatcher regime, 
which sought to substitute North American ―anyone can get rich‖, classless traditions for 
―bankrupt‖ Tory traditions.   
Old Labour‘s grandstanding throughout the 1970s and 1980s weighted preciously 
little in the balance against the two discourses of inevitability embraced by Thatcherites, 
namely the superiority of Anglo-Saxon ―liberal democracy‖ and the unstoppable nature of 
globalisation.  For instance, during the 1970s and 1980s, the leftist part of the Labour Party 
repeatedly turned its attention to the question of nationalisation of financial institutions – 
after more than two decades of truce, following the nationalisation of the Bank of England 
in 1946 (Pollard, 1979).  First, a 1971 conference resolution called for nationalisation. This 
call was followed by policy documents produced by the Banking and Insurance Study 
Group in 1976 and the NEC‘s ―The City: A Socialist Approach‖ in 1982. Although all this 
grandstanding electorally ineffective, the Party‘s emerging new leadership deemed it not 
entirely inappropriate, given the need to play to the galleries when in opposition. When 
push came to shove, however, ―good elite opinion" always prevailed; time after time 
Labour‘s leadership proved more prone to socialisation in the establishment‘s orthodoxy 
than in grassroots‘ grievances of income inequality and a lack of social mobility 
(Gourevitch, 1984: 120). Thus, New Labour‘s most prominent leaders Blair and Brown 
managed the enormous feat of presenting themselves as quasi-Marxists when in 
opposition, before suddenly turning City of London orthodoxy into a progressive policy 
once in government.  Indeed, New Labour‘s leaders Blair and Brown quickly dropped any 
ideas of a capital levy on City business in favour of domestic industry; furthermore, they 
made no secret of their ambition to turn Labour into the ―natural party of business‖881 
(Osler, 2002),  i.e. to prioritise London‘s global ambitions over domestic issues of 
inequality and lack of social mobility.  
Geopolitically, Old Labour‘s transformation into New Labour revealed more continuity 
than change.  In particular, New Labour was the logical conclusion of a core Party 
constituency‘s century-long attempts to escape the insularity of class politics (Cronin, 
2006) through geopolitical means. Due to a record percentage of home-ownership, English 
class politics in at least one way had been overcome since the 1980s. Thus, the decline of 
Old Labour‘s prospects since the 1983 election has been attributed to the development of 
substantial working-class ownership – and the marginalisation of council housing 
(Rubinstein, 1986: 104). 
 All in all, the difference between Old and New Labour may have been 
exaggerated. Notwithstanding its reputation of being inward-looking and bogged down by 
its dependence on trade unions, Old Labour since the 1920s has remained true to the same 
geopolitical strategies that New Labour has embraced –the latter admittedly with more 
evangelical conviction. First, whenever in government, Old and New Labour cabinets at 
the first sign of crisis have turned to the ―one-world system‖ and ―economic liberalism‖ 
dogmas to rally majority support (Strange, 1967; Overbeek 1990; Milward and Brennan 
1996).
882
  That is, in spite of continuing advocacy by the left-wing of the Party for a greater 
focus on domestic industry. Second, due to its long-held ideology of ―liberal 
interventionism‖, and its derision of Conservatives‘ moral panics about the decline of 
national traditions, the Labour Party has long been more open to Americanisation 
tendencies than the Conservative Party. Revelling in their role of ―shock troops of 
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modernity‖, Labour cabinets generally have been less reluctant than their Conservative 
counterparts to pledge loyalty to the triple alliance of financial globalisation, Anglo-
American leadership and business school evangelisation. Clearly, however, post-Thatcher 
Conservatives have more than lost their reluctance in this regard.  
Third, while it is true that from the 1960s onwards, Labour governments 
acquiesced with the Conservatives‘ decision to acquire EEC membership, it is also true 
that core constituencies of the Labour Party have set much of the anti-European trend in 
England. For instance, Labour left-wingers played a leading role in the "No" campaign for 
the 1975 referendum on the Common Market. Interestingly, even Tony Blair was a 
prominent anti-EEC campaigner in the 1970s.  It is often claimed that after Neil Kinnock‘s 
ascendancy to leadership in 1983, anti-Europe MPs lost their dominant voice in the party.  
Still, regarding the Maastricht Treaty, Labour leaders at the left of the Party were even 
more Euro-sceptic than Conservatives, counter posing their socialist internationalism to the 
capitalist Common Market: ―the European Community is the instrument of…the 
archbishop and the bishops of international capital‖.883 Allegedly, the 1990s witnessed the 
Europeanisation of the Labour Party with growing support for the European Union‘s 
economic and social agenda (Gamble and Kelly, 2000b: 3-5). Once in power, ―New 
Labour‖ endeavoured to take a more constructive approach towards the Union, albeit 
always with a clear ―liberalisation‖ and ―one-world system‖ agenda (e.g. Callaghan, 2000). 
Before the emergence of New Labour, the UK had already adopted EU competition policy, 
for instance regarding cartels; some say because this amounted to an Americanisation of 
the EU anyway. With Blair, UK social policy has also been modestly Europeanised, 
although Americanisation has been more eagerly and voluntarily than EU adaptation; 
whereas the former has been informally adopted and without much contestation, the latter 
has been largely ―obligatory‖ in nature, i.e. arising from the corpus of EU social law and 
policy (Annesley, 2003).   
It is important to understand the symbiotic relation between Labour and the 
Conservatives when it comes to influences of Americanisation and Europeanisation. In 
retrospect, the Conservative Party on both accounts – Americanisation and anti-
Europeanism – has done no more than continue those Labour initiatives that had gained a 
foothold in mainstream popular opinion. Thatcher‘s policies exemplify this trend.  
Arguably, she did no more than follow through – with an uncanny ruthlessness – muddled 
choices by the Labour government, namely to opt for a monetarist macro-economic policy, 
use the discourse of globalisation as the carrot and stick for accelerated de-
industrialisation, and give up on a positive contribution by the trade unions. What Thatcher 
arguably did add to Labour‘s legacy was a copy of the North American ―New Right‖ 
ideology and rhetoric about the welfare state (Pierson 1994; King 1995). But even then, 
Labour and Thatcher have to be seen as two sides of the same coin. Just like Old Labour‘s 
―global mindset‖ antecedents helped the public digest Thatcher‘s shock therapy, the 
coming in to being of New Labour was facilitated by the evangelical Anglosphere 
antecedents set by Thatcher‘s government.  For instance, because Thatcher eliminated 
financial support to alternatives, New Labour governments encountered little resistance in 
popular opinion when announcing their main purpose:  making the English population fit 
for global capitalism (Crouch, 1999: 70). Also, there has been a continued influence of the 
US on UK social policy under New Labour (Jordan 1998; King and Wickham-Jones 1999; 
Deacon, 2000). Finally, the departure of Thatcher in 1991 coincided with the return of 
Christian socialism on Labour‘s agenda, and the election of first John Smith and then Tony 
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Blair as leaders of the party. In marked contrast with their immediate predecessors, both 
Smith and Blair were able to acknowledge their religious faith as an important inspiration 
for their political convictions . Thus, starting with Smith, there was a ―renewed use of 
moral language‖, although geared towards ―civic values‖ rather than overtly religious 
values such as in the US (Dale, 2000: 212).
884
  
In sum, despite the existence of a small Europhile minority in each Party, the 
Labour Party, as the Conservative Party, balances the discourses of hyperglobalism and 
intergovernmentalism through implicit reference to a regional Anglosphere. Admittedly, 
since the 1990s, New Labour has been integrating European regionalist elements in its 
hyperglobalist discourse, to fill in the social-democratic void created during the transition 
from Old to New Labour.  This is an integration by proxy, however.  It is meant to 
compensate for the decline of a home-grown ―social democratic‖ discourse. For instance, 
new Labour MPs for a few years embraced the European Union‘s ―social charter‖, to 
compensate for the devastating conclusions of the Labour‘s Policy Review of 1987-1989, 
and in face of the support in popular opinion for Conservatives‘ efforts to weaken the 
traditional powers of English labour unions.  This charter for a few years functioned as a 
proxy for the domestic lack of a constructive relationship between the government and 
workers‘ representatives.885  At the end of the day, it proved to be only a transitional 
proxy: when push came to shove, New Labour has time after time pledged to opt out of the 
EU‘s social and human rights clauses. 886  
Clearly, when push came to shove, every New Labour leader in government has 
made clear its affinity to US ―liberal‖ and ―free‖ traditions and its antipathy for European 
―bureaucratic‖ and ―regulatory‖ traditions. Albeit ironically the Washington administration 
is four times bigger than its Brussels equivalent; and in spite of the growing international 
prevalence of US-style regulatory capitalism (Cook et al., 2004; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 
2004; Majone, 1994, 1997; Manzetti, 2000) – and its embodiment in a ―Council of Wise‖ 
tradition of democratisation.
887
  Beyond all the rhetoric, however, what is clear is that, 
while antagonism for the European Union is very real in the UK, and support for the US 
higher than in other Western European countries, these issues have a low electoral 
salience. Thus, English voters consistently rank the issue of Europe far below the familiar 
issues of a modern welfare state, health, education, pensions, the economy, unemployment 
and transport. All in all, rather than a real part of their national identity, the EU has 
become a way for both Conservatives and Labour to fight a symbolic proxy war over what 
they have lost since the Thatcher era: the capacity to produce distinctive policies away 
from the universality of the ―liberal‖ tradition – a misnomer for a set of US-specific 
republican settlements that increasingly has taken the geopolitical form of a mercantilist 
strategy (e.g. Higgott, 2003; Levi-Faur, 1998).   
To revitalise the British identity Brown is now playing the ―politics of 
nationhood‖ card, i.e. the slogan of Britain as a ―conservative nation‖.  A Tory trump card 
since Disraeli‘s era, the politics of nationhood established the Conservatives as Britain's 
natural party of government for much of the modern era (cf. Lynch, 1999). Keen to dispel 
―Old‖ Labour‖s anti-national image once and for all, Brown is doing more than playing 
Disraeli‘s card for the umpteenth time, however. For one, not being Scottish, but English, 
Disraeli and consecutive Conservative leaders primarily meant England – not Britain – by 
conservative nation. Second, Brown‘s widely advertised admiration for American 
patriotism and Christian values, and his desire to infuse Britain with a similar Christian-
patriotic fervour is eerily reminiscent of the Thatcher project rather than Disraeli‘s politics 
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of nationhood. While before Thatcher English prime ministers were guilty of neglecting 
the modernisation of English traditions of democratisation, from Thatcher onwards prime 
ministers were guilty of confusing English/British with Anglo-American/Anglosphere 
traditions. Unfortunately, by choosing to focus primarily on the readying of the shock 
troops of global modernity, the modernisation of English traditions of democratisation is 
being shelved – once again. In doing this Brown, as his predecessors Thatcher, Major and 
Blair, is relinquishing control over the meaning of English traditions to less bashful parties: 
North Americans, who for centuries have presented Anglo-Americanism as the modern 
English equivalent of outdated Anglicanism; and Murdoch‘s and Black‘s media empires, 
with their xenophobic undertones and unreconstructed English supremacy ideology. 
 After more than a decade in power, New Labour now appears quite old again, and 
the cyclical nature of electoral politics is likely to favour the Conservatives during the next 
parliamentary elections.   
iii) Liberal Party 
A revival of the Liberal Party was again announced in the late 1960s and 1970s, a 
period which witnessed a relative ―liberalisation‖ of lifestyles and class relations, for 
instance in terms of the greater acceptance of consumerism and secondary and higher 
education changes. Tempered by a spirit of ―secular Anglicanism‖, these changes were 
timid, however, as exemplified by the belated – in comparison with the US and France, but 
not the Netherlands – breakthrough of the new feminist and citizen‘s right movement in 
the 1970s. Class backgrounds and relations remained dominant in the conduct of English 
political, civic and economic life (Marwick, 1996).
888
  Still, these liberalisation pressures 
gradually brought back into the limelight the fragility of old intermediary institutions, 
especially regards the cohesion of local community life. The Liberal Party took advantage 
of this by formally adopting a strategy of community politics in 1970, a strategy that would 
prove most successful in the North of England.  
The real revival of the Liberal Party would come as a result of the secession of 
number of Labour and Conservative MPs from their parties in 1981, and their efforts to 
found the Social Democratic Party (SDP).  In the same year, the Liberal Party and SDP 
formed an electoral Alliance. The Alliance‘s political impact was immediate, as it 
managed to a string of by-elections, and 26 per cent of the vote in the 1983 general 
election, the best third-party performance since 1929. Still, in the British first-past-the-post 
electoral system, 23 percent of the vote only equally 23 parliamentary seats as against, 209 
MPs for a Labour Party that won 28 per cent of the vote. Supplementing its focus on 
community politics, the Alliance opposed Thatcher‘s support for the Anglosphere – home 
of the ―trans-Atlantic intellectual Right‖, and warned of ―the Americanisation of Britain, 
complete with sharper inequalities, greater levels of private corruption and of civil 
violence, and the acceptance of an alienated underclass of unemployed and 
unemployables.‖889 Soon, however, differences emerged between the SDP and the Liberals 
on economic questions and, principally, on defence, with the SDP much more strongly in 
favour of a British nuclear deterrent than the Liberals. In 1988, however a considerable 
part of the MPs of the two parties decided to merge, on initiative of the Liberal leader, 
David Steel. The name of the Party eventually became the ―Liberal Democrats‖.  
After a very bad start in the European elections, the Party started regaining its 
grassroots membership with a renewed combination of community politics and anti-
Americanism – under the leadership of Paddy Ashdown.  Ashdown‘s pledge to raise 
income tax to invest extra resources in education, was hugely popular, earning the party 
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17.8 per cent of the vote and 20 seats in the 1992 general election. Ashdown‘s undisguised 
anti-Toryism also contributed to this success.
890
 In 1995, the Liberal Democrats even 
became the second party of local government. Thanks to their community politics, the 
Liberals also became the main opposition to Labour in many urban areas.
891
 And with the 
election of Charles Kennedy to leadership, the Party‘s reinvention of the Liberal position 
of ―educators of the people‖ gained even more resonance, translating in very strong 
electoral results, both national and local. In foreign policy matters, the Liberal Democrats 
reinvented voluntaryist thought on foreign affairs in the spirit of the late Victorian 
Auberon Herbert. Although less pacific than his contemporary equivalents, Herbert was a 
supporter of free trade and national self-determination as a means of promoting 
international peace and co-operation (Edyvan, 2006: 3).  And regarding domestic affairs, 
the Party reinvented the Edwardian New Liberal position that the state should assist the 
development of morality in society, by promoting individual autonomy within a common 
interest.  In spite of all their efforts to distance themselves from Thatcher, from an 
economic policy viewpoint, the Liberal Democrats clearly also are Thatcherite heirs.
892
  
Thus, as Thatcher, the Liberals are in favour of ―the marketisation of public duties‖ (Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2003: 51), and a strong, but limited State that can achieve this goal (cf. 
Crouch and Dore, 1990; Gamble, 1988).  
iv) Bank of England  
While the Bank of England continued to champion the City during the 1960s and 
1970s, its ability to supervise the activities of its constituents through its old informal 
methods declined rapidly. One major reason for this decline was the division between 
resident business in sterling and offshore foreign currency business. The former attracted 
plenty of Treasury controls – aimed at bolstering the exchange rate. The lack of regulatory 
or supervisory attention to the latter, by contrast, encouraged the immigration of foreign 
banks and bankers who eventually would out compete many British banks in the City.  
Some argued this was a good thing, as it exposed the inefficiency of British banks 
(Gowland, 1990).  Others maintained that it were the overseas banks who were 
disadvantaged, because they were being excluded from British regulatory decision-making 
process. The real culprit was that sectional, « meso-corporatist » part of the financial sector 
that undermined the much needed revival of the City of London; and Britain in face of the 
crisis of the Fordist, industrial model (Jessop, 1990; Moran, 1991). Criticisms of meso-
corporatism were in line with the reports of the 1968 Monopolies Commission and the 
1967 National Board for Prices and Incomes. Both reports maintained that commercial 
banks‘ cartel over-emphasised non-price competition, led to a greater spread between 
investment and lending rates than would have been the case under a more competitive 
system, and consequently left the « inefficiency » of smaller banks unpunished.
893
  One 
way or another, changes in the regulation of US securities markets during the 1970s were 
endangering London‘s position in the international financial system. The Bank of England 
responded by introducing its Competition and Credit Control (CCC) reforms in October 
1971. The two aims of these reforms were to put British clearing banks and foreign banks 
on an equal competitive footing; and to, for the first time in contemporary British 
monetary history, control money supply aggregates rather than bank loans and credit
894
 (cf. 
Goldberg and Saunders, 1980: 639-640).
895
   
Why did the Bank of England choose to go ahead with the CCC reforms? Despite 
some occasional doubts about the destabilising aspects of the Euro-dollar markets, the 
Bank of England in the early 1970s remained as keen as it had been in the 1960s to keep 
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them based in London, along with as broad a range as possible of foreign bankers and 
others. So, did world-state concerns prevail? Yes and no. First, the monetary policy of the 
authorities in the period from 1960 to the introduction of competition and credit control in 
1971 rested on the assumed dominance of the clearing banks (Grady and Weale, 1986: 64-
65). Thus, the Bank of England‘s « conscious purpose » with this new regime was to allow 
English clearing banks to compete aggressively in banking and credit markets, and in this 
way contract the foreign and domestic « fringe ». For similar reasons, the Bank in 1968 
had favoured mergers between the clearing banks (Moran, 1984 : 50).
896
 Another reason 
for CCC was that it allowed the Bank of England to continue carrying out its public 
reponsibilities without adopting more formal powers:  its supervision of newcomers under 
CCC continued to rely almost wholly on an informal, personal touch (Kynaston, 2001: 
442; Moran, 1984). This also was the clearing banks‘ preferred way.  
It took a secondary banking crisis in the period 1973-1975 for these piecemeal 
measures to be considered inadequate. As the lending of non-clearing banks to speculative 
sectors of the economy increased in the early 1970s, the liquidity of the English banking 
system fell markedly.  And some leading clearing bankers admitted they should stop 
sheltering behind the « cosy complacency of the Committee of London Clearing Bankers‖, 
which involved unhesitating co-operation ―with the monetary authorities to an extent 
which has become subservient".
897
  
The government was urged to concentrate even more on setting the conditions 
whereby London could retain its international leadership in financial services; most 
notably through a wholesale formalisation of prudential regulation.  In a belated response, 
the government in 1979 abolished all foreign exchange controls, so as to strengthen the 
role of the City of London in the world's financial markets.  The 1979 Banking Act 
increased the regulatory powers of the Bank of England to compensate for this abolition of 
controls.
898
 This piece of legislation also was a response to the 1977 EC Banking Directive 
and the realisation tha the Department of Trade Industry – which under the Companies Act 
had been responsible the actitivities of secondary banks – was ill-equipped for the task. 
Like Norman between the wars, Richardson – Bank governor between 1973-1983 
– had managed to keep the government out of the finance/industry relationship (Kynaston, 
2001: 509-510). With the ascendancy of Thatcher, such efforts became superfluous. Once 
in power, Thatcher ignored all appeals to prop up domestic industries, and followed 
through Labour‘s halfhearted initiatives to renew the City of London‘s central place in 
world markets with evangelical conviction. In the best British tradition of State-led 
financial openness, her government in 1986 introduced the famous ―Big Bang‖ legislation 
– described as a Big Bang, because it deregulated so many of the markets that were ruled 
by old boy clubs and sidelined the Bank of England‘s prudential powers to some extent. 
This legislation aimed at abolishing all remaining restrictions on securities market access, 
inducing foreign banks to get fully involved, and leaving building societies as well as life 
insurance companies with no choice but to get involved.  It systematically organised all the 
main markets into a hierarchy of self-regulating organisations, a move that allowed for the 
rhetorical maintenance of the ―old boy‖ tradition of democratisation – Anglican 
democracy, voluntarism and neutrality, and its reorganisation on the basis of tight State-
backed controls. The self-regulating organisation gained monopoly control over the rules 
of membership and entry to the market they were assigned to. In turn, their own rules and 
internal government were subjected to oversight by an overarching self-regulatory 
organisation, the Securities and Investments Board, which in effect licensed all self-
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regulating organisations (Vogel, 1996).  The Securities and Investments Board speaks the 
language of self-regulation, and as the Federal Reserve is constituted as a corporate body 
financed by a levy on the industry.  At the end of the day, however, the Board‘s authority 
is based on statute: its own constitution is prescribed in law, its leading officers are 
publicly appointed, and it is required to report to Parliament and Whitehall headquarters.
899
  
As in the US, all this regulatory zeal was accompanied by a great deal of legal codification, 
an altogether alien development in a country famed for its ―uncodified‖ constitution – 
albeit the latter is an exaggerated claim.
900
   
Big Bang legislation was accompanied by the 1986 Financial Services Act – a law 
in response to an alliance of State modernisers and big firms that wanted more effective 
anti-fraud controls to position the City as a key location in the global financial services 
industry.
901
  In spite of all re-regulation, such as the 1987 Banking Act which gave it 
further formal powers (Norton, 1991) – the Bank of England was now much a weakened 
authority in the City. Essentially, the Bank was transformed from the City‘s – particularly 
the clearing banks‘ – representative in the State to the State‘s representative in the City; a 
State obsessed with the watchwords « globalisation »
902
 and « market efficiency » 
(Leyshon and Tickell, 1994).  Not surprising in view of the Bank‘s weakened authority as 
well the large amount of new legal codification and State-backed controls, what followed 
after the passage of the 1986 Financial Services Act was more than a decade of confusion 
and instability in financial regulation and internal struggles within the industry. In 
response, after emerging victorious from the 1997 elections, New Labour handed the Bank 
of England back its operational independence – the Bank was allowed to set domestic 
interest rates. Yet, this did not signify a wholesme return to the good old days. The 1998 
Bank of England Act also stipulated that, ultimately, the government retained control of 
the final objective of monetary policy. Through a new Monetary Policy Committee, the 
Bank of England‘s duties were formalised: maintain price stability – a specified low 
inflation target, and support the Government‘s economic policies, including its growth and 
employment objectives – a relative novelty.  
If this were not enough, the Bank‘s authority was overshadowed by a new 
regulatory giant: the Financial Services Authority (FSA). Originally established in advance 
of the law in 1997, the FSA derived its powers from the statute of the 2000 Financial 
Services and Markets Act.
903
  By virtue of statute, the FSA has displaced the Bank of 
England from any significant role in prudential regulation of markets or institutions.
904
  It 
is the sole government agency responsible for bank regulation and in effect licences all 
institutions and products: authorisation, standard setting, supervision, and enforcement 
come within its powers
905
 and not those of the Bank of England. In comparison with the 
Bank of England, the FSA enjoys a very different relationship with the central state. The 
Treasury appoints its Board. Furthermore, the FSA is required to report annually to the 
Treasury and the House of Commons – in particular the Commons‘ Treasury Select 
Committee.
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Beyond regulatory developments in the City of London, the international financial 
instabilty that accompanied the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed-rate system 
provided fertile ground for the extension of central bank co-operation.
907
  Under the 
leadership of among others George Blunden of the Bank of England, a committee was set 
up at the Bank of International Settlements to co-ordinate prudential supervision. From 
these modest beginnings an intricate system of international banking supervision would 
emerge – resulting in a first and second ―Basle Accord‖ in respectively 1988 and 1999-
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2001, both of which heavily influenced EU banking directives. And the Bank of England 
played a leading role in this system – at least when the US Federal Reserve consented.  For 
instance, the agreement on capital adequacy in 1986 was reached first on a bilateral basis 
between the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, and then sold to other central banks 
(Pringle, 1995: 142-143). The Bank of England thus had found another way to circumvent 
the EU and remain influential as a world-state rather than regional proponent – at least if 
we discount the Anglosphere as regional entity. 
 
11.3  Firms‟ strategic positions in new settlements (phase 3)  
 
11.3.1 Renewal of democratic settlements 
Arguably the greatest merit of Thatcher‘s regime is that it increased the 
consistency with which England embraced the unintentional consequences of WWI – the 
Empire‘s secular decline, New York‘s eclipsing of the City of London, and Britain‘s 
dependence on the US to uphold the ―liberal tradition‖ in international trade matters. 
Indeed, according to some, the emergence of Thatcherism amounted to nothing more than 
another swing of the pendulum, a variation on the same old British tune. This observation 
carries a lot of truth when one assumes British history starts after WWI. For instance, just 
like Stanley Baldwin gave in to the miners in 1924 only to stand firm against them in 1926, 
Margaret Thatcher gave in to them in 1982 only to firmly rebuke them in 1984.
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Similarly, the ―anti-waste‖ movement that swept British popular opinion was as strong in 
Baldwin‘s 1920s than in Thatcher‘s 1980s.  Furthermore, in the late 1970s and 1980s full 
employment was abandoned on the altar of monetary reform, just as in the 1930s. And the 
large-scale privatisation of sectors of industry previously owned by the state in the 1980s 
made no more difference to the actual relations between capital and labour than did 
nationalisation after 1945. Also, Thatcher‘s use of religious metaphors and references may 
not be so groundbreaking after all, if one considers that for instance Anthony Eden in 1947 
promoted his belief in ―Christian virtues‖ (National Union of Conservative and Unionist 
Associations, 1947: 42). The same applies to Thatcher‘s anti-State rhetoric. She simply 
repeated what Eden had maintained in 1947: ―complete State domination is utterly 
repugnant to our democratic traditions and the whole political instinct of our people. The 
function of the State is to give the fullest possible scope to the free development of the 
individual‖.909 Finally, if we scratch away the radical appearance of Thatcher‘s rhetorics, it 
becomes clear that the relation between the economy and the state remained fundamentally 
unchanged during her ten year reign. Government expenditure as a proportion of GDP in 
1990 was only some 4 per cent below what it was in 1980, and the proportion of national 
income taken in tax remained constant over the decade at round about a third (Runciman, 
1993: 64).  In sum, Thatcher‘s ―radical politics‖ did not constitute a clean break at all; she 
did no more than continue what had been initiated by her predecessors many decades 
before.  Even in relation to the most recent period, Thatcher simply continued what 
Callaghan had started: the move to monetarism in 1976 in coordination with US central 
bankers, and the start of a massive FDI inflow from the US in 1977. All this had been 
initiated not by Callaghan or Thather, but under pressure of large UK multinationals who 
saw the US as the last bastion of capitalism.
910
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a) Success and failure of Thatcher: confusion of national contexts? 
Thatcher‘s legacy provided a mixed picture of success and failure, the success 
part involving her willingness to modernise old-fashioned traditions and put Britain – the 
City of London – at the vanguard of US-led globalisation trends.  One could argue that in 
absolute terms, Thather‘s failures were not greater than most of her 20th century 
predecessors. Yet, in relative terms, Thatcherism did amount to a qualitatively different 
stage in English history in one unique way: the degree to which the nation‘s homegrown 
traditions of democratisation were confused with another nation‘s traditions as a recipe of 
geopolitical success.  It is well known that all post-WWII prime ministers except for 
Edward Heath were committed Atlanticists and occasionally wallowed in the thought that 
the Pax Americana was a mere continuation of the Pax Brittanica. And all have reflected 
the collectively held belief that their country‘s Anglican nonconformism sets a ―free 
England‖ apart from an ―unfree continent‖ (Pfaltzgraff, 1969: 2). Contrary to her post-
WWI predecessors, however, Thatcher seemed unaware that under the thin veneer of 
Atlanticism resided enormous differences between US and English traditions of 
democratisation. As a self-avowed ―Anglo-Saxon Nonconformist‖ (Smith, 2007) or 
―evangelist‖ (Coleman, 1971: 9), Thatcher convinced herself and many Conservative 
colleagues that shared Anglo-Saxon ethnic and religious traditions set these two nation-
states apart from others. Contrary to Europe which has always been ethnically diverse and 
dominated by a Catholic hierarchy, the United States is the offspring of a free and 
nonconformist community of English settlers (Fischer, 1989: 787; Thatcher, 1991: 509; 
Thatcher 2002: 21, 358–59).  
But because Thatcher confused the national contexts and histories of England and 
the United States to an unprecedented degree
911
, she did not reinvent the English success 
model of ―Anglican nonconformism‖, but its US equivalent – ―American nonconformism‖. 
In an extraordinary display of historical invention more than reinvention, Thatcher 
distanced  herself from homegrown traditions which she saw as an historical aberration 
from England‘s real success model: the traditions of Anglican voluntarism, secular 
Anglicanism, Anglican democracy and neutrality maintained by intermediary institutions 
such as clearing banks, building societies, public utility companies, trade union and 
employer organisations, the Church, the BBC, quality newspapers, the legal and medical 
professions, and the civil service. Instead, Thatcher‘s government promoted traditions 
which in her mind laid the basis for the most glorious periods in English history, but in fact 
were idiosyncratic US traditions that lacked contextual support and historical resonance in 
her home country: ―Real Whig voluntarism‖, ―happy mediocrity‖, ―Council of Wise 
democracy‖ and ―anti-State pluralism‖.  
Thatcher supposedly was an admirer of Victorian values (Samuel, 1992: 22-23), 
which she associated with those special voluntarist qualities of ―self-reliance, personal 
responsibility…being prepared to lend a hand to others".912 Clearly, the voluntarism she 
referred to was of a nonconformist rather than Anglican nature; she associated the heydays 
of enterprise and liberty with the rise of voluntaryist values of ―selflessness and 
benefaction", ―thrift‖ and ―hard work‖ (Thatcher, 1977: 53-54). Though highly charged 
and selective, Thatcher‘s repudiation of Anglican voluntarism and her reification of 
nonconformist voluntaryism as an ―eternal truth‖ in UK history enabled her to cast the 
welfare state in the guise of ―old corruption‖ and vilify Labour as ossified and anti-national 
(Campbell, 2003: 182). Thatcher kept repeating that because of Labour, Britain‘s Christian 
identity was being eroded and that, confronted with the merciless forces of globalisation, 
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the survival of British democratic capitalism depended on the replenishing of the link 
between ―evangelical and materialist systems of meaning‖ (Smith, 2007). Tellingly, she 
summarised the four characteristics of the British nation that had sustained it in the past: 
―the acknowledgement of the Almighty, a sense of tolerance, an acknowledgement of 
moral absolutes and a positive view of work‖. Contemporary generations were warned to 
renew these ―spiritual assets if the integrity of the nation is to survive‖ (Thatcher 1981: 
125).  
Did Thatcher make a relevant historical point? The rise of nonconformist 
voluntaryism in Britain in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries each time had been 
rather short-lived. The first outbreak had led to a large exodus to the US; the second 
―outbreak‖ arose in quite exceptional circumstances, because of the rapid urbanisation of 
the English regions north to the home counties – where Anglicanism had not taken firm 
root.  By the beginning of the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, the establishment had 
managed to smother the nonconformist ―threat‖ to Anglicanism in a rather peaceful way.  
How did it achieve that? Each time the character of nonconformist voluntaryism had been 
transformed in two ways. First by making legal and economic concessions to dissenters – 
as for instance the Whigs and Gladstone had done. And second by casting continuing 
religious dissent in the role of extremist, anti-national threat, i.e. a danger to the 
geopolitical strength of Britain – that free island of nonconformist Anglicanism.  That the 
Anglican religion in the process became entirely secularised actually served the 
establishment well, especially the Whigs amongst them. In sum, every time there was a 
significant outbreak of nonconformism, proponents of the traditions of secular 
Anglicanism and Anglican voluntarism stepped in to take the religious sting out of 
movements of dissent and deflect all nonconformist anger into a national credo of 
―Anglican nonconformism‖.  Remarkably, this each time re-energised the country‘s 
geopolitical position and imperial fervour.   
So, is a new resurgence of dissent underway? In stark contrast with the US, 
English dissent in the twentieth century almost exclusively has had a secular character, 
similar to French dissent and far removed from any religious notion of voluntaryism.  One 
of the only remaining legacies of voluntaryism in England is that attempts by the central 
State to infringe on the taxation freedoms of local authorities by and large are seen as anti-
democratic.
913
 Paradoxically, this is the one aspect of voluntaryism that Thatcher was most 
keen to kill off. The general perception was that many local authorities were in the grasp of 
collectivist Labour or even Conservative politicians – derogatorily called the ―geriatric 
right‖ because of the average age and relative passivity of the councillors (Lansley et al., 
1989: 3; Seyd, 1987).
914
  Thatcher therefore repeatedly tried to expand central state powers 
to local taxation matters, with mixed success - and ultimately contributing to her demise.  
All these contradictions point to only one conclusion, namely that Thatcher was 
not referring either to Anglican voluntarism or voluntaryism, but to an imaginary 
voluntarist context – a ―Real Whig‖ context – shared by Britain and North America (see 
chapter 11, p. 394, 396).   
b) Elements of confusion of US and UK contexts 
In many ways, Thatcher‘s coalition was an evangelical descendant of the 1882 
―Liberty and Property Defence League‖ (Green, 1991: 88). This League was a rather 
sectarian coalition of vested interests which had become afraid of the growth of the welfare 
state, and the infringing effects of democracy on their property and status entitlements. The 
League‘s strategy up to WWI was the defense of the status quo with the weapon of laissez-
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faire (Soldon, 1974: 208,  210-213).
915
 It represented a persistent, but minority strand of 
« New Right Populism » with jingoistic overtones. As with the old League, Thatcher‘s 
coalition represented a rather sectarian part of a society ridden with class differences: those 
middle and lower middle classes most prone to anti-taxation, anti-trade union and anti-
State issues. As her predecessor, but this time with real governmental power, the new 
Liberty and Property coalition wielded the weapon of laissez-faire to restore a link between 
the British nation, liberty and property that could not be challenged by interest groups with 
more « social democratic » aims. To achieve this, Thatcher combined her nationhood 
strategy with very pragmatic domestic and geopolitical tactics (Lynch, 1999: 46). 
Domestically, she demonstrated pragmatism in unleashing her most radical ―liberty and 
property‖ instincts only after her second, stunning electoral victory in 1983.  
Geopolitically, pragmatism meant that Thatcher built on both the victory in the Falklands 
War, the ascendancy of Reagan
916
, and the appeal of an « American dream » discourse of 
financial opportunity to recast Britain in the new hegemonic context of the Anglosphere: a 
sphere devoid of « trade union hotheads » in which low taxation, low government 
spending, deregulation and privatisation reign supreme (cf. Howell, 2000, 2004).  
Thatcher‘s recasting of British history in an imaginary Anglosphere light did not 
stop here, but involved at least two more exercises of historical overstretch and confusion. 
She framed Britain as as much of a nation of shareholders as the US. Citizens were waiting 
to ―come out‖ as shareholders; they just needed the right incentive.  And she mimicked US 
mythology of the classless society – i.e. the middle class society, denying the 
inescapability of class issues in Britain (e.g. Cannadine, 1999), and repudiating the 
―paternalistic‖ institutions of society. Let us have a closer look at both points. 
Thatcher‘s government hoped that a resolute and sustained strategy of 
privatisation would finally turn Britain in what it was meant to be: a nation of 
shareholders, just like the US. While it is true that England experienced a flurry of small 
shareholder republics in the nineteenth century, these had become rather stale by the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. Indeed, during the 20
th
 century, stock market participation 
has always been much higher in the US than in England – and the UK at large. Prior to the 
mid-1980s one could point to a tax bias in England and the UK away from direct holdings 
of equity towards wealth held in housing or occupational pensions – since equity was more 
heavily taxed than consumption, and housing and pensions benefited from tax advantages 
relative to consumption. And given the structure of the tax system these differences were 
significantly greater in times of high inflation such as the 1970s and 1980s. With the 
introduction of Personal Equity Plans and Employee Share Onwership schemes in 1987, 
and the phasing out of tax advantages for building societies, the English nation of 
shareholders was running out of excuses: equity now could be held in an equally favorably 
taxed manner by English and US households (Banks et al., 2000: 27). Thus, from the late 
1980s England has experienced substantial levels of direct share ownership, although still 
not comparable to those in the United States. In addition, several other differences persist 
between the US and England. First, the direct holdings of equity of many stockholders are 
comparably small in England and the UK at larrge (Banks, Blundell. and Smith, 2002a). 
Also, tenure of new shares by English households has been much more short-lived and 
driven by speculative peaks than in the US. Third, there is a large discrepancy in the type 
of equity held by English and US households since the 1980s, something differential rates 
of return in each country's equity markets alone cannot explain (Banks et al., 2002: 258).  
One reason is that the higher house price volatility in England provides important 
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incentives for English households to become house owners and accumulate equity in 
housing earlier in their life-cycle (Banks et al. 2004).  Strikingly, the wave of 
demutualisation in the building society movement in the 1990s – and the speculative 
phenomenon of carpetbagging – meant that by December 1998, English individuals held a 
significantly larger proportion of the recently demutualised companies, 48.5 per cent, than 
they did of the market as a whole (16.7 per cent). This figure had decreased from 60 per 
cent at the end of 1997 (Office for National Statistics, 2000;
917
 Office for National 
Statistics, 2007)
918
 
Fourth, differences in attitudes toward capitalist financial institutions persist 
between the US and England, a nation characterised more by class contestation of 
capitalism than classless love for capitalism. More similar to continental European 
countries than the US in this regard, the stock market has long been seen as one of the 
most vivid symbols of wild capitalism. This distrust could be one reason why the equity 
boom that eventually occurred in the UK affected fewer households (Banks et al., 2000: 
28).
919
 Even compared to some of their purportedly social-communitarian European 
counterparts, UK households‘ share ownership is relatively low. Thus, while the Italians, 
Belgians and Finns hold a comparatively higher share of their financial wealth in the form 
of securities – at a rate of almost 3 to 1 in case of the Belgians, the wealth of English – and 
Dutch – households comprises a comparatively very high proportion of life insurance 
investment and pension fund reserves (Marionnet, 2006).  
Finally, in historical perspective the notion of England, or the UK as an emerging 
nation of shareholders is somewhat imaginary. The figures speak for themselves.  In 2006, 
UK individuals owned £239 billion of UK shares (12.8 per cent
920
 of all UK shares listed 
on the London stock exchange) down from 54 per cent in 1963, 20 per cent between 1989 
and 1994, 16.5 per cent in 1997, and 14 per cent in 2004 (Office for National Statistics, 
2006
921
; Office for National Statistics, 1997
922
).  
c) Traditions of Anglican democracy and neutrality are sidestepped 
To reinvent a new England and Britain devoid of the class, union and economic 
problems of the past, Thatcher‘s government used the Anglosphere idea in another way. 
By  repudiating the ―paternalistic‖ institutions of society. Thatcherites in effect aspired to 
creating a classless Commonwealth. In doing this, they declared irrelevant the homegrown 
traditions of Anglican democracy and neutrality – and their institutional vehicles, namely 
the civil service, the Lords, the medical, legal and educational establishments.  Since these 
latter institutions historically had upheld the unwritten understandings of the British 
constitutional state and functioned as the established channels of democratic settlements, 
Thatcher was responsible for creating an important democratic vacuum (Moran, 1999). 
Again, the New Right would draw inspiration on North-American traditions to fill this 
vacuum, albeit often more instinctively than strategically.  Instead of in terms of Anglican 
democracy, institutional innovations were encouraged in the mould of the so-called 
―Council of Wise‖ tradition of democratisation. Contrary to European traditions of 
democratisation such as Anglican democracy - which are premised on the organic 
interdependence of different social classes, this US tradition is based on the assumption 
that, since everyone is free and has equal opportunities, everyone is part of the middle 
class and class strife is ontologically irrational. As argued in chapter 8, the Council of 
Wise tradition has its origins in the constitutional founding fathers‘ distrust of the 
―inflationary‖ instincts of the masses and their belief that popular participation in 
government had increased to such an extent as to be incompatible with free government 
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(Dietz and Hamilton, 1960: 131). In order to provide the disciplined propertied classes 
with constitutional safeguards against the irrationality of the masses, the founding fathers 
ensured a central place in the democratic system to institutions governed by a council of 
wise men – in their own image. The most notable examples of such ―Council of Wise‖ 
institutions are the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve Bank. Because the latter was 
explicitly modelled on the Supreme Court, it has been historically perceived by US citizens 
as ―essential to the preservation of their liberties‖ (Burns, 1979: 381-382).   
d) The Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority 
In comparison, the Bank of England has never acquired an equivalent 
constitutional primacy or autonomy in Britain
923
; its considerable merits notwithstanding, 
it has remained a highly contestable institution throughout the centuries, prone to 
accusations of profiteering when it still was a private bank, and always in danger of being 
nationalised once it had acquired a more public character.  Thatcher‘s government 
endeavoured to mimic the Fed‘s ―Council of Wise‖ character – as well as its unique 
public-private character, but not its federal nature – with the introduction of the Financial 
Services Act in 1986. Described as a Big Bang, because it deregulated so many of the 
markets that were ruled by old boy clubs and sidelined the Bank of England‘s prudential 
powers to some extent, this legislation systematically organised all the main markets into a 
hierarchy of self-regulatory organisations. These organisations gained monopoly control 
over the rules of membership and entry to the market they were assigned to. In turn, their 
own rules and internal government were subjected to oversight by an overarching self-
regulatory organisation, the Securities and Investments Board, which in effect licensed the 
individual self-regulating organisations (Vogel, 1996).  As in the US, all this was 
accompanied by a great deal of legal codification, an altogether alien development in a 
country famed for its ―uncodified‖ constitution – or would the latter be an exaggerated 
claim?
924
   
What followed after the passage of the 1986 Financial Services Act was more 
than a decade of instability in financial regulation and internal struggles within the 
industry. All this culminated in the changes associated with Financial Services and 
Markets Act of 2000 (Financial Services Authority, 2001). According to this act, the 
Financial Services Authority is the new power to be, and so it is as some contend it is the 
most impressively empowered financial services regulator in any leading world financial 
centre. Worryingly, however, though modelled on American example, the Financial 
Services Authority‘s democratic basis is much narrower than that of the Federal Reserve 
system; the latter‘s authority has long been based on a dispersal of regulatory bodies at 
both state and federal level.
925
 Instead of an historically and nationally embedded banking 
authority, that developed a precarious balance of private and public responsiblities over 
several centuries – the Bank of England for all its faults, there now is the largely State-
driven, yet tradition-less FSA. The FSA has adopted US norms of efficiency and the 
protection of classless consumers as its objectives, rather than respect for English 
traditions that promote social mobility and the republican ideal of non-domination starting 
from an assumption of classes.  The same can be said of other new ―Council of Wise‖ 
regulatory agencies in the UK such as OFCOM and OFTEL; the introduction of these 
agencies has led to an ever greater State and normative focus on Londonisation and 
classless consumer dynamics. Clearly, this has had the effect of stimulating innovation. 
Unavoidably, however, the existence of significant social class differences and large 
regional income inequalities, combined with the agencies‘ lack of embeddedness in class 
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and local realities, has tended to limit the latter‘s democratisation aims to a ―low value 
added‖ road: namely, the lowest common denominators of less product regulation and 
more cost competition. 
e) Confusion of varieties of pluralism 
 The introduction of US-style Council of Wise innovations would not have been 
possible without adopting its complement, the US tradition of pluralism, as a way to 
bypass the  old vehicles of the homegrown tradition of neutrality – in particular the civil 
service and Bank of England.  Although both the US and Britain share a ―plurality‖ 
electoral system, Thatcher‘s coalition of political, civic and business supporters did not 
seem to realise to what the extent the nature of pluralism in the US and England has been 
and remains different. In the US, the historical coincidence of evangelical religious ideas 
with the idea of an expanding frontier, an empire of liberty, has been much more 
meaningful than in the UK.  This has resulted in a US tradition of pluralism that maintains 
the administrative and organisational inferiority of the State to the democratic capacities of 
the « marketplace of ideas ».  Beyond the appearance of administrative weakness and 
fragmentation, however, the US State has actually always been normatively strong, 
exerting great pressure on a plurality of private actors to abide by its grand rules of the 
game (Dobbin and Sutton, 1998).
926
  In sum, the strength of the US State tradition 
domestically is its application of a normative personality principle.
927
 This contrasts with 
the more administratively centralised, « neutral » Anglican State tradition
928
, mother of all 
territorial and fiscal centralisation traditions in Europe – compared to the  the French State 
tradition which shares the ―self-contained normative order‖ aspect with the US, and the 
administrative centralisation aspect with the English (cf. Laborde, 2000).   
The radical nature of the US tradition of pluralism throughout the centuries has 
been energised time and again by its immigrant nature. As members of a ―nation of 
immigrants‖, incumbents and newcomers have sought refuge in a commitment to their 
native religion as a way to ―display their commitment to American values while 
maintaining their ethnic distinctiveness‖, independent from State interference (Bruce, 
1996: 135).
929
 England, by contrast, has never been a nation of immigrants, as 
acknowledged by Thatcher and her Conservative predecessors (Layton-Henry, 1994). 
Instead of religious resilience, pluralism in England has been linked with class resilience, 
independence-craving trade unions and employer organisations. And rather than a 
fragmented State apparatus, the geopolitical and domestic strength of England has long 
depended on a centralised Anglican State apparatus and a – since 1919 – unified and 
culturally homogenous civil service that cherishes ―neutrality‖ as a way to deal with 
England‘s particular brand of pluralism.  
In contrast with the tradition of neutrality, which is based on intermediary 
institutions monitoring gradual changes amenable to the integration of classes, US 
pluralism is premised on what Thatcher called the ―dispersal of power away from the 
center to a multitude of smaller groups and individuals", in particular a shift away from 
power "in the hands of the state at the centre".  Oblivious of the pivotal role of the tradition 
of neutrality, Thatcher‘s coalition promoted all aspects of US pluralism: a minimal State, 
the pursuit of privatisation, and the need to let local communities take responsibility for 
themselves (Finlayson, 1994: 366).  
f) Inequality, social mobility, pathology of interest groups, and inflation 
In sum, by substituting rather unreconstructed US-traditions for homegrown 
traditions, in the name of an end to national decline and the undesirability of class notions 
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– an impossible notion in any nation-state least of all England, Thatcher‘s government 
further weakened and sidelined longstanding English vehicles of rivalry and settlement.  In 
doing this, her government sped up an evolution that was long underway, but about which 
most cabinet ministers seemed somewhat in denial: the further breakdown of homegrown 
roots of contestability and mobility – and only viable basis of democratic governance. In 
particular, Thatcherites preferred to keep legitimising the existence of a British world-state 
on the basis of an immediately available neo-imperial alternative for the Commonwealth – 
the Anglosphere, with one centre in London and another in New York. That is, rather than 
based on long-term investments in grassroots capacities to foster prosperity, civic virtues, 
social mobility and political participation in England. Devolution and the fostering of a 
grassroot national identity was well underway in Scotland, but not in England, which once 
again for ―raisons d‘etat‖ was denied a modern national identity.  Thus, it is the latter 
nation – and its small neighbour Wales – that came to feel the brunt of Thatcher‘s errors. 
While she targeted the expansion of the middling sorts through her shareholder nation and 
property-ownership schemes, she produced a very polarised England with less social 
mobility than in the decades before, as demonstrated by several comparative figures. Not 
only do national comparisons indicate that intergenerational mobility has markedly 
declined since the 1980s; international comparisons point out that Britain has become less 
mobile that most Northern European countries, including the Netherlands and Germany 
(Blanden et al., 2004). 
 
Table 11.1 Regional GDP/Person (Britain = 100) 
 1954/5 1971 1981 1991 2001 
South East 112.7 112.7 115.5 118.9 126.1 
London 137.6 123.4 126.0 129.4 133.9 
Rest of South 
East 
97.9 104.6 108.4 109.5 119.0 
East Anglia 83.5 92.8 94.7 108.9 109.1 
South West 86.4 93.9 91.8 92.4 88.4 
West Midlands 107.9 101.9 89.1 91.3 89.7 
East Midlands 101.6 95.7 95.6 94.4 91.0 
North West 97.8 95.3 92.9 90.2 89.3 
Yorks & 
Humberside 
98.4 92.5 90.2 89.5 85.5 
North 88.0 86.1 92.2 83.1 75.6 
Wales 82.0 87.5 82.0 82.8 78.2 
Scotland 88.1 92.2 94.8 98.9 93.7 
 
Source: for 1954/5, Annual Report of the Commissioners of the Inland Revenue, 
  Cd. 341 (1958), for 1971 and 1981, Regional Trends and for 1991 and 2001, Cope et al. 
(2003). 
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Telling comparative figures notwithstanding, New Labour did not contest the 
Thatcherite consensus, but rather built on it. Its main purpose, as Thatcher‘s, is to make the 
English population fit for global capitalism (Crouch, 1999: 70).  So it should not come as a 
surprise that nothing much has changed since 1997. Instead, since 1979, all through the 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s, it is the UK – in particular England and Wales – that has 
experienced the most severe inequality upswing of all ―developed‖ countries (Blanden et 
al, 2004; Sawhill and Morton, 2007; Freeman and Katz, 1995: 13).  Especially given that 
income inequality in the UK has been acerbated by three factors: its sharply delineated 
regional nature (see table 11.1),  a very pronounced polarisation or ―decline of the middle‖ 
in the income distribution, and the shift from one type of interest group ―pathology‖ to 
another.  Different from most developed countries, polarisation in the UK was driven 
mainly by ―downgrading‖ – defined as the movement of households into the lower tail of 
the income distribution, rather than by ―upgrading‖ – as was the case in the US (Nielsen et 
al., 2005: 14).
930
  In other words, the opposite of Thatcher‘s US-style middle class nation 
has been achieved.  
Finally, to get rid of the pathology of British interest group politics – a series of 
failiures to address class politics and mimick tripartite national consensus mechanisms 
operative in the European Union, access points to policy for interest groups were 
drastically reduced. Instead, companies started negotiating on a private, one-to-one basis 
with Whitehall cabinet ministers, or moved their lobbying efforts to the supra-national 
level (Grant, 2007). One benefit of the drastic curtailing of trade union access and 
financing has been to reduce unemployment to US-style levels; it removed a certain 
number of institutional rigidities, in particular the old link between unemployment and 
inflation.  Whereas in the past a prolonged fall in unemployment led to inflationary 
pressures and contraction, inflation did not materialise after the early 1990s crisis, and the 
economy continued to expand. Some argue that because the unions did not have the power 
anymore to push for wage rises when unemployment was falling, the low-inflation 
credentials of the monetary policy regime were reinforced. And this helped sustain the fall 
of unemployment (Pissarides, 2003).  
As argued above, less positive is that this fall in unemployment has been achieved 
through the regulatory and ideological pre-emption of domestic contestability and rivalry, 
in the name of a geopolitically pioneering model of globalisation (Hirst and Thompson, 
2000).  The end result of Thatcher‘s settlement was not only the end of the post-WWII 
status quo and the rise of the City as a harbinger of casino capitalism (Strange, 1986), but 
also the abandoning of a qualitatively superior English industrial model in favour of a 
focus on cost-reduction and low-added value creation (Delbridge et al., 2006). While 
obviously not devoid of merits, the lack of investment in mechanisms of contestability and 
mobility that has characterised the Thatcherite and New Labour consensus of national 
globalisation undoubtedly has damaged the country‘s democratic resilience and increased 
its geopolitical dependence on the strength of one foreign nation-state, the US, to a 
worrying extent.  
 
11.3.2   Formal evolution of the suffrage 
As in most other Western countries, after 1948, the most interesting and 
innovative democratisation dynamics in England took place outside of the formal suffrage 
framework. Of course, the age of electoral adulthood was lowered from 21 to 18 in 1969. 
But this was a mere reflection of the greater influence of consumerist movements, 
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themselves a reflection of the increasing pervasiveness of Americanisation influences – in 
particular traditions of middle class egalitarianism and individualism, as opposed to more 
rite-of-passage oriented English traditions.
931
  
Still, there was one important formal change, which was more important in terms 
of what it did not do than what it did: the abolition of the business vote in 1969 with the 
exception of the City of London.  More than anything, this symbolised the Labour 
government‘s commitment to neo-imperial aspirations, in particular the belief that the City 
of London was the key to Britain‘s greatness; and that its business autonomy should be 
preserved at all costs – even that of an entirely skewed balance of power in England. 
Labour‘s exemption of the City in 1969 followed a long line of precedents.  The City of 
London Corporation was not reformed by the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, nor by 
subsequent legislation, and with time has become increasingly anomalous. That is, in spite 
of the demographic undermining of the basis of these exemptions. The historical basis of 
exemption – ever since the late Middle Ages – has been the City‘s role as guardian and 
voice of the English citizenry‘s traditions and liberties. Yet, non-residential voters were 
gradually outnumbering residential voters. While the City in 1801 had a population of 
about 130,000, increasing development of the City as a central business district led to this 
falling to below  5,000 after the Second World War.
932
  By 1969, the non-residential – 
business – vote had completely eclipsed the residential part of the City electorate. Rather 
than turn this around, New Labour in 2002 allowed for a substantial increase of the 
business franchise – before the 2002 City of London (Ward Elections) Act incorporated 
companies were disfavoured electorally. The majority force in the City electorate now is 
foreign capital. In fact, the last occasion when overseas interests and traditions were 
deliberately accorded so reasonable a role in the affairs of the City was in the late 
thirteenth century, when King Edward I kept the city under direct rule for a dozen years, so 
as to  ensure that foreign merchants could pursue their business to his advantage (Keene, 
2004).  
Beyond the City, a particularly troubling outcome of the electoral suffrage in 
recent decades has been the decrease in turnout. While the turnout in the 1950 British 
general election stood at 83.6 per cent, it had declined by more than 24 percentage points 
by the 2001 general election. The 2001 figure (59.4 per cent) and that for 2005 (61.3 per 
cent) were the two lowest returns since the 58.9 per cent in the war-time election of 1918 
(Bennett, 2005). In just over fifty years, the United Kingdom moved from being an 
impressive illustration of how turnout can remain high when voluntary voting is used, to 
producing calls for the introduction of compulsory voting (Blackburn, 1995: 109-112).
933
  
 
11.3.3 Firms‟ strategies of democratisation 
In Tables 11.2 and 11.3, I provide comparative growth and marketshare figures 
(in terms of both deposits and total assets) for building societies and banks over the period 
1966 to 2006. The Co-operative Banking Department joined the rank of PLC‘s in 1972934, 
and the TSBs followed suit a decade later – ending up merging with Lloyds in 1995.935  
Given their loss of mutual status, it did not make sense to include Co-operative and Trustee 
Savings Banks as separate varieties of financial institutions anymore in the growth figures. 
No mention is made of National Savings either, as this financial vehicle was rapidly 
marginalized from 1966 onwards (Coles, 1986: 18).  
In the subsequent sections, I expound how the particular strategies of 
democratisation followed by banks and building societies – their particular deployment 
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and combination of the four logics of democratisation – underlay their differential growth 
patterns during the last fourty years. Finally, I provide a ranking of the variety of financial 
institutions for the period 1900 to 1930 in table 11.4, based on the respective financial 
institutions‘ effectiveness in terms of each strategy. The data are listed in two series, one 
up to 1988, the year before the first round of demutualisations of building societies, and 
another from 1988 onwards – including the two demutualisation rounds in 1989 and 1997.  
 
Table 11.2: Growth and proportional shares of building societes versus banks 
in terms of total assets 
Year Building Societies Major UK Banks* 
1976 28,202 56,228 
1978 39,538 72,326 
1980 53,793 102,385 
1982 73,033 171,418 
1984 102,689 214,794 
1986 140,603 279,200 
1988 188,844 338,066 
Growth x 6.69 6.01 
Share % 36 64 
1988 188,844 338,066 
1990 216,848 414,144 
1992 262,515 517,924 
1994 301,010 572,250 
1996 318,392 817,142 
1998 156,014 1,155,126 
2000 177,747 1,404,532 
2002 184,453 1,816,715 
2004 236,146 2,176,289 
Growth x 1.25 6.43 
Share % 9.78 90.22 
Sources : Blair, 1997, Broadberry, 2006; Co-operative Bank Archives; Sheppard, 1971; Gosden. 
1996; UK Central Statistical Office (Abstract of Banking Statistics, various years); Building 
Societies Yearbook 2007/08. 
*in April 1991, the Major British Banking Group (MBBG) was formed, combining Abbey Natonal 
Group with the former Committee of London and Scottish bankers (which included the Standard 
Chartered Group), formed in 1985 to replace the Committee of London Clearing Bankers (CLCB).  
** Trustee Savings Banks ceased from being part of National Savings after 1979 and became a 
banking company owned by shareholders from 1986 as TSB Group PLC Limited. In 1995, TSB 
Group and Lloyds Bank merged to form Lloyds TSB Group PLC. 
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Table 11.3: Growth and comparative market share of building societies versus banks 
in terms of deposits/shares 
 
Year Building Societies Major UK Banks* 
1972 14,369 13,972 
1974 18,524 37,254 
1976 26,271 24,689 
1978 37,022 29,773 
1980 49,950 41,457 
1982 67,661 58,968 
1984 91,442 70,260 
1986 116,998 105,213 
1988 150,778 143,758 
Growth x 10.5 10.3 
Share % 51 49 
1988 150,778 143,758 
1990 160,842 191,246 
1992 190,451 235,544 
1994 210,423 253,176 
1996 212,825 322,347 
1998 109,863 466,710 
2000 112,184 546,043 
2002 138,741 630,829 
2004 160,456 741,279 
Growth x 1.06 5.16 
Share % 18 82 
Sources : Blair, 1997, Broadberry, 2006 ; Co-operative Bank Archives; Sheppard, 1971; 
Gosden. 1996; Trustee Savings Banks‘ Yearbook 1981 ; Robbie, 1992 ; UK Central 
Statistical Office (various years) 
* Figures for London Clearing Banks up to 1980 ; figures for MBBG from 1980 onwards; 
all figures include Co-operative Bank deposits ; figures from 1988 include Abbey National 
deposits (converted from a buildinng society to a bank in 1988) 
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Table 11.4: Comparative ranking of commercial banks and building societies per 
strategy of democratisation for the period 1966 to 2007 
(1=highest, 2=lowest) 
  
Commercial 
banks 
 
Building Societies 
 
Strategy a 
 
Before 1989 1 1 
After 1989 1` 2 
Strategy b 
 
Before 1989 2 1 
After 1989 1 2 
Strategy c 
 
Before 1989 2 1 
After 1989 1 2 
Strategy d 
 
Before 1989 1 1 
After 1989 1 2 
Strategy e 
 
Before 1989 2 1 
After 1989 1 2 
Strategy f 
 
Before 1989 2 1 
After 1989 1 2 
 
  
Strategy a      Help core customers fulfil their social class aspirations. 
i) Commercial Banks  
  In many ways, the main vehicles of minority democratisation in London  
since the 1970s, and increasingly so from the 1980s onwards have been foreign banks, in 
particular North American consumer and corporate banking entities such as Citibank. 
These banks were much more adept at creating and exploting new opportunities to 
accumulate wealth and status in London for foreigners and Englishmen alike: in particular 
Euro-money, Euro-Bond, securities and wholesale banking opportunities. The Big Four 
clearing banks tried to adapt and compete with these foreign entities, with at best mixed 
success during most of the period 1970-2006.  They started to diversify in new lines of 
international business – the recycling of OPEC surpluses – in the early 1970s, and stepped 
up their efforts in the 1980s to prepare for the impending « Big Bang ».  All Big Four 
clearing banks endeavoured to become formidable competitors in both the mortgage and 
investment banking markets.  After the Mexican debt crisis in 1982, the clearing banks 
decided to focus more on domestic activities in an effort to stop the erosion of their 
marketshare in domestic deposits by building societies, merchant banks and other financial 
institutions. Clearing banks came up with several innovations: they introduced interest-
bearing accounts, ―free banking‖ and a much greater variety of savings accounts 
(Mullineux, 1987: 12-19). Fast becoming universal banks, the clearing banks in particular 
targeted the building societies. Initially, they had limited themselves to granting ―bridging 
loans‖, i.e. loans to allow the purchase of a new house before sale of one‘s present house is 
completed. In the 1980s, however, they more decisively entered the mortgage market, 
rapidly sending many building societies ‗down market‘ in their own lending. By 1985, the 
relative newcomers in the mortgage market – principally the clearing banks and the TSB – 
had captured 10 percent of all mortgage balances outstanding.
936
  This percentage would 
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go up rapidly in the 1990s, especially after the demutualisation of several major buiding 
societies – who joined the ranks of commercial banks after two rounds of demutualisation 
in 1989 and 1997 (see table 11.6). 
 
Table 11.6: Numbers of mortgage advances per year in the UK (in thousands) 
(Source: Wilcox, 1999: table 38;Wilcox, 2001: table 39) 
 1983 1986 1989 1992 1996 1997 
 
2001 
 
2003 
Building 
societies 
950 1,231 867 531 589 396 
 
225 
 
197 
Banks 179 246 300 327 431 674 
 
963 
 
967 
  
 The record of clearing banks in international investment banking would prove to 
be more troublesome. Barclays and Lloyds had long been the most internationally 
committed members of the Big Four. It was not until the early 1970s that, faced with 
diminishing returns at home, these two banks consolidated most of their foreign interests. 
Unfortunately, compared with US banks who led the way in the development of 
Euromarkets, neither the clearing banks, with their legacy of retail banking, nor their 
overseas affiliates, skilled in exchange and trade finance, were well-equipped to develop 
competing lending products. English banks‘ legacy of specialised, highly demarcated 
organisational boundaries, meant that when they became more ―universal‖ in 
organisational scope, management often could neither coordinate the different product 
categories, nor decide which market – retail, corporate or wholesale – to focus on (Jones, 
1993: 58-59). Witnessing Barclays and Lloyds suffering heavy Third World losses, and 
proceed with reorganisation at an agonisingly slow pace, embolded the two clearing banks 
with a much lesser international legacy, National Westminster and Midland Bank.
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 Both 
banks tried to surpass Barclays‘ international expansion in the 1980s with ambitious 
diversification and acquisition attempts. The Midland Bank had long avoided foreign 
direct investment in favour of a correspondent strategy. But it had been reassessing its 
strategy as early as the late 1960s, when the decision by all the clearing banks to disclose 
their inner reserves had revealed that it was the most undercapitalised of the clearing 
banks, and that its profitability was much weaker than its competitors (cf. Holmes and 
Green, 1986: 244-255).  And in 1974 a review of the banks‘ international strategy 
demonstrated Midland‘s inordinate dependence on the UK, most notably England, for its 
profits compared to the other clearing banks. Not entirely surprising, the Midland Bank 
chairman was one of the first to criticise the clearing bank cartel. Looking for a way out, 
the bank‘s Board decided to try and raise the contribution of international business to 
profits. From 1979 onwards, Midland Bank engaged in a series of foreign acquisitions, 
culminating in an agreement to acquire 51 percent of Crocker National, one of California‘s 
largest banks.  By a stroke of the pen, Midland Bank had become the tenth largest banking 
organisation in the world.  
Similarly, National Westminster Bank, which had long focused on domestic retail 
banking, purchased a large North American bank on the East Coast in the early 1980s. 
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Initially, National Westminster‘s forays apparead impressive.  Nat West‘s merchant bank 
operation, County Bank went on an acquisition spree, acquiring various stockbroking and 
jobbing firms to create NatWest Investment Bank. The bank also expanded internationally, 
forming NatWest Bancorp in the United States, and opening branches in Europe and the 
Far East. By the early 1980s, NatWest had passed Barclays to become the UK‘s largest 
bank by asset size. Furthermore, its overall outlook was better, as it had less exposure to 
Third World debts than the other clearing banks. Thus, in 1987 National Westminster 
became the first UK bank in history to report profits of over £1 billion. 
By the late 1980s, however, perceptions had changed dramatically. Ultimately, 
the 1980s proved to be the worst financial decade in the Midland Bank‘s history – in 
particular the investment in Crocker National resulted in heavy losses. National 
Westminster was involved in a major financial scandal that led to the resignation of its 
chairman and three other directors. By 1990, National Westminster had reversed to the 
status of being the UK‘s second largest bank by asset size, behind Barclays (Jones, 1993: 
333-334).  Later the company would shed its investment banking arm, to refocus on the 
domestic market under the rebranded name NatWest. Royal Bank of Scotland, a much 
smaller bank, would ultimately end up acquiring NatWest.
938
 The Midland Bank, for its 
part, as soon as 1992 had been acquired by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation – which eventually became HSBC Holdings PLC.939   
Barclays had not anticipated all this. Having suffered a psychological blow in 
falling behind National Westminster, the bank from 1986 onwards took rather drastic 
measures to regain the lead. Barclays' modest merchant banking arm was merged with the 
brokers de Zoete & Bevan and the stock jobbers Wedd Durlacher. In 1986, the resulting 
investment bank BZW was created as an autonomously managed division.
940
 The division 
made a loss in 1987, and would not make substantial profits in its 11 year long life – when 
it was finally divested. Also, for the first time in the last few centuries, Barclays appointed 
a non-family member to the chairman position, Sir John Quinton. Quinton invested £900m 
in balance sheet expansion, and allowed his managers to lend to homebuyers and property 
developers with little restraint during the housing boom of 1988-9.  By default of a clear 
management structure, risky lending operations went on till the property market crashed 
and Barclays endured heavy losses (Vander Weyer, 2000). After a series of corruption 
scandals in the 1990s, Barclays in 1997 decided to get out of investment banking and 
follow the retail banking path that Lloyds had chosen a few years before, after its 1995 
merger with the TSB Bank
941
 (Auger, 2000: 46-47; 114-115; 257).  
From the late 1990s onwards, clearing banks managed to find a good balance 
between stability and profitability in their portfolio, by virtue of their renewed focus on 
retail banking.  Changes in financial markets also helped enormously. While clearing 
banks had given up trying to compete with Wall Street for the lucrative business of helping 
companies sell shares and advising them on takeovers, banks such a Barlcays and RBS had 
kept the bits of their investment banks that dealt with bonds, loans and foreign-exchange 
trading. Located in the City of London, the latter were well-placed to benefit from a plunge 
in interest rates across the world after 2001. The clearing banks eagerly catered to a 
demand for new international products: those that allowed lenders and borrowers to slice 
and repackage risks relating to interest rates, currency movements and loan defaults.
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This included repackaging the infamous sub-prime mortgages that triggered a financial 
crisis in 2008. Up to now, the backlash of this crisis has not impacted on UK clearing 
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banks disproportionately, although some sophisticated accounting tools might have kept 
the worst consequences temporarily undisclosed. 
In sum, it took a long time before old-school institutions such as Barclays and 
Lloyds overcame the breakdown of their old Anglican voluntarism by US banks wielding a 
new protestant work ethic – real Whig voluntarism. A series of fiascos followed, that did 
not testify at all to a capacity to increase social mobility or build profitable new modes of 
self-restraint – based on the principles of anti-waste and anti-usury. After the Mexican debt 
crisis in the 1970s, there were the investment banking fiasco‘s of the 1980s and 1990s, 
followed by the mortgage crisis of the 2000s; all of which were the result of over eagerness 
and lack of self-restraint. Only since their comprehensive return to retail banking in the 
late 1990s did the clearing banks regain the semblance of a modern embodiment of the 
tradition of Anglican voluntarism – i.e. the principle that voluntary self-restraint should be 
at the heart of the social class system and the English model of sound finance. By and 
large, however, clearing banks have played a negative role regarding issues of social 
mobility in England.  
What was the contribution of the Co-operative Bank
943
 in social mobility issues 
and the re-emergence of a new model of sound finance? It was not significant, for two 
reasons.  First, the Co-operative Bank has become a very classical bank both in terms of 
targeted social classes and offered products.  The Co-op targets the better-off social 
classes, as demonstrated by its pioneering of a free banking scheme in 1974 - and later the 
pioneering acceptance of Visa credit cards. Four minor aspects set the Co-op apart from 
mainstream banks: its willingeness to accept low profitability levels, its very small branch 
network, its focus on the North of England, and its purportedly more ethical stance. But all 
this has not made a significant impact on UK banking for the simple reason that the Co-
op‘s marketshare has remained very low, ranging between 2-3 % in the UK retail banking 
market and amounting to near to 0% in wholesale banking – albeit the bank does cater to a 
significant amount of local authorities.  
ii) Building Societies 
 In many ways commercial banks still performed better than building  
societies, at least from the later 1980s onwards. The latter champions of Anglican 
voluntarism found themselves ill-prepared for the siege of ―carpetbaggers‖ that befell 
them. Before that period, during the 1970s and earlier 1980s, the building societies had 
done excessively well. The 1970s had been a learning decade for the building societies, 
insofar as they had to learn how to deal with consecutive housing booms in1971-1974 and 
1977-1979. During the 1960s, house prices had remained fairly stable, as had building 
societies‘ attractiveness. But when interest rates fell dramatically in 1970, this changed 
rapidly: while building societies‘ share rates became increasingly attractive, house prices 
rose by an annual average of 43 per cent during the decade. By the end of the first boom, 
building societies‘ net lending had doubled (Nellis and Longbottom, 1981: 10). Somewhat 
worrisome, building society lending had substantially increased effective demand and 
fuelled house-price inflation, which left them open to accusations of a lack of self-restraint. 
In response, some societies started promoting term shares – a product that encourages the 
intake of money on a longer-term basis in exchange for yielding a one to one and a half 
percent over the ordinary share rate. Term shares had been reluctantly introduced in the 
1960s by a few societies. From 1974, when building societies were experiencing an acute 
shortage of funds, they were taken up more enthusiastically and seriously – promoting 
them with a higher differential than common during the 1960s. By the end of the 1970s, 
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the amount held in term shares by the 17 largest building societies was 13.43 per cent of 
total shares. And it were the social classes with the highest aspirations that principally 
joined building societies‘ product portfolio schemes (see table 11.7).  
 
Table 11.7: Building Society shares/deposit accounts per socio-economic group 
(end 1970s) 
(Source: Gough and Taylor, 1979: 26) 
Socio-economic group % Holding Building Society Shares or Deposit 
Accounts 
AB 40.8 
C1 29.8 
C2 19.9 
DE 12.0 
 
Building societies profited maximally from clearing banks‘ refocusing on 
international banking services during the 1970s. While banks cut back their number of 
branches, building societies' growth during the seventies came through an expansion of 
branch networks in key retail areas. In the period 1972-1982 the number of building 
society branches grew from 2522 to 6479 (Howcroft and Lavis, 1986: 91), while that of 
clearing banks declined by almost 1,000 in the period 1968-1979 (Boleat, 1981).
944
  
All in all, before the late 1980s, building societies were able to make a highly 
innovative contribution to the fulfilment of social classes‘ aspirations. Building societies 
tempered short-term speculation mechanisms, and provided an economically attractive, 
long-term combination of saving and credit mechanisms which married the needs of 
homebuyers for low-cost loans with those of investors in search of a low-risk form of 
saving (Cook et al., 2001). In other words, building societies fulfilled the two conditions 
necessary to raise social classes‘ aspirations. They provided attractive opportunities to 
increase monetary wealth to the up-and-coming social classes. And since these 
opportunities were predicated on voluntary self-restraint, namely a willingness to trade 
longer term investments for short-term speculation or wastefulness, they could not be 
stigmatised as crude profiteering, but actually increased social status. In sum, building 
societies were an effective vehicle of social mobility. Indeed, before the late 1980s, the 
typical building society depositor did not at all conform to the sophisticated ―utility 
maximising‖ investor postulated in economic theory – such as Tobin/Markovitz portfolio 
theory.   
 
Table 11.8 Growth in Building Society Investors 1968-86 
(Source: Coles, 1986: 19) 
Year Number of 
investors (million) 
Percentage of Adult 
Population 
Number of 
shareholders 
(million) 
1968 6.2 15 8.2 
1979 18.9 43 27.9 
1983 25.2 57 37.7 
1986 28.2 64 40.0 
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But cracks in this paradigm would soon appear during the financial liberalisations 
of the 1980s. With the disappearance of competitive boundaries, price competition became 
fiercer, in particular on interest rates for current accounts, deposits and mortgages as well 
on fees for these products. At the same time non-price competition shifted from branch 
networks, which were cut down to reduce costs, to diversification into new products such 
as high yielding accounts and packages of mortgages and insurances (Bailey, 1990). 
Remarkably, in spite of all this competition, profitability levels in the UK remained higher 
than in the rest of Western Europe, including in the mortgage market (Low et al., 2003). 
That was probably due to the disappearance of diversity of organisational forms on the 
supply side; as well as the vanishing of building societies‘ tempering influence on short-
term price fluctuations and speculation mechanisms – the old mechanisms of sound 
finance. 
What is more, building societies‘ effectiveness in catering to the twin conditions 
of increasing monetary wealth and social status fell away during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Initially, they were able to encroach on the banks‘ traditional markets, both in the level of 
deposits they were able to attract and in the number of loans they made, in particular for 
mortgages. Building societies, however, soon found out they lacked the experience and 
skills to rely on highly volatile wholesale markets to raise money.  In addition, owner-
occupiers‘ behaviour was becoming more speculative with each day – in particular because 
they were now able to withdraw housing equity without having to move house (Miles, 
1992). In sum, during the 1980s and 1990s building societies found it increasingly hard to 
provide an economically attractive, long-term investment option for those with ambitious 
social class aspirations. At first, building societies held their own: while banks increased 
lending for house purchase considerable from the mid-1980s, the building societies by 
1987 retained the major share of the home loans market. Furthermore, building societies‘ 
share of the entire market of personal sector liquid assets amounted to 53 %, compared to 
commercial banks‘ 33% and national savings‘ 14 %. Yet, as wholesale funds became more 
profitable than retail deposits, and building societies raised their stakes in the former, they 
were to learn a lesson the secondary banks and clearing banks had already found out: 
wholesale funds did not have the stability of retail deposits (Grady and Weale, 1986: 
28).
945
 Also, the greatly enhanced ability of consumers to engage in speculative lending 
and mortgaging activities, the volatility of wholesale markets, and demutualisation 
pressures proved too much for many building societies. Regarding the latter pressure, even 
societies that did not announce conversion plans were still marred strategically and 
administratively with public speculation on large distributions of windfalls. At times, they 
were almost besieged by carpetbaggers –  short-term investors whose sole motivation was 
to press for conversion in order to make a windfall gain from their membership (Blair, 
1997).
946
  
When considering the track record of those building societies that converted into 
banks, the verdict is rather unequivocal: few of the large new banks have been able to 
remain successful without the help of either a parent commercial bank – Abbey National, 
Alliance & Leicester, Halifax, Woolwich, Cheltenham & Gloucester, Bristol & West – or 
the government – Northern Rock.  Furthermore, this loss of independence has been the 
result of rather dramatic failures, as with Abbey National‘s catastrophic venture in 
corporate banking from 2001-2004 and Northern Rock‘s over exposure to the recent sub 
prime mortgage crisis. The remaining, non-converted building societies have fought hard 
to retain their identity – for instance by offering higher mortgage rates and lower savings 
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rates than their commercial counterparts. But this has only had the slightest impact on their 
image, which still is lower oriented in terms of social class than the PLC organisational 
form. And it had only the slightest influence on customers‘ speculative behaviour, as well 
as the new predilection for variable household mortgage rates – which leaves customers‘ 
wealth portfolios extremely vulnerable to interest rate changes. 
 
Strategy b    Cater to customers of different social classes. 
i) Commercial Banks 
Clearing banks faced two distinct problems from the 1970s onwards. In  
comparative international perspective, they had become less inclusive vehicles of 
consensus; clearing banks largely missed out on the retail banking revolution launched in 
Continental European countries such as the Netherlands from the 1950s onwards. And the 
division between gentlemanly and managerial classes in banks such as Barclays and 
Lloyds became increasingly dysfunctional in face of US managerial practices quickly 
superseding British practices as the standard for the international banking establishment – 
the former being considered less snobbish and more inclusive internationally. Barclays and 
Lloyds were rather slow to react; but when Barclays in the 1980s fell behind in not only 
the international, but also domestic ranking of biggest and most profitable banks, its Board 
made the bold move of appointing the company‘s first non-family chairmain in modern 
history: Sir John Quinton. The latter distinguished himself from his predecessors by having 
a classless reputation – he had no love lost for the tradition of Anglican democracy at all. 
Totally buying in the North American ―happy mediocrity‖ tradition, Quinton wanted 
Barclays to become the ―McDonald's of banking‖, "where you're greeted with a smile and 
not kept waiting" (Weyer, 2000). To get rid of Barclays‘ snobbish reputation, he broadcast 
its brandname amongst as wide as possible social classes by sponsoring the Football 
League – that other former bastion of gentlemanly virtues turned ―classless‖.  
Lloyds followed a different path. Long known as the Tory bank, Lloyds had 
traditionally served the most upper-class clientele of all clearing banks – to the south and 
east of London. It is only after the merger with TSB in 1995, that Lloyds was able to shrug 
off lingering accusations of snobbism. As a former mutual bank, TSB‘s image and main 
clientele was highly complementary. The TSB had more than 20% market share in the 
Midlands, North of England and Scotland, but only 5-12 per cent in the rest of the country, 
where most of the wealth of the country was amassed.  Also, about half of TSB customers 
were classified as being in the lower socio-economic groups – blue-collar workers and 
university students, compared with 25 to 40 per cent in other banks. (Rowe and Pitman, 
1985: 14-20).  
In terms of gradualism and stability, the merger bewteen Lloyds and TSB also made sense: 
by giving Lloyds a strong bancassurance capability and a broader customer base, the bank 
was able to significantly reduce its vulnerability to market swings (Rogers, 1999: 58). 
What did not contribute to a greater feeling of inclusion or gradualism was 
clearing banks‘ 1980‘s stampede towards putting shareholders first. Instead, it spawned a 
countermovement in the early 1990‘s. Among other parties, small businessmen - who 
complained of exorbitant loan charges - and the Consumers‘ Association initiated ―a rising 
storm of complaints‖947 about banks‘ lack of customer unaccountability. In particular, 
banks‘ deceiving presentation of the self – ―the Caring Bank‖, the ―listening bank‖ – was 
denounced (Marwick, 1996). What then, explains the relative consensus – or indifference – 
amongst social classes about the banking industry?  
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For one, the majority social class supporting the consensus consisted of foreign 
rather than English shareholders: by 1988, an astonishing 53.3 percent of all banking 
sector assets in the UK were in foreign hands, compared to for instance 13 percent in the 
Netherlands (Gardener and Molyneux, 1990: 260, 281). By the year 2000, the former 
percentage had increased slightly: some 55 percent of all banking assets in the UK were 
owned by foreign banks.  Most foreign banks are not involved in the English deposit-
market. But they are disproportionately represented in the credit card business, merchant 
banking and other wholesale and securities lines of businesses. This disproportionate 
representation, particularly in London, has made it rather difficult to maintain the centrality 
of traditions of Anglican democracy and secular Anglicanism in those market areas. 
Rather, a diversity of foreign traditions prevails, the dominant ones of North American 
origin. Clearly the English public has only a minority say in all this – particularly as to 
what fair play means in an age of ―globalisation‖.  
Second, clearing banks finally did catch up with their Continental European 
counterparts; under pressure from building societies, access to current accounts and 
cheques was greatly expanded. From 1981 to 1989 the proportion of British adults with a 
personal account rose considerably from 61% to 80% (Bailey 1990). Of the more than 36 
million people in the UK that nowadays hold a current account, the four largest clearing 
banks account for some 56% of the credit card market and 70% of the current account 
market. 
ii) Building societies 
         Before the 1980s, building societies had provided the best available 
guarantee to Englishmen of inclusion in the national Commonwealth – be it at the price of 
an acceptance of merely gradual economic improvement. As self-proclaimed champions of 
―property-owning democracy‖ ambitions, they brought tremendous stability to English 
society and greatly tempered resentment for the propertied upper classes. Building 
societies promoted the tradition of Anglican democracy in two ways: in terms of 
representing a hierarchy of ages and wealth/aspirations. First, while almost as many young 
as old people participated, younger people tended to hold the smaller accounts and older 
people the larger – about 70 per cent of building society savings were held by the over-55 
age groups (Gough and Taylor, 1979: 27).  
Second, building societies fostered a customer/member portfolio that, rather than being 
based on utility-maximisation, constituted a representative cross-section of social classes, 
which was serviced differentially according to needs/capacities. The traditional building 
society depositor was the small, personal saver who was attracted by the convenient 
deposits and withdrawal facilities offered by societies, the variety of savings schemes as 
well as by the superior returns which building society shares offered compared with, say, 
clearing bank deposit accounts, the TSBs and national savings. Apart from this small saver 
social class, higher social classes also participated for their own reason. Prospective house 
buyers were encouraged to open one or more building society accounts because societies 
reportedly gave preference to depositors when allocating mortgage funds. Finally, building 
societies also attracted deposits from the more sophisticated investor, the one whose 
behaviour could more readily be classified as utility-maximising (Pratt, 1980: 15). 
Crucially, up to the 1980s, only the latter investors proved sensitive to interest rate 
changes. 
This was all about to change in the 1980s, when ―nation of shareholder‖ 
aspirations trumped the old property-owning vision. A new managerial class took over the 
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building societies, amidst doubts that their organisations‘ mutual origins put them at a 
disadvantage in this new world. After a long period of deliberation, Abbey National in 
1989 started the process of building society ―demutualisation‖. From 1995 until 1999 eight 
societies demutualised, accounting for two thirds of building societies‘ assets as of 1994. 
And of the fifteen largest building societies still existing in the year of the Building 
Societies Act 1986, five became PLC banks, and five others were taken over by PLC 
banks.  Remarkably, the demutualisation of building societies has actually led to a secular 
decline of their shares in the mortgage and savings markets (McAteer, 1996: 124).  The 
main beneficiaries of building societies‘ decline have been the commercial banks, who 
have experienced tremendous growth of their share in the UK retail deposit market – up to 
80 % in 2003.  
Unfortunately, the bulk of building societies that turned commercial have 
struggled to both prosper and remain independent. Their lack of experience with London-
based institutional investors and the riskier, commercial lines of business meant they were 
not the real beneficiaries of demutualisation either. Finally, and worryingly, building 
societies‘ members were not amongst the principal beneficiaries of demutualisation either. 
At the end of the day, three rather elitist classes benefited most: building societies‘ new 
corporate managers who used conversion to boost their earnings and status, carpetbaggers 
who profited from windfall gains, and London-based investors.  Indeed, by the year 2000, 
the hype of England as a nation of shareholders waiting to come out was starting to die 
down, in face of a clear reality: England now counted less shareholders than before the 
1980s; wealth simply had become displaced to and concentrated in London-based 
investors. In sum, instead of a vehicle of consensus-making, demutualisation has proven a 
costly mistake for many building societies. 
 
Strategy c   Make State policy on economic citizenship by “fait accompli” 
i) Commercial Banks 
     Already troubled by building societies in preceding decades, clearing banks by 
the 1970s were facing new pressures on their ability to embody a modern version of 
Anglican voluntarism. Their gentlemanly culture of self-restraint was fast becoming 
eroded by the new ―protestant‖ work ethic coming from overseas – ―Real Whig‖ 
voluntarism. Also, when the State from 1979 started promoting the desirability of a 
classless and individualistic citizenship – « there is no society », clearing banks simply had 
to invent new types of economic citizenship. Thus, banks abandoned their pre-emptive 
conditions of financial soundness of the past, and offered ―free banking to everyone‖.  This 
did not amount to banks embracing a policy of non-discrimination, however, much to the 
contrary. Banks in effect internalised a responsibility which the State was keen to 
relinquish: the responsibility for drawing the line between those capable of being free – 
and able to engage with new concepts of economic citizenship – and those who are not – 
those incapable of transcending the level of basic needs. Banks introduced harsh excess 
borrowing fees for those abusing their overdrafts and credit lines – penalties used to 
subsidise free banking for the wealthier and more competent.  By 2004 ―excess borrowing 
fees‖ represented about one quarter of the income of UK commercial banks – the European 
average was 10 per cent. In sum, clearing banks have been very adept at creating a type of 
economic citizenship that appears inclusive, but actually is inequality-inducing in that it 
places much of the financial brunt on the weaker and struggling.    
Remarkably, in a bid to dispel its old-fashioned austerity image, the Co-operative 
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Bank pioneered the free banking scheme.  Starting with its membership to the London 
Clearing House in 1974, the Co-operative Bank‘s leadership has made continuing efforts 
to shed this image and portray the company as a modern, innovative financial services 
entity. This earned the Co-operative Bank praise from both the Labour Party and the 
Liberal        Party.
948
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 To differentiate itself, the Co-operative has among other things 
tried to adopt more of an « ethical » banking stance.
950
 Clearly, all this has had some effect 
since the late 1970s: in line with the revival of the Liberal Party, the Co-op bank has 
attracted more customers from the higher socio-economic groups, especially to its London 
branch.
951
   By the end of the 1980s, after another decade of breaking self-imposed credit 
and interest rate taboos, the Co-op Bank was finally ―shrugging off its proletarian image 
and the pink politics behind‖ it. At the end of the day, however, the Co-op Bank has 
remained a very marginal endeavour, accounting for at best 2-3% of UK retail deposits.
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  Then again, maybe the Co-op‘s limited success is due to more established 
clearing banks making even greater strides forward. In spite of being minority players in 
the City‘s wholesale markets, clearing banks have fared comparatively well. According to 
the Banker, the 18 UK banks in the 2007 Top 1000 of World Banks remain the most 
profitable country group in the EU, providing an aggregate $81.5bn in pre-tax profits with 
a return on capital of 27.3%, well ahead of the EU27 average of 22.7% but behind the 
US.
953
  The voluntary dismantlement of the only mainstream alternative – building 
societies, and the fact that foreign banks have focused on non-retail lines of businesses, 
paradoxically has meant that for all the talk of competition, clearing banks have been able 
to keep retail prices high and see off qualitative competition. Driven by a credit card and 
speculative housing investment culture which has never caught off in much of continental 
Europe, UK banks have long been able to rely on comparatively high penalty charges and 
high profitability rates. That is partly because, while the new Financial Services Authority 
oversees the risks commercial banks run, it explicitly does not address competition issues. 
And a voluntary banking code has not fully addressed the problem (Shirreff, 2007).  
ii) Building Societies 
    From about 1954 to 1980 building societies successfully embodied an 
innovative concept of economic citizenship, and a modern version of the tradition of 
Anglican voluntarism. They were greatly helped by a State that treated owner-occupiers 
with an open-handed generosity denied to other owners of wealth (Rigge and Young, 
1981: 41).
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 All this would change from the 1980s onwards. The ascendancy of Thatcher 
symbolised that home-ownership had become a taken-for-granted vehicle of economic 
citizenship; the new holy grail was to create a nation of shareholders. In other words, home 
ownership was still very much a desired outcome, but only within a larger strategic 
framework of economic democratisation – one that did not privilege those with a ―share‖ 
in building societies
955
 over those with a share in other financial investments.  In 1983, 
steps were taken to phase out fiscal discrimination in favour of home-ownership; the 
ceiling on which mortgage interest payments were tax exempt was fixed in nominal terms, 
thus rapidly reducing the tax advantages accruing to mortgagors relative to other 
investment assets (Banks et al., 2000: 27).   
Further compounding building societies‘ woes, the steady march of monetarist 
common sense since the 1970s entailed that the government explicitly considered control 
over the money supply not to be a State responsibility anymore – following monetarist 
ideology, changes in the money supply – interest rates – could not be blamed for changes 
in real output – the real economy - anymore. This had two counterproductive consequences 
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for building societies. Banks were relieved of much responsibility for managing the 
national money supply. This may have temporarily weakened banks‘ status in society; by 
the same token it liberated them from the shackles of the corset, and vastly increased their 
freedom to target wealthy minorities and engage in crude profiteering. Another 
consequence of monetarist beliefs taking hold in popular opinion was even more 
troublesome: building societies‘ self-appointed role as guardians of a low mortgage rate 
was rapidly losing its electoral significance. The mortgage rate was now supposed to be at 
the market clearing level, not below it. In other words, mortgagors should not be protected 
anymore from fluctuations in market rates Pratt, 1980: 7-8).
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 On the contrary, they 
should be fully exposed to it.  Rapidly losing their special purpose character, building 
societies from 1979 onwards were facing deregulatory moves towards a competitive level-
playing field with banks and secondary mortgage providers
957
; one purpose being to bring 
mortgage rates to market clearing levels.  
By default of a credible alternative to the new monetarist and ―nation of 
shareholders‖ ideologies sponsored by the government, the building societies‘ cartel soon 
foundered – officially in 1983.  ―Opportunities‖ were created for building societies to 
‗demutualise‘, that is to abandon their traditional ‗member-owner‘ status, float themselves 
on the Stock Market, and to convert into banks. At the heart of the argument for 
conversion was the claim that investor-owned status provides a stricter performance focus 
and clearer lines of accountability and a more efficient solution to the problem of 
divergence of interests among classes of claimants  (Hird,1996).  In other words, the move 
towards demutualisation reflected the replacement of an archaic and decaying business 
form (the financial mutual) by a more modern and efficient one – the shareholder-owned 
company.  Since 1989, five of the largest building societies (with assets rivalling those of 
the major banks) have demutualised. As it coincided with the exhaustion of the 
Conservative governments‘ privatisation programme958, building society demutualisation 
in the 1990s was heralded as the main mechanism to create a British nation of 
shareholders.  Reality eventually bit back with a vengeance. Indeed, by allocating free 
shares to their members, demutualisation created a potentially important mechanism for 
spreading share-ownership across the population and regions. Initially, it seemed to work. 
By giving free shares to all their saver-members, the building society conversions to PLC 
status created almost double the existing base of UK shareholders - the flotations of Abbey 
National in 1989, Halifax and four other societies in 1997, created respectively 4 and 12 
million shareholders.  However, most of these new ―demutualisation‖ shareholders cashed 
in all or part of their shareholdings soon after receiving them – this applied to an estimated 
50 percent of members in 1997. And most of the shares sold by members in the outer 
provinces – i.e. not in the region of the South-East, were bought by institutional and 
corporate shareholders established in the City of London (Martin and Turner, 2000: 230-
231). 
In sum, by the late 1990s all evidence suggested building society demutualization 
had not brought England and Britain closer to the US ideal of a shareholder democracy. If 
anything England and Britain in the 2000s counted less individual shareholders than before 
the 1980s. Furthermore, local voluntarism – a bulwark of any well-functioning democracy 
– received a major blow in the process – with ownership of building societies shifting 
away from localised membership to London.  
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Strategy d   Translate State policy on economic citizenship  
i) Commercial banks 
      English clearing banks were at a disadvantage to foreign banks in their bid to 
become consensual vehicles of economic citizenship.  The latter – including standalone 
imperial banks such as Standard Chartered and the Hong Kong Shangri Bank Corporation, 
and even Scottish banks – were seen as newcomers catering to new global markets.  They 
were associated with the new British consensus: the need to embrace globalisation 
dynamics and renew the nation‘s world-state qualities. As these globalisation dynamics 
were assumed to increase the wealth of everyone in the long run – although increasing 
inequality and destroying weak industries in the short run – foreign banks could cater 
unabashedly to this exuberant new creditor economy.  Domestic banks, by contrast, had to 
find a way to profit from the ―globalisation‖ of the nation while elegantly discharging 
historical domestic responsibilities – product of the old consensus. Ultimately, clearing 
banks would found a way, largely due to a more permissive competitive and regulatory 
environment, and at the expense of building societies, those specialised vehicles of English 
traditions.   
   During the 1970s and 1980s, clearing banks tried to compete with specialised 
foreign banks and the standalone banks for a chunk of the opening international wholesale 
markets. But they were at a double disadvantage here, expertise and location wise. Skill-
and organisation-wise, the generalist clearing banks were ill-prepared for the new era of 
specialised wholesale services, in particular the fact that wholesale money does not have 
the stability of retail deposits and current accounts. Also, as an increasing amount of 
former colonies and developing countries were incorporated in the Washington Consensus 
- and the system of sound finance propagated by the IMF and World Bank – standalone 
banks with a long presence in these countries were at a distinct advantage to clearing 
banks. Where the latter did manage to gain an advantage – namely in securing self-
regulatory geopolitical agreements such as Basel I and II, and the European Banking Acts 
– this was mainly at the expense of other domestic institutions. 
  During the 1980s, the Conservative governments exhibited great ambitions of 
economic democratisation and citizenship – seemingly as a trade-off for less active 
political participation and contestation. In order to maintain a perception of willing 
partners, and secure a chunk of less volatile retail funds, clearing banks allowed for an 
enormous expansion of the number of current accounts and credit card accounts. Also, 
banks pushed a plethora of financial services that just a decade before would have been 
condemned as deceptive, and in some cases extortionate. Obviously, clearing banks‘ 
leadership should have been aware that many customers did not possess the necessary 
attributes of self-restraint and incumbent wealth to survive the ―sky is the limit‖ credit card 
and housing speculation culture they helped to usher in. But, as the government kept quiet 
about the dangers of cheap money, so did banks.   
ii) Building Societies 
     Building societies in many ways had become too comfortable in their role of 
provider of passive economic democratisation. When during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
English monetary and banking sphere experienced a shift from the esoteric model of 
democratic politics – private, elitist and informal, to one run acording to the exoteric model 
– public and formal, building societies found themselves ill-prepared. In particular since, 
contrary to clearing banks, building societies felt their political responsibilities – such as 
keeping the mortgage rate low – had been cast upon them by virtue of a fit of 
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absentmindness. Also, building societies during the 1960s and 1970s remained sheltered 
from a dynamic that had long besieged clearing banks‘ gentlemanly consensus: the shift 
from the supremacy of ―practical experience and wisdom‖ to ―technical economic 
analysis‖ (Moran, 1984: 26-27) – including pressures to publicise profit figures.  
Building societies suddenly found themselves exposed to consecutive 
Conservative governments‘ push for a new consensus: that of a shareholder democracy and 
an active economic citizenry. As we saw in chapter 8, one of the reasons why building 
societies were very successful exponents of Anglican democracy and neutrality was that 
they provided everyone with a rightful place in the Commonwealth by «severely 
attenuating» the property rights granted to either investor or borrower members 
(Thompson, 1997).  In Thatcher‘s shareholder democracy, this core competence – 
providing consensus by restricting property rights – had become a core liability.  Another 
core competence of building societies had been their ability to contribute to the long-term 
neutrality of monetary flows, in particular those to do with the relation between home-
ownership, house prices and the real wealth of English citizens. During the inflationary 
years of the 1970s, cracks had already appeared in this core competence – building 
societies as protectors of the real English economy. But with every inflationary peak the 
government had stepped in to buttress building societies‘ position – maintaining a 
mortgage rate inferior to market clearing levels. Once monetarism was adopted as a core 
political ideology, however, building societies‘ role in maintaining the ―long-run neutrality 
of money‖ became obsolete. The latter was now best left to the unfathomable workings of 
global markets. Building societies‘ ability to protect the real English economy suffered 
blow after blow. The financial liberalisations of the 1980s led to enormous fluctuations in 
house prices (Miles, 1992), and created a worrisome source of instability. In 2004, the 
Barker Report, commissioned by Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, found that housing 
prices had been increasing at more than double the continental European rate for 30 years. 
Furthermore, since 1980 the UK has experienced a stronger negative relationship between 
saving and house price inflation than any other European country, with little connection in 
the period before 1980 (Farlow, 2005: 21). Secured borrowing and equity withdrawal rose 
rapidly, leading to a sharp fall in the UK household saving ratio during the late 1980s. And 
UK household sector debt as a proportion of disposable incomes more than doubled during 
the course of the 1980s (Muellbauer and Lattimore, 1995).  Finally, as banks and building 
societies shifted to a higher proportion of unsecured lending, more private household 
income became available for life insurance.
959
  
Ideological stances certainly did not change with the ascendancy of New Labour; 
Blairites and Brownites proved to be no more than the regulatory heirs of the Thatcherite 
consensus. Political acquiescence for demutualisation and its not so rosy aftermath has 
been overwhelming. Accepting the triumph of managerial objectives, the Labour Party did 
not provide anti-carpet-bagger regulations, even after the courts annulled a protective two-
year rule after legal action brought by Abbey. Not surprisingly, after more than two 
decades of structural ideological weakness, building societies‘ role as a consensual vehicle 
of economic citizenship has been dramatically – and maybe fatally – marginalised.  Only 
now a widespread credit crisis has left the monetarist consensus open to sustained attack, 
has a return to building societies‘ historical success model become a real possibility. 
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Strategy e   Become a champion of national character 
i) Commercial Banks 
      None of the English clearing banks succeeded in becoming a national 
champion in investment banking, although they tried hard. Barclays was one of the latest 
to get out of investment banking to follow the retail banking path as Lloyds had 
successfully set out to do (Auger, 2000: 46-47; 114-115; 257). After dismal ventures in 
investment banking, English clearing banks have returned to normal, settling for a highly 
profitable, though internationally inconspicuous balance of products and services.  
Ironically, instead of homegrown products, London‘s new city-state champions 
seem to be the product of a ―reverse colonisation‖ movement.  North American investment 
banks have dominated the City since the 1980s. And the former colonial standalone bank 
HSBC has come closest to the status of native national champion. In fact, there is a double 
irony here, given English banks‘ historical urge to distance themselves from Scottish 
banking principles. Indeed, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited was 
established in 1865 by the Scotsman Thomas Sutherland
960
 to finance the growing trade 
between China and Europe on the basis of "sound Scottish banking principles".
961
 Another 
new Scottish champion amongst the top five clearing banks in London is the Royal Bank 
of Scotland - which acquired Natwest.  Noteworthy in a more positive sense is how 
Lloyds, the Tories bank ingrained in the Home Counties, managed to upgrade its British 
status through a merger with TSB. This merger gave Lloyds a strong presence in the north 
of England and in Scotland, where the TSB traditionally was strong.
962
   
ii) Building Societes 
     By the 1970s, building societies had effectively replaced industrial companies 
as the national champions of English real wealth. Amazingly, by 1970 net investment in 
building societies exceeded real net manufacturing investment – the former stood at £ 1213 
million, the latter at £1040 million. And after the crisis of 1973-1974 the gap only 
widened; private housing investment seemed to have become the only vehicle to fight that 
most dangerous of enemies  of real wealth, namely inflation – not only by keeping pace 
with, but by actually outstripping it. As a result, by 1976 manufacturing investment 
amounted to only £365 million, while building society investment totalled a staggering 
£2448 million. (Pawnley, 1978: 128-129).
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In terms of their geographical distribution, building societies were unique 
amongst financial institutions in that they staunchly represented English rather than British 
national character (see tables 11.9 and 11.10). Most other financial groupings were 
headquartered in London and operated in the rest of the UK on the basis of a branch 
network. Building societies, by contrast, more often were headquartered in the Midlands 
and Yorkshire and Humberside, while having the greatest branch penetration and highest 
proportion of the adult population with building society savings accounts in the South 
West. In many ways, building societies were the only archetypical English institutions; 
they were entirely underrepresented in other parts of Britain – most notably Scotland – and 
other parts of the UK – Northern Ireland.  The TSBs, by contrast, were heaviest 
represented in Scotland and Northern Ireland, while being notably weak in the West 
Midlands and the South West.  
Unfortunately, during the 1980s building societies‘ solid roots in English 
traditions of democratisation transformed from a core asset into a core liability.  Building 
societies found themselves ill-prepared for the new ―British dream‖: to create a « plc 
nation » of which all inhabitants would be active shareholders.  The demise of building 
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societies as national champions was symbolised by several rounds of demutualisations 
from 1989 onwards; none of which ensued in the creation of a new national champion. 
 
Table 11.9:   Distribution of Building Society Branches by Region, 1978 
(Source: Boleat, 1981: 7) 
Region 
No of 
Branches/      
Population 
%  Adult 
population 
with BS 
Accounts 
Population 
Population / 
Branch 
% UK 
average 
London & 
SE 
1,513 48 16,834,000 11,126 94 
West 
Midlands 
572 45 5,154,000 9,010 76 
North West 512 34 6,519,000 12,732 107 
South West 486 53 4,729,000 8,805 74 
Yorks 
&Humb 
347 51 4,876,000 14,052 118 
East 
Midlands 
321 47 3,747,000 11,673 98 
North 255 31 3,116,000 12,220 103 
East Anglia 145 41 1,827,000 12,600 106 
Wales 218 38 2,768,000 12,697 107 
UK 4,688 43 55,852,000 11,914 100 
 
 
Table 11.10: Regional breakdown of Building Societies in 1989 
(source: McKillop and Ferguson, 1993: 42) 
Region No. of societies Total assets, £m 
London 13 59,839.8 
South East 21 4,292.9 
South West 9 15,732.5 
East Anglia 3 1,325.7 
West Midlands 12 15,040.8 
East Midlands 13 2,205.2 
Yorkshire and Humberside 11 83,069.0 
North West 7 1,277.2 
North 12 5,392.0 
Scotland 3 558.8 
Wales 3 878.4 
North Ireland 2 169.5 
 
 
Strategy f   Become a champion of the national economic interest 
i)  Commercial Banks  
     While the Bank of England kept cherishing clearing banks as the bulwarks of  
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monetary stability, reality on the ground was changing fast from the late 1960s onwards. 
Successive legislative changes – mergers and the CCC – in favour of clearing banks‘ 
centrality in London money markets proved to no avail. Euromarkets, foreign banks and 
building societies were growing too fast for clearing banks to keep up. Some clearing bank 
leaders such as Stuart Graham of Midland already in 1973 had argued that ―the influence 
of the clearing banks in financial affairs has suffered a serious decline over recent decades, 
and to a great extent this has been caused by a reluctance on the part of the clearing banks 
considerably to adapt their role and attitudes to encompass changing circumstances; also, 
the banks have unhesitatingly co-operated with the monetary authorities to an extent which 
has become subservient".
964
 But of course the Midland Bank was not the leading clearing 
bank in the UK. Other clearing banks such as Barlcays and Lloyds ultimately would follow 
Graham‘s advice due to other evolutions. 
Thatcher gave up entirely on the old notion of self-restraint based neutrality in 
favour of US-led concepts of globalisation and the long-term neutrality of money – 
concepts culminating in the so-called Washington Consensus.  The hope was that giving 
up on old notions of neutrality would lead to a more competitive and pluralist financial 
system as in the US. As any historian would expect, the City authorities and British 
government were not able to create from scratch their own version of a strong, autonomous 
supervisor such as the US SEC; ushering in the demise of British merchant banks and the 
waste of enormous amounts of money after the Big Bang. It is now recognised that 
England‘s regulatory system, while deserving credit for preserving London as a highly 
competitive international financial centre, has been less helpful in maintaining the 
competitiveness of English bankers, either domestically or abroad (Jones, 1993: 57). 
Contrary to merchant banks, all was not lost for clearing banks, however. As 
other big businesses, these had anticipated the individualisation of interest group politics 
under Thatcher, by diversifying abroad and building international lobbying strengths – be 
it at the European Community level, or regarding Euromarkets and the Basel agreements. 
By behaving more like any other big business, clearing banks unavoidably lost some of 
their centrality in society. In many ways, the distinctiveness of the English banking 
profession was in danger at some point – as illustrated by the struggle for survival of the 
Chartered Institute of Bankers (Quack et al, 1995). Of course, to some extent the same can 
be said of foreign banking institutes (Glover, 1994). Yet, given the remarkable historical 
strength and distinctiveness of English banking practices, it still is noteworthy how 
clearing banks have succumbed to successive waves of US-led marketing and accounting 
fashions (Seal and Croft, 1997) – testifying to their incapacity to reinvent a homegrown 
tradition of professional neutrality.  
ii) Building societies 
                  Building societies arguably were at their zenith as vehicles of the tradition of  
neutrality from the late 1960s onwards – symbolised by the BSA‘s success in having its 
members exempted from the 1966 Capital Gains Tax while keeping other tax privileges. 
As self-appointed representatives of the public housing interest – with their low mortgage 
rate and non-profit objectives, building societies were largely left to their own bearings by 
the government and Bank of England. The Building Societies‘ Association met with the 
Bank of England on a very sporadic, informal basis; contrary to clearing banks who 
suffered from the increasingly stifling initiatives of the Bank of England.  An apparent 
contributing factor to building societies‘ success was the hands-off nature of the BSA in 
industrial relations terms. The Building Societies' Association never was an employers' 
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association comparable to the Engineering Employers' Federation. It merely served as a 
forum for the Societies to discuss common problems and most importantly to concert 
action on interest rates. This pre-empted government demands for a social pact, as with the 
formal employers‘ organisations. But when the BSA did provide general advice to member 
societies, the latter listened closely. For instance, confronted with the Industrial Relations 
Act of 1971, the Council of the BSA recommended a policy of neutrality as to the latent 
conflicts between government and trade unions. The Council advised societies to allow for 
a formal representation of staff opoinion, as a way to pre-empt outside interference by 
established trade union. And so did building societies, with great success (Swabe and 
Price, 1983: 15-16).
965
 They appeared an oasis of tranquility during the 1970s‘ winters of 
discontent; even in comparison with clearing banks.  Clearing banks faced a gathering 
―cold war‖ between employers who were entrenched in a snobbish Toryism and employees 
eager to see some change (Marwick, 1996: 150-153; 158-166). Building societies, by 
contrast, lived in a relatively self-contained industry with an apparently insatiable market 
for mortgages ; they were able to perpetuate their employment practices of benevolent 
paternalism sheltered from outside criticisms. 
 The societies had already come under attack from clearing banks and political 
organisations during the early 1970s, regarding the societies‘ purported role in fuelling 
house-prive inflation and the rise of interest rates. Clearing banks argued that the BSA 
should come under supervision of the Bank of England.  To fend off calls for more direct 
government intervention, the BSA agreed with the Department of the Environment to the 
establishment of a Joint Advisory Committee.  As the blame for chaos in the housing 
market initially was being laid with the societies, the BSA wholeheartedly subscribed to 
the Committee‘s recommendations; most notably to support the growth of owner 
occupation and stabilise the housing market and house prices. This earned them the 
necessary government support throughout the 1970s, including during the severe 1978 
inflationary crisis. 
But building societies‘ fortune was about to change. Clearing banks became 
increasingly bold with their accusations of a lack of ―competitive neutrality‖ (Llwellyn, 
1986) – the Committee of London Clearing Banks complained that building banks enjoyed 
unfair and artificial competitive advantages (Committee of London Clearing Banks, 1978: 
189).  Under the Conservative governments of the 1980s all prior criticisms gained 
momentum and proved impossible to fend off any longer. During the 1970s the BSA – in 
its capacity of promoter of gradual home-ownership – had embodied the best possible 
compromise between special interests and the national economic interest. This was no 
longer true in Thatcher‘s era of speculative shareholder wealth; housing soon lost its 
quality of being a fiscally privileged investment option. All in all, Thatcher‘s moves would 
prove highly paradoxical.  In spite of the phasing out of mortgage tax deductibility, 
England and later Scotland experienced a dramatic surge in home-ownership, pushing the 
country from a legacy of relative tenure neutrality to one of tenure-specialisation – home-
ownership.
966
  And despite massive programmes of privatisation and demutualization, 
England did not become a nation of shareholders. Finally, the country on which England 
has modelled itself since Thatcher, the US, has experienced the exact opposite causes and 
effects. While firmly part of a nation of shareholders, US households have received full tax 
deductibility on all mortgage interest payments during the period. The end result is a much 
better balance between stock and home ownership in the US than in the UK – where home 
ownership has become a national obsession pervading all ages and classes, in particular of 
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white people (Banks et al., 2000: 45). In sum, Thatcher‘s attempts to mimick the US 
tradition of pluralism not only ushered in the demise of home-grown neutrality, but also of 
home-grown pluralism – be it regarding the co-existence of PLCs and mutuals, or in terms 
of varieties of tenure. 
Also problematic for building societies is that the 1980s were characterised by an 
individualisation of interest group politics. Contrary to clearing banks who had long been 
geopolitically active, building societies‘ purely national and even provincial nature 
precluded such anticipatory moves – building societies were prohibited by law to engage 
in overseas activities. As a result, building societies remained strangely out of touch with 
for instance changes in EC competitive standards in the 1970s – anticipating the 
standardisation of UK competition laws regarding the acceptability of cartel practices 
(Freyer, 1992). Finally, building societies found themselves besieged equally by the new 
Conservatives and Old Labour, leaving them without political buffer – by default of a 
strong Liberal Party. The Conservative Bow Group in 1980 had advised building societies 
to change to company status. The Bow Group blamed the lack of a ―clear objective‖ in 
building society legislation for the societies‘ ―many inefficiencies‖ (see also Gough and 
Taylor, 1979: 53).  There had been strong Labour Party protests against these 
recommendations. Yet, in 1981, the BSA itself established a working group to review the 
societies‘ constitution and powers and the law governing them. The working group‘s 
arguments – summarised in the 1983 Spalding Report found a receptive hearing in 
conservative government circles, especially regarding the possibility of conversion from 
mutual to company status, and the abolition of the cartel. Ultimately, these 
recommendations would be translated in the 1986 Building Societies Act.  
While Labour protested against announced changes, left-wing Labour politicians 
themselves had long argued that the special advantages of building societies were not in 
the public interest.  These criticisms had gained strength in the 1960s, as building societies 
were rapidly transforming in mainstream investment vehicles.  They were accused of not 
lowering their liquidiy ratio for the sake of extending more mortgages.  Also, building 
societies were criticised for their purported role in perpetuating an old-boy network in the 
property market, and within its own Board, f.i.: ―The services of the housing market have 
long been organized to suit the professionals who sell them rather than the consumers, 
particularly working people, whose hard-earned savings buy them. This is sad, for the 
building societies could have used their financial clout to get expensive burdens off our 
backs...Who, however, could have expected anything better, given the self-perpetuating 
boards of directors - often composed of individuals with extensive property interests 
themselves - who have run the societies with an almost unbelievable lack of managerial 
talent‖ (foreword by Ken Weetch, Labour MP for Ipswich In Barnes, 1984: xiii-xv). 
Building society leaders‘ responses lacked conviction, leaving them at the mercy of 
regulatory changes imposed by less sympathetic interests.
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Beyond the above specific problems, the more fundamental issue that came back 
to haunt building societies in the 1980s is the latter‘s clinging to a long outmoded version 
of neutrality; a nineteenth century version of non-interventionism that did not encourage 
the building of government and civil service relations during the ―fat‖ decades of the 
1930s, 1960s and 1970s. Because of this, and in spite of their growing material and 
political centrality in the English economy, building societies remained a secondary 
vehicle of the national economic interest throughout the post-WWII period. By contrast, in 
spite of their declining material success and centrality in the English economy, clearing 
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banks remained on top of the Bank of England‘s, Treasury‘s and government‘s mind. 
Undoubtedly, this was partly due to clearing banks‘ greater historical confidence in dealing 
with the government, and public-private City vehicles of the national economic interest. 
Barclays, the leading clearing banker which during the 1960s and 1970s was considered 
the world‘s pre-eminent banker, in particular fitted snugly in this pattern. In comparison, 
building societies long suffered from a negative approach to politics. English, rather than 
British in nature, building society executives felt  « about [the British] government as 
Thomas Campion thought about women: ‗Lost is our freedom, When we submit to women 
so ; Why do we need them, When in their best they work our woe ?‘ (Holmes, 1973 : 218-
219).
968
  Clearly, this historical apprehension was due to a relative failure to reinvent the 
building society movement‘s 19th century version of the tradition of neutrality – the 
laissez-faire principle, into a contemporary version – a version implying increasingly 
active forms of regulation and delegation.  As we saw above, from the 1970s onwards, the 
clearing banks were also at fault : they were very slow at reinventing their meso-
corporatist version of neutrality. Yet, their attitude to politics had long been more positive: 
«a sense of parternship and mutual benefit » with «government and with the public at large 
is essential for the success of banks and bankers in fulfilling their special role in the mixed 
economy ».
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  And they could count on the almost unconditional support of the Bank of 
England, Treasury and government. Lacking this unconditional support, the geopolitical 
changes of the 1970s and 1980s ultimately would turn building societies‘ historical 
apprehension into an existential crisis. By default of dynamic relations with the 
Conservatives, Labour or the Liberal Party, building societies found themselves estranged 
of the political scene at a time of great turmoil. Leading building society executives as well 
as the Building Society Association lost their bearings, and less than vigorously contested 
the emerging dominant perspective that PLC‘s were the only viable economic 
organisations in a geopolitical environment of nation-state globalisation.  
                                                 
851 Early fears of being locked out the European customs area had led the UK government to initiate the European 
Free Trade (EFTA); by the end of the 1950s, however, it became clear that neither the EFTA nor the 
Commonwealth was a serious alternative for the EEC.   
852 Many business leaders argued that, with the declining economic importance of the Commonwealth, Britain 
was well placed to become an international gateway to European markets. There was of course a possibility that 
the UK – as it did – would run a trade deficit on manufacturing. But, it was argued, this was an unavoidable  
modernising implication for the domestic economy, and just a continuation of traditional economic policies that 
enforced greater domestic competitiveness through the external sanction of free trade (Gamble, 1994: 115). 
853  FBI, 1961. The Next Five Years: Report of an F.B.I. Conference at Brighton on 24-26 November 
1960. London:, pp. 6-7. Strangely, however, the Federation of British Industries did not argue that given the  
scarcity of resources available to Britain, investing more in the domestic industry would entail changing Britains‘ 
international policy of unilateral liberalism.  
854 The UK‘s applications for membership in the 1960s were met by staunch resistance from the French 
government as well as the other EEC members, uneasy as they were about the UK‘s preferential links with the 
Commonwealth and the US (Ludlow, 1997).  Attitudes of the EEC members gradually changed during the 1960s, 
for two reasons.  First, the US government expressed strong support for UK membership. Given international 
monetary problems – and the 1960 US balance-of-payments crisis, a run on sterling would have deleterious 
effects on the dollar. As reported in a 1963 Anglo/US Working Party on Liquidity Problems, 29 May 1963, BE 
OV 53/18 (cited in Schenk, 2002: 353). Because a strong sterling helped to prop up the US dollar as a reserve 
currency, this reinforced a financial conjunction of interests between the UK and the US (Schenk, 2002).  Thus, 
building on the informal tradition of central bank cooperation between the Fed and the Bank of England, the US 
was a champion of multilateral support for sterling throughout the 1960s. 
On a less official note, the US saw Britain as an important ally in the quest to restore the balance of economic 
power with the EEC Six. In particular the West German surplus was a thorn in the eye of the US. 
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  A second cause of the EEC members‘ change of heart was the collapse of the international monetary system and 
the gold pool after speculative pressures in 1968. This led the EEC members to reconsider their monetary policy. 
This, together with the fall from power of De Gaulle, and significant steps towards the elimination of the sterling 
balances problem - in 1967 the UK government devalued the pound against the dollar, from $2.80 to $2.40, 
greatly facilitated British entry in the 1970s (Schenk, 2002: 352-353; 361-369). 
855 According to Martin (1988: 396), several processes have had profound effects on the geography of 
inequality in the country: ―The first and most apparent of these is the rapid and sustained de-industrialisation of 
the nation's manufacturing base. This has led to a fall in manufacturing employment of more than 2.8 million (36 
per cent) since 1971, most of this having occurred since 1979. The second is the wave of technological 
innovation, based primarily on micro-electronics and information processing, that began in the early 1970s and 
which is generating a number of  new industries and services while dramatically transtorming the operation of 
existing ones. The third new development is the revival of economic growth and employment through a new 
wave of tertiarisation or service sector expansion, especially of financial, banking and producer services. The 
fourth change is political, and relates to the reconfiguration of government policy and state intervention that 
began under Labour in the mid- 1970s, but which has been particularly pronounced under the Thatcher 
governments since 1979. Finally, and intersecting with these various forces, Britain's role in the international 
economy and division of labour has been changing as a result of the restructuring of industrial capitalism on a 
global scale, and the consequential intensification of international competition.‖ 
856 The aim of these innovations had been to develop a price and incomes policy with an eye on boosting exports 
through a general increase in the productivity and competitiveness of British industry (Katzenstein, 1977: 887-
888). 
857 Germany‘s adaptation of the US‘ politics of productivity in terms of an ―export-led growth‖ domestic 
consensus had dazzled even US elites. 
858 Macmillan in 1936 had famously – ―infamously‖ to many contemporary Conservatives – said that "Toryism 
has always been a form of paternal Socialism" (The Star, London, June 25, 1936). Other famous Conservative 
quotes are from Lord Hinchingbrooke who said that "true conservative opinion is horrified at the damage done to 
this country by individualist businessmen‖, and Lord Hailsham who depicted capitalism as an "ungodly and 
rapacious scramble for ill-gotten gains‖ (Goldsmith, 1985). 
859 Demonstrating how uncomfortable they felt about these new responsibilities, both the Federation of British 
Industries (FBI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) had long opposed a voluntary restraint of wages and 
dividends. ―While they disagreed on their diagnosis of the economic situation, both agreed that the 
government, and not the private sector, should be held accountable for Britain's economic difficulties. Both 
resented efforts by the government to shift the blame to them‖ (Blank, 1973: 133-134). Ultimately, the FBI and 
the TUC gave in, attempting to bargain their support of some sort of restraint for a change in government policies 
(Blank, 1978: 693-694). 
860 The role of interest groups in Britain has been largely functional (Almond, 1958); in particular, their function 
has been to act as a counterbalance to the growing role and increasingly centralized nature of the State (Beer, 
1969). 
861  The Labour governments of the 1960s had relatively radical goals. Armed with the belief that they could 
depend on the unions ot deliver, the Wilson government founded a new Department of Economic Affairs that 
would displace the Treasury in the long-term management of the British economy and that would promulgate 
plans that businesses would be willing and eager to follow. The National Economic Development Council 
(NEDC) – originally set up by the Conservatives with much more modest aims – would function as a corporatist 
vehicle for joint consultation between employers and trade unions, both nationally in the NEDC and regionally in 
the so-called ―little Neddies‖. Working through the NEDC, the Department of Economic Affairs secured the 
National Plan, a joint statement on prices and incomes agreed to by the Trades Union Congress and 
the national employer organisations. The National Plan entailed that both unions and employer organisations 
would seek to moderate the increase of prices and wages in return for expansionist policies from government 
that would allow growth to become sustained and which in turn could fund increased wages and improved profits.  
In practice, however, little was done to moderate wage demands as workers took advantage 
of high levels of employment to insist on a share of the proceeds from prior growth. Also, the spread of shop 
steward organisation, especially in newer industries, gave rank-and-file activists a more influential voice within 
unions and on the shop floor. The plan foundered when the political plans met hard economic realities of an 
overvalued currency, inefficient industries, and a financial community with little confidence in, and considerable 
antipathy toward, a reforming government (Cronin, 2006: 55-56).  
862 The Wilson government‘s 1969 White Paper ―In Place of Strife‖ proposed the following plan of reform. Trade 
Unions would be conferred a wide range of legal rights on in exchange for making contracts binding. In case 
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union leaders failed to uphold contracts, the State would get the power to control local, unofficial strikes.  Given 
their association of local voluntaryism with success, this initiative provoked massive union resistance; union 
leaders were outraged about the government‘s apparent willingness to curtail free collective bargaining and 
to recast the legal framework within which the privileges of the trade unions would be embedded (Cronin, 2006: 
55). 
863 The meaningfulness of Labour‘s mandate was somewhat diluted, however; voters had denied either party a 
parliamentary majority.   
864 According to Hickson (2005: 225-226), the UK government at the time at most was an ―‘unbelieving 
monetarist‘ one‖. Rather than introducing full-blown monetarism, the Labour government introduced policy 
reforms that necessarily catered to monetarist pressures, while not giving up on non-monetarist issues of wage 
control, reflationary budgets and direct intervention in the labour markets. The three quasi-monetarist policy 
reforms in question were the publication of monetary targets, the increased use of monetary techniques in macro-
eocnomic policy, and the increased emphasis on anti-inflationary measures – at the cost of an increase in short-
term unemployment. 
865 For UK policy makers the external strength of sterling was taken as almost the sole guiding principle in 
determining macro-economic policy at home. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s domestic demand, 
and particularly domestic investment, was curbed repeatedly in stop and go cycles payments reasons 
(Katzenstein, 1977: 888).  
866 ―From the earliest postwar years, British governments adopted the policy of restraining domestic investment in 
order to strengthen the balance of payments, in the hope that capital goods would be exported rather than used by 
British industry. More generally, reducing the level of domestic demand, it was felt, would lower the flow of 
imports and ease the pressure of labor shortages on domestic industries. Whenever governments were faced with 
an adverse balance of payments, and thus with increasing pressure on reserves, they attempted to remedy 
the situation by cutting back domestic investment‖ (Blank, 1977: 692). 
867 As mentioned in chapter 8, it was the emergence of the Euromarkets and the role of the dollar as an 
international vehicle and reserve currency allowed the US to run large balance-of-payments deficits since 1968 – 
before 1968, the last time the US had incurred a deficit was in 1893. It freed the United States from many 
adjustment pressures, allowing it to maintain a large degree of policy autonomy up to the 1978 dollar crisis 
(Lucatelli, 1997: 26-34).   
868 While foreign central banks could have enforced monetary discipline on the United States by converting 
dollars into gold, in practice they refrained from doing so until 1965, when the French began to convert dollars 
into gold in thefa ce of large and persisting American balance of payments deficits. By that time, a large dollar 
imbalance had been created by expansionary US monetary policy. The relative world supplies of gold and dollars 
trended in opposite directions over this period, and clearly a fixed dollar-gold exchange rate was not sustainable 
under these circumstances. In the event the Bretton Woods System collapsed from 1971 to 1973 following 
closure of the gold window on August 15, 1971 (Calomiris and Wheelock, 1997: 39-40). 
869 What was the role of the Treasury in all this? The level of tolerance for inflation among English bank and 
public service officials historically had been particularly low. Because of the remarkable economic growth in the 
1950s and 1960s, this low tolerance had not been so visible. A first crack in this tolerance was observed in 1967, 
when the devaluation of the pound signalled the resurgence of Treasury dominance in civil administration 
(Bowden, 2000: 188). And when the performance of the British economy after the 1973 oil shock turned out to be 
much worse that that of its main OECD counterparts, the national predilection for an overvalued pound really 
came back with a vengeance. Indeed, the imperative of currency defense bore an almost moral character for 
English policy from that moment on (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002: 549-550). 
870 An outspoken critic of the Soviet Union, Thatcher earned the nickname the ―Iron Lady‖ after delivering a 
blistering attack against the Soviet leadership in a 1976 speech. 
871 The term was coined to summarise policy advice themes commonly shared by Washington-based institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and U.S. Treasury Department. 
872 Peter Tapsell, Conservative, House of Commons, 24 March 1993: 967-868. 
873 Massive speculative pressure on the eve of the French referendum precipitated the worst crisis in the thirteen-
year history of the European Monetary System, resulting in the ejection of the sterling and the lira from the ERM, 
the devaluation of the peseta, the threat of forced devaluation of several other currencies, including the "hard-
core" franc, and the abandonment or near-abandonment of unilateral currency pegs to the system by non-ERM 
countries. The ERM crisis led to a lot of political recriminations and blame-laying between Britain and Germany 
in the aftermath (Sevilla, 1995). That is because one of the main, yet unintended reasons for the collapse of the 
ERM in 1992 was German reunification. The reunification had prompted the transfer of more than half West 
German savings to East Germany, and a sudden rise of the government deficit from 5 to 13.2%.  This caused an 
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enormous rise of interest rates, and a flight of money away from Europe, with devastating consequences for the 
UK. 
874 Thatcher initiated the critical turn with her programmes of low taxation, low government spending, 
deregulation and privatisation, in combination with the reassertion of the nation state as the guarantor of national 
identity and national independence (Baker et al., 2002). In this regard, the Conservatives, Callaghan, Blair and 
Brown unavowedly have welcomed globalisation as a way to put inconstestable contraints on ―socialist‖ 
measures or ―trade union hotheads‖, both incompatible with the essential British tradition of liberty and property 
(e.g. Portillo, 1998). 
875 To restore the city of London‘s status of world financial market, it did not suffice to allow for relatively 
unregulated Eurodollar markets; exchange and capital movement controls also had to be removed. 
876  In 2006, the Conservative Party published its statement of aims and values – Built to Last. In his foreword, 
David Cameron put ―a responsibility revolution‖ at the heart of the modern Conservative Party‘s mission. ―The 
country needs a new direction and new answers. I am clear about the new direction we must set for Britain. To 
meet the challenges of the Twenty-First Century, and to satisfy people‘s aspirations today, this country needs a 
responsibility revolution.‖ http://www.conservatives.com/pdf/BuiltToLast-AimsandValues.pdf 
877 Howard, M. 1994. ―Conservatives and community‖, Disraeli lecture 1994. London: Conservative Political 
Centre.   
878  Speech by David Cameron at the 2007 Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool. 
879 By the 1970s, Labour‘s ability to work collaboratively with the unions constituted one of the party‘s main 
claims to national leadership. 
880  Opinion polls showed that, prior to the winters of discontent, that voters were more or less evenly split 
between Labour and the Conservatives.  Tellingly, the Labour leader, James Callaghan, was much more popular 
than his opposite number, Margaret Thatcher. All this changed after the winter of discontent, ushering a near 
twenty year period of Conservative government.  
881 Tony Blair announced this ambition in a speech given to North American financiers in New York (10 
Downing Street Newsroom, 14 April 1998). 
882 For instance, when New Labour – the unavowed heir of Thatcherism – came to power, it quickly dropped any 
ideas of a capital 1evy on City business in favour of domestic industry, just as Old Labour had done after WWI 
(Whiting, 1987). 
883 Tony Benn, Labour, House of Commons, 24 March 1993: 984 
884 Not surprisingly, it was only when John Smith replaced Neil Kinnock as party leader in 1992 that a campaign 
was launched to diminish the importance of the union vote in determining party policy and the way that vote 
would be cast. Tony Blair would deepen these efforts, and Gordon Brown has vowed not to backtrack   
885 The ―social charter‖ would replace the British tradition in which unions had few formal legal rights but 
extensive informal privileges 
and immunities with a new framework that would not restore the rights of unions per se, but that would guarantee 
workers greater individual rights— including the right to unionize and protections against unfair dismissal—and 
that would, by extension, create a more favorable context for unions. 
886 Blair explicitly revived the language of Britain as a bridge between Europe and the United States. What this 
meant was that Anglo-America rather than Europe remained the priority for Britain. And if there was a choice to 
be made in the security field between a common European policy and support for the United States, Britain would 
continue to choose the US (Gamble, 2007: 13). Examples of Blair‘s Atlantic primacy abound. Much is known of 
Gordon Brown too. For instance:  http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2137109,00.html):  
―Gordon Brown is an Atlanticist who has long been enthralled by the idea of America… For all the talk about 
putting more emphasis on multilateral alliances and soft power, look at what Gordon Brown is actually doing. His 
early decisions have been to tighten the bonds of hard power between Britain and America. To surprisingly little 
attention in the media and little fuss from the left, the Defence Secretary has just announced that Britain will 
allow America to use the air base at Menwith Hill in Yorkshire as part of its contentious missile defence 
system… Even before he became Prime Minister, Mr Brown signed up to renewing Trident missiles, which will 
leave Britain dependent on American military technology for decades to come. Some weeks ago, I predicted that 
Mr Brown would give the green light to the construction of two new aircraft carriers. He did just that last week. 
These carriers will be the largest warships that Britain has ever put on the oceans. Sir Alan West, the former First 
Sea Lord who is now Mr Brown's security supremo, has described the carriers as 'four acres of British sovereign 
territory that you can move anywhere in the world' in order 'to project power'. British sovereign territory they may 
be, but the carriers will be equipped with American Chinook helicopters and Joint Strike Fighters, also made in 
the US of ― 
887 For an explanation of the ―Council of Wise‖ tradition of democratisation, see chapter 9, p. 278. 
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888 Even the Labour cabinet of 1964 was composed for more than one third of traditional upper-class figures, six 
ministers were products of the exclusive Clarendon public schools, and only two Ministers had graduated from 
universities other than Oxford. Prime Minister Harold Wilson, while coming from a lower middle class 
background, was Oxford-educated. 
889 ―Thatcher Pledging More Of The Same Stern Stuff‖, The New York Times. May 17, 1987. 
890 Ashdown even signalled the end of the Liberal Democrat policy of ‗equidistance‘ between the two largest 
parties, and indicated that he would be prepared to work with Labour to defeat the Conservatives. 
891 The Liberal Democrats increasingly were targeting winnable constituencies to overcome the constraints of the 
first-past-the-post electoral system.  
892 Although one could equally argue that it is Thatcher who is the heir of Old Liberal policies. 
893 In ―the Report on Bank Charges, made by the Prices and Incomes Board in 1967…the Board serverly 
criticised the agreements governing interest rates which exist between the banks; it contended that ‗a widening of 
the area of competition‘ was desirable and that one way of achievning this would be the abolition of the 
agreements…the nub of the Board‘s complaint thus lay in what it regarded as an undesirable cartel agreement 
among the banks for restricting competition between each other in interest rates – the interest they will pay on 
deposits, and certain of their lending rates too. The banks themselves replied strongly, in offended tones – to say 
the least: they maintained that to abandon their agreements on interest rates would raise not only the cost of 
borrowing by bank customers but also interest rates generally; furthermore, they contended that the reasons for 
the agreement were sound, that they were in the interests of the financial stability of the country, and moreover 
that the banks were competing, ever more strongly, in other ways (Clegg, 1969: 163-164). 
894 The introduction of competition and credit control in 1971 would prove incapable of restraining credit at a 
time of high demand and was soon amended by the introduction of the corset. The clearing banks gradually 
increased their participation in these new markets at the expense of the discount market ; the new system of 
monetary control introduced in 1981 appeared to support the continuing existence of the discount houses. But the 
subsequent reduction of the necessary holding of ‗club money‘, as the deposits with the London Discount Market 
Associaiton are known, might perhaps be taken as an indicator that the authorities would like, eventually, to 
remove the support offered by club money holdings» (Grady and Weale, 1986: 64-65). 
895 To this end all competitive restrictions on bank loans, such as maximum growth rates, qualitative guidelines on 
desirable borrowers, and interest rate restrictions were abolished. Moreover, in the search for equity, the U.S. 
banks were also subjected to a legal reserve requirement. This was set at the same level (12'/2 percent) for all 
banks in Britain, but had to be held against sterling liabilities only, leaving other currency liabilities free from 
regulatory controls; reserve assets had to be held in the form of sterling assets, such as U.K. treasury bills, 
acceptances, and money at call with the London Discount Market. These reforms lasted only two years. At the 
end of 1973, faced with rapidly accelerating inflation and a worsening balance of payments position, the Bank of 
England sought to reverse its CCC policies and reimpose stringent controls on the banking system in line with 
those that existed pre-1971, but this time extending them to the whole banking system." The first step was to call 
for "special deposits," whereby all banks had to deposit a certain percentage of their sterling liabilities with the 
Bank of England. While these deposits earned the going treasury bill rate, they were unavailable for loans and 
hence imposed an implicit tax on sterling operations. The initial calls for special deposits were also quite high, 
rising from 3 percent in July 1973 to 5 percent in December of that year. The second step was to try to restrain the 
overall growth rate of sterling business through an additional scheme of penalties. At the end of 1973, all banks in 
Britain were warned that any growth in their sterling eligible liabilities at a rate of more than 1% percent per 
month would be subject to a call for "supplementary" deposits. The latter were, like special deposits, compulsory 
loans to the central bank; however, they were more costly to the banks since they bore no interest, and were 
levied at an increasing rate according to the amount by which an individual bank exceeded the 1 '/2 percent 
growth rate. The initial scheme of penalties was for a call of 5 percent for growth of sterling interest bearing 
liabilities of up to 3 percent in excess of the target figure, 25 percent for excess growth of between 3 and 5 
percent, and 50 percent for growth of more than 5 percent in excess of the stated target. These measures were 
further supplemented in December 1975 by the imposition of qualitative guidelines from the Bank of England on 
the acceptable areas in which U.S. and other banks could make sterling loans. While these were only guidelines, 
the banks were expected to adhere as closely as possible to these measures. Acceptable areas of sterling lending 
were designated as finance to manufacturers and for working capital, whereas personal loans, installment credit, 
and loans to property companies were to be severely rationed. In addition, the target levels for acceptable rates of 
growth of interest-bearing sterling liabilities were further tightened in November 1976, with new targets being 
specified as only a 3 percent growth over the succeeding three months and 9'2 percent for the two months that 
followed, with the penalties for excess growth remaining the same. As outlined above, the recent history of 
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British regulation of U.S. banks appears to have been one of increasing specificity of control (Goldberg and 
Saunders, 1980: 639-640). 
896 In 1968 the Westminster and the National Provincial combined into National Westminster Bank PLC to reduce 
the ―Big Five‖ to the ―Big Four‖(Chappell, 1980: 266).  What is more, the Bank‘s Governor had pointed out that 
the Monopolies Commission that « there would be advantages for the Bank in having only three large banks to 
deal with » (Moran, 1984: 50). 
897 Internal Paper 19; cited in Kynaston, 2001: 439.   
898 Although all these measures considerably tightened up regulation, breaches of the legislation by the Johnson 
Matthey Bank were not detected by the Bank of England 
899 Moran, 2003; Reid, 1988. 
900 The Securities and Investments Board‘s independence was guaranteed by its status as a corporate body 
financed by a levy on the industry. Then again, the power it wielded was based on statute, its own constitution 
was prescribed in law, its leading officers were publicly appointed, and it was required to report to Parliament and 
to the central state in Whitehall.    
901 Vogel, S. 1996: 93-117 is authoritative. 
902 In keeping with the Washington Consensus, the Thatcher government was happy to let British financial 
capitals fall into foreign ownership as long as the acquiring institution was privately owned. 
903 The Financial Services Authority is a company limited by guarantee financed by a levy on the industry, thus 
conferring ‗ownership‘ on the regulated themselves.   
904 Financial Services Authority 2001: 9-19. 
905 In contrast, the United States uses many agencies to regulate banks, including the U.S. Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp. In the U.S. there are also state regulators.   
906 Financial Services Authority 2002. 
907 Apart from the secondary banking crisis in Britain, the 1973-78 period saw the Herstatt failure in Germany,  
the real estate investment trust debacle in America, the failure of the Franklin National Bank and severe problems 
at the Japanese securities houses.  
908 Since Lloyd George's government  the pendulum has oscillated between conciliation and confrontation of 
the unions without either going back to the complete removal of their privileged status in law or forward to their 
full incorporation into the making of government policy. And, according to the same logic, the fact that there 
were only one third of the number of workplaces in 1987 employing 2,000 or more people than there had been in 
1977 was of far more significance for trade unionism than anything done by Mrs. Thatcher or her government 
(Runciman, 1993). 
909 Eden, A. 1947. Freedom and Order: Selected Speeches, 1939-1946. London. 
910 In 1977 the dam broke. The USA rapidly climbed in the league table to first position and from 1978 onwards 
has accounted for over 50% of the total annual outflow of direct investment. How does one account for such a 
rapid change? There seem to have been a number of factors at work. First, was the delayed reaction to the 
problems in Europe – the trade deficit in manufacturing and national protection mechanisms, when firms like 
Cadbury Schweppes sought acquisitions in a more receptive market….Second was the resurgence of sterling. 
Suddenly, the cost of dollar acquisitions was reduced to affordable proportions, and with the low share price 
levels on the New York exchanges, American assets were seen to be ‗going cheap‘. Third, were the changes 
affecting the international financial markets and the strategies of the major banks and insurance companies. 
National Westminster Bank bid for the National Bank of North America for £300 million, and Standard & 
Chartered Bank bought Union Bank Corp for $365 million, both in 1978. Barclays added to its earlier Californian 
investments by buying American Credit. They were soon joined by Midland and Lloyds. Fourth, was an element 
of ‗me-tooism‘, pulling more on to the bandwagon than might otherwise have been the case. Fifth, was an 
element of political motivation, born of fears that European governments were likely to remain concerned with 
regulation and social issues rather than with creating conditions for profitable growth. To the more extreme 
pessimists in British boardrooms, the USA loomed as the last bastion of capitalism (Stopford and Turner, 1985: 
91-92). 
911 As a result, contrary to most Western European countries, Britain currently seems to lack a mainstream right-
wing party that puts the national interest first.  Instead, as with New Labour, the Tories see it as their duty to 
make it subservient to a subsantial extent to that of the United States. 
912 For instance, in an address to the Women's Royal Voluntary Service in 1981, she saw "the voluntary 
movement . . . at the heart of all our social welfare provision" and told her audience that "we politicians and 
administrators must not forget that the state has a limited role" and that "the willingness of men and women to 
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give service is one of freedom's greatest safeguards. It ensures that caring remains free from political control". 
[Quoted in Maria Brenton, The Voluntary Sector in British Social Services (London, 1985), pp. 143-4]. 
913 When municipal government was reformed in 1835, Dissenters flooded into town councils throughout the 
country. Strong at the local level, sparsely represented at the national, Nonconformists and men of their class 
naturally tended to distrust the central state which was still in aristocratic hands. Naturally, as well, they came to 
idealize the virtues of decentralized, local government which they could influence or control. The progressive 
vision of society which Nonconformists shared with other liberals, a vision in which privilege and patronage were 
to be replaced with equality and individual independence, was embodied in the movement for free trade. 
Evangelical stress on individualism and personal responsibility supported the idea of a free market in labor. The 
idealized localism of provincial businessmen supported the call for an end to state interference in business 
affairs...Most notably in the Anti-Corn Law movement, Nonconformists raised free trade to the level of moral 
principle, and they saw its introduction as a critical turning point between the old order of society and the 
new..."the parallelism or coincidence of economical truth with practical Christianity"..."Free Trade is but a part of 
the unrestricted development of the national mind; it implies the doing universally what is just". The society of 
the future, as Nonconformists saw it at the middle of the century, was a middle-class millenium in which the 
corrupt power of the aristocracy was eliminated, the Church of England was merely another denomination like 
the rest, and every individual proved his own worth before God and his fellow men (154)...They considered 
poverty the result of two very different causes. Aristocractic oppression was one, and Nonconformists believed 
that the power of the aristocracy to oppress the poor either directly through taxation, or indirectly through 
destroying their ambition with paternalistic social arrangements, was rapidly fading away. The other cause of 
poverty, and the more important one, lay in the individual moral weakness of each poor person. Men were poor 
because they did not work hard enough, or because they were not thrifty enough, or because they were not 
independent enough to search out opportunites for self-improvement, or because they drank too much 
(Helmstadter, 1979: 155). 
914 During the 1960s and 1970s, no one paid much attention to the politics of local government. It was a political 
backwater, an administrative arm of central government without an independent ‗politics‘ of its own. Local 
councils were assumed by many to be concernced with making practical non-political decisions, guided by the 
judgement of professional officers. Municipal councils had been one of the cradles of the semi-noconformist, Lib-
Lab movement in the latter decades of the 19th century, and of the Fabians‘ municipalisation movement which 
was renewed in the decade after WWII. By the 1960s and early 1970s, however, Labour had been sufficiently in 
central power to dismiss local government as nothing more than the rest home for the geriatric Right (Seyd, 
1987).   Not only Conservative councillors were predominantly old. As soon as local government lost its radical 
edge in the 1960s, remaining Labour councillors began to see themselves as pragmatic rather than as class 
warriors. And they were predominantly old (Lansley et al., 1989: 3).In the late 1970s, due to the Liberal Party‘s 
grassroot politics, there was a marked transformation and local government was to be at the centre of the political 
stage for a decade, especially in Northern cities such as Liverpool. Remarkably, the christian liberal Thatcher did 
not pick up on that, but rather saw this modest revival of local voluntarism as a threat. In response, she 
championed the Local Government Act 1988, which limited the powers of a council to intervene in issues of « 
political controversy » (Lansley et al, 1989 : 206).  
915 The years between 1867 and 1914…witnessed the growth of the welfare state and a contest for power between 
the classes enfranchised by the 1867 and 1884 Reform Bills and the old oligarchy which had ruled since 1832. To 
meet this challenge some members of the old oligarchy in 1882 founded a pressure group, the Liberty and 
Property Defence League, dedicated to the defence of the principles of free contract, rugged individualism, and 
laissez-faire. Composed of landed aristocrats, ‗old liberal‘- new model employers, whigs and other vested 
interests, many of whom had practised private paternalism, the league was founded in reaction to the growth of 
‗grandmonterhly‘ legislation, trade unionis, and ‗promising politicians‘…the difficulty of an ‗Establishment‘ 
defending its position in a mass democracy with an ideology based on the doctrine of liberty and property …the 
L.P.D.L. owed its birth not only to various threatened interests defending property, but also to a group of 
ideologues firmly committed to the ideal of liberty …defender of the status quo with the weapon of laissez-faire 
(211)…upheld the principle of liberty and guard the rights of labour and property of all kind against undue 
interference by the state, and to encourage self-help vs. state-help…one of the main purposes of the league was to 
serve as a counterpart to the TUC and its parliamentary committee …the league‘s world view was an amalgam of 
laissez-faire economic ideas, the philosophic views of positivism, and the whig political fear of democracy...As 
the Labour Party outbid the Liberal Party for the votes of the collectivist-minded,…polarisation took place and 
the Conservative party assumed the position as defender of liberty and property (Soldon, 1974 : 208, 210-213, 
232).    
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916 Ronald Reagan, speaking at a 1983 press conference, defined his dream for America this way: "What I want to 
see above all is that this country remains a country where someone can always get rich. That's the thing that we 
have and that must be preserved" (White, 1988 : 24-25).  The hourglass "Save the Dream" ad, joined with 
Reagan's belief that the dream can best be defined by the opportunity to get rich, declares that the Centennial-era 
"lady" in 1986 was a monument to individual financial opportunity (Evertz, 1995). Note that the term "American 
dream" was not coined until the Great Depression; since then, it has enjoyed an amazing fluidity of meaning  
917 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_economy/ShareOwnership98.pdf 
918 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_economy/Share_Ownership_2006.pdf 
919 Starting in 1984, equity ownership grew more rapidly in the UK than in the US. While the gap in equity 
ownership has narrowed, by the mid 1990s one-quarter of British households directly owned stock compared to 
one-third of American households. In UK most of the increase was concentrated in a four year period from 1985 
to 1988, coinciding with the flotation of previously nationalized public utilities such as British Telecom (1984) 
and British Gas (1986). Around this time, the UK government introduced also a further set of measures aimed at 
promoting a 'share-owning democracy' - namely tax-favoured employee share ownership schemes. In the US the 
increase in share ownership was more gradual throughout the 1980s (Banks et al., 2000: 22). One result of these 
trends was that although the stock market boom was relatively similar across the countries, the fraction of 
American households benefiting was far higher than in Britain throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Banks et al., 
2000: 22-23). Moreover, conditional on owning some stock, the value of stock holdings was considerably higher 
among American households. ..in both countries, distributions of stock values are highly skewed, with extreme 
concentrations in five to ten percent of households. But at all points in the distributions, the value of American 
holdings are multiplies of two or three of those held 
by British households...after the stock market surge in both countries, British households had stock wealth similar 
to American households ten years earlier. In the early 1980s, however, we know that in light of the subsequent 
extremely large increase in share ownership British households' stock holdings were considerably smaller than 
their American counterparts (Banks et al., 2000: 23)...the culprit causing the rapidly increasing financial wealth 
inequality in the US is easy to find...the largest increases in finacial wealth holdings are concentrated among the 
well-to-do indicating that there is little doubt the stock market surge was largely responsible for increasing wealth 
inequality in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s (Banks et al., 2000: 24). 
Stock market participation is, and has always been, higher in the US than in the UK. Prior to the mid 1980s, there 
was a tax bias in Britain away from direct holdings of equity towards wealth held in housing or occupational 
pensions, since equity was more heavily taxed than consumption, and housing and pensions benefited from tax 
advantages relative to consumption. Given the structure of the tax system these differences were significantly 
greater in times of high inflation. The introduction of Personal Equity Plans and Employee Share Onwership 
schemes meant that, from 1987 at least, equity could be held in a more favorably taxed manner by British 
households (Banks et al., 2000: 27).  
920 Included in individual ownership are shares owned by company directors and 
those in demutualised companies which are still owned by individuals. The figures for individuals‘ 
shareholdings do not give a complete picture of their equity investments, since unit trusts will be 
overwhelmingly funded by individuals, although they do include shareholdings held directly in Personal 
Equity Plans and Individual Savings Accounts (ONS, 2007: 11). 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_economy/Share_Ownership_2006.pdf 
921 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=107 
922 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/economic_trends/ownership_of_UK_quoted_companies_1997.pdf 
923 Different from the Bank of England, the Fed has always been relatively insulated from centralist Washington 
politics in three ways. First, the system is ―self-financing,‖ so it is independent of the annual appropriations 
process. While the reserve banks are owned by their member banks, they must purchase stock in the Fed and 
follow the Fed‘s regulations. The member banks elect their reserve bank‘s board of directors, who select the 
bank‘s executive officers; in this way member banks can influence their regional bank‘s affairs. Second, Congress 
has never exercised sustained and close oversight of the Fed‘s operations. Third, the Fed is a joint public-private 
partnership, ―a pyramid having a private base, a mixed middle level, and a public apex‖: the Board of Governors 
is the ―apex‖ of this model, the Federal Open Market Committee is at the ―middle, and ‖the ―bottom‖ consists of 
the Reserve Banks, each of which has a Board with nine members; the commercial banks elect six of these 
members, while the Board of Governors appoint three of them (Reagan, 1987: 287).  This organisational structure 
discourages sectional interest group politics, but does not inhibit it altogether. The seven-member Federal Reserve 
Board, located in Washington, sets the Fed‘s basic policies and oversees its operations, but twelve Federal 
Reserve banks conduct the Fed‘s operations . It‘s a public-private board supervising quasi-private reserve banks, 
a board free from Congressional appropriations and presidential oversight, a board composed of officials 
381 
 
                                                                                                                           
exercising Congress‘s monetary powers yet possessing great autonomy and broad flexibility (Kettl, 1986; Rowe, 
1965). Interestingly, the Reserve Banks – although privately owned and controlled‖—are ―public institutions 
performing public functions:  Their net earnings must be paid into the U.S. Treasury. And if the banks were ever 
liquidated, ―any surplus remaining after payment of all debts, dividends, and the par values of capital stock‖ 
would ―become the property of the United States government‖ (Seidman and Gilmour 1986: 309). 
924 The Securities and Investments Board‘s independence was guaranteed by its status as a corporate body 
financed by a levy on the industry. Then again, the power it wielded was based on statute, its own constitution 
was prescribed in law, its leading officers were publicly appointed, and it was required to report to Parliament and 
to the central state in Whitehall.    
925 The fact that both the Fed‘s and the FSA‘s legitimacy are now been questioned, provides for a new window of 
opportunity.   
926 As noted by Dobbin and Sutton (1998), the strength of the US State that it – in contrast with the French State – 
keeps an appearance of being administratively weak and fragmented, while exerting very strong normative 
pressure on private actors. Indeed, the key to the peculiar strength of America‘s weak state is that Americans 
come to see civil society and the market as the sources of social phenomena that are in fact generated by the 
state.The U.S. regulatory framework led managers to recast policy-induced structures in the mould of efficiency – 
this is Four Characteristics of U.S. Employment Law: 1. ambiguity and complexity of compliance standards – this 
convinces executives that they‘ll need experts to properly comply. 2. expanding scope of the law – executives see 
need to establish permanent offices to track changes. 3. fragmented nature of regulation – not only general 
compliance offices needed, but special antidiscrimination, benefits and health and safety offices to handle 
different regulatory agencies. 4. antistatist elements of the state – management specialists want to keep their jobs, 
so recast in efficiency terms to disassociate with policy (Dobbin and Sutton, 1998). 
927 It is only in foreign policy issues that the State avowedly adopts the principle of territorial centralisation; but 
then again with strong normative overtones. Foreign policy as the shielf of homegrown US traditions. 
928 The English State tradition entails a belief in the geopolitical effectiveness of  ―neutral transformatory 
structures processing ‗inputs‘ (demands and supports) from the system‘s environment into outputs‖ (Dyson, 
1980: 230). 
929 In other words, the US has ―a strong religious culture because the strains of cultural transition and the 
need for cultural defence gave each of these groups good reasons to remain committed to its religion‘‘ (Bruce 
1996: 137).   
930 Provocatively, the latter authors propose that instead of the US, it is the UK which comes closes to a post-
industrial society characterised by ―Latin American‖ scenario of a ―narrow, hyper-serviced elite being waited 
upon by a mass of impoverished servants‖ (Esping-Anderson, 1999: 838). 
931 The only change in formal suffrage criteria was the enfranchisement of the homeless in 2001, a symbolic deed 
more than anything. 
932 It has only risen slightly since, to around 9,000,  by virtue of the development of the Barbican Estate. 
933 In 2001 a private member‘s bill was introduced into the Parliament for this purpose, and after the 2005 election 
the Lord Privy Seal, Geoff Hoon, called for compulsory voting to be introduced in an effort to deal with political 
alienation, restore a feeling of community, and address what he called the dangerous issue of ―serial non-voters‖ 
(‗Hoon suggests compulsory voting‘, BBC News, 4 July 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4648095.stm) 
934 The Co-operative Bank in 1975 gained the membership of the London Bankers' Clearing House, as the first 
bank in almost 40 years. Equally, feeling that the title Co-operative Building Society had become overly 
restrictive to its expansion, the Co-operative Permanent Building Society left the Co-operative Union in 1972 and 
changed its name to ―The Nationwide Building Society‖. 
935 Prior to 1969, the Post Office had responsibility for Savings Accounts, Savings Certificates and Premium 
Bonds (ERNIE). On 1st October 1969, when the Post Office became a Corporation, the Savings Bank functions 
remained as part of the Exchequer and became National Savings. Throughout the 1960s, the Post Office was still 
a government department, part of the Civil Service, but on 1st October 1969 it became a public corporation, i.e. 
anationalised industry.      Trustee Savings Banks ceased from being part of National Savings after 1979 and 
became a banking company owned by shareholders from 1986 as TSB Group PLC Limited (Gosden, 1996 : 158).  
In terms of regulatory deliberations and processes, the story unfolded as follows.  The 1973 Committee to Review 
National Savings – commonly known as the Page Committee – recommended a more modest role for National 
Savings in the funding of government debt, as well as for the government in providing a safe investment for small 
savers. Neither had National Savings made a substantial contribution to the financing of government debt, nor did 
it constitute a cheaper method. And, given the greater role of private sector provision for personal savings since 
1950, the government‘s role in this was not at all compelling anymore. Meanwhile, the TSB Association was 
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lobbying for wider powers to provide personal credit, have more discretion regarding it Special Investment 
department, and to have easier access to capital for branch development. The Committee concluded that the TSBs 
should get wider powers. On a less positive note, the Committee advised against the current situation of 
advantageous tax reliefs and exemptions for savings bank depositors – as compared to for instance the building 
societies. In sum, the Committee‘s Report concluded that the TSBs should organise themselves in to much larger 
and tighter regional groups, with a strong central organisation. In this way, the TSB could become a ―third 
banking force‖ between clearing banks and the National Savings Bank, banking organisations similar in most 
respects to the clearing banks except that they would be mutual and not profit making, and would confine their 
activities largely to the operation of personal accounts‖ (cited in Robbie, 1992: 15-16).  Between 1977 and 1979, 
the federation of savings banks increased its range of services in both banking and insurance, including the 
introduction of lending products, investment management and a nationwide insurance sales force. By 1981, 
mergers had reduced the number of regional trustee savings banks to sixteen; the federation quickly built uip its 
reserves. When in 1980, the Chairman of the TSB Central Board retired, an external candidate with a non-mutual 
background was recruited – an accountant and former chairman of a large public company in the private sector. 
Not surprisingly, by August 1982 the TSB Group announced plans to transform itself from a federal mutual 
structure into a Companies Act structure (TSB Group Report, 1983: 5). 
936 Yet, since the TSB was particularly weak in the South East – home to a buoyant mortgage market – its share 
dropped to 2.2 per cent of the 20 per cent of the total mortgage market held by all newcomers. 
937 Table: Economic ratio comparison Commercial, Savings and Co-operative banks in 1981 
 (in £ million) 
 Total assets Total deposits Capital and 
reserves 
Pre-tax profits 
Barclays 37,097 31,980 1,992 523.5 
National 
Westminster 
34,569 31,820 2,146 410.0 
Midland 25,343 22,906 1,349 231.8 
Lloyds 19,866 18,118 1,395 289.0 
Trustee Savings 
Bank 
6,221 5,757 464 110.0 
Co-operative Bank 686 582 47 5.4 
 
938 The takeover of NatWest made the Royal Bank of Scotland the second-largest bank in both the UK and 
Europe in terms of stock market value. 
939 This acquisition gave HSBC the major foothold in Europe that it needed to complement its existing business in 
Asia and the Americas.   
940 This division was populated by an entirely different species of bankers – arrogant, opportunistic, and better 
paid – than common amongst the rule-driven employees of Barclays.  Not surprisingly, mutual resentment was 
the norm. 
941 TSB was created in 1985, by an Act of Parliament that merged together all (except Airdrie Savings Bank) the 
remaining savings banks in Great Britain under TSB Bank PLC.   
942 Barclays announced that its investment bank‘s 2007 pre-tax profit had increased by 55%, contributing almost a 
third of the firm's pre-tax profit.  And Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), the country's second-largest bank, reported 
that its corporate market business was the bank's fastest-growing division in the first six months of the year, 
producing more than half of its pre-tax profit of £4.6 billion. Finally HSBC, Britain's biggest bank, announced 
that first-half profits from investment and corporate banking had increased by more than a third in 2007. 
943 In order to facilitate expansion, the CWS Loan and Deposit Department in 1970 was incorporated as a private 
limited company under the name of ―Co-operative Bank‖. A Bill was presented before Parliament to give effect 
to the transfer of the CWS banking operations to a separate, wholly-owned subsidiary company. The transfer took 
place on 10 July 1971 in accordance with the Co-operative Bank Act 1971, which made provisions for complete 
continuity of banking business. 
944 Three factors have been associated with the decline in the number of clearing bank br 
anches in the period 1950-1979: 
a) bank mergers in 1969. In that year the District, National Provincial and Westminster Bank merged to form 
National Westminster and Martins Bank was taken over by Barclays. In 1970 Glyn Mills, National and Williams 
Deacons merged to form Williams and Glyns... 
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b) disclosure of profits. At the end of 1969 the London clearing banks agreed to forego the majority of their 
exemptions from the various Companies Acts. This induced the banks to study the profitability of individual 
branches far more closely and to take appropriate action  
c) both the mergers and the disclosure of profts were the result of, and a stimulus to, greater competition between 
the banks, which reached its culmination in 1971 with the abandonment of the agreements on the rates of interest 
to be offered on deposits and charged on advances...increased price competition in the banking sector has resulted 
in a greater emphasis on profitability and efficiency and a reductino in expenditure on non-price competitino and 
therefore has contributed to the reduced number of branches(Boleat, 1981: 53). 
945 Up to 1983, most of the money deposited with building societies was lent to house buyers, although some 15-
22% is invested in financial assets which are held partly to finance withdrawals from deposits and other cash 
needs. 
946 Carpetbaggers tried to open accounts, usually with the minimum balance required in order to qualify them for 
a distribution should conversion or takeover occur At societies deemed potential candidates, accout opening 
levels increased by as much as tenfold. While this has induced building societies‘ management to incrase 
minimum openin balances on their share accounts, as well as differentiate themselves anew by demonstrating a 
greater commitment to member mutuality such as Nationwide in 1996 with its announcemnt that it would pass on 
to its memers the continuining benefits of remaining a building society « by alowing them to enjoy in one form or 
another the money whichwuold otherwise have to be used to pay dividensds to shareholders (1996 Nationwide 
Annual Report, Chairman‘s statement ; Blair, 1997: 15). 
947 The Times, 29 November 1991, cited in Marwick, 1996: 414. 
948 ―Liberal Praise for Co-operative Bank‖, Co-op News, February 28th, 1975. This article reports how the Liberal 
MP Richard Wainwright applauds ―the enlightened way in which the Co-op Bank caters…for the needs of the 
ordinary people‖, but laments that ―the Co-op Bank is unable to have premises in every High Street in the way 
that the lordly four main clearing banks do‖. Wainwright concludes that ―there is a class element there which 
should have been eradicated years ago‖.  
949 Already in 1978 did the Co-operative Bank‘s marketing manager declare: ―We are now seen to be standing on 
our own feet: people no longer regard us as being not quite serious‖ (The Guardian, 2 May 1978). 
950 The Co-operative Bank launched quite a few other innovative initiatives during the 1980s and 1990s. So, in 
1985 it launched a first high interest cheque account for business customers, in 1986 it became the first bank in 
Europe to offer credit interest to its Visa cardholders, in  1987 the first UK bank to open all branches from 
9.30am to 5.00pm, and in 1991 the first bank to offer a guaranteed "Free for Life" Visa Gold Card. In 1989, the 
Co-op Bank was ranked eighth in the banking league in terms of customers (after the Big Five, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Yorkshire Bank.  
951 ―Co-op Bank wooing more top customers‖, Manchester Evening News, Tuesday April 25, 1978 : 20.   
952 Table: Growth record Co-operative Bank 
End-year Number of current accounts Consolidated total assets (£) 
1963 135,000 178,308,256 
1972 215,554 282,740,000 
1973 231,483 325,688,000 
1974 251,398 291,762,000 
1975 273,961 330,760,000 
1998 / 5,539,400,000 
2002 / 8,687,600,000 
 
953 The UK has four banks in the Top 25 world banks, and remains well ahead of the other Europeans in key 
aggregate indicators. However, in terms of profitability (return on capital), Belgium leads the Europeans with a 
32% return on capital , ahead of Sweden (29.5%), the UK, Spain (25.3%), France (23%) and Germany at the 
bottom with 13.6%. 
954 Another form of encouragement was given to owner-occupation by MacMillan in 1954 when he reached 
agreement with the BSA on a form of guarantee to enable 95 per cent of advances to be made on houses valued at 
up to £2,000 and built after 1918 ; and 90 per cent advances on houses valued at up to £2,500 and built either 
before or after 1918. The guarantee was tripartite, any losses resulting from the building society having made a 
larger than normal advance being shared equally by the Gonverment, the local authority and the society. In the 
following years, the two schems were merged (Ashfort, 1980 : 146-147) 
955 Building societies have no equity capital as such, but over 95 per cent of their liabilities are to the personal 
sector in shares and deposits constituting short-term placements withdrawable on demand or at fairly short notice. 
Share certificates confer membership on the holder and are issued on demand to shareholders, who receive a 
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fluctuating interest rate on these shares rather than a profit dividend. Depository funds, however, confer creditor 
status on their holders and in view of this they rank before shareholders in the event of dissolution. Usually the 
interest coupon is a quarter per cent below the share rate. These liabilities enable building societies to make house 
purchase advances. Over 80 per cent of the combined assets of societies are advanced to the personal sector 
through mortgage advances exclusively for house purchases, while the balance is held in government securities 
and liquid assets (Black and Stafford, 1988: 41-42).   
956 Apparently, buildinig societies have also been reluctant to change mortgage rate, because of the administrative 
costs of notifying each mortgagor individually 
957 Competitors‘ interest in providing mortgage loans was first sharpened on 6 February 1966, when the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that lending to finance housebuilding would be regarded as a priority 
category for bank advances (Wadsworth, 1973: 444). 
958 By 1989 the number of shareholders created through privatisation efforts had retreated somewhat to 9 million. 
959 This had, together with the Social Security Act of 1986, a rapid impact on the purchase of personal pensions 
(Morgan et al.1993). 
960 Thomas Sutherland also was the Hong Kong superintendent for the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company. 
961 After the relocation of its domicile to London in 1991, and its takeover of Midland, HSBC proved best at 
countering US, Japanese and European competition in the City.  The bank achieved that through a cautious 
investment banking strategy, alongside a diversified and risk-averse approach in its other business operations.   
962 Table: TSB regional branch network compared with regional population, 1985 (source: Robbie, 1992: 59) 
 Branches Regional population 
 Nos. % Million % 
Scotland 258 18 4.7 8 
Yorkshire, Lancashire, the North 532 33 15.0 27 
Midlands, Wales, Eastern England 410 25 14.3 26 
South East & West Country 320 20 19.7 36 
Channel Islands & Northern Ireland 63 4 1.7 3 
UK total 1,610 100 55.4 100 
 
963 This contrasts sharply with the success of TSBs. In face of rampant inflationary pressures in the 1970s,TSB 
customer balances started declining rapidly. The number of savings accounts – bedrock of TSB growth – declined 
after 1974. Growth in investment accounts somewhat compenstated for this plateauing and decline of savings 
accounts.  Yet, from a peak of 10 per cent in 1965, TSB‘s market share of personal liquid assets in the UK had 
declined to 5.1 % in 1981. Deregulation of the financial services sector and high interest rates in the early 1970s 
had not helped the TSB at all – especially since the bulk of TSB assets were in low-yielding government 
securities. Compared to building societies in particular, TSB deposits increased slowly. Even when interest rates 
declined during the 1980s, TSB market share dropped; to little more than 3% by the mid-1980s (Robbie, 1992 : 
52-57). 
964 (Internal Paper, 19; cited in Kynaston, 2001: 439). And, according to the Banker "the habits of the last 
decade..should be well and truly buried". Over the next three months the clearing bankers signified their 
willigness to accept the thrust of the proposals, while managing to persuade the Bank that building societies and 
savings banks should not be protected from competition for deposits (Kynaston, 2001: 439). 
965 When the attempts of various trade unions to mobilise membership amongst the building society employees 
failed overall, unions such as the CIR criticised the anti-trade union views of the managements of building 
societies...Building Society managements were advised to accept unionism wholeheartedly, not remaining neutral 
in stance as to appear in opposition to collective representation...the societies were also advised to become far 
more professional in the personnel and industrial relations function to allow subsequently for union recognition 
on a sound footing (Swabe and Price, 1983: 18). 
966 Home ownership grew from 55 % of the population in 1980 to 64 % in 1987. By the time Margaret Thatcher 
left office in 1990 it was 67 %. However, the number of public houses built went down to 35,000 in 1990 from 
170,000 in the mid-1970s, with most of these built by housing associations rather than councils. 1.5 million 
council houses were sold by 1990, by 1995 it was 2.1 million 
967 For instance, on a television chat show in May 1983, the Chief General Manager of the Abbey National 
Building Society rather desperately claimed that building societies were the ―highest form of socialism‖. 
968 Eric Holmes, Managing Editor of the Building Societies‘ Gazette in Bankers‟ Magazine, 1973 Vol. CCXV: 
218-219.   
969 ―Banks and the public‖, Institute ofBankers, 1981: 1. 
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12  COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
 
12.1  Summary chapter 
 
The main aim of this study was to develop a ―republican settlement‖ theory of 
economic success. This theory holds that a firm‘s long-term success hinges on its ability to 
contribute to a democratic settlement based on republican principles.  Such settlements are 
conducive to the geopolitical success of the nation-state(s) to which the firm is affiliated, 
and with which it shares a critical relation.  In this chapter, I elaborate on this theory by 
summarising the historical narratives of chapters 4 to 11 in eight core propositions; 
propositions on geopolitical, national and firm dynamics.  (Each proposition is introduced 
by P + number, e.g. P1, P2, ...).  I first concentrate on those propositions relating to the 
geopolitical and national levels of analysis (12.2).  Section 12.3 follows up with a 
comparative discussion at the level of analysis of firms.   
 
12.2 Propositions at the geopolitical and nation-state level  
 
P1:  CONTINUED NATION-STATE REQUIRES THE TIMELY RENEWAL OF 
REPUBLICAN SETTLEMENTS AND TRADITIONS OF DEMOCRATISATION  
 
        In chapters 4 and 5, I described the coming into being of republican settlements 
combining two rivalling types of traditions of democratisation since early republican 
times: respectively Regent and Orangist traditions in the Dutch Republic, Whig and Tory 
traditions in England.  These settlements were reinvented over and over since their 
beginnings in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, through the eighteenth, nineteenth, 
twentieth and twenty first centies. 
a) Republican settlements 
With each settlement successive champions of each type of tradition have 
consolidated their willingness to accept that, ultimately, only a settlement incorporating 
elements of both rivalling camps could provide their nation with a sustainable form of 
geopolitical success. As a result, contestability and rivalry between established and 
outsider groups became increasingly institutionalised and pervasive phenomena in England 
and the Netherlands. What is more, to ensure that the elements incorporated in a settlement 
from either type of tradition would not be overly corrupted by the rivalling side, successive 
champions have increasingly embraced the principle of ―freedom of domination‖ – by any 
particular actor or interest.  For instance, Dutch Anti-revolutionary Protestants at the turn 
of the twentieth century accepted that turning the Netherlands into a unified protestant 
nation was an impossible dream. Rather than needlessly antagonise Catholics, or worse, 
leave the country‘s geopolitical position at the mercy of communist populism, Anti-
Revolutionaries preferred to revive the principle of living-together-apart. This principle 
ensured that each circle would retain a measure of autonomy and would remain free of 
domination by other denominations.  
Also, successive champions in England and the Netherlands from the first 
republican settlement onwards have come to accept the need to both separate and 
reconnect State, economic and civic affairs. In other words, successive English and Dutch 
leaders have recombined the liberal ―art of separation‖ – negative liberty or exit from 
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collective regulation of economic affairs, and the communitarian ―art of connection‖ – 
positive liberty or a collective civic voice in economic affairs, by means of State 
intervention if necessary.    
In sum, it may not be historically opportune to contrast English and Dutch success 
models on the basis of essential liberal versus communitarian features – i.e. the dichotomy 
exit/negative liberty versus voice/positive liberty.
970
  While such contrasting features are 
undoubtedly present in contemporary discourse, digging deeper in history teaches us that 
the English and Dutch share similar rivalling traditions – Whig versus Tory traditions; and 
Regent versus Orangist traditions. These two sets of rivalling traditions are the republican 
precursors of contemporary liberal and communitarian discourses. But they are not just 
precursors. Settlements between these rivalling traditions imply the incorporation of a third 
type of freedom: the republican freedom of non-domination. This type of freedom involves 
the impossibility to dominate others, and the possibility of rivalry and dissent.  And since 
early republican times it has been at the heart of English and Dutch national prosperity.  
In conclusion, reinventing the Dutch and English success models  requires not the 
attainment of respectively new communitarian and new liberal heights. Rather, it depends 
on the ability to reinvent republican traditions and settlements; and in the capacity to adapt 
such reinventions to ever more complex and interconnected geopolitical and domestic 
realities.   
b) Traditions of democratisation 
Distinctions in terms of territoriality and personality, minority and consensus, 
economic and social democratisation dyanmics cut across the Dutch and English historical 
contexts; i.e. Dutch and English traditions of democratisation. Content distinctions, on the 
other hand, are very relevant. For instance, both the English tradition of neutrality and 
Dutch tradition of proportionality entail the necessity to ensure the State and Establishment 
are seen as non-preferential vehicles of the general interest, so as to pre-empt calls for 
revolutionary intervention.  To effectively execute these traditions both the English and 
Dutch rely on bodies that straddle the boundaries of the public and the private.   Beyond 
these similarities, the difference content-wise is that the English historically have drawn 
more on ―neutral‖ bodies – i.e. third-party advisory committees and a civil service that is 
neither associated with special interests, nor clearly incorporated in the State.  The Dutch, 
by contrast, have relied on a State administration and self-regulating associations that serve 
the public interest by explicitly embracing special interests – proportional to their 
importance in the polity at large.  
Even then, the obligation to adapt to foreign traditions may appear to blur 
differences in content. For instance, with the incursion of the US ―Council of Wise‖ 
tradition after WWII (see p. 260), English and Dutch traditions seemingly have converged 
somewhat.  The Council of Wise tradition prescribes extra-parliamentary decision-making 
by third party councils of wise men and experts.  This tradition appears closer to the 
English tradition of neutrality.  To adapt to the increasing geopolitical pre-eminence of the 
Council of Wise tradition, Dutch leaders after WWII have invented institutions such as the 
Social-Economic Council and the Central Planning Bureau; institutions with 
characteristics contiguous with the US tradition. This apparent convergence 
notwithstanding, differences in content remain between English, Dutch and US traditions.  
To be effective, the wise men and experts leading English and Dutch extra-parliamentary 
vehicles still need to be guided by the respective traditions of neutrality and 
proportionality, be it less in terms of visible and more in terms of actual logics of decision-
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making. The same story goes for the European Union. Its predecessor, the European 
Community adapted to the pre-eminence of this US tradition, by inventing its own council 
of wise, the European Court of Justice. Yet, compared to the US Supreme Court, the 
archetypical Council of Wise, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is guided in its rulings 
by a much more pronounced confederal reality. The balance between personality and 
territorial principles is very different in a European Union of  nation-states (Sbragia, 1993: 
28).  Furthermore, the ECJ has been guided by the mutual recognition principle since 
1979, not the US efficiency axiom
971
 (Freyer, 2006; see chapter 10, p. 305-306).  
P2:  THE HISTORICAL RELATION BETWEEN A LANDMARK SETTLEMENT AND 
 A  NATION‟S GOLDEN AGE PROVIDES LEADERS WITH A SIMPLE 
 SUCCESS MODEL            
In trying to renew settlements, leaders are primed by their historical interpretation 
of how a landmark settlement produced their nation‘s ―Golden Age‖.  By reimagining the 
historical relation between a landmark settlement and subsequent geopolitical success, 
leaders create a simple success model to enact their renewal projects. After all, the 
historical resonance and sense of continuity provided by landmark settlements points to a 
road of lesser resistance for change initiatives in popular opinion, and a way to simplify 
political, civic and economic complexities. Obviously, this is not just a matter of 
interpretation at one given point of time. As generation after generation of leaders engages 
with renewal projects, interpretations of a success model gradually become 
institutionalised, setting a nation-state on a more or less path-dependent track – at least if 
path-dependency is interpreted as a process of reinventing solutions to problems that repeat 
themselves with increasing degrees of complexity over time.  
This institutionalisation process is not unproblematic. The simple success 
model associated with a nation-state‘s Golden Age typically is shorthand for a deceptively 
long and complex process.  Leaders‘ poor historical insights can engender the creation of a 
black box between historical causes and effects.  As demonstrated in chapters 4 and 5, the 
Dutch and English success models emerged as the synthesis and geopolitical apogee of 
successive, partial settlements spanning more than three centuries. Complicating 
interpretations of historical causes and effects, the Dutch and English success models 
would not have consolidated if it were not for a succession of happy accidents (see p. 52 
and 65).  All this points to the importance of the notion of unintentionality or fit-of-
absentmindedness in any formulations of Dutch and English success models.  
To recapitulate my findings in chapters 4 and 5, I found the following 
formulations of the Dutch and English historical success models to be most accurate and 
consistent. 
The Dutch success model is one of “Dutch nonconformism”:  reinforce local 
privileges and traditions by pioneering a low-cost and pragmatic geopolitical vantage 
point; a vantage point conducive to the unintentional spill-over of the benefits of dominant 
international standards, techniques and agreements. 
The English success model, by contrast, is one of “Anglican nonconformism”: 
reinforce English traditions and liberties by pioneering a qualitatively sounder national 
vantage point; a vantage point conducive to unintentional foreign imitation and 
transformation by virtue of the international openness of the City of London.   
The Dutch success model is typical for a small nation that historically has 
achieved geopolitical success disproportionate to its size, by virtue of a favourable 
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geopolitical position and a pragmatic openness to international spill-overs. The English 
success model, by contrast, is typical for a large nation that has experienced world leading 
success on the basis of immigrants trying to qualitatively differentiate their new home 
country‘s traditions from those of their former mother countries. That is, without falling 
back in isolationism, by virtue of a city-state whose central role in international trade 
proves impossible to foreclose.  
Devoid of historical process insights about causes and effects, successive 
generations of leaders can easily misinterpret history in their urge to rapidly recreate a 
semblance of the successes of the past. Worryingly, they can misinterpret and simplify 
their countries‘ historical success model to an extent that causes and effects are actually 
reversed in the chain of reasoning, and the role of happy accidents is entirely slighted.  
This begs the question under what conditions leaders can successfully reinvent 
their nation-state‘s historical success model.  Based on my findings in chapters 6 to 11, I 
identified the following conditions, as elaborated in propositions 3 to 7.   
Reinvention is successful the more the following conditions are fulfilled: 
 
P3:   Traditions of democratisation and settlements are reinvented in a way sufficiently
 adapted to pre-eminent geopolitical traditions  
P4:  Interpretations of pre-eminent geopolitical traditions and settlements have to 
appear sufficiently different from home-grown traditions to avoid confusion 
P5a: Reinvention is more effective when grounded in consciousness of a failed relation 
 between state and  nation 
P5b: It is necessary to create supra-national settlements and traditions to counter the 
  dominance of emerging  foreign traditions 
P6: There is enough consciousness of the pivotal role played by ―happy accidents‖ 
 in an historical success model 
P7: Up-and-coming leaders go against the grain in periods of high modernity and 
 reinvent habits associated with landmark settlements  
 
P3: REINVENT TRADITIONS AND SETTLEMENTS IN A WAY SUFFICIENTLY 
 ADAPTED TO PRE-EMINENT GEOPOLITICAL TRADITIONS  
After WWII, the pre-eminent geopolitical traditions from the English and  
Dutch perspective derived from US foreign policy. As the ―shield‖ of US traditions of 
democratisation (see p. 222), US foreign policy after WWII served the worldwide 
expansion of the following traditions: City monetarism, Council of Wise democracy, 
pluralism, happy mediocrity and Real Whig voluntarism.  In table 12.1, I juxtapose Dutch, 
English and US traditions.  
As the Netherlands and England, the United States developed a tradition of City 
monetarism. This tradition is grounded in North Eastern City merchants‘ historical efforts 
to increase their financial wealth and gain a higher status away from ―arbitrary‖ political 
and fiscal intervention – by the British Crown.  
More than this first tradition, the tradition of Real Whig voluntarism differs 
significantly from its Dutch and English counterparts – pacification (p. 53, 55) and 
Anglican voluntarism (p. 68).  As the other US traditions, it was first developed  by 
English Puritans, first in the English Commonwealth and later in the Eastern colonies of 
North America. English Commonwealth men in the US were known as Real Whigs 
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(Robbins, 1959: 2-20), contrary to the Whigs that stayed in England after the Restoration 
and Glorious Revolution. The latter gradually relinquished their ―Real‖ or puritan stock in 
favour of an Anglicisation process. All Whigs to some extent believed in freedom of 
thought, tolerance, and religious liberty. Yet, much more than Anglican Whigs, Real 
Whigs believed in Christian doctrines such as: ―All men are invested by God and nature 
with certain alienable rights and privileges‖. Also, Real Whigs had far more missionary 
objectives. They argued that, ultimately, the natural rights of English Commonwealth men 
should be extended ―to all mankind‖. They also believed passionately in the improvement 
of the world through education – a secular education in name, yet imbued with Christian 
moral virtues in practice.    In the eyes of Real Whigs the worst form of national corruption 
was that of ―luxury‖. The highest virtue, by contrast, was the combined application of 
economic and political citizenship by autonomous, self-directed individuals (Foner, 1998: 
55; Hatch, 1989; Marsden, 1980; Watts, 1987). This explains the uniquely North American 
association of individual property and the right to vote as the best way to spread virtue, 
combat corruption and expand liberty.   
 
Table 12.1: A juxtaposition of Dutch, English and US traditions of democratisation 
Dutch traditions English traditions US traditions 
City monetarism City monetarism City monetarism 
Living together apart Anglican voluntarism Real Whig voluntarism 
Pacification Secular Anglicanism Happy mediocrity 
Proportionality Neutrality Pluralism 
Orangist democracy Anglican democracy Council of Wise democracy 
 
The US tradition of “happy mediocrity” (see p. 222) emerged during the 
American Revolution as the North American antidote to corrupt European realities of class 
and religious divisions, as well as income inequality (Conner, 1969).  The story goes that, 
faced with an ―alien European imperialism in 1776‖,  leaders of the American colonies 
realised they shared an exceptional pattern of ―seamless‖ democracy (Brown, 1955: 5, 19, 
167, 295). Benjamin Franklin, the ―first American‖ (Brands, 2000), led the way in 
amplifying this pattern, by declaring immigrants‘ willingness to Americanise more 
virtuous than the maintenance of religious and cultural roots.  He invented and glorified 
the term ―happy mediocrity‖ to express the desirability of a secular, middle class society 
that could overcome European tendencies of both religious extremism and class rigidity 
(Carlson, 1975: 5-7). Ultimately, the republican ideal of happy mediocrity became the 
cradle of middle class consumerism, business school education and other movements of 
middle class egalitarianism and consumerism such as ―McDonaldisation‖. 
The tradition of pluralism (p.222) to some extent counterbalances the assimilation 
imperative of the tradition of happy mediocrity. Pluralism has been universalised by post-
390 
 
WWII political scientists as a theoretical archetype applicable to world-wide 
manifestations of interest group politics and other expressions of democracy. In reality, it 
is shorthand for a very idiosyncratic North American experience. In the US, the historical 
coincidence of evangelical beliefs with the idea of an expanding frontier has resulted in a 
tradition that maintains the inferiority of State centralisation to the democratic capacities of 
the « marketplace of ideas » (Foner, 1998).  The radical anti-State nature of the tradition of 
pluralism throughout the centuries has been energised by a continuous inflow of 
immigrants in the US. As members of a ―nation of immigrants‖, incumbents and 
newcomers alike have sought refuge in a commitment to their native religion as a way to 
―display their commitment to American values while maintaining their ethnic 
distinctiveness‖, independent from State interference (Bruce, 1996: 135).972  
 Beyond the appearance of administrative weakness and fragmentation, 
however, the US State has actually always been normatively strong, exerting great pressure 
on a plurality of private actors to abide by its grand rules of the game (Dobbin and Sutton, 
1998).
973
  This brings us to the last US tradition: Council of Wise democracy. This tradition 
is the linking pin between US State regulation and pluralist democratic capitalism.  The 
tradition has its origins in the constitutional founding fathers‘ distrust of the ―inflationary‖ 
instincts of the masses; especially their belief that popular participation in government had 
increased to an extent incompatible with the practice of free government (Dietz and 
Hamilton, 1960: 131).  In order to provide the disciplined propertied classes with 
constitutional safeguards against the irrationality of the masses, the founding fathers 
ensured a central place in the democratic system for institutions governed by a ―council of 
wise men‖ – in their own image. A council in which American leaders of the revolution 
―grouped themselves with Theseus and Moses, Lycurgus and Romulus as founders of a 
‗new order of the ages‘‖ (Pocock, 1988: 56). The most notable US examples of this 
―Council of Wise‖ tradition are the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve – which was 
explicitly modelled on the Supreme Court. These institutions historically have been 
perceived by US citizens as essential to the preservation of their liberties and the fight 
against national corruption.   
 In regulatory terms, the Supreme Court throughout the twentieth century was 
pivotal in reconciling the founders‘ constitutional ideals with present and future 
geopolitical developments. This has allowed the North Americans to keep revelling in the 
dream of American exceptionalism, i.e. the dream that their Republic would be able to 
escape the historical cycle of growth and decay that had typified European republics. 
Indeed, the Court‘s continuous recasting of ―commerce‖, ―contract‖, and other 
constitutional and legal code words facilitated the adjustment of republican ideology to the 
rising influence of liberal capitalism (Freyer, 1994: 30).  In reinventing history along the 
way, the Supreme Court ultimately has been instrumental in convincing North American 
citizens that the US from its birth has acted as the supreme defender of the ―liberal 
tradition‖.  This provided the US government with a decisive geopolitical advantage 
during the 20
th
 century. For the liberal tradition provided a much more universal front to 
foreign policy aims than the US‘ actual republican traditions. After all, the liberal tradition 
had already been granted world-wide legitimacy by virtue of the success of the Pax 
Britannica – the nineteenth century liberal front for ―England and Empire‖ foreign policy 
ambitions.  Even better, taking up the mantle of promoter of liberal-democratic capitalism 
allowed the US government to distance itself from the legacy of European imperialism, 
while pushing an expansive ―Empire of Liberty‖ agenda (see also p. 371).  
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In sum, one of the most persistent geopolitical misconceptions is that, contrary to 
Western European countries that are bogged down by the Old Corruption of feudal 
traditions, the liberal tradition is the main foundation of US democratic capitalism (Hartz, 
1955). In effect, the liberal tradition is no more than a geopolitically opportune  
amalgamation of particular North American traditions into one ―end of history‖ narrative.  
Although its influence was unmistakeable, the ―liberal tradition‖ narrative was not the 
product of a far-sighted Supreme Court.  On the contrary, just like in England – with the 
unintentional emergence of a British international gold standard
974
, it emerged by fit-of-
absentmindess and by default.  A domestic compromise – the US ―New Deal‖ or ―politics 
of productivity‖ settlement (see p. 196), by fit-of-absentmindedness was copied abroad and 
internationalised as the best way to ―liberate‖ other nation-states from their domestic 
crises. Once US leaders realised other nation-states were using the US model to liberalise 
their own economies from ―Old Corruption‖, they – hesitantly at first – reified it as an 
intentional liberal tradition; eager as they were to use it as the geopolitical shield of 
altogether less ―liberal‖ US traditions. Undoubtedly, US leaders hereby learnt from British 
precedent. Expanding the Empire of Liberty abroad on the basis of the North American 
need for ―more territory for its own commercial development or its own security‖ was 
bound to invoke much resistance, both domestically and abroad. Yet, as in Britain, ―the 
more altruistic justification of empire‖ – the argument based on a ―nation's duty to the 
world‖ – could not be so dismissed so easily (Porter, 1968: 186).   
In sum, more than any other tradition, ―Council of Wise‖ democracy contributed 
to the end of history doctrine of ―liberal capitalism‖ which the US so successfully pushed 
after WWII, and most forcefully from the 1980s onwards with the Washington Consensus.  
That is, the doctrine of the virtues of a ―weak administrative state‖ and regulatory bodies 
of wise men and experts guided by an efficiency mantra.  
 
P4: PRE-EMINENT GEOPOLITICAL TRADITIONS AND SETTLEMENTS 
 RESONATE WITH HOME-GROWN TRADITIONS, BUT APPEAR   
  SUFFICIENTLY DIFFERENT TO AVOID CONFUSION 
 
a) City monetarism 
At first sight, both Dutchmen and Englishmen should have felt blessed with the  
coming to geopolitical prominence of rather contiguous US traditions.  Most notably, the 
Netherlands, England and the US share a similar tradition of City of monetarism. After all, 
the baton of pre-eminent financial world centre was passed from Amsterdam to London to 
New York in a spirit of continuity through the modern Western age.  Thus, while Dutch 
central bankers maintained privileged relations with their English counterparts during the 
nineteenth century, they increasingly built Atlantic connections with the Federal Reserve 
from the turn of the twentieth century.  As such, they were able to take a first-mover stake 
in the British gold standard system as well as its US successors. Ultimately, these 
privileged connections with London and New York served to revive the declined position 
of Amsterdam – home of the Dutch tradition of City monetarism – in the century leading 
up to WWII.   
Some argue that the City of New York eclipsed the City of London as financial 
centre of the world as early as the post-WWI period (Wilkins, 1999). After WWII, the new 
hierarchy became undisputable. By the 1960s, the City of London had been demoted to an 
offshore financial centre or spin-off of New York, welcoming US, Japanese and European 
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banks that fled their more regulated home markets. The City of London brilliantly fulfilled 
its role of vehicle of ―dollarisation‖ of world finance – in a triumvirate with New York and 
Tokyo. The British government and Treasury formalised the new hierarchy in the late 
1970s and 1980s, synchronising the British turn to monetarism and the regulatory Big 
Bang of the City with their senior US partners – the US government and Federal Reserve.   
 In terms of avoiding confusion between foreign and home-grown traditions, the 
Dutch were in a more favourable position than the English. Every semblance of 
Amsterdam as a world financial centre had long disappeared by the 1950s, removing much 
nostalgia of past imperial greatness, and allowing the Dutch to recreate their historical 
success model of Dutch nonconformism with a clean sheet.  The Dutch Bank, Ministry of 
Finance and commercial banks let go of their primary Atlantic gaze of the pre-WWII 
period, and increasingly hedged their bets between the offshore market of London, and 
Frankfurt-driven monetary developments. Pragmatic stands with a big ―P‖ in the Dutch 
case. The Dutch-driven acceptance of the 2007 NYSE bid for Euronext – against the 
wishes of Frankfurt-based EU officials – exemplifies this.   
 Confusion is all the more likely, given the US tradition of City monetarism‘s 
intimate connection with the other four US traditions – Council of Wise democracy, Real 
Whig voluntarism, pluralism, and happy mediocrity.  Individually, some US traditions 
appear more contiguous to English traditions – Real Whig voluntarism and Council of 
Wise democracy, some closer to Dutch traditions – pluralism and happy mediocrity.  To 
anticipate what follows, beyond first appearances this closeness has turned out to be 
devoid of much substance in both the English and Dutch cases. Nevertheless, the 
behaviour of especially most British, but also many Dutch opinion leaders during the last 
decades suggests not everyone was aware of this. 
b) Real Whig voluntarism and Anglican voluntarism 
At first sight, the tradition of Anglican voluntarism is closer to the tradition of 
Real Whig voluntarism than its Dutch counterpart, pacification. Given the Real Whig 
tradition‘s origins in emigration from Britain and the subsequent American Revolution, 
this may have been a poisoned gift, however, as Thatcher-led practice revealed. Not only 
are North American Real Whigs federalists, contrary to their Anglican counterparts: the 
Real Whig principle of voluntarism emerged from the ideal of an ―equal federal union 
between the different parts of the British Isles and a partnership or family compact 
between Britain and her distant colonies‖. Much more than Anglican voluntarism, Real 
Whig voluntarism associates the creation of a Commonwealth of propertied individuals 
with the extension of the suffrage. Indeed, in the US the right to vote became the main 
emblem of citizenship and liberty after the American Revolution.
975
   This is also how one 
should interpret the North American predilection for shareholder capitalism, i.e. as a 
manifestation of a Commonwealth of economic citizens with voting rights. Paradoxically, 
the greater influence of Real Whig voluntarism after WWII in the UK has sent electoral 
turnout figures plummeting (p. 328). This evolution was accelerated by Thatcher‘s 
shareholder democratisation programme and her curtailing of political access points. At the 
end of the day, the UK was left with the worst of both worlds: the meaningfulness of the 
suffrage plummeted, and the country did not become a shareholder democracy after all.   
The tradition of Real Whig voluntarism also provides one part of the explanation 
of why the US government, even today, can periodically wage an invasive foreign policy 
based on the ideal of the extension of English Commonwealth and suffrage principles. In 
comparison, British imperial aims were far less premised on assimilation (Lieven, 2002), 
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although at their apex they occasionally relied on the Cromwellian notions of a civilising 
mission, a sense of cultural superiority over native people, and the doctrine of terra nullius. 
In spite of this major difference, the UK eagerly participated in the latest US wars of 
geopolitical domination and assimilation, in the name of continuity between the US 
doctrine of liberal interventionism – the expansion of the Empire of Liberty  (p. 238, 349) 
– and the British tradition of ―unilateral liberalism‖.   
Furthermore, the US tradition of Real Whig voluntarism stands for an evangelical 
belief in liberty guided by moral absolutes, in particular industry, sobriety and self-
discipline. How did Thatcher succeed in associating English national character with Real 
Whig voluntarism, a tradition of ―moral absolutes‖, in a country in which the great 
majority of the population favours gradualism and abhors moral absolutism.
976
  That is, in 
a country in which traditions of secular Anglicanism and neutrality had long reigned 
supreme? After all, did many self-appointed ―Real Whigs‖ not leave England in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for this very reason, namely the dominance of secular 
Anglicanism, Anglican democracy, gradualism, and the lack of support for moral 
absolutes?  
c) Thatcher’s reinvention of history 
First, Thatcher became a cheerleader of the vested interests of the middle and 
lower middle classes.
977
  Borrowing from the US tradition of happy mediocrity and the 
ideology of middle class consumerism, her government brushed aside the home-grown 
tradition of neutrality. For instance in terms of housing, the government gave up all 
semblance of tenure neutrality in the 1980s, privatising swathes of council housing and 
stigmatising those who did not live the dream of a property-owning democracy. Also, 
Thatcher declared that Britain was an integral part of a regional sphere of English-speaking 
nations that embraces « liberty, Christianity, industry and modernity » (Bennett, 2004; 
MacFarlane, 2000; Veliz, 1994).  Eager to get rid of the perennial feeling of national 
decline and rediscover its « pathfinder society » role, a majority of British popular opinion 
came to embrace the idea that the « Anglosphere » historically had always been the one to 
provide the prototypical institutions of modernity.
 
 Finally, Thatcher applied a 
longstanding North American solution to the problem of balancing moral absolutes with 
British patriotism. She combined a patriotic discourse of ―assimilation‖978, i.e. a discourse 
of ―Anglicisation‖ through the promotion of middle class individualism, egalitarianism and 
consumerism, with a focus on the need to tolerate immigration for the sake of liberty and 
economic growth. 
This last point brings us to the different historical ways in which the English and 
North Americans have come to deal with immigrants. Although once all parts of Europe - 
including the British Isles – were riddled by streams of immigrants, no modern European 
country has convincingly embraced the identity of « nation of immigrants ». In England, 
pressures of Anglo-conformity managed to neutralise the diversity of immigration by the 
late Middle Ages. With the triumph of traditions of Anglican democracy and secular 
Anglicanism in the seventeenth century, England definitively ceased to view itself as a 
nation of immigrants, although the City of London‘s openness to foreigners precluded 
overly isolationist tendencies.  In the United States, by contrast, pressures of Anglo-
conformity – « happy mediocrity » - have not managed to destroy its nation of immigrants 
identity as of yet.  While such pressures did manage to reduce American diversity to an 
English ethnic essentialism (Kauffman, 1999; see p. 407)
979
, the simultaneous 
counterbalancing role played by religion has provided an escape valve, an outlet for 
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pluralism.  Thus, one major reason why Americans are religious is precisely because ―their 
churches offer them a way in which they can display their commitment to American values 
while maintaining their ethnic distinctiveness… [including] ethnic exclusion‖ (Bruce 
1996: 135). This is not the case in England, where religion has been usurped by Kings and 
the State ever since the Anglican rupture from the Catholic Church.  
As we saw in chapter 7, the tradition of Anglican voluntarism has been 
episodically contested and revived in England by nonconformist varieties of 
―voluntaryism‖, in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.  Yet, contrary to English 
voluntaryism, whose revival in the nineteenth century proved short-lived, the evangelical 
roots of Real Whig voluntarism in the US have been reinforced with each generation since 
the 1870s (Marsden, 1980). More generally speaking, evangelical revivals have been a 
continuous, enduring feature in US history, contrary to England, where secular 
Anglicanism has been the norm.
980
 I have noted that the religious resilience of US citizens 
provided the lifeblood of anti-State pluralism in the US – and of the latter‘s country‘s 
ability to present itself as a nation of immigrants. What explains the world-wide success of 
the US tradition of pluralism after WWII, even in the absence of corresponding religious 
resilience abroad?  For one, US multinationals naturally exported US traditions of 
democratisation such as happy mediocrity and neutrality abroad. In addition, the Federal 
Reserve implicitly supported expansion by US banks into foreign city-states such as 
London. Also, by proxy with their country‘s nation of immigrant image, some US 
multinationals and banks from the 1970s increasingly  presented themselves as harbingers 
of a culture that transcended nation-state boundaries – a company as the ultimate melting 
pot of nations and cultures.
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 Third, there was the turn to monetarism – and assumptions 
of non-State intervention – from the late 1970s onwards; and the spread of this ideology 
across the West and later developing countries. Four, most Western countries shared a 
contiguous traditions of democratisation, that could easily be interpreted as a variety on the 
same plurality melody. Finally, the revival of evangelical non-profit organisations after 
WWII, and the fiscal privileges attributed to such organisations from Eisenhower through 
Reagan and Bush, helped export the tradition of pluralism to developing countries; most 
notably by blurring the neat distinction between public and private US initiatives. The 
blurring of public and private responsibilities became even more pronounced with 
Reagan‘s advocacy of monetarism, the launch of a new global discourse of liberal 
capitalism and democracy, and the policy to cut back government funding to non-Christian 
organisations with a quasi-public function.
982
 As a byproduct of this evolution, the 
tradition of anti-state pluralism has been spread across more and more US-sponsored 
international organisations.  
By contrast, the wave of anti-Statism which Thatcher piggybacked on to push her 
privatisation programme was rooted in something entirely less functional
983
: the pathology 
of interest group politics (Grant, 2007). This pathology throughout the 20
th
 century 
signalled an increasingly fraught relation between State and nation, premised on the 
historically unresolved contradiction between Anglican paternalism and nonconformist 
libertarianism in England. Post-WWII ―paternal socialism‖ was a failed attempt to address 
class politics; Thatcher‘s neo-liberalism and Blair‘s ―third way‖ failed attempts to escape 
them.  The most deplorable effect of the lingering pathology of interest group politics has 
been the gradual weakening of the effectiveness of the home-grown tradition of neutrality 
since WWII (see p. 347).  
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d) Council of Wise democracy 
The very different historical interpretations of the Council of Wise tradition by 
English and North-American leaders demonstrate how different nation-states can evolve 
different versions of the same original tradition to accommodate their own particular 
problems.  The oldest Saxon kings relied on the Witan, or counsel of the wise, gathered at 
royal behest, mainly in the south of the kingdom. Arguably, the English stayed closest to 
the original Saxon tradition. Indeed, it is from these Saxon precedents of the Witan and 
elected kingship that English Common law and Parliament evolved to grow certain 
autonomy from the monarchical state (Colls, 2002: 14, 17).  The US founding fathers, by 
contrast, invented a more legalistic and extra-parliamentary variety on the Council of Wise 
theme, relying on the authority of the Supreme Court – and later the Federal Reserve. 
There were two reasons for this divergence, the first to do with the best way to deal with 
the dangers of monetary inflation, the second relating to North American leaders‘ anti-
Europeanism. The founding fathers feared the inflationary tendencies of the masses most, 
and sought to create extra-parliamentary bodies of wise men to counterbalance the masses‘ 
possible excesses (Lippmann, 1920). In England, by contrast, debasements by Kings were 
most dreaded, and Parliament was seen as the ultimate safeguard against royal excess.  
Furthermore, contrary to the US, the UK‘s constitutional principles have never 
been formalised in republican ideals of ‖commerce‖, ―contract‖ or ―anti-trust‖ (Freyer, 
1992b).
984
 This partly explains why the ―politics of productivity‖ has not been accepted as 
voluntarily and enthusiastically in the UK than in the US.  England has never had the 
equivalent of the US Supreme Court to transform political issues such as class struggle into 
problems of efficient output and anti-cartel legislation. Even at the height of British 
Empire, the rallying cry ―National Efficiency‖ did not become a resounding success.  The 
other side of the politics of productivity, anti-cartel legislation, historically has also lacked 
majority support in Britain and was only sparingly introduced before the 1980s (Freyer, 
1992a). In many ways, the imposition of strict anti-cartel legislation constitutes a breach of 
the English tradition of neutrality, which proclaims non-intervention and a reliance on 
voluntary mechanisms as much as possible. 
 The gulf between English and US interpretations of the Council of Wise 
tradition widened even more in view of the anti-European motivations of many North 
American opinion leaders; in particular their view that ―America was created as an antidote 
to Europe‖ (Garton Ash, 2003). One of the most loathed aspects of European society was 
its hierarchical system of ranks and classes. The idea of England as a ―Commonwealth that 
embraces all classes, sections, interests in a common life‖ (Bentinck, 1917: 137) did not 
appeal at all to most North American leaders. In England, the Establishment, through 
Parliament or other avenues, promised to protect the natural balance and rightful 
aspirations of the different classes and ranks. This notion of a natural, self-regulating 
justice ultimately provided the basis for the tradition of Anglican democracy – an informal, 
non-legalistic variety on the Council of Wise theme.  The US founding fathers, by contrast, 
abhorred the notion of ranks and classes, preferring the notion of a seamless, egalitarian 
democracy. Simultaneously, they realised the necessity of an extra-parliamentary body 
sheltered from the masses‘ worst excesses.  Hence, their more legalistic and extra-
parliamentary, yet officially class-free interpretation of the Council of Wise tradition. 
Clearly, it is true that American politics has long lacked the English ideology which 
defines the political situtaion in terms of class and guides interests in the direction of class 
solidarity (Beer, 1956 : 21). Nevertheless, the US in actual practice also engages in class 
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integration mainly through the unassailable authority of the Supreme Court, but also 
through modest welfare provision.  In view of the greater vigour of anti-Statist ideology, 
and the greater Constitutional fear of lower than upper rank usurpation, welfare 
mechanisms have been framed more within a perspective of  welfare capitalism rather than 
welfare statism (e.g. Tone, 1997: 7, 253).  
e)  Decline of Anglican democracy and resurgence of class 
 In expressing their horror for the excesses of ―society‖ and a self-sufficient class 
system, Thatcher and Blair have distanced themselves from the tradition of Anglican 
democracy, and promoted US-style regulatory vehicles in all matters economic, social and 
educational.   Unfortunately, in their urge to copy the US classless ideology, both prime 
ministers, in particular the first, have severely aggravated income inequality in the UK.  
Even more worrying, by default of a renewal of the Anglican democracy tradition, social 
mobility has plummeted in the UK. In sum, doing away with the Anglican democracy 
tradition, and the notion of natural justice within a class system is not only impossible in 
the UK – more even than in other Western European countries (p. 346).  It is 
counterproductive, as figures of social mobility and inequality demonstrate.  And it seems 
to go against the grain of popular opinion. The 2006 British Social Attitudes surveys 
corroborate this: 57% of adults in the UK consider themselves working class, while 
according to official labels a majority of citizens is middle class.
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986
  That is because, 
instead of religious resilience, pluralism in England has been linked with class resilience, 
independence-craving trade unions and employer organisations. Fairness, on the other 
hand, has long been associated with a tradition of active class-neutrality, cherished by the 
civil service. Indeed, in England ―tax politics is class politics‖ (Webber and Wildavsky, 
1986).  Where in the US there is broad popular support for lower taxation, in the UK 
support has only ever been very strong among the lower middle classes. Not surprisingly, 
weakening the class-neutralising role of the taxation system and civil service has resulted 
in a system that has actually widened the income inequality and mobility gap in the UK 
(Dilnot and Stark, 1986; IFS, 2007
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; Hills, 2005). 
Different from North Americans, English people historically have held highly 
elastic and often contradictory views about their social classes, seeing them at times as 
small and endangered and, at other moments, as strong and confident.  Similarly, popular 
opinion alternated periods in which membership of the middle class was the embodiment 
of virtue with periods in which membership was not a commendable thing. English 
popular opinion – as fragmented as it may appear – at the moment seems to be going 
through a period in which middle class membership and the ―classless society‖ – with its 
virtues of egalitarianism and individualism – are perceived as less commendable than the 
virtue of being part of the working classes. The polarisation of individual and regional 
income inequality patterns in England also seems to be contributing to an ―us‖ versus 
―them‖, ―productive‖ against ―parasitic‖, ―virtuous‖ against ―vicious‖ reaction from 
occupational members of the middle classes. This is another explanation for the latter‘s 
retreat into a working class membership. In sum, one lesson of English history is that 
periods of revolution generally are accompanied by a revival of Anglican democracy – as 
demonstrated in the aftermath of the Commonwealth, the 1832 Reform Act, the movement 
of voluntaryism
988, and Thatcherite and Blairite ―classless‖ pretensions. The desire to 
integrate all classes and ranks in a concept of English society ultimately always prevails 
because over the long term that vision ―has been the most pervasive and persuasive" 
(Cannadine, 1999: 172). 
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Let us now turn to the similarities between US and Dutch traditions, in particular 
the US traditions of pluralism and happy mediocrity, and the Dutch traditions of living-
together-apart and pacification.   
f) Happy mediocrity and pacification   
The traditions of happy mediocrity and pacification at first sight share some 
common traits. The happy mediocrity tradition embodies the US founding fathers‘ 
preference for a secular, middle class society that can overcome European tendencies of 
both religious extremism and class rigidity. The Dutch pacification tradition shares its US 
counterpart‘s belief that rivalling factions should resolve their differences by depoliticising 
them and finding a pragmatic middle ground, even if a mediocre one in the eyes of the 
more critical citizens.  This last characteristic, which is encapsulated in the Dutch success 
model of ―Dutch nonconformism‖, probably also explains the early success of business 
schools in the Netherlands.  Finally, because the tradition of pacification only works 
insofar as the lower ranks can identify with their elite representatives, the latter have to 
engage in inconspicuous, pragmatic behaviour to be democratically acceptable. This 
behaviour, particularly the quality of always staying ―on speaking terms‖ sometimes 
conveys the impression that the Dutch are a classless people. Yet, ultimately, to be 
effective, the tradition of pacification is linked to the use of elitist decision-making bodies, 
and the very European tradition of Orangist democracy.  Thus, in spite of classless 
appearances, there is ample historical evidence of the Dutch predilection for pacification 
through esoteric, elitist problem-solving methods.  Nevertheless, confusion has been rife; 
undoubtedly the influence of the happy mediocrity tradition in the Netherlands has been 
pervasive.  Since the hesitating creation of a middle class consumer culture in the 1960s 
and 1970s, Dutch consumers have become real believers, as testified by the burgeoning 
practice of withdrawing a large part of housing equity to  finance consumer goods – a 
practice popular in the US and the UK, but not the rest of Europe.  
Still, there is ample proof of the continuing relevance of the home-grown tradition 
of pacification, certainly in comparison with the declined Anglican democracy tradition. 
For instance, Dutch regulators and banks agreed consumers to some extent should be 
protected from themselves by means of fixed rate mortgage packages – with a term of 20 
or 25 years.  Tellingly, the share of fixed rate mortgages in the Netherlands fluctuates 
between 84.5% and 95%. In the UK this figure is between 17.7% and 36% (Low et al., 
2003).  Furthermore, the governor of the Bank of England has in vain called for mortgage 
prices to be part of the official inflation. These prices present the biggest expenses for 
many households, but are not included in the Consumer Price Index.  In a clear sign of the 
weakening of Anglican democracy, however, the Monetary Policy Committee has refused 
to do this, causing particular difficulty to the Bank of England in its bid to protect the long-
term interests of vulnerable mortgagees and consumers.  
The privatisation of pension funds provides another comparative example of this 
trend. While the Dutch government greatly encouraged the privatisation of pension fund 
contributions in the 1980s, such private contributions have actually been made semi-
compulsory, pre-calculated in wage payments. Also, Dutch consumers received fiscal 
incentives to hedge their bets between pension funds, savings and mortgages. English 
consumers, by contrast, have received much less governmental and fiscal leadership, 
inducing them to invest a disproportionate amount of their savings portfolio in housing, to 
the detriment of pension fund investments and savings.
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  Indeed, since the 1980s there 
has been a much smaller connection between housing inflation and a decline in savings 
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and pension fund investments in the Netherlands than in the UK.  In the UK the withering 
away of building societies‘ fiscal advantages and protection against carpet bagging has 
induced a boom in short-term housing speculation and a plummeting savings ratio (Farlow, 
2005: 21).  At the end of the day this means English consumers are less protected from the 
present ―credit crunch‖ and housing crisis than their Dutch counterparts. 
g) Living-together-apart, pluralism and neutrality  
The Dutch living-together-apart and US pluralism traditions also bear some 
resemblance, in that they both are associated with resilient religious differences. Yet, 
where a ―nation of immigrants‖ identity buttresses the dynamism of the latter, it is a 
profound sense of local particularism that supports the former. Thus, in both cases, 
religious resilience is more a symptom than cause. Nothing can testify more eloquently to 
the actual incompatibility of the living-together-apart and pluralism traditions than the 
remarkable coincidence that the former‘s effectiveness started to decline when the latter 
became more in vogue in the late 1960s. Indeed, the start of the relative decline of the 
living-together-apart tradition came with social-democrats‘ calls for an end to local 
particularisms, in particular the ―undemocratic‖ system of self-regulating pillars. Inspired 
by North American practice, social-democrats announced the start of a new era of 
pluralism and direct ―democratic‖ justification (p. 281). Ironically, the decline of the 
living-together-apart tradition is one of the reasons why the Dutch during the last few 
decades have struggled with the integration of immigrants (p. 294) – the very lifeblood of 
the US tradition of pluralism. Indeed, where before the 1970s, tolerance of immigrants‘ 
diversity had been more pronounced in the Netherlands than in England by virtue of the 
living-together-apart tradition, roles arguably have been reversed in favour of England and 
the UK in the last two decades (Bagley, 1973).
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 Although both the US and England share a ―plurality‖ electoral system, 
Thatcher‘s coalition of political, civic and business supporters did not seem to realise to 
what the extent the nature of pluralism in the US and England has been and remains 
different. I have already pointed out how class resilience rather than religious resilience 
provides the lifeblood of pluralism in England.  There are other differences. In the US, the 
historical coincidence of evangelical religious ideas with the idea of an expanding frontier, 
an empire of liberty, has been much more meaningful than in the UK.  This has resulted in 
a US tradition of pluralism that maintains the administrative and organisational inferiority 
of the State to the democratic capacities of the « marketplace of ideas ».  Beyond the 
appearance of administrative weakness and fragmentation, however, the US State has 
actually always been normatively strong, exerting great pressure on a plurality of private 
actors to abide by its grand rules of the game (Dobbin and Sutton, 1998).
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  In sum, the 
real strength of the US State tradition is its application of a normative personality 
principle.
992
 This contrasts with the more administratively centralised, « neutral » Anglican 
State tradition (Dyson, 1980), mother of all territorial and fiscal centralisation traditions in 
Europe. Interestingly, the French State tradition shares the ―self-contained normative 
order‖ aspect with the US, and the administrative centralisation aspect with England (cf. 
Laborde, 2000).   
Lacking its US counterpart‘s normative strength, the British State has been unable 
to mimic the politics of productivity settlement that laid the pre-WWII basis of US 
geopolitical pre-eminence.  In other words, the British State has been unable to combine 
systematic repression of radical elements with the voluntary commitment by the Unions  to 
the principle that labour should not seriously threaten the control of private capital over the 
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production process (Bowles and Gintis, 1982:64-68; 1986:55-62; Rupert, 2000: 437-440).  
Both US and British trade unions and employer organisations are seen to perform similar 
―functional‖ roles (Almond, 1958), namely to act as a counterbalance to the growing role 
and increasingly centralized nature of the State (Beer, 1969).  The historically fragmented 
and highly normative nature of the US State, however, has given US unions a much harder 
target, generally inducing compliance and consensus-seeking on their part.  The relative 
normative weakness of the British State regarding interest group politics, by contrast, on 
many occasions has given UK unions a perfect target for non-compliance and rebellion.  
The infamous ―winter of discontent‖ at the end of the 1970s finally proved a bridge too far 
the political classes. It gave them the perfect excuse to cast unions convincingly in the role 
of ―pathologically dysfunctional‖ social partners and anti-national ―hotheads‖ (Grant, 
2007; Hay, 1996).
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 Effective as it may have appeared regarding inflationary targets (cf. 
Pissarides, 2003); the marginalisation of trade unions and employer organisations 
ultimately has aggravated the crisis of participation in the UK. That is, contrary to the US, 
where compliance was more willing and inclusive, based as it was on endogenous 
normative traditions, rather than a discourse of inevitability about globalisation and the 
role of English-speaking nations as ―shock troops of modernity‖. 
h) Empire of Liberty: a very different “liberal tradition” 
 Finally, and most confusing of all, what England and the US supposedly have in 
common is a liberal or ―Empire of Liberty‖ tradition (cf. Tucker and Hendrickson, 1990), a 
tradition which hails the ―genius of the Anglo-Saxon race‖ when confronted with real or 
imaginary threats.
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 As long argued by Emerson (1846: 434), Gossett (1953: 82), 
Horsman (1981: 146), Ross (1984) and Foner (1998: 77), this ―genius‖ refers to an 
amalgamation of Anglo-Saxon superiority – hostility to France, a racial definition of 
nationality
995
, and manifest destiny – into a single account of these nations‘ mission.  But 
even here there is a major difference between England and the US: the latter defines its 
―Empire of Liberty‖ and ―universal nation‖ claims on an entirely different historical claim. 
US constitutional mythology defines the US as the ―great nation of futurity‖ (O‘Sullivan, 
1839: 426): a nation whose ―birth was the beginning of a new history...which separates us 
from the past and connects us with the future only‖. As argued above, the US‘ manifest 
destiny ―from the beginning defined itself morally in terms of anti-Europeanism‖, most 
notably anti-Britishness. America was ―the land of the future versus the Europe of the 
bankrupt past...a country of innocence, virtue, happiness and liberty as against a Europe of 
vice, ignorance, misery and tyranny‖ (Vann Woodward, 1991: 3). This US foundational 
perspective is much closer to its French equivalent of “universal rationalism” than to 
English historical and evolutionary beliefs.  Conservative accounts of the English nation 
stress the value of an historically evolved national culture, constructing an idealised 
‗imagined community‘ from Magna Carta to D-Day (Anderson 1984). Reverence for 
parliamentary sovereignty is the lynchpin of this vision. In this view, the British 
Constitution was conceived not as a set of rules constructed on rational first principles, but 
as evolving organically over centuries, self-selecting the very best from national traditions 
and British moral sensibility
996
 (Baker et al., 2002: 402).  
i) Mixed comparative picture 
To summarise the preceding sections, I have encountered a mixed comparative 
picture. The English have benefited more from their traditions‘ apparent contiguity with 
the US‘ liberal and City monetarism traditions, and the contiguity of their success model of 
Anglican nonconformism with the US success model of ―American-Anglican 
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nonconformism‖.  Most tangibly, the City of London has disproportionally benefited from 
the deregulation of capital markets initiated by the United States and the expansionist 
fiscal policy of the early Reagan era, both in terms of outward and inward foreign 
investment.  By virtue of the tremendous growth of the City, the UK by 2007 had almost 
managed to catch up with the Netherlands in terms of GDP per person employed (see 
figure 12.1). Also, since the UK‘s decisive turn away from monetary Europe in 1992, its 
closeness to US policy has become more consistent and paid off more, reducing the 
volatility of annual GDP growth rates to an impressive extent. That is, more than in the 
Netherlands which has stayed closer to the struggling European social market economy 
(figure 12.2).  Of course, this could all change with the current US-centred economic and 
monetary crisis, given the UK‘s greater geopolitical dependence on that country. 
 
Figure 12.1: GDP/person employed NL and UK (1950-2007) 
(Source: Total Economy Database, January 2008 
997
) 
 
 
While the Dutch may have benefited less from the resonance of (apparently) 
contiguous traditions, they have been better at avoiding confusion between home-grown 
and US traditions.  Although it certainly is true that, from the 1970s onwards US traditions 
were increasingly invoked as a high modernity model by  "liberal" and "evangelical" party 
and employer organisations, and to a lesser degree even the social-democrats from the late 
1980s onwards (Kroes, 1991: 6). Overall, one could say the Netherlands‘ clear identity of a 
small nation that can only punch above its weight in the EU, and a steadfast belief in the 
historical success model of ―Dutch nonconformism‖, have protected Dutch ―high 
modernists‖ from themselves.  
At the end of the day, the model of Dutch nonconformism prompted less 
ideological and universalist interpretations of the US liberal tradition than common in 
Westminster.  Indeed, while English elites have proved prone to believe in the superiority 
of unilateral liberalism
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, Dutch elites have comfortably held on to the primacy of their 
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local traditions; that is while welcoming the international spill-overs of US-led and EU-
facilitated globalisation efforts (Van Elteren, 1998; Phillips, 1985: 29-30).
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 Maybe this 
explains why, contrary to figures of GDP per person employed, the divergence between 
Dutch and UK GDP per hour worked has not diminished much during the last decades (see 
figure 12.3). 
 
 
Figure 12.2: Volatility Real GDP Growth Rates NL & UK (yearly change in %) 
(Source: Eurostat, 21 July 2008) 
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Figure 12.3: Comparison GDP/hour worked NL and UK (1950-2007) 
(Source: The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total 
Economy Database, January 2008, http://www.conference-board.org/economics/
1000
) 
 
 
Figure 12.4a: Comparison total gross income share of top 1% in NL and UK 
(Source: Atkinson and Salverda, 2005: 897-900, Tables 2NL and 2UK; data for the UK 
between 1922-1946  estimated from Wilterdink, 1984 : 269, Table 26) 
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       Figure 12.4b: Comparison total gross income share of top 10% in NL and UK 
(Source: Atkinson and Salverda, 2005: 897-900, Tables 2NL and 2UK; data for the UK 
between 1922-1946  estimated from Wilterdink, 1984 : 269, Table 26) 
 
 
 
 
Table 12.2: Comparison regional income inequality NL and UK                                        
(2004 PPS, EU27=100) (Source: Eurostat 23/2007 - 19 February 2007) 
 
GDP per 
inhabitant
, 2004 
PPS 
GDP per 
inhabitant, 
2004 
PPS, 
EU27=100 
 
GDP per 
inhabitant, 
2004 
PPS 
GDP per 
inhabitant, 
2004 
PPS, 
EU27=100 
UK 26, 455 123 Netherlands 27,946 130 
North East 20,897 97.2 North 25,922 120.6 
North West 23,189 107.8 East 23,703 110.2 
Yorkshire & 
Humber 
23,101 107.4 West 30,762 143.1 
East Midlands 24,528 114.1 South 27,000 125.6 
West Midlands 23,677 110.1 
 
East of England 25,364 118.0 
London 40,542 188.5 
South East 28,580 132.9 
South West 24,971 116.1 
Wales 20,606 95.8 
Scotland 25,264 117.5 
Northern Ireland 21,292 99 
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Remarkably, by default of an ideology of unilateral liberalism, Dutch people seem 
to be less worried about economic globalisation trends than their British counterparts. 
Thus, international surveys demonstrate how British individuals only rank 16
th
 in their 
opposition against trade protection, the same rank as for US citizens (Mayda and Rodrik, 
2002: Table 1)
1001
. By contrast, Dutch people overall rank first.
1002
 One reason for this 
overall lesser fear of the consequences of economic liberalisation may be the different 
lessons of income inequality and social mobility experienced by different social classes in 
different parts of the Netherlands and the UK. In figures 12.4a and 12.4b, I compare the 
evolution of income inequality in the Netherlands and the UK during the 20
th
 century. The 
UK overall performed better up to the 1980s, when historical differentials between the two 
countries were more than reversed. Indeed, in terms of both social mobility and income 
inequality, post-WWII England actually did much better than the caricature of Thatcherite 
meritocrats allowed for.  As a matter of fact, the post-1950 period produced a greater 
degree of inter-generational mobility than the post-1980 period (Blanden et al. 2004; 
Breen, 2004).  From the 1980s onwards, the UK followed the lead of the US, where both 
social mobility and earnings equality increased sharply after the Great Depression, through 
WWII to 1953, but decreased steadily afterwards, with a dramatic increase in annual 
earnings concentration since the 1970s (Kopzuck et al. 2007). 
Income inequality in the UK was acerbated by several factors, including its 
sharply delineated regional nature.  By the 1980s, remaining regional disparities in the 
Netherlands had largely disappeared and would not reappear anymore. By contrast, the UK 
– in particular England and Wales – during the 1980s and 1990s experienced the most 
severe inequality upswing of all ―developed‖ countries (see p. 356).  In table 12.2, I 
compare patterns of regional income inequality in the UK and Netherlands for the year 
2004. While the Netherlands only has one sub-region, Flevoland in the Eastern part of the 
Netherlands which performs below par with a GDP/inhabitant percentage of 96.4, England 
– discounting Wales and Scotland – not only has 10 sub regions but also one entire region 
that perform below par.
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In the next sections, I discuss two other conditions to the successful reinvention of 
a country‘s success model: a sufficient consciousness of failure, needed to 
comprehensively reinvent the relation between state and nation; and the ability to leverage 
supra-national state relations as a geopolitical translation mechanism for pre-eminent 
foreign traditions. During the discussions I shall touch upon some of the above points.  
 
P5a:     CONSCIOUSNESS OF A FAILED RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND    
            NATION
1004
 
P5b: CREATE SUPRA-NATIONAL SETTLEMENTS AND TRADITIONS TO  
            COUNTER THE DOMINANCE OF EMERGING FOREIGN TRADITIONS            
 
The post-WWII period provides the litmus test for propositions 5a and 5b. During 
this period, the Dutch success model became increasingly dependent on the emergence of a 
European social democracy model – based on the new success model of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (p. 209). While discussing propositions 5a and 5b I shall therefore 
not only compare the Netherlands and England, but also the Federal Republic of Germany 
and England.   
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a) The benchmark of the Federal Republic of Germany    
Nations can gain the geopolitical recognition of being a legitimate state, but can 
also lose this legitimacy, as happened with Germany during WWII (Schwab, 1981: 54).
1005
  
Germany is a most interesting case which I shall briefly discuss to gauge the English 
experience of success and failure in the post-1976 period. The post-WWII emergence of 
the Federal Republic exemplifies how a nation can reinvent itself and its relation with a 
State, to gradually regain geopolitical leadership in the process.  A significant part of the 
resources and inspiration needed for the rebirth of a West-German nation-state initially 
were provided by a US keen to extend its geopolitical influence sphere and enlarge its 
commercial and cultural hinterland to Europe.  In this regard, the Federal Republic 
provides an interesting comparative case with the UK, which in the 1980s to some extent 
functioned as a launching platform for renewed North American ―Empire of Liberty‖ aims.  
In retrospect, being the launching pad of the New Right‘s Anglosphere, and benefiting 
from a large chunk of the budget and trade deficits of the United States in the 1980s to a 
great extent fuelled the recovery of the UK economy (Gamble 1988: 98; Gifford, 2006: 
469). The comparison is all the more relevant since, just like in England, ―the specter of 
lost international competitiveness‖ has continually haunted West German policy making in 
the post-WWII period (Wadbrook, 1972: 63).    
To summarise quickly, the Federal Republic in the period 1948 to 1973 did a 
better job at reinventing its success model than England in the period 1976 to 2008 for 
several reasons. The first two reasons relate to causes referred to in section ii – the 
resonance of pre-eminent foreign traditions‘ and their differentiation from home-grown 
traditions.  Summarised shortly, the US New Deal and its ―politics of productivity‖ 
settlement resonated much with pre-WWII German traditions and settlements, in particular 
so-called ―Ordoliberalism‖.  Similarly, Reagan‘s monetarism, his Empire of Liberty aims 
and the Washington Consensus resonated with England‘s imperial past and cross-party 
ideology of unilateral liberalism. The difference is that in Germany, Ordoliberalism and its 
associated notion of ―Rationalisierung‖ emerged in the 1920s and 1930s as a contiguous, 
yet clearly distinct alternative for the US politics of productivity – and associated US 
notions of liberal democracy and scientific rationalism. In England, by contrast, 
differences between North American and home-grown traditions remained less elaborated, 
not just because of their apparent contiguity, but due to two additional reasons: a 
comparative lack of consciousness of the failed relation between the British Imperial State 
and its constituent nations; and an inability to create sufficient supra-national buffers and 
translation mechanisms for US traditions. 
After WWII, the German nation was in urgent need of modernised traditions of 
democratisation.  In a bid to invent a new, more pacific nationalism, West German leaders 
were anxious to separate new nation-building efforts from old German Empire influences – 
both regarding economic policy and the monopoly of violence.  What the West German 
nation needed after WWII was a republican settlement
1006
 amenable to the rebirth of a 
geopolitically legitimate State – hence the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
While many West Germans still longed for a revival of the Bismarckian, ―qualitatively 
total‖ state of the 1870s, they were less keen on reviving heavily discredited notions of 
―Führertum‖ (Rüstow 1932:70) and state interventionism. All the more so, since West 
German leaders had to reconcile their own traditions and desires with those of the US 
occupiers.  One condition for North American support was that the young Federal 
Republic would be integrated in Atlantic military collaboration structures (Van der Pijl, 
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1984: 145) – to avoid West Germany gravitating into the geopolitical influence sphere of 
the Soviet Union. West German leaders actually welcomed US insistence on its inclusion 
in the NATO (1955) – although many privately expressed reservations about the US 
Empire of Liberty aims. Another condition was the adoption of federal parliamentary 
principles akin to those prevalent in the US. Finally, West German leaders also had to take 
into account the wishes of other European nations such as France. They came to the 
realisation that reviving their nation-state aspirations could best be achieved by linking 
them to a new European identity and territorial level. Thus, a combination of 
consciousness of the deep failure of the German imperial state, and new nation-building 
aspirations provided an important impetus to the birth of a fledgling European state in the 
1950s and 1960s.
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 Of course the new West German identity and European traditions 
would take time and a measure of geopolitical stability to become institutionalised. 
Fortunately, the Pax Americana would provide exactly this (Eichengreen 1996; Maier 
1987:153-184).  
In the first post-WWII decades, West German leaders successfully circumvented 
other types of US domination, in particular the wholesale adoption of scientific rationalism 
and the ―liberal tradition‖. The Germanisation of Americanisms such as ―scientific 
rationalism‖ had started timely, in the 1920s, under the German denominator 
―Rationalisierung‖. Rationalisierung had an all-encompassing quality that ―scientific 
management‖ lacked (Steinrotter, 1929; Brady, 1974: 526-540).  Thus the German 
Institute for Technical Labour Training
1008
, supported by much of German industry, 
advocated a distinctly German economy that would be rationalised and profitable; yet 
avoid Fordist mass production and preserve quality work. It promised to create workers 
who would be committed to achievement and productivity as well as to their ―Beruf‖ and 
the firm – all this without the levelling dynamics of high wages and mass consumption 
(Nolan, 1994: 179).
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 In Britain, by contrast, rationalisation remained ―an empty word, 
the quintessence of abstractness‖ (Bowie, 1931: 7).1010   
Also, during the Weimar Republic Germans had developed their own version of 
liberalism, Ordoliberalism, partly in response to the economic crises of the 1920s and 
1930s. After WWII – in particular from mid-1948 onwards – Ordoliberalism would be 
reinvented as the ―the quasi-official credo of West Germany‘s economic policy‖ (Giersch 
et al., 1992:16). Since this credo was interpreted as a philosophy of State non-
interventionism, the Federal Republic earned approval from the US occupying forces.
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Nevertheless, Ordoliberalism amounted to no more than a ―liberalism by default‖ tradition 
(see chapter 8, p. 195). Before WWII, prominent members of the liberal Freiburg Kreis 
had demonstrated a pro-state orientation, but with a strong anti-parliamentary bent 
(Vorländer 1997: 6). In retrospect it is clear that in the concept of Ordoliberalism only 
―Ordo is necessary and absolute‖; the liberalism part is ―contingent and relative‖ (Nörr 
1993: 13). Tellingly, « ordo » means inner order in contrast to « ordinato », which means 
externally imposed (Grossekettler, 1989: 43).  In actual reality, self-imposed, voluntary 
order in both private and public enterprise, rather than privatisation in the name of 
efficiency, was the credo of the Federal Republic. Also, the Ordoliberal credo stood for the 
opposite of US interest group functionalism. The latter is premised on the assumption that 
interest groups act as a counterbalance to State centralisation tendencies, in particular the 
latter‘s belief in its superior policy competence (Almond, 1958; Beer, 1969). By contrast, 
the ―Freiburg imperative‖ adopted in the FRG assumed a State fit to reject the demands of 
special interest groups and ensure a principle of non-domination based a high level of 
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policy competence (Rieter and Schmolz, 1993: 104-7; Rittershausen, 2007).
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  The credo 
of public-private voluntarism and non-domination eventually would be transplanted to the 
European Community in a more confederal form (Ebner, 2006: 216; Freyer, 2006: 245; 
Muller-Armack, 1998: 272-3; Watrin, 1979).  Indeed, West German leaders ultimately 
would turn to Europe to build enough geopolitical critical mass for their post-WWII 
settlement. And to further differentiate their European settlement from that of the US, they 
turned to the ―powerful myth of the ‗social market economy‘ as a supposedly fundamental 
post-war political innovation‖ (Lehmbruch 1992: 33).1013  
b) Post-WWII England compared 
In comparison, the English nation after WWII neither acted from a clear 
consciousness of the failed relation between the British Imperial State and its constituent 
nations, nor in terms of the need for supra-national buffers and translation mechanisms for 
US traditions. While their continental counterparts started Germanising Americanisms as 
early as the 1920s – leading to the invention of concepts of rationalisation and 
Ordoliberalism, England after WWII failed to move beyond the rapidly ageing concepts of 
nationalisation, the imperial myth of universal liberalism, and a deep skepticism of the old 
German and French foes. Nevertheless, many of the factors that had successfully created a 
shared sense of British identity in the previous centuries were in secular decline  (Colley, 
1992b: 327).  Far-reaching secularisation had eroded Britain‘s ―Protestant‖ identity since 
the turn of the twentieth century. Also, the decline of Empire quickly reduced the 
relevance of a common economic project that benefited citizens from the different nations. 
Furthermore, since WWI Britain effectively had become dependent on the US to uphold 
the liberal tradition in international trade matters.  Finally, WWII was the last great 
collective project where all the peoples of the British Isles faced a common threat from a 
continental European foe.  After WWII, Great Britain was definitively subjugated to the 
military reality of Pax Americana – the NATO and nuclear dependence.  In spite of its 
increasingly hollow character, British patriotism nevertheless remained the legitimation of 
the State (Kellas 1991, Seton-Watson 1977).  
At the turn of the twentieth century, there had been a "moment of Englishness"; a 
brief resurgence of English nationalism caused by waves of North American and German 
nationalism, as well as a crisis of belief in the imperial mission following events in the 
Boer War (Kumar, 2003: 176). Yet, contrary to the United States and Germany, the search 
for English consciousness throughout the modern period has been perceived as a symptom 
of decline, rather than as a means to revival. In the best Whig ―progress‖ tradition, which 
is content with nothing else but universal values, English leaders have long aspired to be a 
―beyond national character‖ country (e.g. Mandler, 2006: 242). Meanwhile, however, 
England‘s geopolitical nemesis, the US, less bashfully has appropriated Anglo-Saxon 
national character and the ―Anglican nonconformism‖ success model.  In a remarkable bid 
of reverse colonisation, this usurpation started as early as the American Revolution and the 
constitutional foundation of the US.  Indeed, in spite of its nation of immigrant identity, the 
United States has never been an exception to the rule that nations are formed by core 
ethnic groups that attempt to shape the nation in their own image (Kauffman, 1999: 449-
450).  By virtue of panoply of legal, educational and social tools of ―Anglo-conformity‖, 
immigrants have long been made to accept the myth promoted by Statesmen that American 
people were essentially English in ancestry (Brookhiser, 1991; Gordon, 1964: 89; Herberg, 
1955: 34).  While the English denigrated the anti-modernism of English nationalism, North 
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Americans defined their English ancestry – linked to assumptions of American English, 
American Liberty, and American Protestantism – as highly modern. 
The Conservatives, Party of the Union, made a further error of judgement after 
WWII. Ignoring all signs that the days of the British Empire were numbered, they refused 
to constitute  more federal links between the British State and its associated nations – in 
particular England and Scotland.  Nevertheless, such federal arrangements were part and 
parcel of the West Germany success story: the new federal nation-state settlement  
definitively ended the need to unite the protestant Prussian region with the southern 
regions through a super-imposed imperial patriotism. The federal issue is especially 
relevant since the British Union was split by two north-south divides, not just one as 
usually acknowledged (p. 248).   The first divide was between English regions, the 
manufacturing heartland and the old agricultural heartland. At stake here was the 
reinvention of English traditions of voluntarism and secular Anglicanism that could unite 
the entire country.  The second divide was between the bulk of English regions and 
Scotland, the latter comprising much of the industrial periphery.  The issue here was the 
lingering contrast between Scottish and English traditions.  By default of a timely federal 
settlement, Scottish nationalism grew apace; contrasting itself with imperial English 
traditions (see p. 249). Meanwhile, the reinvention of English traditions remained 
subordinated to British priorities. To bind all constituent nations to the Union, the British 
State religiously guarded the financial and international autonomy of the City. For many 
centuries this autonomy had suggested a pacific way to secure Welsh, Irish and Scottish 
allegiance to Britain. Unfortunately, this actually aggravated Britain‘s north-south divides, 
in particular the first one, between English regions. Since the 1960s, London and its home 
counties have received a disproportionate share of all private investments, both in services 
and manufacturing skills, to the detriment of the other regions of England. Regional 
income equality levels in England, unseen in other OECD countries (p. 247, 350), were 
further aggravated by an overheating of the London housing market during the booms of 
the 1980s and 1990s. This has led to the additional problem of regional mobility trap
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(Murphy and Muellbauer, 1990) – a trap far less evident in other Western nations (Balchin 
and Rhoden, 2002: 275-276).  
This brings us back to Thatcher‘s regime. Clearly, it did not induce a qualitative 
break with the Conservative Union legacy.
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 On the bright side, her regime had positive 
quantitative effects; it halted the UK‘s geopolitical decline in terms of GDP per capita and 
GDP per hour worked (see Figures 12.5, 12.6a and 12.6b).  Why? Arguably, Thatcher‘s 
greatest merit is that she increased the consistency with which English parties and groups 
embraced the unintentional consequences of WWI – the Empire‘s secular decline, New 
York‘s eclipsing of the City of London, and Britain‘s dependence on the US to uphold the 
liberal tradition in international trade matters.  This earned the UK the privilege of being 
the launching pad of the US‘ monetarist turn and the recipient of the bulk of US and 
Japanese FDI in Europe. Consistency was increased further after Black Wednesday, and 
Britain‘s decisive turn away from European monetary collaboration. In line with the US, 
unemployment decreased very fast in the UK, and so did inflation. The German miracle, 
by contrast, since the late 1960s gradually turned into a textbook story of decline. A first 
blow to the Wirtschaftswunder had been the advent during the 1960s of a more ideological 
belief in the social facets of Ordoliberalism (Rittershausen, 2007), inducing more central 
State interventionism, and an imbalance in the precarious post-WWII success model.   
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Geopolitically, things took a turn for the worse in the late 1970s.  The US dropped 
many elements of the ―politics of productivity‖ settlement which the Federal Republic of 
Germany had long aligned itself with. The FRG was ill prepared for the US‘ turn towards 
liberal monetarism. A new Americanisation of the German business system ensued which 
marginalised certain Ordoliberal principles (Hagemann, 2004). The strength of German 
republican traditions was weakened further in October 1990, when West Germany was 
reunified with its much weakened Eastern counterpart.
1016
 
 
 
                Figure 12.5: GDP per capita FRG and UK from 1950-2007 (1990$) 
(Source: Total Economy Database, 2008) 
 
 
c) Summary comparison FRG and UK 
Clearly, the Federal Republic of Germany‘s recovery after WWII was more 
successful than that of Thatcher‘s and Blair‘s UK. For instance, while the FRG‘s GDP per 
hour worked gradually caught up with that of her post-WWII patron the US – to finally 
level at the end of the 1980s (figure 12.6a), no such evolution is evident with the UK and 
the US since 1976. What is worse, in spite of its geopolitical misfortunes, Germany‘s 
performance in terms GDP per hour is still better than that of the UK, which has 
experienced a great deal of geopolitical good fortune in the last decades (figure 12.6b).  All 
this points to a very imperfect reinvention of England‘s historical success model. The 
UK‘s successes – a fall in unemployment and inflation – have been achieved through a 
historically very strange settlement. In the name of unilateral liberalism, a North American 
efficiency doctrine has been adopted without a prior qualitative Anglicisation – 
comparable to the Germanisation of Americanisms. Thus the UK‘s focus on cost-reduction 
and low-added value creation since the late 1970s (Delbridge et al., 2006) is typical of a 
small Western nation – or of a non-Western nation geopolitically dependent on the West.   
Of course, in more qualitative terms, talk of the City of London as the premier 
global financial centre and basis of Britain‘s Greatness has continued unabated.1017  Yet, 
the City‘s activities have not added qualitatively to England‘s historical success model of 
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Anglican nonconformism. Depending on one‘s vantage point, the City‘s actual post-WWI 
role was that of imperial heir, or offshore market for Wall Street.   
 
 
Figure 12.6a: GDP per hour worked FRG, UK and US from 1950-1990 (1990$) 
(Source: Total Economy 
Database,2008)
 
 
        
Figure 12.6b: GDP per hour worked FRG, UK and US from 1990-2007 (2007$) 
(Source: Total Economy Database, 2008) 
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All this leads to a remarkable conclusion: a failure to reinvent a modern relation 
between nation and State, and ongoing confusion about the role of the City has kept the 
English nation stuck in the middle between the geopolitical positions of imperial heir and 
small nation. That is, rather than enabling England to re-emerge as a leading nation 
organically, and by fit-of-absentmindedness (see p. 69-71 for a discussion of the historical 
role played by fit-of-absentmindedness and happy accidents).  
d) Post-WWII Netherlands compared 
How does the Netherlands compare in this regard? The Netherlands was a very 
artificial nation-state at the end of the nineteenth century. As  English national 
consciousness, Dutch national consciousness was not particularly alive.  The English were 
somewhat split between a voluntaryist northern camp and a voluntarist southern camp; yet, 
the British Empire united most English citizens. The Dutch, for their part were split 
between more ideological and regional camps. To make matters worse, especially the 
southern Catholics were not very attached to the Dutch Empire. Still, on impetus of the 
latter denominational group the Dutch State started accommodating a ―multi-ideological‖ 
and ―multi-regional‖ nationalism after WWI (see p. 90). English nonconformists, by 
contrast, were not able to seize the opportunity to do the same. Christian socialists – 
Anglicans who initially had some success in the North, were equally unable to create a 
united English consciousness. Thus, English nationalism remained firmly subordinated to 
British State patriotism.  On the other hand, the emergence of a Dutch Green Front in the 
1930s quickened the demise of the Dutch Empire. While the English reinforced the 
position of sterling in the vast Commonwealth markets, the Dutch were unable to do the 
same with the guilder in their much smaller colonies. In addition, the position of the City 
of Amsterdam was fatally weakened after the international financial crisis of the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, which meant the end of the Amsterdam prolongation market.  The 
government‘s belated abandoning of the Gold Standard in 1936 - five years after its 
English originator – also removed much credibility from Dutch Regent capitalism. The 
ravages of WWII provided the tipping point to the emergence of a deep consciousness of 
the failed relation between State and nation in the Netherlands.  
As geopolitical parameters changed drastically after WWII, an ability to start with 
a clean sheet was a major geopolitical advantage for the Dutch.  The English did not 
develop this ability, even when Labour came to power. In spite of their resentment for 
some US traditions such as ―happy mediocrity‖, most English elites believed in continuity 
between the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana. The elites that came to prominence in 
post-WWII Netherlands, by contrast, harboured no such illusions, and sought to 
comprehensively reframe the relation between nation and State.  The rapid demise of the 
last remainders of the Dutch Empire, and the sheer devastation of WWII changed the 
balance of powers in the Netherlands. This facilitated the emergence of a new settlement 
between State and nation, sometimes referred to as ―low-cost consociationalism‖, around 
which almost 100% of Dutch groups rallied. By the late 1950s, this settlement would give 
rise to a new Dutch national consciousness, which, in turn would go in search for a new 
type of State to promote its traditions and interests. This new consciousness greatly helped 
the Dutch State to punch above its weight in the making of the early State apparatus and 
traditions of the European Community.  
Indeed, with world-state aspirations defeated, and Dutch Catholics and social 
democrats firmly in control, the Dutch government turned away from its former Atlantic 
priorities, and expressed its commitment to emerging Franco-German European ambitions. 
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To the better prepared and more dynamic belongs good fortune. Besides the visible 
benefits of opening Franco-German markets
1018
, the Dutch were served hand and foot by 
the emergence of a very contiguous West-German model.  Figure 12.7 illustrates how 
Dutch GDP per capita caught up with UK GDP per capita in 1956, seemingly to leave it 
behind definitively from 1961 onwards.  
Meanwhile, the discovery of natural gas allowed Dutch GDP per capita to race 
away from its UK counterpart at an accelerated pace in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, as 
during the Dutch Republic‘s Golden Age, the Dutch were unable to deal with this sudden 
―embarrassment of riches‖ in a strategic way; ushering in a period of political polarisation 
and an almost destructive embrace of a social-democratic civilisation myth in the 1970s. 
The UK‘s period of polarisation came a decade later, with the Winters of Discontent, the 
final demise of Old Labour, and the arrival of Margaret Thatcher, new champion of liberal 
mythology and Anglican nonconformism. This coincided with a new stage of more 
confident US imperialism, and the launch of a new geopolitical strategy of monetary 
liberalism.  
 
Figure 12.7: GDP per capita NL and UK from 1950-2007 (2007$) 
(Source: Total Economy Database, 2008) 
 
 
The Dutch reacted in the 1980s by attempting a wholesale renewal of low-cost 
consociationalism, and becoming the best EC follower of the Bundesbank‘s monetary 
policy.  While Germany experienced panoply of problems in face of the US turn away 
from the politics of productivity, the Dutch to some extent managed to reinvent the 
European social market economy myth – a variation on the Ordoliberal success model1019 - 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Obviously this was no more than a pragmatic, small nation version 
of the West German success model. Essentially, the Dutch traded high labour productivity 
and low employment for low-productivity, high-employment growth, in a bid to ensure the 
viability of Dutch nonconformism, while accommodating the geopolitical monetarist turn 
to low inflation priorities. Thus, arguably there was a crisis of labour productivity growth 
413 
 
behind the ―Dutch miracle‖ of the 1990s (Kleinknecht and Naastepad, 2002; Naastepad 
and Kleinknecht, 2004; SCP, 2000). This more critical argument was vindicated in the 
early 2000s by a cyclical counter reaction to the latent crisis. To compound Dutch 
problems, the economic crisis of the early 2000s coincided with a national identity crisis, 
in which the failure of European immigration policy came back to haunt the precarious 
balance between minorities in the Netherlands. Thus, instead of providing a geopolitical 
buffer, the EU in some regards actually aggravated problems of globalisation and 
immigration – an insight that contributed to the Dutch ―no‖ in a 2005 European 
referendum. Yet, at the end of the day, the Dutch reinvention of low-cost 
consociationalism in the 1980s and 1990s seemed to have been effective enough to pre-
empt any chances of the UK catching up in GDP per capita and labour productivity terms 
during the lean 2000s (see also figure 12.3). 
 
P6: CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PIVOTAL ROLE PLAYED BY “HAPPY 
 ACCIDENTS” IN AN HISTORICAL SUCCESS MODEL  
Original settlements are often misinterpreted by contemporaries. The latter often 
are aware neither of the time-lag between original settlements and actual geopolitical 
success, nor of the pivotal role played by unintentional consequences and happy accidents 
in transforming orginal settlements into a success formula.  ―Happy accidents‖ are 
dynamics that by fit-of-absentmindedness rather than design help leaders transform 
original settlements into a geopolitical blueprint for success. 
The post-WWII Wirtschaftswunder exemplifies the role of happy accidents. The 
West German miracle was not principally down to the ―honest efforts of a whole people 
who …were given the opportunity of using personal initiative and human energy‖ (Erhard, 
1958: 116).  In so far as there was a miracle, it boiled down to the conjuncture of several 
favourable conditions (Abelshauser, 1983). These conditions unexpectedly helped 
transform original settlements – Bismarckian welfare arrangements, and pre-WWII 
Ordoliberalism and Rationalisierung – into a geopolitical success model.  What favourable 
conditions or happy accidents were in play after WWII?  During the war, particularly East 
German production equipment had been destroyed. Much of the West German pre-WWII 
industry base had been reserved.  Furthermore, Western allies after WWII soon came to 
the insight that the post-WWI stick had not worked and a carrot – financial aid and 
political integration – should now be used.  Also US‘ efforts to open up commercial 
frontiers, and the emergence of the EEC gave West Germany ready access to international 
markets. Finally, an abundance of cheap, high-quality labour allowed West Germany to 
quickly restore its intangible productivity assets to peacetime use, while avoiding pre-
WWII inflationary tendencies (Katzenstein, 1989).   
Because consciousness of the pivotal role of happy accidents is often lacking, 
contemporary elites tend to misinterpret the nature of landmark settlements as intentionally 
liberal-utilitarian or communitarian. For instance, the West German success model became 
popularised as a « social market economy » as early as 1952. The post-WWII settlement 
was not altered for ideological reasons as long as it produced spectacular growth figures. 
Yet, a new more ideological generation of Keynesians took advantage of the first signs of 
trouble in the 1960s to push their ideas of more State managed growth (Rittershausen, 
2007). By the late 1960s, the West German economy had gone from miraculous to 
mediocre (Giersch et. al, 1992: 125), making it less resilient to upcoming geopolitical 
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shocks in the 1970s.  Why? The new social-democratic generation did not sufficiently 
recognise the « by default » character of Bismarckian and Ordoliberal welfare measures 
that the post-WWII Federal Republic had inherited. In effect these measures had been 
adopted precisely to pre-empt overbearing demands on the State and economy.  
Keynesians, however, launched more State centralisation and « managed growth » 
programmes in the belief this was the secret of the Republic‘s extraordinary success.   
Similar lessons apply to the historical cases of the Netherlands and England. In 
chapters 4 and 5, I singled out the many elements of fit-of-absentmindedness that 
facilitated the emergence of Dutch and English traditions of democratisation, as well as 
these nations‘ respective geopolitical success models. More recently, a post-WWII 
comparison of the Netherlands and England reveals how happy accidents can trigger 
opposite types of behaviours, transformative and reproductive. Happy accidents can either 
induce a nation to reinvent its historical success model comprehensively, as was the case in 
post-WWII Netherlands.  Or they can facilitate a sense of continuity with the unintentional 
consequences of erstwhile glory days, to an extent that comprehensive reinvention can be 
avoided – as happened in post-WWII England.     
a) The effect of happy accidents in post-WWII Netherlands 
  Why did the Netherlands turn the corner ahead of much of the rest of Western 
Europe after WWII and again in the 1980s? In both cases, it was not primarily due to the 
far-sightedness of Dutch labour, business and government representatives.  Several happy 
accidents led to broad support for the post-WWII settlement of low-cost consociationalism, 
some of which I have already touched upon above. There was the emergence of a Green 
Front in the 1930s that gained much support due to the Atlanticist, ―world-state‖-minded 
government‘s botched management of the gold standard crisis. Subsequently, during the 
German occupation of WWII there was an upsurge of national consciousness in the highly 
fragmented Netherlands.  Also, the ravages of WWII had created a new level-playing field 
between finance and industry, the Holland city-states and the outer provinces, Catholics, 
social-democrats and Reformed Protestants. The loss of the Dutch Indies provided a new 
geopolitical clarity of mind amongst all quarrelling groups. This clarity was propitious to 
the reinvention of the Dutch historical success model of Dutch nonconformism, and 
eventually would help the Netherlands punch well above its weight in the laying out of 
prototypical European Community traditions.  In particular since Catholics – most with 
links to the 1930s Green Front – came to power after WWII, with a greater readiness to 
focus on the Catholic European Community than their protestant, Atlanticist predecessors.  
With the grandeur of colonial rentier capitalism out of the way, the Dutch in effect went 
back to the humble roots of their success in the sixteenth and seventeenth century: a low-
cost economic base.  Testifying to the birth of a new national consensus, all 
denominational groups early on agreed to restrain wages and produce more cheaply than in 
neighbouring countries.  
Low-cost consociationalism, rather unintentionally, functioned as the stepping 
stone to not only a higher quality of life, but also a vigorous system of parliamentary 
democracy. Some may have anticipated that consociationalism would produce a level-
playing field for a more sophisticated democratic rivalry. What few had anticipated is that 
this level-playing field would be used to revive the social-democratic dream of a national 
―breakthrough‖. This social-democratic breakthrough for the first time in Dutch history 
would produce a national consciousness able to override local and denominational 
allegiances. Finally, what none could have predicted is that Catholics, long sufferers of a 
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minority complex in this nation with protestant overtones, would be the ones to open up 
the Pandora box of national consciousness – by virtue of greater individualisation and 
dissent in their own ranks than in the other pillars. Nevertheless, the Orangism that finally 
emerged would be neither overtly Protestant nor Catholic in nature. Instead it would take 
on the ―secular Christian‖ character anticipated by 1930s social-democrats, not because the 
latter actively pushed for it, but because it fitted so well in an emerging European 
Community tradition of ―secular Christianism‖.    
Arguably, the discovery of natural gas sped up the entire process. After all, 
democratisation also entails the trading of property for political rights; the newfound gas 
riches allowed the government to subsidise this trade-off. Eager to re-open their case for a 
breakthrough of societal divisions, the social-democrats in particular were in favour of that 
last point.  Yet, the discovery of natural gas also had a disrupting effect:  it greatly reduced 
the urgency of all parties involved to end their polarisation and politicisation practices – 
which hampered the reinvention of the traditions of pacification, living-together-apart and 
proportionality that laid the basis of the post-WWII settlement. After talk of a Dutch 
miracle in the 1960s finally turned into talk of a Dutch disease in the late 1970s, a new 
settlement was finally reached in 1982: the Wassenaar Agreement.  
 Often forgotten is that some 13 years lapsed before the 1982 Wassenaar 
Agreement was recognised as having produced a new geopolitical success model – the 
Dutch polder model or ―third way‖. Remarkably, it was belated geopolitical recognition by 
European Union leaders more than domestic conviction or foresight that led to all Dutch 
negotiation parties finally accepting interpretations of a new success model. Instead of 
exceptional foresight or sacrifice, what Dutch leaders excelled at was management of the 
process of change: they did not force the pace of change, but relied on happy accidents to 
gain a broad platform of support for the Wassenaar Agreement on the basis of fait 
accompli. Besides the emergence of a new national consciousness, the main happy 
accident Dutch leaders took advantage of derived from the 1960s and 1970s breakthrough 
movement.  This breakthrough, which had come comparatively late in Western Europe, 
weakened the male wage earner family structure on which post-WWII low-cost 
consociationalism had been built. Assumptions about the role of women in the Dutch 
labour market changed, belatedly in comparative perspective. What is more, assumptions 
changed in a rather idiosyncratic direction: flexible, part-time jobs were to be the hallmark 
of emancipated women. Although entirely unplanned by government, the comparatively 
greater influx of women in part-time jobs in 1980s Netherlands has greatly helped the 
country reinvent its low-cost consociational model in a more modern guise – keeping 
wages and inflation at bay, diminishing unemployment rates to a spectacular degree, while 
retaining significant welfare state aspects.  There was another happy accident, at the 
European level.  Dutch women‘s belated influx in low-cost, flexible jobs coincided with 
France‘s U-turn on the need for European integration in the 1980s. This U-turn allowed 
Delors to develop a European Employment Strategy in the early 1990s. Ultimately, Delors‘ 
search for role models  triggered European praise, and interpretations of the Netherlands as 
the rightful heir of the West German ―social market‖ economy. 
b) The opposite effects of happy accidents in post-WWII England 
As noted above, while a series of happy accidents induced the Dutch nation to 
comprehensively reinvent its historical success model after WWII, happy accidents had an 
altogether different effect in post-WWII England: they facilitated a sense of continuity 
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with erstwhile glory days – to an extent that comprehensive reinvention of the historical 
English success model could be avoided.   
 How did Dutch and English conditions differ to produce such opposite effects? 
For one, the consequences of the international financial crisis in the 1930s were better 
managed in England; among others through the rapid instauration of a sterling zone and 
central bank collaboration in the Commonwealth area.  Also, as one of the few European 
countries, England was not occupied by Germans during WWII.  Furthermore, the 
protracted decline of the British Empire precluded immediate Scottish dissent, as well as a 
comprehensive reinvention of the relation between the English nation and State.  The 1976 
sterling crisis, and subsequent ―policy shifts‖, proved a happy accident for the economic 
growth of the UK, in particular London.  Both in terms of outward and inward foreign 
investment, London from all the world‘s city-states benefited most from the US-initiated 
de-regulation of capital markets and the expansionist fiscal policy of the early Reagan era.  
In retrospect, acting as a launching pad for the US‘ new geopolitical strategy meant that 
the UK could benefit from a large chunk of that country‘s budget and trade deficits in the 
1980s; all of which considerably fuelled the recovery of its economy.  The emergence of a 
concept of Anglo-modernity – English-speaking countries as the shock-troops of 
modernity and capitalism – and Anglo-American nonconformism in the 1980s and 1990s 
further precluded the need to comprehensively reinvent the historical success model of 
Anglican nonconformism. Finally, the ERM crisis, and ensuing recriminations and blame-
laying between Britain and Germany, induced the Conservatives to fully play the 
Atlanticist card and follow the Euro sceptic route – at a time of growing desperation with 
the decline of the German Wirtschaftswunder.    
Of course, one could easily criticise the route of ―continuity at any price‖ taken by 
England after WWII.  For instance, one could argue that Thatcher‘s call to accept the 
primacy of unilateral liberalism is an instance of chain of causality reversal – an inversion 
– of England‘s historical success model.  And Gordon Brown‘s primary objective to make 
the City of London the global financial center of the world reflects a misguided 
substitution of State control for the fit-of-absentmindedness that worked so well 
historically.  The original English success model was that of an ambitious emerging large 
nation, steeped in the exact opposite of the orientation promoted by Thatcher, her 
successors, and indeed, most of her 20th century predecessors: England‘s parliament and 
financial authorities focused much more on the « real » national economy than its 
Continental counterparts up to the mid-nineteenth century.
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  Starting from this  advanced 
real economy orientation which goes back to the Middle Ages, many unintentional effects 
were at work in turning the City into the guardian of Anglican nonconformism; and the 
English banking system into the guardian of the international Gold Standard. The 
formation of Empire and retrospective attempts to legitimise it in terms of a liberal 
tradition have durably obscured this original chain of causality, however. In sum, Thatcher, 
Blair and Brown – like many of their 20th century predecessors –  turned the historical end 
result of global financial leadership, achieved after an entirely different original focus and 
many unintentional effects, in the very cause of nation-state success.  
Clearly, it is unrealistic and undesirable to go back to England‘s original real 
economy orientation. Yet, it is equally undesirable to keep ignoring the original chain of 
causality in the name of an original unilateral liberalism orientation, and the apparent 
continuity of purpose that the Pax Americana or any future flagship of the liberal tradition 
would provide with the British Empire. What is needed is a reconstruction of the English 
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success model, with full consciousness of its original chain of causality and the pivotal role 
played by happy accidents between original settlement and geopolitical success. This 
implies welcoming permanent immigration of high-quality foreigners – with 
individualisation and re-societalisation aspirations that cannot be fulfilled in their mother 
country – across the country, in order to revive a new spirit of Anglican nonconformism.  
It also implies guaranteeing the City of London‘s international openness as only a 
secondary objective. And it entails using geopolitical buffers and translation mechanisms – 
such as the EU – for as long as necessary to allow for the geographical expansion of 
markets and civic habits in which qualitatively superior English standards ultimately could 
lead the way. That is, just like during the first fifty years of the hundred years of peace – 
1815-1914 – which rested primarily on the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe rather 
than English unilateral liberalism (Polanyi, 1957a: 5, 76).    
 
P7:  GO AGAINST THE GRAIN IN PERIODS OF HIGH MODERNITY AND 
 REINVENT HABITS ASSOCIATED WITH LANDMARK SETTLEMENTS  
 
There is a final condition to the effective reinvention of a nation-state‘s historical success 
model, which has to do with the anticipation of geopolitical shocks.  Geopolitical shocks 
are typically preceded by overbearing ―high modernity‖ or ―end of history‖ ideas. During 
these periods, liberal, social or third way myths of intentionality eclipse the importance of 
traditions of democratisation and happy accidents in explaining historical success. I find 
that the more up-and-coming leaders go against the grain in periods of high modernity and 
reinvent behavioural habits associated with old and successful, yet now  criticised 
settlements, the more likely they will benefit from happy accidents and achieve a quick 
recovery.  This finding exemplifies how expressive actions – the reinvention of habits 
associated with past successful settlements – can facilitate the emergence of substantial 
belief in a new settlement. It also shows that happy accidents are not principally down to 
blind luck, but often benefit those with the more vigorous traditions and expressive habits. 
 Summarising quickly, bedevilled habits
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 and traditions should not be 
discontinued altogether, but renewed in an adapted guise in anticipation of a geopolitical 
shock, which will prompt calls for less overbearing leadership and a return to the success 
model of the past. Often this will mean relegating the modernisation of habits and 
traditions to low-key, private meetings.  All in all, even the low-key renewal of habits 
provides a platform to quickly start a change programme after a geopolitical shock, and 
turn the corner ahead of geopolitical rivals. For it provides up-and-coming leaders with a 
greater sense of continuity; needed to quickly step in and conclude a new settlement, 
although initially only of a partial quality. By virtue of such an early, but partial settlement, 
the odds are that leaders will be able to expediently leverage fortuitous dynamics, and 
improve partial settlements along the way. This is not to say that preventing old 
behavioural elements from turning stale, and concluding an early, partial settlement 
necessarily blesses new leaders with a superior degree of intentionality or vision. Rather, it 
provides all involved with a familiar, consistent behavioural model; a model whose 
complexity-reducing effects in the aftermath of geopolitical shocks increases the odds of 
leaders taking advantage of happy accidents, and nation-states reinventing a successful 
settlement ahead of geopolitical rivals.  Essentially, maintaining the vitality of habits and 
traditions can infuse leaders and their followers with the necessary confidence to steer 
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away for shortcut solutions and accept a measure of fit-of-absentmindedness along the 
way. 
 For instance, there was another reason why the Netherlands turned the corner 
ahead of the rest of the European Union in the 1980s. After more than a century of belated 
modernisation, a social-democratic ―high modernity‖ myth gained currency in the late 
1960s and 1970s. Boosted by the revenues of natural gas, the Dutch social-democrats 
gained power in the 1970s with their message ―Change the People, Improve the World‖ 
(Van Rossem et al., 1993). Social-democrats reified Dutch national character as essentially 
―social‖ and reinvented the Dutch nation as a ―progressive beacon to the world‖ (Kok, 
2004: 321); that is a national community which takes as its core mission ―solidarity‖, and 
the formulation of a progressive egalitarian model for the rest of the world (cf. Lechner, 
2008).  Prime Minister Den Uyl even used the Dutch football team‘s ―total soccer‖ model 
at the 1974 World Championships as a metaphor for the Dutch nation‘s civilisation role in 
the world: he congratulated the team for writing ―world history‖ (Andere Tijden, 2004; 
Kok, 2004: 20). Clearly, these social-democratic high modernity ambitions were somewhat 
overbearing, given the Dutch historical success model of Dutch nonconformism. Even 
during its Golden Age, the Dutch Republic was perceived as a non-replicable oddity – 
wealthy beyond proportions but devoid of a national ideology – by contemporaries 
embarked in national modernisation projects (Porter, 2001). Not surprisingly, a dismal 
decade of inflation and productivity loss followed the ―Change the People, Improve the 
World‖ civilisation myth. 
 So, what explains the rapid revival of Dutch fortunes in the 1980s and 1990s?  
One secret of this rapid revival is that during the 1970s and early 1980s up-and-coming 
leaders such as Wim Duisenberg and Wim Kok went against the grain of high modernity 
myths. These leaders behind-the-scenes kept reinventing behavioural habits associated 
with ―Old Corruption‖ – esoteric consociational practices and other more pragmatic 
behaviour.  Indeed, during the heydays of polarisation, politicisation and participations 
(1966-1981), Dutch leaders such as Duisenberg and Kok opted to complement fashionable 
attacks on the ―undemocratic‖ habits of the old generations with the low-key and private 
reinvention of exactly those old habits. That, is habits of depolarisation, depoliticisation 
and elitist decision-making.  The polarisation of the public debate during the 1970s 
notwithstanding, the more pragmatic social-democratic, confessional, liberal, employer 
and trade union elements throughout remained on speaking terms and kept demonstrating a 
willingness to compromise. This alternative consultation channel provided a new 
generation of leaders and policy vehicles with a means to anticipate the need for a 
settlement ahead of most of their European counterparts.  
 For instance, when the social-democrat Wim Duisenberg was appointed Minister 
of Finance in the cabinet Den Uyl (1973-1977), he tried to follow the cautious, pragmatic 
financial route he already had advocated as a university professor in 1970.
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 This 
orientation went very much against the grain of Prime Minister Den Uyl, who presided over 
a government that had been voted into office on the basis of promises of large government 
expenditures, equality and income redistribution programmes. Duisenberg, as in the old days, 
behind the scenes deliberated with the Dutch Bank and other financial instances about the 
best way to curtail government excesses and overzealous world civilisation ambitions. After 
a spell as vice-president of Rabobank - from 1978 to 1981 – Duisenberg was appointed 
president of the Dutch Bank in 1982.  In this capacity he gave his full support to the 1982 
Wassenaar Agreement.  He also contributed to the emergence of the Central Planning Bureau 
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as the guardian of depoliticised, depolarised, and elitist decision-making in the Netherlands – 
i.e. guardian of the Dutch traditions of pacification, living-together-apart and proportionality. 
Furthermore, as president of the Dutch Bank Duisenberg translated his earlier calls 
for caution and pragmatism in a comprehensive reinvention of Dutch monetary policy. In 
the best spirit of Dutch nonconformism, Duisenberg linked his behaviour to that of the 
President of the Bundesbank, and the Dutch guilder to the German Deutsche Mark; all in 
the name of reaping cheap international spill-overs of the latter currency‘s strength. 
Contrary to Den Uyl, Duisenberg did not mind being called extremely pragmatic – or 
receiving the nickname ―Mr Fifteen Minutes‖ following his copy-cat behaviour. 
Ultimately, Duisenberg would be recognised as a main contributor to the Dutch miracle in 
the 1990s, earning him an appointment as the first president of the new European Central 
Bank in Frankfurt (1998).
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 The case of Wim Kok bears many similarities. As chairman of the socialist 
trade union NVV (1973 to 1982), and chairman of the new socialist-catholic federal union, 
the FNV (1976 and 1986), Kok initially was an advocate of polarisation, politicisation and 
participation, at least publicly. Years before the 1982 Wassenaar Agreement, Kok behind the 
scenes reinvented old consociational habits with up-and-coming leaders of other 
denominational groups. Indeed, the drafting of the Wassenaar Agreement was a result of 
Wim Kok privately meeting with his employers‘ organisation counterpart, Chris van Veen, 
at the latter‘s home in Wassenaar.  The Wassenaar agreement was pounded out in silence 
on van Veen‘s kitchen table, hardly a public democratic forum. Although the Wassenaar 
agreement catered much more to the wishes of employer organisations than the unions, Kok 
in 1986 was called on to succeed Joop den Uyl as leader of the social democratic party in 
1986.  During the 1989 electoral campaign, Kok translated private behaviour into public 
rhetoric: he told the electorate that his party had said goodbye to its historical ―socialist‖ 
pretensions. Kok argued that the appeal of the liberal tradition had become so obvious that 
there was no realistic alternative anymore but to strive for a pragmatic coalition with the 
more right-wing parties. This very pragmatic stance earned Wim Kok the job of Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. After becoming Prime Minister in 1994, Kok 
officially proceeded to casting off  ―the ideological feathers of the past‖.   During most of 
Kok's time as Prime Minister, the Netherlands was booming economically and Kok was 
credited internationally for the Dutch "Polder Model" or ―Third Way‖.  Unfortunately, Kok 
became a prisoner to this new high modernity myth. When the Dutch ―third way‖ went out of 
fashion early 2002, an anti-modernist counter reaction ensued, with the rise of the righ-wing 
populist Pim Fortuyn. 
The behaviour of Chancellor Lawson in Thatcher‘s cabinets comes closest to the 
two above Dutch cases.  During the 1980s, the Bank of England was considered "one of the 
symptoms, indeed, arguably one of the courses" of British economic decline since the 
1960s (Kynaston, 1995: 37). In a replay of the sporadic banking and monetary crisis during 
the period 1790-1840, the Bank was deemed responsible for the chaotic monetary policy, 
high inflation and gradual decline of the British currency from the 1960s onwards. Of 
course, the fault was not primarily with the Bank of England, as real power over monetary 
policy had been transferred to politicians since the abandonment of the Gold Standard in 
1931. During Thatcher‘s Big Bang era of the 1980s – a protracted battle against Old 
Corruption, the Bank lost what little residual influence it had possessed over high-level 
policy. With inflation continuing unabated, Chancellor Lawson in the latter half of the 
1980s went against the grain of Thatcher‘s policy by implying that inflation might be 
420 
 
easier to control if England had a central bank that was independent of Government 
control, as in the old days. Lawson even proposed to Mrs. Thatcher a fully worked-out 
scheme for the independence of the Bank of England. The independence of the Bank of 
England – guardian of English traditions – became somewhat reinforced after the demise 
of Thatcher, and Black Wednesday. Lawson‘s proposals, however, were only half-
heartedly implemented, which spelt disaster – and confusion with the FSA‘s 
responsibilities – during the most recent monetary crisis. 
 
12.3  The level of analysis of firms 
 
P8:  FIRMS‟ SUCCESS DEPENDS ON THEIR ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE 
 RENEWAL OF SETTLEMENTS FOLLOWING SIX STRATEGIES 
 
In chapters 6 to 11, I have laid out in detail how Dutch and English financial 
institutions‘ differing capability to contribute to the renewal of republican settlements 
impacted on their long-term success.  I identified six strategies firms should follow in this 
regard; regardless of their commercial or mutual legal character and historical origins.  
What is worth discussing in greater detail here, is how several of the conditions to 
the successful reinvention of nation-states‘ success models also apply to firms 
(Propositions 3-6). In this regard, it is important to note that for firms‘ leaders history 
primarily begins with the foundation of their organisations. They generally interpret 
history in light of their firm‘s landmark periods; i.e. the periods when a firm occupied its 
most favourable position in settlements and a country‘s success model.  
In the following discussion I shall focus on the examples of English building 
societies and Dutch co-operative banks to illustrate my points about: the role played by 
happy accidents (12.3.1), the importance of leveraging supra-national buffers (12.3.3) and 
changes in the relation between state and nation (12.3.2.), as well as the importance of 
going against the grain in periods of high modernity (12.3.4).   
 
12.3.1. The pivotal role of happy accidents  
 
a) English Building societies 
 During the 1960s and 1970s building societies experienced their heydays  
as representatives of England‘s success model of Anglican nonconformism. Since their 
earliest foundations at the end of the eighteenth century, building societies benefited from 
several happy accidents to finally occupy this leading strategic position.  
 A first happy accident refers to a rather exceptional demographic situation. 
Building societies were founded midst the large migration influx to the new industrial 
cities in the Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside and the North West, at a time when 
London was in decline as a centre of nonconformism and guardian of English traditions of 
democratisation (1790-1830). This provided the nonconformist industrial communities in 
the outer provinces – building societies‘ members – with the opportunity to become the 
new champions of English traditions of liberty and property.   
 A conjunction of favourable circumstances after WWI helped building societies 
take on the mantle of champions of English traditions more firmly – in particular the 
traditions of Anglican voluntarism, Anglican democracy and secular Anglicanism. The 
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building societies had gone through a particularly troubled period from the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century to WWI.
1024
 This would all change from the 1920s onwards. The 
origins of this change in fortune lay much further in the past. First, there was the shift in 
allegiance from the Liberal Party to the Conservative Party‘s influence sphere. This shift 
did not occur overnight, but by fit-of-absentmindedness over a longer period of time. 
Trapped in a Red Queen race with Labour for the ―progressive‖ vote, Liberals‘ aggressive 
attitude towards the Building Societies Association drove the latter in the arms of the 
Conservatives. Conservatives would not have wanted to help building societies, if it were 
not for another happy accident. During the 1870s the Conservative Party finally came to 
terms with the Reform and Representation Acts, having received conclusive proof that the 
much wider male franchise of tenants and small property-owners was not intent on 
undermining the established order.  This gave credibility to Disraeli's Tory democracy 
gamble – of extending the party and suffrage to the lower classes. Thus, with the help of 
Conservatives, the 1874 Building Societies Act was passed against the wishes of 
Liberals
1025
 – allowing building societies much more financial freedom than friendly 
societies in general, and Co-operatives in particular. As mentioned before, this does not 
mean that all building societies let go of their liberal allegiance overnight. With the Liberal 
party in secular decline from WWI onwards, however, more and more building societies 
came into the fold of the Building Society Association by default of a genuine alternative – 
although the Association never publicly avowed its allegiance to any particular political 
party.   
 Furthermore, in 1895 the Building Society Association reached an agreement with 
the government, allowing building societies to pay interest free of income tax in exchange 
for a composite tax payment from the societies themselves.
1026
 This agreement would 
prove crucial for building societies‘ success, although with a long delay; and largely 
unintentionally, since the original intention of the arrangements was no more than to 
simplify the administrative procedures concerning the taxation of building society 
interest.
1027
 The assumption was that such simplification would not cause the Inland 
Revenue to lose any tax revenue.
1028
 In other words, there was not an intention to give 
special protection to building societies through the composite tax arrangements – since the 
vast majority of building society investors were small investors who were not liable to the 
standard rate anyway. Yet, when income tax rates rose after WWI, building society shares 
and deposits became more attractive to those liable to this tax, i.e. the middle classes. More 
substantial investors soon became more interested in building societies‘ services. Some of 
these were people who before 1914 had invested in houses to let and who had now to find 
an alternative – the Lib-Lab coalition‘s stance on land rentiers had effectively destroyed 
the private rental option in England.  Building societies provided one such alternative.
1029
  
Finally, after a last happy accident, the collapse of the international stock markets, the 
average shareholding in building societies by 1930 had grown considerably higher than in 
the various popular savings institutions and close to that of the average investor in 
industrial securities.
1030
 Immediately after WWII, the Board of the Inland Revenue 
proposed to abolish the income tax arrangements, but in 1950 the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced that he intended to bow to the ―fait accompli‖ and give the 
arrangements permanent effect and statutory sanction – especially in view of the need to 
stimulate housing in post-WWII England.   
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 For a comparative discussion of how a conjunction of unfavourable conditions 
precluded Dutch mortgage banks benefiting from unintentional advantages in a way the 
English building societies could, I refer to chapter 8, pages 201, 205 and 210. 
  b) Dutch Co-operative banks 
 Dutch Co-operative banks became champions of the Dutch success model of 
Dutch nonconformism by the 1960s, and into the 1970s.  As their building society 
counterparts, Dutch Co-operative banks benefited from several happy accidents to arrive at 
this high point.  For the first time in several centuries, the agricultural sector in the outer 
provinces superseded the Holland city-states as draughthorse of economic growth between 
1830 and 1880. After Britain‘s repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the resulting opening 
of international trade, the liberal Dutch government started investing large amounts of 
money in agricultural education on a regional basis, to guarantee Dutch agriculture‘s 
competitive position in the world economy.
1031
 That is, rather than fostering 
industrialisation and finance at the expense of home-grown agriculture, as happened in 
England. During the agricultural depression of 1882-1896, the government called upon the 
goodwill of local religious leaders to set up agricultural co-operatives at fiscally 
advantageous conditions.   
 In England an ideology of universal liberalism took hold in the outer provinces in 
the first half of the nineteenth century to facilitate Anglican secularisation tendencies, and 
put a hold to the nonconformist revivals of the period 1790-1830.  In the Netherlands the 
opposite was the case. The liberal ideology remained a privilege of the wealthy, Atlanticist 
rentiers in the Holland cities. These so-called ―Regent capitalists‖ found themselves 
increasingly separated from the outer provinces which experienced a religious revival. As 
such, secularisation would remain a far cry in the Netherlands long into the twentieth 
century.
1032
  Combined with the intensely locally oriented character of Dutch society, this 
helped Catholic and Protestant co-operatives enormously in their bid to fend off the 
challenge of liberal savings banks and commercial banks.  Competition was not only 
fended off in the agricultural sector, but in the entire local communities in which religious 
leaders prevailed and co-operatives became embedded as retail banking and small and 
medium enterprise credit providers.  
A final happy accident Dutch co-operative banks benefited from was the 
creation of a level-playing field between finance and agriculture, city-states and outer 
provinces, Protestants and Catholics during and after WWII.  Protestants had discredited 
themselves with the bad management of the international financial crisis in the 1930s. In 
the process, the protestant predilection for a colonial form of Regent capitalism was also 
discredited, to the benefit of the agricultural Green Front led by Catholic leaders. After 
WWII Catholics came to power, and all parties pledged their support to agricultural co-
operatives who were now treated on a par with commercial banks by the Ministry of 
Finance. The emergence to power of Catholics on a cross-party platform of agricultural 
modernisation and support could not have come at a more propitious time, given the 
coincident emergence of a ―Catholic‖ European Community, focused on a similar agenda 
of agricultural modernisation and competitiveness.  
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12.3.2   Leverage changes in the relation between state and nation  
 
  a) Building societies 
 Other historical dynamics – of a more intentional nature – laid the basis of 
building societies‘ success as champions of Anglican nonconformism by the 1960s and 
1970s.  Summarised quickly, building societies were better at leveraging changes in the 
relation between state and nation than other friendly societies from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards; and better than clearing banks after WWI.  In the period 1790 to 1830, 
the power of provincial constituencies increased considerably, providing an extra-
parliamentary relation between State and English nation. This extra-parliamentary relation 
had a peculiarly nonconformist, outer province character which transcended differences 
between the working and middle ranks. After the passage of the first Reform Act (1832), a 
break between working and middle classes emerged gradually. Equally gradually, the 
centre of gravity of the modernisation of English traditions moved back to the home 
counties and London (see p. 147-48).  Both dynamics served emerging leaders of the 
British Empire such as Peel and Gladstone hand and foot. These leaders disliked the 
options of either a variety of provincial popular opinions, or an unpredictable mass popular 
opinion. They preferred the dilution of popular opinion into a set of predictable, minority 
interests adhering to a few general principles.  Distinguishing between the realms of 
freedom and necessity, and promoting self-sufficient classes was one way to achieve this. 
The building society movement followed suit, although in a rather spontaneous fashion 
given the decentralised character of the movement. As the centre of Anglican 
nonconformism moved back to the South from the mid-19
th
 century onwards, building 
societies were increasingly founded in the South West and home counties. These societies 
differed from their predecessors in that they had a permanent, secular Anglican character. 
As investors could join at any time and withdraw money at will, the character of building 
societies changed from self-help vehicles to agencies for the investment of capital. 
Crucially, the building societies started compartmentalising their services to the different 
classes, in line with joint-stock banks‘ departure from their direct democracy roots, and the 
break between working and middle classes that followed the first and second Reform Acts.  
 While representatives of the other elements of the friendly society movement – 
savings banks and co-operative organisations, pledged their continuing allegiance to the 
increasingly radical stream of Liberalism and the principle of voluntaryism in the North, 
building societies followed in the footsteps of Christian Socialist leaders in the South. The 
latter leaders felt more inclined to favour the Conservatives and the principles of Anglican 
democracy and voluntarism. In many ways, permanent building societies through the latter 
part of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century functioned as the heirs of the 
Christian Socialists, those Anglicans who tried to bring nonconformists back into the fold 
of traditions of Anglican democracy and voluntarism. In sum, building societies were one 
of the few English vehicles able to resolve the contradiction between Anglican paternalism 
and nonconformist libertarianism. This is also the way Conservatives such as Macmillan 
saw it; particularly since building societies appeared to be the heirs of Disraeli‘s Tory 
democracy. Indeed, building societies were rather unique in that they mobilised 
investments for different classes of investors and borrowers: from working class to upper 
middle class investors, and from nonconformists in the North and Midlands to Anglicans 
in the South.  All this made building societies an up-and-coming force of the traditions of 
Anglican democracy and voluntarism. 
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During the 1920s, building societies decisively pulled away from the other 
members of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century friendly society movement. To some extent, they 
would do the same with clearing banks from the late 1950s onwards. While clearing banks 
were trapped in their allegiance to Empire, were increasingly dominated by government 
and used as a vehicle of monetary policy, building societies were left free to pursue their 
own goals. Thus, building societies gradually became the new champions of Anglican 
voluntarism. 
 b) Dutch Co-operative banks   
 The story of Dutch Co-operative banks is comparable. They pulled away from the 
competition of other self-help organisations such as savings banks and mortgage banks by 
virtue of being much better aligned with changes in the relation between the Dutch State 
and nation. First, Co-operative banks were champions of the consociational movement – 
promoting a multi-regional, multi-national Netherlands – from their very foundation. As 
consociational realities increasingly encroached on liberal dreams, co-operative banks 
flourished, savings banks failed to grow much further, and mortgage banks suffered.  Co-
operative banks‘ leaders‘ involvement in the 1930s Green Front, as well as their exemplary 
anti-German front during WWII, earned these organisations a central position in the 
making of a new Dutch national consciousness. That is, on a par with commercial banks – 
which had declined due to their association with a discredited form of Regent capitalism. 
Co-operative banks flourished after WWII for other reasons, most notably their efforts to 
modernise both Dutch and European agriculture and promote small and medium enterprise 
in a spirit of ―secular Christianism‖ – in line with tendencies of secularisation and the 
emergence of the social-democratic myth in both the Netherlands and the European 
Community in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
12.3.3  Leverage supra-national relations 
The comparison between building societies and Dutch co-operative banks is so 
clear regarding this point, that it need not be elaborated in great detail.  While building 
societies were legally discouraged to engage in supra-national relations before the late 
1980s, Co-operative banks since their foundations had adopted an international viewpoint 
– given Dutch agriculture‘s international position. Also, while Co-operative banks after 
WWII took a decisive stake in EC agricultural and small and medium enterprise policy, as 
well as the elaboration of the European ―mutual recognition‖ tradition, building societies 
did nothing of the sort. At the end of the day, this condemned building societies to a 
marginal position during the 1980s, when Conservative governments reinvented the 
success model of Anglican nonconformism according to an ideology of unilateral 
liberalism. Dutch co-operative banks, by contrast, fared much better, although they had to 
relinquish their position of champions of Dutch nonconformism to commercial banks. 
 
12.3.4     Go against the grain in periods of high modernity 
Building societies‘ history exemplifies both the best and worst behaviour 
regarding this point. The societies pulled away from the myth of unilateral liberalism from 
the mid-1840s onwards, while other members of the friendly society movement such as 
English co-operatives stayed stuck in a dream of an international commonwealth. On the 
other hand, the urge of many building society leaders in the 1980s and 1990s to join the 
new liberal dream, and relinquish their own traditions, facilitated dismal types of 
behaviour: carpet bagging and other types of speculation in the housing market.  The 
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withering away of building societies‘ fiscal advantages and protection against carpet 
bagging has induced a boom in short-term housing speculation and a plummeting savings 
ratio.  At the end of the day this means English consumers are less protected from the 
present ―credit crunch‖ and housing crisis than for instance their Dutch counterparts. 
 The 1980s example of building societies stands out particularly negatively against  
the Dutch counterexample of housing associations. The latter associations became infused 
with consociational traditions.  Yet, during both the periods of polarisation (late 1960s and 
1970s), and neo-liberalism (1980s and 1990s), Dutch housing associations managed to 
modernise their operations without relinquishing these consociational traditions. All in all, 
this has rendered the Dutch housing market more balanced and of a higher general quality 
than its English counterpart. Also, this means that varieties of Dutch housing, most notably 
the social rental sector, are not hit as much by stigma and spatial segregation as in 
countries such as the UK – where the tradition of neutrality between varieties of housing 
has been relinquished in favour of a one track home ownership direction (Priemus and 
Dieleman, 1997; 1999; 2002).  
There are many other examples of counterproductive behaviour, i.e. leaders  
jumping on the bandwagon of a high modernity myth and severely hurting their  
organisations in the process. One example that comes to mind is Barclays, whose first non-
family chairman in modern history, Sir John Quinton, distinguished himself from his 
predecessors by totally buying in the North American ―happy mediocrity‖ tradition. 
Quinton during the 1980s expressed his desire to turn Barclays, the old champion of 
Anglican democracy and voluntarism, in the ―McDonald's of banking‖, with dire 
consequences in the ensuing decade.   The story of ABN AMRO is even worse than that of 
Barclays. The leaders of the Dutch bank ABN AMRO bought in too much into the US 
liberal tradition, and neglected their Dutch nonconformism origins; ultimately causing the 
demise of this Dutch flagship in 2007.  
                                                 
970 Thus, I could have added a sub sentence in the middle of proposition 1: the dynamic ability to renew 
settlements between rivalling traditions of democratisation presupposes an ability to steer clear of liberal and 
social-communitarian prescriptions of success. As demonstrated in chapter 7 (see p. 223), the liberal and social-
communitarian success models are based on historical myths. They are the unintended and undesired 
consequences of historical landmark settlements that have been reified as best practice models by ideologues, 
eager to contrast their allegiance to High Modernity with the Old Corruption of tradition. 
971 Under impulse of the Supreme Court, notions of impartial efficiency and the elimination of wasteful 
competition came to dominate US popular opinion in the 20th century. One of the first clear expressions of the 
efficiency mantra was the ―politics of productivity‖ doctrine which emerged during the Progressive Era – on 
initiative of among others the 1918 War Production Board. It was then championed by Herbert Hoover under the 
form of a ―business associationism‖ that would bring about impartial efficiency and eliminate wasteful 
competition (Hawley, 1973, 1974). 
972 In other words, the US has ―a strong religious culture because the strains of cultural transition and the 
need for cultural defence gave each of these groups good reasons to remain committed to its religion‘‘ (Bruce 
1996: 137).   
973 As noted by Dobbin and Sutton (1998), the strength of the US State that it – in contrast with the French State – 
keeps an appearance of being administratively weak and fragmented, while exerting very strong normative 
pressure on private actors. Indeed, the key to the peculiar strength of America‘s weak state is that Americans 
come to see civil society and the market as the sources of social phenomena that are in fact generated by the 
state.The U.S. regulatory framework led managers to recast policy-induced structures in the mould of efficiency – 
this is Four Characteristics of U.S. Employment Law: 1. ambiguity and complexity of compliance standards – this 
convinces executives that they‘ll need experts to properly comply. 2. expanding scope of the law – executives see 
need to establish permanent offices to track changes. 3. fragmented nature of regulation – not only general 
compliance offices needed, but special antidiscrimination, benefits and health and safety offices to handle 
426 
 
                                                                                                                           
different regulatory agencies. 4. antistatist elements of the state – management specialists want to keep their jobs, 
so recast in efficiency terms to disassociate with policy (Dobbin and Sutton, 1998). 
974 The gold standard is often presented as a liberal monetary regime that privileged market-led adjustments 
among national economies, and imposed significant constraints on the policies of states. In other words, the 
British gold standard purportedly was part of a broader attempt to subject societies to the universal discipline of 
the market discipline – reflecting the growing prominence of a universal liberal ideology across Europe 
(Gallarotti, 1995; Knafo, 2006; Polanyi, 1957). 
975 The term ―citizen‖ had, in America although not in Europe, become synonymous with the right to vote. 
Political democracy was thus an essential attribute of American freedom. The vote, said one advocate of 
democratic reform, was ―the first mark of liberty, the only true badge of the freeman‖ (Foner, 1998: 50-53). 
976 Testifying to the lack of resonance for moral absolutes, the use of God and religion in English political 
discourse was accepted only in a rather diluted way, and from the late 1960s was considered entirely ―not 
doneWhat had been very much acceptable in England for several centuries, by contrast, was to make implicit 
reference to one‘s duty to cultivate virtues of self-effacement in service of the country and the greater good, as in 
the tradition of Tory voluntarism.  
977 Thatcher declared on the BBC that the country was being ―swamped‖ with foreigners, who were endangering 
the character of the nation. 
978 A discourse reminiscent of Enoch Powell's populist patriotism. 
979 In Kauffman‘s words (1999): ―The American case betrays many of the same features that characterize other 
ethnic groups. These include: a sense of election (Puritan), a myth of exclusive genealogical descent (Anglo-
Saxon), a set of cultural boundary markers (``wasp''), a process of dominant-conformity (Anglo-conformity), an 
association with a specific territory (United States Frontier), a life-style representation (Yeoman), and a 
communal Golden Age (Jefferson's Republic) to which the group seeks to return‖. 
980 There also was no revival of Christian religion in England in the 1930s, contrary to the US where the Great 
Depression induced a massive revival of evangelical and fundamentalist christianism since the Great Depression 
in the 1930s. In terms of religious support, Thatcher comparatively was also poorly served, narrowing 
considerable the platform of support for her evangelical change project. In the US, in dignation about the 
Democrats‘ support for the Civil Rights and Desegration movements in the 1960s and 1970s, had led 
conservative catholics and in particular the evangelicals to gradually realign their political support from the 
Democratic Party to the Republican Party. By the late 1970s the move had been completed, with evangelicals 
now forming the ―the most strongly Republican group in the religious spectrum.‖ (Layman, 2001: 199; Wuthnow, 
1988: 133). Thatcher‘s hopes were especially in vain, since the UK had not experienced the replacement of a 
class divide by a ―liberal versus orthodox‖ divide as occurred in the US since the 1970s and maybe even sooner 
(Manza and Brooks, 1999; Noll, 1988).  Evangelical and fundamentalist churches had not substituted mainline 
Protestant churches in the UK since the 1960s; while the latter generally were somewhat relativist and ―liberal‖ in 
their attitudes, the former became infamous for their belief in the inerrancy of the bible, salvation through faith, 
the born-again experience, and a premillennialist eschatology (Carpenter, 1997; Roof and McKinney, 1987; 
Stone, 1997) – fundamentalist beliefs that do not sit well neither with the ―secular Anglican‖ nature of England 
nor the respect for international historical and contextual differences inherent to the multi-national ―global‖ order 
which the British historically vied for. Also, Thatcher could not count on the ―suburban warrior‖ spirit 
demonstrated by white evangelical conservatives in face of the Desegration and Civil Rights movements (McGirr, 
2001). The urbanisation of England had followed a very different pattern than in the US. The twin tensions of 
being part of a nation of immigrants and wanting to be a bastion of American values - white, ―Anglo-Saxon‖, 
middle-class conformity, spurred the US movement of suburbanisation since about 1900. The alliance of white 
evangelicals with these American values since the 1960s reinforced the movement of suburbanisation (Carlos, 
1970; Curtis, 1991).980   
981 For instance, Dow Chemical‘s CEO‘s expressed his dream of establishing headquarters on an neutral island 
‗beholden‘ to no nation and concluded that the managers of 
global corporations are demanding ‗… the right to transcend the nation-state, and in the process, to transform it‘ 
(Barnet and Muller 1974: 16). 
982 This apparent programme of privatisation in effect significantly enhanced the importance of the Churches as 
funders for many organisations with a social role (Schafer, 1997: 1, 18-19). 
983 British Conservatives such as Thatcher have long acknowledged that England is not a nation of immigrants 
(Layton-Henry, 1994). 
984 The US Supreme Court at the end of the 19th century recast notions of ‗commerce‘, ‗contract‘, etc…in 
constitutional terms to facilitate the adjustment of republican ideology to the rising influence of liberalism and the 
free-labor paradigm.  US republican ideology is based on notions of freedom antithetical to experiences with the 
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British empire: to be truly free in the American republic meant freedom from the corruption of aristocratic 
hierarchy, freedom to pursue individual opportunity liberated from monopolistic regulations, and above all 
freedom from historical laws which determined that republics eventually decayed and died (Freyer, 1994: 30). 
985 Reported by BBC News, 25 January 2007. 
986 Similarly, according to a 2002 Mori poll, two-thirds of British adults felt proud to be among the ranks of the 
working class. This "remarkable renaissance" in working class solidarity - up from 52% in 1999 – came despite a 
drop in the actual size of the social group.  The Social Value poll by Mori also found half of those in the middle 
classes nursed "working class feelings" (BBC News, Tuesday, 20 August, 2002, ―Renaissance for the UK's 
working class‖). 
987 17 May 2007 at Sources: Office for National Statistics; Institute for Fiscal Studies 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=332 
988 From the 1880s to 1914, class sentiments had intensified considerably, partly due to Conservatives abandoning 
their normal Anglican democracy perspective and echoing class struggle themes. 
989 For instance, UK citizens‘ people's pension pots were hit hard by falling stock markets between 2000 and 
2003, with the Government exacerbating the problem by removing tax credits from pension schemes.  
990 Similarly, both conformity and desire to be assimilated in British society (e.g. by West Indians) and 
conformity and desire for integration (e.g. by Pakistanis) are rejected by the majority of the British population. In 
the Netherlands by contrast, conforming behaviour was rewarded by acceptance (either through assimilation, or 
cultural co-existence) (Bagley, 1973: 244). 
991 As noted by Dobbin and Sutton (1998), the strength of the US State – in contrast with its French equivalent – 
is that it keeps an appearance of administrative weakness and fragmentation, while exerting very strong normative 
pressure on private actors. Indeed, the key to the peculiar strength of America‘s weak state is that Americans 
come to see civil society and the market as the sources of social phenomena that are in fact generated by the 
state.The U.S. regulatory framework led managers to recast policy-induced structures in the mould of efficiency – 
this is Four Characteristics of U.S. Employment Law: 1. ambiguity and complexity of compliance standards – this 
convinces executives that they‘ll need experts to properly comply. 2. expanding scope of the law – executives see 
need to establish permanent offices to track changes. 3. fragmented nature of regulation – not only general 
compliance offices needed, but special antidiscrimination, benefits and health and safety offices to handle 
different regulatory agencies. 4. antistatist elements of the state – management specialists want to keep their jobs, 
so recast in efficiency terms to disassociate with policy (Dobbin and Sutton, 1998). 
992 It is only in foreign policy issues that the State avowedly adopts the principle of territorial centralisation; but 
then again with strong normative overtones. Foreign policy as the shielf of homegrown US traditions. 
993 Employers were similarly incapacitated, in that the national organisations of business were loose 
confederations with no effective authority at the level of the firm or the industry. No national center was capable 
of ensuring the commitment of individual companies or sectors to deals struck with the government or the unions. 
994 The idea that the pre-Conquest Anglo-Saxons had known a primitive form of freedom with roots in the 
German forests had emerged in England by the sixteenth century. According to some, this explained why Anglo-
Saxons carried a desire for freedom in their veins, and had a destiny to realise this impulse. These ideas found a 
very fertile audience in eighteenth century America, for instance amongst ―Real Whig‖' historians James Burgh 
and Catharine Macaulay. The idea that the Anglo-Saxon English had selected themselves through immigration to 
escape the British (Norman) yoke and bring the torch of freedom to America was a quintessential myth shared by 
the likes of Franklin and several constitutional founding fathers (Kauffman, 1999: 445). 
995 The Anglo-Saxon racial identity theory is sometimes referred to as the ―Teutonic-Whig germ‖. Americans 
adapted the Teutonic-Whig germ theory which connected the ancient Anglo-Saxons to the Magna Carta, the 
Glorious Revolution, and other events. In the American interpretation, the United States was seen to represent the 
culmination of the Whig theory of history (Kauffman, 1999: 448). According to Horsman (1981: 22), the 
founding father Thomas Jefferson proclaimed to John Adams in 1776 that the Americans were ``the children of 
Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night; and on the other side, Hengist and 
Horsa, the Saxon chiefs from whom we claim the honour of being descended, and whose political principles and 
form of government we have assumed ''. 
996 This supposedly was in great contrast with French nationalism, a heady brew of universalist rationalism, 
Catholicism and feudalism. 
997 GDP levels are measured in 2007 US dollars, for which 2005 EKS purchasing power parities updated with 
aggregate deflators to 2007 have been used. These 2005 PPPs are obtained from OECD, Purchasing Power 
Parities 2005, (Paris), November 2007 (The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 
Total Economy Database, January 2008, http://www.conference-board.org/economics/) 
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998 Since the early nineteenth century, a majority of British elites saw the continued successful operation of the 
international financial system as the best guarantee for both a better world and British leadership (Blank, 1977: 
680). The reason why unilateral liberalism has had longstanding majority support from a majority of British 
elites, in spite of much historical evidence of its often contrary workings, is that this principle blurs the distinction 
between moral and realpolitik motivations. Indeed, even during the years of great antagonism for Empire, 
unilateral liberalism has been used effectively as a moral justification for support for the responsible government 
– at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 20th century the British government, after WWII the US 
government.   
999 In the Netherlands, as in other  Western small nations, the individual is not supposed to draw attention or try to 
distinguish herself from other people. Significantly, only the members of one‘s own reference group serve as the 
basic testing ground for this conformism. This group can be based on religious conviction, social background, 
age, education, work setting or the like. Whatever the character of the group concerned, its social conventions are 
very significant for what one considers worthwhile, how one thinks and what one does (Phillips 1985: 19-20).   
1000 GDP levels are measured in 2007 US dollars, for which 2005 EKS purchasing power parities updated with 
aggregate deflators to 2007 have been used. These 2005 PPPs are obtained from OECD, Purchasing Power 
Parities 2005, (Paris), November 2007 
1001 http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/TradePref.PDF 
These conclusions are based on 1995 data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) – in particular 
the ISSP National Identity module, which proposed a ranking of country individuals‘ opposition and support for 
trade protection. The data set covers information at the individual level on some 28,456 respondents from 23 
countries, including the United States, Canada, Japan, many Western and Eastern European countries, and one 
developing country (the Philippines). 
1002 Followed by the Japanese, the West Germans, the Norwegians, the Swedes, the Canadians, the New 
Zealanders, the Czechs, the Slovenians, the Slovaks, the East Germans, the Italians,the Philippines, the Irish and 
the Russians.  Thus, the Brits only leave Poland, Spain, Austria, Hungary, Latvia and Bulgaria behind (there were 
no data for France). Another remarkable finding is that the continental European countries tend to be more free 
trade oriented that the former socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe on several accounts – such as 
skill base, perceived benefits and threats. The United States, finally, is intermediate between these two groups of 
―old‖ and ―new‖ EU members (Mayda and Rodrik, 2002: 9). 
1003 The English region in question is the North East; the ten subregions are Tees Valley and Durham (89.6) in the 
North East, Cumbria (95.3 %) and Merseyside (87.3 %) in the North West, South Yorkshire (94.9 %) in 
Yorkshire & the Humber, Lincolnshire (93.5 %) in the East Midlands, Shropshire & Staffordshire (97.9) in the 
West Midlands, Kent (99.2) in the South East, and Dorset & Somerset (99.5 %), Cornwall & Isles of Scilly (79.2) 
& Devon (97.0 %) in the South West. 
1004 The nation-state has retained a key role through modern history precisely because its ―territorial state‖ part, 
far from being an immovable object, functions as a negotiation platform for rivalling aspirations of nationalism. 
In this regard, changing realities of local self-determination and geo-political dependence not only impact on the 
popularity at a certain time and place of different varieties of nationalism. They also impact on the particular 
―territorial state‖ platforms that are deemed most appropriate to embody a particular form of national 
compromise.   
1005 A complementary argument has been made by Smith (1986) and Weber (1976). These authors distinguish 
between different stages or emphases in the history of European nation-building: a stage "from state to nation" 
and a stage "from nation to state" path (Smith, 1986). The first, which can also be called the Western path, is 
exemplified by France: a dynastic center incorporates the periphery via military, educational, or infrastructural 
penetration and inclusion (Weber, 1976). The second path, the "latecomer" or Eastern path is exemplified by 
Germany: an elite-constructed yet linguistically or ethnically conceived nation (or "demotic ethnie") seeks to 
acquire its own state (Joppke, 1996: 3-4). 
1006 The earlier imperial settlement between a Prussian Protestant camp and a southern camp that preferred a 
grossdeutsche Lösung‘  to counterbalance Prussian dominance obviously had been heavily discredited. 
1007 Not surprisingly, this entity is reminiscent of the old ―Mittel Europa‖ Habsburg confederation: a 
confederation of loosely allied core and peripheral regions, willing to give up or create State authority at the 
European level only in matters necessary to safeguard their preferred variety of nationalism. 
1008 Dinta – Deutsches Institut fur Technische Arbeitsschulung 
1009 The German advantage compared to UK-situation at the end of the 1970s is that US culture in 1920s Germany 
was seen as relativelyimmature at that time (Nolan, 1994). 
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1010 In spite of Urwick‘s (1929) efforts, there was ―no hint‖ that rationalisation meant anything new or, indeed, 
anything in particular. It could be equally used as defining ―industrial efficiency‖, or ―scientific management‖ 
(Bowie, 1931: 7). 
1011 At face value, West Germany was even more liberal than the UK. For instance, West Germany used 
remarkably little tax incentives to encourage export after 1955, reestablished free convertibility early and 
unilaterally reduced import tariffs to create international goodwill and improve the international standing of the 
Federal Republic, even to the point of seemingly prioritising commercial expansion in a liberal international 
economy over European unification (Katzenstein, 1977: 900). Indeed, for West German elites, the ―spread of 
state interventionism and dirigisme in international economic relations‖ became the ―nightmare‖ of their 
country‘s foreign economic policy (Kreile, 1977: 808). 
1012 The Ordoliberal credo, sometimes called the ―Freiburg Imperative‖, associated the competitive order of 
market processes, well-established property rights and competition-promoting policies, with institutional pillars 
such as religion-based community orientation, confronting the disruptive effects of socio-cultural rationalisation, 
and a strong state with a high level of policy competence that is fit to reject the demands of special interest groups 
(Rieter and Schmolz, 1993, 104-7; Rittershausen, 2007). 
1013This myth was enshrined in promises of a West German Wirtschaftswunder as early as 1952.  Yet, as we saw 
(p.223-224), the social market economy was as much a case of ―liberalism by default‖ than ―socialism by 
default‖.  
1014 Households wishing to move from areas of high to low unemployment, for example from the Northern region 
to the South east not only would have had to pay substantillay more for a house but also would have had to secure 
more remunerative employment to afford their housing needs. Conversely, fewhouseholds would have been 
willing to move from high-to low-proce regions (assuming jobs were available) since they would have had to 
forgo opportunities for substantial capital accumulation, and might also have feared that they would be priced out 
of the house market should they wish to return. 
1015 Thatcher declared that Britain was an integral part of a regional sphere of English-speaking nations that 
embraces « liberty, christianity, industry and modernity » (Bennett, 2004 ; MacFarlane, 2000; Veliz, 1994). This 
Anglosphere is‖more conducive to free-enterprise capitalism and thus to economic progress than 
others‖…because it is based on a ―Judaeo-Christian tradition‖ as opposed to ―Asian religious traditions‖ and the 
―religious traditions of Africa‖ (Thatcher 2002: 418). And although many would argue that the European Union is 
as much a bulwark of the Judaeo-Christian tradition than the ―Anglosphere‖, she argues that the European Union 
is doomed to fail because it has no shared cultural identity comparable to the Anglo-Saxon bond between Britain 
and the United States. In effect, Thatcher makes a very clear distinction between the nonconformist Anglosphere 
which is still inspired by a christian tradition and catholic Europe which has become a "Eurocracy" that is anti-
Christian because it ―commits the ultimate infraction of the First Commandment…worship of the State‖ 
(Thatcher, 1991: 509).  In sum, the discourse of British exceptionalism that is used to induce the British public to 
embrace globalisation remarkably is based on the assumption of a pre-existing ethno-centric region: the 
Anglosphere. 
1016 Before the Second World War the strength of the East German economy had taken very promising 
proportions, with a per capita national come amounting to 103 per cent of West Germany, and an industrial labour 
productivitity of 91 per cent of the West German level. Unfortunately, by 1991, these two figures had dropped to 
31%.   
1017 That is, somewhat oblivious of the lack of British world leadership after the Suez disaster, the marginal role 
played by the pound sterling as world reserve currency, and the dominance of US monetary policy. 
1018 Economically, the EEC rested on a Franco-German ―entente‖ which opened French markets to German 
industry in exchange fro Germany subsidies to French agriculture. 
1019 Social policy should be designed as Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik, that is, policy for maintaining a competition-
oriented economic order, aiming at the preservation of the market process as the decisive precondition for the 
productive solution of all actually existing social problems (Ebner, 2006; Eucken, 1952: 312-3). 
1020  English banking was more domestically orientated – on English agriculture and industry – up to the 19th 
century than its continental counterparts.   
1021 For an elaboration of the relation between habits and problem-solving capacity – including the capacity to 
reinvent settlements – see Appendix A, section 1 (p. i). 
1022 Duisenberg had advocated against ―imported inflation‖ (1970, Oratie ter gelegenheid van de benoeming tot 
Gewoon hoogleraar in de macro-economie aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam). 
1023 This was much to the chagrin of France, who wanted a French candidate. Still, a compromise was agreed 
upon whereby Duisenberg would serve for at least four years, upon which the Frenchman Jean-Claude Trichet, 
director of the Banque de France, would take over. 
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1024 Confronted with falling prices, interest rates and property values, building societies reacted by by maintaining 
mortgage rates. While this allowed them to attract increasing volumes of savings, falling property values and the 
rising volume of surplus funds meant that demand for loans backed by adequate mortgage security was 
inadequate to absorb the societies‘ funds. Hence, building societies extended their business into increasingly risky 
areas. Competition between building societies soared in the form of more generous advances against poorer 
security, an extension into increased finance of commercial enterprises and an increase in more purely banking 
business. Not surprisingly, as a result, many building societies ran into difficulties. The demise of the societies  
―Liberator‖ in 1892 and Birkbeck in 1911, shook investors‘ confidence in the building society movement. 
Following a further Building Societies Act in 1894, the boundaries of trustworthy building society business were 
more sharply delineated from other financial activities. This allowed the movement to recover its membership and 
asset totals by 1919. 
1025 Liberals not only criticised building Societies of a permanent character for failing to provide members with 
the same rights as other friendly societies; building societies‘ policy of renting houses rather than building them 
purportedly was in danger of discrediting the whole concept of a Building Society. 
1026 As a result, a given rate of building society interest represented a higher gross (of tax) rate when there was an 
increase in income tax rates, and it was this gross rate which was relevant to an income tax payer keen to compare 
the yields of alternative investments. 
1027 The intention of the arrangements was to save the Inland Revenue from routine clerical work in taxing or 
paying rebates to investors, many of whom did not understand income tax, but they also gave to building society 
members the advantage of a simple straightforwards investment free from tax complications. 
1028 The arrangements began in 1895 and continued until 1932 – afterwards the same basic principles were 
retained on more informal grounds. 
1029 In sum, although building societies benefited clearly from certain taxation policies from the 1920s onwards, 
this was not the result of an active pro-home-ownership. Rather, fiscal advantages accrued to owner-occupation 
by fit-of-absentmindedness: for reasons of administrative simplification, and because home-ownership had 
become the only the only real option between the rent-option which the Liberal and Labour Parties eschewed and 
Labour‘s nationalisation option which the Conservatives abhorred. 
1030 The average shareholding shown in the industrial societies varied approximately from £250 to £700 at par 
whilst the average shareholding in the building society movement as a whole was £208. The returns for the 
average of the 47 large societies was even larger, and was actually £240. 
1031 The ability of co-operative banks to contribute to a public-private settlement in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands was most clearly expressed by the way they managed to combine different systems of education to 
their advantage. On the one hand, co-operative banks piggybacked on the system of public agricultural education 
set up by the Liberal governments of the 1860s. This system provided Dutch farmers and co-operatives with 
education in the most advanced agricultural working methods and significantly boosted their capacity to compete 
on world markets. On the other hand, co-operative banks supported the private educational reforms obtained by 
Reformed Protestants and Catholics at the beginning of the twentieth century. As a result, they were able to hire 
personnel and cater to members who had already been socialised into the lifestyle most fitting to either the 
Protestant or Catholic circle. 
1032 Secularisation being a way to transform minority religious interests in the provinces into a more centrally 
manageable form of mass competition. 
431 
 
13 LIMITATIONS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER 
 RESEARCH 
 
13.1 Summary chapter 
 
In this final chapter, I discuss some methodological limitations and possible 
further avenues of research. First (13.2), I explain why ontological and epistemological 
features of history – its non-linearity (a) and the need for an enlivening narrative (b), have 
drawn me to make certain choices. Second (13.3),  I discuss some further avenues of 
research. One empirical choice was to focus on banks (a); what if I had chosen firms in a 
different economic sector? This manuscript in many ways lies at the intersection of the 
institutional literatures on democracy and capitalism, albeit with a focus on firms. This 
begs the question (b): how can republican settlement theory be used to help bridge the gap 
between these two institutional literatures? Another consideration for further research is 
the relevance of republican settlement theory for developments in non-Western nation-
states such as China (c). This last question is inextricably linked to a final consideration 
(d). Is the current focus of Western promoters of democratisation on formal ideal-types 
appropriate?  
 
13.2  Limitations 
 
a.  Non-linear reality of history 
While writing and rewriting the chapters – in particular chapters 6 to 11, I have 
had to strike a balance between methodological rigour and the specific demands of 
historical narrative. Historical causality more often than not is non-linear. This reality is 
not always easy to reconcile with the methodological demands of analytical dualism.  In 
other words, an uncompromising separation of structural and strategic effects over time – 
as advocated by Archer – to some extent stands in the way of a compelling historical 
narrative. Especially since the presentation of historical causality is most compelling when 
it draws on a counterfactual argument (Hawthorne, 1991). For instance, in this manuscript 
I have translated the plot of what actually happened in the Dutch financial sector to what 
could have been in the English financial sector and vice versa. Counterfactual reasoning 
implies first that one should systematically present historical ―facts‖ at hand; and second 
that one should construct a plot that relates all these often disparate, and sometimes 
contradictory facts in an historical narrative of what could have been. Thus, the historical 
narratives in chapters 4 to 11 reflect a compromise between methodological rigour, 
systematic presentation of disparate historical ―facts‖ – often cited interpretations of events 
and actions, and a counterfactual storyline that draws on comparative cases.  
b. Not total history, but focused on “enlivening” reader and Popperian 
validation 
 Several authors have pointed out the need to balance a comprehensive sense of 
history with a sense of proportion towards the practical use of historical understanding. 
Thus, Geyl noted in his discussion with Toynbee (1968: 47-48) that, while a ―sense of 
history is absolutely indispensable‖ and ―wisdom is to be gained from the study of the 
past‖, history provides ―no definite lessons for the actual problems of the present‖. 
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Nietzsche takes a complementary viewpoint.  Drawing on one of Goethe‘s mantras he 
underlines the need for a ―proportional‖ historical sense: ―I despise everything which 
merely instructs me without increasing or immediately enlivening my activity‖ (cited in 
Nietzsche, 1873: 1). Refuting his contemporaries‘ urge to deliver a total and complete 
history, Nietzsche argues that we should ―serve history only insofar as it serves living‖.   
Thus, instead of going into every historical detail and demonstrating a total awareness of 
all things historical, it is more useful to build a thorough, yet ―enlivening‖ historical 
narrative, with a counterfactual plot. This is exactly the road I chose to follow, although I 
am conscious of specialist historians‘ looming ire. In order to pre-empt accusations of an 
approach rife of imagination and short of disciplinary rigour, I would like to emphasise the 
centrality of a thorough application of analytical dualism in this manuscript; a 
methodology and application far more systematic in its assumptions and consequences 
than that applied by most specialists. At the end of the day, this makes this study more 
prone to Popperian validation than most historical studies – the litmus test of any scientific 
endeavour. 
 
13.3 Issues for further research 
 
a. Firms in other sectors? Other traditions? 
In this manuscript I used historical perspective to tie a firm‘s success model 
inextricably to the success model of the nation-state or (nation-states) it is associated with. 
In particular, I focused on banks to demonstrate how six strategies of democratisation, 
applying republican principles, were and still are vital to these firms‘ long term success. 
But what if I had chosen firms from other economic sectors? It is widely acknowledged 
that banks are special firms in that they are critically important to the economic wealth, 
civic order and strength of the nation-states they are associated with (e.g. Goodhart et al. 
1998). Yet, what if I had chosen retail firms, IT companies or other non-financial entities? 
Would the six strategies be as vital to these firms‘ success? Would these firms operate in a 
looser relation with the nation-states there are associated with? Would the same traditions 
of democratisation have surfaced if I had chosen another economic sector than the 
financial system? Or would the role of rivalling national traditions be less important for 
firms  pertaining to sectors less central to the stability of a nation-state‘s domestic affairs 
and geopolitical position? For all these reasons, I have limited the title of this manuscript 
to ―retail banks‖.  Clearly, only further research will demonstrate the further applicability 
of republican settlement theory.  
b. Bridging gap between democracy and varieties of capitalism literatures? 
Can republican settlement theory be used to bridge the disciplinary gap between 
institutional literatures; the literatures on democracy and varieties of capitalism?  I shall 
provide a first answer in the next paragraphs. 
More than the literature on democratisation – which tends to differentiate between 
liberal-utilitarian versus social-communitarian modes of coordination in ideological terms, 
the varieties of capitalism literature (Albert, 1991; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Streeck and 
Yamamura, 2001) differentiates between national systems on contextual and historical 
grounds. A panoply of writers have analysed the nature of national systems, giving them 
different labels in the process: ―economic policy paradigms‖ (Hall, 1986), ―business 
systems‖ (Whitley, 1992, 1994), ―national systems of industrial production‖ (Djelic, 
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1998), ―varieties of capitalism‖ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or ―industrial policy paradigms‖ 
(Dobbin, 2004).  My interest is not in discussing the different nuances in the work of each 
one of these academics. Rather it is in developing links between a strand in this literature 
which feeds in directly into the literature on democratisation, namely the liberal versus 
communitarian dichotomy.  
Summarised quickly, according to the authors of the ―varieties of capitalism‖ 
label (Hall and Soskice, 2001), in ―liberal market economies‖ such as England, economic 
organisations coordinate their activities primarily via arms‘ length market 
arrangements.
1033
  In ―coordinated market economies‖ such as the Netherlands, on the 
other hand, economic organisations depend more heavily on relations with political and 
civil society institutions that provide actors with a capacity for non-market deliberation.
1034
   
How could the ―democratisation‖ and ―variety of capitalism‖ agendas inform 
each other? There are at least four potential complementarities between the two literatures. 
The first complementarity relates to the taken-for-granted notion of coordination modes in 
the varieties of capitalism literature. To paraphrase their argument, Hall and Soskice claim 
that different coordination modes historically have provided the best basis for sound 
economic growth in different varieties of capitalism. Given the strong emphasis by these 
leading authors on the role of actors within an economic framework, however, the 
―civilising‖ and ―politicising‖ role of actors is given somewhat short shrift in their analysis 
of coordination modes.
1035
  Other authors have of course paid more attention to the role of 
governmental or State-sponsored actors (e.g. Fligstein and Sweet, 2002) and civilising 
actors (e.g. Kristensen, 2005).
1036
 What has remained underdeveloped, however, is a 
theoretical understanding of how the involvement of firms in not only dynamics of 
marketisation, but also dynamics of politicisation and civilisation, gives rise to or hampers 
the emergence of new coordination modes. Based on the findings in this manuscript, I 
argue that the emergence of coordination modes is one result of the more encompassing 
process of reaching democratic settlements. Especially in view of the following three 
points such a viewpoint makes sense.  
The varieties of capitalism literature recently has taken a new turn, involving a 
research perspective more mindful of, on the one hand, change and conflict (e.g. Lane, 
1995) and, on the other hand, the interplay of local, national and global levels of analysis 
(e.g. Djelic and Quack, 2003; Morgan, 2005; Sorge, 2005).  The analysis of the interplay 
of logics of democratisation in this manuscript subsumes all these elements. For one, the 
notion of a republican settlement singles out the institutional possibility of rivalry and 
conflict, and interprets these elements as essentially involving a struggle between territorial 
and provincial dynamics. All in all the adoption of republican settlement theory could 
boost the shift which is currently happening in the varieties of capitalism literature: a shift 
from static classifications of business systems in terms of social-communitarian versus 
liberal-utilitarian properties, to a more dynamic focus on the emergence, decline or 
renewal of different firms and business systems over time.  
 Another potential complementarity between the research agendas of the 
democratisation and varieties of capitalism literatures lies in the elaboration of the notion 
of leadership. Following Barnard (1938), the problem of leadership can be conceptualised 
as containing two sub problems: a coordination and a cooperation problem (cf. Foss, 
2001). Coordination problems are based on the following premise: given that different 
individuals or groups realise the need to act upon an issue, what is required to make them 
expect they won‘t waste their time and efforts if they participate in projects of change – i.e. 
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make them expect sufficient significant others will participate, and the practical means to 
achieve change will be available (Chwe, 2003; Grandori, 1997; Hensmans, 2006; March 
and Simon, 1958; Weber, 2005).  Questions of coordination thus involve the leadership 
issue of convincing people to sign up to a change project which the latter also see a need 
for, but heretofore did not have the practical means to engage with meaningfully yet. 
Generally speaking, resolving coordination problems requires a vanguard of leaders, a 
minority, to set an inspirational and practical example.  
Contrary to coordination problems, cooperation problems arise from assumptions 
of self-interest and opportunism between groups (Axelrod, 1984; Camerer and Knez, 1996, 
1997; Heath and Staudenmayer, 2000). Questions of cooperation involve the leadership 
issue of convincing people to sign up to a change project which they do not necessarily 
think is in their interest. Resolving cooperation problems therefore is a matter of instituting 
new incentive and distribution mechanisms that diminish tendencies of self-interest and 
create a common interest across groups, encouraging followers with different agendas to 
consent or acquiesce to a change project. Obviously, coordination and cooperation 
problems are interrelated issues. Their resolution depends on a majority of people signing 
up to the change project, be it in terms of solving a coordination or a cooperation problem.  
As mentioned before, the varieties of capitalism literature has mainly focused on 
classifying existing solutions to coordination problems, and distinguishing them on liberal-
utilitarian versus social-communitarian grounds. Little attention has been paid either to the 
difference between coordination and cooperation problems or to the complementary nature 
of solutions to coordination and cooperation problems. The democratisation literature, for 
its part, does not deal explicitly with the language of coordination or cooperation 
problems, but generally distinguishes between liberal versus communitarian polities on the 
basis of their allegiance to respectively majority versus consensus democracy properties.  
Majority democratisation allegedly work best in ―liberal‖ countries such as England, while 
consensual democratisation are deemed functional in more ―communal‖ countries such as 
the Netherlands (cf. Lijphart, 1984). This argument has policy implications in terms of 
how to deal with minorities.  In majority democracies, dynamics of contestability and 
mobility between the established majority and new minorities is resolved in the following 
way: minorities have no choice but to either significantly influence or comprehensively 
adapt to the will of the established majority – unless they accept to be excluded from 
democratisation process altogether.  In consensus democracies, on the other hand, the 
opinion of all minorities as a rule is represented, albeit often in a diluted way that is not 
threatening to the establishment.   
How does the research agenda put forward in this manuscript bridge the varieties 
of capitalism and democratisation literatures in this regard?  I maintain that the distinction 
between majority and consensus democracies is overstated. English and Dutch firms, as 
other nation-state actors, face the same challenges to be successful. English and Dutch 
firms have to contribute to a democratic settlement.  While the traditions underlying such 
settlements are different for English and Dutch firms, both English and Dutch settlements 
involve a combination of minority and consensus strategies of democratisation. The failure 
to notice this commonality between English and Dutch firms is grounded in several blind 
spots: a failure to identify different contextual expressions of voice and exit – different 
traditions of how to legitimately obtain State interventionism and ensure civic or economic 
autonomy
1037
, an over reliance on formal expressions of democracy – such as majority 
versus consensus cabinets, and a failure to distinguish between coordination and 
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cooperation problems.  Throughout this thesis, I have shown that the distinction between 
―minority‖ and ―consensus‖ strategies of democratisation maps directly on the respective 
problems of coordination and cooperation.  As noted above, the first strategy entails 
building a coalition of challenger and incumbent actors competent to set a leadership 
example, and change political, economic, and civic modalities of contestability and 
mobility to accommodate new minorities.  The second strategy entails tempering rivalries 
between all groups – established and minority groups – through the distribution and 
alignment of incentives.   
Finally, there is a fourth way republican settlement theory could help to bridge the 
disciplinary gap between the literatures on capitalism and democracy. If one really takes 
the discussions on loose versus tight path-dependence (e.g. Morgan, 2005), and the relation 
between political, civic and economic factors seriously, there is a need to further 
historicise democratic settlements, i.e. complementary modes of coordination and 
cooperation. The empirical opportunity has to do with the discrepant assumptions 
employed in historical studies of, on the one hand, capitalistic modernisation, and, on the 
other hand, democratic modernisation. During the last decade or so, studies of the 
development of capitalism have taken a new historical turn. While in the original account 
economic modernisation was associated with the rise of industrialisation in 18
th
 and 19
th
 
century Britain, dynamics of financial development from the 16
th
 century onwards – in the 
Dutch Republic and later Britain – are now considered the real starting point of capitalistic 
modernity (cf. Sylla, 2000). As mentioned above, the same historical turn has not yet been 
made with regards to the literature on democracy. On the contrary, the predominantly 
Anglo-Saxon view still is that democratic modernity started in industrializing Britain and 
its cousin the United States in the first decades of the mid-19
th
 century, to be followed by 
first Western European industrializing countries and later industrializing parts of Eastern 
and Southern Europe.  
The discrepancy in historical starting points raises the question whether 
capitalistic modernity did not involve a measure of democratisation from the earliest 
periods onwards. Did democratisation really only start after the emergence of nineteenth 
century nation-states, and not a few centuries earlier, concurrent with capitalistic 
modernisation? The distinct opportunity for the literature on varieties of capitalism here is 
to take this last question seriously, and study the emergence of varieties of coordination 
and cooperation modes – democratic settlements – from as early as the sixteenth century 
onwards. 
c. Relevance beyond the West of “republican settlement” theory 
Does the theory presented in this manuscript bear any relevance to non-Western 
nation-states, such as China?
1038
  Obviously this question deserves more than passing 
attention and should be treated as an issue for further thorough research. Nevertheless, I 
shall formulate a tentative answer here. The question can be answered from at least three 
viewpoints. First, is the West – i.e. Europe and its offshoots – in decline?  Second, to what 
extent has an emerging nation-state such as China already adopted elements of Western 
republican theory? Third, in what respects are Chinese traditions structurally different from 
their Western counterparts? All three questions are not new at all, which gives us the 
opportunity to look for answers in past historical tendencies. 
If the West were in terminal decline and in danger of being surpassed by 
emerging powers such China and India, the theory presented here would have little 
relevance beyond historical perspective.  Fortunately, the decline of the West has been 
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announced rather prematurely on many occasions, for instance in the 1920s with the then 
rather authoritative reading of history by Spengler (1926-1928). At the end of the day one 
may argue that the perpetual fear of being corrupt and in decline is one of the ingrained 
dynamics of Western republican practice; a dynamic that in the modern era may have 
saved the West from the very decline it so fears. Clearly, even now the decline of the West 
is predicted by manifold pundits, and China and India are being hailed as emerging super 
powers, the only available paradigm for gaining world influence akin to Europe and its off-
shoots remains republican theory. That is, the theory of democratisation premised on the 
principles of non-domination and complementary personality and territoriality principles. 
The only other alternative is worldwide acquisition by force, an unlikely option in a world 
ruled by a nuclear balance of power.  In sum, by default of an overwhelming monopoly of 
force, emerging nation-states that want to acquire world influence akin to Europe and its 
off-shoots will have to develop republican traditions as a starting point.  
Of course, instead of opting for world influence, non-Western nation-states such 
as China may opt to become ―super regional powers‖, and buffer themselves geopolitically 
from overbearing Western influence.  China is doing exactly that. And that is not 
surprising, given the country‘s almost obsessive search for continuity in the past 23 
centuries – long before the emergence of modern republican traditions in Europe and the 
US.  In spite of having undergone possibly the most turbulent twentieth century of any 
country  in the world
1039
, what stands out even now is the remarkably continuity of the 
Chinese success model since the landmark settlement of the 3
rd
 century BC. This success 
model is based on the Sino-centric imperial myth of a ―Middle Kingdom‖ that leaves room 
only for patriotic loyalty, not for autonomous nations seeking to modernise their relation 
with a State.  Indeed, rather than nationalism per se, the concept of ―state-centred 
nationalism‖ or ―patriotism‖ –  the Chinese ―aiguozhuyi‖ which means the ―ideology of 
loving the country‖ – most appropriately denotes the concept of Chinese national identity 
(Choe, 2006; Fairbank, 1986; Fitzgerald, 1996a and b).  To ensure the viability of this 
state-centered patriotism, Chinese leaders have alternated long periods of relative 
isolationism with episodes of temporary collaborations for the sake of self-preservation – 
as under the Han dynasty and throughout the period of the ―Unequal Treaties‖ (Hunt, 
1996: 8). This explains why Chinese foreign policy seems to perennially alternate between 
unquestioned superiority and an almost slavish self-loathing (Barme, 1995: 219). 
Given the above, how can we explain China‘s apparent turn to ―liberal 
capitalism‖? I have demonstrated that the liberal tradition historically has been used for 
geopolitically opportune reasons – the creation of universal legitimacy and the 
preservation of continuity with prior empires. For instance, the liberal rhetoric adopted by 
the US government amounts to nothing else than an amalgamation of reinvented national 
traditions of democratisation, which, for reasons of worldwide commercial expansion and 
continuity with the Pax Britannica were coined ―liberal‖. This is a first reason why an 
embattled post-Mao regime decided to accede to the WTO and open up to capitalistic 
dynamics in the 1970s.  Also, there is a clear parallel with the Federal Republic of 
Germany‘s post-WWII turn to liberal capitalism. When German Ordoliberals in the end 
did accept the necessity to adhere to a measure of non-interventionism in the name of US-
style liberal democracy, they did this to safeguard as much as possible of the authority 
structures inherent in age-old German traditions.  In other words, appearances of liberal 
capitalism were accepted to protect one‘s actual goal: to preserve the viability of one‘s 
own traditions, and buffer oneself from overbearing foreign domination in the process.  In 
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effect, one can state that China since the late 1970s is following the exact same strategy. 
Of course, one major difference between Germany and China is that the former‘s traditions 
for many centuries had developed in a more republican direction than the latter‘s.  
This brings us to the question to what extent Chinese traditions are structurally 
different from their Western counterparts. In chapter 1 I noted that city-states are the 
geopolitical environments most prone to the development of a republican personality 
principle; for city-states possess a measure of political autonomy and territorial privileges 
granted by charter.  Yet, as Max Weber has long remarked, cities in China and other parts 
of Asia, unlike those in the West, did not develop a tradition of city law, political 
association of merchant and craft guilds backed up by independent military power, or 
privileges granted by charter. While the rise of modern states and capitalism in the West is 
inseparable from the rise of city-states, in China cities often were the planned 
administrative product of the Imperial State (Weber, 1983: 59-61).  The only exception to 
this Chinese rule were the cities under Foreign Concession in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century. The British and French stance on freedom of association, press and speech, 
ushered in the Chinese bourgeoisie‘s Golden Age in 1920s Shangai, which arguably 
boasted China‘s most vibrant civil society (Bergere, 1986).1040  Does the experience of 
Shangai mean China has adopted a city-state tradition in which the personality principle 
can flourish? Paradoxically, the very existence of a personality principle in Shangai made 
it attractive to the leaders of the New Cultural Movement, who ultimately turned it into the 
new cradle of State-centered patriotism. After WWII, the clock was turned back in Shangai 
to the pre-foreign concession period. And the personality principle again was reduced to 
the State-led rhetoric that China is a multi-ethnic, multi-nation country in which no 
ethnicity or nation is superior to another.  
Given all the above, does it make sense for Western countries to relentlessly push 
the Chinese government to adopt more Western democratic traits? The answer is negative 
in so far that it could overly weaken the central government and force it into humiliating 
concessions. After all, it was not only China‘s pre-modern experience of preventing 
turmoil between different warlords and ethnicities that has led its leaders to obsessively 
hold on to a form of state-centered patriotism.  It also was the very threat posed by  
encroaching Western powers; as evidenced by the 1911 Chinese Revolution and the 1949 
Chinese Communist Revolution
1041, both reactions to the ―humiliating‖ Foreign 
Concessions (Kim and Dittmer, 1993; Karl, 2002).  What is more, the Western threat is 
more pronounced now than during the pre-WWII decades of British domination. While the 
latter was based on co-opting local allies and clients, the current US Empire is far more 
assimilationist (cf. Lieven, 2002), which poses an existential danger to an equally 
assimilationist Chinese State apparatus.  
One historical lesson of Western proselytising about democratisation in China is 
that it almost unavoidably ends with the re-nationalisation of assets and people. What is 
the particular nature of nationalisation that looms large on Western businesses in China?  
At some point, when the balance between Chinese geopolitical confidence and the influx 
of Western firms and traditions becomes fraught, the dream of the ―Promised Market‖ will 
founder again and a new wind of patriotic revolution will blow over China. This is exactly 
what British and French companies experienced in the post-WWII years. After WWII, the 
Chinese authorities in retribution for a ―hundred years of exploitation‖ by the 
Westerners
1042
 employed subtle methods to achieve expropriation of foreign assets.
1043
  
Riding on the waves of a new national revolution, the government set in motion a process 
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of ―reverse compensation‖ in which private foreign businesses were now made to work for 
the public Chinese interest (Boardman, 1976; Shai, 1989, 1997: 172-173, 175).   
Before WWII, Chinese leaders had long argued that their people were not ready 
for democratisation. Yet, after WWII, when most foreign assets were re-nationalised, the 
revolutionary government translated Western slogans of ―democratisation‖ and 
―enterprisation‖ in its own terms. ―New democracy‖ was to be a transitional stage between 
the democratic revolution and the building of new imperial state. The sizeable private 
enterprise sector was allowed to remain in existence during this transition stage; although 
the state-owned sector of the economy was to ―exercise leadership‖ over the private sector 
and assist it in its transformation (Brugger, 1971: 10).  
At the end of the day, the biggest problem for the US is that, while its leaders tend 
to favour shock therapy as the platform for revolutionary change, all episodes of revolution 
in China have proved to be no more than Australian bushfires which provided conditions 
for the same sort of regrowth (Brugger and Kelly, 1990: 29-30).  Another problem for 
Western proselytisers of liberal democracy is the pervasiveness of orthopraxy in Chinese 
patriotism, which implies that doing the right Chinese thing is more important than actual 
initial belief –  in the confidence that behaviour will change thought (cf. Watson, 1993: 
84). In other words,  most Chinese will do the right ―communist‖, ―capitalist‖, or 
―democratic‖ thing as long as it serves the Chinese patriotic interest, not by virtue of actual 
belief or independent thought.  Liberal capitalism may well mean very little in terms of 
substantial beliefs for most Chinese.   
Clearly, if the West really wants the Chinese to break through the vicious circle of 
isolationism and temporary collaborations for the sake of self-preservation, they should 
tone their rhetoric of liberal democracy in dealings with the Chinese central government – 
particularly publicly. After all, the Chinese central government has adopted measures of 
liberal capitalism in the 1980s primarily as an ideological and regulatory control substitute; 
i.e. to replace the declined belief in Marxism and Maoism that in previous decades had 
provided the national government with its most powerful tool to regulate and subordinate 
local society (Zheng, 1999; He and Guo, 1999; Sautman, 1997). Instead of focusing on the 
central government, Western investors and governments should try to subtly influence 
local authorities and societies in China. After all, local society is the principal agent of 
change and tradition-building in China (Krug and Hendrischke, 2008). Westerners should 
not try to induce change by bombarding local people and dignitaries with the ideology of 
liberal democracy, but by paying tribute to the principles of non-domination and 
contestability in their daily business dealings. For instance, by trying to treat local 
employees as well as they would Westerners, with respect for local traditions. Anything 
less would provide central leaders with patriotic ammunition to perpetuate their rule ―by 
the very few over the very many‖ (Fairbank, 1986: 21). Or it could induce a new national 
revolution aimed at erasing overbearing concessions to the West, spelling the beginning of 
another episode of isolationism, or worse, war. 
d. The misguided focus on formal ideal-types of Western democracy 
Clearly, there is no better way to point out the limitations of ideal-types of high 
modernity for non-Western countries than by demonstrating the continuing, central 
relevance of centuries-old traditions in prototypical Western nation-states such as the 
Netherlands, England and the US.  This is what I have attempted to do in this manuscript. 
Following this, an issue for further research is whether the contemporary literature 
overemphasises the less important attributes of Western democracy, i.e. those pertaining to 
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the realm of apparent realities rather than deeper mechanisms such as traditions. Would 
formal ideal-types of Western democracy such as the universal suffrage, or the protection 
of equal opportunity through a secular rule of law, have taken root if it were not for the 
successful reinvention of centuries-old traditions of democratisation?  My findings hint at a 
negative answer.  For instance, in the Netherlands ideal-types such as the proportional 
electoral system and a secular rule of law emerged as by-products of the reinvention of 
traditions of proportionality, living-together-apart, pacification and Orangist democracy by 
confessional parties from the late nineteenth century onwards. Since the 1970s, it has 
become common practice for political scientists to deride the democratic quality of these 
―consociational‖ traditions, particularly given their confessional, paternalistic origins.  
Nevertheless, if it were not for the reinvention of these traditions in a more modern guise 
during the 1980s, the 1970s Dutch disease would not have been transformed in the 1990s 
Dutch miracle.  
In sum, one can wonder whether ideal-types of democracy would not rapidly 
become discredited as empty shells in the 21
st
 century if it were not for the continued 
reinvention of such traditions. For instance in chapter 10 I have demonstrated how 
centuries-old English traditions were sidestepped during the 1980s and 1990s in favour of 
a high modernity myth of liberal capitalism.  The marginalisation of these traditions – 
which started before WWII – has coincided with a very significant decrease in the electoral 
turnout since 1950 (p. 351-352), and a ―shocking‖ decline in levels of political 
participation. According to ―The Economist 2007 index of democracies‖1044 Britain‘s score 
in the area of political participation is the lowest in the West and is reflected across all 
dimensions – voter turnout, membership of political parties, willingness to engage in 
politics and attitudes towards it.  Maybe it is time to focus more on the reinvention of old 
traditions of democratisation, and less on high modernity appearances.
                                                 
1033 These market relationships are characterized by the exchange of goods or services in a context of competitive 
price signalling and formal contracting. The State in such a system allegedly only operates to guarantee a degree 
of stability and fairness to competitive economic associations and markets. 
1034 Examples of such institutions are business or employers associations, strong trade unions and State-sponsored 
regulatory systems designed to foster collaboration. These institutions provide means for extensive communal 
rather competitive relationships. 
1035 This is quite remarkable, given Hall‘s (1986) comprehensive study of British historical modes of governance, 
which somewhat hinted in this direction, especially with regards to the relation of economic actors with political 
parties or pressure groups. 
1036 In particular, in contrast with for instance Cable (1995) who maintains that States are losing authority in face 
of globalization forces, authors such as Mann (1997) have long been arguing for their continuing significance in 
transnational – e.g. regional (Ohmae, 1995) – and international networks. 
1037 For a comparison of different forms of desired and undesired State interventionism in the US, Britain and 
France, see p. 354-355.  For more on different expressions of voice and exit in Dutch and English traditions of 
democratisation, see p. 389-390. 
1038 And what to say of India, that other emerging ―super power‖? One comparison that is worthwile making, is 
that between India and the European Union. More even than the EU, India is a virtual democratic entity lacking 
the prospect of a unified constitution. Much more than the European people, the Indian people is an exclusively 
adminstrative category. India is civically, politically and economically more diverse than the EU. While there was 
a time when India was ―studded with republics‖ (Mehta, 1997: 92), this is a far bygone era. What hopes are there 
of making a federal republic out of small republics that are so detached from their roots? Worst of all, India has a 
central federal administration that formally dominates in a much more ―despotic‖ way than the EU commission or 
Council has ever done, or could imagine to do, while most substantive power is decentralised. India‘s formal 
dictoatorship in the mid-1970s was thrown out without significantly altering very much for very long. The central 
government, acting on the basis of a constitution and procedures which have been given the formal democratic 
fiat by Western observers, can pass all sorts of laws for moral effect without expecting them to be carried out. In 
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other words, the existing constitution has little substantive effect on local populaces. Substantial politics has 
always been and largely remains the preserve of local communes, and thus is occasionally violent to a pre-modern 
extent. At the end of the day, the Indian people can vote and remove the government, but republican traditions of 
non-domination do not spread because cynicism about the central government prevails (Brugger, 1999). 
1039 At the turn of the twentieth century, China was ruled by the Qing dynasty, heir to an imperial tradition that 
can be traced back to the 3rd century BC. By the end of the century China had experienced three major political 
revolutions, and six major developments:  
(1) The 1911 Revolution, which overthrew China's last imperial monarchy and established a republic;  
(2) The May Fourth Movement in the 1910s and 1920s, a cultural-intellectual movement that also marked the 
beginnings of a mass nationalism and resulted in the creation of the ChineseCommunist Party;  
(3) The Nationalist Revolution of the 1920s and establishment of China's first party-state under the Guomindang 
(Nationalist Party)  
(4) The communist-led rural revolution of the 1930s and 1940s that ushered in the People's Republic of 
China in 1949  
(5) Mao Zedong's 'Chinese Road to Socialism' in the 1950s and 1960s  
(6) The economic, social and political changes of the post-Mao period after 1976. 
1040 Throughout the first three decades of the 20th century, both the growth and shares of modern industry and 
services in China were disproportionately concentrated in Shanghai, which alone produced about 40% of the 
national manufacturing output (including Japanese-controlled Manchuria) in 1933; housed 50 to 60% of cotton 
spindles throughout the 1910s and 1930s; and generated about 50% of the national electricity output in the 1920s.  
In 1931, Shanghai absorbed 34% of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and 67% of FDI in 
manufacturing; handled more than half of China‘s foreign trade and one fifth of its shipping business throughout 
1896-1936; and boasted of 47.8% of the national financial capital in 1936 (Ma, 2004, 2005). 
1041 Arguably, the communist leader Mao driven less by the desire to prompt world revolution, than by a wish to 
―revive the national confidence and self-respect that had been lost during a century of foreign humiliation‖. (Hsü, 
2000: 660). Thus, in contrast to the image the Communists developed in propaganda of a ‗clean sheet‘, many 
aspects of the People Republic of Chine were consistent with its predecessor Republican and Imperial states. 
1042 Sometimes called the Western Rong meaning "Western Barbarians", Middle Persian: Xiyon, (Hiun/Hion)) 
were the westernmost branch of the Hunas, a nomadic tribe prominent in Transoxania and Bactria.[1] These 
"Western Barbarians" were the original "White Huns" according to the eastern order of cosmic precedence which 
the central Asian nomads observed [1]. Chionites had arrived in the mid-4th century with the wave of 
immigration from Central Asia 
1043 The Chinese method of ―protracted expropriation‖ in relation to foreign property was much subtler than its 
Soviet equivalent, in that the Chinese ensured that no claim for compensation could be made even in the distant 
future. Thus, the Chinese government gradually managed to get its hands on some of the most modern and 
prosperous foreign businesses in the country, without incurring either the ire or the financial liability of outright 
confiscation. 
1044 This index focuses on five categories of democracy: elections, civil liberties, functioning government, 
political participation and political culture.  According to this index, Sweden is a near-perfect democracy, coming 
top of all countries in the world. The Netherlands comes third and the UK 23rd.  More surprising are the 
relatively modest scores for two traditional bastions of democracy—Britain and the United States. In America 
there has been a perceptible erosion of civil liberties related to the fight against terrorism. Long-standing 
problems in the functioning of government have also become more prominent. In Britain, too, there has been 
some erosion of civil liberties but also a shocking decline in political participation. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Supplementary explanations    
 
1. Antecedents to the Dutch rivalry between Regents and Orangists 
The unification of the Low Countries
1045
 – the northern and the southern 
Netherlands – started at the end of the fourteenth century, when the dynasty of Burgundian 
and Habsburg princes acquired control over Flanders and Brabant, and a few decades later 
over Holland.
1046
 This happened in a rather pacific, mutually agreeable fashion. Flanders, 
Brabant and Holland felt a growing need of supra-provincial leadership and protection in a 
geopolitical landscape of increasing territorial consolidation and rivalry. Besides providing 
military help, the Burgundian-Habsburg authorities were increasingly called upon to help 
mediate the settlement  of economic issues (Van Gelderen, 1992: 16-18).  The seat of 
government – the so-called States-General1047 – was established in Brussels as a 
geopolitical compromise. Through the fifteenth century, the States-General remained a 
largely ad hoc institution, representing the particularism of each province. As the Low 
Countries did not have one clear center of influence, the Burgundians found it very hard to 
control the relation between State development, civilisation and economic growth
1048
, 
especially given the exceptional rate of urbanisation of the core provinces Flanders, 
Brabant and Holland
1049
. Popular opinion in these cities was led by a merchant class, 
aspiring to a city-state status.
1050
 Still, through techniques of patronage and venality of 
offices, the Burgundians to some extent managed to overcome the forces of provincial 
particularism and keep the Low Countries together (Prevenier and Blockmans, 1984).   
 In particular, the Burgundian duke kept aloof from Holland‘s Baltic wars and 
geo-politics. Even if these politics clashed with the interests of the southern provinces of 
Flanders and Brabant, this was the only way to accommodate Holland within the 
Burgundian state. Thus, a north-south divide characterized the Burgundian Netherlands, 
epitomised by a province of Holland in which a clear hierarchy of public office was soon 
installed. More than in other provinces, in Holland the influence of the guilds and civic 
militias was curtailed.
1051
 Instead, a rather small Regent oligarchy ruled, based on paternal 
political rule and multiple arrangements among family heads.  This oligarchy, in collusion 
with Orangist stadtholders. ultimately would provide the foundations of the Dutch 
Republic‘s ―familial State‖ (Adams, 1994). Meanwhile, it returned the Burgundian duke‘s 
favour of granting special privileges to the province of Holland by promising to provide 
stability, administer justice and collect taxes in his stead. What is more, contrary to their 
purported ―freedom-loving‖ motivations, Holland Regents provided the military and 
financial support to subdue the provinces of Gelderland, Overijssel and Utrecht.  A small 
group of noblemen in the southern provinces – among which the ancestors of the later 
princes of Orange  – had advised the Burgundian dukes to adopt such a tit-for-tat policy 
with Holland. Part of the deal was that Holland – as the other provinces – had to accept the 
residence of a Stadtholder in charge of choosing burgomasters and magistrates.
1052
   
In 1482, the Burgundian inheritance passed to the House of Habsburg, which 
from 1452 also had secured the title of Holy Roman emperor. Paradoxically, the progress 
of central imperial development under the Habsburgers, and especially Charles V who 
completed the territorial unification of the Low Countries by 1543, proceeded hand in hand 
with the strengthening of the provincial States.  Under a tit-for-tat agreement, territorial 
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unification was conditioned on the possibility of a burgeoning commercial economy and 
an inveterate tradition of local privileges. As a result, the burghers who sat in its provincial 
parliaments probably had more political leverage than in any other princely state in 
Europe. This had one important geopolitical advantage. In an era of transition between 
medieval city-states and proto-modern nation-states, the expansion of the public debt 
principle pioneered by city-states could best be undertaken by provincial parliaments 
whose territories were intermediate between city-states and nation-states both in size and 
in the difficulties of political and civic integration
1053
.  In coordination with successive 
Habsburg governors, the provincial States launched the fiscal innovation of provincial 
annuities.
1054
  These soon became widespread; the balance of power between imperial 
rulers and provincial Regents provided potential creditors with assurances of a more 
regular payment of interests than for instance in France, where such a balance of powers 
did not exist (Tracy, 1985: 109-100, 213, 20). 
Nevertheless, cracks started appearing in the relation between the prince and the 
provincial States when the conflict between Habsburg and French rulers reignited in the 
1540s. Faced with a desperate need for cash with which to pay the army, the Habsburgers 
subjected all provinces to higher levels of taxation, recruiting etc... The temptation for 
Charles V and his successor, Philip II of Spain, to overburden the wealthy city of Antwerp 
– the hub of Europe‘s rich trades – and the relatively prosperous Amsterdam – the 
emerging European hub for Baltic bulk-carrying and fisheries – was enormous, especially 
given the rapidly declining economic soundness of Spain. In the end Habsburg officials 
imposed a more extensive use of annuities on especially Holland, an unwilling province. 
Not surprisingly, the escalation in fiscal and military pressures had the effect of renewing 
deep-seated resentments over the centralisation of State authority in the Low Countries. 
The restlessness of the once loyal nobility, the objections coming from part of the Holland 
Regents, and the rapid advance of Protestant humanism compounded the problems of the 
Habsburgers. Despite extensive mediation efforts by the Prince of Orange
1055
, who tried to 
reconcile the centralisation tendencies of Habsburg officials and the protestant radicalism 
of town ministers, a ―civil war‖ broke out in 1566 which was soon termed the ―Dutch 
Revolt‖. During the Revolt, the Dutch Republic became a confederation of  7 provinces – 
Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, Groningen, Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel. In this 
Republic of United Provinces, towns were autonomous to a degree that was unusual when 
compared to states like England, France or Prussia
1056
 (Prak, 2000: 343). The absence of a 
confederal leadership tradition meant that the new Dutch state had to invent ways to 
coordinate the aspirations of the seven provinces, and that potential free-riding problems 
were vast. 
 
2. Resolving Dutch leadership problems: the Regent and Orangist traditions 
           Two types of traditions of democratisation emerged during the late fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, and crystallised during the Revolt: the ―Regent‖ and ―Orangist‖ 
traditions of democratisation. Framed in terms of respectively economic interests and civic 
ideals, and the threats to local privileges posed by foreign invasion and war, Regent and 
Orangist discourse contributed to bringing the disparate variety of Dutch towns and 
provinces together. Three institutions in particular held the Dutch Republic together, the 
first two a reflection of the rivalry between the Regent and Orangist traditions, the third a 
reflection of  Regents‘ and Orangists‘ willingness to compromise and settle their 
differences. First, there was the practice of provincial parliaments which, in particular in 
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the merchant province of Holland, symbolised the primacy of city-state autonomy. Second, 
there was the practice of choosing a stadtholder in the different provinces, an honour 
which mostly fell to the heirs of the family of Orange. Finally, there was the unifying 
institution of the States-General, which existed before 1572 as the representative body of 
the seventeen provinces of the Habsburg state, but was reestablished in 1579 as a body of 
the new coalition of provinces. Most provinces were represented in the States-General 
through a balance of nobles, who represented the countryside, and the enfranchised towns. 
Holland, on the other hand, was represented by an overwhelming urban majority, eighteen 
town versus one countryside representative (Israel, 1979). 
The States-General successfully functioned as a vehicle to resolve leadership 
problems for two reasons. On the one hand, States-General representatives were careful to 
restrain their own powers to what both Orangist and Regent groups considered to be 
matters of absolute urgency and need. On the other hand, the States-General devolved as 
much authority as possible to Regent and Orangist groups. On the first point, as long as the 
urgency of war and economic expansion dominated, the States-General held almost 
exclusive authority in the area of foreign policy.  This helped greatly in forcing through 
impopular military and fiscal decisions. On the second point, the fact that ultimate impetus 
and responsibility for these decisions lay with the Regent and Orangist groups helped to 
maximise grassroot support during the implementation phase of these decisions. So, the 
stimulus for economic and fiscal expansion came especially from the Holland Regents, 
who did not shy away from carrying the heaviest burden in this regard. And as Orangist 
groups in the other provinces also profited from the Regents‘ investments, their 
representatives agreed to contribute to a small share of the fiscal burden. On the other 
hand, the impetus to maintain a strong army based on civic militias and a strong Church 
based on a monopoly of public functions came mainly from the Orangist groups. The 
Holland Regents, for their part, profited from the strength of the Orangist army and the 
order provided by the Dutch Church, and eagerly piggybacked on anti-papist ideology to 
promote mercantilist expansion. I shall now further elaborate on the origins and salient 
characteristics of the Regent and Orangist traditions. I summarise these characteristics in 
table A.1.  
a. Regent traditions: origins and salient characteristics 
During the sixteenth century, prince Philip decided to reinforce ecclesiastical 
control in the Low Netherlands, by restructuring it along the lines of new (arch)bishoprics. 
This move spectacularly backfired in the more protestant city-states of the Low Countries, 
in particular in the Holland province. In Amsterdam, a group of Regents emerged – mainly 
ministers and merchants. This group openly resented the ―old corruption‖ and foreigness 
of the Catholic clergy (Israel, 1995: 25-39; 128) which threatened to put limits on 
economic and religious freedom. While the alliance between merchants and ministers was 
awkward, it did work very well.  Merchants‘ practical focus on monetary wealth was 
complementary to the more ideological outlook of the Dutch ministry, which idealised 
economic expansion because it was connected with the struggle against Habsburg 
domination in particular and anti-Papist ideology in general
1057
 (Riemersma, 1967: 84). 
During the Revolt, town ministers and lawyers had constructed an ideology of liberty, with 
freedom of conscience, constitutional charters, representative institutions and popular 
sovereignty as its main defining factors (Van Gelderen, 1992: 272-273).  Given their 
merchant spirit, most of the Regents envisioned good government in less radical terms, 
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however: public order, economic wealth and the inviolability of their own class 
privileges
1058
.  
 
Table A.1: Regent and Orangist traditions of democratisation 
 
Regent 
 
Orangist 
 
1) Democratisation ideal-type: 
- city-state oriented (Holland) 
 
2) Market: 
- Virtual money 
(open stock exchange) 
 
3) Civil society: 
- « freedom of conscience » 
- education: secular and 
independent 
 
4) Politics: 
- Parliament: 
based on assumption that polity 
consists of minorities and that 
only a « qualified » majority is 
feasible 
 
- Government: 
Representative of city-state 
interests and principles « no 
taxation without representation » 
and ―those who stand to gain 
from a service provided by the 
state should pay for it‖ 
 
5) Corruption: 
- Lack of world-orientation, business  
   autonomy 
 
6) Solution to leadership problems: 
- tradition of ―City monetarism‖ 
- tradition of ―living-together-apart‖ 
- tradition of ‖proportionality‖ 
 
 
1) Democratisation ideal-type: 
-     country-oriented (outer provinces) 
 
2) Market: 
- Real money 
(domestic produce and land) 
 
3) Civil society: 
- « concord » provided by 
« religion, freedoms and 
property » 
- education: Dutch Reformed 
 
4) Politics: 
- Parliament : 
based on assumption that all 
minorities find unity in central 
state 
 
- Government:                                           
Representative of natural 
functional order 
 
5) Corruption: 
- Lack of patriotism and bigger 
social-economic picture (narrow 
financial capitalism) 
 
6) Solution to leadership problems: 
- tradition of ―pacification‖ 
- tradition of ‖Orangist democracy‖ 
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The Regents presented themselves as the superordinate trustees of the people, and 
held on to a pragmatic tolerance for other ideas and groups – such as the Catholics, defying 
the  Revolutionary legacy of dogmatic calvinist militias (Kickert, 2003a: 119).
1059
 Their 
alleged pragmatism notwithstanding, most Regents were adamant that the principle of 
sound finance they had championed – City monetarism1060, later also labeled ―Regent 
capitalism‖, should be shielded from encroachment of the less commercially and 
financially orientated outer provinces.  One way to achieve this was by championing the 
principle of ―living-together-apart‖ (e.g. Bax, 1988: 82). This principle enabled ―mutually 
interdependent social and political groups to maintain their autonomy to a perceived 
optimum, within the framework of a national sovereignty.‖1061 In more practical terms, 
living-together-apart translated in the principle that personalistic allegiances – whether to 
one‘s city-state, province or religion, would remain at least as authoritative as territorial 
State or Church tendencies.  In 1587 the States of Holland accepted a position paper
1062
 
which claimed that with the abjuration of the Habsburg emperor popular sovereignty had 
devolved on the provincial States. In Holland, this meant that sovereignty was devolved to 
a ―commonwealth of burghers‖ (Goudsblom, 1968: 15-16), i.e. the communities of 
merchants and traders that flocked to the Amsterdam and Rotterdam city-states.  
Although provincial sovereignty remained a contentious issue for the Orangists, 
who strove for a greater centralisation of power, this principle became accepted practice 
regarding fiscal and general economic issues in the States General. One notable result of 
this agreement was that often less than ten per cent of the money employed by the central 
institutions was raised directly by the States-General (‗t Hart, 1993, p. 86). The rest was 
provided by the provincial states. To prevent endless negotiations about the distribution of 
the tax burden, the Holland Regents in 1583 had proposed a system of fixed quotas, which 
attributed certain relative weights to each province's contribution to the central treasury. 
Until 1594 only Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Friesland were paying; by 1616 the other 
provinces had also been fitted into the system. By all means, the quota distribution 
underlined Holland's supremacy in the Republic: Holland paid 58 per cent of the total
1063
. 
The great advantage of the quota system was the substantial freedom it gave to every 
province to decide how to collect and invest its fiscal revenues. Holland relied mainly on 
excises levied on market transactions, whilst rural provinces preferred to tax income from 
landed property. The main disadvantage of the quota system was that it was a standing 
invitation to free-riding, especially since much of the money never reached the central 
treasury (Van Zanden and Prak, 2004). 
The Dutch financial system suffered a great deal from the confusion of the 
early decades of the Revolt, with the Habsburgers‘ central control on coinage and currency 
falling away. At this moment, the province of Holland decided to step in with its economic 
power to bring stability to commercial transactions. First, the Amsterdam regents 
relaunched the use of annuities – an innovation introduced by the Habsburgs – as the 
backbone of public borrowing in the Dutch Republic
1064
 (Tracy, 1985: 193 ; 213-214).  
Second, the Regents set out new monetary rules by establishing the Bank of Amsterdam in 
1609 (Dehing and ‘T Hart, 1997: 61)1065. By virtue of the Bank of Amsterdam‘s monetary 
monopoly, the guilder was established as the main unit of account for deposits (Neal, 
2000: 120-122). All of a sudden, merchants and citizens from within the Republic and later 
from all over Europe found an unparalleled ease of payment in the always reliable bank 
guilder. By 1700 a multilateral payment system with all major financial centres of the 
world had been installed. Not surprisingly, the years from 1600 onward saw a period of 
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great wealth in the Republic. The Amsterdam city profited most from this wealth, for 
several reasons
1066
. First of all, the central element of the Dutch economy was the 
Amsterdam stock exchange. As the Dutch States-General interfered much less in trade (via 
regulations and taxation) than the traditional states did, and as foreigners were treated with 
higher regards in Amsterdam than abroad, the stock exchange was a great success. Other 
foreign trade innovations also were propitious to international economic spill-overs to 
Amsterdam. The public banks set up on initiative of the Amsterdam Regents allowed for 
the regularisation of coin export, as well as the facilitation of the formation of large capital 
associations such as the Dutch East India company – founded in 1602.1067  Also, the 
Regents saw colonial policy neither as the shield of ―universalist‖ beliefs, or as a means of 
political interference. Devoid of such beliefs and aloof of political centralization, 
colonialism merely was an economic means to enhance the Holland cities‘ local privileges 
and wealth.  Thus, in contrast to the universalist aspirations of Spanish and Portuguese 
expansion, Dutch expansion came to be characterised by relatively minor outlays for 
political domination and conversion of non-Christian peoples (Price, 1994: 85).  Generally 
speaking, Dutch mercantile societies favored the living-together-apart tradition abroad 
also; they allowed for pluralism abroad, as long as it did not hamper their economic 
revenues. All the above peculiarities of Regent policy allowed for an unprecedented boom 
of foreign trade via the Holland cities. 
                     Another position which the Regent group zealously promoted was a policy of  
non-interference by the church in public affairs, be they economic, political or educational 
affairs (Price, 1994).  With regards to economic affairs, Calvinist ministers voluntarily 
abstained from interference, as they saw commerce as the main way to safeguard the 
superior destiny of the Republic. The Regent policy was relatively unsuccessful with 
regards to education, however. Backed by Orangist administrators, the Dutch Reformed 
Church kept a firm public control over educational matters in towns and above all in the 
countryside. Controls were especially firm in the newly acquired ―generality‖ territories of 
Brabant and Limburg. Given their highly catholic nature, education was virtually grinded 
to a halt in these regions as a result of stringent Calvinist controls (Hentzen, 1920: 7-15). 
Unhappy about the public control over educational matters by ministers of the Reformed 
Church, the Regents arranged a private education system for their own children – at home 
or in small groups (Roling, 1982: 73).  Remarkably, this proto-example of private 
education in the living-together-apart tradition, would provide Catholics and a new wave 
of anti-Statist protestants with a key antecedent for their own school struggle in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
                   Meanwhile, the Regents‘ predilection for religious non-interference proved 
more successful in political matters. Contentious as it may have been, non-interference by 
the Reformed Church in political matters became accepted practice in the States 
General.
1068
 Nevertheless, one important concession was made to the Orangists in favour 
of a State religion: only members of the reformed Church were allowed to take up public 
functions.  This effectively meant that Catholics had become second-rate citizens in the 
Republic. Yet, in spite of the stigma on the Catholics in a nation labeled protestant by its 
Orangist dignitaries, the Republic never became religiously homogeneous. So, it is 
estimated that Catholics still accounted for 40 per cent of the population in 1795 (Boxer, 
1965: 125), compared to about 50 percent for the Reformed Church. The main reason for 
this is that, while in most parts of Europe ecclesiastical efforts to develop a confessionally 
uniform culture were actively supported by the political authorities , the Dutch authorities 
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– with their pragmatic priorities  – branded confessionalism to be the biggest threat to piety 
in the Republic, due its potential for sowing discord. Thus, starting with Johan van 
Oldenbarnevelt, the Dutch Regents refused to forcefully reform the Dutch people. Few 
Dutch rebels wanted to exchange a Genevan protestant inquisition for a Spanish catholic 
inquisition. Still, Catholic public services were forbidden in the Republic.  
               The emphasis on laissez-faire towards catholics that were practical enough to 
keep their beliefs private, undoubtedly had a lot to do with the fact that the sheer number 
of Catholics in the United Provinces made effective prosecution a practical impossibility 
from the point of view of civic order. From an economic point of view also, Dutch 
burgomasters considered effective anti-Catholic action suicidal; demographically and 
economically, the towns were heavily dependent on the influx of immigrant labour from 
adjacent Catholic areas (Van Nierop, 2002: 109). This is not to deny that religion was not 
important for the Dutch policy establishment. Religion played an important, though 
peculiar role in shaping unity in the Dutch Republic. The political, economic and moral 
order in the Republic was buttressed, not by a specific confessional system, but by a 
general Christian outlook of a natural order in which divine providence manifested itself 
visibly (Pollman, 2000: 231). In effect, this meant that, while being wedded to a secular 
form of foreign trade, the Dutch Regents systematically grounded much of their political 
discourse in quasi-theological wordings
1069
.  
                  One reason for which wealth during the Dutch golden age – from about 1600 to 
1670 – came to be concentrated heavily on the province of Holland,  was that in the States-
General, the Representatives of Holland always placed their local privileges and interests 
first, identifying Holland privileges with the common interest of the Dutch Republic.
1070
 In 
practical terms this means that, while the Holland Regents respected the fact that the 
Republic consisted of minorities with no hope of becoming a quantitative majority, they 
tried to push through their own dominance in a quasi-majoritarian way in the States-
General. With a financial contribution that amounted to 57 % of the Dutch Republic's 
budget, the Holland Regents only officially supported the principle of proportional 
representation. They in effect held on to a qualified principle of proportional 
representation, in which their interests and initiatives would lead the agenda, whether in 
the East India Company, the States-General, the Dutch church or other representative 
institutions of the Dutch Republic. 
A last salient characteristic of the Regent tradition is its engrained antagonism for 
the ―absolutism‖ of a central, territorial government.  So, when during the Dutch Revolt, 
Orangists tried to make William the new sovereign of the Republic, this met with fierce 
resistance of the Regents who identified the prince with the ―old corruption‖ of the 
Habsburg regime
1071
. Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Regents would 
systematically oppose the practice of appointing members of the family of Orange as 
Stadholders. In addition, they jealously guarded their own administrative privileges, by 
ensuring two constitutional guarantees. First, the political centre of the Republic was to be 
based in The Hague, a town in Holland within the influence sphere of Amsterdam. Second, 
this political centre would never command more than a few hundred civil servants
1072
 (‗t 
Hart, 1993).  
b. Orangist traditions: origins and salient characteristics 
              When in 1567, the Spanish duke of Alva was sent to Brussels as the new governor 
of the Low Countries, the prince of Orange was forced to take position for or against the 
Habsburgers. Alva‘s task was to punish all rebels, teach the higher aristocracy a lesson and 
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restore respect for the Catholic Church. He was to reduce the provincial States to a 
secondary role by freeing finances from their control and by garrisoning the principal 
towns (Vlekke, 1945: 137). In reaction to this infringement of rights, the prince of Orange 
finally decided to become a Calvinist so as to be able to give leadership to the key 
Calvinist rebel groups in the Low Countries. The contribution of Orange in the Revolt was 
substantial; as the richest man in the Low Countries, he invested much of his riches in 
recruiting troops. Nevertheless, a remarkable reversal of fortunes accompanied the 
formation of the Orangist tradition after the Revolt. During the Revolt it had been clear to 
everyone that if the United Provinces were to win the war against the Habsburgers it would 
be mainly due to the alliance between the Prince of Orange and the highly organised 
Calvinist militias. With victory in sight, however, both the Prince of Orange and the 
Calvinist zealots found themselves opposed by the urban and provincial regents, who had 
little or no share in either the Prince‘s military prowess or the revolutionary tradition of 
―Calvinist democracy‖ (Renier, 1944: 34-35). Both groups were accused of absolutism – 
be it Statist or religious – by the mercantile Regents, fearful of the ―old corruption‖ of the 
Habsburg regime. Still, the Regents found it impossible to do away with the prince of 
Orange. Before the Revolt already, the stadtholder had been the representative of the 
sovereign in the various provinces, including Holland.  As he became the leader of the 
Revolt, which he supported with substantial amounts of his personal fortune, it was 
considered impossible to do away with his office after the abjuration of the Habsburg 
emperor.   
              Following the dominance of ―Regent history writing‖ – the Dutch equivalent of 
―Whig history‖, historians have long denied that the Orangist tradition was more than an 
―absolutist doctrine‖. Recently, the Orangist tradition has been rediscovered: historians 
increasingly acknowledge that Orangism is rooted in explicitly republican notions (Israel, 
2004). According to Orangist republicans, the resistance against the corrupt Habsburg 
princes originated in the struggle by the Prince of Orange and the nobility in the southern 
Netherlands – Brussels, Antwerp and Gent – to protect their age-old privileges. In this 
tradition, not the Regent-induced ―Union of Utrecht‖, but the Orange-induced Pacification 
of Ghent constituted the key precedent in the unification of the Low Countries – the future 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. This interpretation has far-reaching consequences. For one, 
the founding origins of the States-General – the predecessor of the Dutch Parliament – are 
located outside the Dutch Republic in this account, namely Brussels – a point worth 
making in the context of the contemporary European Union. In addition, the prince of 
Orange and the industrial and landed nobility of the outer provinces are designated the 
founding fathers of the States-General – the democratic voice of the people. Finally, at the 
heart of the Pacification of Ghent was a recognition of the equivalence of the protestant 
and catholic religions.  Initially, this facilitated a depiction of the Prince of Orange, 
William the Silent, as the incarnation of religious pluralism (cf. Sneller, 1938: 15-17); 
although William‘s heirs eventually would position themselves as the defenders of the true 
Protestant religion against the economic relativism of Regent capitalists. This would not 
occur before the eruption of a dispute between Remonstrants – supported by the freedom 
of conscience champion Regent Van Oldenbarnevelt, and Contra-remonstrants – supported 
by the national synod favouring Maurice of Nassau – after 1610.    
               Up to the turn of the seventeenth century, both Regents and Orangists had 
followed  the example of the iconic William the Silent, who had championed both the 
rallying cries ―freedom of conscience‖ and ―concord‖ during the Revolt. While the 
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Regents were more inclined to champion freedom of conscience, given their emphasis on 
local trade privileges and international capitalism, they saw the benefits of supporting 
―concord‖ too. For this was the only way to reach a settlement with the nobility in the less 
foreign trade oriented outer provinces,  and the lower classes in Holland, who increasingly 
sought refuge with the Orange family.  The predisposition by both Regents and Orangist to 
stay on speaking terms, pacify differences and bolster settlements has often been 
summarised in the catchphrase  ―accommodating and fitting‖ (Hendriks and Toonen, 
1998). I shall refer to it as a tradition of pacification, given its origins in William the 
Silent‘s Pacification of Ghent.   
 As mentioned above, all in all Orangist traditions were weaker in times of 
peace than  in times of war. This had several whimsical effects, but also one very 
stabilising, albeit largely unintentional consequence.  The war time agreements of 1576 – 
the Pacification of Ghent – and 1579 – the Union of Utrecht – had been concluded with 
Orangist help. They implied, amongst others, an agreement between the Dutch provinces 
to preserve a common silver rate for the preservation of unity and mutual commerce. Once 
peace had returned however, private provincial interests soon came to overrule any such 
national monetary agreements again (Dehing and t‘Hart, 1997; Fruin, 1980). By 1659, a de 
facto silver currency ratio was set, following the Bank and City of Amsterdam‘s 1638 
initiative, the absence of an Orangist Stadholdter from 1650 onwards, and the other 
provinces substituting as centre of Dutch unity the Amsterdam Regency for an Orangist 
eminent head. From 1659 the value of the guilder – the main unit of account in the Low 
Countries since the Burgundian-Habsburg period – comparatively became very stable, 
more so than the English pound.  In retrospect, the lack of a central authority had the 
advantage of sparing the Republic the type of government engineered inflation and 
debasement – that is after the interprovincial debasement competition of the 1570s (Klein, 
1980). As a result, the interest on the Dutch public debt remained at a comparatively very 
low and stable 3 to 4% for much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, compared to 
more than 6% in other European countries (Dehing and t‘Hart, 1997 : 57). Finally, because 
of the Bank of Amsterdam‘s careful monetary management and its informal position as 
international currency depot, Dutch money was the key currency in many international 
transfers for most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  In sum, unhampered by a 
central Dutch authority, the City of Amsterdam‘s financial system developed by refining 
the techniques of old Italian and Antwerp masters, particularly in terms of perfecting the 
negotiability of foreign bills of exchange (Neal, 1990: 7).  On the downside, the lack of a 
strong Orangist tradition meant a paucity of incentives to institute a central public bank – 
equivalent to the Bank of England, able to issue banknotes. Similarly, there was no 
sufficient Orangist incentive to convince each province to give up its own Mint. All this 
would prove fatal to the geopolitical viability of the Dutch Republic in the long run. 
   Keywords in Orangist discourse were « religion, freedoms and property 
».
1073
  The resonance of Orangist discourse hinged on a notion of authentic liberties and 
―concord‖, which was especially popular among landowners, Calvinists, civic militias and 
guilds, and later even Jewish and Catholic groups. That is because, as stadtholders, the 
Orangist family played an important counterbalancing role for the Regent‘s monetary and 
anti-corporate zeal. Indeed, the great resonance of Orangist republicanism to a great extent 
lay in its emphasis on corporatism or ―Orangist democracy‖. Economically, corporatism  
provided major sections of the middle ranks and aspiring working classes with some sort 
of protection against the vicissitudes of conjunctural fluctuations and other uncertainties 
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besetting the small but independent merchant or craftsman. Civically, it turned the small 
merchants and craftsmen into a community, in which they had some sort of social status. 
Finally, politically, corporate rights gave the middling ranks a claim on the authorities, 
while at the same time keeping the less respectable ranks at bay (Prak, 1991: 94). Given 
the fact that the ―Stadtholderate‖ of several provinces usually was combined in the hands 
of a member of the Orange family, the Oranges provided the ideal rallying point for the 
middle ranks to counter the Holland Regents' overbearing influence on their corporate 
liberties and properties – hence the concept of ―Orangist democracy‖.  As defenders of the 
―real wealth‖ of the country,1074 and as flagbearers of Dutch mercantilism, the Oranges 
enjoyed quite some support from international merchants too.  In particular, as supreme 
commanders of the army and the navy, the princes of Orange were given credit for their 
efforts to repel the threat of French invasion and the English navy, and safeguard maritime 
trade routes – for instance through the blockage of passage to the port of Antwerp, the 
biggest rival of the Holland ports. As a result, even the Holland regents, who liked to 
oppose their own republicanism with the court's aristocratic policies and culture, were not 
convinced that the country could afford to do without an ―eminent head‖. There were two 
periods in which the Regents ruled alone and the Dutch Republic did not have a 
Stadtholder – from 1650 to 1672 and from 1702-1747. Both these experiments, however, 
ended in humiliating military defeats, in 1672 and 1747, and a falling from grace of Regent 
republicanism. 
Generally speaking, the Stadtholder was both a competing and coordinating 
factor in the Dutch Republic, depending on the issue at hand (Van Zanden and Prak, 2004: 
25-27). With regards to finance, William of Orange‘s role was ambiguous. On the one 
hand, it is fairly well known that William had established a personal relationship with 
several leading figures of the Amsterdam Sephardi financial circles as far back as 1673. 
Sephardic leaders on occasion risked large sums for the sake of the prestige, influence and 
favours which accrued to them from their links with the Stadtholder and the Dutch state; 
they went out of their way to project an image of themselves as being willing and able to 
perform significant services for both the Prince and the States General (Israel, 1997: 344; 
Israel, 1988: 271-272).  On the other hand, through his connections with Sephardic 
bankers, William of Orange transplanted Dutch financial secrets to London after his 
ascendancy on the throne of England in the 1690s
1075
. Still, it can easily be argued that it 
William‘s bridging function between Amsterdam and London, helped the former city 
remain at the centre of international finance – especially government loans –  up to the end 
of the eighteenth century – that is in spite of a trading system which was crumbling 
through the eighteenth century.   
Popular Orangism was inextricably entwined with Reformed orthodoxy from at 
least the period of the Truce crisis – the 12 years from 1609-1621 – onwards. The 
emotional power of Orangism seems to have derived principally from the identification of 
the princes of Orange with the interests of the Reformed Church, which in turn carried a 
heavy emotional charge because of the widespread tendency to confuse and conflate 
religious orthodoxy and patriotism (Price, 1994: 187). In other words, Orangism helped to 
spread a sense of patriotism throughout all provinces, not just Holland. A final 
characteristic of the successive Princes of Orange is that they were defenders of a more 
centralised conception of government. They often chafed at the fragmentation of power in 
the Republic - for example, the five separate Admiralties, including three in Holland, each 
with its own jealously guarded territorial base (Tracy, 1985: 200-201). They saw a greater 
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need for unity in the Dutch Republic, both economic and religious, which only a stronger 
central executive and a stronger consensus of beliefs could bring. Orangists abhorred the 
narrow focus on merchant capitalism which the Regents pursued. Still, what the Orangists 
were pursuing was not a French-style unitary government. Realistically, the most they 
could achieve was to stop the Regents‘ encroachment in old corporate privileges, in 
particular to do with «religion, freedoms and property‖ – e.g. the Dutch Reformed Church, 
guild-like corporations or the raising of land taxes.  Thus, while the Regents did not wish 
more than a confederal type of republic, Orangists republicans strived for a federal system 
which combined respect for ―corporate‖ liberties – in the premodern sense – with a strong 
central executive.   
 
3.  Antecedents to the rivalry between Whigs and Tories 
      a. Squirearchy versus merchant oligarchs 
     Late medieval England was the most centralised and unified monarchy in 
Western Europe. When William of Normandy claimed English kingship in 1066, he took 
charge of ―the best organized monarchy in all Europe‖ (Van Caenegem 1973: 9).  A 
remarkable interaction between English State – led by the King – and nation took place. 
Given that most ―great‖ English national institutions dated before the conquest if was 
difficult for the incoming William to start from a position of absolute personal authority. 
The natives of England by the 10
th
 century had developed a common law tradition 
unparalleled in its internal consistency and nation-wide cohesion to anywhere in 
Continental Europe.  They had also produced the most advanced, nation-wide currency in 
Europe (Loyn, 1984; Wormald, 1999).  All this had been achieved by a long line of Saxon 
successors.
1076
 William‘s place was not only going to be relative to the traditions 
established by this Saxons. Beyond Saxon kings, there had been an England and 
Englishness since at least 937, when Alfred‘s grandsons Aethelstan and Edmund defeated 
the Northumbrians at the unidentified place of Brunanburh. Since then, the English 
territory has stayed roughly the same and the people have continued to call themselves 
English (Colls, 2002: 8, 13-19, 380-381).  
Because they recognised the expansive power of the link between relatively 
autonomous national traditions and a centralised State apparatus, English Kings, from the 
days of William the Conqueror, became relatively more effective at controlling the relation 
between political power, civilisation and economic wealth than their European 
counterparts. By making the city of London – with its unique concentration of urban 
citizenship and cosmopolitan trade
1077
 - the seat of government, the Kings were able to 
build a Court entourage which not only would provide the political platform for the 
settlement of economic issues
1078
, but also the platform for the development of new civic 
habits.
1079
    
By the eleventh century already, most of the English shires and boroughs were in 
place as effective administrative units, with courts big enough and inclusive enough to 
involve ―the active participation of thousands of men of relatively of wealth and status‖  
(Campbell, 2000; Colls, 2002: 380-381; Loyn, 1984; Wormald, 1999). But, obviously, the 
English kings were already thinking beyond this territory, in terms of a new ―English 
empire‖. The autonomy of the city-state of London suggested a pacific way to secure 
Welsh, Irish and Scottish allegiance to this empire.  London embodied the logic that wealth 
accumulation would lead to voluntary citizenship
1080
 (Davies, 2002: 113). At the same 
time, Irishmen, Welshmen and Scots saw London‘s city-state tradition as a bulwark of free 
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popular opinion – against interference by the English State.1081  For instance, Welshmen 
dreamed of how their ancient empire would have London as its seat (Davies, 1990: 104-5)
 
1082
. Thus, London became the main pole of civility in the first English Empire
1083
, whose 
barbarous fringes to the north and west were largely defined in terms of distance from the 
city (Keene, 2004: 472; Gillingham, 2001). 
 When Henry VIII, in spite of his past as a Catholic orthodox opposed to the 
Reformation, decided to break with the Holy Roman Emperor (1533) and transform the 
English Catholic Church into an autonomous Anglican Church, the centralisation of Court 
authority in London reached its peak. What is often forgotten, is that it were provincial 
industrialists – most notably in the textile industry – rather than London merchants who 
acted as the engine of economic growth in England before the end of the sixteenth century. 
By the seventeenth century, however, the export of textile had significantly declined and 
London had become the new engine of growth. The switch to large-scale farming and 
wealthy landlords that was taking place since the 1580s, and the increasing opportunities 
of social mobility in London, facilitated such a shift (Fisher, 1971: 7). Up to the second 
decade of the seventeenth century a situation of relative status-quo lasted. By contrast, 
from about 1621 to 1721, England lived a remarkably turbulent period of political rifts, 
civic unrest and economic transformations. This period coincided with the intensification 
of warfare with continental European rivals, the reorganisation of the State apparatus 
around the financing of a national debt, and growing tensions between religious Dissent 
and Anglicanism, the monied interests and the landed establishment. It is also the period in 
which two groupings, the so-called Whigs and Tories, emerged, each one promoting its 
own views on how the relation between State, civil society and market actors should be 
reconstituted. Finally, it is also the period which gave the final impetus to London as a 
unique centre of not only overseas trade, government expenditure and consumer-oriented 
industries, but also British civilisation (cf. Fisher, 1989) – whose growing superiority 
provided the impetus for the emergence of a second British Empire.  
 The increasing turbulence in the 17
th
 century was caused by two dynamics. The 
autonomy and cohesion of the established elites organised around the Crown and the 
Church was threatened by financial, religious, and geographical disintegration – the 
growing population in the north of England was largely out of ecclesiastical control. On 
the other hand, two rivalling groups of challenger elites representative of the new financial, 
religious and geographical realities were seeking to establish a leadership position. The 
first of these groups was the so-called ―squirearchy‖, a new middling rank between small 
freeholders and aristocrats which benefited enormously from the sales of land after the 
Dissolution of the Monasteries. Realising that they needed a stronger authority basis in the 
provinces, the Crown and Church establishment entrusted the squirearchy with the running 
of the local counties in which they resided. Assuming respectable positions in government 
office, the law or trade, the squirearchy possessed the sufficient funds and status to engage 
in the buying up of cheap Church, Crown or noble lands. Up to around 1640, the 
squirearchy were a unique middling rank only known to English society. According to 
many, it was the secret of England‘s social stability and her domestic entrepreneurship – 
the squirearchy was responsible for much of the process of agricultural modernisation in 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The squirearchy not only bound together the 
various classes of the countryside. It also was at the core of a network of personal 
relationships emanating from the Treasury and encompassing the whole of rural society as 
well as the mercantile and financial society of London (Habakkuk, 1940: 2). In sum, the 
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squirearchy was at the centre of the English system of ―sound money‖.  Contrary to its 
continental counterparts, this system was not premised on international currency 
speculation and exchange, but on the exact opposite, namely containing market arbitrage 
around currency exchange to preserve a “real” link between money and the wealth of the 
nation (Braudel, 1985; Knafo, 2007: 14; Wood, 1991). Thus, England, and in particular its 
Parliament, stood out in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for having very few coin 
debasements and for trying to limit currency outflows from London –  by stopping foreign 
merchants from taking home their speculative currency profits in monetary form (Munro, 
1992).
1084
 At the end of the seventeenth century onwards, the English proto-modern system 
of national monetary management reached its first tipping point, with the invention of the 
Bank of England. More importantly even, by that time, the English monetary system was 
based on a de fact gold standard – where de facto bimetallism and its corollaries of 
seignorage and cross-territorial arbitrage remained prevalent on the Continent up to at least 
the mid-nineteenth century (Fetter, 1965: 2; De Roover, 1949; Knafo, 2006: 86)  
 The commercial and financial oligarchs constituted the second challenger elite. 
These oligarchs were at the centre of both the network of Dissenters – be they 
Presbyterians, Congregationalists or Puritans – and the commercial and financial boom in 
seventeenth-century London. Contrary to conventional wisdom, before the eighteenth 
century, the English State only informally tolerated the speculative practices of foreign 
merchant bankers in London, but did not officially sanction them. The Crown and Church 
establishment soon came to realise that preventing their own disintegration hinged as much 
on securing the loyalty of the London oligarchs as on mobilising the squirearchy.  This 
realisation, however, developed only gradually, from the 1640s onwards, and was 
intimately linked with the evolving role of Parliament, religion and fiscal rules.
1085
  It was 
also linked with the transition from an English to a British empire, and the State‘s 
increasing need from the late eighteenth century onwards of a system of sound money; that 
is a financial system anchored in the stability of the pound and in the ability of London-
based financial intermediaries to act as a world hub for long-distance trade.  
     b. Civil War and Glorious Revolution  
     When the civil war broke out in 1642, it was waged for religious and fiscal 
reasons.  When the Archbishop of Canterbury William Laud (1633-1645), encouraged by 
James I, tried to enforce the political authority of the Anglican bishopry, two things 
became clear. England‘s conversion to Protestantism had been superficial and 
incomplete.
1086
 And, following this insight, the real division in England was not between 
Protestants and Catholics, but between Anglicans and Protestants (cf. Russell, 1989, 1990). 
Anglicanism and Protestantism were very different things, although both aspired to a type 
of nonconformism – the first more territorial, the latter corresponding more to the 
personality principle.  Laud‘s attempts failed. More even, his failed attempts triggered a 
counterrevolution, led by the Puritan Oliver Cromwell; the latter   established a ―Godly 
Commonwealth‖ in which most royal and clerical authority was effaced.  After the 
breakdown of Cromwell‘s experiment, and the Crown‘s Restoration, the Puritan 
aristocracy and gentry finally opted for the Church and left the sects to their social 
inferiors. This prompted the crystallisation of civil society in clear denominational layers, 
with Anglicans
1087
 at the top and bottom, and Dissenters in the middle (Perkin, 1969: 34, 
196).
1088
 
 What has remained largely unacknowledged is that the Civil War also provided 
a critical conjuncture in England‘s fiscal and constitutional history.  Beyond the religious, 
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the conflict had also originated as a tax revolt (O‘Brien, 2001).1089  In many ways, the Civil 
War precipitated a greater financial revolution
1090
 than the Glorious Revolution half a 
century later. Clearly, the Glorious Revolution and the ascendancy of the House of 
Orange
1091
 enabled the emulation of several features of Dutch taxation and finance of a 
national debt.
1092
 Still, the centralised nature of the English fiscal system a few decades 
earlier had already stood in stark contrast with the decentralised tax farming system 
operated in the Dutch Republic.
1093
   Parliaments in London enjoyed legal sovereignty over 
probably the most centralised fiscal system in Europe. Compared with political systems in 
continental Europe, provincial estates, special privileges and exemptions  
hardly figured in England‘s fiscal process1094.  
 In addition to providing a critical fiscal conjuncture, the Civil War provided a 
critical foreign policy conjuncture. Cromwell‘s Rump Parliament broke with the Stuarts‘ 
hesitant legacy, and placed at the centre of England‘s foreign and military policy 
industrial, commercial and financial interests.
1095
  Policy was now decidedly geared 
towards the conquests of overseas markets and the destruction of England‘s great 
economic rival, the Dutch Republic.
1096
 
 The legislation of the Long Parliament
1097
 during the Civil War ensured that no-
one could raise taxes without parliamentary consent. After the brief experiment of the 
Commonwealth – the English equivalent of the Dutch Republic – which ended in 
confusion following Richard Cromwell's downfall, the Stuarts were restored. In a first 
stage, James II tried not to excessively antagonise Parliament. He justified the collection of 
heavy customs on the grounds that to cease doing so would disrupt trade, an argument that 
was acceptable to many. The levying of excise taxes, legitimized on the basis of the 
precedents under Charles I, was more grudgingly accepted. In a second stage, however, 
faced with his failure to persuade the parliament to repeal the penal laws
1098
 and Test 
Acts
1099
, James II decided to pack the parliament and replace it with a more compliant 
body in matters of religious policy (Speck, 1988: 146). 
 In the formulation of foreign and economic policy, James‘ government was 
obliged to take into consideration the views and interests of the City of London 
Corporation, just as Cromwell had done. This was because the overseas commerce they 
controlled and directed was becoming such an important sector of the English economy, 
still small in proportion to agriculture and the internal market but critical for certain key 
aspects, especially the export of cloth, the import of luxury products, and the supply of 
bullion needed for increasing the quantity of money in circulation. Moreover, the 
merchants of London, as the sole suppliers of credit, had obtained a stranglehold on 
government finances. Lacking a system of long-term institutionalised credit through a 
banking or ―rents‖ system, the English government was dependent on the London money 
market for the loans without which it could not function. In return for such services, the 
London merchants increasingly demanded that foreign and military policy be adapted to 
their need for the protection of trade routes and the expansion of overseas markets. They 
also wanted the preservation of their monopoly rights in overseas trade, along with a 
dismantling of the now ramshackle and corruption-ridden system of economic controls 
over internal trade, industrial production, land use and interest rates. Since it was barely 
represented in Parliament, the ―monied interest‖ as it was later to be know, exercised its 
leverage in more obscure ways, by lobbying at the Court, by getting friends or clients to 
introduce bills in Parliament, or by threatening to cut off the necessary flow of loans to the 
royal treasury. It was influential in Parliament because many landowners represented there 
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were sheep owners, who depended on flourishing cloth exports to keep up the price of 
wool, while others were passive investors in overseas trading companies. To some extent, 
therefore, the economic interests of landowners and London merchants coincided; 
although in other ways, over issues of war and taxation, they were often diametrically 
opposed (Stone, 1980: 29-30). 
 After the Glorious Revolution, Parliament was finally transformed into a 
permanent institution. The Declaration of Rights of 1689 accused James of ―levying 
money for and to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative for other time and in 
other manner than the same was granted by parliament‖ (Schwoerer, 1981: 295-298). The 
consequences were far-reaching: the availability of a permanent legislative machine turned 
parliamentary lobbying into a profession.  
 The Glorious Revolution did not immediately settle all problems of 
constitutional, fiscal and religious democratisation, however. The failure to reach a 
comprehensive democratic settlement was mainly due to the ongoing rivalry between 
squirearchy and London merchants.  In the wake of the Glorious Revolution, the members 
of the squirearchy were not offered positions by the new government, because they had 
been staunch defenders of James II. Aggrieved, they began to identify themselves as the 
defenders of ―Country‖, the antithetical counterpart of ―Court‖ –  that corrupt and ever-
encroaching political entity settled in London. The rivalry had a religious element too: 
while the rural squirearchy was predominantly Anglican, many London oligarchs had their 
roots in the Dissenter community (Speck, 1980: 26-31).
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   During and after the Glorious 
Revolution, the two groups came to identify with respectively the Tory and Whig 
traditions of democratisation.   
 
4) Resolving English leadership problems: the Whig and Tory traditions  
 The Glorious Revolution was not a class war
1101
.  Both Whigs and Tories came 
from the upper echelons of English society
1102
. Both targeted only piecemeal changes to 
the English constitution and abhorred the thought of radical changes. Both still envisaged a 
role for the Crown in the new era of parliamentary supremacy after the Revolution.  And 
although the permanence of Parliament distinguished the post-Revolution situation from 
the absolutism to which the Stuarts had aspired, both Whigs and Tories
1103
 were quick to 
argue that sovereignty lay not in the people but in the legislature, i.e. in division of power 
between the King, Lords and Commons (Goldie, 1980). Clearly, when respectable 
Englishmen used the term ―revolution‖ to describe the events of 1688 and 1689, or even 
the period 1640 to 1689, they did not mean by it the violent overthrow of authority, nor the 
transfer of power from one class to another
1104
. Rather, it was used in the sense of the 
revolution of a wheel turning round to a former state.  
 a. Whig traditions: characteristics 
 According to the winners of the Glorious Revolution, the Whigs, ―not a single 
flower of the Crown was touched; not a single new right was given to the people‖ 
(Macaulay, 1308: vi, cited in Speck, 1988: 1).
 1105
  The Whigs wanted to prevent another 
Commonwealth experiment at all cost.
1106
 Thus, the overthrow of James II had been much 
more about property than about liberty, despite the Whig slogan ―Liberty and Property‖. 
Or, more to the point, the Revolution had been more about ensuring the continuity of 
property and liberty rights for those recognised as ―competent and able‖, rather than the 
extension of these rights to all. Still, Whigs and Tories differed on important points. I 
summarise these different points in table A.2. 
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Table A.2: Whig and Tory traditions of democratisation 
 
Whig Tory 
 
Democratisation ideal-type : 
- Personality principle, city-state 
centered                                               
 
Market : 
- International exchange, credit 
economy 
 
Civil society : 
-  « liberty and property »  
- education: secular Anglican schools 
 
Politics
1107
 : 
- Parliament : 
a)  Assump tion that                                       
minorities can find expression in 
one of the major parties
 1108
 
1109
 
b)  ―popular sovereignty‖ expressed 
through parliamentary 
sovereignty (except during 
elections) 
c)  rotating representation 
independent from established 
interests
1110
 
- Government:                                                        
 representative of city-state principles  
« no taxation without representation 
» and ―those who stand to gain from 
a service provided by the state should 
pay for it‖    
 
Corruption : 
- lack of world-oriented nationalism and 
business autonomy 
 
        Solution to leadership problems:  
      - tradition of ―City monetarism‖ 
 - tradition of ―secular Anglicanism‖ 
- tradition of ―neutrality‖ 
 
 Democratisation ideal-type : 
- Territoriality principle,  
country-oriented                            
2)  
3) Market : 
- real economy 
 
 Civil society : 
- Ancient liberties and national 
duty 
- education: religious and 
        public spirited  
 
  Politics : 
- Parliament : 
a)    based on assumption that all 
minorities in polity are 
represented by established 
ranks
1111
 
b) « popular sovereignty » 
expressed through 
voluntarist institutions of 
Monarchy, Anglican 
Church, Civil Service and 
Hereditary Peers 
c)   Stable, locally embedded 
system of representation 
- Government:                                        
representative of an organic 
functional order  
 
  Corruption : 
- Lack of patriotism and bigger 
social-economic picture (narrow 
financial capitalism instead of 
Commonwealth
1112
) 
 
Solution to leadership problems:  
-  tradition of ―Anglican voluntarism‖                                    
 -  tradition of ‖Anglican democracy‖ 
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 Tories and Whigs interpret the Glorious Revolution‘s slogan ―Liberty and 
Property‖ in different ways.  In contrast with the Tory tradition, which stands for ancient 
liberties and cohesion provided by the ―real‖ wealth of the country, the Whig1113 tradition 
stands for new opportunities for accumulating personal wealth. Whigs were staunch 
defenders of a diminished semi-Orangist dynasty, a national debt
1114
, an autonomous Bank 
of England and champions of greater parliamentary clout for the Lower House.  They were 
fledgling proponents of ―monetarism‖, a financial system partial to a credit-using 
economy. In a system of monetarism, national wealth is not just an external reflection of a 
―real exchange‖ economy.1115 Rather, it is a reflection of the fact that money is an 
independent, quantitative commodity that can lead to the creation of territory-transcending 
customs and legislation – most notably in terms of promissory notes or contemporary 
variations such as Euromarkets.
1116
 
1117
 While Tories rallied more to a ―real‖, or territorial 
theory of money – albeit with a strong focus on established, voluntarist authority, Whigs 
generally sided with a personality principle of money in line with the international reality 
of the City of London.   
 Traditionally, merchants who developed newer markets with little protection 
from the English establishment rallied strongly to the Whigs. That is because, more than 
Tories, the Whig families have always assumed that their authority rested on a readiness to 
make money militantly and commercially from the city-state of London (Hobsbawm, 
1968: 17-18). This included wielding a permanent standing army and a mighty navy to 
assert the superiority of British world-state claims against Popish or underdeveloped 
nations‘ counterclaims.  
 Less violently, the Whig tradition is based on a conviction that all men‘s 
natural rights ought to be transformed into civil liberties; yet active political rights should 
be restricted to the property-owning elite (Dickinson, 1981: 37).  Historians often make the  
claim that one major difference between Tories and Whigs is that the latter acknowledge 
the right of resistance against those institutions that are tyrannical and have no legitimacy 
but their historical existence.
1118
 This is much truer if one considers domestic than 
international tyranny, however. Different from the ―radical Whigs‖ who emigrated en 
masse to the United States, British Whigs only consider ―secular laissez-faire‖ and 
electoral campaign strategies legitimate forms of resistance.  For instance, in terms of 
secular laissez-faire: before the ascendancy of the Whigs, the religious establishment
1119
 
had been a logical instrument of political and civic control – the expression of popular 
opinion often took religious forms.  Once in power, Whigs gradually subordinated the 
religious Establishment – symbol of Tory authority – to secular authorities, by nurturing a 
tacit acceptance of religious apathy.  Arguably, ―gradualism‖ is at the core of all English 
Whig traditions – but not their North American‖Real Whig‖ variant.  The gradualism 
principle prescribes accommodation between old and new in an ―organic‖, ―digestible‖ 
fashion (Bancroft, 1984; Norton, 1984). One illustration of the Whig propensity for 
digestible change, was its promoters‘ reluctance to come up with a new written 
constitution after the Glorious Revolution.
1120
  Afraid of a Tory-led counterrevolt, and 
cognisant of the resonance of informal arrangements such as the Magna Carta, the Whigs 
thought it sufficient to circumscribe the prerogative of the Crown and fix the succession in 
the Protestant line ―to give satisfaction to the constitutional feeling in the country‖ (Fisher, 
1911: 136).  A less reluctant expression of Whig gradualism is the Westminster model of 
government.  This model not only involves a strong cabinet government based on majority 
rule and a two-party system. Most importantly, it includes the doctrine of parliamentary 
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supremacy over popular opinion – ―popular sovereignty‖ – except during elections.  It 
provides that all minorities should be able to find expression in one of the major parties 
until the next elections; any popular revolution that is not channelled through the means of 
official elections therefore is considered illegitimate (Verney, 1991: 637).  
 Within the Whig family, there has always been a vociferous minority of 
radicals that does not subscribe to the gradualism thesis. These self-appointed ―real 
Whigs‖ abhorred the fact that at the first opportunity Whig leaders reduced the frequency 
of elections from three years to seven, quietly restricted the number of eligible voters in 
many boroughs, eliminated actual contests for seats through prior gentlemanly 
understandings wherever possible, and almost succeeded in converting the House of Lords 
into a self-perpetuating corporate body (Murrin, 1980: 381). Much in the same way as the 
Dutch Regents dealt with overzealous ministers in their ranks, the Whigs generally 
managed to slight the radical claims as unrealistic
1121
. 
 b.  Tory traditions: characteristics 
 Toryism involves an aversion for both national disunity and a State that 
encroaches on the natural order of society (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Blake, 1985; Gamble, 
1988; Gilmour, 1978
1122
). Tories are in favour of intermediate institutions such as the 
monarchy, the Anglican Church or civil service, which can provided barriers to state 
intervention
1123
. Nostalgic of the societal cohesion of early modern English society, the 
Tories have a vested interested in state failure, and a belief that a popular opinion led by a 
natural, voluntary hierarchy can keep market forces in check. In many ways, the Tories 
championed the voluntarism principle: the principle that to be a leader it does not suffice 
to be endowed with ample civic qualifications and property; one also needs to have 
internalised a ―public spirit‖1124 that prioritises the national interest over the self-interest in 
an effective way. In more practical terms, the voluntarism principle points to the fact that 
Tories would like to restrict active political rights to those who, by default of lowly 
subsistence problems, over several generations have developed a deep sense of 
commitment to ancient English liberties, and an ability to serve them by integrating habits 
of self-interest in the bigger picture of national duty. Given the above characteristics, it is 
not surprising that many Tories after the Glorious Revolution concluded that the Whig 
Statists were destroying ancient liberties and traditional families only to raise a swarm of 
greedy parvenus upon their ruin. For instance, before the Revolution, the old monopolies, 
such as the East India
1125
 and Royal African Companies, were led by Tories. The fact that 
after the Revolution the Whigs gradually encroached on the old monopolies‘ independence 
was a moot point for Tories.
1126
 
1127
  
 Similarly, but from a geopolitical viewpoint, there was a fear amongst Tories 
that with the Revolution and the ascendancy of William of Orange on the throne, the Dutch 
had found an effective means to settle in their favour the age-old conflict with the English 
for mastery of the world's trade. So, Pamphleteers such Robert Price concluded that the 
events of 1688-89 had produced a revolution in England that far from being 'glorious', was 
humiliating, disruptive, and economically ruinous. "We shall be supplanted by our 
neighbours and become a colony to the Dutch" (Price, 1702: 102, cited in Israel, 1997: 
360).  The Tories defended 1688 as the restoration of the ancient and virtuous 
constitutional balance of King, Lords and Commons. And while they were quick to 
recognise after the Revolution that James II had once threatened this balance, they 
maintained that the bigger menace now came from a new and more sinister direction: the 
fiscal revolution and the patronage politics of Walpole's "Robinarchy".
1128
 Corrupt rule in 
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name of a union of ―unnatural interests‖ was denuding the real wealth of the nation, as 
well as undermining its virtue and liberties. The Whig oligarchy was undermining the 
―national interest‖; it had come to represent self-interest in the service of corruption 
(Harris, 2002: 70). The old squirearchy was fighting against the ―shift from seeing money 
as wealth to viewing it as capital‖ (Trevelyan 1926: 102) and the rise of ―speculative 
market conditions‖ as a substitute for real national wealth (e.g. Goldsmith, 1766). In 
particular, Tories stood for the ancient right to secure the ―real‖ wealth of the family 
through inherited land.  
 Given Tories‘ trepidation about the coalition between a Whig State and the new 
monied interests
1129
, the foundation of the Bank of England
1130
 in 1694 was another moot 
point.  There was a lot of resistance against the Bill for the Bank of England.
1131
 
1132
  Most 
notably, the Tories feared that the Government would be strengthened by the establishment 
of a successful Bank
1133
.  In addition, seven of the first 24 Directors were descended from 
Protestant Refugees from the Continent, mostly French Huguenots. This was not 
surprising, as most prominent City merchants at this time were of foreign extraction 
(Hennessy, 1995: 186).  But as the financial revolution took its toll, Tories began to 
question whether France was any more a natural enemy than the Dutch Republic. In sum, 
they now embarked upon what Pocock has called a 'quarrel with modernity' siding with the 
ancients in the battle of the books. It was now the turn of the Tories to enlist, far more 
successfully than Court Whigs, the greatest literary talents of the age to denounce a 
standing army, bloated patronage and above all the corrupt alliance between government 
and money power that threatened to destroy the virtue and independence of the gentry and 
the House of Commons.   
 c. Continuity of the democratic settlement 
Between 1714 and 1721 all the tensions between Whigs and Tories slackened, 
and England entered upon a long period of relative tranquility. This tranquillity, especially 
from the Tories, is quite remarkable, given that England's Revolution Settlement created a 
centralised system of Court politics and one-party rule, closely tied to the disturbing new 
world of high finance
1134
 and parliamentary patronage. Why was the continuity of the 
settlement between Tories and Whigs rarely endangered?  One reason for this continuity 
was the creation by goldsmiths of a new banking system based on the issuing of bank notes 
through discounting.
1135
 The emergence of goldsmiths‘ banking business had been 
triggered by Charles I‘s 1640 decision to seize the ingots deposited in the Tower of 
London by the City merchants. After that, City merchants en masse sought asylum for their 
property with the goldsmiths (Braudel, 1973: 360).  
A major breakthrough was achieved in the 1660s, when goldsmiths started 
popularising the use of bank notes through discounting.  Based on this new banking model, 
country banks would later be formed, primarily to serve a local clientele outside the City, 
but gradually facilitating the emergence of a nation-wide discount service, centred on the 
Bank of England (Marchal and Marchal, 1977: 27).  Using the discount operation to issue 
banknotes, goldsmiths created a mechanism that allowed a debt form of money, while 
ensured the credibility of banknotes in terms of the real economy. Banknotes were still 
convertible into gold. But since they could only be converted back into gold once the 
assets against which they had been issued came to maturity, the risk of bankruptcy of 
financial intermediaries was greatly reduced (Quinn, 1994).  The national coverage and 
reputation mechanisms offered by the goldsmiths –  Quaker families such as the Barclays 
and Coutts
1136
, in combination with the lesser corruption  potential of local banknotes, 
543 
 
meant the system of discounting soon became widespread in England (Nevin and Davis, 
1970).   
 The discounting innovation provided one foundation for the English industrial 
revolution.  It ushered in a new system of issuing banks that could inject important sums of 
liquidity into the economy without causing inflation; that is, a highly responsive banking 
structure that could adjust the supply of money to the real needs of the English economy in 
an unprecedented way. Particularly helpful in this regard was that the Bank of England – 
the most prolific issuer of bank notes – left the market of mortgage securities to private 
banks – who suffered from irregular cash-flows for quite a long time in the eighteenth 
century.  With the Bank focusing on managing the national debt as well as on ensuring a 
non-inflationary system of note circulation, private banks were able to develop very active 
discounting operations closely corresponding to real economic transactions (Melton, 1986: 
40-41). Mortgaging, in particular, became very popular after the 1680s amongst 
landowners intent on consolidating their estates in favour of their offspring. This practice, 
which became known as ―entailing estates‖, in effect was a reinvention of the old 
squirearchy principle of safeguarding the real wealth of the nation through mechanisms of 
inherited land (Habakkuk, 1940: 7).
1137
 
Testifying to the solidity of the English system of sound money, by the late 
eighteenth century onwards it would become widely admired by Continental Europeans.  
In particular, the English banking system had proven far less open to the ―international 
corruption‖ of coinage debasements and bill of exchange movements than common in 
Continental Europe. As noted above, this domestic resilience – which sometimes 
resembled isolationism – had been triggered by the English Parliament‘s greater diligence 
in fighting monetary ―corruption‖.  For instance, the 1666 legislation ―for encouraging of 
coinage‖ abolished seignorage charges, in effect establishing free and unlimited coinage of 
gold and silver (Fetter, 1965: 1). While silver coins would long remain the preferred means 
of exchange for small sums, a de facto gold standard – against which silver coins were 
valued – emerged in England as early as the end of the 17th century, two centuries earlier 
than on the Continent.
1138
 Again, the English State had played a role in this, although a 
largely unintended one. First, under the Protectorate silver coinage had been in a 
particularly bad state, leading to the increasing use of gold for larger payments. 
Furthermore, with the State‘s decision to start the coinage of guineas in 1663 – and the 
fixation of the guinea‘s value to a first erratic but later increasingly narrow shilling 
exchange rate – gold became an increasingly popular means of payment. This reflected the 
health of the English economy as compared to for instance the Spanish one where copper 
was the means of payment (Braudel, 1973).    
Beyond the role of the State, the English domestic system had become 
increasingly monetised through a means of exchange that was not accepted abroad – 
helping to render international corruption of the English currency a distant memory – bank 
notes. As the demand from industry for small cash and short-term credit was growing in 
the eighteenth century, a group of specialised country bankers offered local banknotes to 
accommodate this demand.
1139
 By the end of the eighteenth century there were more than 
three hundred country banks in England. Through forces majeures, in particular banking 
crises such as those in 1793 and 1825, and calls to counter Old Corruption, financial and 
taxation policies would become more centralized. Initially much against their volition, this 
gradually brought country bankers into closer contact with the Bank of England, London 
brokers of bills of exchange, and indirectly, the Bank of England. Thus, with the benefit of 
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hindsight, country bankers – rather unintentionally – as early as the late eighteenth century 
were laying the groundwork for a national credit network with London at its centre. In 
particular, this four-party network ensured that money from the saving districts of the 
country – particularly the agricultural areas of East Anglia and the West Country with their 
seasonal surpluses, could be transferred to the industry-investing areas of the Midlands and 
the North (cfr. Briggs, 2000:  22-23).
1140
  
While English bank notes often were only local in scope, country banks‘ 
increasing use of a discount system centred on the Bank of England gave rise to a 
precocious national monetary system. The conjunction of State interventions and 
unintended, voluntaristic effects allowed the English monetary authorities to do what none 
of their Continental European counterparts could before the mid- or even late-nineteenth 
century: increase the stock of money without endangering the stability of the national 
currency (Braudel, 1984: 356; Knafo, 2006: 88).  The stable value of the sterling pound, 
the fading out of silver coinage debasement practices, and the early spread of banknotes 
and discount mechanisms came to symbolize English exceptionalism, as well as national 
pride in the tradition of ―voluntarism‖ on which it was partly built.  
 Another major facilitator of a stable settlement between Tories and Whigs was 
the drastically changed geopolitical reality. By the time of the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1702-13), Britain had emerged as unquestionably the financially and militarily 
strongest of the powers ranged against the might of France and Bourbon Spain. Contrary to 
Tory fears the Dutch Republic increasingly played a subsidiary role, especially at the sea 
and outside Europe. Tories soon came to realise that the Bank of England
1141
, a sound 
national debt, and a Parliament sympathetic to the monied interests, enabled the state to 
collect significantly higher revenues than its ―absolutist‖ rivals on the Continent. In 
addition, All this convinced the Tories that serving the English national interest indeed 
could best be achieved by overseas conquests in conjunction with commercial 
expansion.
1142
  While Dutch patriots complained that Amsterdam financiers were serving 
foreign interests rather the national interest, this argument could not be applied to England. 
Indeed, contrary to the Dutch Republic, England until the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century developed an essentially domestic form of industrial and financial capitalism.
1143
  
Just like their North-American industrialists at the end of the nineteenth century, English 
industrialists and manufacturers in the eighteenth century enjoyed a substantial amount of 
governmental protection, while benefiting from the stability and liquidity of the London 
money market.
1144
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 The remarkable continuity of British policy also had its foundations in the fact 
that England was not a confessional state in any narrow sense.
1146
  Its laws proclaimed it to 
be a pluralist protestant nation at home and an aggressively anti-catholic polity abroad.  
Religious differences between Anglicans and Dissenters were smoothed over in the name 
of the greater English interest of anti-Catholicism and the commercial wealth of Britain. In 
fact, as the Anglican church was relapsing into a docile branch of the patronage system of 
the political elite
1147
, and as almost all traders – dissenters and Anglicans alike – could 
benefit in some way from Britain‘s ruthless pursuit of colonial markets1148, a new 
consensus of “secular Anglicanism” emerged (cfr. Marwick, 1996).1149  This consensus 
held that all domestic religious – and in later centuries class – strife amounted to anti-
national factionalism.  The only legitimate religious strife was with Catholics, the French 
in particular (Colley, 1992a: 56). The paradox of secular Anglicanism is that it was not 
really protestant in nature at home. Yet successive evangelical movements would do much 
545 
 
to stre
, 1912; Haseler, 1976: 23). By being mobilised as a vehicle of secular 
Anglicanism, religious movements such as Methodism of course signed their own death 
warrant  
 A third reason for the continuity of the eighteenth century settlement simply 
was that Tory landowners became accustomed to the growing power and influence of the 
commercial and monied interests. This was not so hard, given that it soon became apparent 
that the hold of the former on the levers of power in the countryside and on the execution 
of policy at the center remained largely unaffected. City bankers and merchants were 
neither edging out the squirearchy on the benches of the Justices of the Peace in the 
counties, nor crowding out the aristocracy in the cabinet council in London
1150
. Foreign 
and military policy now certainly had to be accommodated to suit the monied and 
commercial interests. But then again, this had been the case since the end of the Civil War. 
Even in terms of domestic industry, the position of the Bank of England did not turn out to 
be such a moot point after all. While the Bank in 1694 drew mostly from the great monied 
and commercial magnates of London, it gradually spread its net across the countryside. In 
addition, Tories came to realize that the Bank of England did not in fact reduce rents or 
lower the price of land. Instead, to induce landowners to invest their surplus cash in the 
Public Funds, the Bank did lower the rate of interest. As lenders to the Government felt 
obliged to support it, monied and landed interests increasingly converged. This 
convergence was greatly assisted by social and educational developments, which provided 
both Whigs and Tories with a common cultural background and a common lifestyle 
(Cameron, 1967: 23; Stone, 1980: 82-84)
1151
. It was also greatly helped by the fact that 
another central financial institution, the Treasury, remained closer aligned to the Tories 
than the Bank of England
1152
.  
 A fourth reason was the apparent social mobility in England, an important de-
antagonising element in a rapidly modernising country.
1153
  Rather than being the result of 
the openness of the landed elite to penetration by newly enriched bourgeois, the stability of 
the English establishment owed more to the mobility, wealth and numerical strength of the 
―middling sort‖. This middling population emerged between 1660 and 1800 through the 
diffusion of a focus on financial property – the monetisation of individual and group 
exchanges according to a clear national standard – and the expansion of overseas 
commerce and internal free trade. The existence of such a large urban middling class 
focused on individual monetary wealth distinguished England from its continental 
counterparts, where guilds and rural common property kept playing a bigger role.
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1156
  On this last point, it has to be noted that the Corporation of London was a enormous 
exception to this rule, retaining a comparably larger amount of autonomy than its 
continental counterparts well into the 20
th
 century. 
  Willing to embrace the principle of possessive individualism championed by 
merchant-dissenters,
1157
 but unwilling to relinquish its paternalistic entitlements, one of the 
great strengths of the English landed elite was its capability to in turn co-opt those below 
them into the status hierarchy of gentility.
1158
  It is this last point that made the rise of the 
middling ranks so crucial for the continuity of England‘s policy establishment. Instead of 
resenting the aristocracy, the middling ranks eagerly sought to imitate them. Aspiring to 
gentility, they copied the education, manners and behaviour of the gentry (Stone and 
Stone: 409). This then, was one important aspect of the tradition of Anglican democracy. 
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The other aspect of Anglican democracy has been summarised somewhat ideologically by 
Young (1937: 7): ―The Tories are the true representatives of the people. They defended the 
people both against those who would destroy the institutions, whether in Church or State, 
which were their self-appointed way of life, and those who would manipulate them to their 
exorbitant advantage‖.  
 The appearance of nation-wide social mobility for the ―middling sorts‖ was 
greatly facilitated by the City of London
1159
, which played the role of centre of extra-
parliamentary opposition.
1160
  Indeed, the City of London from the 1730s onwards became 
―the critical source and springboard for nation-wide campaigns‖ against what was seen as 
the increasingly extensive powers being taken by the Whig landowners and their leading 
commercial allies
1161
. Up to the 1760s, when the Whig oligarchy started crumbling, the 
City in effect was the spokesman for the ―middling sort‖; it was the place where 
pamphleteers played their role of guardian of English liberties against an oppressive 
government, excessive taxation and monopolistic tendencies in commerce (Evans, 1994: 
154-155).  Thus, due to the relative autonomy of the London city from the English 
government
1162
, and its extra-parliamentary opposition role, a shift had occurred towards a 
sense of national consciousness or popular opinion
1163
 by 1760 (Sharpe, 1987: 120). 
 A last element accounting for the relative domestic tranquility was the wide 
scattering of industry throughout the countryside. Industrial capitalism in 18
th
 century 
England was highly developed in the countryside as well as in the towns.A good deal of 
the industries and manufactures of Britain were rural, the typical worker being some kind 
of village artisan or smallholder in his cottage, increasingly specializing in the manufacture 
of some product – mainly cloth, hosiery and a variety of metal goods. By degrees small 
peasant or craftsmen turned into wage-labourers. The little market centers where 
merchants issued to buy up the village products, or to distribute the raw material and rent 
out the looms or frames to the cottage workers, became towns, filled with workshops or 
primitive manufactories to prepare and finish material and goods. The system of rural 
―domestic‖ or ―putting-out‖ industry spread widely throughout the countryside, and 
tightened the meshes of the web of cash transactions which spread over it
1164
. This had two 
linked and important consequences: ―It gave the politically decisive landlords a direct 
interest in the mines which happened to lie under their lands and the manufactures in their 
villages. Thus, the local nobility and gentry invested in canals and turnpike roads not so 
much to open wider markets to local agricultural produce as to reap the benefits of better 
and cheaper transport for local mines and manufactures. The second consequence was that 
manufacturing interests could already determine government policy, unlike in the other 
great commercial pioneer, the Dutch Republic, where the interests of the commercial and 
financial interests of merchants reigned  supreme (Hobsbawm, 1968: 15-17).
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5. Position of Dutch agriculture in democratisation dynamics  
      Dutch farming since at least the fifteenth century was peculiarly modern, in 
the sense of being geared towards innovation and higher production (De Vries, 1974). An 
important cause of this modernity was that the Dutch Republic became a main commercial 
power in Europe in the 15
th
 to 17
th 
centuries, and, together with England, developed the 
highest degree of urbanization in Europe (Mokyr, 1976). This had two important effects on 
agricultural production. First, in contrast with many of its European counterparts, the 
northern (diluvial) provinces of the Republic did not develop an extensive agrarian-feudal 
dominated system, but rather thrived on the early rise of the cities in the thirteenth and 
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fourteenth century and the comprehensive inclusion of peasant farmers in nascent urban 
trading networks (Van Iterson, 1997: 51)
1167
. Second, the drain of labour towards the cities 
forced farmers to choose for technology-intensive, rather than labour-intensive production. 
Another factor inducing the early modernity of Dutch agriculture was the Republic‘s 
international openness and focus on trade, services, and staplemarkets. This openness, on 
the one hand, increased the available capital in the country, which made it possible to 
invest in agricultural technologies, and, on the other hand, increased the demand of rich 
burgers for agricultural products.  
According to Giele and Van Oenen (1976), Dutch society in the first half of the 
nineteenth century was stratified as follows - in descending order of status rank: the upper 
Regent bourgeoisie (3 % of the population), the lower Liberal bourgeoisie (22.7 %), 
Catholic and Protestant independent farmers (22.9 %) and the Catholic or Protestant 
working classes (49.9 %). Protestant and Catholic clergymen, depending on their wealth, 
belonged either to an intermediary class between the upper and lower bourgeoisie, or to the 
lower bourgeoisie (Van Dijk, 1976: 132). In England, on the other hand, Tory and Whig 
aristocrats represented the upper establishment layer, which was of a predominantly 
Anglican signature. Remarkably, the lowest status layer in England was composed by 
agricultural farmers of an Anglican signature. Nonconformist industrialists, finally, by 
1850 provided England with a broad middle class. As a late industrialiser, the Netherlands, 
by contrast, barely had an upcoming industrial middle class before the twentieth century. 
In fact, until 1850, the Netherlands had only two estates: the ―poor‖, which included all 
wage labourers, shopkeepers and small farmers, and the ―respectable‖1168. Because of their 
independence and economic association at a distance with urban merchants through semi-
urban marketplaces, Dutch farmers constituted the fifth and lowest rank of people in the 
Netherlands, after the Regents, the clergy, the commercial bourgeoisie, and even urban 
―common people‖ (Van Hamelsveld, 1791). In fact, due to the dominance of urban life and 
the lack of a strong landowner noblesse in the key Holland provinces, the agricultural rank 
was not the dominant rank in the body politic. This is not so surprising in light of the fact 
that even the commercial bourgeoisie from the eighteenth century onwards was kept out of 
the heart of the body politic: after the Dutch Revolt, the  Regent class with each generation 
consisted of less active businessmen, so as to form a closed political elite by the eighteenth 
century (Boxer, 1965).  
During the Dutch Revolt, and more precisely from about 1566, political 
conviction [based on religious value-rationalities] became more important than the 
‖faction‖ of patronage to which one belonged (Van Nierop, 1984: 675); Under the 
leadership of William of Orange, Calvinist revolutionaries formed the first ‗party‘ in the 
Low Countries. Once the main conflicts were over at the end of the sixteenth century, 
however, William of Orange distanced himself from radical Calvinist ideas to become a 
symbol of ―concord‖ in the United Provinces (Koenigsberger, 1971). Compared to 
England, due to the bigger influence of protestant radicals and the lesser influence of 
aristocratic traditions, politics in the Dutch Republic much earlier was transformed into a 
vocation in the Dutch Republic. In addition, arrangements were made to allow incumbents 
―to make politics a permanent source of income‖ (Weber, 1946: 84), thus allowing a group 
of incumbents to become conscious of not only normative, but also  material 
commonalities. More particularly, incumbents coupled the emergence of politics as an 
autonomous sphere to two dynamics. On the one hand, they claimed autonomy on the basis 
of their professional ―diligent activism‘, i.e. the moral discipline of not only conscience, 
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but also sober and hard work (cf. Walzer, 1965). Remarkably, professional politicians did 
not pursue profit-gains as a primary goal, as demonstrated by them taking a distance from 
active business occupations, and holding on to ostentatiously modest consumption 
patterns. On the other hand, they legitimised the autonomy of politics on the basis of their 
role as protectors of the general interest of the Republic, as materialised most evidently in 
pragmatic-bourgeois policies.  
While the Regent class‘ structural focus was on maintaining a form of 
international capitalism – thus maintaining the historical influence of the merchant class – 
from a political point of view, farmers were considered outsiders in the Netherlands 
(Goudsblom, 1988). One popular legitimation of this outsider rank by urban residents was 
the supposed lack of moral standards amongst farmers: ―No matter how clear you make 
things to them, you will not succeed in making them leave their prejudices; they will stick 
with their customs, because their parents have acted and talked like that.‖ (Van 
Hamelsveld, 1791: 510)
1169. Paradoxically, the Dutch polity‘s attitude towards the country-
side can much more readily be called liberal and laissez-faire than their attitude towards 
urban workers for two reasons. First, the  Dutch elites were not landowners, but 
commercially oriented patricians. Especially in the northern provinces of the Republic, the 
peasantry as a class owned a considerable portion of the land, and the privileged class 
rarely possessed – or wanted to possess- the power to held them in subjugation (De Vries, 
1973: 55)
1170
. In addition, Dutch elites developed an international form of capitalism: their 
ideological dominance and economic prosperity was based on their position in 
international trade and banking opportunities, not domestic agriculture and 
industrialization. For the Dutch elites, keeping the agricultural rank from holding sway in 
the body politic by keeping them at an ideological distance, was enough. In contrast with 
urban citizens, whose economic activities were regulated by restrictive guild practices (cf. 
North and Thomas, 1973: 145), farmers were allowed to modernize their economic 
practices at will
1171
. Because farmer-tenants were able to develop remarkably modern 
properties with regards to commercialisation and production
1172
, and because the 
landowner rank was weak in the Dutch Republic, little resistance arose from this 
separation from the political affairs of the Republic. In fact, farmers seem to have felt well 
served by this separation. On the one hand, it allowed them to maintain some continuity in 
their life-style and traditional values – many farmers were catholics and could express their 
faith unencumberedly in the protestant Republic. On the other hand, it allowed them to 
reap the fruits of their work and thrive economically; farmers used almost all opportunities 
to consolidate the laissez-faire policy by willingly increasing production for the market (cf. 
Van Zanden, 2000: 54)
1173
.  
A crucial achievement of especially northern farmers in the Dutch Republic, was 
the avoidance of a polity of urban exploiters. While an urban impulse to subordinate and 
monopolize was certainly present, it could not act unchecked in the Republic. On the one 
hand, by default of a central authority, the competition of the numerous cities restrained 
their monopolizing instincts. On the other hand, an incipient national economy rather than 
a series of cities with rural hinterlands was constructed from as early as the sixteenth 
century. Cities did not dominate nor orchestrate this process. With regards to market 
niches, many initiatives of agricultural specialization and occupational differentiation were 
instigated by farmers themselves. In this way, a commercial system took shape that flowed 
almost seamlessly from city to country.  Politics, on the other hand, was institutionalized at 
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the provincial level so as to check any possibility of arbitrary rule of a city. As such, a 
forum was created to link politics and market issues (De Vries, 2001: 81).  
Thus, especially the northern and coastal provinces were open towards market 
dynamics; standards of farming in the inland regions, with their predominantly sandy soils, 
were lower (De Vries and Van der Woude, 1997). While labour productivity in the coastal 
provinces was about twice the level of the sandy soil regions, the differences in land 
productivity were smaller due to a higher man:land ratio in the coastal provinces (Van 
Zanden, 1991: 40). Still, the gradual intertwining in these provinces of a rural farming 
economy with the flourishing urban economy in the westernmost part of the country meant 
this part of the agricultural country also demonstrated a higher dynamic from the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. When after the middle of the seventeenth 
century, the Dutch urban sector started declining, agricultural prices started falling. Yet, 
this did not lead to less developed types of agriculture. On the contrary, Dutch farming 
both in the northern, coastal and southern inland provinces retained its high standards. In 
the highly urbanized coastal provinces, with their highly specialized labour-intensive type 
of farming, a trend towards extensification through the introduction of new techniques and 
equipment could be perceived. In the inland regions, where labour costs were lower and 
family farms predominated, a trend towards intensification – for instance through tobacco 
cultivation – became apparent after 1650. Be it through extensification or intensification, 
Dutch farmers incorporated important improvements which allowed them to benefit long-
term benefits after 1750, when industrializing Britain‘s demand for livestock and arable 
farming products soared. Though prices of arable farming products fell dramatically after 
the Napoleonic period due to the flooding of European markets by Russian grain, prices of 
livestock and livestock products remained fairly stable. In fact, Dutch farmers profited 
greatly from the increasing sales of their products to Britain, Belgium and Germany 
(Bieleman, 1996: 14-17).    
The international orientation of Dutch agriculture was impressive: in 1829 
agricultural exports (40 million guilders) amounted to half the total amount of Dutch 
exports (80 million guilders) (De Jonge, 1996: 25). Taking into account this international 
orientation, the beneficial effects of the laissez-faire policy vis à vis farmers were visible 
until the agricultural crisis of the 1870s and 1880s. So, in the years after 1850 fertilizing 
techniques were introduced in Dutch agriculture. This allowed them to adapt their 
endeavours to the selling price and quantity they expected on the international market. 
Also, when after 1860 the expansion of employment in cities added to the shortages in the 
labour market, farmers readily focused on further labour-saving techniques as means to 
innovate. It is only at the end of the 1870‘s that a break occurred in the adaptability and 
growth of Dutch agriculture, and that the limits of the laissez-faire policy for farmers 
became clear. At the end of the 1870‘s international competition forced farmers to become 
more large-scale and specialized. Farmers had to shift their focus to land-saving 
technologies such as fertilizers, which made a higher output per hectare possible, and 
purchased feed stuffs, which were a substitute for scarce land. The lack of State 
intervention and credit institutions for farmers made this transition very hard. It is here that 
the co-operative movement, and the emergence of co-operative banks for farmers 
especially came into play.  
In sum, the Holland merchant establishment developed a hands-off policy vis a 
vis farmers in the Dutch Republic from at least the fifteenth century. This establishment 
found its basis in a neutralization of antagonism between the city and the country in the 
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Republic via the economic sphere. City and country in the Dutch Republic did not form 
opposite and conflicting spheres, so as to ease the passage of urban patterns of life to the 
countryside (De Vries and Van der Woude, 1997: 714-715). Dutch urban elites eagerly 
associated with farmers‘ ―independent‖ modernizing impulses when it came to achieving 
economic self-sufficiency at home and economic domination abroad. Since farmers played 
an important role in making Dutch international capitalism sustainable, their life-style had 
a place within the domestic policy establishment when it came to associative practices at 
the international level. Farmers themselves were not interested in exerting political-
communal influence beyond the economic in the Republic, but were happy to remain 
independent qua values and economic income. One result of this historical political 
separation of the agricultural rank, is that, when at the end of the eighteenth century the 
first promoters of a Dutch national identity appeared, they ignored farmers as moral 
outsiders, and focused on moralizing urban workers (see next section). This situation 
would last until well into the second half of the nineteenth century. In fact, it would not 
before the emergence of the agricultural co-operative movement that the population of 
farmers would be actively worked upon as a moral category. 
 
6.       The construction of a Dutch national consciousness 
      The legitimacy of economic leadership in the Netherlands hinged on two 
elements: 1) proving continuity with the past and 2) introducing a spirit of international 
pacification. On the one hand, the Republic was so new that the Dutch felt an acute need to 
construct a national identity that showed a continuity with the period  beyond the Dutch 
Revolt (Pollmann, 2000: 143). This tendency has inspired Dutch historians already from 
the fifteenth century. From that period onwards to the creation of the Batavian Republic in 
1795, Dutch historians, in search of a national identity, increasingly focused on the 
Batavians, the tribe once described as especially freedom-loving by the Roman historian 
and provincial governor Tacitus.  On the other hand, the prevalence of Dutch city 
merchants as the leading class in the Republic explains the Dutch habitus to pacify 
conflicts. Instead of a military style of armed conflict, the art of governing with the help of 
negotiation and compromise was passed on first from the city of Antwerp (Tawney, 1926), 
and later from Amsterdam and Utrecht. In fact, Dutch city merchants provide an 
exemplary case for the question of how to protect civilians from violent external attack 
without being dominated by their own military helpers (Elias, 1996: 11-12). Dutch naval 
captains were in large part from the middle and petit-bourgeois strata. On land, on the 
other hand, the Republic mainly fought with the help of mercenaries, commanded by the 
members of the one important noble dynasty, the Protestant House of Orange.  
The pragmatic, highly bourgeois policy establishment emanating from the leading 
Dutch cities, inspired the Dutch to attempt to make internationally neutral policies after the 
Dutch Revolt, and eagerly accepted the fruits of other people's revolutions.  So, with the 
exception of the Belgian Revolution in 1830, the most disruptive Dutch episodes (since the 
Dutch Revolution against Spain) were almost totally non-violent in contrast with the 
French Revolution of 1789. Nevertheless, despite this search of continuity, the evolution of 
the Dutch policy establishment from the end of the eighteenth century was more similar to 
France‘s revolutionary path than England‘s gradual path (cf. Stuurman, 1993: 96-97). In 
less than sixty years, several revolutionary steps were made to transform the Dutch 
Republic into a centralized State modeled after the French, as exemplified by the Batavian 
Revolution in 1795, the Belgian Revolution in 1830 and the revolutionary Reform of 1848. 
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Though the Netherlands received an executive monarchy in 1814, all the major governing 
crises in the Netherlands were linked to the revolutionary process in France. The Batavian 
Revolution succeeded thanks to the help of French military intervention; the Belgian 
secession was triggered by the July Revolution; and the Great Reform of 1848 was made 
possible by the revolutionary wave going through Europe with France as the epicenter.  
After this sixty year long period of relative disruption, the search of continuity settled in 
again in the Netherlands. First, with the institution of Willem I of the House of the Orange 
as the king of the Netherlands in the 1814, the centuries-old relationship between the 
House of Orange and the Dutch commercial classes has been preserved. In addition, 
despite the formal change of the Netherlands into an absolute monarchy narrowed the 
responsibility of the States-General, this parliamentarly assembly retained considerable 
power (Elias, 1996: 11-12).  Second, after hearing of the February Revolution in France 
that was quickly spreading to other parts of Europe, king Willem I decided it was time to 
calm down tempers in his own country.  He set aside his rivalry with the Belgian king, and 
pre-empted the revolutionaries‘ claims by commissioning a constitutional revision, which 
before he had consistently denied Dutch liberals. As the King himself admitted, on March 
the13th 1848 he changed from ultra-conservative to ultra-liberal within 24 hours 
(Andeweg, 1989: 45). With the constitutional reconciliation of Willem I and the Dutch 
liberals in 1848, the established and emerging elites settled for more stability.  The 
acceptance of ministerial responsibility and direct elections for the Second Chamber in 
1848, and several other reforms drafted by the liberal leader Thorbecke, were the most 
significant concessions made by the king. Of course, it took decades before the legal 
change led to the recognition in practice of collegial cabinet government, and of the 
necessity for a government to enjoy the confidence of a parliamentary majority. 
  A third explanation for the constitutional stability after 1848, finally, is that 
liberals and conservatives, the dominant political elites in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, chose to forge a national identity reminiscent of the Golden century (1580-1670), 
i.e. as a politically stable, pacific and neutral nation, with a central role in the international 
economy. To make this identity viable, the Netherlands was now pictured as a big nation 
with a small economy, instead of the small nation with a big economy of the Golden 
century. In addition, the revolutionary political period at the turn of the nineteenth century 
was erased from national memory. For instance, there was no commemoration of the 
hundredth anniversary of the Batavian Revolution in 1895, the period from 1795-1813 was 
called the ―French period‖ in school books, and the year 1813 was glorified as the year of 
the national liberation from French tyranny. Only the year 1848 found an organic place in 
national memory, as the date of the conciliation between king Willem II and the liberal 
camp (Stuurman, 1993: 97). Instead of the revolutionary French period, the more 
―civilized‖ and reformatory English influences were emphasized. Not surprisingly, these 
influences were deemed more appropriate for building the identity of an international 
nation with an open economy. In this way, the conditions were shaped to build a national 
consciousness emphasizing the continuity of the political and the economic. 
 
7. Leadership in the Dutch Co-operative movement 
The success of Co-operative banking in the Netherlands would depend on 
the availability of ―leaders of sufficient authority‖, as the 1872 report of the State 
Commission on Agriculture stated. Social liberals, though very supportive of Co-operative, 
did not manage to become leaders of the working classes  – in the farmers they were not 
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really interested. Liberals, old and new alike, favoured a laissez-faire policy and 
emphasized the virtues of individuality. They became promoters of self-help, rather than 
paternalism
1174
.  As members of government, liberals felt they could not directly intervene 
in the market. This approach at a distance proved to be unrealistic and impracticable for 
the targeted classes. During the 1880‘s the labour movement and the social liberals drifted 
further apart, mainly because the new liberal leader Treub, faced with the emergence of a 
socialist party, was taking a much more anti-socialist position than his predecessors. Treub 
did not expect anymore that charity, self-denial and mutual help would spontaneously 
emerge from civil society. Instead he now promoted a strong social politics from the State 
so as to impose forms of solidarity and the superiority of the general interest to the private 
interest. Though Treub (1897: 157-158) had less hopes in Cooperation, he still felt positive 
about it. What had fundamentally changed however, was that Cooperation was now 
entrusted only the elements of morality, independence and productivity, and not so much 
solidarity and self-denial in favour of the general interest . 
The first Co-operative leaders to emerge were socialists. This is not surprising, 
since socialists were the first pillar to actively organize for action amongst the working 
classes. So the first association that can be rightfully called a trade union was the General 
mutual helpfund ―Typography‖ (―Boekdrukkunst‖), founded in 1861 in Amsterdam. This 
union worked towards the purpose of ―giving moral and material help‖ to its members 
(Brugmans, 1929: 265), an idea to be picked up by the Co-operative banks in a later stage. 
In 1866, the typographists decided to organize themselves interlocally, by founding a 
national trade union. This idea of local-national organisation was picked up too by the Co-
operative banks. Finally, the advise of the leaders of the Dutch Internationale, long before 
the existence of Co-operative banks, was to ―found self-help banks, savings banks, and 
shop unions…to help and support each other‖ (Brugmans, 1929: 271).   
Whether socialist leaders had sufficient authority, is another issue than the 
innovativeness of their initiatives. Before the 1880s, socialists‘ strategies were too 
intellectual-rational, too diluted and not antagonistic enough. For instance, in 1869 the first 
Dutch section of the Internationale was founded, by a few youth that were not content 
about the progress of the workers‘ movement. Typical for the cautious mentality prevalent 
in the Netherlands, the Internationale was not markedly socialist or revolutionary, in the 
sense of aiming at the commonalization of privately owned production resources. Instead 
the statutes of the Internationale were markedly vague, with the purpose of binding as 
many workers as possible from all different strands to the workers‘ movement. In addition, 
all violence was condemned, ―because existing laws have to be respected, because they are 
deemed to represent the will of the majority of the people‖ (Brugmans, 1929) . As a result, 
socialist hardliners were alienated and newcomers were not getting clear messages. 
Surprisingly, with the emergence of the much more radical labour union SDB in 1881, the 
tendency totally shifted towards extreme antagonism against the existing capitalist system. 
Yet, by default of a grassroots radical movement, a strange split became clear in the 
purposes of the socialists with regards to Co-operatives. On the one hand, in line with 
Marxist theory, already established Consumer Co-operatives were deemed to be much too 
profit-oriented, i.e. a continuation of capitalist tendencies. On the other hand, the socialists 
needed these co-operatives for economic reasons, i.e. to invest money in the socialists‘ 
labour movement. These mixed signals did not help socialists in gaining much authority as 
Co-operative leaders.  
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The first leaders of sufficient authority were catholic priests and protestant 
publicists, who, inspired by Pope Leo XIII‘s Rerum Novarum, increasingly took interest in 
the lower classes‘ fate. Up till then most moneyed catholics rejected social legislation and 
labour strikes; they preferred to preserve the customary paternalistic charity system around 
local churches. With the encyclical Rerum Novarum, the pope signalled that social 
problems had to be resolved through association between the classes, not class antagonism. 
Still, he claimed that workers had the right to defend their rights and that social legislation 
was in order. Though the Rerum Novarum was written in reaction to the threat of the 
socialist movement with regards to the urban working classes, Dutch catholics were 
convinced that it was even more relevant for farmers . A first catholic leader that emerged 
was the local Norbatim Gerlacus van den Elsen, representing farmers in the southern 
provinces of the Netherlands. Van den Elsen, as most catholics, was allergic to 
revolutionary changes. In order to prevent peasants losing patience and reacting against the 
authorities, as the socialists would do, he urged Catholics to take all possible non-violent 
action to improve the living conditions of farmers.  So, he stated: ―the concerns of the 
church are not only limited to the salvation of the souls, the church does not oversee the 
things that belong to the moral life…Therefore, I cannot provide a better advice to our 
farmers than to run to their clergymen and ask them for guideness and leaderhip.‖ 
(NoordBrabantsch Dagblad, november 24th, 1892) . Two factors made the appeal of 
confessional leaders even greater. First, the socialist movement was not so large that it 
could not be contested. Second, the Protestants were already emancipating due to a 
struggle with the liberals to get the government to finance denominational schools. 
With regards to agriculture, Christian Publicists insisted that the agricultural class 
itself should take command of its condition through purposive organisation. In doing this, 
they pointed to the success of farmer organisations in Germany and Belgium. This success 
was contrasted with the work of the existing provincial agricultural societies, of a liberal 
nature. These liberal societies did not appeal to the publicists because they reduced the 
needs of farmers to a purely economic-technical problem, and failed to plead for more 
agricultural production. The ultimate proof of this was that the liberal societies did not 
even bother to organize the collective purchase and sales of feed and fertilizers. 
 
8. The emergence of Dutch Labour Unions 
In most European countries the emergence of political contestation – in the 
form of socialism and labour unions – and economic industrialization went hand in hand. 
This was not the case in the Netherlands, which lived its first wave of industrialization at 
the moment England was in the midst of its second wave. Because of the belated 
industrialization of the Netherlands, an according to European standards peculiar situation 
arose in the Netherlands. Socialists became politically involved before an industrial 
working class had formed (Brugmans, 1929: 295; Holthoon, 1985: 321). Contemporaries 
testified to an enormous lack of capitalistic mentality in Netherlands until 1870 
(Brugmans, 1929: 59). Until about this year, the prevailing idea in the Netherlands was 
that differences in classes were instituted by the Will of God . Only in the 1870‘s did the 
Dutch working class gradually wake up to the fact that they had to take up the 
improvement of their own condition; it is around this period that the first unions were 
founded and the first signs of a co-operative movement became perceptible.  
In fact, the first labour union established in the Netherlands was social-liberal of 
character. The ANWV  was founded in 1871 by artisans. Though the ANWV officially 
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was religiously neutral, it in fact accommodated many protestants. The ANWV strove for 
better working conditions, higher wages and better social legislation – just like the 
confessional and socialist unions would later. Contrary to the socialists, however, the 
ANWV wanted to maintain harmonious relationships with employers; they did not want to 
tamper too much with the existing separation of the political and the economic. The 
ANWV, supported by the Commission  in charge of discussing the ―social question‖ in the 
Netherlands in the 1860s and 1870s, saw the promotion of Co-operation as one of its main 
purposes. After 1875, the orthodox protestants decided to separate from the more liberal 
protestants, by establishing their own union, called Patrimonium . The more paternalistic 
appeal of Patrimonium directly led to the decline of the ANWV, which without avail 
called for more self-help and individual initiative amongst workers . Different from social-
liberals, the protestants saw consumer co-operation always in connection with socialism. 
They therefore were ardent enemies of any consumer co-operation. The union established 
by Catholics in 1888, the RKV , apart from being a weakly organized union, until the 
beginning of the twentieth century shared the protestant belief that consumer co-operation 
was contrary to a natural world order based on the will of God (Otten, 1924: 143). Yet, 
after the railway strikes of 1903, the catholic labour union woke up to the socialist 
challenge. Even more conservative catholics started to understand that a national labour 
union was necessary to counter the red threat, be it under the conditions that a priest would 
supervise the union, and members were also affiliated to a catholic church. As a 
consequence, more and more voices in favour of consumer co-operation could be heard. 
Despite the resistance against consumer co-operation shown by the shopkeepers and local 
traders during a meeting of the RKV in 1900, the new argument a few years later was that 
―few shopkeepers would be bothered by consumer co-operatives‖ (Aengenent, 1909: 199); 
only the less competent shopkeepers that already were heading for bankruptcy would be 
hurt.  
The socialists for their part, at first were not very successful either. For a long 
time, Dutch socialists had to derive their purpose from intellectual inspiration from other 
European countries, rather than the actual needs of the working class. In addition, part of 
the constituency of the socialists were not urban workers, but farmers; socialists had to 
deal not only with the social problems of the workers, but at the same time had to consider 
the totally different difficulties experienced by farmers as well. As mentioned before, this 
strained the socialists to develop a labour-movement based on the labour-capital 
antagonism inherent in a ―pure Marxist ideology‖ (De Beus et al., 1989: 54). Rather, 
especially before 1880 (and again from 1905 on), it made them willing to make 
compromises. It is only in the 1880s that the socialists‘ calls for proletarian action found 
grassroots support amongst the worse-off workers. In 1880 all local unions came together 
in the national union SDB . In the best Marxist tradition, the SDB strove for a total union 
of political and economic affairs. The SDB‘s purpose was to institute a classless society 
and abolish private property. While a substantial amount of workers joined the SDB, 
almost no farmers however joined. Unhappy with the non-compromising nature of the 
SDB, a new socialist party was founded in 1894, the SDAP, which ultimately also wanted 
a union of the political and the economic in a classless society, but, in the mean time 
wanted to press practical reforms in the existing capitalist system. Subsequently, in 1905 a 
much more moderate labour union, the NVV , was established, as an affiliate of the SDAP. 
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9. Leadership in the English Co-operative movements 
a) Owenite Co-operation 
Robert Owen, the Welsh-born manufactorer and utopian millenarist, is  
often the starting point for any history of Co-operatives. Owen‘s views on improvement 
for the working classes positioned co-operation beyond the « irrational » limits of class (cf. 
Tsuzuki, 1971: 33-35). Calling classes the embodiment of the false principle of division in 
the old England, Owen endeavoured the opposition  « productive / non-productive »   and 
the principle of « but one class »  for Chartist forces of class struggle. In doing this, he 
depended to a large extent on the voluntary benevolence of the middle class, which « 
possess the greatest breadth of useful knowledge within its circle to form a Rational 
Community », and the upper class, ―with their trained perceptions of the principles of 
policy and of being governed‖ . Fraught with the prejudices of his own class, Owen‘s 
socialism was antagonistic to any form of people‘s democracy. Rather than being a 
defender of the status quo in politics – as many contemporaries accused him of   , Owen 
was more of a cynic of any type of low politics, as he distrusted any authority established 
on the principle warring interests .  
 When he came back to England in 1829, he found a changed political climate; 
most notably, the repeal of the Combination Laws  made possible the development of trade 
union activitism in particular and self-organisation by the workers in general (Youngjohns, 
1954: 21-23) .  While under Owen‘s leadership two bodies of working-class activity were 
founded in the 1830s, the peaceful Equitable Labour Exchange and the more revolutionary 
Grand National Consolidated Trades Union ,  the combined offensive of government, 
courts and employers soon led to their downfall   .  
After the collapse of the Union, working class leaders increasingly turned their 
attention to Chartism and its campaign to gain the vote as a means to improve their 
situation. Owen did not share this "Chartist" dream. He believed that whilst there are rich 
and poor, the rich will rule - whoever has the vote. After the collapse of the early co-
operative store movement and of the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union, non-
violent Co-operation went into eclipse. The working classes turned their attention to direct 
political action, to the ten-hour movement and to Chartism. 
b) Violent Co-operation 
Though Owenism, as an elitist movement, made a certain impact on 
Chartism, many Chartists rejected Owen‘s antagonism for democracy. Unlike Owenism in 
the 1820s and 1830s, Chartism , as a movement for Parliamentary Reform and an attempt 
to restore by political means the workers‘ right to the whole produce of labour , from the 
late 1820s onwards was uniquely successful in mobilizing the co-operation of whole 
communities and of whole trades. Often called the first working-class movement – though 
this has to be very broadly interpreted  – Chartism's strength peaked in times of depression 
and unemployment: 1838-39, 1842 and 1847-48 .  
 
Following the ―Great Betrayal‖ of the middle ranks, « the two classes were 
ranged against each other in a hostility which daily grew more bitter » (Briggs, 1956: 70). 
More correctly, after 1832, antagonism between workers and the middle ranks was 
increasingly cast in terms of classes, as exemplified in case of the Anti-Corn-Law League 
– that ―uniquely powerful instrument in the forging of middle-class consciousness‖ 
(Briggs, 1969: 59). The industrialists leading the League    declared that the repeal of the 
Corn Laws would mean lower food prices, better trade and greater freedom. The Chartists 
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replied that repeal would not make any difference without political power; many Chartists 
did not believe in the salutary effects of laissez-faire ―free trade‖. When in 1846 the Corn 
Laws were repealed and trade improved in many industry sectors, the Chartists‘ discursive 
legitimacy in the eyes of many working mean took a heavy blow. The introduction of ―free 
trade‖ economic reforms in addition to social reforms  under the Conservative government 
of Peel undercut Chartism. By 1850 the prophecies of the Chartist leaders had foundered, 
those of the Anti-Corn League had gained credibility. As the decades passed, working 
people increasingly looked to parliamentary action to protect their autonomous 
organisations, rather than as a means of greater government intervention. So, as workers 
wanted freedom for trade unions to operate rather than government intervention in wage 
bargaining, they similarly wanted protection for the funds of their own organisations of 
self-help, rather than government aid. In other words, gradually, the working classes 
became supporters of the laissez-faire correlative of free trade finance.  
The strength of Chartism had lain in an unquestioning belief in the efficacy of 
political change to bring about social improvement. In the late forties many of these ideas 
were no longer so potent. In addition, the fact that the Irish in England contributed an 
important element to Chartism at all levels divested it of much of its original English and 
constitutional appeal . Besides ruining all chance of political support from the House of 
Commons, the Irish angle of Chartism created much division in the working classes, and 
ultimately lost the movement much popular support. As testified by Marx himself : ―Every 
industrial and commercial centre in England now possesses a working class divided into 
two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English 
worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to 
the Irish worker he regards himself as a member of the ruling nation and consequently he 
becomes a tool of the English aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland, thus strengthening 
their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices 
against the Irish worker.‖ 
As became clear in the writings of Francis Place, many of the non-Irish Chartist 
leaders of the middle ranks – later classified in the groups of either philosophical radicals 
or labour aristocrats – saw themselves not as leading a mass Movement, but a political 
pressure group working to persuade the electors and to educate the non-electors in the need 
for democracy. They  resented the way in which a movement which they had nurtured in 
its earliest days had been perverted from its ―rational and peaceful‖ course by a mass of 
irrational and violent anti-Poor Law protesters – most notably the Irish radical Feargus 
O'Connor. In trying to distance themselves from the working-class image conjectured by 
the elites during the period of violent Chartism, namely that of ―the masses as an irrational 
and potentially savage mob‖, these leaders increasingly favoured an ―anti-Statist‖, 
voluntarist style to achieve their purposes. As such they joined the many other lower-
ranked elements that already were aloof of politics out of tradition, dependence or belief. 
In fact, they faced up to the new reality that, in face of Chartism‘s lack of a viable and 
constructive alternative, many trades had already begun to organise for more limited but 
achievable aims (Thompson, 1984: 319-320; 333-334;389-393) .  
The voluntarism of the workers could take different courses, all of which in some 
way were connected to religion. First, many unskilled workers took recourse to numerous 
competing sects, which rather than dealing with the problems of the proletarian, evaded 
them . Second, more and more workers joined trade unions and – to a lesser extent – the 
Co-operative movement – which often sprung out of Chapel life, and typically were led by 
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Nonconformist men – mostly Methodists but also Wesleyan Baptists.  In fact, though 
rarely mentioned in Co-operative histories or theories religion played an all important, 
though peculiar role in the rise of English Co-operatives in particular, and working-class 
institutions in general .  Many of the promoters of the co-operative philosophy were 
middle ranked people whose beliefs arose much more from religious ethics than from a 
socialist vision  (Thornley, 1981: 6). In addition, Dissent, or Nonconformity, played a 
twofold historical role in bringing about new organisational styles in England (Perkin, 
1969: 196). First, Nonconformity was a means to express emancipation from paternalism 
and the dependency system before it had matured in overt class antagonism. Second, 
Dissent provided the model for class organisation; it was an active example of the benefits 
of non-violent organisation geared towards improvement. Especially the lower and lower-
middle ranks of early industrial society were receptive to Evangelical Nonconformity 
(Gilbert, 1976: 83-87). The Methodist movement in particular proved to be hospitable to 
the symbolic expression of status withdrawal and independence for artisans, tradesmen, 
and manufacturers. Since several of the founding fathers of the Rochdale Co-operative 
were handloomweavers, their beliefs are of special relevance to this study. Between 1740 
and 1820, handloom weavers turned massively to Nonconformity. In doing this they found  
a way to make sense of the relation between economic rewards and their own industry and 
entrepreneurial skill. Infused with the spirit of ―freedom and independence‖ and a 
―consciousness of the value of character and of their own weight and importance‖, 
handloom weavers perceived their economic position to be dependent mainly on their own 
exertions.  
Nonconformists‘ predilection for an organisational style geared towards promoting 
moral self-help via the market went hand in hand with an alternative version of laissez-
faire free trade: «voluntaryism». Voluntaryism was a subtle mixture of traditional 
Dissenting ideals and political liberalism (Ellens, 1994: 269). The voluntary principle was 
―a version of laissez faire with religion and education at its heart, couched in the language 
of political liberty‖ (Helmstadter, 1979: 149). Anglican privileges concerning education 
and ecclesiastical taxation became the focal points of antagonism between voluntaryists 
and establishmentarians. That a nonconformist, voluntaryist thread runs through the history 
of Co-operation will become clear in the next section, when I shall discuss Co-operation 
between labour aristocrats from the end of the eighteenth to the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  
c) Labour aristocracy Co-operation 
Less conspicuously than the later Owenite movement, the lower middle 
ranks – coined ―labour aristocracy‖  in the 1850s – from Yorkshire, the naval ports of the 
south of England, the East and West Midlands and East Anglia had already started their 
own practical-ethical movement in the late eighteenth century. As noted by Bamfield 
(1998: 16-17; 30-31), the co-operative bread and flour societies of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries had already adopted many of the practices of the co-operative 
movement as it developed after the Rochdale Pioneers in the 1850s. These early societies 
were founded in particular where the corn market was leading to bread shortages during 
1795 and 1816 (Alexander and Akehurst: 1999: 8-9). More generally speaking, in the 
period from 1759 until 1820 , about 46 flour and bread societies were established in 
England and Scotland ―for the Purpose of Reducing the Unexampled Prices of Bread and 
Flour, and to Prevent the Adulteration of these Articles with Materials of Inferior and 
Pernicious Qualities‖. There were four main categories of flour and bread company, small 
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flour clubs, shipwright societies (in naval dockyards), friendly society corn mills, and joint 
stock flour and bread companies. The large societies such as the Hull Anti Mill, the 
Sheffield Club Mill, and the Birmingham Flour and Bread Company were vertically 
integrated consumer organisations operating with transferable stock. 
In line with Thompson‘s (1971,1991) writings on the lingering ―moral economy‖  
in eighteenth and nineteenth century England, these societies combined business practices 
with moral ideals.  So, apart from the antagonism against adulteration and exploitation by 
local millers and bakers, the societies provided bread and flour to a subscribed community 
below local ―market prices‖  and were owned directly by consumers or operated indirectly 
through a friendly society.  The members and leaders of these societies were antagonistic 
to the material exploitation by local monopolists who ―fixed‖ market prices (Birchall, 
1994: 4). Thus, rather than identifiying the market as a site of material exploitation, they 
saw it as a means of moral improvement against local monopolies that thwarted the natural 
workings of market prices.  In contrast with the often violent protests against the disruption 
of the old moral economy, the leaders of these societies were preaching non-violent 
economic dissent, in line with non-conformist preaching. Also noteworthy, is that, 
generally speaking, the labour aristocracy viewed technological innovation as a debasing 
threat to their higher artisanal culture. So, ―dishonourable‖ workshops employing workers 
who had never had a ―proper apprenticeship‖(Birchall, 1994: 6)  threatened ―on every side 
by technological innovation and by the rush of unskilled or juvenile labour‖ (Thompson, 
1968: 289). 
d) Christian Socialist Co-operation 
Out of fear of Nonconformist encroachment, the Anglican Church had 
systematically enforced its parochial system in the south, the southern Midlands and the 
south-east, especially in the agricultural regions. In alliance with the ―landed interest‖, 
Anglicanism had grown stronger in agricultural areas than among more urban populations 
engaged in manufacturing or commerce. By the 1830s, however, the population balance in 
England had been transferred from agrarian to manufacturing and industrial areas, and 
from southern and south-eastern England to the Midlands and the north . Yet, it was 
precisely in these areas that the parochial system was poorly established and ill-equipped 
to meet the needs of pastoral guidance (Gilbert, 1976: 110-112).  
Faced with the violence of Chartism, a number of clergy in the Church of England 
reacted by actively demonstrating their sympathy for the working classes‘ plight.  As a « 
union of the Church, the gentlemen and the workmen »,  i.e. an alliance of Tory-
paternalism and Whig-gradualism, the so-called « Christian Socialists » from about 1848 
looked upon those who «stand rather upon birth and inheritance» to « provide moral 
guidance and leadership to the masses ».    To become leaders of the masses was not easy: 
a large part of the working class was very sceptical about the Anglican Church, because it 
was considered to be exclusively geared towards the well-to-do and respectable. The 
Establishment‘s attitude vis a vis the miserable living conditions of the poor at best was 
perceived as indifference. 
    The Christian socialists revived the producer co-operative movement in the 
1850‘s. Christian Socialists were a group of middle class lawyers and clergymen 
concerned at the neglect of Christian obligations of people to each other. With little 
knowledge of the co-operative experiments by Robert Owen and the Rochdale Pioneers, 
but heavily inspired by the French associations ouvrieres of Louis Blanc and Charles 
Fourier, the Christian socialists invested large fortunes into co-operatives, used their 
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influence in Parliament to get laws passed benefiting co-operative formation and 
publicising their ideas widely. Different from the other Co-operative leaders, Christian 
Socialists were politically conservative, and skeptical of radical liberalism. Despite these 
differences, the Christian Socialists won the confidence of organized labour because they 
were capable of acting as mediators between the Government and the working-class 
movement. They helped to transform the State‘s attitute to working-class institutions from 
one of hostility to one of cautious benevolence: they had a hand in the legalization of Co-
operative enterprise by the Industrial and Provident Socieites Acts of 1852-1862, in the 
protection of friendly society and trade union funds in 1855, in the legalization of peaceful 
picketing in 1859, and in the favourable report on the unions by the Royal Commission of 
1867 and their legalization in 1871. 
The movement survived only seven years but had a lasting impact on co-operative 
development. Noteworthy is that the Christian Socialists teamed up with the leaders of the 
older flour mill societies in southern England – and not the northern Rochdale leaders – in 
establishing the important legal framework for co-operatives in the 1852 Industrial and 
Provident Society Act. With this act, effective protection was given to the assets of flour 
and bread companies, and the shops and depots of the Rochdale Co-operators (cf. Purvis, 
1992).  Apart from giving Co-operatives a legal standing and limited liability, Christian 
Socialist movement was also important in leaving behind devoted supporters such as Neale 
and Hughes in the Co-operative movement of the second half of the century (Thornley, 
1981: 21). Last but not least, while the Christian socialists did not manage to win back 
workers in large numbers to the Church, at least they managed to neutralize their hostility 
in the Co-operative movement (cf. Perkin, 1969: 364). 
 
10. Dutch Consumer Co-operatives 
Surprisingly, the first consumer co-operative in the Netherlands, the  
―Onderneming van Werklieden‖ founded in 1860 in Rotterdam, was of a protestant 
signature
1175
. The co-operative was a failure for two reasons. First, the organisation held on 
to the purpose to organize the co-operative in accordance with the will of God (Scheffer, 
1964), and in close co-operation with philantropic employers. At a time when workers 
were passive about their condition precisely because of the fatalistic atmosphere associated 
with philanthropy and legitimation in terms of the will of God, the initiative did not trigger 
much interest and response amongst the workers. Apart from this failure to carve out a 
value-rational niche, a second reason for the failure was that workers were not skilled in 
shopkeeping, and were experiencing much competition from local shopkeepers and 
tradespeople with more expertise and experience. Though a failure, the organisation 
principles of this first consumer co-operative would be copied by the consumer co-
operatives to come.
1176
 Subsequently, the social-liberal union ANWV set up consumer co-
operatives in the 1870s. Increasingly, the social-liberals saw Co-operation as a means to 
throw up a dam against the ―red revolution‖1177 (Oosterhuis, 2000:53). According to the 
social-liberals, ―the co-operative shop is the preparation for the highest degree of co-
operation: worker co-operation‖ (Kerdijk, 1873: 46), be it within the existing political-
economic constellation of capitalism. The consumer co-operatives set up by the ANWV 
also failed, mainly because of their focus on the ultimate purpose of co-operation, worker 
co-operation. So the social-liberal propagandists‘ purpose was to enable workers to raise 
capital through consumer co-operatives, this at the expense of the payment of dividends. 
The focus on ultimate purposes at the cost of practical cash-value caused the undoing of 
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the ANWV‘s consumer co-operatives1178. Of the fifteen co-operatives founded between 
1860 and 1873, twelve went brankrupt after a short time
1179
.  
Amongst catholics, consumer co-operatives were most successful in the southern 
provinces of Limburg and Brabant. One reason for this success was that catholic co-
operatives already from the 1870s operated within an ideological monopoly in these 
provinces, a privilege that socialists and liberals did not enjoy. Using this isolation, 
catholics did not feel compelled to formulate ultimate purposes like the socialists or social-
liberals did. The purpose of the catholic consumer co-operatives was to ―create better 
living conditions for catholic workers‖. Apart from moral elevation, ultimate purposes – 
such as the abolition of profits or private property in worker co-operatives – did not play a 
big role in catholic purposes. If one ultimate catholic purpose has to be pointed at, it 
probably was to counter socialist influence amongst workers (Oosterhuis, 2000: 71). 
Socialists, for their part, propagated consumer co-operatives under strict 
conditions. As testified by the secretary of the SDB – the socialist union:  ―We can not 
dismiss co-operation as a means to struggle. But the utmost should be done to ensure that 
the co-operation is driven in the sole interest of our [socialist] party and with some scale. 
Above all: profits should go to the party and should not be distributed amongst the 
members.‖ (Croll, 1887)1180 Yet, after the troubles they went through with often liberal-
minded directors of the consumer co-operatives, the SDB and the Dutch Internationale 
took an ideological distance from co-operatives. Remarkably, despite the fundamental anti-
consumer-co-operative stance expressed by socialist leaders, co-operative plans were still 
concocted  in socialist practice. Precisely because some socialist co-operatives – like the 
―Arbeidersmaatschappij‖ and the ―Volharding‖ – had already achieved a sizeable scale, 
they were keen not to lose control of the co-operatives. For instance, because the co-
operative Volharding ―spent her important profits completely on divident payments‖ and 
―this was not the purpose of [socialist] co-operation‖ (Vliegen, 1904: 95), some socialist 
leaders were brought in the Board of Directors of the mentioned co-operative.   
Up to the 1890‘s consumer co-operation was a marginal phenomenon with only 
22 societies in 1890. These mainly were civil servant co-operatives – as the Co-operative 
―Eigen Hulp‖ – or initiatives of social-liberal leaders. With the foundation of the socialist 
party SDAP in 1894, however, the consumer co-operative movement gained some 
momentum. With larger grassroots support than a decade ago, the purpose of consumer co-
operation to give support to the labour union and the party became more tangible. As a 
result, socialist consumer co-operation grew steadily until WWI. Yet, the enmity of local 
shopkeepers and tradespeople
1181
, and the increasing antagonisms between catholics, 
liberals, socialists and protestants unmistakingly led to increasing fragmentation and 
division of the so-called « consumer co-operation movement ». 
A first tendency of unification was the association of the socialist co-operatives 
with the neutral Dutch Co-operative Union NCB (Nederlandsche Coöperatieve Bond) in 
1905. Yet, the socialist co-operatives remained affiliated to the socialist Union, the 
BVNAC (Bond van Nederlandse Arbeiderscoöperaties) for non-commercial purposes. The 
socialist consumer co-operatives had to keep giving important financial support to the 
party and the labour union, to the expense of divident payments to the own members. As 
such, the split between value-rationalisation – being a member of a consumer co-operative 
to serve the ultimate goal of a socialist society – and instrumental-rationality – the practical 
cash-value of being a member of a consumer co-operative – became even more 
evident.When the BVNAC decided to abandon the principle of profit transfers after WWI, 
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a fusion with the NCB became possible. Yet the fusion at a national level in the CBNV
1182
  
in 1920 was only a symbolic success. Because pillarization had grown to a peak by 1920, 
regional fusion plans were mostly not realised.  
From a symbolic viewpoint, consumer co-operatives were triumphant during the 
First World War (Oosterhuis, 2000: 85). From the outset of the war, panic amongst 
hoarding families led to substantial price increases for foods on the market. Price increases 
of 50 percent were very common. Yet, it soon became clear that consumer co-operatives in 
many regions led to the moderation of prices (Oosterhuis, 1924: 86). The price-regulating 
influence of the consumer co-operatives during WWI was not left unnoticed ; especially in 
the southern catholic provinces, a spectacular growth in the number of co-operatives 
ensued, with the main purpose to win the fight against rising prices. So, while in 1915 only 
17 consumer co-operatives were affiliated to the catholic union RKB, in 1918 that number 
had waxed to 192 (Groeneveld, 1938: 123).Yet, the war years had created unrealistic 
expectations. Especially smaller co-operatives succumbed in the crisis years 1921-1923. 
So, the  number of catholic co-operatives affiliated to the RKB waned to 99 in 1924. 
From an economic viewpoint, however, the war years in general were very hard 
times for consumer co-operatives: the co-operatives suffered from a lack of foods, which 
greatly halted the development of their normal activities. Co-operative Banks, on the 
contrary, were able to obtain enormous war profits, which earned them the stigma of ―War 
Profit Makers‖ by  consumer co-operatives: ―From 1913 to 1919  the credit balance of 
Farmer co-operative banks increased from about 52 million guilder to almost 228 million 
guilders, mortgages were payed off early, and the earnings from the security on golden and 
silver objects rose steadily and this money came out of the pockets of the farmers. 
Obviously, that money first had to come out of the pockets of others.‖ (De Jong, Deel I: 42, 
italics added)
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Why did Dutch consumer co-operatives
1184
 get into their stride very slowly in the 
Netherlands, contrary to for instance England? There were at least three reasons for this 
lack of success. First, consumer co-operatives were the target of effective antipropaganda 
of local merchants. Second, the local merchants, who almost all were catholics or 
protestants, found support for their anti-propaganda amongst protestant-christians as well 
as roman-catholics. This is because in these milieus, consumer cooperation was deemed 
contrary to justice, in that it threatened the business of fellow merchants, and charity, 
because it was profit-oriented and consumerist of character. Third, consumer co-operation 
was mostly a liberal and socialist endeavour; it was a public secret that protestants..and 
catholics were against consumer cooperation because of this reason (Oosterhuis, 2000: 69). 
As such, members of the so-called ―consumer co-operative movement‖ never 
really felt united in a common front (Oosterhuis, 2000: 73). Despite its officially neutral 
character – in accordance with the English Rochdale principles – antagonistic elements 
between liberal, socialist, and catholic purposes impeded this. Because of the permanent 
division between these three groups, a reaction-counter-reaction cycle developed: when a 
co-operative became too socialist according to some of its members – as in the case of the 
co-operative ―Volharding‖ in The Hague – the members proceeded to the foundation of an 
anti-socialist co-operation – in this case called ―De Hoop‖. Conversely, when a majority of 
members chose for a neutral purpose in a historically ―red‖ co-operative – as in the case of 
the ―Vooruitgang‖ in Rotterdam – then socialists proceeded to the establishment of a 
competitor – the ―Voorwaarts‖ in this case. Finally, when a big catholic co-operative 
managed to establish a strong position in a locality – as ―Ons Dagelijk Brood‖ did in 
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Heerlen – then a red co-operative was established to counter this influence (―Gluck auf‖) 
(Oosterhuis, 2000: 82-83). 
As a result of all these divisions, the discursive legitimacy –  the political ability 
to overcome dissent and rally a population‘s beliefs around a common purpose – of 
consumer co-operation as one movement never was significant. In addition, the total 
economic resources of the Dutch Co-operative Wholesale Society
1185
 was much lower than 
in other European countries. In 1913 (and 1920), the turnover in the Netherlands was 4,561 
Guilder (14,613), in Germany 91,486 guilder (+- 210,000
1186
), in England and Wales 
379,382 guilder (1,275,087), in Scotland 108,464 guilder (357,554). More tellingly, this 
remained true when these amounts were averaged per head of the population in the 
different countries. So, in 1913 the average amounted to 0.73 in the Netherlands, 1.36 in 
Germany, 10.40 in England and Wales, and 22.99 in Scotland. In 1920 these figures were 
respectively 2.13 for the Netherlands, 33.98 in England and Wales, and 73.56 in Scotland 
(Otten,1924: 173). 
From a normative viewpoint, consumer co-operatives were triumphant during the 
First World War (Oosterhuis, 2000: 85). From a material viewpoint, however, the co-
operatives suffered from a lack of foods, which greatly halted the development of their 
normal activities. From the outset of the war, panic amongst hoarding families led to 
substantial price increases for foods on the market. Price increases of 50 percent were very 
common. Soon, it became clear that consumer co-operatives in many regions led to the 
moderation of prices (86). The war years in general were hard times for the less wealthy 
people. Others, on the contrary, were able to obtain enormous war profits, which caused 
them to be called ―War Profit Makers‖ (Oorlogs Winstmakers). According to socialist De 
Jong, the farmer credit co-operatives were prominent War Profit Makers: ―From 1913 to 
1919  the credit balance of Farmer co-operative banks increased from about 52 million 
guilder to almost 228 million guilders, mortgages were payed off early, and the earnings 
from the security on golden and silver objects rose steadily and this money came out of the 
pockets of the farmers. Obviously, that money first had to come out of the pockets of 
others.‖ (De Jong, Deel I: 42, italics added).  
Dutch consumer co-operative leaders blamed the pillarisation movement for the 
fact that the Co-operative movement was not considered a third pillar of the Labour 
movement in the Netherlands, as in England. After WWII many co-operators expected that 
a start would be made of the depillarization of politics, trade unions and broadcasting 
networks. With that idea in mind the PVDA was formed in 1946. Yet, the PVDA did not 
succeed in becoming much stronger than its precursor SDAP at the elections of 1946. A 
strong confessional front still was blocking any breakthrough. A notable exception took 
shape in the reunion of socialist, catholic and christian consumer co-operatives in the 
Central of Dutch Consumer Cooperatives (Centrale van Nederlandse 
Verbruikscooperaties) in 1947 (Oosterhuis, 2000: 136-138).  The catholics posed a 
condition for this reunion in one Central: the purpose of this central had to be limited to 
exclusively commercial ends ―that of course are assumed…not to be conflicting with 
catholic morality‖. Christians reacted in a similar fashion. As a consequence, it was agreed 
that a merger of the three ideologies could only be issued in terms of a strictly limited 
purpose: the promotion of the consumer interest. Striving for this purpose would be a 
guarantee for ―reaching the largest possible prosperity, because the battle for power and 
profit for a few would be replaced by cooperation for the benefit of all‖ (De 
Verbruikscoöperatie, brochure 1949: 36). 
563 
 
While consumer co-operatives in Finland and England respectively claimed about 
31 and 10 percent of retail trade business in 1970, consumer co-operatives only accounted 
for a mere 1 percent in the Netherlands (Intermediair, June 21
st
 1974). What is more, after 
a particularly disastrous year 1973, the most important Dutch consumer co-operatives were 
declared bankrupt and had to sell or shut down their operations. In comparative perspective 
with the co-operative banks, what were the reasons for this failure? First of all, consumer 
co-operatives could not participate in a democratisation movement as influential and 
united as the agricultural movement. Second, retail trade organisations proposed far more 
challenging democratisation alternatives than savings and commercial banks, as the much 
earlier introduction of self-service and an active price policy towards retail customers 
proves. Nevertheless, the Dutch consumer co-operatives for a large part had themselves to 
blame: especially their paternalistic and outmoded attitude in face of growing income 
equality and general welfare caused their failure. For instance, consumer co-operative 
leaders for many years condemned the concept of self-service; they argued that self-service 
would tempt consumers to buy more than strictly needed, causing them to fall prey to 
consumerism. Yet, this criticism was futile in view of the retailer Albert Heyn‘s 
overwhelming success with self-service stores in the Netherlands.   
Leaders of the Dutch Co-op movement also declared that it would be 
fundamentally unjust to copy commercial supermarkets‘ active price policy in the mid-
1960‘s. When producers like Van Nelle, Nestle, Douwe Egberts, Nutricia and Heineken 
decided to discontinue the price regulation mechanisms in force since 1928, the Dutch 
consumer co-operatives did not follow suit. They argued that since important price 
discounts on a limited amount of products would result in rising prices for other products, 
customers would be deceived by ―a suggestion of cheapness‖1187. Despite the changing 
competitive tides, co-op leaders persisted in labeling profit-making practices ―dirty‖, with 
all the ensuing problems. Indeed, it would take until 1969 for concepts like marketing and 
profit-making to be accepted in consumer co-operative circles. Other problems of Dutch 
co-operatives were ―amateuristic leadership‖, the loss of grassroots idealism and 
commitment amongst co-operative members, the rigid dividend policy, a lack of 
organisation at a European level, and a deficient ―democratic‖ decision-making structure. 
The leaders of consumer co-operatives mostly were social-democratic PvdA or VARA
1188
 
incumbents rather than retail trade professionals. This prompted the press to characterise 
the Dutch Co-ops as a hobby club (Haagsche Courant, November 5
th
 1969). Members, 
meanwhile, while often remaining passively affiliated, more and more were ―lured‖ by the 
―deceptive‖ marketing tricks of retail traders to buy from their shops. The slogan ―not for 
profit, but for the family‖ that had made the modest success of Dutch consumer co-
operatives in earlier decades, was starting to turn against them (Oosterhuis, 2000 :161-
183).   
Another element contributing to the early demise of Dutch consumer co-
operatives, was their dividend policy. For fiscal and competitive reasons many consumer 
co-operatives maintained a ―guaranteed dividend‖ policy, a euphemism for the label ―fixed 
discount‖.  This policy proved to be hugely detrimental in the 1960‘s and 1970‘s, when 
consumer co-operatives were not making significant profits anymore, and the dividend 
policy precluded consumer co-ops to reinvest their limited profits in new competitive retail 
techniques. For fear of member desertion, consumer co-operatives‘ leaders refused to bring 
to an end the dividend policy, even when by the mid-1960s they were making more losses 
than profits. Also, while many retail traders and wholesale producers started organizing on 
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a European or even international level, it took too long for co-operative production to be 
initiated at a European level.  Co-operative producers remained trapped in a logic of 
consumer co-operatives satisfying primary necessities of life, rather than what the 
consumer in the meantime had become interested in. A deficient production capacity and 
lack of flexibility was the result. Finally, distrust had crept in the relation between the 
mother co-operative Co-op Netherlands and the directors of its affiliates. During many 
years Co-op Netherlands had acted as the banker, accountant and advisor of consumer co-
operatives. While these functions were not statutory, they informally had gained a 
compulsory status. Yet, when consumer co-operatives in the 1960‘s and 1970‘s were 
facing a looming crisis, the discrepancy between the juridical and the actual role of Co-op 
Netherlands prevented it from realigning the whole organisation of consumer co-operation. 
There were some contacts between, on the one hand, the local, regional, and central 
agricultural cooperatives, and, on the other hand, the Dutch consumer co-operatives. Yet, 
these contacts were purely commercial and transaction-based; there existed no 
organisational links between both co-operative sectors (Lockhart, 1967: 144). 
 
11. English Consumer Co-operatives 
English Co-operative societies first gained legal protection under the 
Friendly Societies Act of 1834 which authorised the registration of societies for ―any other 
purpose [ than those specified] which is not illegal‖ (Gosden, 1961: 9). With the Industrial 
and Provident Societies Act of 1852 , certain privileges and certain limitations were set on 
co-operative practice. While Co-operative funds were now protected against fraud, 
societies were forbidden to hold land or to engage in banking, mining, or wholesaling. The 
Act was amended in 1855, so as to make land-owning legitimate; expenditure on 
education, however, was disallowed. The right to establish a wholesale society and enjoy 
limited liability, finally, was granted in 1862 (cfr. Cole, 1944: 114-126). An Act of 1862 
further conferred incorporation on societies registered under the I&P Act and limited the 
liability of their members. 
The third co-operative movement – after the flour and mill societies and the 
Owenite Co-operatives – found its origin and inspiration in the so-called Rochdale 
Pioneers – a small core of Owenite activists, chartists and handloom weavers. These 
founded the famous Rochdale Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in 1844 . As 
demonstrated by Bonner (1970), the Pioneers should not be pictured as half-starved 
operatives driven by the desperation of hunger. Most of the Pioneers were comparatively 
well-paid, skilled artisans, some in business on their own account, many of them regarded 
as part of the labour aristocracy. According to the 1844 statutes of the Rochdale Pioneers, 
the purpose of the society was ―to form arrangements for the pecuniary benefit, and 
improvement of the social and domestic condition of its members, by raising a sufficient 
amount of capital in shares of one pound each, to bring into operation the following plans 
and arrangements.‖ In the very long run, the purpose was to ―proceed to arrange the 
powers of production, distribution, education and government‖  in the so-called Co-
operative Commonwealth.  
Stores were run ―democratically‖ – members had the same voting rights 
regardless of the number of shares held. Finally, the most famous specification concerned 
the so-called dividend or ―divi‖ : a portion of the Society‘s operating surplus was to be 
distributed to members on the basis of business done . Though the principles of ―one 
member, one vote‖  and ―religious and political neutrality‖  were not mentioned in the 
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Pioneers‘ bylaws, it is generally accepted these were accepted principles from the outset. 
With regards to the notions of religious and political neutrality, it is interesting to note that, 
on the one hand, the upper floors of the Rochdale warehouse held a chapel for Dissenters, 
and, on the other hand, the Pioneers were all in favour of liberal radicalism.  
The ambitions of the Rochdale Pioneers did not stop at the setting up of a store; 
their purposes were not solely financial, but aimed at general improvement of the condition 
and status of members. The Pioneers first wanted to open a store, accumulate share capital 
and surpluses of members. With these funds, co-operative housing would be undertaken. 
Subsequently, co-operative production would provide employment to the members; 
products from this employment would then be marketed through the society‘s stores. 
Finally, all these endeavours would ensue in a self-supporting co-operative community. 
Co-operative education would be essential to achieve this; so, the 1854 statutes stipulated 
that 2.5 percent of Rochdale‘s annual surplus before distribution was to be put in ―a 
separate and distinct fund…for the intellectual improvement of the members‖.   Education 
and recreation were arranged by elected educational committees, which regularly held 
delegate meetings throughout the country.  
While the ―capitalist‖ trusts from the turn of the century were organising 
themselves on an international scale, and thus escaped national public scrutiny and control, 
the Co-operative movement still had to create its own international co-operative system of 
distribution and supply. Because the capitalist trusts, as the international City associations 
were virtually untouchable, the Co-op movement was increasingly being stigmatised as the 
intruder by individual shopkeepers and private traders, not the capitalist trusts. As a 
leading co-operator claimed: ―they reserved their animosity to attack co-operative societies 
which did not undersell them, when they ought to have been battling against the soulless 
and devouring trusts‖ (Mercer, 1936: 111). As early as 1906, some Co-operators urged the 
fusion of all local societies into one gigantic National Co-operative Societies to counter the 
threat, with no avail. Even though the Co-operative Congress in 1920 resolved that ―the 
time is now ripe for the Co-operative Movement to bring itself into closer unity by 
organisation of its forces…into one National Society‖, the tendency that societies valued 
local autonomy more than national unity remained.  
 
Table a: Membership of Retail Societies affiliated to the 
English Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) 
Year 
 
Members 
 
1901 1,800,000 
1914 3,054,000 
1919 4,131,000 
1940 8,716,000 
1955 13,000,000 
 
By 1920 there were 1,379 distributive stores in Britain with over 4.5 million 
members (see table a. The annual sales of the English CWS that year was over £ 105 
million, making it one of the largest enterprises of its kind in the world
1189
. Immediately 
before and after WWII, the Co-op movement was ―at the peak of its development 
(Birchall, 1994 :136).  The Co-op registered 28 percent of the population for rationing and 
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sold 23 percent of grocery sales in 1951 (see table b). From an innovation point of view, 
the Co-ops pioneered self-service stores.  In 1942, a first self-service shop was opened by 
the London Co-operative Society. By 1950, 90% of all the self-service stores in the UK 
were operated by co-operatives. Yet, though the Co-op long continued to dominate the 
establishment of self-service stores – until 1960, the Co-op operated almost 50 per cent of 
the self-service stores in Britain –  it was the rapidly growing, regionally based multiple 
retailers which established supermarket retailing within Britain. Supermarket retailing, 
incorporating self-service operations in large surface areas, required enormous capital 
investments unavailable to decentralised Co-ops and small independents  (Morelli, 1998: 
49-50).   
As late as 1950 only 34 of the 145 multiple firms operating in Great Britain were 
established as public companies. By default of political success, the Co-operative 
movement‘s distinctiveness increasingly hinged on the ―divi‖. Indeed, the dividend 
symbolized the purposes and practices of a lot of affiliated members. As testified by the 
daughter of an early member: ―I thank the day I became a co-operator…[I am] thankful 
that I have my ‗divi‘to draw at the quarters‘end – it pays for coal…The advice of my 
mother, a staunch co-operator, who died at the age of ninety-one, was ‗keep true to the 
store and the store will keep true to you‖1190. A drawback of this increasing reliance on the 
dividend, however, was that Co-operative societies tried to distinguish themselves by not 
lowering the dividend ―patronage refunds‖ paid out, even in times of declining business. 
At the turn of the twentieth century 73 percent of retail co-operatives were repaying two 
shillings or more per pound sterling in patronage refund, that is more than 10 percent. 
What is more, a significant percentage of co-operatives paid 20 to 25 percent refunds (four 
to five shillings on the pound). More and more co-operatives paid higher and higher 
refunds as time went on. This situation was checked during certain periods by the burden 
of taxation. Still. to compensate for the increasing burden of dividends, more an more local 
societies started charging higher prices, which left them vulnerable to cost-cutting 
competitors. On the longer term, the emphasis on high dividends impeded the development 
of sufficient financial reserves for investment in new business opportunities (cf. Fairbairn, 
1994: 16). As a response to the adoption of trading stamps by other food retailers, the 
consumer co-ops introduced dividend stamps in 1965 as an alternative to the traditional 
methods of paying the 'divi'. The CWS even launched a national Dividend Stamp scheme 
in 1969.  
An important link between concentration and cartelisation of English companies 
was provided by so-called Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), i.e. the practice to fix the 
price at which retailers may sell through loyalty rebates or withholding supplies from 
price-cutters through stop-lists. RPM practices increased dramatically in the interwar-
years, and steadly grew to a peak in the mid-1950s
1191
. RPM was especially significant 
with regards to branded, nationally advertised consumer goods – foods and durables 
(Mercer, 1995: 18-19), i.e. the core business of the Co-ops
1192
. In the mid-1950s, Resale 
Price Maintenance (RPM) practices were at their peak: it covered about 44 per cent of 
consumer expenditure on goods. By the time the Resale Prices Act was passed in 1964, the 
incidence of RPM had dropped to about 33 per cent of consumer expenditure, as a result of 
its collapse on grocery products, on other consumable goods sold increasingly through the 
fast-growing self-service outlets and on tyres (Pickering, 1974, Oxford Economic Papers: 
120). Paradoxically, despite the Co-operative movement‘s initital resistance against 
cartellisation based on RPM practices, the gradual abolishment of these practices after 
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WWII laid a heavier burden on Co-ops than on its capitalist counterparts. Lacking the level 
and depth of integration and cartellisation of these latter firms, and historically dependent 
on paying out high dividends to prove their distinctiveness, Co-ops‘ price level often was 
above-par with its competitors. By default of the protection of RPM, charging lower prices 
meant that the dividend would lay an even heavier burden on Co-ops capacity to raise 
finances, increase the scale of its operations and become more efficient. In fact, as a result 
of higher prices, higher overheads, lower profit margins and increased competition after 
WWII, many local co-ops found it increasingly difficult to keep dividend. So, a survey 
carried out in 1952 found that only 380 societies, out of the 942 who responded, were 
paying the normal rate of dividend on market prices
1193
.  As many Co-operative societies 
were trying to maintain previous high rates, they adopted tactics that had a detrimental 
effect both on their trade and the public image of unity and purposiveness of the co-
operative difference. So, some neighbouring co-operative societies tried to outcompete 
each other based on dividend levels. In 1954 the Co-operative Union advised that ―in 
keeping with basic co-operative principle retail societies should pay the same rate of 
dividend on all the purchases of members irrespective of the surplus made on the sale of 
particular articles and irrespective also of the profitability or otherwise of particular 
departments‖. Furthermore, ―dividend must be allowed to find its own level‖; societies 
were advised ―not to artificially keep rates up or retain their previous rates‖1194.  
 
 
Table b: Economic performance Retail Co-ops affiliated to the English CWS to other 
retail trading organisations in terms of marketshare in the grocery provision trade 
(Source: Jefferys,1954: 29; Morelli, 1998: 47) 
Year Co-ops Multiples Independent outlets 
1900 6.0-7.0 3.0-4.5 86.5-90.0 
1910 7.0-8.0 6.0-7.5 81.5-85.5 
1920 7.5-9.0 7.0-10.0 77.0-82.5 
1930 8.5-10.0 12.0-14.0 76.0 
1939 10.0-11.5 18.0-19.5 63.5-67.5 
1950 23.23 19.95 56.81 
1961 20.76 26.9 52.33 
1966 16.70 36.33 46.97 
1971 13.23 44.31 42.46 
 
   
As the Co-operative movement‘s decline became particularly obvious in the 
1950s, four major inquiries were held into its condition between 1953 and 1964, (Birchall, 
1994: 147-150): two into the CWS, one into the movement as a whole and one into 
relationships between the wholesalers and the Co-operative Union. The common problem 
identified in all enquiries was that authority in the movement was decentralised to around a 
thousand retail societies whose members were anxious to preserve local autonomy. In fact, 
the movement had ―failed to co-ordinate the enormous buying power of the retail and 
wholesale sides and wield it as a national marketing and sales promotion force. 
Fragmentation and local autonomy prevailed in almost every field of Co-operative trading 
a a time when private enterprise was marshalling its forces into specialised, nationally 
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controlled units‖ (Richardson, 1977: 199).  The most authoritative inquiry was the Co-
operative Independent Commission Report set up in 1955 with Hugh Gaitskell – deputy 
leader and later leader of the Labour Party – in the chair, and a committee of authoritative 
Co-operative and retailing experts. Four main problems were identified in this Report. 
First, there were too many grocery shops in the north, and not enough in the south and 
west. In the Greater London area a mere 31 non-food goods shops had to face the 
competition of 688 multiples‘ outlets.  Second, while food shops had been distributed quite 
effectively, department stores had been founded in old working-class areas which had now 
become unfashionable. Non-food shops were worst situated. Generally speaking, the Co-
op was weakest in the larger towns, strongest in the country and small towns. Third, the 
quality of the shops was very variable, though generally below-par compared to 
multiples….Fourth, the Co-op image was in need of updating to appeal to a younger 
generation: goods sold were old-fashioned, particularly in women‘s and children‘s wear.  
In addition, the Co-op inhibition towards giving credit was seriously restricting the trade in 
furniture and electrical goods; customers were turning to other firms who offered hire 
purchase.  
The report claimed that the underlying cause of these deficiencies was the quality 
of management. In this regard, it became painfully visible how the Co-op‘s attitude vis a 
vis education was out-of-date. The Co-op‘s tradition was to recruit its staff exclusively 
from school-leavers with a minimum of schooling. This staff subsequently had to work 
their way up the ranks of the local Society. An advantage was that this staff were content 
with much lower salaries than their for-profit equivalents, in view of the security of life-
time employment, a high status and sense of community in the working-class 
neighbourhoods. Until WWII the Co-operative movement had benefited from an education 
system built on the premises of class; many talented working-class children were 
prevented from gaining a decent education in this system. Yet, with the opening up of 
access to the grammar schools after WWII, the best working-class students were beginning 
to stay on at school and go to college. These students, who most probably whould have 
made the best managers according to the professional standards of their time, were now 
bypassing the Co-op. This problem was compounded by the frequent interference of Board 
of Directors ―amateurs‖ in daily management. Another point made by the Gatskell 
Commission is that the Co-operative movement should raise its sights and realise that it is 
no longer appealing to ―a working class which is barely above the subsistence line‖. 
Indeed, as the New Statesman reported on the 10
th
 of May, 1958, there was ―some 
evidence that with full employment, a substantial part of the working-class has been 
‗shopping up‘ from the Co-op to the multiple stores‖1195. 
According to part of the press, the Gatskell Commission had only uncovered part 
of the problem. So, a leading article in the Times read: ―they do not…refer to the liability 
that the democratic management may be more interested in social and political aims than 
in shopkeeping‖1196. And a reporter of the Manchester Guardian wrote: ―The Co-operative 
movement has been slipping behind the times…Too many co-op shops wear an appearance 
of drab mediocrity; a general smartening up is needed, in line with contemporary 
taste…there is a general lack of style‖(italics added).1197 According to the News Chronicle, 
finally, ―the Co-operative movement…needs livening up and modernising…In some areas 
the Co-ops have lost trade by charging too much in order to maintain or increase the 
dividend…‘They sell at market prices and treat the dividend as a residual‘‖1198.  
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In the mean time, it became clear that Co-operative customers were more 
attracted by the sales of fashion and new consumer goods in private multiples than by the 
savings aspect of the dividend. In addition, the dividend was also becoming increasingly 
costly to administer, especially as the rates reduced. The emergence in the 1960s of trading 
stamps, symbolised the end of the dividend era. When in October 1963 Fine Fare and 
Tesco started with these stamps, leaders of the Co-operative Union were quick to utter 
their total antagonism for this form of trade, believing that it was against the best interests 
of the consumer. They argued that the emphasis on the ―something for nothing approach is 
contrary to the philosophy of the movement‖1199 . Rejecting trading stamps as commercial 
ideas that ― like so many other gimmicks, ... emerged in the United States of America‖, the 
centre of moral decay, Co-operative leaders once again proved to what extent they were 
out of touch with modern value-rationalities
1200
. 
In March 1963 the Co-operative News had a banner headline, ‘C.W.S. says no to 
stamp trade‘; the Co-op Union condemned the several individual co-operative societies 
who had signed up with various private stamp firms in the hope of promised increase in 
turnover. Instead, the Union advised that ‗dividend was best‗ as it provided superior 
purchasing power compared to the true cost of the ‗free‘ gifts obtained by collecting 
stamps. societies were urged not to be drawn into stamps trading and told that they should 
do more to explain what dividend really was
1201
. Unfortunately, the co-op‘s appeal to the 
public, by sensible reasoning, failed to convince that dividend was best and the movement 
concluded that despite the stigma of unethical trading, trading stamps were here to stay. In 
1968 the Co-operative Wholesale Society therefore launched the co-operative ‗dividend 
stamp‗. The publicity went to great lengths to stress the dividend aspect of the stamp. The 
message was that the dividend stamp should not be confused with stamp trading as it was 
translating a basic co-operative benefit into a modern idiom
1202
.  
Co-ops‘ entry into the newly emerging trading stamp arena was delayed by a 
reluctance to modernise their own retailing methods, despite the Co-ops‘ failure to sustain 
capital reserves for expansion and the increasing stigma of being old fashioned. As only 
the very poorest of the working class kept frequenting the Co-op shops, the Co-ops finally 
were urged into action. Instead of coming up with their own innovations, in the end they 
were forced to emulate those of their commercial counterparts.  The move to the dividend 
stamp had the effect of rearranging the finances of the movement: as the incentive to 
become a member disappeared, most stamp books were being exchanged for goods rather 
than deposited in share accounts.  
The final demise of the English consumer co-operative movement as a credible  national 
champion was symbolised by the Consumers‘ Association1203 emergence in the 1960s. As 
a non-profit organisation, the latter has taken over the role of ―consumer interest 
champion‖ and self appointed watchdog on behalf of the English public.  
Things did not improve in the 1980s and 1990s. It is generally known that the 
Thatcher government was not pro Co-operatives, much to the contrary. So, though the 
emergence of new generation worker co-operatives – such as Meriden – in the 1970s in the 
wake of growing unconventional protest of workers had culminated in the passing of the 
1976 Industrial Common Ownership Act
1204
, the ascendancy of the Thatcher government, 
however, meant that this initiative would quickly be starved of financial support.  The 
voice of the Co-operative Party and Co-operative Union became marginalised amongst 
civil servants. Pauline Green, secretary-general of the Co-operative Union, described the 
events of the last decades as follows: ―What happened over the last twenty years in Britain 
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is that the Conservative governments under Margaret Thatcher and John Major have 
destroyed all the national Co-operative organisations, for instance the Co-operative 
Development Agency‖. In the 1980s and 1990s, ―if you weren‘t a PLC in the UK you were 
not a proper company‖. But the decline of the Consumer Co-op movement was not due to 
political reasons alone. Since WWII, the English Consumer Co-op movement has not been 
strong enough to affect markets on behalf of customer, be it with regards to prices or 
quality. Gradually, the Consumer Co-ops lost more and more marketshare. Not 
surprisingly, in the 1970s, increased competition, a lack of business integration between 
local societies, and a general climate of member disinterest, led to the definitive demise of 
the Co-operative  dividend. Local Co-ops now openly copied the retail strategies of their 
competitors, for instance through offering low prices or discounts to all customers 
(Birchall, 2001: 72). Still, the copycat behaviour of Co-ops did not spell growth, as they 
were still sending mixed messages and, overall, were perceived as old-fashioned. The only 
solution found by Co-ops was to keep open small, lossmaking shops to mitigate these 
effects (Birchall, 2001: 82-83). The recent turn towards ―ethical‖ branding, for its part, has 
changed this perception only to a limited extent.  
The Co-operative Bank has had some success with this strategy, but only because 
it had initiated larger market-conform changes from the early 1970s onwards. With the 
disappearance in the 1960s of grand Commonwealth visions, the idea had been pondered 
of transforming the CWS Bank into a standalone for-profit subsidiary, so as to increase its 
credibility in established popular opinion.
1205
  The idea was finally transformed in practice 
in 1972, with the formation of the Co-operative Bank PLC,  As a sign of recognition of 
this move, the Co-operative Bank in 1975 gained the membership of the London Bankers' 
Clearing House, as the first bank in almost 40 years. 
The Co-operative Bank at the end of the 1970s further distanced itself from the 
political failure of the Co-operative Party and Union, by affirming its ―apolitical‖, non 
party-affiliated character. The new strategy of the Co-operative Bank is to influence State 
by having a greater impact on popular opinion, i.e. the creation of popular opinion. This, 
the Co-operative Bank endeavours to achieve by launching a new project of « democratic » 
or « people‘s capitalism », which combines a peculiar mixture of liberal market-orientation 
and nonconformist ethics. Tellingly, the ―insolent‖ customer focus of the Co-operative 
Bank on the higher middle ranks of English society is now being propagated as a best 
practice for the other Co-operative entities, despite the Co-operative Bank lacking any 
traditional concept of membership. In its defense, the Co-operative Bank declares that, 
instead of a passive membership, it is preferable to attract customers able and willing to 
participate in consultation rounds regarding the appropriateness of pursued policies. All in 
all, by focusing on a small niche of retail banking, the Co-operative Bank has managed to 
increase its marketshare of personal deposits in England from 2 percent in 1970 to 5 
percent in 2003.  
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Appendix B : Parliamentary politics 
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Appendix C: Religious Affiliation 
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Table C.1: Dutch schools cater to what kind of religious affiliations (of parents) in 
      2000 
(Source : Dijkstra, Driessen & Veenstra, 2001) 
 
Religion Parents: None Cath Prot Islamic     Other Total 
Religion Schools: 
Public  60 17  14    7        3   2332 
Catholic  17 71   6    4        1  3317 
Protestant 23 11  59    7        2   1967 
Protestant (orth) 0 0  89    0       11       228 
Islamic  0 0    0   99         1           73 
Private  
non-religious 36 38   12   11         4         343 
          N=8260 
 
 
 
Table C.2: Relation religious affiliation Dutch parents and choice of schools (2000) 
(Source : Dijkstra, Driessen & Veenstra, 2001) 
 
Religion Parents:     None Cath Prot   Islamic Other 
Religion Schools: 
Public       55 13 16 30 38 
Catholic       23 76 11 26 19 
Protestant      18 7 60 24 19 
Protestant (orth)        0 0 11 0 16 
Islamic         0 0 0 13 1 
Private non-religious  5 4 2 7 8 
Total  2549    3096         1905      550       160 N=8260 
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Appendix D: Comparative Total Assets 
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Appendix E: Income inequality comparison (NL – UK) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1918 1922 1928 1932 1937 1946 1949-
1950
1959 1962 1966 1970 1977 1981 1985 1990 1993 1996 1999-
2000
S
h
a
re
 %
Year
Figure E.1: Comparison Total Gross Income Share of Top 10% in 
Neth and UK
(Source: Tables 2NL and 2UK in Atkinson and Salverda, 2005: 897-
900)
NETH
UK
0
5
10
15
20
25
1918-
1919
1922 1928 1932 1939 1946 1949-
1950
1958 1962 1966 1970 1977 1981 1985 1990 1993 1996 1999-
2000
S
h
a
re
 %
Year
Figure E.2: Comparison Total Gross Income Share of Top 1% in Neth 
and UK
(Source: Table 2NL and 2UK in Atkinson and Salverda, 2005: 897-900)
NETH
UK
 
 
578 
 
Appendix F : Government Expenditure 
  Source: CBS, 2001 Tweehonderd jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen 
(figures in million guilder) 
NA = figure not available 
* Government spending figures exclusive repayment of government loans 
**NNI at market prices 
 
Sources :  Mitchell, B.R., 1962. Abract of British Historical Statistics. 
Mitchell, B.R. 1971. Second Abstract of British Historical Statistics. 
Mitchell, B.R. 1988. British Historical Statistics 
Mitchell, B.R. 1992. International Historical Statistics Europe. 1750-1988. 
Booth, 2001. The British Economy in the Twentieth century 
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Appendix G: Labour productivity 
 
 
Table G.1: Comparison labour productivity NL and UK manufacturing (1913-1938) 
(gross value added per person hour, UK=100) 
 1913 1921 1929 1938 
Netherlands 78 104 91 89 
United Kingdom 100 100 100 100 
(Source: Van Ark and De Jong, 1996: 32, Table 10) 
 
 
Table G.2: Productivity levels in Dutch, German, US and UK manufacturing (1950-88) 
(gross value added per person hour, UK=100) 
 1950 1965 1973 1979 1988 
Netherlands 75 100 135 169 144 
Germany 74 121 133 162 137 
United States 247 254 220 226 207 
United Kingdom 100 100 100 100 100 
(Source: Van Ark, 1990a: 345, Table 1) 
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Appendix H: Opportunity structure of Politics 
 
                 Table H.1: Opportunity structure of English Politics 
 
 
Years 
Events 
1847 - Abolition Corn Laws 
1860s 
- Substantial transformation Civil Service starts; a public system 
of primary education is formed; the public schools are being 
infused with gentlemanly purposes and stripped of any 
remaining  working class stigma 
1875-… 
- Despite growing government intervention, laissez-faire policy 
remains predominant 
1897 
- In 1897 a Department of Agriculture is added to the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. This Department is moved to the Ministry of 
Water Management, Trade and Industry in 1901. 
1900-1905 
- static trade union membership 
- Labour movement is weakened by 1901 Taff Vale decision, 
which limits union powers to conduct strikes 
 
1909-1910 Introduction of super-tax in Lloyd George‘s Budget 
1914-1918 
- Trade Union membership soars in parallel with labourers 
grievances: the labour market tightens, inflation accelerates, 
higher profits in the munitions industry and rising rents for 
workers in the main engineering districts 
- Growth of national collective bargaining accelerates as the 
membership of employers‘ organisations in turn increases 
- Shopfloor workgroups gain great power in face of full 
employment and the need for production at any cost 
1917-1918 
- Employers are concerned about the extenions of the state 
apparatus, trade union power and taxation during WWI 
- Churchill states four days before the end of WWI that 
government price restrictions and industry control should be 
abandoned in order to ―liberate the forces of industrial 
enterprise, to release the controls which have been found 
galling, to divest ourselves of responsibilities which the state 
has only accepted in this perilous emergency, and from 
which…it had far better kept itself clear‖1206 
1918-1920 
- Local authorities are responsible for financing most of the new 
houses built 
1919 
- The Profiteering Act of 1919 makes the earning of ―a profit 
which is, in view of all the circumstances, unreasonable‖ a 
punishable offence 
- Continuing full employment and substantial inflation help 
unions to achieve a sharp reduction in the normal working week 
without reduction of pay 
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1920 
The 1920 price and earning collapse and the rise of unemployment 
weaken trade union support: membership and density collapses 
1921 
Many Conservatives adopt the view that action against profiteerinng 
would do private enterprise more harm than good; the Profiteering Act is 
allowed to lapse; the protests of the Standing Committee on Trusts fall 
on deaf ears with the ministers at the Board of Trade; the Balfour 
Committee which was appointed to enquire into ―the present extent of 
large-scale production, its possibilities and limitations‖, concludes that 
―the case for immediate legislation for the restraint of such abuses as 
may result from combinations cannot be said to be an urgent one‖1207 
1920s-
1930 
As the Labour Party seeks to present itself as a potential party of 
government, it increasingly employs a strategy of respectability and 
compromise in order not to alienate itself from middle-class voters (this 
leads to the marginalisation of for instance the ILP) 
1926 Great Strike ending with coal miners being starved into submission 
1931 
- the Labour government falls 
- in face of the world economic crisism the golden standard is 
abandoned 
1932 
―Great policy‖ of protection is installed, based on indirect tariffs rather 
than ―undue taxation to private enterprise‖1208 
1935 
The 1925 government budget provides a tax concession to companies 
engaging in voluntary schemes to restrict capacity 
1939- 
Banking becomes the subject of official controls from the spring of 1939. 
Throughout the war, banks are required to finance government 
expenditure. Until 1979, commercial banks‘ business is to a certain 
extent constrained by credit controls (involving lending priorities for 
manufacturing investment and the support of exports) 
Post-
WWII 
Voluntarism of industry vis a vis purposes of full employment is 
accepted by the state 
1950s 
―sound finance‖, i.e. a balanced budget, the maintenance of London‘s 
role as a centre for world banking and the stability of the sterling 
currency, is reintroduced and reconciled with social democratic policies: 
the result is a ―stop-go‖ policy1209 
1956 
The first effective legislation against restrictive practices, the Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act
1210
 (RTPA) comes into being; an associated RTPA 
Court is established to judge whether or not agreements are against the 
―public interest‖ 
1958 
The wartime regime of bank control is partially lifted; as a result of the 
stop-go policy clearing banks‘ activities are free from government 
direction only in the periods summer 1958 – July 1961 and October 1962 
– December 1964. 
1964 
The Resale Prices Act prevents the use of individual resale price 
agreements 
1970s 
Labour Party
1211
 as committed to home ownership as Conservatives; role 
of Building Societies is described as unique
1212
 
1979-1982 Conservative government deflects criticism on its policies – especially 
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high unemployment – by blaming the unions and previous economic 
policies 
1979 
Ascendancy of neo-liberalism: monetary lever is interest rate and not 
fiscal policy; low inflation is as important as low unemployment; 
monetary policy in accordance with rule not discretion 
 
 
 
 
Table H.2: Opportunity structure of Dutch Politics 
 
Years 
Events 
1863 
End of system of slavery in Dutch colonies, more than thirty years 
after British 
1869 Up to the year 1869 labour unions are prohibited in the Netherlands 
1915-1920 
- Government subsidises the union-initiated arrangements for 
unemployment insurance 
- During WWI prices and profits soar, which allows labour 
unions to negotiate important pay rises 
- As a result, the status of unions rises fast, as does their 
membership 
1917 
After years of tedious negotiation, a package deal known as the 
Pacification of 1917 is concluded. This deal entailed financial 
equality for christian-democratic schools, and universal (manhood) 
suffrage  requested by social democrats 
1918 
- After the declaration of the socialist leader Troelstra, the 
Dutch government mobilises the army 
- Troelstra‘s declaration also mobilises the confessional trade 
unions 
- The result of the first elections under the proportional representation 
system are disappointing for the socialists: the SDAP obtains only 
22% of the votes, which means that can easily be excluded from the 
cabinet formation of 1918. 
1919 
- Despite the massive condemnation of the socialist ―coup‖, 
the revolutionary intermezzo leads to important social 
reforms. So, after WWI, a separate ministry of Social 
Affairs is established led by the progressive catholic 
Aalberse. 
- As a first formal-legal instance of corporatism in the 
Netherlands, the Minister of Social Affairs in 1919 installs a 
―High Council of Labour‖ in which some 40 members from 
employers, employees, and government (led by the minister) 
officially meet and discuss social affairs. 
1920s 
The Social-Democratic Labour Party (SDAP) publishes a report on 
socialisation of the means of production and the abolition of private 
property 
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1927 
After long negotiations between parliament, political parties and the 
High Council of Labour, employers and employee organisations, the 
Law on Collective Labour Agreements is passed: collective labour 
agreements are now legally recognised 
1930 
In face of an international economic depression and worsening 
cost/benefit ratios in the Dutch gricultural sector, Van den Heuvel, 
chairman of the Protestant farmer union (CBTB) and Member of 
Parliament for the Protestant Party, asks the government to intervene 
and support the prices of sugarbeets, potatoes and wheats. 
The minister responds by installing a Committee in charge of 
formulating policy proposals. The two Central Co-operative Banks 
form part of this committee
1213
. 
1933 
As the industrial sectors were not willing to establish voluntarily 
industrial councils, as proposed by the Catholics, a law on industrial 
councils (Bedrijfsraden) is passed in parliament, albeit with minimal 
effect on industrial practice. 
 
1935 
Based on the thoughts of the Socialist Professor Tinbergen – in turn 
influenced by Keynes – and President Roosevelt‘s New Deal 
programme, the Socialist Party publishes the influential ―Labour 
Plan‖ in which it declared that a precondition for socialisation is the 
ordering of economy, most notably through the planned development 
of production. 
1936 The Dutch government finally abandons the golden standard 
1937 
The Minister of Social Affairs is adjudicated the right to approve 
collective labour agreements, or declare them invalind if deemed to 
be against the ―public interest‖ 
1940 
Dutch industry is incorporated in the trade and industry ―Woltersom‖ 
organisation imposed by the German occupiers. 
1945 
Neither employer nor employee unions want to create conflicts in this 
period of reconstruction: in a climate of social harmony, the bipartite 
Labour Foundation, a private organisation, is established to give 
neutral advise about appropriate wage levels. All employers and 
employees keep to the wage agreements initiated by the Labour 
Foundation for the years to come. 
 
1946 
Minister of agriculture Mansholt wants to reform the agricultural 
sector so as to restore the foodsupply; Mansholt is especially 
concerned with international market developments 
1950 
- The tripartite Social and Economic Council of the 
Netherlands (SER), a public organisation, is established to 
advise the Dutch government on national and international 
social and economic policy. The SER is financed by 
industry and is wholly independent from the government. It 
represents the interests of trade unions and industry, 
advising the government (upon request or at its own 
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initiative) on all major social and economic issues. A 
positive advise of the SER is always followed by 
government
1214
. The four purposes of the SER are: economic 
growth, productivity increase, balance of payments 
equilibrium and full employment 
- The law on Corporate Organisation comes into being, which 
provides sectoral organisations with the possibility to gain 
public self-regulatory authority and become financially 
independent through for instance the levying of taxes 
 
1954 
- The ―Landbouwschap‖, a public corporation for agricultural 
self-regulation, comes into being by royal decree. 
- Membership in the Landbouwschap is compulsory for all 
those engaged in agriculture, whether they belong to one of 
the six private agricultural unions or not. 
- As a body for the promotion of the general interests of 
farming business, the Landbouwschap has autonomous 
legislative authority with regard to 
a) promotion of animal health, quality of agricultural produce 
b) regulation of production, storage and land cultivation 
c) internal distribution 
d) rationalisation and normalisation 
e) conditions of employment for agricultural workers 
- the Landbouwschap is regarded by the Dutch government as 
the authoritative voice of Dutch organised agriculture, a 
voice moderate in tone; relation can be summed up as a 
―partnership‖ 
 
1960s 
 
A first wave of professionalisation of parliamentary representation 
takes place
1215
 
 
1959-1972 
As the Dutch economy recovers from the war devastation and 
enormous natural gas reserves are found, government expenditure 
explodes 
 
1970s 
 
Parliament  becomes a ―workshop for professional 
politicians‖1216 
 
1973-1980 
i) the motto of Prime Minister Den Uyl‘s cabinet (1973-
1977) is ―the spread of knowledge, income and power‖ 
ii) the State deficit explodes 
iii) central state planning by the Den Uyl cabinets cannot 
stop the declining tide, most notably in terms of 
employment figures 
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iv) European Union freezes price-support measures in 
order to stop inflation and control the production level 
1980s - The purpose of ―acceptable income distribution‖ to some 
extent is sidelined. 
- Three new policy goals dominate the 1980s: 
i) reduce the budget deficit 
ii) downsize the welfare sector 
iii) revitalise the production capacity of the economy 
- Two issues dominate the municipal reforms of the mid-
1980s: 
i) result-oriented financial management (the new 
―planning and control system‖) 
ii) decentralising management responsibilities 
(the ―concern-division‖ model1217) 
 
1989-2001 i) Minister of Finance - from 1994 Prime 
Minister -  Kok substitutes a focus on good 
public/private ―management‖ for the neo-
liberal emphasis on economic privatisation and 
downsizing 
ii) the goals of ―preservation of purchasing 
power‖ and  ―a more    equivalent income 
distribution‖ are revalorised 
iii) local politics: in face of an historically low 
voters‘ turnout and the access of extreme right 
parties to some city councils, a ―search for the 
lost citizen‖ starts1218 
2002 - Economic recession and criticism by the New Right – in 
particular the political party LPF – with regards to the issues 
of security, healthcare and education usher in a period of 
―neo-liberal‖ austerity 
- Law-based state control of outputs and performances: halt to 
―permissiveness‖, climate of ―inspection and control‖, call 
for strict compliance with rules and regulations 
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Appendix I: Opportunity structure of Civil Society 
 
Table I.1: Opportunity structure of English Civil society 
 
Years 
Events 
1780s The attack on ―Old Abuses‖1219, and the desire to substitute it with 
economic reform takes off 
1790s The belief that labour is a commodity to be bought and sold at a free 
market price is accepted by most elites
1220
 
1900-1905 - static trade union membership 
- Labour movement is weakened by 1901 Taff Vale decision, 
which limits union powers to conduct strikes 
- many employers use the economic downturn to either 
express their anti-unionism or exploit the situation in their 
negotiations with the unions 
 
1910-1920 - trade union membership trebles 
- two periods of serious industrial unrests 
1918 - With the moral examples of the Russian revolution in 1917 
and the German uprising of workers and soldiers in 1918, 
the chairman of the Socialist Party Troelstra fires up the 
already revolutionary mood amongst Dutch workers and 
soldiers: in november 1918 he  declares in the Lower 
Chamber that the revolution would not halt at the frontiers 
of the Netherlands and that the socialists were ready to take 
over power in the country 
- After Troelstra‘s declaration, everyone who is not socialist 
joins around the Queen in a massive anti-socialist 
demonstration on november the 18th of 1918. 
1921 - While the Labour pressures were pushing public opinion 
towards action against profiteering and combinations until 
1920, falling prices shift the political initiative back to 
preferences for laissez-faire and ―anti-waste‖; ―trusts…are 
inevitable. They will continue, whatever obstacles we 
attempt to put in their path‖1221 
1920-1930 - one period of serious ―anti-profiteering‖ unrest 
- even a moderate suggestion that the government should 
sponsor the publication of monopolistic prices was 
characterised as a step on the ―slippery slope of 
socialism‖1222 in the interwar period 
1931 - Final demise of Free Trade; the belief in the ―inevitability of 
monopoly‖ and ―trusts‖ becomes generalised to even Labour 
leaders 
Post-
WWII 
- main post-WWII purposes: full employment and the 
development of the welfare state 
1950s - emergence of the policy objective of ―sound finance‖ 
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- the ―Americanisation of English industry‖ – the use of mass 
production and sophisticated management techniques – 
becomes a hot issue 
 
1979-1989 - Thatcherian variety of High Tory Liberalism: state 
intervention, bureaucracy and corporate tripartism are 
rejected; marketisation, economic ―efficiency‖ and 
managerial rationality are praised; against macro-state and 
society and for a return to micro-communities and self-help 
- Consumers are encouraged to believe that the economy has 
entered a new era of prosperity 
1990-1992 - Botched attempt to enter European ERM 
 
 
Table I.2: Opportunity structure of Dutch Civil society 
 
Years 
Events 
1850s Growing impact of free labour ideology on Dutch MPs, translating itself 
in anti-slavery feelings with regards to the colonies and ideas of self-
organisation (self-help) domestically 
1880s Feeling of emergency is growing in face of the threat of ―food shortage‖ 
1930s Feeling of emergency is growing in face of the threat of ―food shortage‖ 
1935- Social-democrats accept corporatism as a justified ―preparatory phase‖ 
of socialization 
Post-
WWII 
Labour unions reject strikes as a bargaining means 
1950s Catholics substitute the notion of ―personalism‖ for the social-
democratic and liberal pressures for respectively a ―breakthrough‖ and 
the liberalisation of the corporatist system 
1970s The threat of ―food shortage‖ has become obsolete; as material welfare is 
taken-for-granted, attention shifts to non-material aspects of well being: 
―democratisation‖ and ―politicisation‖ forces call for the end of 
regentesque policy and the installment of pluralism, in which all interest 
groups have equal access to agenda-building and policy-making
1223
; 
1973 The summit of this period of polarisation and politicisation occurs when 
the 1973 cabinet Den Uyl proclaims its motto: the ―equal distribution of 
knowledge, income and power‖ 
1975-1980 In face of the unsuccessful cabinets Den Uyl, the aversion for State 
planning grows 
1980 No-nonsense: neo-liberal self-help and retreat of the welfare State 
1989-2001 Reinvention of the Regent policy tradition (―interactive decision-
making‖) 
2002 The New Right in the Netherlands led by the university professor 
Fortuyn, launches blistering attacks on Regentesque policies and the 
taboos of the ―Left Church‖. 
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Appendix J: Opportunity structure of Markets 
 
Table J.1: Opportunity structure of markets in England 
 
Years 
Event 
1850-1880 Income inequality increases sharply 
1900 Sharpest clashes between consumer co-operatives and private 
retailers 
1900-1905 Downturn in business cycle. 
1920-1960 Income inequality decreases (for middle class, not so much for lower 
class
1224
) 
1921 Food prices fall 
1918-1930 - Merger wave: the Anglo-Dutch company Unilever 
exemplifies how through a series of mergers starting in 1918 
a veritable empire of integration and diversification could be 
achieved by 1929. The increasing need of marketing and 
distribution skills forms the rationalisation behind these 
mergers 
- Of relevance to the Co-operative Wholesale Society is that 
Unilever controlled a large chain of grocery shops, including 
the Liptons groups 
1930s-
1940s 
The formation of larger corporate firms after the merger wave of the 
1920s ushers in a period of market control through formal cartels and 
informal oligopolistic collusion, rather than further mergers
1225
 
1938-1949 Income inequality decreases most sharply 
1964-1976 Income inequality decreases for lower classes 
1950s-
1960s 
After the pause in the 1930s and 1940s, firm concentration increases 
again at a rapid pace 
1970-1971 Interest rates fall. 
1977-1990 Income inequality increases sharply 
1979-1981 British competitiveness on the international market deteriorates by 25 
percent from 1979 to 1981 
Early 
1980s 
Inflation tumbles in the early 1980s thanks to the collapse in world 
commodity prices 
1982-1988 Consumer spending rises faster than GDP 
i) consumer savings declines, borrowing soars 
ii) consumers speculate in assets, most notably houses 
iii) property prices rise by 75 percent between 1985-1988 
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Table J.2: Opportunity structure of markets in the Netherlands 
 
 
Years 
Event 
1750-1775 Amsterdam investors start pouring large sums of money into the West 
Indian plantations (Suriname, Guinea…); repayment failure leads to wave 
of bankruptcies after 1775; after 1775 metropolitan investment drops 
dramatically 
1830-1863 ―Cultivation‖ system of forced cropping and land rent tax in the colonies 
leads to Dutch budget surplus; revenues of the cultivation system reached a 
third of the yearly Dutch budget in 1860 
 
1870-1900 
Income inequality increases 
 
1914-1918 Working class does not profit from WWI, in which the Netherlands stays 
neutral; trade and industry decline, unemployment soars, poverty and 
income inequality grow 
1921-1929 Dutch GNP increases comparatively fast (faster than trading partners): 
―Golden years‖; income inequality decreases 
 
1929-1939 Dutch GNP increases comparatively slowly (slower than trading partners); 
income inequality 
1931-1936 The Dutch economy suffers comparatively more than other western-
european countries in face of the Dutch monetary policy of not abandoning 
the golden standard before 1936 
1930-1945 The Dutch argricultural and horticultural sector suffers financially during 
the economic depression; credit demand from this sector is limited to 
repayments on existing loans. 
1938-1950 Income inequality, most notably between the cities of Holland and the 
provinces, decreases sharply, creating a new middle-class level-playing 
field between Amsterdam and the provinces (Holland was seriously 
impoverished during WWII and the introduction of progressive income tax 
further leveled inequality) 
1944, 1949 Devaluation currency (guilder) to compensate for the deficit on the balance 
of payments (mainly due to the loss of the Indonesian colony) 
1941-1953 Rental prices are frozen to curtail inflation. After 1950, a policy of directed 
yearly increases is instituted. While other prices treble over the period 
1940-1949, farm rent increases are limited to 20 %. As a continuation of 
the 1930 agricultural crisis policy – instituted in the name of ―food 
shortage‖ – agricultural prices are fixed. A directed wage policy is 
instituted. 
1945-1954 As a result of the Labour Foundation wage agreements, wage levels 
comparatively do not rise faster than price levels. 
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1950-1970 During the period 1950-1975 three developments bring down the level of 
income inequality 
i) the decreasing importance of capital income 
ii) the introduction of standardized function classification 
systems of income levels 
iii) the increasing importance of secondary income (from social 
subsidies, unemployment benefits…) 
 
1950-1965 Until 1965 more than 70 percent of industrial investments is based on 
internal financing 
1954-1965 With the vanishing of the balance of payment deficit, wages are allowed to 
go up. Wages increases comparatively fast. Currency is revalued in 1961 
by 5 %. Rental prices soar, agricultural prices are raised to the level 
foreseen by  European agricultural policy. Because wages and prices rise 
faster (inflation) than in trading partners‘ countries, the competitive 
position of the Netherlands deteriorates: the Netherlands‘ comparative 
advantage as an island of ―cheapness‖ is lost in face of European economic 
integration. 
1959 Enormous natural gas reserves are found; the Dutch economy starts 
recovering from the war devastation 
1966-1978 i) Despite the deterioriation of Dutch competitive position, the 
marketshare in international export rises. Because domestic 
production costs rise disproportionately, profit margins of 
export products drop. 
ii) In the 1960s, the declining productivity of limited liability 
companies induces a rapprochement of banking and 
industry. A merger and takeover movement waves over the 
Netherlands, as part of an extensive process of scaling up 
and rationalisation. While in 1965 more than half of the 
liabilities were formed out of own equity capital, this 
percentage had decreased to 38 percent in 1973. Almost 80 
percent of the increase of the balance was on account of 
foreign capital, mostly short-term. 
 
1973 Arab oil boycott; the worldwide stagnating economy hits the Netherlands‘ 
open and internationally dependent trade economy hard; Unemployment 
grows. 
1979-1985 The competitive position of the Netherlands improves fast. 
1980s-1990s Income inequality increases 
2002- Economic recession; below European average macro-economic 
performance indicators 
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Appendix K: List of all British Prime Ministers (1721-2008) 
 
 
Year   Prime Minister Party Specific 
2007   Gordon Brown Labour  
1997   Tony Blair Labour 
State is an enabling, trustworthy 
partner for the public, private or 
―voluntary‖ sectors, depending on 
what sector is best placed to realise 
―mutual purposes‖ 
1990    John Major Conservative  
1979    Margaret Thatcher Conservative  
1976    James Callaghan Labour  
1974    Harold Wilson Labour  
1970    Edward Heath Conservative  
1964    Harold Wilson Labour  
1963    Sir Alec Douglas-Home Conservative  
1957    Harold Macmillan Conservative ―Every man a capitalist‖1226 
1955    Sir Anthony Eden Conservative ―Property-owning democracy‖ 1227 
1951    Winston Churchill Conservative 
1) ―service, responsibility and 
moral integrity‖ 
2) communist-socialist threat to 
freedom and individual 
enterprise
1228
: home ownership
1229
 
3)maintain Britain as ―first-class 
country‖ 
1945    Clement Attlee Labour  
1940    Winston Churchill Conservative  
1937    Neville Chamberlain Conservative  
1935    Stanley Baldwin Conservative  
1931    James Ramsay MacDonald National  
1929    James Ramsay MacDonald Labour  
1924    Stanley Baldwin Conservative 
1) Working-class ―Tory 
democracy‖: social legislation 
2) National unity: reform local 
government and abolish unfair 
local rates impeding industrial 
revival 
3) Protection against foreigners 
(Aliens act + Safeguarding 
duties)
1230
 
1924    James Ramsay MacDonald Labour  
1923    Stanley Baldwin Conservative  
1922    Andrew Bonar Law Conservative  
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1916    David Lloyd George Liberal  
1908    Herbert H. Asquith Liberal 
"People's Budget", Parliament Act 
1911
1231
 
1905    Henry Campbell-Bannerman Liberal  
1902    Arthur Balfour Conservative  
1895    Marquess of Salisbury Conservative  
1894    Earl of Rosebery Liberal  
1892    William Ewart Gladstone Liberal  
1886    Marquess of Salisbury Conservative  
1886    William Ewart Gladstone Liberal  
1885    Marquess of Salisbury Conservative ―Tory democracy‖ 
1880    William Ewart Gladstone Liberal  
1874    Benjamin Disraeli Conservative 
―England and empire‖1232; Tory 
democracy
1233
 
1868    William Ewart Gladstone Liberal 
―Modernisation‖ of ―intermediate‖ 
establishment institutions; 
voluntaryism; cheap government, 
free trade and sound finance
1234
 
1868    Benjamin Disraeli Conservative 
 
 
1866    Edward Stanley Conservative  
1865    John Russell Liberal  
1858    Viscount Palmerston Liberal 
sound, cautious government at 
home and a stout defence of 
national interests abroad 
1858    Edward Stanley Conservative  
1855   Viscount Palmerston Liberal 
Victorian good government: 
- office is a public trust 
- civil officers should be 
subject to uniform 
standards of recruitment, 
performance and 
compensation 
1852   George Hamilton-Gordon Conservative  
1852   Edward Stanley Conservative  
1846    Lord John Russell Whig  
1841    Sir Robert Peel Tory Repeal of Corn Laws
1235
 
1835    William Lamb Whig  
1834    Sir Robert Peel Tory  
1834    Arthur Wellesley Tory  
1834    William Lamb Whig  
1830    Charles Grey Whig 
Improvement of intermediate 
institutions 
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1828    Arthur Wellesley Tory 
Counter evils of commercial 
society with a responsible 
aristocracy, endowed clergy, and a 
national church
1236
 
1827    Frederick Robinson Tory  
1827    George Canning Tory  
1812    Robert Jenkinson Tory  
1809    Spencer Perceval Tory  
1807    William Bentinck Tory  
1806    William Grenville Whig  
1804    William Pitt, the Younger Tory  
1801    Henry Addington Tory  
1783    William Pitt, the Younger Tory  
1783    William Bentinck Tory  
1782    William FitzMaurice Whig  
1782    Charles Watson-Wentworth Whig  
1770    Frederick North Tory  
1767    Augustus Fitzroy Whig  
1766    William Pitt the Elder Whig  
1765    Charles Watson-Wentworth Whig  
1763    George Grenville Whig  
1762    John Stuart, Earl of Bute Tory  
1757    Thomas Pelham-Holles Whig  
1756    William Cavendish Whig  
1754    Thomas Pelham-Holles Whig  
1743    Henry Pelham Whig  
1742    Spencer Compton Whig  
1721    Sir Robert Walpole Whig office as private property
1237
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Appendix L:  The English Consumer Co-operative movement‟s 
relationship with politics 
 
 
Year Problems Solutions? 
1830 
Owen holds Parliament in 
scorn 
- Co-operative Commonwealth will 
make State irrelevant 
- Down to and including the 
Rochdale pioneers, Co-operators 
want nothing from the State in the 
way of assistance, apart from 
adequate legal protection 
 
1840s-
1860s 
Co-operatives are considered 
partnerships, and have no 
statutory legal protection 
Christian Socialists and 
Liberal M.P.s lobby for the institution of 
protective statutory legislation the Industrial 
& Provident Societies Act 
1840s-…  
Religious tolerance and political neutrality, 
in the sense of not being formally aligned to 
any denomination or political party, and not 
posing these elements as conditions for 
membership 
1856 
Rochdale Society clashes with 
State over dividend tax issue 
Reluctant payment of taxes 
1870 
National coordination and 
standardisation of supra-local 
competences is necessary to 
ensure the Co-operative 
movement‘s growth 
A Co-operative Central Board is established 
in 1870, later renamed as the Co-operative 
Union. The Co-operative Board furnishes 
legal advice, publishes literature and 
propaganda, promotes cooperative 
education, and organizes the Annual 
Congresses, held every spring from 1869. 
Leadership of the Board is largely in the 
hands of the Christian Socialists. 
1880  
1) Joint Parliamentary Committee 
2) Support of some Liberal MPs who 
are active co-operators or just 
favourably disposed 
 
1900-
1905 
- Labour movement is 
weakened by 1901 Taff Vale 
decision, which limits union 
powers to conduct strikes 
- Trade Unions and Socialist 
societies in favour of 
Parliamentary representation 
through the Labour Representation 
Committee (later to become the 
Labour Party) 
- Liberal nonconformist leaders 
such as Holyoake oppose entry 
into politics: ―You are opening the 
stormy doors of politics‖1238 
1906-
1915 
- The Liberal 
government proves 
to be less favourably 
- Joint Parliamentary Committee 
argues that political representation 
is imperative but status quo 
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disposed towards 
Co-operative 
grievances than  it 
declared before 
coming into power in 
1906 
- Trade Union and 
Labour party 
pressure within the 
Co-op movement 
increases 
spontaneously 
- Of every 1,000 
members of the Co-
operative Societies, 
450 voted 
Conservative 
(neutral ―laissez-faire‖ policy) 
prevails 
- bulk active co-operators believes 
pressure group activity is enough 
- The Co-operative Union Limited is 
established with the purpose of 
―propagandist and defensive 
action‖ 
 
1915-
1919 
1) Co-operators treated 
comparatively bad 
by government 
during WWI 
2) ―appalling‖ 
ignorance of Co-
operative societies 
by ministers, 
parliamentarians and 
most administrators 
despite the size and 
importance of Co-
operative trade 
- As a result of the Emergency Conference in 
October, 1917, the decision is taken to 
officially enter into ―politics‖; the Co-
operative Party is formed in 1919 
1918 
Lloyd George‘s Coalition 
Government, on the 
instigation of private 
traders and the Federation 
of British Industries, 
appoints a Royal 
Commission to inquire 
into the purported income 
tax advantages accruing 
to Co-operative business 
Co-operators lobby to get into the 
Commission and block the calls for income 
tax levies on ―any part of the net proceeds 
not actually returned to members as 
‗dividend‖ and equal treatment of taxation 
with regards to co-operative wholesale and 
productive societies and retail distributive 
societies 
1920 
The income tax is imposed by 
statutory law in 1920: 
surpluses arising from co-
operative trade are treated as 
taxable profit by the Inland 
Revenue 
Co-operative lobbying against the tax goes 
on through petitions and parliamentary 
pressure. 
In 1921, the tax is abolished. 
 
1921 
Alliance or not with the 
Labour Party? 
During the 1921 Congress the following 
declaration is made: ―identification of the 
Co-operative Movement in politics with any 
one political party…will retard the progress 
of co-operative trade and industry and thus 
weaken…the Movement. Congress 
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thereforce declines to ratify the terms of the 
proposed…Alliance‖1239 
1922 
What distinguishes the 
programme of the Co-
operative Party? 
The Co-operative Party launches a National 
Programme with as it two main purposes: 
1) to safeguard the interests of the 
voluntary Co-operation and to resist 
any legislative or administrative 
inequality which would hamper this 
2) The processes of production, 
distribution and exchange (including 
the land) shall be organised on co-
operative lines in the interests of the 
whole community (Co-operative 
Commonwealth 
1926 
The Co-operative Party, while 
being very small, differs not 
much from the Labour Party, 
which has to struggle to unite 
its potential electorate 
An ―Agreement‖ between the Co-operative 
and Labour is concluded. 
1921-
1932 
- The same ―private‖ lobby 
against Co-operative societies 
continues to exert pressure on 
successive governments. 
- Despite a monster petition 
signed by 3,346,573 Co-
operative member, the Raeburn 
Committee – installed by the 
National Government headed 
by Ramsay McDonald – in 
1932 decides in favour of 
taxing the ―undistributed 
surpluses‖ of co-operative 
societies. 
Though the first decade of Co-operative 
politicking was not unsuccessful, the odds 
turn in face of a national economic slump: 
the Co-op movement has to pay an 
additional annual tax of £1,250,000 on 
surpluses from 1932 until WWII. 
1922-
1940 
The Co-operative Party lobbies 
for an Amendment of the 
Industrial and Provident 
Societies Act, in order to 
broaden the legal protection of 
Co-operatives. 
The Co-operative Party‘s efforts are 
thwarted by Conservative M.P.s, some of 
whom are closely associated to private 
traders or the Federation of British 
Industries. 
1960s-
1990s 
Consumers‘ Association 
overtakes the role of 
―consumer interest champion‖ 
from the Co-op Parliamentary 
Committee and Party 
 
 
Co-operative Bank, established as a separate 
PLC in the 1970s affirms its  ―apolitical‖, 
non party-affiliated nature. 
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Appendix M: References to the Consumer Co-operative movement 
in Labour Party manifestos 
(Sources: http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man.htm and 
http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/ ) 
 
 
Year Labour Party 
1918 Labour stands with the Co-operative Movement in its insistence on reasonable food prices 
and fair distribution, and in its resistance to unfair taxation. The Labour Party will do all it 
can to aid co-operators in their struggle for a democratic food organisation and against 
unfair discrimination. Labour and Co-operation are a single movement, and in the coming 
battle with reaction they must fight side by side. 
1923 The Labour Party is working for the creation of a Commonwealth Co-operative Service. It 
believes that so far only a beginning has been made in the scientific organisation of 
industry. It will apply in a practical spirit the principle of Public Ownership and Control to 
the Mines, the Railway Service and the Electrical Power Stations, and the development of 
Municipal Services. It will make work safe for the worker by stricter Inspection of 
Workplaces, and more effective measures against Accidents and Industrial Diseases. It will 
provide fuller Compensation for the Workers and improve the Standard of Hours. 
1929 The Labour Programme of peaceful but determined National Development and 
Reconstruction leading towards the Socialist and Co-operative Commonwealth is the only 
alternative to Reaction and Revolution. On this Programme Labour asks for the support of 
men and women of good will of all classes. 
1931 The Labour Party demands efficiency. Any special assistance of industry must be 
conditional upon the acceptance of the necessary measure of public ownership or 
control….Because it appreciates the vital importance of the Co-operative Movement, the 
Labour Party will work in full alliance with co-operators, utilising their long experience and 
specialised knowledge. 
1935 Labour is pledged to a comprehensive programme of industrial legislation…It would repeal 
the unjust and penal tax which the Government has imposed upon Co-operative Societies 
1945 ―And the effective choice of the people in this Election will be between the Conservative 
Party, standing for the protection of the rights of private economic interest, and the Labour 
Party, allied with the great Trade Union and co-operative movements, standing for the wise 
organisation and use of the economic assets of the nation for the public good. Those are the 
two main parties; and here is the fundamental issue which has to be settled. ― 
 
1950 No trade union movement in the world has such a proud record as the British. With 
unexampled restraint and loyalty, it has co-operated to hold wages steady through these 
difficult years. The great Co-operative Movement has also exerted a steadying effect on 
retail prices. It is a fine example of democratic co-operation to meet the needs of the people. 
But many prices are still far too high and a burden to every housewife. Our aim for the 
future is to bring down excessive prices, by increasing the efficiency of production and 
distribution. 
1959 Existing consumer protection organisations will be encouraged and we shall examine the 
need for further consumer protection-a task in which the Co-operative Movement will 
obviously have a great part to play. 
 
1970 We also stress the contribution that can be made by co-operative enterprise. This is already 
a large sector in the economy, and operates on democratic criteria which we would like to 
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see extended. The Labour Party is therefore considering the establishment of a Co-operative 
Development Agency to give added strength to the rationalisation and development of co-
operatives 
1974 [we shall] work with the co-operative movement to develop its role through the creation of a 
Co-operative Development Agency and in other ways. 
1979 We will reestablish the Rural Development Boards in England and ensure that the Co-
operative Development Agency, the NEB, the tourist boards and the Manpower Services 
Commission play an active role in rural job creation. 
1983 We also believe that a major new role should be played in the industry by public and co-
operative enterprise - to provide a new source of enterprise, initiative and innovation 
1986 We will encourage the establishment and success of co-operatives of all forms. 
1992 Employees should have the opportunity to own collectively a significant stake in the 
company for which they work, through a democratic Employee Share Ownership Plan 
(ESOP) or a co-operative. We will strengthen support for such schemes and consult about 
the possibility of creating a new tax incentive to encourage companies to establish or extend 
an ESOP or set up a co-operative. 
1997 We are keen to encourage a variety of forms of partnership and enterprise, spreading 
ownership and encouraging more employees to become owners through Employee Share 
Ownership Plans and co-operatives. 
2001 We will modernise company law to promote transparency, reduce burdens on small 
business and promote long-term economic success. We welcome the recommendations of 
the Co-operative Commission, which also covered the significant mutual sector, and will 
examine them with a view to strengthening these important parts of our economy. 
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Appendix N:  Historical Composition Dutch Government 
 
 
Period 
Cabinet 
policy label in 
press and 
books 
Cabinet composition 
2006- 
―Centrist‖ 
(motto prime 
minister: 
“back to the 
Golden Age”) 
- Coalition between two Christian-democratic 
parties (CDA and ChristenUnie), and Social-
democrats (PVDA) 
- Prime Minister Balkenende (CDA) 
2002-… 
―Centre-
Right‖ 
- Coalition between Christian Party (CDA), Liberal 
Party (VVD) and third Party (first New Right 
(LPF), now New Liberals D66) 
- Prime Minister Balkenende (CDA) 
1994-2002 ―Purple‖ 
- Coalition between Social-democrats (PVDA), Liberal 
Party (VVD) and New Liberals (D66) 
- Prime Minister Kok (PVDA) 
1982-1994 ―Lubbers‖ 
- Coalition between Christian-Democratic Party (CDA) 
and Liberal Party (VVD). In the third term, the Social-
democrats (PVDA) replace the VVD in the coalition 
- Prime Minister Lubbers (CDA) 
1966-1982 ―Polarisation‖ 
- first coalition between Catholics (KVP) and one 
Protestant Party (ARP) 
- second coalition between Catholics (KVP), two 
Protestant Parties (ARP and CHU), and Liberal 
Party (VVD) 
- third coalition between Catholics (KVP), two 
Protestant Parties (ARP and CHU), Liberal Party 
(VVD), and Democratic Socialists (DS‘70) 
- fourth coalition between Social-democrats 
(PvdA), PPR, New Liberals (D66), Catholics 
(KVP), one Protestant Party (ARP), and the 
Christian Radicals (PPR) 
- fifth coalition between New Christian Party 
(CDA) and Liberal Party (VVD) 
- sixth coalition between New Christian Party 
(CDA), Liberal Party (VVD) and New Liberals 
(D66) 
- Prime Ministers are Zijlstra (ARP), De Jong 
(KVP), Biesheuvel (ARP), Den Uyl (PVDA) and 
Den Agt (CDA) 
1958-1966 
―Welfare 
State‖ 
- Three christian parties (ARP, CHU en KVP), that 
mainly govern in coalition with the liberal party  
VVD (from 1959 to 1965).  During the years  
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years 1965-1966, ending in the 'Night of 
Schmelzer', the social-democratic party (PvdA) is 
part of the governing coalition 
- Prime Ministers Beel (KVP), De Quay (KVP), Marijnen 
(KVP) and Cals (KVP) 
1945-1958 
―Roman 
Catholic – 
Red‖ 
- KVP and PVDA form centre of cabinet 
- Prime Ministers Schermerhorn (first Liberal-
democratic Party, later PVDA), Beel (KVP), 
Drees (PVDA), 
1939-1945 ―War‖  
1918-1939 ―Interbellum‖ 
- Pillarisation and the supremacy of the 
confessional parties characterise the interbellum. 
- Extra-Parliamentary cabinets1240 led by De 
Beerenbroeck (Roman Catholic Electoral 
Association), Colijn (ARP) and  De Geer (CHU) 
1913-1918 
―Pre-WWI‖ 
Last non-confessional government before the 1990‘s is 
formed 
1897 
A progressive Liberal government is formed, ―the cabinet 
Pierson‖. 
A conservative ―old‖ liberal becomes Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. 
1894 
A Liberal government (with one catholic minister) is 
formed, called the ―cabinet Roëll‖. 
1891 
The ―right‖, i.e. the protestant and catholic parties lose 
their majority. A liberal-progressive cabinet is formed. 
1888 
First confessional coalition government is formed, 
composed of a small combined majority of Anti-
revolutionaries and Catholics. The government also 
contains a few Conservatives. 
 
Before 
1888 
Before 1848 Ministers were in the first place servants of 
the King that convened on a very irregular basis. These 
Ministers generally speaking were Conservatives, i.e. 
members of the 19
th
 century political movement that 
opposed democratisation. The first regular government 
cabinet was formed in 1848. 
Until 1888, government cabinets barely had a clear 
political party orientation. From 1888, when a system of 
quadrennial elections was introduced and political parties 
were established, all this changed.  
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Appendix O: General election results by English region, 1900-1997  
 (source: Butler, 2000: 395-398)
1241
 
 
 
 1900 Dec 
1910 
1922 1931 1945 1951 1964 1979 1987 1997 
London           
Cons 51 30 43 53 12 14 10 50 58 11 
Lib 8 26 9 4 -    3 6 
Lab - 3 9 5 48 29 32 42 23 58 
Rest SE           
Cons 123 103 130 156 88 153 156 146 170 95 
Lib 32 49 23 4 3  3 3 3 22 
Lab - 2 9 5 91 46 46 13 3 48 
Midlan
ds 
          
Cons 60 50 53 80 24 35 42 57 67 28 
Lib 27 30 17 3 -     1 
Lab 1 8 17 4 64 59 54 41 33 74 
North           
Cons 98 50 82 146 43 69 53 53 63 13 
Lib 55 82 27 9 2 2  4 4 5 
Lab - 21 60 15 128 99 114 107 96 139 
Univers
ity 
     - - - - - 
Cons 9 9 8 8 4      
Lib   3 2 1      
Lab           
TOTAL
S 
          
Cons 402 272 345 521 213 321 304 339 376 165 
Lib 184 272 116 37 12 6 9 11 22 46 
Lab 2 42 142 52 393 295 317 269 229 419 
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Appendix P: 
Social and educational composition of British Cabinets, 1895-1997 
(Source : Butler, 2000: 407) 
 
   No. Arist
1242
 
Class 
Midd
le 
Class 
Wor
king
1243
 
Public 
School 
Edu
Eto
n 
Educ 
Univ. 
Edu 
Oxbr
idge 
1895 Conservative Salisbury 19 8 11 - 16 7 15 14 
1902 Conservative Balfour 19 9 10  16 9 14 13 
1905 Liberal Bannerman 19 7 11 1 11 3 14 12 
1914 Liberal Asquith 19 6 12 1 11 3 15 13 
1919 Coalition Ll. George 21 3 17 1 12 2 13 8 
1922 Conservative Bonar Law 16 8 8  14 8 13 13 
1924 Labour MacDonald 19 3 5 11 8  6 6 
1924 Conservative Baldwin 21 9 12  21 7 16 16 
1929 Labour MacDonald 18 2 4 12 5  6 3 
1931 National MacDonald 20 8 10 2 13 6 11 10 
1935 Conservative Baldwin 22 9 11 2 14 9 11 10 
1937 Conservative Chamberlain 21 8 13  17 8 16 13 
1945 Conservative Churchill 16 6 9 1 14 7 11 9 
1945 Labour Attlee 20 0 8 12 5 2 10 5 
1951 Conservative Churchill 16 5 11  14 7 11 9 
1955 Conservative Eden 18 5 13  18 10 16 14 
1957 Conservative Macmillan 18 4 14  17 8 16 15 
1963 Conservative Home 24 5 19  21 11 17 17 
1964 Labour Wilson 23 1 14 8 8 1 13 11 
1970 Conservative Heath 18 4 14  15 4 15 15 
1974 Labour Wilson 21 1 16 4 7  16 11 
1976 Labour Callaghan 22 1 13 7 7  15 10 
1979 Conservative Thatcher 22 3 19  20 6 18 17 
1990 Conservative Major 22 3 17 2 14 2 20 17 
1997 Labour Blair 22 0 15 7 8 - 21 3 
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Appendix Q: Income inequality 
 
 
Source: http://www.ifs.org.uk/election/ebn4.pdf 
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Table Q.1: Income inequality 
Gini-coefficient (0 means total equality, 1 total inequality) and relative poverty rates 
(percentage of households earning less than 50% of median income) in selected Western 
countries (based on annual equivalent disposable household income
1244
 
 
 Mid 1980s Most recent year available 
 Gini Poverty Year Gini Poverty 
Aus 0,292 11,9 1994 0,311 12,2 
Austria 0,227 6,7 1997 0,266 8,0 
Bel 0,227 4,5 2000 0,277 8,0 
Can 0,283 6,9 2000 0,304 11,4 
Den 0,254 10,1 1997 0,257 7.2 (1992) 
Fin 0,209 5,4 2000 0,247 5,4 
Fr 0,292 8,0 1994 0,288 8,0 
Ger 0,249 6,5 2000 0,252 8,3 
I 0,306 10,4 2000 0,333 12,7 
NL 0,260 4,7 1999 0,248 7,3 
Sw 0,218 7,5 2000 0,252 6,5 
Swi 0,309 7,6 1992 0,307 9,3 
UK 0,303 9,1 1999 0,345 12,4 
US 0,335 17,8 2000 0,368 17,0 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures, accessed at 
http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm on 16/3/05 
The Gini-coefficient is derived from a Lorenz curve, 0 means total equality and 1 is total 
inequality (one person earning the total inome, everyone else earning nothing). 
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Appendix R: Key economic figures of the Dutch Co-operative Banks 
 
 
Table R.1a: Comparison cost structure of Dutch banks 
Costs / 
Total results 
(average 
percentage) 
 
Cooperative Bank Commercial Banks 
1908-1939 0.5 1.9 
1956-1960 0.9 2.3 
1966-1970 1.5 2.4 
1976-1980 2.2 2.0 
1983-1996 2.0 2.0 
 
 
Table R.1b: Comparison ratio interest assets / total results of Dutch banks 
 
Interest Assets / 
Total results 
(percentage) 
 
Cooperative Bank  
Commercial Banks 
1908-1939 0.9 2.4 
1956-1960 1.3 2.4 
1966-1970 2.0 2.3 
1976-1980 2.6 2.0 
1983-1996 2.5 1.8 
 
 
Table R.2: Added figures of both Co-operative Centrals 
 1908 1928 1948 1968 1988 1998 
Balance figures 
 
22 514 1,835 14,490 161,576 550,307 
Profit 
x f 1million 
 
0 2,5 6 38 778 2,062 
Equity capital 
x f 1million 
 
0 22 80 351 9,282 22,877 
# Local banks 
 
509 1,270 1,313 1,249 906 445 
# Members 
x 1,000 
39 208 268 571 780 565 
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Table R.3: The evolution of the combined Co-operative Banks‟ share of 
Dutch banking (in percentages) 
 
 
In terms of 
 
Year 
Total Assets Savings Mortgages 
1908-1939 5 28 5-10 
1956-1960 17 38 10-20 
1966-1970 21 40 20-25 
1976-1980 21 42 25-30 
1983-1996 21 38 20-25 
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Appendix S: Denominational affiliation Dutch firms 
 
Table S.1:  affiliation of organisational leadership in the Netherlands around 1900 
Affiliation 
 
Economic 
organisation 
 
Regent Liberal 
Reformed 
Protestant 
Catholic Socialist 
Old merchant banks xx     
New provincial banks  x xx   
Mortgage banks  xx x x  
General Savings Banks  xx xx x  
Post Office Savings 
Bank 
X xx    
Co-operative Banks X  xx xx  
Consumer Co-
operatives 
    xx 
 
 
 
Table S.2: affiliation of organisational leadership in England around 1900 
Affiliation 
 
Economic 
organisation 
 
Conservative – 
Anglican 
Liberal - 
Nonconformist 
Commonwealth Labour 
Old merchant banks xx    
New clearing banks 
 
x 
 
x: provincial 
legacy 
  
Trustee Savings 
Banks 
x x   
Post Office Savings 
Bank 
    
Consumer 
Co-operatives 
 xx x x 
Building Societies x 
x: northern 
legacy 
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Table S.3: religious membership of commissioners occupying interlocking 
directorates at the turn of the twentieth century 
(Source: Schijf, 1998: 39, Table 3.1) 
Religious affiliation Number of commissioners 
Dutch Reformed 79 
Baptist 19 
Evangelican Lutheran 14 
Roman-Catholic 11 
Remonstrant 8 
New-Israelite (Jewish) 7 
Other 3 
No 3 
Unknown 52 
Total 197 
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APPENDIX T: GDP/CAPITA COMPARISONS 
 
GDP per capita NL, UK, US from 1500-1998 (1990$) 
(Source: Maddison, 1991) 
 
 
 
GDP per capita NL and UK from 1880-1949 (1990$) 
(Source: Maddison, 1991) 
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GDP per capita NL and UK from 1950-2007 (2007$) 
(Source: Total Economy Database, 2007) 
 
 
100
105
110
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120
125
130
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%
Comparison GDP/capita in PPS NL & UK, 1995-2007 (EU 
25=100)
(Source: Eurostat 9 July 2007)
NL
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Table T.1: GDP per capita relative to the UK (1974-2004) 
(based on Dilnot and Emmerson. 2000: 345; 
Eurostat News Release June 2005
1245
; 
Fredrik Bergstrom and Robert Gidehag, 2004. “EU vs. USA.”1246) 
 
 
 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 2004 
France 122 122 121 114 113 93 
Netherlands 116 113 111 104 110 100 
United States 160 160 159 149 151 135 
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Appendix U: Trade Union membership 
 
Figure U.1: Union membership in the Netherlands 
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Figure U.2: Trade Union density in the Netherlands versus the United Kingdom 
(membership as a percentage of the ―dependent‖ labour force) 
(Source: Van Zanden, 1997: 106) 
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Appendix V: Housing tenure patterns 
 
Table: UK and Netherlands tenure patterns in 1950, 1985 and 1990 (%) 
(Based on Table 1.1 in Doling, 1997: 15 and Table 1.7 in Feddes, 1995: 52) 
 
  Owner-occupation Non-profit renting Private renting 
1950 
UK 28 15 57 
NL 29 18 53 
1985 
UK 62 30 8 
NL 43 42 15 
1990 
UK 68 25 7 
NL 44 44 12 
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Appendix W: Economic importance different sectors 
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1045 The expression "The Low Countries" (Les Pays-Bas) was phrased at the Burgundian court in Dijon, to 
describe the conglomerate of territories acquired, beginning with Flanders-Artois in 1384. It came to be applied 
for those territories in the area which ultimately came under the rule of the Burgundian Dukes and their 
successors, the Habsburg family.  
1046 Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, acquired Flanders and Brabant. His Grandson Philip the Good was 
inaugurated as Count of Holland in 1433. 
1047 The States-General was the first representative assembly of the Burgundian provinces. The institution grew 
organically from the beginning of the fifteenth century, with each of the provinces that were successively added 
to the Burgundian realm bringing in their own power and traditions to a joint assembly. Generally speaking, the 
assembly was summoned each time all provinces had a common problem. Remarkably, these problems were 
nearly all about economic policy. Indeed, the States General originally had been founded by Philip the Good to 
simplify the process of putting fiscal demands to the different provinces and to coordinate the provincial 
currencies (Spufford, 1970). The provincial States, however, successfully discouraged this fiscal simplification. 
In the end, the States General only ever handled problems to do with foreign export or import. For instance in 
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1430, Philip the Good summoned the estates of Brabant, Flanders, and Holland to a joint assembly in order to 
discuss the high price of English wool, a question in which all three provinces were vitally interested 
(Koenigsberger, 1971: 126-128). 
1048 The defeat of Charles the Bold in the 1477 battle of Nancy, not only resulted in the Burgundians losing the 
Duchy of Burgundy to the French king, but also led to a profound policy crisis in the Low Countries. A sort of 
legal revolution took place during this crisis, in which the provincial elites managed to impose a set of 
institutional reforms, known as the Grand Privilege, which strongly curtailed the central power of Mary of 
Burgundy (Charles‘ heiress). Content with this agreement the patricians in the States General were happy to 
recognise Mary as the legitimate successor of her father, and to take measures to protect the Low Countries 
against the French King. Yet, between 1490 and 1506 Philip the Fair was able to regain much of the central 
power that had gone lost in the 1477 crisis. In addition, the marriage of Philip with Juana of Castile sealed the 
alliance between the Habsburgs and the Spanish monarchs against the King of  France; the Low Countries were 
united with Spain. 
1049 By the beginning of the sixteenth century, no less than two thirds of the inhabitants of the Low Countries 
lived in cities, half of which in the main towns Antwerp, Brussels, Gent and Amsterdam. 
1050 Trade and industry had flourished in these regions already from the late Middle Ages, partly because of their 
favourable geographical position, partly due to the strategic usage of a number of international routes. In 
cooperation with local town leaders, merchants were able to to  turn the omnipresence of water (sea and rivers) 
into a positive force, by constructing a dense network of ports and water connections which facilitated the 
formation of an internal market. Other innovations, such as the invention of the full-rigged herring buss ensured 
the dominance of the Low Countries over the North Sea Herring grounds. In addition, the merchants‘ seagoing 
ships formed the basis of the increasing bulk-carrying traffic between the Baltic (grain and timber) and western 
France and Portugal (salt). With the centre of the international economy gradually shifting from the 
Mediterranean to the Atlantic coasts of north-western Europe, Antwerp had become the trading and financial 
centre of Europe and Amsterdam the centre for the Baltic grain trade by the beginning of the fifteenth century. 
1051 Different from the German territories and the Southern Netherlands, the Northern Netherlands, with the 
possible exceptions of the cities of Utrecht and Dordt, did not experience guild-revolutions in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth century that caused important political changes in favour of guild representatives (Prak, 1994: 22). In 
addition, unlike the situation in German or British cities, Dutch guilds did not so much further the monopolistic 
interests of a few, but rather represented inclusive instruments of civic government and techniques of ―the general 
interest‖, as encouraged by the ruling patrician Burghers. As a result, the Dutch guilds rarely possessed the 
influence that they had elsewhere in Europe. As described by De Vries and Van der Woude (1997 : 162-163): 
―their role typically was to implement municipal economic policies – policies about which they could submit 
requests, but which were decided in their absence. Internally, the guilds‘ importance to their members resided 
chiefly in matters of safety and security, such as the suppression of competition,…the extension of credit in poor 
years. The patrician urban magistracies always kept their thumb on the guilds…[they were the] vehicle whereby 
the government sought to advance its vision of an urban general interest. This vision tolerated a measure of 
particularism relative to the outside world, but it did not usually tolerate the maintenance of unequal market 
access within the city‖.  
1052 Thus, the Stadtholders customarily originated from the same southern group of nobles. 
1053 In the sixteenth century, many territorial realms had functioning representative bodies whose writ was 
coterminous with the king's (e.g. England, Castile, Poland), but for various reasons none of these bodies became 
involved in the management of long-term debt.  
1054 As noted by Tracy ( 1985: 221), the innovative character of these annuities as a way to fund long-term debt 
came about in three stages.  First, Habsburg gents of the central government were able to persuade the States, as 
early as 1515, to adopt the novel principle of collective responsibility for the issuance of renten. This principle 
was no mean achievement, given that noble-burgher conflicts and intra-urban jealousies were at least as common 
in these provinces as elsewhere in Europe. In 1542 - this was the second step - Mary of Hungary and her advisers 
induced the States to accept the 'novel expedients', which included new provincewide excise and land taxes, as 
well as new series of renten that came to be funded by these taxes. Finally, in 1553 the regent and the States 
agreed to abandon the custom (prevalent hitherto in Holland, at least) of forced buying; it was this decision, 
encouraged no doubt by currently high level of interest rates, which as it were opened the tap and allowed urban 
capital to flow freely into the refinancing of state debt. The end product of these decisions deserves to be 
recognised as a financial revolution, not so much because by these means the govenrment could raise 
unprecedented sums during the great war of the 1550s, but rather because it marks the first time in European 
history that the future revenues of whole provinces could be mobilised for present needs through the mechanism 
of credit. 
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1055 The prince of  Orange declared in the Brussels States General that an end should be made to ―the arbitrariness 
with which kings determine and direct the religious sentiments of their subjects‖ (Vlekke, 1945: 133-134). The 
prince clearly envisaged a situation in which the majority of Catholics would live side by side with the minority 
of Calvinists.   He gave advice to the duchess of Parma and recruited troops against her all at the same time (135). 
1056 A significant step along the way towards the establishment of the new state in the  North was the Union of 
Utrecht, concluded in January 1579. Essentially a defensive alliance between rebel regions and towns, the 
document came to be seen in later years as the equivalent of the Republic's constitution. The dilemma of the new 
state was formulated in the very first clause, stating that on the one hand the united provinces would behave "as if 
they constituted only a single 
province", but at the same time that all regional and urban "special and particular privileges, franchises, 
exemptions, rights, statutes, laudable and long-practiced customs" and so on, would be carefully maintained and 
protected by each individual member of the union (Rowen, 1972, p. 70; Van Zanden and Prak, 2004)). 
1057 Dutch ministers like Udemans, Cloppenburg and others showed themsevels far less distrustful of agressive 
profit-seeking than their English colleagues in the sixteenth century. 
1058 Both the cosmopolitan and moderate tones were especially predominant in the Holland province, where 
merchants dominated the provincial State assembly. Such attitudes remained typical of the whole Holland regent 
class during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
1059  De Baena summarised how the old Dutch version of tolerance translated in twentieth century terms (1966: 
21): ―Life in any part of Holland is only possible if one embraces wholeheartedly the attitude of the particular 
community towards personal and political freedom. On the other hand, all these diflerent and numerous 
communities, which are capable of tolerating one another with understanding, are certainly not very fond of each 
other [tolerance, after all, does not imply love] [my italics]. Once you have discovered that there is no love lost 
among these small communities, it is easy to observe the sparks of fanaticism which break out here and there 
periodically without any outward signs of cruelty or persecution in the people, who react, nevertheless, with an 
obstinate rigidity and stubbornness. In his heart of hearts, each Dutchman believes that the social conventions of 
the community in which he lives are the only proper ones to follow‖.  
1060 For a more detailed explanation of monetarism, not in the naive Friedmanian sense, but as an an historically 
informed term, see  page 449. 
1061 It ensured ―the integration of these groups to a minimal degree such as to prevent the jeopardizing of the 
national existence. A breakdown of the latter would be detrimental to the relative autonomy of all its constituting 
parts. Interactions between the groups involved are structured according to this institutional arrangement‖ (Bax, 
1988). 
1062 This paper was prepared by the legal adviser of the Holland city of Gouda, François Vrancken. 
1063 Only Friesland, set at 11.7 percent came anywhere close. The other provinces were set below (Zeeland, at 9 
per cent) or far below (Overijssel, at 3.6 per cent) even a tenth of the total tax burden. 
1064 Up to 1600 the largest part of public finance was in taxation rather than in public borrowing; foreign 
subisidies and foreign loans – provided by for instance the Prince of Orange and English merchants – were more 
important than the domestic capital market as a source of finance for the army.  While in England the upgrading 
of both the government‘s creditworthiness and its capacity of public borrowing had been achieved largely through 
the contracting of short-term loans from a small and trusted merchant elite – organised in the Bank of England, 
the Dutch Republic‘s financial revolution was built on an ever-expanding short-term debt on the money market of 
Amsterdam a few other towns (Fritschy, 2003: 80-81). 
1065 Founded in 1609 at the initiative of foreign – protestant and jewish – merchants who had come to Amsterdam 
after being expelled from Antwerp by the Habsburgers, the Bank was the first in outlawing all existing money 
changers and cashiers. The Bank was a huge success: as early as 1610 it performed major deposito, transfer, 
clearing, exchanging and purchasing functions in the Amsterdam Exchange. Confronted with the circulation of an 
estimated 1,000 different gold and silver coins, the city of Amsterdam in 1638 determined a currency standard 
that in 1659 was adopted by the States General of the Netherlands. 
1066 Amsterdam‘s  population more than tripled from ca. 30.000 in 1565 to ca. 100.000 in 1630, as many of the 
refugees from Antwerp settled down here. 
1067 In 1621, the V.W.C. was formed as a counterpart to the V.O.C. for the West Indies trade. 
1068 One demonstration of the Regents‘ attempts to limit the potential political role of the Church was the 
representation of ―commissioner delegates‖ of the States at the meetings of the synods of north and south 
Holland. The task of these representatives was to ensure that the discussions of Church bodies remained within 
limits acceptable to the States, and did not trespass into political areas which the States deemed to be none of their 
business (Price, 1994: 185). 
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1069 In addition, the Reformation seems to have reinforced rather than eliminated religious diversity. Often, a 
whole congregation was either converted to Protestantism or remained Roman Catholic. Religion united whole 
communities in the weekly services. So, while in Roman Catholic parishes common acceptance of ritual and 
doctrine bestowed a sense of fellowship, in Protestant congregations the lay duties of church administration 
stimulated active communal participation.  Even in the face of increased socio-economic mobility and 
encroaching secularisation, many tows and villages remained religiously homogeneous. And local unity of faith 
was usually reflected in municipal government (Goudsblom, 1968: 141-142).Thus, religion arguably was one of 
the best-tested source of mobilisation and advocacy in the Dutch Republic and later the Netherlands (Gladdish, 
1991: 20, 43). 
1070 This is one of the reasons why in contemporary parlance the provinces of Holland and the modern nation-
states Netherlands are often treated as one. 
1071 So, when the Amsterdam burgomaster – and major grain merchant Cornelis Hooft – was informed of these 
plans, he fumed "that many prominent citizens will rather leave, than stay with us under those conditions". 
Furthermore, he argued that many towns would not have joined the Revolt, had they known that it would come to 
this (Hooft, 1925: 7). 
1072 There was no ―higher‖ civil service in the Dutch Republic (Eldersveld et al. 1981: 11-12). 
1073 Words of the prominent Orangist propagandist Ericus Walten (1689. Onwederleggelijk Bewijs. The Hague: 
11-12) cited in Israel (2004: 21). 
1074 The stadtholders made sure that Holland would not dominate the States-General, by requiring that each one of 
the seven ―united provinces‖ would have one vote in the States-General and that for important decisions 
unanimity would be required. 
1075 The services which William's Sephardi associates performed on his behalf thus were by no means only 
financial and were by no means simple business transactions (Israel, 1997: 343). 
1076 From the unwritten efforts of Aethelbert of Kent to Ine of Wessex to Offa of Mercia to the great Saxon 
codifications of customary law, beginning with Aethelbert in the early seventh century and reaching high points 
under Alfred (871-899) and Cnut (1016-1035) (Colls, 2002). 
1077 William the Conqueror was the first King to make London the centre of government – though London at first 
had to share this privilege with Winchester.  
1078 Indeed, London was unique in its concentration of consumer-oriented industries and services and its reliance 
on wealth derived from overseas trade and government expenditure (cf. Fisher, 1989). 
1079 Roman London had been a trading settlement before becoming a military and governmental centre. Likewise, 
while London was not the dominant base of English political authority in the early Middle Ages, it was attractive 
because of its propitious location and the consequent concentration of money, men and goods. It is only by the 
fifteenth century that London became England‘s political capital, if anything because it had become the principal 
repository of the state treasury and the main source of goods and credit for the crown. Thus, in contrast with 
Paris, London has developed its own city institutions separately from state institutions.  To exemplify this 
difference, London in the seventeenth century was still described as a ―republic of wholeseale merchants‖.  And it 
is being described again as such at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Keene, 2004: 470-472). 
1080 For wealth accumulation would lead to fear to lose goods and subsequently willingness to adopt English 
civility as a means to gain protection of property rights from the State. 
1081 The London merchant elite received preferential treatment in terms of taxation in the sixteenth century, most 
notably through the so-called ―subsidy‖. Tax farming was even outsourced to London merchants in the 1590s. 
1082 In the same vein, Londoners made a significant contribution to the English civilising mission in Ireland 
through Dublin in the thirteenth century (Watt, 1986: 150-157). 
1083 The British isles were largely colonised by 1300. 
1084 Dominated by Tories, the English Parliament was not very keen on a banking system geared towards bills of 
exchange. This device had been developed in Italian and Low Countries‘ city-states in the 13th century to address 
the needs of long distance merchants who dealt with various currencies (De Roover, 1949; Munro, 1979).  The 
device of bills of exchange enabled bankers and merchants to circumvent laws against usury that prohibited the 
payment of interest on loans. By speculating on variations in exchange rates between currencies, bankers could 
make a profit without explicitly imposing interest rates (Knafo, 2007: 13-14). 
1085 Parliament, a term which was not used before the 16th century, had begun life as an irregular gathering of 
noblemen, summoned by the King to extract pledges and impose taxes. By the 15th century it was divided into, 
on the one hand, a House of Lords, populated by the peerage of the King (the lords temporal) and all the bishops 
(the lords spiritual), and, on the other hand, a House of Commons which increasingly was populated by the 
landed gentry and an emerging merchant rank. Under the Tudors, who reigned from 1485 until 1602, the English 
monarchy was at the zenith of its powers. Nonetheless, the Tudors chose to try and control potential challenges of 
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bishops, landed gentry and merchants through Parliament.  Thus, The rise of the House of Commons was an 
integral part of Tudor policy (North and Thomas, 1972: 147). That this policy put limits on the royal prerogative 
is exemplified by the repeated claims by Parliament, which at that time still was an irregular assembly, that the 
King was expected to live on his own financially speaking. Yet, while Henry VIII saw it fit to confiscate 
monasteries‘ lands and possessions to add to his revenues, he did not find it appropriate ―with nearly half the 
peers and at least four-fifths of the clergy against him‖ (Richardson, 1952: 5) to antagonise the House of 
Commons beyond these bounds. Despite the slight increase in influence of the middle ranks, during the whole 
sixteenth century the Tudors managed to consolidate the old policy of separating political and religious from 
economic authority only when it was opportune to themselves. This status-quo behaviour manifested itself in for 
instance a continued opposition against enclosures, and their use of monopolies and other mercantilistic 
techniques to excise revenues. 
 The Stuarts, which reigned from 1603 until 1687, inherited what the Tudors had sown: a House of 
Commons ready to claim more sway in governing matters. The fact that the Stuarts, i.e. James I, Charles I, 
Charles II and James II, all were looking to extend their royal prerogatives, meant antagonism vis a vis parliament 
was looming large during most of the seventeenth century. At the beginning of the 17th century, the execution of 
laws and expenditures was not subject to a public budgetary process yet. Parliament played only a minor role in 
expenditure and investment decisions; its only influence over policy resulted from the Crown‘s dependence on 
tax revenue, typically for extraordinary purposes such as various wars (North and Weingast, 1989: 809). While 
Parliament was also responsible for granting the Crowns revenues from customs and other sources, in practice, 
the Stuarts continued to collect the revenue without parliamentary consent.  
 The first Stuart, James I, was a Scotsman who believed in the Divine royal prerogative to rule. When 
he came to power in 1603, he inherited sizeable debts from Elizabeth‘s war. Though he sold 25 percent of Crown 
lands, this was not enough to resolve his financial difficulties. In order to resolve his difficulties he resorted to 
different fund raising methods. So, he ordered the raising of customer revenues through new impositions. Another 
method used was to demand ―forced loans‖, which in practice were never repaid. Finally, he misused  patent 
monopolies to expropriate more quasi-rents. Charles I (1625-49) continued his father's acrimonious relationship 
with Parliament, squabbling over the right to levy taxes in the form of purveyances, and expanding peerage in 
exchange for revenue (Maitland, 1961). Parliament responded with the Petition of Right in 1628. It was the most 
dramatic assertion of the traditional rights of the English people since the Magna Carta. Its basic premise was that 
no taxes of any kind could be allowed without the permission of Parliament.  
 Charles finally had enough, and in 1629 he dissolved Parliament and ruled without it for eleven years. 
Through the institution of the Star Chamber as a royal court, the raising of custom revenues through new 
impositions, the practice of forced loans, and the sale of monopolies, Charles I tried to extend his powers and find 
financial solvency beyond parliamentary consent. The failure of both James I and his son Charles I to understand 
the English tradition of parliamentary liberty eventually led to civil war. 
1086 In this non-isolationist view, Catholics were not so un-English after all. 
1087 In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Anglican landed elite was mainly concerned with entrenching domestic 
political order (Cain and Hopkins, 1987: 1). 
1088 Apart from the differences between Anglicans and Dissenters, the most striking feature in the religious 
landscape was the gulf between Protestantism and Catholicism. From the late seventeenth century until 1829, 
English Catholics were not allowed to vote and were excluded from all state offices and from both houses of 
Parliament. They were discriminated in terms of taxation, access to education, property rights and freedom of 
worship. In The legal position of Protestant non-conformists was very different. They could vote providing they 
met the relevant property qualifications, they could build their own churches, they could set up their own 
education facilities, and they even could carry arms. On the other hand, they had to conform at least occasionally 
to Anglican worship in order to be eligible for state of local office. But, in practice, dissenters were able to 
penetrate almost all levels of the policy system including Parliament itself. 
1089 Before the Civil War there was no symbiotic relation between the King, parliament and the London merchant 
elite. On the one hand, the Crown ceded to pressure from the London merchants by  granting them a preferential 
taxation regime. And as long as London merchants escaped taxation of their disproportionately – compared to 
other British regions – growing wealth, the taxation system was bound to be a failure. On the other hand, as the 
Crown considered customs duties – the main source of taxation – as its personal income, it did not commit to 
spending customs revenues on the protection and expanstion of the merchant fleet – as the States General in 
Holland had to do (cf. Veenendaal, 1994). 
1090 To students of English history, the term 'financial revolution' connotes a dramatic rise in public borrowing 
during the 1960s, coupled with a shift from short-term to long-term debt. Financiers' loans at high rates gave way 
to low-rate securities such as life or perpetual annuities, each of which was guaranteed by Parliament and funded 
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by specific revenues. To enhance the popularity of these instruments, Parliament made the income free of tax. In 
1694, holders of this new debt pooled their credits to form the Bank of England, which in turn began issuing its 
own interest-bearing shares. To prevent indebtedness from accumulating to unmanageable proportions, 
Parliament decreed in 1717 that redeemable annuities would either be reduced to a lower rate of interest or, if the 
holder preferred, redeemed from a sinking fund that was established at the same time (Tracy, 1985: 1)...this 
system of public borrowing, enabling England to spend on war out of all proportion to its tax revenue, which best 
explains why Britain prevailed against a larger and wealthier France during the long series of wars from 1689 to 
1815 (Tracy, 1985: 1-2). Though state annuities were new to England in the 1690s, proponents of the new system 
drew consciously on long-established precedent in the Dutch Republic, just as critics were quick to observe that 
'stock-jobbing' of this particular kind had never been heard of before England acquired a Dutch sovereign in 1688 
(cf. Dickson. 1967: 8-9, 17, 51; Tracy, 1985: 2). 
1091 During and after the Revolution, there existed a fear amongst the English elites that with the Revolution the 
Dutch had found an effective means to finally settle in their favour the age-old conflict between themselves and 
the English for mastery of the world's trade. So, Pamphleteers such Robert Price concluded that the events of 
1688-89 had produced a revolution in England that far from being 'glorious', was humiliating, disruptive, and 
economically ruinous. "We shalll be supplanted by our neighbours and become a colony to the Dutch" (Price, 
1702: 102; cited in Israel, 1997: 360). Nevertheless, in financial and military terms, the power of the British state 
expanded spectacularly in the years after 1688. By the time of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13), 
Britain had emerged as unquestionably the strongest of the powers ranged against the might of France and 
Bourbon Spain. The Dutch Repubic increasingly played a subsidiary role, especially at the sea and outside 
Europe.  
1092 It also facilitated substantial changes to England‘s foreign policy – supported by the upgrade in expenditures 
on the army and navy. 
1093 As O‘Brien (2001) notes, it stood in even starker contrast with the ‗negotiated‘ imposition of taxes on the 
ancient Spanish kingdoms of Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia, the fiscal relations between Austrian Habsburgs 
and Bohemia, the privileged positions occupied by Hungary and other parts of that Empire, the status of Pays 
d'État within Bourbon France, and finally the special position of Norway within the kingdom of Denmark. 
1094 Another peculiarity of the British system is that the tax revenues required to service a national debt in service 
of naval, imperial, commercial and industrial purposes emanated in very large part from indirect taxes, most 
notably excise and customs duties. 
1095 The combination of policies represented by the Navigation Acts, a strong navy, and protectionism resulted in 
Britain's capturing gains from trade as well as achieving fruitful import substitution (Ormrod, 2003). 
1096 Arguably, the first Dutch War was a watershed in English history. In contrast with the early Stuarts‘ foreign 
policy dynastic motives, the war against the Dutch was mainly waged for commercial-political purposes. 
1097 The Long Parliament held from 1640 until the Restoration in 1660. It was summoned by Charles I after his 
defeat in the second Bishops' War.  
1098 The penal laws were a series of Acts passed between 1571 and 1593, introducing penalties, ranging from 
proscription of worship to disqualification from office, for those who refused to attend Church of England 
services. These were extended in 1606 and 1610, but the penal laws were implemented, according to the temper 
of the times, with varying degrees of strictness. Repeal occurred gradually with successive Toleration Acts. 
1099 In England, the Acts stipulating that public office holders must take Holy Communion in the Church of 
England (1673) and excluding all Roman Catholics except the Duke of York (later James II) from parliament 
(1678). The Test Acts were only repealed in the mid-19th century. 
1100 Before the end of the English Revolution, court apologists were intensely statist and, in their most extreme 
form, might seek to emulate a continental European monarchy. Country spokesmen expressed strong suspicion of 
government, might even at times seem isolationist in foreign policy, and preferred to rely upon local resources 
and institutions for the preservation of domestic order...After the Glorious Revolution the English Court finally 
abandoned the persecution of dissenters for limited toleration, and it accepted a permanent role for Parliament in 
the governance of the realm. But in other respects its goals after 1688 merely continued, intensified and  
exteneded the policies of Charles II and James II. William III and his successors still sought the means to restrain 
opposition at home and to conduct a vigorous foreign policy against French expansion - a standing army, a huge 
navy, ample revenues to wage war despite the inevitable disruption of trade and customs duties, a reasonably 
effective bureaucracy and increased patronage. The Country opposition, staunchly Whig in the 1680s, preferred a 
militia to a standing army, limited revenues, small government dependent on the volutnary cooperation of the 
gentry, and place bills and frequent elections to prevent Court patronage from corrupting the House of Commons 
(Murrin, 1980: 379-380). 
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1101 In seventeenth-century England, the distribution of governing power beyond the king, the landowners and to a 
minor extent the merchants was hardly an issue. In fact, the governing order  was seen as being composed of 
various sectional interests, which together made up a national interest. Interests were not classes, however, since 
they were vertical rather than horizontal fissures in society. Thus the landed interest held together all those 
involved in the agricultural sector, from the greatest landlord to the poorest labourer (Speck, 1988: 249). Instead 
of vying for political voice, the ―great functional interests‖ lobbied for patronage of their particular policies. In so 
far as economic questions entered politics, it was via these ―interests‖: the various trades, industries, and 
professions, considered as hierarchies within the general hierarchy of society, and representing through their 
leaders all levels of society from the squire, great merchant…down to the humblest labourer. The landed elite was 
the predominant ―interest‖ in this paternal hierarchy. Everyone dependent on them, was bound to follow the 
landowners‘ religion: Anglicanism. Only those groups who were not dependent on the landed elite for 
employment, tenancies, or patronage in the form of preferment, government contracts, or the purchases of their 
wares or services, could afford the luxury of dissent from the landlords‘religion (Perkin, 1989: 29-34). Prohibited 
by law to enter political office, many dissenters tried to excel in another interest: as merchants in the monied 
interest.   
1102 The majority of both Whig and Tory politicians in the eighteenth century were landowners. Still, the two 
factions were composed of quite different economic and regional groups. So, Whig support tended to be drawn 
from the aristocracy and large landowners in general, while Tory support tended to be drawn from the gentry and 
smaller landowners...Tory support was drawn from more peripheral regions of the country, while Whig support 
was more likely to be drawn from the home counties (Stasavage, 2003: 109-110). 
1103 Originally an Irish name for a Roman Catholic outlaw, it was applied in 1679 to the political group that, in 
opposition to the Whigs, supported the succession to the throne of the Roman Catholic Duke of York. The Tories 
became the Conservative Party under Peel in the 1830s. The Tories are generally associated with the purposes of 
the lower country gentry, merchants and Anglicans.  
1104 Contrary to the notion of revolution associated with the 1789 French Revolution. 
1105 While supplying private benefits at public expense now required co-operation of the Crown, Parliament and 
the courts, remarkably, it was still only the Crown that could propose and set the purposes of expenditures. 
Parliament could only authorize and appropriate funds within this purposive framework.  
1106 The Whigs, in their capacity of moderators rather than leaders of popular movements, from the Glorious 
Revolution onwards have been depicted as the ―connecting link‖ between ―advanced party [politics] and those 
classes which, possessing property, power and influence, are naturally averse to change.‖ (Jenkins, 1988: 7).    
1107 Legislature serving the « commonwealth » at large: members of parliament must be independent 
representatives and not delegates under instruction from their constituents or from any special interest group 
1108 The British political system adopted a first-past-the-post electoral system which does not favour third parties.  
1109 This assumption translates in the assumption that the parliament has supremacy over popular opinion, except 
during elections. 
1110 Up to the nineteenth century, ―property in office‖ was considered a safeguard against any royal pretensions to 
absolutist control over the administrative system, and the virtual sacralisation of property in the eighteenth 
century made it difficult to deny an office-holder the vested ‗right‘ to his office, even for the sake of 
administrative reform (Harling, 1996: 22). Still, the notion of property in office in the spirit of the academic 
tenure system. This system allegedly functions as a safeguard against monopoly and arbitrariness, and a stimulant 
to freedom of expression and mobility of ideas. 
1111 This representation came in two ways. First, the assumption was that the monarchy, the House of Lords and 
the Church of England represented every righteous Englishman. Second, public office was considered an 
historical ―right‖  and duty‖ for the established ranks. 
1112 The Republican image of a Commonwealth, as loosely associated with Cromwell‘s 17th century experiment, 
embodies a tradition that values wealth, but also the common good (Pincus, 1998 : 708). In addition, it conveys 
the image of direct representation of the people (Alborn, 1998). 
1113 Originally an abusive Scottish name for a horsethief, the term ―whig‖ was later applied to Scottish 
Presbyterians and from 1679 to the emerging political group that, in opposition to the Tories, wished to exclude 
the Roman Catholic Duke of York (later known as James II) from the succession. 
1114 The holders of the funded long-term national debt - mobilised by the government - came mostly from London 
and its environment. Within the metropolis, the majority of larger individual investors were merchants and 
financiers. Of this majority many, especially in William and Anne's reigns, were of recent foreign origins or were 
self-made men (Horwitz, 1987: 173; Dickson, 1967). 
1115 A link between money and national wealth based on the reality of territorial customs, State taxation and 
legislation. 
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1116 The above distinction can be mapped on the opposition between two more contemporary theories of money: 
monetarism and chartalism. Contary to monetarism, chartalism portrays money as the product of existing social 
customs, taxation and legislation, a symbolic means that can be controlled to some extent by a central state and/or 
local governments within a national territory (e.g. Muller, 1816; Knapp, 1924). 
1117 Plato is sometimes portrayed as the first proponent of the Chartalist theory of money. For Plato money comes 
into being only once a society has organized itself along continuous market lines, and social custom and 
legislation give money a unique symbolic importance in a system of real exchange – where "goods trade for 
money and money trades for goods, but goods do not trade for directly for goods" (Clower, 1965). Aristotle, on 
the other hand, can be seen as a predecessor of metallism and even monetarism, with his insistence that money is 
not just a veil, but a commodity in its own right – ―if money is going to be used in the market of commodities as a 
medium of exchange, it must itself be one of these commodities‖ (cfr. Schumpeter, 1954, History of Economic 
Analysis). 
1118 Whigs were careful to point out that subjects had no right to use force in order to resist minor or isolated 
examples of injustice.  And subjects certainly had no right to overturn an established government simply because 
they wished to set up a better one (Dickinson, 1981). 
1119 England officially remained a confessional state until the late 1820s when finally the laws that limited the 
civil rights of Protestant dissenters and Catholics were repealed (Clark, 1994: 141-217; Spaans: 75-76). 
1120 To illustrate the continuing relevance of Tory traditions, it suffices to point at the outrage of the Tory press, 
politicians and civic groups such as the Bruges-group over the possibility of a written European constitution.  
1121 For instance the Whigs disagreed sharply with the radicals that all men had a natural and inalienable right to 
influence and shape the legislative and executive functions of the State. While they acknowledged that the people 
had the right to good government they denied that this meant that they must have self-government.‖ (Dickinson, 
1981: 34) 
1122 Gilmour (1978 : 143) ―the fundamental concern of Toryism is the preservation of the nation‘s unity‖. 
1123 The Tory tradition holds that the Anglican Church, as a bulwark against both Catholicism and 
Nonconformity, is the protector of the English constitution (cf. Southey, 1824). 
1124 ―Public spirit‖ was a key concept in Tory Country thinking. It canbe defined as devotion to the common good 
of the patria, the disposition to disregard devotion to the common good of the patria, the disposition to disregard 
self-interest and sectional advantage for the sake of national interest (Harris, 2002). 
1125 The East India Company had the unusual distinction of ruling an entire country. Its origins were much 
humbler. On 31 December 1600, a group of merchants who had incorporated themselves into the East India 
Company were given monopoly privileges on all trade with the East Indies. The Company's ships first arrived in 
India, at the port of Surat, in 1608. Sir Thomas Roe reached the court of the Mughal Emperor, Jahangir, as the 
emissary of King James I in 1615, and gained for the British the right to establish a factory at Surat. Gradually the 
British eclipsed the Portugese and over the years they saw a massive expansion of their trading operations in 
India. Numerous trading posts were established along the east and west coasts of India, and considerable English 
communities developed around the three presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. In 1717, the 
Company achieved its hitherto most notable success when it received a firman or royal dictat from the Mughal 
Emperor exempting the Company from the payment of custom duties in Bengal.  The Company saw the rise of its 
fortunes, and its transformation from a trading venture to a ruling enterprise, when one of its military officials, 
Robert Clive, defeated the forces of the Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-ud-daulah , at the Battle of Plassey in 1757. A 
few years later the Company acquired the right to collect revenues on behalf of the Mughal Emperor, but the 
initial years of its administration were calamitous for the people of Bengal. The Company's servants were largely 
a rapacious and self-aggrandizing lot, and the plunder of Bengal left the formerly rich province in a state of utter 
destitution. The famine of 1769-70, which the Company's policies did nothing to alleviate, may have taken the 
lives of as many as a third of the population. The Company, despite the increase in trade and the revenues coming 
in from other sources, found itself burdened with massive military expenditures, and its destruction seemed 
imminent. State intervention put the ailing Company back on its feet, and Lord North's India Bill, also known as 
the Regulating Act of 1773, provided for greater parliamentary control over the affairs of the Company, besides 
placing India under the rule of a Governor-General. 
The first Governor-General of India was Warren Hastings. Under his dispensation, the expansion of British rule 
in India was pursued vigorously, and the British sought to master indigenous systems of knowledge. Hastings 
remained in India until 1784 and was succeeded by Cornwallis, who initiated the Permanent Settlement, whereby 
an agreement in perpetuity was reached with zamindars or landlords for the collection of revenue. For the next 
fifty years, the British were engaged in attempts to eliminate Indian rivals, and it is under the administration of 
Wellesley that British territorial expansion was achieved with ruthless efficiency. Major victories were achieved 
against Tipu Sultan of Mysore and the Marathas, and finally the subjugation and conquest of the Sikhs in a series 
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of Anglo- Sikh Wars led to British occupation over the entirety of India. In some places, the British practiced 
indirect rule, placing a Resident at the court of the native ruler who was allowed sovereignty in domestic matters. 
Lord Dalhousie's notorious doctrine of lapse, whereby a native state became part of British India if there was no 
male heir at the death of the ruler, was one of the principal means by which native states were annexed; but often 
the annexation, such as that of Awadh [Oudh] in 1856, was justified on the grounds that the native prince was of 
evil disposition, indifferent to the welfare of his subjects. The annexation of native states, harsh revenue policies, 
and the plight of the Indian peasantry all contributed to the Rebellion of 1857-57, referred to previously as the 
Sepoy Mutiny. In 1858 the East India Company was dissolved, despite a valiant defense of its purported 
achievements by John Stuart Mill, and the administration of India became the responsibility of the Crown. 
1126 With few exceptions the numerous Bank of England and East India company  directors who served after 1715 
were supporters of the Whig government (Sedgwick, 1970: 71). 
1127 One of the major victories of the Whigs had been to secure common law control over the development of 
commercial law, this to strike down the tariff and monopolistic special privileges associated with Crown 
prerogative  that were disrupting external trade in the face of fierce Dutch competition (North and Thomas, 1972: 
147-148). Through the leadership of Coke existing property rights were safeguarded in a body of impersonal law. 
By initiative of the Whigs, the alliance of parliament with common law was cemented. As the independence of 
the courts limited potential absuses by both Parliament and the Crown, the credibility of the English financial 
system with regards to the repayment of loans etc. improved substantially (North and Weingast, 1989: 818-819), 
so as to raise the availability of funds and their market price. 
1128 Under Walpole, government had become a system of corruption…The revolution in public finance in the later 
seventeenth century had both expanded the opportunities for corruption and laid the basis for the impoverishment 
of the bulk of the population. The high levels of taxation required to fund this debt, especially in the form of 
duties on consumer goods and trade, not only expanded the size and influence of the revenue departments, a 
powerful source of government patronage, it also depressed the wealth of the population and rendered it more 
susceptible to corruption. Corruption was denuding the wealth of the nation, as well as undermining its virtue and 
liberties (Harris, 2002: 70). There was a crisis of ―public spirit‖ – a key concept in Country thinking – defined as 
devotion to the common good of the patria, the disposition to disregard self-interest and sectional advantage for 
the sake of national interest.  
1129 The heterogeneous composition of the Whig party – aristocrats mixed with dissenters and foreign merchants – 
was frequently criticized by Tory writers such as Jonathan Swift: "For I do not take the Heads, Advocates, and 
Followers of the Whigs, to make up, strictly speaking, a National Party; being pathced up of heterogeneous, 
inconsistent Parts, whom nothing served to unite by the Common Interest of sharing in the Spoil and Plunder of 
the People" (Swift, 1711: The Examiner, 35, April 5; cited in Stasavage, 2003: 110). 
1130 After its foundation in 1694, an important function of the Bank of England was to manage the government‘s 
funded debt. This funded debt was essentially comprised of a large number of loans made by individual and 
corporate investors to the government who offered an agreed rate of return. The national debt was an important 
pillar of John Brewer‘s celebrated notion of the eighteenth-century fiscal-military state. as Martin Daunton (2001) 
has recently noted, the size of the national debt remained substantial until the end of the century and was as much 
a source political concern as it was a focus for personal investment. 
1131 Among directors of the Bank of England during the period 1694-1715, thirty were Whigs, while only three 
were Tories. Likewise, among shareholders of the Bank, Whigs outnumbered Tories by two to one (Stasavage, 
2003: 111). 
1132 The first group of Bank of England  Governors in 1694 swore they would maintain ―the Body Politique or 
fellowship of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England and the liberties and privileges thereof‖. 
Chosen from ―the most able and wealthy Citizens of London‖, the first group of Directors, in its turn, swore to be 
―indifferent and equal to all manner of persons‖ in their advice and assistance (Acres, 1931: 13-14; Hennessy, 
1995: 185). 
1133 The goldsmiths and money-lenders, for their part, foresaw a serious dimunition in their profits if they had to 
compete with so powerful a Corporation. In the course of its progress through the House of Commons, several 
amendments were made to the Bill. On the one hand, to appease the Whigs, who feared that the monarchy would 
become practically independent of Parliament if the King were free to borrow money from the Bank, the 
Corporation was prohibited from lending money to the Crown or from purchasing Crown lands without the 
consent of Parliament. On the other hand, to quiet the apprehensions of the old merchants the Corporation was 
forbidden to trade in ‗goods, wares of merchandise‘ (Acres, 1931: 10). 
1134 The connection between London's ―monied interest‖ and its well-entrenched Dissenting community 
heightened Tory distaste for the Financial Revolution and helps to explain the Sacheverell riots (Horwitz,  1987: 
173). 
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1135 Goldsmiths de fact invented a new banking system tied to a ―debt‖ form of money instead of the 
―commodity‖ of earlier forms of money.  The former form of money is based on a promise for a future 
transaction – e.g. redeeming a banknote into gold. The latter is based on the credibility of the purported value of a 
commodity.  
The debt form of money provided by goldsmiths became so popular that it soon gave rise to an entirely new set of 
institutional arrangements in England (Sayers, 1967). 
1136 Their religious community feelings, symbolized in the Quaker meeting house or the Nonconformist chapel 
facilitated the construction of a network of mutual borrowing and lending. 
1137 Although the relatively unadapted ―old squirearchy‖ was gradually sold out of its property (Habakkuk, 1940). 
1138 Initially, the currency most prone to debasement, silver, remained more popular than gold, as in Continental 
Europe. Also, the reality of this de facto standard would only become recognised legally in 1774, when the 
English State recognised gold as legal and common money (Braudel, 1973: 345).  
1139 These country bankers emerged from the Quaker networks and more established groups like country attorneys 
or collectors of government revenue (Pressnell, 1956). 
1140 The success of this four-party cooperation would inculcate a resilient tradition of ―sound finance‖ in the 
English financial system. Summarised quickly, this tradition entailed that while country bankers act as middle-
term deposit and cash service intermediaries – often through the proxy of local paper notes, London bankers 
provide liquidity-enhancing bill-brokerage facilities. In cooperation with the London Stock Exchange, the 
―international‖ financial centre since the downfall of Amsterdam, the Bank of England, finally, acts as the long-
term stabiliser of this system by providing three services. First, it ensures the liquidity of the entire system by 
discounting the bills of London bankers. Second, the Bank‘s gold reserves provide both an exchange standard for 
transforming local paper notes into (inter)nationally recognised bills, and a last-resort option to bankers 
threatened by inflationary or deflationary pressures. Finally, while officially being private actors, especially the 
Bank of England, but increasingly also the London Stock Exchange, established their ―public‖, third-party 
reputation, by providing a ―sound money‖ link between the challenger private credit network – local and 
international – and the growing public debt. 
1141 Instituted as a joint stock company, the Bank of England was established by Parliamentary charter in 1694: 
though being a civil society institution, the Bank was created by explicitly political legislative acts and charged 
with public duties. The Bank of England was founded as an explicitly temporary institution, which could be 
dissolved upon one year's notice after the eleven-year life guaranteed by its initial charter had passed. The charter 
was renewed nine times between 1694 and 1844. On advice of the Treasury, parliament made life easy for the 
Bank of England. So, the issuing of the 1708 Act, which stated that no banking concern could consist of more 
than six partners, and the passing of the Bubble Act in 1720, ushered in  a period of monopoly of joint-stock 
banking for the Bank of England. As a result, by 1750, the Bank of England had achieved an impregnable 
position in England. Outside London there were only a handful of banks. That this monopoly was not beneficial 
to the growth of either private banking, joint stock banking or industrial investment has of course been amply 
argued (cf. Cameron, 1967: 20; Warren, 1903: 23). 
1142 For instance, George I‘s speech from the Throne of Parliament in 1721 stated bluntly that the prime purpose 
of government policy should be ―extending our commerce, upon which the riches and grandeur of this nation 
chiefly depend‖ (Stone and Stone, 1984: 420). The landed elite therefore were willing to build a massive navy 
with the purpose of opening up markets to English enterprise. Not surprisingly, traders and manufacturers of all 
kinds were always prominent supporters of the existing authority structure. On the one hand, domestic traders 
relied on it for maintaining the good order that made commercial and credit transactions feasible. On the other 
hand, overseas merchants required its naval protection on dangerous sea routes. Thus, one of the reasons for the 
remarkable continuity of the predominance of aristocrats and landowners might well be their willingness to 
govern in the interest of bankers and overseas merchants. 
1143  ―[England] created a new banking system that originated, in contrast to the rest of Europe, in domestic trade, 
largely in domestic products...in a 'metropolitan market' centered on London" (Ellen Meiskins Wood, 1999: 99). 
1144 Down to 1815 manufacturers‘ demands for protection and export markets were met not so much by deliberate 
structural change of the policy establishment, but by incremental adjustments to economic policy. In fact, 
industrial protection by and large was a side-effect of the raising of revenue by government . During the decades 
after 1689, it was secured alongside the success of fiscal policy for at least three reasons. First, after 1689 war 
demands induced taxation needs on an entirely new scale (taxation never reached two millions before 1688; in 
1786 it was fifteen millions). The new relation between Crown and Parliament made possible a new taxation 
regime. Second, there was, of course, the nationalism-rousing rivalry with the great power France (Davis, 1966: 
317). Third, the louder political voice of a number of industries such as the linen and silk industries, reared to 
maturity under protection (Davis, 1966: 316). 
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1145 The combination of protection and laissez-faire thus had a downside for the landowners. So as to protect 
themselves best from past encroachments, the great landowners had created the constitutional pre-conditions – 
personal liberty, absolute security of property, minimum political intervention in economic affairs, and adequate 
protection from foreign competition – best suited for generating a spontaneous industrial revolution. In fact they 
did more than this. They helped to create the preconditions in agriculture, mining and transport for the take-off of 
industrialism. Because of the fear of government interference in internal affairs, landowners denied the State any 
permanent standing army or effective professional police. Instead, they preferred to rely on their own historical 
authority and the continued deference of the lower orders for the defence of their property and status. 
1146 The high Anglican clergy struck up a successful alliance with the natural scientists, to promote a brand of 
low-keyed latitudinarian Protestantism, which was congenial to and supported by both Newtonian cosmology and 
the capitalist ideology of the new commercial elites.  The Dissenters were also evolving into nonproselytizing 
Unitarians, with close ties to the power structure through their connections with the Low Church episocpacy and 
their influence on City government, banking, and overseas commerce. Once this rapproachment became evident, 
the possibility of peaceful cohabitation became a reality that most people could accept.  The flames of religious 
zeal, and hence of animosity between Church and Dissent, died down. The Anglican clergy were distracted by the 
quest for place and patronage and were anyway fearful of a growing anti-clericalism among the laity, expressed 
most visibly by the Mortamin Act of 1736 (Stone, 1980). 
1147 The old Anglican theories could not withstand the new realities of the rising monied ranks in a world of 
business enterprise.  Clearly, this transformation of Anglican faith to the realities of a new economic regime was 
not sudden, as for instance associated with the break with Rome in 1535. Rather, it was gradually formulated 
under the wing of reformed faith so as to increasingly make ―business enterprise the star to which Protestantism 
hitched its economic bandwagon‖ (Richards, 1929: 212-213). 
1148 Though the leading traders were Dissenters, they more than other Britons had reasons to remain loyal to the 
construction of a stable identity of Britain as a Protestant nation. The ruling Whig leaders stood for tolerance 
(Tawney, 1926). 
1149 Marwick invented the concept ‖secular Anglicanism‖ to describe the lack of extremity of feeling in England 
to be found between Catholics and anti-Catholics in France and Italy, among Lutherans and Calvinists in northern 
European countries, and in the Bible belt of the United States, as also in Ireland and parts of Scotland (Marwick, 
1996: 10). 
1150 Local government continued to enjoy considerable autonomy from central control and interference. Local 
men resented the idea that central government should interfere in their affairs. The government might decide who 
should be appointed to a local office, but once appointed, that official should be left alone. With the establishment 
of the Whig supremacy in the 1720s the wholesale political dismissals from the bench which had disfigured local 
government in the previous years came to an end. Central government became less preoccupied with local 
administration…the Justices of the Peace, drawn overwhelmingly from the gentry, governed England in the 
localities (O‘Gorman, 1997: 136). The influence of corporate towns, which originally had enjoyed an open 
franchise for elections to these corporate offices, but whose democratic status by the eighteenth century had 
declined to  one of a self-perpetuating oligarchy, increasingly fell under the influence of loca, rural maganates. 
London was exceptional in enjoying an open franchise of over 12,000 electors, with the mercantile, craft, retailing 
were well represented in the Court of Common Council. The Court of Aldermen, representing the great monied 
interests, was elected for life; it had close ties with the government‘s funding requirements while the Common 
Council flirted with popular Toryism and resistance to the financial oligarchy of the City (O‘Gorman, 1997: 138). 
1151 There were two types of schools in the pre-Victorian era. Public schools, the oldest form, were endowed 
schools owing to pious founders of various types: in the early days bishops and churchmen, after the Reformation 
yeomen, merchants or noblemen. The most prestigious endowed schools were called ―public schools‖, because 
they were founded by royalty as early as 1382 (Winchester) and 1440 (Eton). From the very beginning these latter 
schools were for the better-off. Other public schools originally were grammar schools set up by town or village 
natives or by guilds; others by cathedrals for their choir.for the local education of those in need of financial 
assistance. After a while these grammar schools converted in boarding schools which drew pupils from all parts 
of the country, mostly the sons of wealthy parents (Barnard, 1947: 12-13). 
1152 When after the Revolution, the decision was taken that Parliament would meet ever year and elections would 
be held regularly, the political investment of a seat in Commons became more secure and financially rewarding, 
Tories and Whigs started vying with one another for control over the electorate and a myriad of related jobs and 
freeholds. After a short period of party strife – in which electioneering was enhanced up to a point that only the 
richest men could afford it, an oligarchic system of political patronage developed that dissolved overly 
antagonistic party feelings.  Through the political patronage system, the aristrocracy ensured that, on the one 
hand, parliamentary majorities would stay aligned with the government, and, on the other hand, local 
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constituencies would be effectively co-opted. The civil service was a firm part of this patronage system, as 
exemplified by the expansion of the Treasury department. The Treasury had been established in 1612 to collect 
and manage public revenues and coordinate national economic policy. Between 1689 and 1715 it expanded 
enormously to impose its control over all previously independent agencies concerned with revenue and taxation. 
The Treasury emerged as a central agency, coordinating not only the financial system as a whole but also the 
dispensation of the government‘s patronage. To understand how central an agency the Treasury was, it suffices to 
observe how, by the middle of the eighteenth century,  parliamentary cabinets managed the majorities in 
Parliament through the pensions and jobs at the disposal of the Treasury.  Even at the provincial level, it was the 
steady flow of favours coming from the center that enabled county and borough patrons to control their 
electorates. 
1153 This mobility was not to be found so much into the highest ranks though. The myth of England being a nation 
with an exceptional upward social mobility into the highest ranks (see for instance Perkin, 2002), has been amply 
debunked (cf. Stone and Stone, 1984: 402). More recent research has shown that, while the volume of upward 
social mobility has turned out to be far less than expected, those who did manage to move up were rarely 
successful business men. Most of the newcomers were rising parish gentry, officeholders or lawyers, i.e. men 
from backgrounds quite similar to those of the existing county elite. 
1154 Inequality in England, a potential antagonising class factor, for a long time was mitigated by a wide diffusion 
of wealth. The middle ranks were distinguished at the top from the gentry and nobility not so much by lower 
incomes as by the necessity of earning their living…at the bottom from the labouring poor not so much by higher 
incomes as by the property, however small, represented by stock in trade, livestock, tools, or the educational 
investment of skill or expertise (Perkin, 2002: 22-23). According to Samuel Johnson, the English were ―a people 
polished by art, and classes by subordination‖, by the ―fixed, invariable external rules of distinction of rank, 
which create no jealousy, since they are held to be accidental‖ (Perkin, 2002: 25). In terms of income inequality, 
the Gini coefficient of inequality rose from .468 in 1688 to .487 in 1759, .519 in 1801-3, .551 in 1867 for England 
and Wales (and .538 for the UK), then declined to .520 in 1880 and .502 in 1913 (Rubinstein, 1986 : 66). 
1155 As in continental countries, in England urban guilds sought to control entry into the particular craft or trade, 
limit competition and uphold customary standards of reward and status. At the height of their powers, in the late 
medieval period, English guilds were more than legalised closed shops, however. As guilds were constituted by 
popular assemblies, legislatures, courts and executives, their authority was akin to legalised governments. Guilds 
even had the authority to enforce fines and imprison those violating guild rules (Commons, 1924: 225). 
Obviously, this would not have been possible without the fiat granted by Tudor governments, eager to uphold the 
motto ―No man without a lord‖ and the paternalistic structure of reciprocal obligations of protection and 
obedience. Despite this government fiat, already by the beginning of the sixteenth century guild authority was in 
decline. In face of the quickening of trade and production, tradesmen began to follow the example of clothmakers 
by moving to rural areas where economic life was comparatively unregulated. Tudor governments reacted to this 
escape with the 1563 statutory rules on apprenticeship and related issues. The local justices and town authorities 
were now required to make annual assessments of the wage rates so as to better regulate them. Unlike some 
Continental counterparts, the English government did not seek to rejuvenate the guilds. Rather, in its attempts to 
limit the spread of industry to the rural areas it gave the crucial powers of jurisdiction to local justices. These 
local justices,  however, were more concerned with maintaining local employment and order than paying tribute 
to central, urban concerns and formal apprenticeship rules. Indeed, individual employers who sought to bypass 
monopolistic regulation often found a powerful ally in English common law, the framework for local justices. All 
these elements combined allowed the forces of ―possessive‖ or ―market individualism‖ – already firmly in place 
in the thirteenth century (Macfarlane, 1978)  – to gain the upper hand over the forces of paternalism. Indeed, by 
the end of the sixteenth century the English policy establishment differentiated itself from its continental 
counterparts by its general emphasis on and acceptance of individual property (Fox, 1985: 7-15). 
1156 In England, 18th century economic ―laissez-faire‖ reformers successfully pressed their claims in parliament to 
―improve‖ unproductive farm land by enclosing them and thus submitting them to the laws of private property. 
They achieved this not only thanks to the influence of major private landowners, but also because the 
development of ―scientific‖ techniques like the ―horse-hoing husbandry‖ made their claims practicable. The spirit 
of improvement – as concretized not only in Enclosure acts, but also in the New Poor Laws – in very real terms 
led to the marginalisation and pauperisation of tenant farmers.  
It is often held that the main driving force behind the movement from agricultural small tenancy to industrial 
proletariat was the enclosure movement. Yet, at least two more factors influenced this movement. First, the 
growth of new industries stimulated the increase of population in rural areas – population trebled between 1750 to 
1850. In fact, the agricultural population, in spite of its relative decline vis a vis other sectors, continued to grow 
in absolute terms until 1851. Second, the finding that industrial employment meant higher wages for many 
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agricultural labourers puts in perspective the claim that enclosures were the product of ―exploitative‖ landlords. 
As Tawney remarks (1926: 64): ―It was not the lords of great estates, but eager and prosperous peasants, who in 
England first nibbled at commons and undermined the manorial custom.‖ In fact, the more ―prosperous 
peasantry…were rearranging their strips by exchange or agreement‖ concurrently with ―lords, no longer petty 
sovereigns, but astute business men‖ who ―were leasing their demesnes to capitalist farmers‖ (Tawney, 1926: 
117).  These tendencies were most clear in the southern part of England, in the neighborhood of the London 
metropolis. Out of fear of Nonconformist encroachment, the Anglican Church had systematically enforced its 
parochial system in the south, the southern Midlands and the south-east, especially in the agricultural regions. As 
a result, capitalist farmers and labourer-peasants alike had for the most part remained true to Anglicanism. In 
alliance with the ―landed interest‖, Anglicanism had grown stronger in agricultural areas than among more urban 
populations engaged in manufacturing or commerce. This strategy was effective until 1740; until then it was in 
these first areas that the bulk of the population lived.  After 1740, however, the urban-rural balance gradually 
tilted in favour of urban settlement. The population engaged in non-agricultural or agricultural-industrial 
occupations had risen from around 20 percent at the end of the seventeenth century to over 50 percent by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, and to over 70 percent in 1831. Where the population of predominantly 
agricultural counties had more than doubled between 1701 and 1831, the population in predominantly non-
agricultural industrial counties had tripled or quadrupled, due to the expansion of mining and manufacturing 
industries – cotton, iron and coal. As a result, the population balance had tended to be transferred from agrarian to 
manufacturing and industrial areas, and from southern and south-eastern England to the Midlands and the north. 
Yet, it was precisely in these areas that the parochial system was poorly established and ill-equipped to the new 
needs of pastoral guidance (Gilbert, 1976: 110-112). Nonconformism thrived especially in those northern 
counties where there was a boom of domestic industry and small-scale industrial settlements, as amongst the 
handloom weavers, which number increased from 50,000 in 1769 to 240,000 in 1820. 
For three hundred years, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, common right was defended at the centre 
of government. Until then, agricultural writers who supported enclosures did not approve of it for the conversion 
of arable land to pasture or the loss of commons without full and proper compensation in land. Yet, in the early 
seventeenth century, the final withdrawal of official resistance to enclosure followed: the last Inquisitions of 
Depopulation were held in the 1620s (Martin, 1982). What distinguishes the period from the mid seventeenth 
century to the 1790s is the development of a public argument in favour of enclosure even when it did cause local 
distress (Neeson, 1993: 18-19). Basically, the critics of commons wanted to raise productivity and infuse a spirit 
of ―improvement‖ in the supply and quality of labour. According to them, common right stood in the way of 
modernisation. 
1157 In fact, critics of commons wanted to improve society as well as agriculture: they wanted to change the 
structure of rural England. Regarding liberalism as an antidote to authoritarianism and paternalism in all spheres 
of life, they used the ―rhetoric of the free market‖ so as to give the moral implications of improvement ―a 
polemical and persuasive force‖  (Coats, 1972: 133). The critics laid the groundwork for their victory in the 1760s 
when they began to adopt the national interest argument of the defenders of commons in conjunction with the free 
trade argument. So, they increasingly promoted the subordination of individual property rights to the national 
interest and accused commoners of selfish individualism. Stating that agriculture‘s role in promoting the national 
interest foremost was to ensure an adequate supply of food they defined defenders‘ concern for the rights of 
commoners as hostile to the English national identity. At the same time they began to transfer the 
defenders‘descriptions of commoners as honest, hardworking and available to the future agricultural proletariat 
(Neeson, 1993: 44-46).  During the 1790s a new pamphleteer had caught the ear of Parliament: the Reverend 
Thomas Malthus. In 1798 he argued against giving outdoor relief to the poor; in 1803 he argued against giving 
them land. Malthus stated that giving land to the poor would lead to more poor relief, not less. His appeal further 
explains the failure of defenders and critics of commons to persuade Pitt of the value of compensated enclosure. 
A newer ideology than improvement sealed the fate of nineteenth-century commoners (Neeson, 1993: 51-53). 
1158 Evangelical nonconformism again played a crucial role in this process. As succinctly, but misleadingly 
phrased by Thompson (1977:  412), the New Dissent embodied in Methodism became the ―religion of both the 
exploiters and the exploited‖. Apart from the purpose of gaining salvation, both prosperous merchants and factory 
operatives became Nonfcormists as a means to symbolically reject the mores and values of a social system which 
ascribed status largely in terms of inherited advantages of landed wealth and family background (Gilbert, 1976:  
83-84). Between 1740 and 1820 the majority of weavers had become deeply imbued with the doctrines of 
Methodism (Guest, 1823:  38). 
1159 'This city', or the 'city of London', to 'the City' tout court, in the sense of London business, can be observed as 
early as 1621 in the debates of the Parliament (Tawney, 1958: 75, note 1). 
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1160 The Corporation and people of London, too proud to be subservient, were traditionally in opposition to 
Government ; their wealth and concentration of population at the doors of Parliament and Ministers, made them, 
when roused, a great power, especially as the City had the traditional privilege of presenting its petitions at the 
bar of the House of Commons and the right of petitioning the King in person (Read, 1964: 4). London was the 
commercial and industrial centre of the nation, its literary and journalistic centre…the centre of religious dissent 
(one-fifth of its population being officially estimated in 1711 to comprise English Dissenters and French 
Huguenots), and the mob centre (Read, 1964: 4-5). Its economic predominance, linked to that predominance in 
population already noticed, was remarkable. The London market dominated the economy of the rest of the 
country…through London‘s port passed eighty per cent of all exports and forty-five per cent of all imports…With 
economic leadership went extra-parliamentary political leadership. ‗The noble spirit of the metropolis is the life-
blood of the state, collected at the heart: from that point it circulates, with health and vigour, through every artery 
of the constitution‘ (cited in Everett, 1927: 157 ; Read, 1964: 5). 
1161 In contrast, with the slow communications of the time…news of Acts of Government and Parliament and of 
response from the country was slow to circulate …A network for the communication of provnicial political 
opinion did exist, from the country gentlemen in their ‗neighbourhoods‘ via the Justices of the Peace, local 
Members of Parliament, and the Lords-Lieutenant; but at times of crisis swift extra-parliamentary expression of 
opinion had perforce to be left to London. Thus in the Excise Crisis of 1733 London headed the unprecedentedly 
noisy popular agitation against Walpole‘s proposed extension of excise taxation to wine and tobacco. The 
inquisitorial powers of excisemen were traditionally hated by English people, and the cry went down from capital 
to country…that under the proposed new tax trade would decay, houses would be broken open by excise men and 
pillaged without redress, and that wives and daughters would be violated ; in short, that Englishment would be 
brought down to the level of Frenchmen. In this spirit London'‘ anti-excise petition spoke to Parliament on behalf 
of the whole nation (Read, 1964: 5). 
1162 Although the City of London led extra-parliamentary opinion at this period, it was much influenced by 
Opposition politicians within Parliament. About mid-century, however, an important change took place as 
London began to adopt political attitudes independent of promptings from within Parliament. A great stimulus 
was given to the City‘s sense of independence by its support for the Elder Pitt and his successful policies during 
the Seven Years War ; when he left office in 1761 London returned to its traditional opposition role with a new 
sense of self-confidence (Read, 1964: 6). 
1163 Popular opinion in varying shapes had of course exerted a spasmodic influence upon affairs for centuries 
before this, going back at least to the Peasants‘ Revolt of 1381. It had played a vital part in the outbreak and 
course of the Civil War. Its most active centres in the Hanoverian period were the University of Oxford and , 
especially, the City of London (Read, 1964). 
1164 By 1750 the characteristic structure of English landownership was already discernible: a few thousand 
landowners, leasing out their land to some tens of thousands of tenant farmers, who in turn operated it with the 
labour of some hundreds of thousands of farm-labourers, servants or dwarf holders who hired themselves out for 
much of their time. This implied a very substantial system of cash-incomes and cash sales (Hobsbawm,. 1968: 
15). 
1165 ―Unlike others (such as the Dutch)…[Britain‘s] economic aims were not completely dominated by 
commercial and financial interests, but shaped also, and increasingly, by the pressure group of manufacturers; 
originally in the fiscally important woollen industry, later the rest‖ (Hobsbawm, 1968: 33). 
1166 In spite of the modest wealth and influence of the budding industrialists: in 1760 the poorest merchants earned 
as much as the richest master manufacturers. Indeed, it is most peculiar that, while trade – especially overseas – 
seemed to be more lucrative and prestigious than manufactures, the purposes of domestic industry producers 
prevailed over those of commerce in the English establishment, mainly because merchants could only mobilize 
London and a few ports, while the manufacturers could count on large stretches of the country and of 
government.  Where the interest of merchants lay in freedom to import, export and re-export, those of industry lay 
in protecting the British home market against foreigners while capturing export markets for British products. The 
prevalence of manufacturers ensured that British industry could grow up in a protected home market until strong 
enough to demand free entry into other people‘s markets, i.e. ―Free Trade‖. 
1167 This was less the case in the southern alluvial provinces of the Republic. 
1168 After 1850,  a social revolution took place. In industry, the family gradually ceased to be the unit of 
production. In addition, production and trade increasingly was catered to shopkeepers and other intermediaries, 
and not directly to families. 
1169 In fact, this attitude towards farmers did not change that much in the centuries to come, even in the twentieth 
century. So, when urban residents in the Netherlands in 1956 were asked to give an appreciation of the value of 
farmers, researchers found that: ―If one describes the farmer as a human being in general, the result is a 
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predominantly unfavourable image. If he is described as the working-manager of an agricultural holding, the 
result is a distinctively favourable image‖ (Stedeling en boer, 1957: 123). So, as a group of people embodying a 
particular life-style, farmers were stigmatized as backward, etc…In other words, urban residents were rather 
antagonistic towards farmers as incorporating a particular life-style, and separated their ideals of the perceived 
life-style of farmers. But, when positioned as instrumental in contributing to the fulfillment of Dutch prosperity in 
general – the good management of the Netherlands being the purpose shared by all populations –, and urban 
residents‘ prosperity more specifically, famers were perceived in a more positive way: urban residents were more 
willing to associate with farmers as working-mangers. 
1170 As such, cleavages formed within the peasant class and capitalist relations developed in the countryside. 
―Some peasants owned much land, leased it other peasants, lent money and engaged in local trade. Other peasants 
owned nothing and found themselves economically dependent not upon noblemen, churchmen or their 
representatives but upon other peasants.‖ (DeVries, 1973: 55) 
1171 Of course, this attitude was workable only through the relatively independent, but still highly synergetic 
development of a ―modern‖ infrastructure in the countryside. As mentioned before, this infrastructure mainly 
developed in the alluvial (northern) provinces of the Republic, where agricultural development was dependent on 
land reclamation from the sea. Since polder-making required large capital investments, investors demanded some 
kind of a guarantee that they would be able to reap the benefits. Yet, polder-making required some sort of 
cooperation between the many actors involved: merchants, the state, landowners and labourers (Van Zanden, 
2002: 638). This had paradoxical effects on the resulting arrangements about property rights. On the one hand, a 
first form of private property in land was incorporated in the institutional arrangements of the Dutch provinces at 
least since the thirteenth century. From then on, formal commercial contracts governed the relationship between 
landowners and their tenants. Leases usually ran for a reasonably long period and were primarily concerned to 
protect the property from permanent changes that would reduce its intrinsic quality. On the other hand, these 
stipulations generally did not constitute a direct intervention in farm decision making by the owner. This is 
because, in contrast with England, in the Dutch Republic, formal contracts were accompanied by the maintenance 
of an informal concept of property rights in favour of the farmer tenants until well into the nineteenth century.  
The basis of this informal concept was the customary old Dutch law. This law did not define the owner‘s property 
rights as absolute, but explicitly acknowledged the rights of tenant farmers, thus ensuring their continuity (De 
Vries and Van der Woude, 1997). As a result, small peasant owner-operators, with 7 to 10 acres, dominated the 
Dutch agricultural organisation (North and Thomas, 1973: 143).   
1172 The catalyst for the rise of Dutch industry and commercial agriculture was the ecological crisis of the later 
Middle Ages. ―Dutch peasants were‗pushed‗ out of arable production for subsistence and into dependence on the 
market. Because such an unusually large part of the population was thereby impelled to purchase its means of 
production and means of subsistence, the size of the domestic market, was in potential enormous. Nevertheless, in 
view of the very low standards of living that must, at the start, have prevailed, the actually existing domestic 
market was necessarily restricted, all the more so since domestic agriculture was decreasingly able to supply 
bread grains, in the wake of the widespread decline of arable production with the subsistence of the peat. Dutch 
producers could not therefore avoid, from the first, and unusually high level of dependence upon international 
markets, both to dispose of their output and secure necessary inputs. ..The ability to successfully complete the 
cataclysmic transition from arable subsistence economy to market dependent, export oriented economy was very 
much facilitated by the spectacular growth of grain imports from the Baltic. From the end of the fifteenth century, 
prices for grain in the Northern Netherlands went from being the highest to being the lowest in Europe, as 
Amsterdam emerged as the central grain market in Europe…Cheap grain played an especially important role in 
enabling Dutch agriculture to successfully pursue its specialization for the world market in dairy production and 
cattle raising…by the seventeenth century, in an economy in which perhaps half the population was out of 
agriculture, Dutch non-agricultural exports were almost covering the full cost of grain imports‖ (Brenner, 2001: 
330-331). 
1173 So, when the Dutch provinces became the depot of the Baltic trade from the fifteenth century on, they also 
gradually developed into a Western European commercial and manufacturing centre. Helped by the relative 
capital affluence in the Low Countries (mostly in the cities Antwerp and Amsterdam) and the absence of a 
landowning rank that was wary of industrial development, rural industry developed as a small-farmer strategy for 
greater prosperity.  No  major resistance arose against commercialization or specialization.  As a result, the 
enclosure movement started at the end of the eighteenth century in the Netherlands, except for a few incidents in 
the diluvial (southern) provinces, was relatively consensual compared to England (cf. Sneller, 1951). At the end 
of the 18th century, a restructuration period started in the Dutch Republic. Where once Amsterdam was the 
largest staple market in Europe, competing staple markets like London and Hamburg started contesting its 
hegemony. In addition, European countries became increasingly mercantilistic and autarchic, which decreased the 
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need for international intermediation through staple markets. Because of the decrease in international trade of 
goods the Dutch increasingly had to concentrate on other elements of their national economy: mostly agriculture, 
but also financial services. Since the upper ranks in the Dutch Republic derived their income mainly from non-
agrarian sources like trade, banking, some industry, government services, and rentier capital, they did not have to 
increase the exploitation of the rural sector (for instance through enclosures) to secure their position in this 
restructuration period (Van Zanden, 1991: 55).  As a corollary, the level of taxation on the agricultural sector, 
though rather high and rising until about 1840, in the longer run increased much less than total production, 
because other sources of taxation became of increasing importance to the State (Van Zanden, 1985: 192). In this 
way, the laissez-faire policy towards farmers continued in the nineteenth century. 
1174 The popularity amongst social liberals of Co-operative democratisation not in the least was due to its promise 
to reconcile improvement of the fate of the labour classes with a capitalist order, based on private property and a 
strict separation of the political and the economic. Participating in Co-operatives would not only entail 
stimulation by the market dynamic of labour wages, but also enable workers to profit from their shares in a 
communal enterprise.  Liberals like De Witt Hamer and Goeman Borgesius propagated Co-operation as the road 
towards a more righteous and viable capitalism. Their argument that Co-operation would not interfere with 
private property, while resolving the ―Social Question‖, was received approvingly in most of the upper circles 
(Dudink, 1997). Through Co-operation workers would be transformed in careful, productive citizens. ―If one says 
co-operation one also says: industriousness, moderateness, thrift, development, welfare‖ (De Witt Hamer, 1866: 
211).Ultimately, Co-operation would serve as a preparation for full citizenship, culminating in the suffrage (106-
107). 
1175 Surprisingly, because of the later antagonism expressed by protestants vis a vis consumer co-operatives. 
1176 Inspired by the Rochdale pioneers, the principles of this consumer co-operative and the ones to follow were: 
1) open membership, 2) democratic control, 3) payment of the surplus to members in proportion with the 
purchases made (also known as the dividend rule), 4) sale for cash.   
1177 ―As such the co-operative is not the cradle of the revolution, but the means to take away the reason for 
revolution‖ (Slotemaker, 9 may 1890, Ons Belang) 
1178 Already in 1866, De Witt Hamer made an inventory of the reason of the failures of co-operatives (mostly 
consumer, but also worker co-operatives): 1) started too fast with running a business; lacking sufficient capital, 2) 
workers live too scattered, not in one area, 3) a strong mutual bond between workers was lacking, 4) members 
thought that cooperation would be cheaper and did not realise the need to accumulate capital, 5) deficient 
administration, sometimes theft, 6)everyone‘s expenses were written down; this allowed the man to control the 
woman, which she did not like, 7)legal personality was often denied; often because of the strong position of small 
businessmen, 8)too much philantropy; wealthy lords‘ deposits diminished the involvement of workers, 
9) workers‘ deficient development and purchasing power. Another popular reason for the failure of co-operatives 
– in line with Webb‘s derogatory comments about the divi in England – was that workers-members were ―almost 
exclusively interested in the immediate benefits their association brought, and not in what it would promise after 
struggling through its infancy‖ (Otten, 1924: 49).   
1179 The ANWV‘s enthusiasm was almost given a fatal blow when in 1878 the Amsterdam Co-operative ―Ons 
Voordeel‖ was put into liquidation with a deficit of 27,000 guilder. 
1180 Cornelis Croll in Recht voor Allen, 30-12-1887. 
1181 The repeated calls of the local shopkeepers for government to oppose consumer co-operation mostly were at 
no avail (otten, 1924: 211). 
1182 ―Centrale Bond van Nederlandse Verbruikscooperaties‖ 
1183 In fact, the First World War as a period of strong growth for the whole financial sector in the Netherlands. 
Dutch commercial banks saw their size triple or quadruple. It is only with the financial crisis of 1921 that the 
expansionary phase of Dutch banking ended (Van Zanden, 2002b: 21). 
1184 Worker co-operation, a socialist initiative, enjoyed even less support of catholics and protestants. In addition, 
social liberals like Treub, with the emergence of the socialist party and the labour movement, gradually became 
more anti-socialist. There were two other reasons for the relative failure of worker co-operatives. As mentioned 
before, the socialist movement  lacked purposive clarity and fervour compared with other countries. The informal 
authority of socialist leaders was much smaller than the authority of catholic and protestant publicists and 
propagandists. Socialist discourse, partly due to the antipropaganda of local merchants, catholics and protestants, 
did not strike root amongst many workers and most farmers. Second, the techniques developed by worker co-
operatives were much less practicable than the ones of Co-operative Banks. Inadequate financial administration 
and expertise, the lack of resources of members, insufficient interest and understanding by workers and farmers, 
competition by local merchants…all these factors contributed to the demise of worker co-operatives. 
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1185 It lasted until 1924 before the consumers‘ co-operative movement had its own savings bank,  the ―Algemene 
Spaarbank van de Verbruikscooperaties‖) (Barou, 1932: 107). 
1186 In fact, this figure is of 1919. No data about 1920 are available for Germany.  
1187 Co-op Maandblad, February 1965: 22-23. 
1188 The social-democratic radio and television organisation. 
1189 As stated by Gurney (1999: 140), the visibility of the Co-operative movement in the late Victorian and 
Edwardian periods constrast starkly with its marginalizations by recent historians. 
1190 Failsworth Co-operative Messenger, June 1913, as cited in Gurney, 1999: 141. 
1191 In 1900 an estimated 3 per cent of consumer expenditure went to price-maintained goods. In 1938 this figure 
had risen to 30, and in 1954 to 55. After this date, the figure waned to 44 per cent in 1956, and 33 per cent in 
1960 to go slightly up and down in the following years.. 
1192 In fact, RPM was investigated very frequently by government committees between 1919 and 1956, most 
probably because the impact of restrictive practices in the retailing sector was so significant to the general public, 
which in turn may have consequences for the legitimacy of the business system. After WWII, the Labour 
government, backed by the general pressure from the United States agreed that a tough line on restrictive 
practices, and anti-social practices in generally, should be taken. A Board of Trade report of 1949 claimed resale 
price maintenance practices had ―turned price maintenance from a reasonable means of preventing damage to 
well-known quality brands…into a comprehensive system fro regulating and policing entire industries‖ which 
―must result in the virtual elimination of price competition in the greater part of the distributive trades of the 
country‖ (Mercer, 1995: 150). 
1193 Co-operative Congress Report, 1954: 68. 
1194 Co-operative Congress Report, 1954: 68-74.  
See also http://www.lancs.ac.uk/users/history/histwebsite/online/histfest/histfest2002/cropper.htm 
1195 ―Modernising the Co-op‖, New Statesman; cited in ―From Market Research Department. Press Comment on 
―Independent Commission‘s Report‖, Market Research Department WE/DB/00055/2, Co-operative Union, 18th 
May, 1958. 
1196 ―Co-operation Spring Cleaned‖, The Times; cited in ―From Market Research Department. Press Comment on 
―Independent Commission‘s Report‖, Market Research Department WE/DB/00055/2, Co-operative Union, 18th 
May, 1958.  
1197 ―Reform for Co-ops‖, Manchester Guardian; cited in ―From Market Research Department. Press Comment on 
―Independent Commission‘s Report‖, Market Research Department WE/DB/00055/2, Co-operative Union, 18th 
May, 1958.  
1198 ―Co-op needs livening up, says report‖, News Chronicle; cited in ―From Market Research Department. Press 
Comment on ―Independent Commission‘s Report‖, Market Research Department WE/DB/00055/2, Co-operative 
Union, 18th May, 1958. 
1199 Co-operative News, 23 March 1963: 1. 
1200 Co-operative Review, November 1964: 323-327 
1201 Co-operative News, 23 March 1963, p.1, 26 October 1963, p.2 , 9 November 1963, p.1, 16 November 1963, 
p.2 & 30 November 1963, p.2; Co-operative Gazette, 11 November 1963, 275. 
1202 Co-operative News, 30 March 1968, pp.1-2. 
1203 The Consumers' Association was set up in 1957 to improve the standards of goods and services available to 
the public in the United Kingdom 
1204 This act provided the Industrial Common Ownership Movement (ICOM) with a five-year grant for £100,000 
and £250,000 for investment in co-operative enterprises , and the establishment of the Co-operative Development 
Agency in 1978.  
1205 The Consumer Co-ops increasingly appealed only the poorest working classes; their image further 
deteriorated from the 1960s on; In his study of goal displacement in the British Co-operative movement, 
Donnelly (1980: v-vi) concluded that consumer ―co-operators today see the goal of the movement as one of 
survival… Wider, more socialist aims, such as replacing the capitalist system, attract little or no support‖. There 
was then and is now, ―a lack of vision about why the retail movement exists except that it provides jobs‖. Or as 
the Commission of Enquiry into the Co-operative Movement submitted in the year 2000: ―missing is a vision of 
why do we exist, why are we here.‖  In this regard, the difference between building societies and consumer co-
operatives is remarkable (cf. Table 11.5). While both types of economic organisations in theory are non-profit, 
mutual organisations , what differentiates building societies from consumer co-operatives is that the former‘s 
leadership openly declares that ―societies are run as commercial enterprises and not as extensions of the welfare 
state‖ (Harloe et al., 1974: 82). The leadership of the Consumer Co-operative movement is ever more willing to 
change, however, to remediate these flaws. So, according to the Co-operative Commission instituted in 2000, the 
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Co-operative Bank should serve as a best-practice model of change for the Consumer Co-ops. Substantive change 
is still far off, though. 
1206 Report of the War Cabinet, 1918 
1207 Cited in Hannah, 1976: 45. 
1208 Cfr. Hannah, 1976: 50-51 
1209 The ―stop-go‖ policy worked by ―satisfying popular demands for social reform – the welfare state, full 
employment and rising living standards, by leaving industry to get on with its own business, and by applying the 
economic brake if either seemed to threaten the stability of the sterling‖. In other words, the stop-go policy 
―integrated the opposing interests under the ultimate hegemony of financial capital‖ (Vickerstaff, 1985: 52). 
1210 This Act made collective restrictions over the sale of goods to third parties registerable in the Register of 
Restrictive Agreements.  
1211 Boddy, 1981: 87. 
1212 Cf. Labour Party‘s 1977 Green Paper on Housing Policy: the building societies‘ ―dominant role in financing 
home ownership is probably unique among countries where home ownership is the largest tenure, and places their 
operations at the centre of housing policy‖ (HMG Cmnd 5851, 1977: 50). 
1213 The so-called Committee Lovink consisted of the three leaders of the farmer-associations, the two Central Co-
operative Banks, three land-labourer organisations and two agricultural issue groups. 
1214 http://www.ser.nl/default.asp?desc=en_introduction 
The SER also has an administrative role. This consists of monitoring commodity and industrial boards, which 
perform an important role in the Dutch economy. Industrial boards are responsible for representing the interests 
of particular branches of industry, and are made up of employers‘ representatives and union representatives. In 
addition, the SER helps the government to enforce the Works Councils Act ( Wet op de ondernemingsraden ), the 
Establishment of Businesses Act (Vestigingswet Bedrijven ) and the Insurance Agencies Act ( Wet 
Assurantiebemiddelingsbedrijf ). What are the main differences between the Labour foundation and the SER, 
apart from the fact that the former is a private, bipartite body, and the latter a public, tripartite body. While the 
Labour Foundation is a ―flexible‖ body for negotiations between social partners, the SER is a more 
institutionalised body for debate. Also, while the SER is an advisory body to the government, the Labour 
Foundation (although sometimes also asked for an advice) is primarily an institute to formulate recommendations 
to negotiating parties in branches and companies. 
1215 Fennema and Schijf, 1984: 16 
1216 idem 
1217 Cf. Kickert, 2000.  
1218 A debate about directly-elected mayors – subject to Crown appointment in the Netherlands – started. New 
methods of interactive decisionmaking and citizen participation were created, such as citizen polls and citizen 
panels. 
1219 I.e. the practice of using the central state apparatus to enjoy financial favours for private distribution by great 
political patrons (Hobsbawm, 1968: 194). 
1220 Cf. Hobsbawm, 1968: 192-193. 
1221 Boothby, 1927: 47. 
1222 Royal Commission on Food Prices, First Report (Cmd. 2390, 1925): 173, Cited in Hannah, 1976: 46. 
1223 ―All decisions should be open and public‖ (Kickert, 2003: 122-123). 
1224 Cf. Atkinson, 1999: 59-60. 
1225 Hannah, 1976: 137. 
1226 The movement for wider investment in industry by wage earners and other small investors‖ (Conservative 
Political Center, 1959  Everyman a capitalist.  London). 
1227 This catchphrase was first pronounced by Mr. Eden in 1945 (Lewis, 1954: 3). 
1228 Butler, 1963: 3-7. 
1229 Towards the end of the [Conservative] opposition period [end of 1940s], housing had emerged as the 
centrepiece of Conservative social-policy proposals, the heart of promises to spread property-ownership and the 
construction of a ‗property-owning democracy‘. Under Bevan, housing policy had taken on a universal character 
based upon need rather than upon the ability to pay ; licenses to build privately were restricted, and those homes 
which were built privately were limited in size and standard. The bulk of new housing was provided through the 
local authorities, and targeted at general needs rather than focused on slum clearance. But congestion and 
materials shortage in the building industry led to public disaffection with socialist housing policy ; this was the 
weak spot which the Conservatives, promising to unleash the productive forces of the market, hoped to use as a 
showcase policy to demonstrate the virtues of free enterprise. The 1950 conference pledge to build 300,000 
houses a year. 
633 
 
                                                                                                                           
1230 1928. ―What Conservatives have done for British workers‖, Conservative Political Centre Handbook. 
1231 This Act limited the powers of the House of Lords to block House of Commons legislation, asserting the 
supremacy of the Commons. 
1232 Dating back to Disraeli‘s anti-Gladstonian speeches in 1872, in which he accused Liberals to effect the 
disintegration of the Empire of England. Disraeli effectively transformed the Conservatives into the ―national 
party‖ in the 1870s (Blake, 1997: 126-127, 130). The nationalist element would prove be a great trump card for 
the Conservative Party, most notably in its ability to credibly launch accusations of anti-nationalism towards first 
the Liberal and later the Labour Party. 
1233 Disraeli tried to focus on interests common to the middle and working classes; Tory democracy in effect 
meant both the reorganisation of the party machine so as to make it more open to the urban middle class and the 
promotion of policies appealing to the working class (Blake, 1997: 147-148). 
1234 Harling, 1996: 258 
1235 The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 led to a severe split in the Conservative party‘s ranks. 
1236 Burrow, 1988: 37. 
1237 Property in office had long been considered a safeguard against any royal pretensions to absolutist control 
over the administrative system, and the virtual sacralisation of property in the eighteenth century made it difficult 
to deny an office-holder the vested ‗right‘ to his office, even for the sake of administrative reform (Harling, 1996: 
22). 
1238 Report of the 1901 Co-operative Union Congress: 186-189. 
1239 Report of 1921 Congress: 484-485. 
1240 By extra-parliamentary, I mean that the cabinet maintains only loose links with parliamentary parties; for 
instance in that the cabinet more or less autonomously shapes  its government programme. 
1241 Numbers for the Conservative Party are also those for the Coalition party. 
1242 Aristocrats are those who had among their grandparents the holder of a hereditary title. 
1243 Working class are those whose fathers appear to have had a manual occupation while they were growing up. 
1244 Disposable income is sum of market income (earned income from wages, salaries, self-employment, other 
cash-incomes from private sources) and public transfer payments, minus taxes and social security contributions. 
Income is measured on an annual base. 
1245http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP_PRD_CAT_PREREL/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_
2005/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2005_MONTH_06/2-03062005-EN-BP.PDF 
1246 http://www.timbro.com/euvsusa/pdf/EU_vs_USA_English.pdf 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
 
Bedrijfssucces: vermogen om bij te dragen tot democratische  pacten  
 
De bedrijfskundeliteratuur en andere, bedrijfseconomische media die de Westerse 
publieke opinie richting geven, gaan impliciet uit van een positieve relatie tussen 
bedrijfssucces en deelneming in democratiseringsprocessen. Zo is het vanzelfsprekend 
geworden dat ondernemerschap bijdraagt aan de democratisering van de samenleving. De 
vele corporate governance and industriële democratie disputen doorheen de 19de, 20st en 
21ste eeuwen wijzen op een algemener punt: Westerse bedrijven worden periodisch 
geëvalueerd in termen van bepaalde democratische standaarden.   
Ondanks het wijdverbreide karakter van deze veronderstellingen bestaat er noch 
een theorie die de preciese rol van bedrijven in democratiseringsdynamieken opheldert, 
noch klaarheid over hoe verschillende soorten van democratische participatie invloed 
hebben op bedrijfssucces. Zulke inzichten zouden een licht werpen op hoe een bepaalde 
positionering in projecten van economische groei, burgerschap en Staatsontwikkeling 
bedrijfssucces schraagt.   
In dit manuscript stel ik niet enkel dat democratische participatie onontbeerlijk is 
voor bedrijfssucces; bedrijfssucces vereist een leidende rol in democratiserings-
dynamieken.  Meer bepaald, bedrijven worden afgerekend op hun capaciteit bij te dragen 
tot pacten tussen drie verschillende soorten democratiseringsdynamieken: ten eerste, 
economische versus politieke versus burgerlijke democratisering; ten tweede, 
democratisering van een minderheid versus gericht op consensus; en ten terde, 
democratisering gebaseerd op het territorialiteitsprincipe versus het personaliteitsprincipe. 
Na nauwgezette analyse van de strategieën gevolgd door Nederlandse en Engelse 
commerciële en coöperatieve banken vanaf de 19de eeuw tot 2007, concludeer ik het 
volgende.  Algemeen gezien
6
 hangt bedrijfssucces af van zes strategische competenties – 
die allen bijdragen tot een pact tussen rivaliserende democratiseringsdynamieken: 
1. Help de sociale mobiliteitsaspiraties van kern klanten vervullen 
2. Bedien klanten van verschillende sociale klassen 
3. Maak Staatsbeleid aangaande economisch burgerschap bij “voldongen feit”  
4. Vertaal Staatsbeleid aangaande economisch burgerschap in diensten & producten               
5. Word een kampioen van nationaal karakter 
6. Word een kampioen van het economische landsbelang 
Deze strategische competenties moeten beschouwd worden binnen een bredere 
geopolitieke en historische context: een context van bedrijven die in natiestaten opereren, 
en nationale leiders die democratiseringsdynamieken sturen overeenkomstig principes die 
historische continuïteit en geopolitiek voordeel het best waarborgen.   
 
De historische rol van republikeinse principes in democratische pacten      
 
De opkomst van een Westers systeem van democratiseringsprojecten – 
economische groei, goed burgerschap en Staatsontwikkeling – is in belangrijke mate toe te 
                                                 
6 Uiteraard moet men rekening houden met de speciale nationale en geopolitieke rol van de banksector bij het 
algemene conclusies trekken uit bevindingen over banken voor de gehele bedrijfspopulatie. 
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schrijven aan de historische organisatie van beginnende natiestaten rond een aantal 
republikeinse principes. Drie republikeinse principes – met als belangrijkste 
vaandeldragers de Nederlandse Republiek, Engeland, Frankrijk en de Verenigde Staten –
brachten een drastische verandering in geopolitieke verhoudingen. Een eerste principe is 
dat geen enkele nationale speler, groep of belang anderen structureel kan domineren. In 
andere woorden, de mogelijkheid tot democratische rivaliteit and meningsverschillen moet 
geïnstitutionaliseerd worden. Ten tweede, democratische rivaliteit en meningsverschillen 
moeten mogelijk zijn in economische, politieke en burgerschapszaken, aangezien 
economische groei, good burgerschap en een sterke Staat even belangrijke republikeinse 
verdiensten zijn. Tenslotte, de dreiging van corruptie van republikeinse principles is steeds 
aanwezig. Dit noopt tot een tijdige transformatie van democratische instituties en een 
continue vernieuwing van democratische pacten.  
In werkelijkheid zijn democratische pacten altijd onvolmaakte overbrengers van 
republikeinse principes geweest. De democratische standaarden die feitelijk in voege 
waren en het gedoogde corruptieniveau dienen in relatieve termen afgewogen te worden, in 
vergelijking met de standaarden en corruptieniveaus bij de geopolitieke concurrentie.    
Geopolitieke vergelijking leidt tot ranglijsten van natiestaten, overeenkomstig hun 
vermogen om uitdrukking te geven aan het ideaal van volkssoevereiniteit en het recht op 
zelfbeschikking. 
 Het vermogen van bedrijven om uitdrukking te geven aan het recht op 
zelfbeschikking hangt uiteraard ook af van hun band met bepaalde natiestaten en 
democratische pacten. Het gemak  waarmee Noord-Amerikaanse bedrijven en 
multinationals West-Europese markten veroverden met hun organisatiemodel steekt in dit 
verband af met de vele moeilijkheden die Engelse en Nederlandse multinationals zoals 
Unilever ondervonden om hun bestuurlijke systemen en autonomie te behouden.  
Gezien de kritische schakel tussen bedrijfs- en natiestaatssucces, beschrijf ik in 
zeven stellingen hoe nationale leiders – niet in het minst bedrijfs- en lobby-leiders – een 
gunstige geopolitieke positie trachten te bemachtigen; en de mogelijkheden tot 
zelfbeschikking voor aangesloten bedrijven trachten te maximaliseren. Deze stellingen zijn 
gebaseerd op een historische vergelijking van democratische pacten in Nederland (de 
Nederlandse Republiek) en Engeland sinds de 16
de
 eeuw; en in mindere mate de Verenigde 
Staten en de Europese Unie (de Duitse Republiek incluis) sinds WWII.  
De stellingen zijn alle gebaseerd op dezelfde bevinding. De meest succesvolle 
institutionele ordeningen in de Nederlandse en Engelse geschiedenis – de Nederlandse en 
Engelse ―succes modellen‖ – zijn gegrondvest in republikeinse democratiseringstradities 
en pacten: 
1. Duurzaam succes voor natiestaten vereist het vermogen om republikeinse pacten 
en concurrerende democratiseringstradities te vernieuwen  
2.  De vermeende historische relatie tussen een democratisch pact en een nationaal 
Gouden Tijdperk verschaft leiders een simpel succes model 
3. Eigen democratiseringstradities dienen heruitgevonden te worden 
overeenkomstig de tradities van het (de) geopolitiek leidende land(en) 
4. Interpretaties van leidende geopolitieke tradities en pacten moeten voldoende 
verschillend zijn van de eigen tradities om historische verwarring te vermijden 
5a.  Heruitvinding van tradities en pacten is effectiever indien het uitgaat van een  
       gefaalde relatie tussen staat en natie 
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5b.  Opkomende buitenlandse tradities effectief opvangen en beantwoorden vereist het 
 opzetten van supra-nationale pacten en instituties  
6.    Een geslaagde heruitvinding behoeft bewustzijn van de centrale rol van “happy  
       accidents” in een historisch succes model 
7.  Opkomende leiders moeten tot op zekere hoogte tegen de stroom in roeien in   
            tijden van hoge moderniteit en expressieve gewoonten geassocieerd met oude     
            pacten heruitvinden  
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APPLIED TO RETAIL BANKS IN ENGLAND AND THE NETHERLANDS (1830-2007)
What is the relation between participation in democratisation dynamics and firms’
success? The ability to take a leading role in democratic settlements largely shapes a firm’s
long term success. A key requirement to occupying such a leading role is the creation of a
platform for the execution of rivalling democratisation dynamics by customers, stake -
holders, and political actors. After careful analysis of the strategies followed by commer cial
and mutual banks in the Netherlands and England from the 19th century to 2007, I
conclude that, in general, firms’ success depends on six strategic abilities – conducive to a
settlement between rivalling dynamics of democratisation. A second goal of the manus cript
is to bring the geopolitical and historical back into the theory of the firm. Geopoliti cally,
firms’ ability to take a leading role is enabled and constrained by their affiliation with (a)
particular nation-state(s); in particular the geopolitical perception of a nation-state’s
capacity to express the ideal of popular sovereignty and the right to self-determination.
Historically, the main driver of the emergence of a Western system of democratisation was
the organisation of incipient nation-states around republican principles: the impossi bility
for any actor or interest to dominate others, the possibility of rivalry and dissent, and
timely action against corruption. These republican principles revolutionised geopolitical
competition and are still key to Western nations’ prosperity. Strategic abilities thus have
to be considered within a larger geopolitical and historical context: that of firms operating
in nation-states, and nation-state leaders steering democratisation dynamics according to
principles most likely to provide them with both historical continuity and a geopolitical
advantage. Drawing on an historical analysis of the strategies followed by the Netherlands
(the Dutch Republic) and England since early republican times, the US and the EU since
WWII, I clarify how nation-state leaders should go about in securing an advantageous
geopolitical vantage point; and in maximising the possibilities of self-determination and
success for affiliated firms. 
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